Amicus Curiae Brief — Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al., Petitioners v. Dahlia Doe, et al.

No. 25-1084

IN THE

Supreme Court

of the United States

_________

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

FRITZ EMMANUEL LESLY MIOT,

ET AL.,

Respondents.

_________

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

_________

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE HAITIAN WOMEN FOR

HAITIAN REFUGEES IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

_________

JO-ANN TAMILA SAGAR

Counsel of Record

DARRYL E. WILLIAMS, JR.

KATHERINE T. MCKAY

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 637-5600

jo-ann.sagar@hoganlovells.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

STATEMENT OF INTEREST .................................... 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

THE ARGUMENT ................................................. 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 5

I.

HAITI’S SELF-LIBERATION, FOUNDING, AND

EARLY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE

UNITED STATES .................................................. 5

II.

A.

Haiti’s Colonial History ............................ 5

B.

The Haitian War For Independence ........ 7

C.

Aftermath And Early United StatesHaitian Relations ..................................... 9

UNITED STATES–HAITI RELATIONS IN

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY ............................ 12

A.

The American Occupation

Of Haiti ................................................... 13

B.

The Duvalier Era And The Push To

Leave Haiti ............................................. 15

C.

Anti-Haitian Immigration Policy ........... 17

III. UNITED STATES–HAITI RELATIONS IN

THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ....................... 20

A.

Present Day Economic, Environmental, And Political Challenges

Facing Haiti ............................................ 20

B.

Modern United States Immigration

Policies Affecting Haitian Refugees ....... 23

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 28

(i)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES:

Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary,

789 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ....................... 18

Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale,

823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) ..................... 18

Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti,

503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980) .......................... 3

Louis v. Nelson,

544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982) .......................... 4

NAACP v. DHS,

364 F. Supp. 3d 568 (D. Md. 2019) ........................ 2

Saget v. Biden,

No. 19-1685, 2021 WL 12137584

(2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2021) .............................................. 2

Saget v. Trump,

345 F. Supp. 3d 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) .................. 26

Saget v. Trump,

375 F. Supp. 3d 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) .................. 26

STATUTES:

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1) ............................................... 25

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(A)-(C) .................................... 26

42 U.S.C. § 265 .......................................................... 24

TREATY:

Agreement Effected by Exchange of Notes,

33 U.S.T. 3559 (Sept. 23, 1981) ........................... 19

REGULATIONS:

75 Fed. Reg. 3476 (Jan. 21, 2010) ............................. 26

76 Fed. Reg. 29000 (May 19, 2011) ........................... 26

(ii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT’D)

Page(s)

77 Fed. Reg. 59943 (Sept. 28, 2012) ......................... 26

79 Fed. Reg. 11808 (Mar. 3, 2014) ............................ 26

80 Fed. Reg. 51582 (Aug. 25, 2015) .......................... 26

86 Fed. Reg. 41863 (Aug. 3, 2021) ...................... 22, 27

89 Fed. Reg. 54484 (July 1, 2024) ................... 4, 21, 22

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

Patrick Bellegarde-Smith et al., Haiti and

Its Occupation by the United States in

1915: Antecedents and Outcomes,

21 J. Haitian Stud. 14 (2015) .........................12-14

Jana Evans Braziel, Duvalier’s Ghosts:

Race, Diaspora, and U.S. Imperialism

in Haitian Literatures (Univ. Press

of Fla. 2010) .................................................... 15, 16

Gordon S. Brown, Toussaint’s Clause: The

Founding Fathers and the Haitian

Revolution (Univ. Press of Miss. 2005) ............... 10

Anthony R. Brunello, Duvalier Takes

Power in Haiti, EBSCO Research

Starters (2023) ..................................................... 15

Azadeh Dastyari, United States Migrant

Interdiction and the Detention of Refugees

in Guantánamo Bay (Cambridge Univ.

Press 2015) ..................................................... 18, 19

Marlene L. Daut, How Haiti Destroyed Slavery

and Led the Way to Freedom Throughout

the Atlantic World, Public Books

(Jan. 9, 2024) .................................................. 6, 8, 9

(iii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT’D)

Page(s)

Marlene L. Daut, What’s the Path Forward

for Haiti?, The New Yorker (Mar. 18, 2023) ....... 16

Daniella Diaz et al., Democrats Blast Biden

Administration on Handling of Haitian

Immigrants at the Border, CNN

(Sept. 23, 2021) .................................................... 25

Elizabeth Maddock Dillon et al., Introduction,

in The Haitian Revolution and the Early

United States (Univ. Penn. Press 2016) ................ 6

James Dobbins, Eileen Sullivan & Edgar

Sandoval, Thousands of Migrants Huddle in

Squalid Conditions Under Texas Bridge,

N.Y. Times (Sept. 16, 2021) ................................. 25

Camila Domonoske, U.N. Admits Role in

Haiti Cholera Outbreak That Has Killed

Thousands, NPR (Aug. 18, 2016) ........................ 22

Laurent Dubois, Two Revolutions in the

Atlantic World: Connections Between the

American Revolution and the Haitian

Revolution, Hist. Now (2012) ............................... 10

Joseph M. Frengel II, The Haitian Revolution,

Anti-Haitianism, and the Evolution of

Exclusionary Immigration Policy in the

United States, 20 Intercultural Hum. Rts.

L. Rev. 483 (2025) ............................................ 3, 21

Lazaro Gamio et al., Haiti’s Lost Billions,

N.Y. Times (May 20, 2022) .................................. 11

(iv)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT’D)

Page(s)

David Geggus, The Haitian Revolution in

Atlantic Perspective, in The Atlantic

World c.1450–c.1820 (Nicholas Canny

ed., 2011) .............................................................5-9

David Geggus, Slavery and the Haitian

Revolution, in The Cambridge World

History of Slavery (David Eltis

ed., 2017) .............................................................7-9

Jean-Claude Gerlus, Effects of the Cold War

on U.S.-Haiti Relations, 1 J. Haitian

Stud. 34 (1995) ..................................................... 16

Johnhenry Gonzalez, Maroon Nation:

A History of Revolutionary Haiti (Yale

Univ. Press 2019) ....................................... 8, 10, 12

A Guide to Title 42 Expulsions at the Border,

Am. Immigr. Council (Oct. 15, 2021)................... 24

Claire P. Gutekunst, Interdiction of Haitian

Migrants on the High Seas: A Legal and Policy

Analysis, 10 Yale J. Int’l L. 151 (1984) ............... 18

Haiti Profile – Timeline, BBC (Feb. 11, 2019) ....... 5, 6

Haitian Women for Haitian Refugees, A

Critical Hour for Haitian Immigrant Justice:

