Amicus Curiae Brief — D. A., a Minor, By and Through his Mother, B. A., et al., Petitioners v. Tri County Area Schools, et al.
Supreme Court briefApr 30, 2026
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No. 25-1143
───────────────────────────
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
──────────────────────────
D.A., A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HIS MOTHER, B.A., ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
TRI COUNTY AREA SCHOOLS, ET AL.,
Respondents.
──────────────────────────
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
──────────────────────────
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF
THE BUCKEYE INSTITUTE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
──────────────────────────
David C. Tryon
Counsel of Record
Alex M. Certo
J. Simon Peter Mizner
THE BUCKEYE INSTITUTE
88 East Broad Street, Suite 1300
Columbus, OH 43215
(614) 224-4422
D.Tryon@BuckeyeInstitute.org
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Fraser permits schools to censor
nondisruptive political speech that is not plainly
profane or lewd.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED ............................................ i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................ iii
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................. 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT............................. 1
ARGUMENT ................................................................. 4
I. This is an ideal vehicle to provide guidance to
school officials, parents, and students on how
Fraser and Tinker handle nondisruptive
speech that is not plainly profane or lewd ......... 4
II. Students cannot be punished for using profane
language when their language is not profane .... 6
III. Lewd
substitutes
for
profanity
are
unacceptable under Fraser, but non-lewd
substitutes for profanity are protected by the
First Amendment ............................................... 12
IV. The First Amendment protects Petitioners’
political statements ............................................ 14
V. Petitioners’ conduct does not violate the
Tinker standard because it did not create a
disruption ............................................................ 18
CONCLUSION ............................................................ 20
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68 (1979).................................................... 13
B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist.,
725 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2013) ............................ 3, 5, 11
Barr v. Lafon,
538 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2008) ................................... 11
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675 (1986) .....................5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 19
Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138 (1983) ................................................... 4
Defending Educ. v. Olentangy Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 158 F.4th 732 (6th Cir. 2025) ....................... 4
Defoe ex rel. Defoe v. Spiva,
625 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2010) ................................... 19
Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau,
461 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2006) .................................... 11
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988) ................................................. 10
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B. L. by and through
Levy, 594 U.S. 180 (2021).......................... 3, 4, 10, 17
Morse v. Frederick,
551 U.S. 393 (2007) ................................................. 10
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist.,
240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001) .................................... 18
iv
Sheets v. Lipker,
No. 2:25-CV-493-KCD-DNF, 2026 WL 265715
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2026)............................................. 1
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969) ............................. 5, 6, 10, 18, 19
Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 1464 ...................................................... 7, 18
Other Authorities
Colleen Long, How ‘Let’s Go Brandon’ became code
for insulting Joe Biden, Associated Press (Oct. 30,
2021), https://tinyurl.com/3kp7wuer ...................... 16
Declan McCullagh, FCC Reversal: Eminem Not
Obscene, Wired (Jan. 12, 2002),
https://tinyurl.com/mthhhxmv ................................. 7
Eminem, Without Me, on The Eminem Show (CD,
Aftermath Ent. May 26, 2002) ................................. 7
F***, Cambridge Dictionary,
https://tinyurl.com/yk5h3bfu (last visited Apr. 2,
2026) ......................................................................... 13
Let’s go Brandon: NASCAR driver Brandon Brown
caught in unwinnable culture war, ESPN (Feb 19,
2022), https://tinyurl.com/aeuspb4a................... 2, 13
Marc A. Thiessen, Three cheers for ‘Let’s Go
Brandon’, Wash. Post (Nov. 23, 2021),
https://tinyurl.com/three-cheers-lets-go-brandon ... 3
Mark J. Perry, English Has the Richest
Vocabulary, AEI (Oct. 18, 2006),
https://tinyurl.com/23ahkkrw ................................... 2
v
Matthew S. Schwartz, Man who said ‘Let’s go,
Brandon’ to Biden on Christmas Eve says he was
only joking, NPR (Dec. 26, 2021),
https://tinyurl.com/3zeywwuz ................................. 16
N.W.A., Express Yourself, on Straight Outta Compton
(CD, Ruthless Records 1988) .................................. 15
Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, Federal
Communications Commission (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://tinyurl.com/FCC-Broadcast-Guide .............. 7
Profanity, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) .. 11
Public Radio Exchange, A guide to broadcast
obscenities and issuing content advisories,
PRX, https://tinyurl.com/e2mjkw7x (last visited
Apr. 2, 2026) ............................................................... 7
1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
The Buckeye Institute was founded in 1989 as an
independent research and educational institution—a
think tank—to formulate and promote free-market
policy in the states. The Buckeye Institute
accomplishes its mission by performing timely and
reliable research on key issues, compiling and
synthesizing data, formulating free-market policies,
and
marketing
those
policy
solutions
for
implementation in Ohio and replication across the
country. The Buckeye Institute also files lawsuits and
submits amicus briefs to fulfill its mission. The
Buckeye Institute is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, taxexempt organization, as defined by I.R.C. section
501(c)(3).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case is about words. Respondents would have
the courts believe that it is about a “four-letter
expletive that has vexed legal authorities and amused
teenagers for generations.” Sheets v. Lipker, No. 2:25CV-493-KCD-DNF, 2026 WL 265715, at *1 (M.D. Fla.
