Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jain-Miecell Roberson, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

MAR - 3 2026

no. 9S^|U3

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

3n tlje

Supreme Court of tlje Wnitefc States

JAIN-MIECELL ROBERSON,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Jain-Miecell Roberson

Petitioner Pro Se

5511 Bearcreek Dr.

Mechanicsburg, PA 17050

609 234 8347

jainmiecell.roberson@yahoo.com

March 3, 2026

SUPREME COURT PRESS

(888) 958-5705

Boston, Massachusetts

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5

U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., provides a comprehensive

framework for reviewing adverse personnel actions

against federal employees, channeling most claims to

the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) with

judicial review exclusively in the Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit. In Perry v. Merit Systems Protection

Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017), this Court held that

“mixed cases”—those combining CSRA-covered per­

sonnel actions with discrimination claims under fed­

eral anti-discrimination laws—must be reviewed in

district court under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2). However,

this Court has not addressed whether claims alleging

constitutional violations (e.g., due process deprivations)

or state-law torts intertwined with CSRA-covered

actions constitute “mixed cases” warranting district

court jurisdiction, or whether such claims are preempted

by the CSRA and funneled exclusively to the MSPB

and Federal Circuit.

The Questions Presented Are:

1. Whether a federal employee’s claims alleging

constitutional due process violations and state-law torts

(e.g., negligence and emotional distress under Penn­

sylvania law) arising from a CSRA-covered personnel

action (e.g., detail, transfer, or reassignment) constitute

a “mixed case” eligible for district court review under

Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Board, or whether

such claims are precluded from district court jurisdic­

tion by the CSRA’s exclusive remedial scheme.

2. Whether the CSRA precludes district court

jurisdiction over constitutional claims challenging the

validity of a federal statute or regulation governing

11

personnel actions, notwithstanding this Court’s recog­

nition in Elgin v. Department of the Treasury, 567

U.S. 1 (2012), that the CSRA does not bar all con­

stitutional challenges, particularly where the MSPB

lacks authority to adjudicate such claims.

iii

LIST OF PROCEEDINGS

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

No. 25-2203

Jain-Miecell Roberson v. United States of America

Final Opinion: December 2, 2025

Rehearing Denial: February 4, 2026

U.S. District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania

Civil Action No. l:24-cv-2036

Jain-Miecell Roberson v. United States of America

Final Order: June 16, 2025

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED............................................. i

LIST OF PROCEEDINGS............................................. iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.......................................... vi

OPINIONS BELOW..........................................................1

JURISDICTION................................................................. 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED...................................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE........................................ 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION......... 6

I.

The Decision Below Conflicts with This

Court’s Precedents on CSRA Preemption and

“Mixed Case” Jurisdiction.................................... 6

II. There Is a Circuit Split on Whether

Constitutional and State-Law Claims

Intertwined with CSRA Actions Warrant

District Court Review............................................9

III. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally

Important, Affecting Thousands of Federal

Employees and the Integrity of Due Process

Protections............................................................ 10

CONCLUSION......................................

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)

Page

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinions and Orders

Per Curiam Opinion, U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit (February 12, 2026).. la

Judgment, U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit (December 2, 2025)....................... 9a

Memorandum Opinion, U.S. District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(June 16, 2025)............................................ Ila

Order, U.S. District Court for the Middle

District of Pennsylvania (June 16, 2025).. 29a

Rehearing Order

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc,

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

(February 4, 2026)....................................... 30a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Baca v. Department of the Army,

983 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2020)

9, 10

Department of the Navy v. Egan,

484 U.S. 518 (1988)

7, 10

Elgin v. Department of the Treasury,

567 U.S. 1 (2012)

ii, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10

English v. MSPB, et. al.,

No. 23-9526 (10th Cir. 2023)

9

FDIC v. Meyer,

510 U.S. 471 (1994)

5, 8

Kloeckner v. Solis,

568 U.S. 41 (2012)

5, 6, 7

Manivannan v. Department of Energy,

No. 18-297 (W.D. Pa. 2020)

9, 10

Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Board,

582 U.S. 420 (2017)

i, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9

United States v. Fausto,

484 U.S. 439 (1988)

5

Weaver v. United States Information Agency,

87 F.3d 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

9

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const, amend. 1

9

U.S. Const, amend. V

1, 4

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Cont.)