Community Testimony and Policy Solutions

Amid Relentless Racist Attacks on TPS and

Humanitarian Parole (Dec. 12, 2025) ............. 5, 27

Haitian Women for Haitian Refugees,

Humanitarian Parole Crisis: How Racist

Policies and Practices Deny Haitian

Refugees Work Authorization (2023) ....... 17, 20, 23

(v)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT’D)

Page(s)

Donald R. Hickey, America’s Response to

the Slave Revolt in Haiti, 1791-1806,

2 J. Early Republic 361 (1982) ............................ 10

Celucian J. Joseph, A Brief History of

Presidential Deaths in Haiti, Haitian

Times (July 11, 2021) ..................................... 13, 14

Jeffrey S. Kahn, Islands of Sovereignty:

Haitian Migration and the Borders of

Empire (Univ. of Chicago Press 2019) .......... 18, 19

Jonathan M. Katz, Can Low-Paying Garment

Industry Save Haiti?, Associated Press

(Feb. 21, 2010) ...................................................... 20

Bonnie Kelly, The Tale of St. Domingo’s Fate:

The Impact of the Haitian Revolution on

Virginia’s Slave Codes, 1800-1810,

52 S.U. L. Rev. 91 (2024) ....................................... 2

Franklin W. Knight, The Haitian Revolution,

105 Am. Hist. Rev. 103 (2000) ....................... 6, 8, 9

Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights,

Refugee Refoulement: The Forced Return

of Haitians Under the U.S.-Haitian

Interdiction Agreement (1990) ............................. 19

Malissia Lennox, Refugees, Racism, and

Reparations, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 687 (1993) .......... 4, 6

Letter from Daniel Foote, U.S. Special Envoy for

Haiti, to Antony Blinken, U.S. Sec’y of State

(Sept. 22, 2021) .................................................... 25

(vi)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT’D)

Page(s)

Carl Lindskoog, Detain and Punish:

Haitian Refugees and the Rise of the

World’s Largest Immigration Detention

System (Univ. Press of Fla. 2018).................. 16, 17

Jana K. Lipman, The Caribbean Origins of

the Krome Detention Center, Radical

Hist. Rev. 115 (2013)............................................ 17

Murdo J. MacLeod et al., History of Haiti,

Encyclopedia Britannica (Jan. 12, 2026) .............. 5

Mem. from Harold Hongju Koh, Ending Title

42 Return Flights to Countries of Origin,

Particularly Haiti (Oct. 2, 2021).......................... 25

Metering and Asylum Turnbacks, Am. Immigr.

Council (Mar. 8, 2021) ......................................... 23

Leslie Mullin, The First US Occupation of

Haiti: 1915-1934, Haiti Solidarity

(Aug. 2015) ..................................................... 13, 14

Julia Neusner, A Year After Del Rio, Haitian

Asylum Seekers Expelled Under Title 42

Are Still Suffering, Human Rights First

(Sept. 22, 2022) .............................................. 23, 24

Thomas O. Ott, The Haitian Revolution:

1789–1804 (Univ. Tenn. Press 1999)..................... 6

Renaud Piarroux et al., Understanding the

Cholera Epidemic, Haiti, 17 J. Emerging

Infectious Diseases 1161 (2011) .......................... 22

Catherine Porter et al., The Root of Haiti’s

Misery: Reparations to Enslavers, N.Y.

Times (Nov. 16, 2022) ........................ 10, 11, 12, 14

(vii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT’D)

Page(s)

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security,

DHS Outlines Strategy to Address Increase

in Migrants in Del Rio (Sept. 18, 2021) .............. 24

Refugees International, “It’s Very Hard to

Have Rights”: The Impact of COVID-19 on

Refugee and Migrant Communities in

Tijuana (Dec. 2021).............................................. 24

Diana Roy & Rocio Cara Labrador, Haiti’s

Troubled Path to Development, Council on

Foreign Rels. (Nov. 5, 2025) ...................... 9, 11, 20

Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation

of Haiti, 1915–1934 (Rutgers Univ.

Press 1995) ........................................................... 14

Michael Schoeppner, Peculiar Quarantines:

The Seamen Acts and Regulatory

Authority in the Antebellum South,

31 L. & Hist. Rev. 559 (2013) .............................. 11

Jeffrey W. Sommers, Race, Reality, and

Realpolitik: U.S.-Haiti Relations in the

Lead Up to the 1915 Invasion

(Bloomsbury 2015) ............................................... 13

Jeffrey W. Sommers, The US Power Elite and

the Political Economy of Haiti’s Occupation:

Investment, Race, and World Order,

21 J. Haitian Stud. 53 (2015) .............................. 14

State Dep’t Off. of the Historian, The United

States and the Haitian Revolution,

1791–1804............................................................... 6

(viii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT’D)

Page(s)

Alex Stepick, Haitian Boat People: A Study

in the Conflicting Forces Shaping U.S.

Immigration Policy, 45 Law & Contemp.

Probs. 163 (1982).................................................... 3

Irwin P. Stotzky, Haiti: Confronting an

Immense Challenge, 55 U. Miami

Inter-Am. L. Rev. 1 (2023) ............................. 21, 22

Jacki H. Tyler, The Unwanted Sailor,

117 Or. Hist. Soc’y 506 (2016) ............................. 11

Sandra C. Wisner, Starved for Justice:

International Complicity in Systematic

Violations of the Right to Food in Haiti,

6 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.

Online 409 (2022) ................................................. 21

Sandra C. Wisner & Brian Concannon, Debt

and Dependence: Foreign Interference in

Haiti and the Importance of Non-State

Actor Accountability, 21 Nw. J. Hum.

Rts. 185 (2023) ..................................................... 21

(ix)

IN THE

Supreme Court

of the United States

_________

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

FRITZ EMMANUEL LESLY MIOT,

ET AL.,

Respondents.

_________

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

_________

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE HAITIAN WOMEN FOR

HAITIAN REFUGEES IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

_________

STATEMENT OF INTEREST1

Haitian Women for Haitian Refugees (HWHR) submits this brief as amicus curiae in support of Respondents.

HWHR is a nonprofit organization that responds to

the needs of Haitian refugees and immigrants in the

United States. Since its founding in 1992, HWHR has

provided direct support to thousands of families seeking protection in this country after facing persecution

in Haiti. It offers case management, legal clinics, and

many other services in addition to engaging in grassroots advocacy.

1

No party or counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or

in part. No party, counsel for a party, or person other than amicus curiae or their counsel made any monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

(1)

2

HWHR has an interest in this proceeding because

many of the refugees it serves have Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and would be subject to irreparable and potentially fatal harm if the district court’s order is stayed. HWHR has previously been a plaintiff

in litigation challenging the suspension of TPS for

Haiti, and has also served as an amicus in such litigation. See NAACP v. DHS, 364 F. Supp. 3d 568 (D. Md.