Feb. 2, 2026). In reality, it is about a non-profane
phrase that infiltrated mainstream pop culture.
1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, no counsel for any party
authored this brief in whole or in part and no entity or person,
aside from amicus curiae made any monetary contribution toward
the preparation or submission of this brief. Counsel timely
provided the notice required by Rule 37.2.
2
The English language has a rich vocabulary, which
continues to expand. Mark J. Perry, English Has the
Richest
Vocabulary,
AEI
(Oct.
18,
2006),
https://tinyurl.com/23ahkkrw. The words speakers
choose convey emotion, tone, setting, and other details
that characterize the communication and the message
conveyed. Speakers can express similar concepts with
different words taking into consideration the
particular audience.
Some people express concepts with impolite—or
even profane—words or phrases, while others express
those same ideas through (more) polite words or
phrases to avoid giving offense. Hence, while sailors
and nuns may be equally regimented, their
vocabulary . . . differs. In this case, the district court
judged the words on a shirt as though the speakers
said something besides what was actually “said.”
Like many phrases or political slogans, “Let’s go
Brandon” has taken on a life of its own. The phrase
originated when a sports broadcaster at a NASCAR
race incorrectly reported on live television that the
crowd chanting “F*** Joe Biden” was instead chanting
“Let’s go Brandon.” Let’s go Brandon: NASCAR driver
Brandon Brown caught in unwinnable culture war,
ESPN (Feb 19, 2022), https://tinyurl.com/aeuspb4a.
Since then, “Let’s go Brandon” has come to be
universally understood as representing dissatisfaction
with former President Biden and his administration’s
policies. Marc Thiessen, a former chief speechwriter
for President George W. Bush, has noted that the
chant is tame compared to what has been said about
other presidents. Marc A. Thiessen, Three cheers for
‘Let’s Go Brandon’, Wash. Post (Nov. 23, 2021),
3
https://tinyurl.com/three-cheers-lets-go-brandon
(referencing phrases such as “Bush lied and people
died,” “Jail the Chief,” “a drunken trowser-maker,”
“pimp of the White House,” and “a hideous
hermaphroditical character which has neither the
force and firmness of a man, not the gentleness and
sensibility of a woman”). But here, “[t]he only ones
hurt by the chant are kids named Brandon whose
parents can no longer cheer for them at sporting
events. Otherwise, it [was] a perfectly harmless and
humorous way for Americans to express their
frustration at a flailing – and failing – presidency.” Id.
This case revolves around the intersection of the
political phrase “Let’s go Brandon” and students’
speech rights in school. This Court has held that
schools can regulate student speech that is indecent,
lewd, or vulgar when said at a school assembly,
promotes illegal drug use, or may appear to be the
speech of the school itself. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v.
B. L. by and through Levy, 594 U.S. 180, 187–88
(2021). Schools may also discipline students who use
“profane” language. See B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton
Area School District, 725 F.3d 293, 304 (3d Cir. 2013).