Page

STATUTES

5 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.,

(Civil Service Reform Act of 1978)........ i, 4-9

5 U.S.C. § 7512......................................................... 1, 4, 7

5 U.S.C. § 7513(d)..............................................................2

5 U.S.C. § 7701(a)..............................................................2

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)......................................................... 2

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2)..................................................... i, 3

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)............................................................1

28 U.S.C. § 1331................................................................. 4

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)

Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).................. 4

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)

Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).............. 3, 4

28 U.S.C. § 2674

Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).................. 4

77 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 41................................................. 4, 8

77 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 51..................................................4, 8

77 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1302............................................. 4, 8

JUDICIAL RULES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)......................................................4

1

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals for the third

circuit (App.la-8a) is unpublished. The opinion of the

district court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(App.lla-28a) is unpublished.

------ ®-----JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals for the Third

Circuit was entered on December 2, 2025. (App.la).

The Order Denying Petition for Rehearing entered on

February 4, 2026. (App.30a). This petition is filed within

90 days of that judgment. Jurisdiction is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

------ ®-----CONSTITUTIONAL AND

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. Const, amend. V

No person shall be * * * deprived of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law.

5 U.S.C. § 7512

5 U.S.C. § 7512 provides in pertinent part that

the CSRA covers actions including

(1) a removal

2

(2) a suspension for more than 14 days;

(3) a reduction in grade;

(4) a reduction in pay;

(5) a furlough of 30 days or less;

5 U.S.C. § 7513(d)

(d) An employee against whom an action is taken

under this section is entitled to appeal to the

Merit Systems Protection Board under section

7701 of this title.

5 U.S.C. § 7701(a)

5 U.S.C. § 7701(a) provides in pertinent part that

an employee may submit an appeal to the MSPB

from any action appealable under law, rule, or

regulation.

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)

(1) The Board may hear any case appealed to it

or may refer the case to an administrative law

judge appointed under section 3105 of this title or

other employee of the Board designated by the

Board to hear such cases, except that in any case

involving a removal from the service, the case

shall be heard by the Board, an employee expe­

rienced in hearing appeals, or an administrative

law judge. The Board, administrative law judge,

or other employee (as the case may be) shall make

a decision after receipt of the written repre­

sentations of the parties to the appeal and after

opportunity for a hearing under subsection (a)(1)

of this section. A copy of the decision shall be

furnished to each party to the appeal and to the

Office of Personnel Management.

3

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2)

Cases of discrimination subject to the provisions

of section 7702 of this title shall be filed under

section 717(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42

U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)), section 15(c) of the Age Dis­

crimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C.

633a(c)), and section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Stan­

dards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C. 216(b)),

as applicable. Notwithstanding any other provi­

sion of law, any such case filed under any such

section must be filed within 30 days after the date

the individual filing the case received notice of the

judicially reviewable action under such section

7702.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) provides in pertinent part

that district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction

over civil actions on claims against the United

States for money damages for injury or loss of

property or personal injury or death caused by

the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any

employee of the Government while acting within

the scope of his office or employment.

4

-------- ®-------STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Jain-Miecell Roberson is a former super­

visory comptroller at the Naval Supply Systems Com­

mand Business Systems Center (NAVSUP), a federal

agency under the Department of the Navy. (App.lla)

In May 2023, Roberson was detailed, transferred, or

reassigned from his position, an adverse personnel

action under the CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7512. (App.l2a)

Roberson alleges this action violated due process under

the Fifth Amendment, as he was not provided notice,

an opportunity to respond, or a neutral decision-maker

before the action. (Doc. 1 at 1-2, 5; Doc. 14 at 1, 6.) He

further claims negligence and emotional distress under

Pennsylvania law (77 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 41, 51, 1302)

and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1346(b), 2674, asserting 26 instances of negligent

conduct by agency officials. (Doc. 1 at 3-5; Doc. 1-1 at

3-26.) Roberson seeks $3,839,840,000 in damages,

including compensatory relief for due process viola­

tions and emotional harm. (Doc. 1 at 5.)