2019); Saget v. Biden, No. 19-1685, 2021 WL

12137584 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2021). HWHR is well situated to provide this Court with a background on

Haiti’s history and relationship with the United

States, which is important context in considering the

United States’ relationship with Haiti and Haitian nationals.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The United States and Haiti have a long, shared history. At roughly the same time that the thirteen colonies that would become the United States were

fighting for freedom from English rule, the enslaved

people of the colony of Saint-Domingue were fighting

for their freedom from French slaveholders.

But when the enslaved people of Saint-Domingue

won their independence and abolished slavery, their

northern neighbor viewed Haiti as a threat. Haiti’s

very existence challenged the racial hierarchy on

which the United States’ economy depended. Politicians in the United States feared that news of the Haitian Revolution could lead to violent uprisings by enslaved people at home. See Bonnie Kelly, The Tale of

St. Domingo’s Fate: The Impact of the Haitian Revolution on Virginia’s Slave Codes, 1800-1810, 52 S.U. L.

Rev. 91, 101-108 (2024). The United States refused to

3

recognize the new Haitian state and instead helped

France impose “reparations” on Haiti—payments to

former French slaveholders for their lost slaves—that

permanently crippled Haiti’s economy. See Joseph M.

Frengel II, The Haitian Revolution, Anti-Haitianism,

and the Evolution of Exclusionary Immigration Policy

in the United States, 20 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L.

Rev. 483, 489-490 (2025).

This shared history has had lasting effects on Haiti

and on the United States’ immigration policy toward

Haitians. At the same time that the United States has

played a key role in shaping Haiti’s political and economic landscape, the United States has turned away

Haitian refugees. For example, the United States supported François Duvalier’s rise to the presidency in

1957. Id. at 696. The Duvalier regime, which was arguably “the most oppressive regime in the hemisphere,” forced hundreds of thousands of Haitians to

flee for safety. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F.

Supp. 442, 475-477 (S.D. Fla. 1980). But in the 1970s,

when Haitian refugees began arriving in southern

Florida by boat, the United States turned those migrants away. See Alex Stepick, Haitian Boat People: A

Study in the Conflicting Forces Shaping U.S. Immigration Policy, 45 Law & Contemp. Probs. 163, 163

(1982). The United States established a “Haitian Program,” “[t]he goal” of which “was to expel Haitian asylum applicants as rapidly as possible.” Civiletti, 503

F. Supp. at 512-513, 519. Upon being returned to

Haiti, the returners were seen as opponents of the Duvalier regime, and were imprisoned, persecuted, and

in many cases, killed. Id. at 476-482.

The United States’ immigration policies are

uniquely hostile to Haitian refugees. For example,

4

while Haitians were fleeing the United States-backed

Duvalier regime, Cubans were fleeing Mariel Harbor

for south Florida. See Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp.

973, 978 (S.D. Fla. 1982). In contrast to the Haitian

refugees being systematically sent back through the

Haitian Program, Cuban refugees were greeted with

preferential treatment. See Malissia Lennox, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 687,

712-716 (1993). Similarly, the United States broke

new ground in the 1980s when it began incarcerating,

rather than paroling, Haitians upon their arrival in

the United States. Louis, 544 F. Supp. at 984. Prior to

that program, the United States had rarely jailed people for alleged immigration violations. Id. at 981.

In more recent years, Haiti has continued to struggle politically and economically. Rather than accord

Haitians refugee status, the United States has provided a limited form of relief through the TPS program. See Extension and Redesignation of Haiti for

Temporary Protected Status, 89 Fed. Reg. 54484 (July

1, 2024). Haiti’s TPS designation acknowledges the

dire conditions of present-day Haiti. Id. at 54488-92.

For years, Haiti has suffered from devastating natural disasters, economic hardship, and severe political

instability that have left the government unable to

provide basic services or to protect its citizens from violence. Id. The TPS program provides needed humanitarian relief to those refugees.

The discontinuation of TPS status for Haitian refugees would be devastating. As one impacted community member told HWHR: “The way things are going

[in Haiti]—the situation isn’t good. Political problems,

kidnapping, killings, rape * * * all these problems are

why we can’t stay there. They’re still happening, even

5

worse.” See Haitian Women for Haitian Refugees, A

Critical Hour for Haitian Immigrant Justice: Community Testimony and Policy Solutions Amid Relentless

Racist Attacks on TPS and Humanitarian Parole 21

(Dec. 12, 2025) (“A Critical Hour”). As another explained: “[P]eople are being killed, gangs are causing

destruction, innocent people are being shot. It’s not

only physical insecurity but also food insecurity and

economic insecurity.” Id. As another said: “If they end

TPS for Haitians, it’s as if we are dead.” Id. at 20.

ARGUMENT

I.

HAITI’S SELF-LIBERATION, FOUNDING,

AND EARLY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE

UNITED STATES

“Of all the Atlantic revolutions, the fifteen-year

struggle that transformed French Saint-Domingue

into independent Haiti produced the greatest degree

of social and economic change, and most fully embodied the contemporary pursuit of freedom, equality,

and independence.” David Geggus, The Haitian Revolution in Atlantic Perspective, in The Atlantic World

c.1450-c.1820 533 (Nicholas Canny ed., 2011) (“Atlantic Perspective”). Understanding the forces that led to

Haitian independence in 1804—and how the United

States reacted—is key to understanding modern

Haiti.

Haiti’s Colonial History

In 1492, Christopher Columbus claimed the island

he called Hispaniola—which had been inhabited by

indigenous people since around 5000 BCE—for the

Spanish. Murdo J. MacLeod et al., “History of Haiti,”

Encyclopedia Britannica (Jan. 12, 2026), https://tinyurl.com/56rt9cz5; Haiti Profile – Timeline, BBC

6

(Feb. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/4V7D-R7KV. Two

hundred years later, Spain ceded the western part of

its territory to France, which established the colony of

Saint-Domingue. Thomas O. Ott, The Haitian Revolution: 1789-1804 5 (1999).

Over the next century, the French forcibly transported 900,000 captive Africans to be slaves on SaintDomingue. Marlene L. Daut, How Haiti Destroyed

Slavery and Led the Way to Freedom Throughout the

Atlantic World (Jan. 9, 2024), https://perma.cc/RPW4CA9T. Though thirty percent of newly arrived slaves

died from disease, deplorable living conditions, corporal punishment, and suicide, slaves ultimately

made up nearly 90 percent of the population. Lennox,

supra, at 690; Geggus (Atlantic Perspective), supra, at

533. Saint-Domingue became the largest single market for the Atlantic slave trade. Geggus (Atlantic Perspective), supra, at 533.