But these are exceptions to the rule, and—even taking
these exceptions to their maximum logical
boundaries—“Let’s go Brandon” does not fall into any
recognized prohibition. Nothing in the phrase itself is
facially indecent, lewd, or vulgar. There is no reference
to drug use. And no one would read a student’s shirt
and assume he speaks for the school. Punishing
speech for any reason that does not fall within one of
the Court’s approved exceptions is unacceptable.
4
ARGUMENT
I.
This is an ideal vehicle to provide guidance
to school officials, parents, and students on
how
Fraser
and
Tinker
handle
nondisruptive speech that is not plainly
profane or lewd.
Speech on matters of public concern “ ‘occupies the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values’ and so receives ‘special protection’ from the
courts.” Defending Educ. v. Olentangy Loc. Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 158 F.4th 732, 752 (6th Cir. 2025)
(quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).
This case sits atop that highest rung. Its result
impacts students’ First Amendment rights and
determines when and where school administrators
can set the limit on those rights.
This case is critically important to the millions of
students throughout the country who are exploring
the boundaries of permissible in-school political
speech. The First Amendment’s importance for
students cannot be overstated. Unfortunately,
teachers, administrators, and school boards—not
unreasonably—tend to prefer control over freedom out
of “fear of a disturbance” in the classroom. See, e.g.,
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). But that does not excuse
illegal censorship. This is America, where “public
schools are the nurseries of democracy. Our
representative democracy only works if we protect the
marketplace of ideas.” Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 594
U.S. at 190.
5
The decision below creates a circuit split on this
important issue with, at least, the First, Second,
Third, and Tenth Circuits. See, e.g., Pet. App. at 31a–
32a, 43a–44a, 51a–52a, 56a (Bush, J., dissenting). The
panel majority’s reasoning is largely based on Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). But
this case is more like Tinker. After all, “[f]or a young
person, wearing apparel with a political message can
be the first point of entry to civic engagement.” Pet.
App. at 29a (Bush, J., dissenting). As Judge Bush’s
dissent points out, the Third Circuit took a different
approach that “reinforces why Fraser must be read
narrowly, and why Tinker governs here.” Pet. App. at
56a (Bush, J., dissenting) (citing B.H. ex rel. Hawk,
725 F.3d 293 (en banc)).
Consistent with this Court’s precedent, under the
Third Circuit’s approach,
(1) schools may categorically restrict
plainly lewd speech, regardless of
message; (2) they
may
restrict
ambiguously lewd speech unless it
plausibly comments on political or social
issues; but (3) schools may not
categorically restrict speech that is not
plainly lewd and that could be seen as
political or social commentary.
Pet. App. at 57a (Bush, J., dissenting) (citing B.H. ex
rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 301). Unlike the approach taken
by the Sixth Circuit below, the Third Circuit draws a
clearer line between what the First Amendment
protects and what it does not.
6
Schools are supposed to teach students how to be
responsible, civically engaged citizens. Stifling
speech—especially political speech—curbs human
growth and flourishing. And doing so on the grounds
of any particular administrator’s subjective and wrong
interpretation is all the worse. Under the panel’s
opinion, any principal, teacher, or other administrator
would have near carte blanche authority to sanction
speech they do not like and “reasonably interpret” to
violate school rules. But “[i]n our system, stateoperated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. Like a class
clown who cannot read the room, the panel’s grant of
authority takes this Court’s precedent a bridge too far.
Thus, the Court should grant the petition to clarify
that where actual profanity is absent, the disruption
test laid out in Tinker is the standard.
II. Students cannot be punished for using
profane language when their language is not
profane.
Regulating speech under the First Amendment
should constitute a rare exception. Still, certain words
or phrases are so profane, lewd, or vulgar that the
government does not allow them in school, or in radio
or TV broadcasts for that matter. But schools cannot
prohibit non-profane words conveying the same
message. Polite society avoids, and schools can
prohibit, certain words, but generally not the message
behind those words.