Roberson filed an administrative tort claim with

the Navy on March 4, 2024, which was denied on March

15, 2024, and denied again on reconsideration on

August 27, 2024. (Dr Roberson Final action on Admin

Claim J243367.pdf.) He did not pursue MSPB review,

instead filing suit in the U.S. District Court for the

Middle District of Pennsylvania on November 22,

2024, invoking jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,

1346(b)(1), and the CSRA. (Doc. 1.)

The United States moved to dismiss under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

5

arguing the CSRA provides the exclusive remedy for

federal personnel actions, preempting district court

review of constitutional and tort claims. (Doc. 5;

Doc. 12.) The District Court (Magistrate Judge Bloom,

by consent) granted the motion. (App.lla-28a; 250616Memorandum Opinion.pdf.) The court held that Rob­

erson’s claims arose from a CSRA-covered action (detail/

reassignment), and under United States v. Fausto,

484 U.S. 439 (1988), and Elgin v. Department of the

Treasury, 5Q7 U.S. 1 (2012), such claims must be

channeled through the MSPB and Federal Circuit,

even if constitutional. (App.l8a—20a.) The court rejected

Roberson’s “mixed case” argument, distinguishing

Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420

(2017), as limited to statutory discrimination claims.

It dismissed FTCA claims as preempted by the CSRA,

citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994). (App.l7a—

18a.) Judgment was entered June 16, 2025. (App.28a.)

Roberson appealed to the Third Circuit. (Notice

of Appeal, 250815-Response Brief Appeal.pdf.) He

argued the case was “mixed” due to constitutional and

state-law claims, warranting district court review

under Perry and Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41 (2012).

(Informal Brief; 250815-Response BriefAppeal.pdf at

5-10.)

The Third Circuit affirmed per curiam. (App.la-8a;

251202-Docket 14 Opinion for Sustaining Dismissal,

pdf.) The court held that the CSRA’s comprehensive

scheme precludes district court jurisdiction over con­

stitutional claims challenging personnel actions,

citing Elgin, 567 U.S. at 15. (App.l8a-20a.) It rejected

the “mixed case” characterization, noting Perry applies

only to discrimination claims under specific statutes,

not constitutional or state-law torts. The court dismis-

6

sed FTCA claims as barred by CSRA preemption.

(App.l7a—21a.) Judgment was entered December 2,

2025. (App.9a—10a.)

------ ®-----REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This case presents a recurring question of excep­

tional importance: whether federal employees alleging

constitutional due process violations or state-law torts

intertwined with CSRA-covered personnel actions

may seek district court review as a “mixed case,” or

whether the CSRA funnels all such claims exclusively

to the MSPB and Federal Circuit. The Third Circuit’s

decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents in Elgin,

Kloeckner, and Perry, which preserve district court

jurisdiction for certain “mixed” claims and do not bar

all constitutional challenges. It also deepens a circuit

split on CSRA preemption of constitutional and state­

law claims. Certiorari is warranted to resolve these

conflicts and protect federal employees’ access to mean­

ingful judicial review.

I.

The Decision Below Conflicts with This

Court’s Precedents on CSRA Preemption and

“Mixed Case” Jurisdiction.

The Third Circuit’s holding that the CSRA pre­

cludes district court jurisdiction over Roberson’s due

process and tort claims directly conflicts with this

Court’s guidance on the CSRA’s scope.

First, the decision misapplies Elgin v. Department

of the Treasury, 567 U.S. 1 (2012). In Elgin, this Court

held that the CSRA provides the exclusive avenue for

7

reviewing most personnel actions, even those raising

constitutional challenges, because Congress intended

a “comprehensive” scheme. Id. at 11-12. However, Elgin

expressly limited its holding to claims where the MSPB

has authority to review the action and grant relief. Id.

at 21 n.ll (noting the CSRA does not bar claims where

the MSPB lacks jurisdiction). Here, Roberson’s claims

involve a “detail, transfer, or reassignment” (App.21a22a), which may not qualify as a major adverse action

under 5 U.S.C. § 7512, potentially depriving the MSPB

of jurisdiction. See Department of the Navy v. Egan,

484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (MSPB lacks authority over

certain personnel decisions like security clearances).

The Third Circuit ignored this, assuming CSRA

exclusivity without addressing MSPB jurisdiction.

(App.4a—8a.) This conflicts with Elgin’s caveat that

constitutional claims may proceed in district court if

outside MSPB purview. 567 U.S. at 21.