France derived immense wealth from its slaves’ labor. Saint-Domingue “stood at the very center of the

network of the developing capitalist world economy.”

Elizabeth Maddock Dillon et al., Introduction, in The

Haitian Revolution and the Early United States 5

(Univ. Penn. Press 2016). By the late 1780s, SaintDomingue exported more than the United States,

Mexico, and Brazil; and France claimed that it was

the “richest colony in the world.” Franklin W. Knight,

The Haitian Revolution, 105 Am. Hist. R. 103, 107

(2000); Geggus (Atlantic Perspective), supra, at 533;

see also State Dep’t Off. of the Historian, The United

States and the Haitian Revolution, 1791-1804,

https://perma.cc/89C7-6BBH (by the 1760s, SaintDomingue was “the most profitable colony in the

Americas”).

7

Despite the wealth that Saint-Domingue and its

other colonies provided, the French monarchy went

bankrupt in 1788, precipitating the French Revolution. David Geggus, Slavery and the Haitian Revolution, in The Cambridge World History of Slavery 324

(David Eltis ed., 2017) (“World History”). Within days

after France issued the 1789 Declaration of the Rights

of Man, which implicitly promised racial equality, free

black men in Paris—including those from the colonies—began to campaign for equal participation in the

new government. Geggus (Atlantic Perspective), supra, at 537. And free black men in Saint-Domingue

petitioned local authorities for inclusion in the colony’s politics. Id.

Vincent Ogé, a prominent free black activist from

Saint-Domingue, had gone to Paris to demand political representation. Geggus (Atlantic Perspective), supra, at 537. But the new French government’s response was “embarrassed prevarication and dishonest

maneuvering.” Id. Unsuccessful, Ogé returned to

Saint-Dominigue in 1790, where the “predominant

white response” to the French Revolution was “violent

repression” of the black population. Id. After white

colonists perpetuated a series of murders and property confiscations against Saint-Domingue’s black

community, Ogé initiated a consequential 300-man

uprising. Id. at 326. Though the French captured and

executed Ogé, his rebellion inspired large-scale uprisings among both enslaved and free black men. See id.;

Geggus (Atlantic Perspective), supra, at 537.

The Haitian War For Independence

The Haitian slave rebellion from 1791 to 1793 “was

by far the largest in the history of the Americas.” Id.

at 321. The self-liberated black forces burned a

8

thousand plantations, “physically disabling and removing the material means of their oppression and

confinement.” Johnhenry Gonzalez, Maroon Nation: A

History of Revolutionary Haiti 60 (Yale Univ. Press

2019); Geggus (Atlantic Perspective), supra, at 538.

The uprising “drew strength from * * * the creole language and Vodou religion that knit together the diverse cultures that composed it.” Geggus (Atlantic

Perspective), supra, at 538.

In 1793, led by former slave Pierre-Dominique Toussaint Louverture, “the tide of war turned inexorably”

in favor of the black rebels. Knight, supra, at 112.

Toussaint and his army successfully forced the formal

liberation of all of Saint-Domingue’s enslaved people.

Daut, supra. Louverture—a legendary and “brilliant

military leader[]”—became governor general of SaintDomingue in 1797. Knight, supra, at 112. His army

ultimately expelled all invading forces, including the

Spanish, British, and French. See id.; Geggus (World

History), supra, at 334.

Louverture then helped establish a “remarkably

modern and democratic constitution” that declared

emancipation inviolable. Geggus (World History), supra, at 335; Knight, supra, at 112. Saint-Domingue

was de facto no longer a French colony. Geggus (Atlantic Perspective), supra, at 543.

Driven to restore slavery and reestablish the French

empire, Napoleon Bonaparte sent 44,000 troops to

Saint-Domingue beginning in 1802. Knight, supra, at

113. France’s war campaign was “savage and bitter.”

Id. One historian characterized it as “veer[ing] toward

a strategy of genocide.” Geggus (Atlantic Perspective),

supra, at 544. Louverture was captured and died in

exile in a French prison. Geggus (World History),

9

supra, at 336. But the French army sustained significant losses, and after losing almost 40,000 soldiers in

less than two years, France evacuated SaintDomingue in late 1803. Geggus (Atlantic Perspective),

supra, at 544.

In January 1804, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, a senior

black general, declared the independence of the “State

of Haiti.” Geggus (World History), supra, at 337. Dessalines adopted the name “Haiti,” from the Amerindian word Ayiti, as “a symbolic erasure of the colonial

past.” Geggus (Atlantic Perspective), supra, at 544.

Haiti’s Declaration of Independence was only the

third in history. Geggus (World History), supra, at

337.

Aftermath And Early United StatesHaitian Relations

Haiti was the first nation in the world to permanently abolish slavery—more than six decades before

the United States took that step. Daut, supra. Haiti

was also “the first independent non-European state to

be carved out of the European universal empires anywhere.” Knight, supra, at 105. The Haitian Revolution

achieved independence, racial equality, and emancipation. Geggus (Atlantic Perspective), supra, at 545.

Haiti became a beacon of abolition and self-determination. Diana Roy & Rocio Cara Labrador, Haiti’s

Troubled Path to Development, Council on Foreign

Rels. (Nov. 5, 2025), https://perma.cc/Y9XJ-BE35.

But Haiti’s triumph was followed by civil war and

decades of isolation and financial crises, enforced

through economic imperialism. Because Haiti was

founded by and for black people who had liberated

themselves from enslavement, “the Haitian Revolution posed a direct threat to deeply entrenched

10

interests throughout the world,” especially in the

United States. See Laurent Dubois, Two Revolutions

in the Atlantic World: Connections Between the American Revolution and the Haitian Revolution, in 34

Hist. Now (2012), https://perma.cc/N5AG-QBVG.

The United States—whose economy then depended

on the enslavement of black people—refused to recognize a former slave state as a sovereign nation. See

Gordon S. Brown, Toussaint’s Clause: The Founding

Fathers and the Haitian Revolution 237, 294 (Univ.

Press of Miss. 2005). Haiti received no foreign assistance or trade preferences for most of its first century.

Gonzalez, supra, at 3. Haiti was “simply not allowed

to be an equal participant in Atlantic commerce, diplomacy, or an alleged ‘international community.’ ” Id.

at 10.

Haiti’s exclusion was the United States’ design.

From the beginning, United States policy was to continually undermine Haiti as a state. The United

States prohibited trade with Haiti in February 1806

and again in later years; those embargoes had direct

consequences on Haiti’s economy, and particularly its

agricultural sector. See Donald R. Hickey, America’s

Response to the Slave Revolt in Haiti, 1791-1806, 2 J.