7
The government has long recognized that certain
words are unacceptable for certain audiences. The
federal government has prohibited broadcasting
“obscene, indecent, or profane language.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464. The FCC explains that “[i]ndecent content
portrays sexual or excretory organs or activities in a
way that is patently offensive but does not meet the
three-prong test for obscenity.” Obscene, Indecent and
Profane Broadcasts, Federal Communications
Commission (Jan. 13, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/FCCBroadcast-Guide. “Profane content includes ‘grossly
offensive’ language that is considered a public
nuisance.” Id. But while the FCC may not let Eminem
be, and may have tried to shut him down on MTV,
Eminem, Without Me, on The Eminem Show (CD,
Aftermath Ent. May 26, 2002), it nevertheless
interprets these restrictions narrowly, cf. Declan
McCullagh, FCC Reversal: Eminem Not Obscene,
Wired (Jan. 12, 2002), https://tinyurl.com/mthhhxmv.
Indeed, although it does not publish a list of prohibited
words, the Public Radio Exchange has noted specific
words that “must always be bleeped/dropped”—and
there are not many. Public Radio Exchange, A guide to
broadcast obscenities and issuing content advisories,
PRX, https://tinyurl.com/e2mjkw7x (last visited Apr.
2, 2026). By contrast, substitute words for the
“bleeped” words are acceptable. Id.
8
In the education context, consider the following
scenarios:
1. Principal Rooney comes upon a group of
freshmen and hears:
Ferris: “That was a great movie!”
Cameron: Bulls***! It was awful. I hated
it.
Garth: No f***ing way! It was lousy.
Sloane: Shut the front door!
Jeanie: Bullcrap, Ferris, are you out of
your mind?
Now who should get in trouble? Four of the students
expressed the same sentiment disagreeing with
Ferris. But schools can—and should—distinguish
between the boys’ profanity and the girls’ nonprofanity, punishing the former incidents and not the
latter.
2. Mr. Gillen comes into his classroom and hears
the kids complaining about the lack of heat in the
room:
Alice: Shucks, it’s cold in here!
Lisa: Shoot, I know, I’m absolutely
freezing.
John: S***, I am so cold I can’t stand it.
Are all these statements legally “equivalent”? See Pet.
App. at 93a. The principal in this case and the district
court judge might say so. But, in fact, they are not.
9
3. Bob is angry about his grade on a math test that
he just received back. He can express his anger and
displeasure in several ways. Which of the following
expressions is/are unacceptable?
a. Shoot!
b. Shucks!
c. Crap!
d. S***!
e. F***!
f. Frick!
Answer: It depends. If he attends Tri County Area
Schools, all of the above—because the words express
the same sentiment, and the principal in Tri County
cannot distinguish between the actual words. If
Michael attends a more sensible school district, the
answer is only d and e.
4. Student A and Student B get into an argument.
Student A is overheard saying “F*** you!” Student
B retorts: “That is not nice. No freakin’ way am I
going to put up with your profanity. I wish
misfortune and suffering on you and your heirs for
generations to come!”
Did Student B say anything warranting discipline
versus Student A’s exclamation?
Analyzing this case requires not only familiarity
with the law but also common sense—and a sense of
humor. The school district in this case seems to lack a
bit of both.
10
Of course, student speech cases can be challenging
because the situations often deal with sensitive topics.
Some involve socially uncomfortable issues like sex,
see Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685, others—including this
case—involve politics, see Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. But
“[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker,
393 U.S. at 506. And the political speech in this case
is free of profanity.
Recently, the Court explicitly set out the
“categories of student speech that schools may
regulate in certain circumstances.” Mahanoy Area
Sch. Dist., 594 U.S. at 187. Those categories are:
(1) “indecent,” “lewd,” or “vulgar” speech
uttered during a school assembly on
school grounds; (2) speech, uttered
during a class trip, that promotes “illegal
drug use,”; and (3) speech that others
may reasonably perceive as “bear[ing]
the imprimatur of the school,” such as
that appearing in a school-sponsored
newspaper. Finally, in Tinker, we said
schools have a special interest in
regulating speech that “materially
disrupts
classwork
or
involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others.”
Id. at 187–88 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685; Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988); and
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513). Further, Fraser upheld a
school’s discipline of a student for violating the school’s
11
policy prohibiting “[c]onduct which materially and
substantially interferes with the educational
process . . . , including the use of obscene, profane
language or gestures.” Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678
(emphasis added). Several circuit courts have followed
Fraser, explaining that “[u]nder Fraser, a school may
categorically prohibit lewd, vulgar or profane2
language.” B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 304; Guiles
ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 326 (2d Cir.