Second, the Third Circuit’s narrow reading of

“mixed cases” conflicts with Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017), and Kloeckner

v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41 (2012). In Perry, this Court held

that “mixed cases”—involving CSRA actions combined

with discrimination claims under Title VII or similar

statutes—must be reviewed in district court, not the

Federal Circuit, to ensure de novo review of discrimi­

nation allegations. 582 U.S. at 423-24. Kloeckner simi­

larly emphasized that mixed cases go to district court

regardless of MSPB procedural dismissals. 568 U.S.

at 50. Roberson’s case is “mixed”: it combines a CSRA

action (reassignment) with constitutional due process

claims (lack of notice/hearing) and state-law torts (negligence/emotional distress). (Doc. 1 at 1-5.) These

are akin to discrimination claims in requiring fact-

8

intensive review beyond MSPB expertise. See Perry,

582 U.S. at 431 (district courts better suited for de

novo fact-finding). The Third Circuit dismissed this

analogy, limiting Perry to statutory discrimination,

but Perry turned on the need for holistic review of

intertwined claims, not statutory labels. 582 U.S. at 429.

Third, the dismissal of FTCA claims conflicts with

FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994). In Meyer, this Court

held that sovereign immunity does not bar constitu­

tional tort claims against agencies if not “cognizable”

under the FTCA, as constitutional claims are federal,

not state-law based. Id. at 477-78. Here, Roberson’s

FTCA claims invoke Pennsylvania tort law (77 Pa.

Stat. Ann. §§ 41, 51, 1302) for negligence in the re­

assignment process. (Doc. 1 at 3.) The Third Circuit

deemed them preempted (App.l3a), but Meyer allows

FTCA suits for torts not subsumed by other schemes,

especially where constitutional violations underpin

them. 510 U.S. at 478.

These conflicts warrant certiorari to clarify CSRA

boundaries.

9

II. There Is a Circuit Split on Whether Consti­

tutional and State-Law Claims Intertwined

with CSRA Actions Warrant District Court

Review.

The circuits are divided on CSRA preemption of

constitutional and state-law claims like Roberson’s.

The Third, D.C., and Tenth Circuits broadly apply

CSRA exclusivity. The Third Circuit here held consti­

tutional claims must go to the MSPB/Federal Circuit.

(App.6a-7a.) The D.C. Circuit in Weaver v. United

States Information Agency, 87 F.3d 1429 (D.C. Cir.

1996), precluded district court review of First Amend­

ment claims tied to personnel actions. The Tenth

Circuit in Baca v. Department of the Army, 983 F.3d

1131 (10th Cir. 2020), and English v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, et al., Nos. 23-9526 (10th Cir. 2023),

dismissed constitutional torts as CSRA-preempted.

In contrast, other circuits recognize exceptions

for “mixed” constitutional claims. The Western District

of Pennsylvania in Manivannan v. Department of

Energy, No. 18-297 (W.D. Pa. 2020), allowed district

court review of due process claims outside MSPB

authority, aligning with Elgin’s limits.

This split affects federal employees’ forum choices.

Certiorari is needed to resolve it, as in Perry (resolving

split on mixed-case appeals). 582 U.S. at 422.

10

III. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally

Important, Affecting Thousands of Federal

Employees and the Integrity of Due Process

Protections.

Over 2 million federal employees are subject to

the CSRA. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 528. Many face per­

sonnel actions implicating due process, yet the Third

Circuit’s rule denies district court review, funneling

claims to the MSPB (limited to administrative reme­

dies) and Federal Circuit (deferring to agencies). This

undermines due process, as the MSPB cannot declare

statutes unconstitutional. See Elgin, 567 U.S. at 10.

Roberson’s case exemplifies this: his reassignment

lacked process, causing harm, yet he lacks a de novo

forum. (Doc. 1 at 2-5.)

The issue recurs frequently, as seen in Baca and

Manivannan. Granting certiorari ensures uniform pro­

tection of constitutional rights.

11

------ ®—

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Jain-Miecell Roberson

Petitioner Pro Se

5511 Bearcreek Dr.

Mechanicsburg, PA 17050

609 234 8347

jainmiecell.roberson@yahoo.com

March 3, 2026