Early Republic 361, 361-362 (1982). The United

States isolated Haiti in part because “American lawmakers * * * did not want enslaved people in their own

country to be inspired by Haiti’s self-liberation.” Catherine Porter et al., The Root of Haiti’s Misery: Reparations to Enslavers, N.Y. Times (Nov. 16, 2022),

https://tinyurl.com/2rj33sna. And the United States

did not formally recognize Haiti until 1862, after the

southern states had seceded. State Dep’t, supra.

11

Prohibitions also affected participation at the individual level. For example, take the so-called “Negro

Seaman Acts.” First appearing in South Carolina after the Haitian Revolution, southern states passed

laws that mandated the arrest and incarceration of

free black sailors while their ships were in port. See

Jacki H. Tyler, The Unwanted Sailor, 117 Or. Hist.

Soc’y 506, 510 (2016). Enacted on the premise that

free black sailors would act as a “moral contagion” and

spread ideas that might encourage rebellion, those

laws served to further obstruct the ability of Haitians

to participate in the international community. See Michael Schoeppner, Peculiar Quarantines: The Seamen

Acts and Regulatory Authority in the Antebellum

South, 31 L. & Hist. Rev. 559, 563-565 (2013) (noting

that proponents of the laws “pinpointed the origins of

the contagion in the French and Haitian Revolutions”).

Two decades after Haiti won its independence from

France, France forced Haiti to pay 150 million francs

in reparations—$560 million in today’s dollars—a

“staggering amount” far beyond the nation’s means.2

Lazaro Gamio et al., Haiti’s Lost Billions, N.Y. Times

(May 20, 2022), https://perma.cc/S954-DEC3; Roy, supra. The ransom imposed severe limitations on infrastructural development in Haiti. The first installment

France demanded was more than six times the Haitian government’s annual income, so Haiti was forced

to take out loans from French banks. Porter, supra.

2

The value of the French ransom is even higher when taking lost

investment opportunities into account. A New York Times study

estimated that if the money Haiti had paid to France had instead

stayed within the Haitian economy, it would have added a staggering $21 billion to Haiti over time. Porter, supra.

12

The debts “drain[ed] away much of [Haiti’s] revenue

and chopp[ed] away at its ability to build the essential

institutions and infrastructure of an independent nation.” Id. The legacy of that ransom can be seen in

modern Haiti’s limited hospitals, crumbling roads,

and slums—all in a countryside once considered the

most lucrative and productive in the world. Id.

Despite these and other efforts to undermine Haiti’s

capacity to function as a state, early Haitians created

a new economic order centered around small farms

and “enjoyed relative autonomy and prosperity during

most of the nineteenth century.” Gonzalez, supra, at

15-16. Rural self-sufficiency guided their economic

achievements and led to unprecedented demographic

growth. Id. at 3-4. The men and women who became

Haiti’s first farmers—former slaves and their immediate descendants—succeeded at “throw[ing] off the

hunger and indignities of slavery by claiming their

own land and by cultivating food for themselves.” Id.

at 5. And they developed pronounced cultural, economic, and political autonomy. Id. at 7.

II.

UNITED STATES–HAITI RELATIONS IN

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Still, Haiti entered the twentieth century carrying

the immense structural burdens created in part by the

United States in the wake of its independence. The

lack of international recognition and the crippling national debt to France had destabilizing effects on the

Haitian government and economy. See Patrick Bellegarde-Smith et al., Haiti and Its Occupation by the

United States in 1915: Antecedents and Outcomes, 21

J. Haitian Studies 14 (2015). The United States and

American businesses spent the next 100 years exploiting Haiti’s vulnerabilities.

13

The American Occupation Of Haiti

At the turn of the twentieth century, the United

States had a policy of hemispheric hegemony and

seemed to “reserve[] the right to intervene anywhere

and whenever it chose.” Bellegarde-Smith, supra, at

15. As such, the United States and American entities

became interested in financially investing in (and controlling) Haitian affairs.

For example, between 1849 and 1913, the United

States military intervened 24 times to “secure the economic interest and socio-political development of the

United States” in Haiti. Jeffrey W. Sommers, Race,

Reality, and Realpolitik: U.S.-Haiti Relations in the

Lead Up to the 1915 Invasion viii (Bloomsbury 2015).

In 1909, the National City Bank of New York (now,

Citibank) secured a controlling interest in the Haitian

National Bank; and to protect that interest, President

Woodrow Wilson authorized United States military to

take a sizable portion of the Haitian National Bank’s

coffers to New York for “safeguard[ing],” giving the

United States control of Haiti’s largest financial institution. See Leslie Mullin, The First US Occupation of

Haiti: 1915-1934, Haiti Solidarity (Aug. 2015),

https://perma.cc/LR9X-DBYB. American investors

also acquired Haiti’s National Railroad and the corresponding right to establish banana plantations along

certain points on the track, which violated the Haitian

Constitution’s

(slavery-preventing)

prohibition

against foreigners owning land and caused mass evictions of small Haitian farms. Id.

During the same period, Haiti’s political order deteriorated—in a four-year span, seven presidents were

assassinated or overthrown, culminating in the lynching of President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam. Celucian J.

14

Joseph, A Brief History of Presidential Deaths in

Haiti, The Haitian Times (July 11, 2021),

https://perma.cc/V98Z-29EP. And most of Haiti’s presidents came to power through coups d’etat. Bellegarde-Smith, supra, at 14. While the country continued to struggle, Haiti’s internal volatility intersected

with intensifying foreign competition.

Facing pressure from banks with investments in

Haiti and possibly unnerved by Germany’s influence

there, President Woodrow Wilson authorized a military invasion in 1915, effectively stripping Haiti of its

sovereignty. Jeffrey W. Sommers, The US Power Elite

and the Political Economy of Haiti’s Occupation: Investment, Race, and World Order, 21 J. Haitian Studies 53, 55, 63 (2015). Haiti’s American occupiers consistently suppressed local democratic institutions and

denied elementary political liberties. Hans Schmidt,

The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 17

(Rutgers Univ. Press 1995). And when guerilla fighters took up arms against American occupiers, they

were killed. See Mullin, supra.

The United States finally withdrew from Haiti in

1934, making the Haitian occupation one of the longest in United States history. See Porter, supra. But

before that point, the occupation shaped Haitian institutions so that they “always gave first priority to

United States political, military, and economic interests.” Id. Indeed, the United States installed a new

president, seized control of Haiti’s administrative institutions, and forced labor projects to fulfill Haiti’s

debts to the United States and other foreign interests.

Id. The United States also installed a new Haitian

constitution that legalized foreign land ownership for

the first time since Haiti’s founding, indefinitely

15

suspended the elected Haitian legislature, and legalized the military occupation. Id. at 11. The United

States’ occupation only exacerbated Haiti’s poverty

and instability.