2006) (same); cf. Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 563–64
(6th Cir. 2008) (“[U]nder Fraser, a school may
categorically prohibit vulgar, lewd, indecent, or
plainly offensive student speech.”).
Neither the school nor the district court have
explained how Petitioners, by wearing sweatshirts
saying “Let’s go Brandon,” fall into any of the Court’s
categories. There is no sexual over or under-tone, no
reference to drugs, and no appearance that Petitioners
were speaking for the school—leaving available only
the Court’s profanity exception—which does not apply
either. Rather, the opinions below mischaracterize the
profanity exception and allow the school to ban
language that has a “profane meaning.” See, e.g., Pet.
App. at 53a (Bush, J., dissenting). The district court
reasoned that Respondents’ “reasonably interpreted
Let’s Go Brandon as having a profane meaning. In a
middle school, the phrase enjoys no more First
Amendment protection [than] Matt Fraser’s
nominating speech—none at all.” Pet. App. at 87a
(emphasis added). But that expansion of “profanity”
would include virtually all “clean” substitutes for
Profanity includes “obscene, vulgar, or insulting language.”
Profanity, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
2
12
profanity. Under the district court’s theory, the school
could ban all substitutes for notorious curse words like
the F-bomb, H***, S***, D***, B****, A**, etc.
Further, under this theory, a school could ban nearly
every exclamatory word or phrase—which is well
beyond the limited First Amendment exception
permitted by precedent.
III. Lewd
substitutes for
profanity
are
unacceptable under Fraser, but non-lewd
substitutes for profanity are protected by
the First Amendment.
Schools may restrict speech only if it falls within
the Court’s directives. In the case of the F-word, the
word itself is profane and therefore always
inappropriate. The school should also be able to
regulate plainly lewd language, whether that
language is a substitute for the F-bomb or a student’s
attempt to pull one over on school administrators. For
example, in Fraser, Matt Fraser delivered a speech
filled with sexual innuendos to a high school assembly.
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678. The Court agreed that
punishing Fraser was permissible because his conduct
“undermine[d] the school’s basic educational mission.
A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a
sexually explicit monologue directed towards an
unsuspecting audience of teenage students.” Id. at
685. The overall speech was “offensively lewd and
indecent.” Id. That is not the case here. Rather,
Petitioners’ use of euphemism was to convey a political
opinion. Although it is highly unlikely that public
schools’ educational missions would include
“unprovoked sexually explicit monologues such as Mr.
Fraser’s,” see id. at 686, their educational missions
13
certainly should include the “inculcat[ion of]
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of
a democratic political system,” see, e.g., id. at 681
(quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–77
(1979)).
As previously mentioned, “Let’s go Brandon” was
derived from a “F*** Joe Biden” chant. ESPN, supra.
The F-word has two distinct dictionary definitions.
The first: “a rude word meaning to have sex with
someone,” and the second: “a rude word used when
expressing extreme anger, or to add force to what is
being
said.”
F***,
Cambridge
Dictionary,
https://tinyurl.com/yk5h3bfu (last visited Apr. 2,
2026). Surely when Petitioners wore sweatshirts to
school that said “Let’s go Brandon,” they were
expressing the latter. Cf. Pet. App. at 48a (Bush, J.,
dissenting) (“The crowd did not chant the word at
Talladega to advocate having sex with the former
President.”). The F-word is considered taboo and
socially inappropriate, no matter the underlying
meaning. To illustrate, consider alternative phrases
for “F*** Joe Biden.” If a student wore a shirt that
said, “I want to have sex with Joe Biden,” that would
be lewd (not to mention bizarre), and the school could
ban that speech accordingly. Conversely, a shirt that
read “I hate Joe Biden,” could not be banned under
Fraser because it is neither lewd nor vulgar; it is
political. Petitioners’ shirts were indisputably political
in nature, not sexual.
14
IV. The First Amendment protects Petitioners’
political statements.
Petitioners’ speech did not include any words that
were vulgar, and their speech was not innuendo for a
lewd or indecent message. Instead, the speech
expressed a political message—displeasure with the
Biden Administration.