The Duvalier Era And The Push To

Leave Haiti

The conclusion of the United States’ formal occupation ushered in another period of political volatility in

Haiti. The decades-long occupation left Haiti with institutions that were highly susceptible to executive

control. It was against that backdrop that François

“Papa Doc” Duvalier rose to power.

In “one of the most brutal authoritarian systems of

the twentieth century,” Papa Doc consolidated authority by restructuring the security services, creating a

parallel paramilitary force that reported directly to

the executive, and using those forces to violently silence dissenters. See Anthony R. Brunello, Duvalier

Takes Power in Haiti, EBSCO Research Starters

(2023), https://perma.cc/EK3U-8AP3. Over time, the

Duvalier government centralized political power, curtailed avenues for dissent, and reorganized state institutions to ensure executive dominance.

That regime continued beyond his death. When

Papa Doc died in 1971, his son, Jean-Claude “Baby

Doc” Duvalier, succeeded him, continuing a system in

which political authority was tightly held and avenues

for democratic participation were limited. See Jana

Evans Braziel, Duvalier’s Ghosts: Race, Diaspora, and

U.S. Imperialism in Haitian Literatures 159-161

(Univ. Press of Fla. 2010).

The United States supported both administrations.

Despite the Duvaliers’ anti-democratic ideals, the

United States maintained diplomatic relations and

16

provided economic and security assistance at key moments when the Duvalier governments faced internal

or external pressure. See Jean-Claude Gerlus, Effects

of the Cold War on U.S.-Haiti Relations, 1 J. Haitian

Studies 34, 37 (1995). This assistance—financial, military, and political—helped sustain the regimes by reinforcing their international legitimacy and providing

resources that the Haitian state could not generate

domestically. See Braziel, supra, at 135.

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the combined effects of prolonged authoritarian governance, limited

economic opportunity, and deteriorating rural conditions forced many Haitians to emigrate. In 1981, responding to an outbreak of swine fever, the United

States and Duvalier forced Haitian farmers to kill

every native Creole pig in the country. Marlene L.

Daut, What’s the Path Forward for Haiti?, The New

Yorker (Mar. 18, 2023), https://perma.cc/ZFA2-6AHV.

The country’s pork industry was virtually destroyed;

the Creole pig went extinct; and many rural families,

facing starvation, flocked to the capital to seek scarce

factory jobs. Id. The population of Port-au-Prince

swelled, causing mass unemployment and a housing

crisis. Id. Those and other political and economic

forces left many Haitians without viable means of subsistence or political recourse. These structural pressures—shaped in part by the American-aided Duvalier regimes—led to the large-scale emigration of Haitian nationals to the United States. See Carl Lindskoog, Detain and Punish: Haitian Refugees and the

Rise of the World’s Largest Immigration Detention

System 14 (Univ. Press of Fla. 2018).

17

Anti-Haitian Immigration Policy

Despite its involvement in the conditions that

caused many Haitians to flee their country, however,

the United States took a hostile view of Haitian migrants seeking asylum.

In 1972, Haitian migrants began arriving in southern Florida in improvised boats. Instead of aiding

these refugees, the United States adopted a policy of

rejecting their asylum applications. The treatment of

Haitian migrants differed greatly from that of migrants from other countries like Cuba, who “remained

privileged and often exercised greater rights than

Haitian entrants.” Jana K. Lipman, The Caribbean

Origins of the Krome Detention Center, Radical Hist.

Rev. 115, 122 (2013). For example, Cubans were

“given an application for political asylum (and sometimes cash),” while Haitians were seen simply as undocumented migrants awaiting removal. See Lindskoog, supra, at 36.

Things got worse in the 1980s, when Haitian immigration garnered national attention, and “the reduction of Haitian migration became a focus of U.S. immigration policy.” Haitian Women for Haitian Refugees, Humanitarian Parole Crisis: How Racist Policies and Practices Deny Haitian Refugees Work Authorization 10 (2023), https://perma.cc/VD2R-NQCL

(“Humanitarian Parole”). In 1981, the United States

adopted a policy whereby Haitians—and Haitians

only—were detained without the possibility of parole

for the duration of their immigration cases. See Lindskoog, supra, at 62-63.

Detention centers rapidly became horrifically overcrowded. Id. at 74. In response, the government began

to transfer Haitian refugees to federal prisons across

18

the country. Id. By summer 1982, thousands of Haitians were detained across the United States. Id. And

by decade’s end, the United States began to hold Haitian migrants in deplorable conditions at the Guantánamo Bay naval base. See Azadeh Dastyari, United

States Migrant Interdiction and the Detention of Refugees in Guantánamo Bay 25-26 (Cambridge Univ.

Press 2015). The policy, which was eventually wound

down due to a combination of court orders, political

change, and mass repatriation, was unquestionably

implemented to discourage migration from Haiti. See

id.; see also, e.g., Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v.

McNary, 789 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Haitian

Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028

(E.D.N.Y. 1993).

During the same period, the United States also instituted another policy aimed at preventing Haitian

arrival in the country: interdiction—intercepting Haitian refugees at sea and returning them to Haiti. See

Jeffrey S. Kahn, Islands of Sovereignty: Haitian Migration and the Borders of Empire 80 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2019). Throughout the 1970s, the United

States’ detention and deportation machinery had been

hampered by political mobilizations and lawsuits, but

the executive branch believed interdicting refugees

outside United States waters could enable it to send

Haitians back to Haiti without meddling from advocates and courts within the United States. See id., at

81; see also Claire P. Gutekunst, Interdiction of Haitian Migrants on the High Seas: A Legal and Policy

Analysis, 10 Yale J. Int’l L. 151, 165-166 (1984).

Charged with implementing this policy, the United

States Coast Guard focused its efforts at the “choke

point” on the route from Haiti to southern Florida.

19

Kahn, supra, at 85. If a boat with Haitians aboard was

found to be traveling to the United States, its passengers and crew were transferred to a Coast Guard ship.

See Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Refugee

Refoulement: The Forced Return of Haitians Under the

U.S.-Haitian Interdiction Agreement 5 (1990). The

Haitian boats left behind were typically “destroyed or

sunk as ‘hazards to health and navigation.’ ” Id.

Once the Haitians were aboard the Coast Guard

ship, an immigration officer and interpreter would

conduct brief interviews to determine whether the interdicted Haitians credibly feared return to Haiti. Id.

at 5-6. If the immigration officer was not convinced

that the migrants had a sufficient reason to be fearful,

they were sent back. Id. As one senior government official later reflected, the officers tasked with conducting the interviews often “had no instruction, they had

no training, they just had whatever they felt at the

moment.” Kahn, supra, at 173. With that, it should be

no surprise that—literally—99.9% of interdicted Haitians were returned to Haiti. See Dastyari, supra, at

20 (noting that, from September 1981 to September

1991, just 28 interdicted Haitian refugees were permitted to enter the United States and that the remaining 23,551 Haitians were sent back to Haiti).3

All told, characterized by a desire to exclude at a

near-categorical level, the late twentieth century set

the stage for the current treatment of Haitian migrants arriving in the United States. Indeed, these

policies sit at “the root of many of the most inhumane

3

As it turns out, the interdiction policy was implemented with

the approval of Jean-Claude Duvalier—the very dictator the migrants were seeking to escape. See Agreement Effected by Exchange of Notes, 33 U.S.T. 3559 (Sept. 23, 1981).

20

immigration policies in place today.” See Haitian

Women for Haitian Refugees (Humanitarian Parole

Crisis), supra, at 10-11 (noting that “xenophobia

against Haitian and other Black refugees, asylum

seekers and migrants” impact modern immigration

policy in numerous ways).

III.

UNITED STATES–HAITI RELATIONS IN

THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

In this century, as economic and political conditions

in Haiti have deteriorated, immigration laws and enforcement policies in the United States have generally

worked to deter Haitian refugees from seeking asylum

here.

Present Day Economic, Environmental,

And Political Challenges Facing Haiti

The past 25 years in Haiti have been marked by serious economic challenges. “Nearly two-thirds of the

population lives below the poverty line and some 5.7

million people—almost half the population—are facing acute hunger.” Id. There are not enough economic

opportunities for those who want to work; only around

60% to 80% of Haitians have steady incomes, with

most barely surviving by working sporadically and receiving money from friends and family outside of the

country. See Jonathan M. Katz, Can Low-Paying Garment Industry Save Haiti?, Associated Press, (Feb. 21,

2010), https://perma.cc/DH5B-7KRG. These remittances make up more than 15% of Haiti’s Gross Domestic Product. See Roy, supra.

The United States has contributed to those challenges. Through a series of policies implemented

starting in the 1980s, the United States pushed Haiti

towards a manufacturing economy by flooding Haiti

21

with subsidized American food and simultaneously

forcing Haiti to drop import tariffs. See, e.g., Sandra

C. Wisner, Starved for Justice: International Complicity in Systematic Violations of the Right to Food in

Haiti, 6 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. Online 409, 415-418

(2022), https://perma.cc/SV53-5ME6 (“Starved for

Justice”); Sandra C. Wisner & Brian Concannon, Debt

and Dependence: Foreign Interference in Haiti and the

Importance of Non-State Actor Accountability, 21 Nw.

J. Hum. Rts. 185, 205-206 (2023).

In 2009, to further protect American interests in

Haiti’s manufacturing sector, the United States “pressured Haitian President René Préval to limit the minimum wage to $3 per day” instead of the “$5 per day”

that he preferred. Frengel, supra, at 491. Low wages

and dependence on imported food have led to persistent food insecurity in Haiti. See Wisner (Starved for

Justice), supra, at 420-424. Indeed, “Haiti has one of

the highest levels of chronic food insecurity in the

world with more than half of its total population

chronically food insecure and 22 percent of children

chronically malnourished.” 89 Fed. Reg. at 54490.

At the same time, Haiti has grappled with a series

of environmental disasters and resulting public

health challenges. In January 2010, Haiti was hit by

a devastating earthquake that killed over 350,000

people, displaced another two to three million people,

and destroyed much of the infrastructure of its capital, Port-au-Prince. See Irwin P. Stotzky, Haiti: Confronting an Immense Challenge, 55 U. Miami InterAm. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2023). Shortly afterwards, in fall

2010, there was a large-scale outbreak of cholera that

killed thousands—caused by United Nations peacekeepers emptying human waste into the largest river

22

in Haiti. See Camila Domonoske, U.N. Admits Role in

Haiti Cholera Outbreak That Has Killed Thousands,

NPR (Aug. 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/8ACH-7M3K;

Renaud Piarroux et al., Understanding the Cholera

Epidemic, Haiti, 17 J. Emerging Infectious Diseases

1161 (2011), https://perma.cc/7F99-ZFKD. In October

2016, a hurricane ravaged parts of the country and

killed more than 500 people. A smaller—but still devastating—hurricane in 2021 and a pair of earthquakes in 2021 and 2023 also struck Haiti, resulting

in further deaths, displacements, and damage.

Stotzky, supra, at 5. “Worldwide, Haiti remains one of

the most vulnerable countries to natural disasters,

predominately including hurricanes, floods, and

earthquakes.” 89 Fed. Reg. at 54490 (internal quotation marks omitted).

These economic and environmental struggles have

contributed to political instability. “Haiti’s political

situation has been unstable and volatile for decades,

with frequent changes of government, coups, protests,

and violence,” but “[t]he assassination of President

Jovenel Moise on July 7, 2021,” “created a power vacuum that allowed gangs to seize control of the capital

and block the country’s main port and fuel terminal.”

Stotzky, supra, at 1, 2. Since then, so-called gang violence has exploded.4 Even in rural areas, gangs “terroriz[e] local populations with abduction, murder,

4

The term “gang” fails to fully capture the level of organization,

structure, and political involvement that these armed groups

have. See, e.g., 86 Fed. Reg. at 41865 (noting that “over a third of

Haiti's voters now live in areas controlled by criminal gangs” and

that between “2019-2021,” “a new federation emerged, uniting

urban criminal gangs that control entire neighborhoods in the

capital city of Port-au-Prince”).

23

sexual and gender-based violence, extortion, and

forced displacement.” Id.

Modern United States Immigration

Policies Affecting Haitian Refugees

Some Haitians have sought asylum in the United

States to escape the devastating effects of these recent

challenges. However—just like in the twentieth century—the United States has largely resisted those efforts, imposing uniquely harsh policies on Haitian refugees. “From October 2018 to June 2021, Haiti had

the highest rate of asylum denial in the U.S. among

83 countries surveyed—less than 5% of asylum requests were granted.” See Haitian Women for Haitian

Refugees (Humanitarian Parole), supra, at 11. And

“[i]n May 2022, Haitians made up 6% of immigrants

crossing the Mexico/U.S. border, but they occupied

60% of the flights expelling migrants.” Id.

1. Two recent policies illustrate the trend: metering

and Title 42.

Metering. Under a policy known as “metering,” first

implemented in 2016, the United States limited the

number of Haitian migrants permitted to request asylum at ports of entry and instructed most asylumseekers to wait in border cities for an opportunity to

request protection. See Metering and Asylum Turnbacks, Am. Immigr. Council (March 8, 2021),

https://perma.cc/Q443-3DT5 (noting that “early usage

of metering primarily targeted Haitian asylum seekers”).