In the context of a then-upcoming presidential
election and with many politicians and pundits
repeating the phrase, “Let’s go Brandon” was, and is,
understood as a political statement. Petitioners could
have worn shirts that said “F*** Joe Biden” to express
their displeasure with the President, but they chose
instead to convey a similar message using language
that is a clean, school-friendly alternative. Saying
“Let’s go Brandon” is not the same as “F*** Joe Biden.”
Hence, we do not even write out the f*** word but
freely type “let’s go.”
It is common practice for people in polite society,
and professional, academic, and social settings, to
refer to the word “N*****” as “the N-word.” Virtually
everyone knows what the “N” stands for. Speaking the
N-word in full is universally considered profane—and
highly inflammatory. Anyone using that word is likely
to be socially ostracized. When people hear someone
substitute “the N-Word,” in place of saying the actual
N-word, no listener wonders whether the speaker
meant nincompoop, numbskull, or Narnia.
So what does the speaker mean by saying the
phrase “the N-word”? For one, the speaker conveys
that he or she is uncomfortable using the actual word.
Second, saying “the N-word” can signal the weight of
15
the actual word without also carrying the profanity.
Indeed, the use of euphemisms such as “the N-word”
in classrooms and polite society furthers pedagogical
interests while avoiding offense. If teachers and
students cannot use euphemisms rather than actual
profanity, schools will be hard-pressed to effectively
discuss divisive topics such as race relations. In many
instances, using a euphemism in place of the actual
word invokes the seriousness of a particular lesson.
Stripping the message of any reference to the actual
word would leave the lesson incomplete. For example,
when students in English class discuss the classic
book Huckleberry Finn—which uses the actual Nword as part of a larger condemnation of racism—we
expect students to use the phrase “the N-word” rather
than the actual word. The word is problematic, but the
substitute is not. And without any reference to the
original word students blunder past Huck Finn’s
lesson.
Or consider an example from this century—a
student wearing a shirt that portrays a promotional
poster for the movie Straight Outta Compton, the title
of an album and biographical film about the music
group “N.W.A.” The shirt does not include the full
name of the music group. The “N” in N.W.A. stands for
the N-word, which is profane. Because the shirt does
not include the full written-out N-word, the First
Amendment would not permit banning that shirt.
However, the district court’s reasoning would allow
the school to punish a student for “‘expressin’ with full
capabilities,” N.W.A., Express Yourself, on Straight
Outta Compton (CD, Ruthless Records 1988). Even
though there is nothing vulgar or otherwise disruptive
about the shirt, under the lower court’s logic, if “school
16
officials reasonably interpreted the [picture] as having
a profane meaning,” the school could require the
student to change. Pet. App. at 87a. Such a standard
is unworkable and unconstitutional. Students should
not be punished as though they have used profane
language when they have not, in fact, used profane
language.
Many lawmakers have posted the phrase “Let’s go
Brandon” on social media or recited it verbally,3
including on the House floor. Colleen Long, How ‘Let’s
Go Brandon’ became code for insulting Joe Biden,
Associated
Press
(Oct.
30,
2021),
https://tinyurl.com/3kp7wuer.
Petitioners
and
politicians alike have used the phrase to express
anger, dissatisfaction, or even humor—never a sexual
act. This phrase became so popular precisely because
it expresses the speaker’s political views in a
humorous, socially palatable, and non-profane
manner. It conveys a shorthand message of political
dissatisfaction and also serves as a much more
effective, light-hearted critique of the Biden
Administration. Plus, it’s catchy. In other words, “let’s
go” is not in danger of becoming the new “F-word.”
3 Oddly, even President Biden repeated the phrase to a young child
during a Christmas Eve phone call. Matthew S. Schwartz, Man
who said ‘Let’s go, Brandon’ to Biden on Christmas Eve says he was
only joking, NPR (Dec. 26, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/3zeywwuz.
17
Petitioners expressed their political message in a
manner appropriate for a school setting. Indeed,
there is a category of speech that is
almost always beyond the regulatory
authority of a public school. This is
student speech that is not expressly and
specifically directed at the school, school
administrators, teachers, or fellow
students and that addresses matters of
public concern, including sensitive
subjects like politics, religion, and social
relations. Speech on such matters lies at
the heart of the First Amendment’s
protection.
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 594 U.S. at 205.
Every day, people choose to express themselves
using clean(er) language in certain contexts instead of
resorting to full swear words. In an ideal world,
Lincoln-Douglas debates would occupy politics more
than memes and gifs, but the First Amendment
requires no such thing. Petitioners’ shirt choice,
fashionable or not, conveyed a political message
without using profanity and fits squarely within the
Supreme Court’s “category of speech that is almost
always beyond the regulatory authority of a public
school.” Id. These students expressed their opinions
through G-rated language rather than wearing the Fword on their chests. The law should not punish kids
who are complying with societal norms while
expressing their political viewpoints in a non-profane
and humorous manner. The students’ comparatively
civil speech should be encouraged because, otherwise,
18
students learn that polite society does not value selfcensorship to avoid profane language.
The reporter’s original gaffe or misdirection
resulted in a cultural phenomenon—not a new
profanity. Most telling is that the reporter’s use of the
statement, “Let’s go Brandon” did not violate FCC
decency regulations because it is not “obscene,
indecent, or profane language,” 18 U.S.C. § 1464,
while the word the crowd was actually chanting would
have elicited a bleep in order to comply with FCC
rules. Schools should have at least as much common
sense and respect for the First Amendment as the
FCC—it’s not a high bar. Whether it is “Let’s go
Brandon,” “Orange man bad,” “Lock him/her up,” “He
is a fascist,” or “Trump too small,” the First
Amendment protects expressing various insulting
political phrases.
V.
Petitioners’ conduct does not violate the
Tinker standard because it did not create a
disruption.
Speech falling outside of the Court’s limited
categories of lewd, vulgar, or profane language “is
subject to Tinker’s general rule: it may be regulated
only if it would substantially disrupt school operations
or interfere with the right of others.” Saxe v. State Coll.
Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001). The
students in Tinker were punished for wearing black
armbands to protest the Vietnam War. Tinker, 393
U.S. at 514. But that punishment was
unconstitutional and violated the students’ First
Amendment rights. Id. Although the lower courts
liken this case to Fraser, Tinker is a more accurate
comparison. Like the armbands in Tinker, Petitioners’
19
“Let’s go Brandon” apparel expressed a political
opinion and “neither interrupted school activities nor
sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of
others.” Id. “In [these] circumstances, our
Constitution does not permit officials of the State to
deny their form of expression.” Id.
Even the Fraser Court acknowledged the “marked
distinction between the political ‘message’ of the
armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of
[Fraser’s] speech.” Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680. Central to
Tinker is whether the student conduct disrupts school
activities. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. Here, the school
offers no evidence that Petitioners’ conduct disrupted
any school activities or learning. Even the district
court avers that
the general rule is that school
administrators can limit speech in a
reasonable fashion to further important
policies at the heart of public education.
Tinker provides the exception—schools
cannot go so far as to limit nondisruptive
discussion of political or social issues that
the administration finds distasteful or
wrong. Drawing such a line may be
difficult, but it must be left as a practical
matter first to school administrators,
with resort to the courts always available
for cases like Tinker where the school
goes too far.
Pet. App. at 81a (emphasis added) (quoting Defoe ex
rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 342 (6th Cir. 2010)).
20
Here, the school went too far. The school has no
“important policy” that it is advancing by punishing
Petitioners—it is simply suppressing speech. The
“disruptive conduct” that is vital to the Tinker
analysis is missing here, and without it, the school has
no justification for punishing Petitioners’ non-profane
speech.
CONCLUSION
Amicus—calling upon the richness of the English
language—respectfully asks, “What in tarnation was
the lower court thinking?”—a non-profane way of
saying, “Amicus respectfully requests that this Court
grant the petition and reverse the lower court’s
decision.”
Respectfully submitted,
David C. Tryon
Counsel of Record
Alex M. Certo
J. Simon Peter Mizner
THE BUCKEYE INSTITUTE
88 East Broad Street, Suite 1300
Columbus, OH 43215
(614) 224-4422
D.Tryon@BuckeyeInstitute.org
April 30, 2026
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.