Life at the border for Haitians turned away because

of metering is dangerous and desperate. See Julia

Neusner, A Year After Del Rio, Haitian Asylum Seekers Expelled Under Title 42 Are Still Suffering, Human

Rights

First

(Sept.

22,

2022),

24

https://perma.cc/4AQC-EKTZ. For example, black migrants in Tijuana are perceived “as easy targets who

will not be protected by the police.” Refugees International, “It’s Very Hard to Have Rights”: The Impact of

COVID-19 on Refugee and Migrant Communities in

Tijuana 18 (Dec. 2021), https://perma.cc/H5RG-BP5K.

Haitians in Tijuana have therefore reported that

“they do not go out at night for fear of attack or theft.”

Id. Children are deprived of their right to education.

Id. at 27. And families struggle to access healthcare.

Id. at 26.

Title 42. The United States has also turned away

Haitian refugees through health policies related to the

COVID-19 pandemic. See A Guide to Title 42 Expulsions at the Border, Am. Immigr. Council (Oct. 15,

2021), https://perma.cc/8WB8-TNGB. Soon after the

pandemic began, citing a public health statute that

permits the United States to “prohibit * * * the introduction” into the United States of individuals when

the United States believes that “there is serious danger of the introduction of [a communicable] disease

into the United States,” 42 U.S.C. § 265, the United

States began expelling migrants without providing

them with an opportunity to contest their expulsion

on the grounds that they would face persecution in the

country to which they would be expelled. Id. DHS

later announced that it would apply these policies to

thousands of Haitian asylum-seekers who had gathered in Texas border cities. See Press Release, U.S.

Dep’t of Homeland Security, DHS Outlines Strategy to

Address Increase in Migrants in Del Rio (Sept. 18,

2021), https://perma.cc/YHW5-TY8U.

These policies culminated in the shocking treatment

of Haitian migrants at the Del Rio Bridge in 2021.

25

Border Patrol detained thousands of Haitian refugees

in “a temporary staging area under the Del Rio International Bridge” for processing, which the mayor of

Del Rio described as “squalid conditions” that “resembled a shantytown, with little access to clean water

and food and just a few portable toilets.” James Dobbins, Eileen Sullivan & Edgar Sandoval, Thousands

of Migrants Huddle in Squalid Conditions Under

Texas Bridge, N.Y. Times (Sept. 16, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/mry7cfsm. Customs and Border Patrol

agents were video recorded on horseback swinging

reins and charging to confront migrants crossing the

river. See Daniella Diaz et al., Democrats Blast Biden

Administration on Handling of Haitian Immigrants

at

the

Border,

CNN

(Sept.

23,

2021),

https://perma.cc/4EA7-TFNE.

Instead of hearing the asylum claims of these individuals, the United States returned thousands of

them to Haiti, even though the officials with the greatest insight into the matter acknowledged that “[t]he

collapsed state is unable to provide security or basic

services, and more refugees will fuel further desperation and crime.” Letter from Daniel Foote, U.S. Special Envoy for Haiti, to Antony Blinken, U.S. Sec’y of

State (Sept. 22, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/2e4yt7wj;

see also Mem. from Harold Hongju Koh, Ending Title

42 Return Flights to Countries of Origin, Particularly

Haiti (Oct. 2, 2021); https://tinyurl.com/yezenw75.

2. TPS provides a limited avenue for relief for Haitian refugees. It allows recipients to live and work in

the United States on a temporary basis. See generally

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1). It allows Haitian refugees to

contribute to the United States economy. Id. And it

acknowledges the reality that Haitians cannot yet

26

safely return to Haiti. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(A)(C).

The Department of Homeland Security first designated Haiti for TPS status in 2010, after Haiti was

struck by a massive earthquake. See 75 Fed. Reg.

3476, 3476 (Jan. 21, 2010). DHS later extended this

designation and redesignated Haiti for TPS status

multiple times based on continuing harms from the

earthquake, political instability, and economic insecurity. See, e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. 29000 (May 19, 2011); 77

Fed. Reg. 59943 (Sept. 28, 2012); 79 Fed. Reg. 11808

(March 3, 2014); 80 Fed. Reg. 51582 (Aug. 25, 2015).

“With each of these decisions, DHS outlined conditions arising from the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and

its attendant damage to infrastructure, public health,

agriculture, transportation, and educational facilities.” Saget v. Trump (“Saget II”), 375 F. Supp. 3d 280,

301 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). “In addition, each extension cited

the cholera epidemic and the exacerbation of preexisting vulnerabilities caused by the earthquake, including food insecurity and a housing crisis.” Id.

However, in January 2018, DHS announced the termination of TPS for Haitians, despite the continuously dire conditions in Haiti. The TPS termination

was enjoined after a federal court found that the policy failed to comply with the applicable statutory and

regulatory standards. Saget v. Trump (“Saget I”), 345

F. Supp. 3d 287, 303 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); see also Saget

II, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 374. In particular, DHS failed to

acknowledge the substantial evidence that the agency

had regarding dangerous conditions in Haiti, including “unsafe homes, food security concerns, and

longstanding public health challenges.” Saget II,

375 F. Supp. 3d at 356. The government initially

27

appealed that decision, but after a change in administration, withdrew the appeal and once again extended Haiti’s TPS designation. See 86 Fed. Reg.

41863 (Aug. 3, 2021).

3. Haitian TPS recipients now find themselves facing the suspension of their status once again. “The

prospect of losing TPS is devastating” for Haitian TPS

recipients. See Haitian Women for Haitian Refugees

(A Critical Hour), supra, at 20.

Haitian TPS recipients rely on their status to live

and work in the United States. As one community

member explained: “If TPS ends, I wouldn’t be able to

work, pay rent, buy what my child needs. * * * Even

though the child was born here, it’s by working that I

take care of him.” Id. at 18. Indeed, “Haitians living in

the United States contribute substantially to the U.S.

economy, through participation in the work force

across a variety of sectors, their spending, and their

tax payments.” Id. at 14. “Haitian TPS holders” alone

“contribute approximately $5.8 billion to the U.S.

economy annually and pay $1.5 billion in taxes.” Id. at

14.

And they reasonably fear returning to Haiti, where

they could not effectively contribute to society and

would face extreme violence, food insecurity, and economic instability. Id. at 21. As one impacted community TPS recipient told HWHR: “If they end TPS for

Haitians, it’s as if we are dead.” Id. at 20.

28

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those in Respondents’ brief, the Court should affirm.

Respectfully submitted,

JO-ANN TAMILA SAGAR

Counsel of Record

DARRYL E. WILLIAMS, JR.

KATHERINE T. MCKAY

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 637-5600

jo-ann.sagar@hoganlovells.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae