Amicus Curiae Brief — Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al., Petitioners v. Dahlia Doe, et al.

Supreme Court briefApr 13, 2026

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Nos. 25-1083 & 25-1084

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, Department of

Homeland Security, et al., Petitioners,

DAHLIA DOE, et al., Respondents.

DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United

States, et al., Petitioners,

FRITZ EMMANUEL LESLY MIOT, et al.,

Respondents.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURTS OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND AND THE D.C.

CIRCUITS

BRIEF OF FAITH IN ACTION AND FAITH

LEADERS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT

OF RESPONDENTS

Robert E. Shapiro

Counsel of Record

Corwin J. Carr

Joshua W. Mahoney

Jill M. Doherty

M. Olivia Glass

BARACK FERRAZZANO

KIRSCHBAUM &

NAGELBERG LLP

200 W. Madison St., Suite

3900

Chicago, IL 60606

(312) 984-3100

rob.shapiro@bfkn.com

LEGAL PRINTERS LLC ! Washington, DC ! 202-747-2400 ! legalprinters.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... ii

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.................................... 3

INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 4

ARGUMENT .............................................................. 7

I. CONGRESS ENACTED TPS TO REPLACE

THE ARBITRARY EVD REGIME WITH A

MANDATORY, FACT-BASED FRAMEWORK—

THE VERY FRAMEWORK SECRETARY NOEM

FAILED TO FOLLOW.......................................... 7

II. THE RECORD CONFIRMS THAT SECRETARY

NOEM DID NOT CONDUCT THE REASONED,

FACT-BASED REVIEW THE TPS STATUTE

REQUIRES. ........................................................ 12

Conditions in Haiti Have Worsened by

Every Measure During the Review Period.13

Secretary Noem Found Improvement Where

the Record Shows Only Deterioration. ...... 19

III.SECRETARY NOEM’S “NATIONAL

INTEREST” RATIONALES ARE

UNSUPPORTED, ILLOGICAL, AND

CONTRARY TO THE STATUTE’S PURPOSE. 22

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 25

APPENDIX: LIST OF AMICI CURIAE ...................1a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Hotel & Rest. Emps. Union v. Smith,

846 F.2d 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ..............................7

Judulang v. Holder,

565 U.S. 42 (2011) ................................................25

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

463 U.S. 29 (1983) ..........................................12, 13

National TPS All. v. Noem,

150 F.4th 1000 (9th Cir. 2025) ..............................8

Salguero-Fuentes v. Holder,

569 F.3d 399 (8th Cir. 2009)..................................8

Sanchez v. Mayorkas,

593 U.S. 409 (2021) ................................................8

Statutes and Rules

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) .............................................13, 21

8 U.S.C. § 1254a ..........................................................6

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a) ....................................................11

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b) .......................................... 8, 11, 20

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1) .................................................6

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(C) ....................................12, 22

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3) .........................................11, 12

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A) ....................................14, 19

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(C) ..........................................11

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) ..........................................11

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c) ....................................................23

Sup. Ct. R. 37.6 ...........................................................1

Regulations

90 Fed. Reg. 54733 (Nov. 28, 2025) ........ 19, 22, 23, 24

International Agreements

U.N. Convention Relating to the Status

of Refugees, art. 33(1), July 28,

1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189

U.N.T.S. 150 .......................................................5, 6

U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of

Refugees, art. I, done

Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,

T.I.A.S. No. 6577 ....................................................6

Other Authorities

136 Cong. Rec. H8685 ..................................... 9, 10, 25

136 Cong. Rec. H8686 ...............................................10

136 Cong. Rec. H8687 ................................. 8, 9, 10, 25

iii

Amnesty Int’l, Gang Violence and

Unrest in Haiti,

https://www.amnesty.org/en/projects

/gang-violence-in-haiti/ ........................................24

Brief of Amicus Curiae Springfield

Neighbors United in Opposition to

Application to Stay, Trump v. Miot,

No. 25-A-999 (U.S. Mar. 16, 2026) ......................24

Diego López Colín, Armed Gangs

Murder 2 Nuns in Haiti, Nat’l

Catholic Reg. (Apr. 4, 2025),

https://www.ncregister.com/cna/arm

ed-gangs-murder-2-nuns-in-haiti ........................18

Fed. Bureau of Investigation Crime

Data Explorer, Expanded Homicides

Reported in the United States,

https://cde.ucr.cjis.gov/LATEST/web

app/#/pages/explorer/crime/shr ...........................16

James Blears, Haiti: Irish missionary,

orphanage staff, 3-year-old released

after abduction, Vatican News (Aug.

30, 2025),

https://www.vaticannews.va/en/worl

d/news/2025-08/haiti-irishmissionary-orphanage-staff-freeafter-abduction.html ............................................18

Peace Security Data Hub, Haiti

Security and Crime Statistics

Dataset,

https://psdata.un.org/dataset/BINU

H-SCStats ............................................................15

U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees,

UNHCR Note on the Principle of

Non-Refoulement (1997),

https://www.refworld.org/policy/legal

guidance/unhcr/1997/36258 ...................................5

U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights,

Situation of Human Rights in Haiti

(July 1, 2025)

https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/58/76 ........ 15, 16, 17

U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights,

Situation of Human Rights in Haiti

(Mar. 23, 2026),

https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/f

iles/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/se

ssions-regular/session61/advanceversion/a-hrc-61-74-auv.pdf..................... 15, 16, 17

U.S. Census Bureau, Haiti,

https://www.census.gov/popclock/wor

ld/ha ......................................................................16

U.S. Dep’t of State, Haiti Travel

Advisory (July 15, 2025),

https://travel.state.gov/content/trave

l/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories

/haiti-travel-advisory.html ..................................14

William O'Neill, States Should Not

Return Anyone to Haiti (July 4,

2025),

https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements

-and-speeches/2025/07/statesshould-not-return-anyone-haiti-unexpert-bill-oneill ...................................................18

Holy Bible (New American Bible, Revised ed.)

Leviticus 19:16 .......................................................4

1 John 3:17 .............................................................4

Luke 10:29–37 ........................................................5

John 1:5 ................................................................25

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF

AMICI CURIAE 1

Amici comprise 56 Christian faith leaders who

serve Haitian diaspora communities across the

United States, including Catholic clergy and women

religious (such as sisters); Baptist, Pentecostal,

Presbyterian, and other Protestant and Evangelical

pastors and bishops; and leaders of faith-based

organizations supporting ministries in Haiti, together

with Faith in Action, a global network of religious

leaders and faith-based organizations with a

significant presence in both the United States and

Haiti. Many amici lead churches, parishes, and

fellowships whose congregations include many of the

estimated 352,959 Haitian nationals who hold

Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”). 2

Amici write because they have witnessed

firsthand what any genuine review of conditions in

Haiti would have revealed: that Haiti is in deep crisis

and has been suffering catastrophic deterioration by

every observable measure over the past few years,

including during the critical period between July

2024, when then-DHS Secretary Mayorkas last

designated Haitians as eligible for TPS protection,

and November 2025, when then-DHS Secretary Noem

(“Secretary Noem”) sought to terminate that

protection. These conditions have led many of Faith

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,

and no entity or person, other than amici curiae and their

counsel, made a monetary contribution intended to fund the

preparation or submission of this brief. See Sup. Ct. R. 37.6.

2 A complete list of amici is set forth in the attached Appendix.

in Action’s members, with great sorrow, to suspend

mission trips to Haiti because the security situation

makes travel too dangerous even for experienced

clergy with deep community ties on the ground.

In their ministries, amici have connected with,

and come to know, the Haitian community here in the

United States. They know and have directly

witnessed the unique contributions Haitian TPS

holders make to the fabric of their communities and

congregations. They know Haitian TPS holders as

deeply spiritual, hardworking people who care for

their neighbors. In Springfield, Ohio (where the

Haitian community’s presence has made national

news), and elsewhere, Haitian TPS holders contribute

to the economic and spiritual revitalization of their

communities.

Amici fear for the safety of the Haitian TPS

community, including amici’s own congregants, who

will suffer tremendously if forced to return to their

home country where murder, sexual violence, internal

displacement, and housing- and food-insecurity run

rampant while well-armed criminal gangs work

tirelessly to consolidate and expand their hold on the

country.

Amici’s sustained engagement with Haiti and

the Haitian diaspora communities whose lives depend

on this Court’s decision gives them a direct and

unique insight into conditions in Haiti. This comes

from, among other things, amici’s activities

ministering to their diaspora congregants in the

United States and supporting charitable and spiritual

efforts in Haiti. They actively support churches,

orphanages, community development projects,

feeding programs, assistance for internally displaced

persons, and parish twinning partnerships in Haiti.

Through these missions and their Haitian partner

churches and charities, amici maintain continuous

contact with conditions on the ground.

Amici’s engagement with Haiti mirrors the deep

bonds between Haiti and American society more

broadly. Many Americans have traveled to Haiti on

mission trips, adopted Haitian children, contributed

to Haitian charities, and maintained lasting ties of

friendship and kinship with the Haitian people. Many

support family members still living in Haiti. These

bonds are a testament to the enduring relationship

between Haiti and the United States, a relationship

rooted in love, faith, and shared humanity.

Amici urge this Court to recognize that by

arbitrarily ignoring the deteriorating conditions in

Haiti, Secretary Noem’s decision to remove TPS

protection subverts both the plain language of the

TPS statute and the moral imperative it codifies.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Congress enacted TPS to replace an arbitrary,

discretionary regime with a mandatory, fact-based

framework for protecting foreign nationals who

cannot safely return home. The statute requires the

Secretary to review conditions in the designated

country and determine whether the basis for

designation continues to be met. Conditions in Haiti

have worsened by every available measure during the

review period—homicides, internal displacement, and

gang territorial control have all increased—yet

Secretary Noem concluded the opposite because she

failed to conduct the reasoned, fact-based analysis the

statute demands. Her “national interest” rationales

are equally unsupported, treating Haitian TPS

holders as instruments of international messaging

rather than as human beings whose lives are at stake.

The Secretary’s conclusions are so contrary to the

evidence that they could not have resulted from the

analysis the statute requires. Her decision was

arbitrary and capricious, and this Court should set

aside the revocation of Haiti’s TPS status.

INTRODUCTION

The United States government tells its citizens

not to travel to Haiti for any reason and advises those

who go anyway to leave DNA samples with their

doctors, draft a will, and establish a proof of life

protocol with their families. Throughout the period

when Secretary Noem was required to review

conditions in Haiti, every measurable indicator of

human suffering—homicides, displacement, gang

territorial control—moved in the same direction:

worse. Yet she concluded, without any credible

analysis, that hundreds of thousands of Haitian

nationals can be sent back there in safety. The TPS

statute was enacted to prevent exactly this kind of

arbitrary decision—and the moral traditions that

inspired it demand better.

Caring for one’s neighbor is a moral imperative

emphasized in numerous cultures and religions, with

particular prominence in Western, Judeo-Christian

teachings. “You shall not . . . stand by idly when your

neighbor’s life is at stake.” Leviticus 19:16. This

command is echoed throughout Christian scripture.

“If someone who has worldly means sees a brother in

need and refuses him compassion, how can the love of

God remain in him?” 1 John 3:17. The Parable of the

Good Samaritan illustrates the same principle. Luke

10:29–37.

Shortly after World War II, the international

community translated this command into the

Principle of Non-Refoulement, which serves as “the

cornerstone of asylum and of international refugee

law.” U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR Note

on the Principle of Non-Refoulement (1997),

https://www.refworld.org/policy/legalguidance/unhcr/

1997/36258 (last visited Apr. 10, 2026). The principle

requires that people “be protected against return to a

place where their life or freedom might be threatened

until it has been reliably ascertained that such

threats would not exist and that, therefore, they are

not refugees.” Id. It “reflects the commitment of the

international community to ensure to all persons the

enjoyment of human rights, including the rights to

life, to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman, or

degrading treatment or punishment, and to liberty

and security of person.” Id.

Accordingly, Article 33(1) of the United

Nations Convention Relating to the Status of

Refugees prohibits signatories, including the United

States, from expelling or returning any refugee “to the

frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would

be threatened on account of his race, religion,

nationality, membership of a particular social group

or political opinion.” Convention Relating to the

Status of Refugees, art. 33(1), July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.

6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. 3

Congress gave this moral obligation the force of

domestic law with the TPS statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a.

As the Government’s opening brief aptly states: the

purpose of the TPS program is to provide “shelter” for

those whose home countries are afflicted by war,

natural disasters, or other extraordinary conditions

that would prohibit their safe return. Brief for

Petitioners at 5–6 [hereinafter “Pet. Br.”]; 8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a(b)(1).

Congress established TPS because the preexisting Extended Voluntary Departure (“EVD”)

system left those seeking refuge at the whim of the

Executive Branch’s discretion and, in some cases,

apathy. With TPS, Congress sought to ensure that

those who needed protection would get it, so it

included detailed procedures for the administration of

the TPS program to ensure that the government lived

up to its moral responsibilities. Congress required

that TPS decisions be made based on a reasonable,

good-faith analysis of the facts, including the facts on

the ground in the affected nation and facts about the

affected population of potential TPS holders.

Although the Secretary retains an appropriate

measure of discretion, she must engage in the

reasoned process specified by Congress, and her

decisions must not be arbitrary, capricious, or so

The United States is party to the United Nations Protocol

Relating to the Status of Refugees, which incorporates articles

2–34 of the Convention. Protocol Relating to the Status of

Refugees, art. I, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No.

6577.

contrary to undisputed facts that the Secretary could

not possibly have undertaken the informed, goodfaith analysis the TPS statute requires.

There is no way to square Secretary Noem’s

purported conclusions with the uncontroverted facts

of Haiti’s circumstances or her statutory obligation to

actually review those circumstances before rendering

a decision. As a result, the Government takes a

different tack, asking this Court to bless any TPS

decision as unfettered. That result would embrace a

misinterpretation of the TPS statute and constitute a

grave moral failure, as thousands of Haitian TPS

holders would be sent back to a nation where—as the

Government itself well knows—they will assuredly

suffer. For many of amici’s congregants, losing TPS

status will be a death sentence.

The Court should decline the Government’s

request.

ARGUMENT

CONGRESS ENACTED TPS TO

REPLACE THE ARBITRARY EVD

REGIME WITH A MANDATORY, FACTBASED FRAMEWORK—THE VERY

FRAMEWORK SECRETARY NOEM

FAILED TO FOLLOW.

Before TPS, the Executive Branch relied on its

“broad latitude in enforcing the immigration laws” to

grant or withhold EVD to certain classes of foreign

nationals. Hotel & Rest. Emps. Union v. Smith, 846

F.2d 1499, 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (opinion of Mikva,

J.); Pet. Br. at 22–23. As the Government highlights,

the Executive’s decisions to extend EVD protections

were largely discretionary and unreviewable. Id. at

23.

TPS was enacted in large part because

Congress viewed that unfettered, discretionary

regime as inadequate to the moral task at hand. See,

e.g., National TPS All. v. Noem, 150 F.4th 1000,

1009–10 (9th Cir. 2025) (discussing Congressional

“concerns about granting unbridled deference to the

Executive branch in determining the country

designations and time periods for relief” leading to the

enactment of the TPS statute to replace the EVD

system’s “ad hoc framework for providing relief”).

TPS’s moral character is apparent on the face

of the statute. It provides refuge in the United States

for those whose home countries are afflicted by war,

natural disaster, or other extraordinary conditions

that prevent people from returning home safely.

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b).

This Court and others have likewise recognized

that the program is a “humanitarian” one. See, e.g.,

Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 593 U.S. 409, 412 (2021)

(recognizing that TPS “provides humanitarian

relief”); Salguero-Fuentes v. Holder, 569 F.3d 399, 400

(8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that TPS provides

“temporary humanitarian relief”).

That moral character is no accident. In the first

floor debates over the Immigration Act of 1990, which

included

the

TPS

statute,

Massachusetts

Representative Joe Moakley, the primary sponsor of

the TPS program and its shepherd through the

House, was explicit that TPS reflected “our deep

moral obligation to protect innocent victims.” 136

Cong. Rec. H8687 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990). He

continued:

[T]hese are good people we seek to

protect. Somehow, I think we owe it to

them. We also owe it to ourselves to

enact this measure. Mr. Chairman,

America is the beacon of freedom and

hope for the people of the world because

of our values and respect for human life

and dignity. This is what makes us great

and unique in the community of nations.

We owe it to ourselves to practice what

we preach. We owe it to ourselves to

uphold our country’s traditions. We owe

it to our posterity to act today in a

manner which will make our children

proud. Let it not be said that the

America of 1990 does not have the heart

and soul to provide this modest

temporary protection to refugees from

war . . . [H]elp save some lives.

Id.

Others echoed that same sentiment. Texas

Representative Jack Brooks defended TPS as “a

compassionate and humanitarian action on the part

of the United States . . . in keeping with the finest of

our national traditions.” Id. at H8685. Pennsylvania

Representative William Gray described it as “a

matter of human compassion.” Id. West Virginia

Representative Nick Rahall emphasized that “[t]he

United States has always been a leader in recognizing

the rights of victims of inescapable violence” and that

“we should continue to protect those who have no

other choice than to leave their homelands.” Id. at

H8687.

Against the backdrop of this moral imperative,

the inadequacies of the pre-TPS discretionary regime

were plain. Pennsylvania Representative William

Gray, for example, pointed to the plight of 14,000

Liberians stranded in the United States: unable to

return home because of rampant civil war and left

without any protections because of administrative

inaction. Id. at H8685. He urged that “[w]hat is

needed now is the force of law to protect these people”

and that “[t]hey need to be removed from the whim of

procedural discretion and administration lethargy.”

Id. Ohio Representative Mary Rose Oakar likewise

advocated passage of TPS because “[t]he current

procedure for extended voluntary departure is so

arbitrary and discretionary that aliens are reluctant

to come forward.” Id. at H8686. TPS would, in her

words, provide “[a]n orderly, systematic procedure for

providing temporary protected status for nationals of

countries undergoing war, civil war, or other extreme

tragedy” and “replace the current ad hoc haphazard

procedure.” Id. Representative Moakley was again

explicit, explaining that TPS “establishes a statutory

framework for future uses of safe haven protection

[and] ends the current ad hoc approach to dealing

with people in need.” Id. at H8687.

The statutory text makes manifest Congress’

desire to “enshrine[] a more formal and orderly

mechanism for group-based grants of humanitarian

protection” than was found in the EVD regime. Pet.

Br. at 23 (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted). It imposes clear procedural guidelines for

determining which nations should be designated

under the statute and, as relevant here, sets out a

detailed analysis that must be conducted before a

country’s TPS designation can be terminated.

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a), (b). In particular, before revoking

a country’s TPS designation, the Secretary of

Homeland Security must (1) “consult[] with

appropriate agencies of the Government”; (2) “review

the conditions in the foreign state (or part of such

foreign state) for which a designation is in effect”; and

(3) “determine whether the conditions for such

designation . . . continue to be met.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a(b)(3).

Lest there be any doubt that the statute was

not intended to carry forward the discretionary

character of the EVD regime, the statute itself uses

the term “discretion” only once, and then only when

describing the ability to extend a country’s TPS

designation “for an additional period of 6 months (or,

in the discretion of the [Secretary], a period of 12 or

18 months).” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(C). 4

4 The same considerations set forth above counsel in favor of a

narrower, rather than broader, interpretation of the

jurisdictional bar set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A). Indeed,

had Congress intended to provide the Executive Branch with

unfettered and unreviewable discretion to grant humanitarian

relief (as the Government contends), it would have remained

silent and left the EVD-regime in place. The existence of the

statute itself disproves any such contention, and the

Congressional record confirms that Congress sought to replace

the EVD-regime precisely because of its wholly discretionary

character.

II.

THE RECORD CONFIRMS THAT

SECRETARY NOEM DID NOT

CONDUCT THE REASONED, FACTBASED REVIEW THE TPS STATUTE

REQUIRES.

Before revoking Haiti’s TPS designation,

Secretary Noem was required to (1) “consult[] with

appropriate agencies of the Government”; (2) “review

the conditions in the foreign state (or part of such

foreign state) for which a designation is in effect”; and

(3) “determine whether,” based on that consultation

and review, Haiti was afflicted by any “extraordinary

and temporary conditions” that would prevent

Haitian nationals “from returning to the state in

safety.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(C), (b)(3). The law, and

respect for the human dignity of those Haitian TPS

holders whose lives she was weighing, demanded that

she undertake this process sincerely and in good faith

and, in so doing, demanded that she “examine the

relevant data and articulate a satisfactory

explanation for [her] action including a rational

connection between the facts found and the choice

made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Where an agency fails to fulfill statutorily

mandated obligations by, for example, failing to

consider important facts and issues, providing

explanations that “run[ ]counter to the evidence,” or

providing explanations that are “so implausible that

[they] could not be ascribed to a difference in view or

the product of agency expertise,” the agency’s actions

are

arbitrary

and

capricious

under

the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Id.; 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A).

Secretary Noem failed to discharge these

responsibilities. As set forth below, the facts show

that Haiti is “a nation deep in crisis.” J.A. 680. Her

decision-making process produced no credible

analysis supporting the contention that Haitian TPS

holders can “return[] to the state in safety”—a

contention that is wholly “counter to the evidence”

and “so implausible that [it] [can]not be ascribed to a

difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”

State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. Rather than follow the

informed, multi-step process the TPS statute

requires, Secretary Noem attempted to apply the

arbitrary process of the previous, now-rejected EVD

system.

Amici do not ask this Court to substitute its

judgment for the Secretary’s on matters committed to

her discretion. They ask only that the Court require

the Secretary to engage in the reasoned fact-based

review process the statute mandates before exercising

that discretion. As set forth below, the overwhelming

and uncontroverted evidence of Haiti’s deterioration

during the review period—evidence the Secretary’s

own decision fails to address—demonstrates that no

such review occurred.

A. Conditions in Haiti Have Worsened by

Every Measure During the Review

Period.

The evidence of Haiti’s deterioration is

overwhelming and uncontroverted. Any genuine

review of conditions—the review the statute

requires—would have confronted these facts. When

then-DHS Secretary Mayorkas last redesignated

Haiti for TPS in July 2024, conditions in the country

were already dire. In the sixteen months that

followed—the period for which Secretary Noem was

required to review whether those conditions “continue

to be met,” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A)—they grew

dramatically worse. Haiti today is among the most

dangerous nations on the planet. On July 15, 2025,

the U.S. State Department issued (and has since

maintained) a “Level 4: Do Not Travel” advisory “due

to kidnapping, crime, terrorist activity, civil unrest,

and limited health care.” U.S. Dep’t of State, Haiti

Travel

Advisory

(July

15,

2025),

https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladviso

ries/traveladvisories/haiti-travel-advisory.html, (last

visited Apr. 10, 2026) (emphasis in original). The

situation is so severe that the State Department

recommends that those traveling to Haiti in spite of

the advisory designate a family member to serve as a

“point of contact” with “kidnappers or hostagetakers”; “[e]stablish a proof of life protocol”; “[l]eave

DNA samples” with their medical providers; “[d]raft a

will”; and “put [their] financial affairs in order” before

leaving. Id.

Haiti is controlled by criminal gangs who,

through violence, kidnapping, rape, and sexual

exploitation, terrorize the population and undermine

any semblance of government authority or control.

Since at least the latter-half of 2024, Haitian gangs

have “attack[ed] state institutions, infrastructure,

private businesses and residences;” expanded their

reach well-outside Port-au-Prince (the capital city);

and have been able to “fortify strategic corridors and

maintain dominance over critical maritime and

overland trafficking routes.” U.N. High Comm’r for

Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in Haiti,

¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/58/76 (July 1, 2025)

https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/58/76, (last visited Apr.

10, 2026) [hereinafter “July 2025 HCHR Report”];

U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Situation of

Human Rights in Haiti (advance unedited version),

¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/61/74 (Mar. 23, 2026),

https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/h

rbodies/hrcouncil/sessionsregular/session61/advance-version/a-hrc-61-74auv.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2026) [hereinafter

“March 2026 HCHR Report”]. The UN describes

gangs “us[ing] violence to assert their criminal control

over populations” and “target[ing] individuals

perceived as collaborating with the police or with selfdefense groups, or as defying gang-imposed ruling.”

March 2026 HCHR Report ¶ 4. This includes using

“sexual violence, including collective rape and sexual

exploitation . . . as a tool to coerce their victims and

assert dominance over communities.” July 2025

HCHR Report ¶ 17.

Homicide rates in Haiti are staggering—and

they worsened during the review period. U.N. data on

reported intentional homicides between July 1, 2024,

and February 1, 2026, reflects a steady march of

death, with monthly totals ranging from 517 (in July

2024) to as high as 998 (in December 2024). See Peace

Security Data Hub, Haiti Security and Crime

Statistics

Dataset,

https://psdata.un.org/dataset/BINUH-SCStats

(choose “Download”; then choose “Download CSV”)

(last visited Apr. 10, 2026). In the months leading up

to Secretary Noem’s November 2025 de-designation,

the tallies were 648 (August), 611 (September), 684

(October), and 696 (November). In comparison, FBI

data on homicides in the U.S. (which has nearly 30

times Haiti’s population) identified 1,046 homicides in

August 2025, 1,081 in September, 981 in October, and

940 in November. U.S. Census Bureau, Haiti,

https://www.census.gov/popclock/world/ha

(estimating a Haitian population of 12 million and a

U.S. population of more than 342 million) (last visited

Apr. 10, 2026); Fed. Bureau of Investigation Crime

Data Explorer, Expanded Homicides Reported in the

United

States,

https://cde.ucr.cjis.gov/LATEST/webapp/#/pages/expl

orer/crime/shr (last visited Apr. 10, 2026). Thus Haiti,

a country with approximately 3.5% of our population,

nevertheless experienced 65% as many homicides as

the United States did in that same four-month

period—a per-capita homicide rate roughly nineteen

times that of the United States.

Yet these figures fail to capture the extent of

the horror Haitians are facing in their country. Gang

killings are often incredibly gruesome, following

“trials” in which the “guilty” are sentenced to death,

shot, and their bodies set on fire. March 2026 HCHR

Report ¶ 4. Mass killings inflict further terror on the

population. On October 3, 2024, gangs killed at least

100 people and injured sixteen others in an attack

launched in Pont Sondé (approximately sixty-six

miles north of Port-au-Prince). July 2025 HCHR

Report ¶ 15. And over the course of five days in

December 2024, at least 207 people were killed in a

series of gang executions in Port-au-Prince. Id. In

other cases, groups are executed on the orders of gang

leaders as part of purported Vodou ceremonies. For

instance, in May 2025, 15 elderly men were

“sacrifice[d]” and their throats slashed as part of such

a ceremony. March 2026 HCHR Report ¶ 12. In

January 2026, six women were similarly sacrificed in

another purported ceremony. Id.

The rampant violence has, predictably,

resulted

widespread

and

accelerating

displacement, as well as housing- and food-insecurity.

As of approximately December 2024, “there were at

least 1,041,229 internally displaced people in Haiti,

owing primarily to the escalating armed violence in

the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince.” July 2025

HCHR Report ¶ 21. Over half of these were children.

Id. These people were “forced to seek shelter with host

families with limited financial resources or in

makeshift shelters that lacked basic security, and

where access to food and water was severely limited.”

Id. By September 2025—just two months before

Secretary Noem’s termination decision—that number

had risen to 1,412,199, a 36% increase in ten months,

“primarily driven by escalating gang violence in the

Centre and Artibonite departments.” March 2026

HCHR Report ¶ 16. In other words, during the very

period when the Secretary was supposed to be

assessing whether conditions had improved, the

number of people driven from their homes grew by

nearly 400,000.

The religious community’s experience in Haiti

and ministering to Haitian congregants bears out

these horrific experiences. In March 2025, Catholic

sisters Evanette Onezaire and Jeanne Voltaire were

murdered by gang members who stormed the town of

Mirebalais. Diego López Colín, Armed Gangs Murder

2 Nuns in Haiti, Nat’l Catholic Reg. (Apr. 4, 2025),

https://www.ncregister.com/cna/armed-gangsmurder-2-nuns-in-haiti (last visited Apr. 10, 2026). In

August 2025, an Irish missionary and six others

(including a three-year-old child) were abducted from

the St. Helene Orphanage. James Blears, Haiti: Irish

missionary, orphanage staff, 3-year-old released after

abduction, Vatican News (Aug. 30, 2025),

https://www.vaticannews.va/en/world/news/202508/haiti-irish-missionary-orphanage-staff-free-afterabduction.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2026).

William O’Neill, the U.N. High Commissioner’s

designated expert on human rights in Haiti,

concluded in July 2025 that “[t]he human rights

situation in Haiti is catastrophic by any measure” and

that “[t]here is currently no possibility for a safe,

dignified and sustainable return of Haitians who are

abroad.” Statement of William O’Neill, States Should

Not Return Anyone to Haiti (July 4, 2025),

https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-andspeeches/2025/07/states-should-not-return-anyonehaiti-un-expert-bill-oneill (last visited Apr. 10, 2026).

In fact, he said, “[i]f anything, their country is much

more dangerous than the one they fled” and “nowhere

is safe in Haiti.” Id. That assessment was rendered

four months before Secretary Noem’s termination

decision—and conditions have only deteriorated

since, as the data set forth above confirms.

B. Secretary Noem Found Improvement

Where the Record Shows Only

Deterioration.

The statute required Secretary Noem to

determine whether the conditions that warranted

Haiti’s TPS designation “continue to be met.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a(b)(3)(A). Those conditions did not merely

continue—they

intensified.

Homicides

rose.

Displacement surged by 36%. Gang control expanded

beyond the capital. Yet Secretary Noem concluded, in

late November 2025, that “there are no extraordinary

and temporary conditions in Haiti that prevent

Haitian nationals . . . from returning in safety.” 90

Fed. Reg. 54733, 54735 (Nov. 28, 2025). That

conclusion, given the record before her, could not have

been the product of the reasoned, fact-based analysis

the statute demands.

The sole bases for her conclusion appear to be

that (1) unspecified “parts of the country are suitable

to return to,” (2) a vague hope that a new Gang

Suppression Force might have some success in

stemming the epidemic of violence plaguing the

country, and (3) an expectation of “modest GDP

growth.” Id. None of these rationales engages with

the central, unavoidable fact: conditions in Haiti got

worse during the review period, not better.

Secretary Noem’s contention that “parts of the

country are suitable to return to” is wholly

unsupported by any analysis, data, or evidence (see

J.A. 685–86) and, in any event, cannot be squared

with the indisputable facts: conditions in Haiti are

and have been deteriorating; gangs are expanding

their territorial control over the country; murder,

violence, and sexual violence are rampant; nearly 1.5

million people and counting are displaced from their

homes; and housing- and food-insecurity are

inescapable facts of life for a substantial percentage

of the population. The story of Haiti remains one of

profound human suffering and social collapse.

As for Secretary Noem’s invocation of “modest

GDP growth,” GDP is irrelevant to the question the

statute asks. A nation can post growing GDP figures

while its citizens are being murdered in the streets,

displaced by the hundreds of thousands, and

subjected to gang-imposed rule. Haiti is doing all

three—and all three are getting worse.

To be sure, the Secretary retains an

appropriate measure of discretion in weighing the

evidence and determining whether conditions

warrant a TPS designation, extension, or

termination. But the statute requires that she

actually consider and weigh the evidence. The record

contains no evidence that the Secretary actually

undertook the evaluation process the statute

requires, and the Federal Register notice identifies no

factual basis that could have resulted from such a

process. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b). Notably, the

Government does not even attempt to defend the

reasonability of Noem’s analysis or otherwise suggest

that she engaged in any good-faith effort to comply

with the statute’s mandated review process. Instead,

it pleads that the TPS statute does not require any

“meaningful” consultation with other agencies or

assessment of the facts. Pet. Br. at 36–39. This is

because, according to the Government, the statute

provides the Secretary with substantial “flexibility” in

exercising what the Government describes as

essentially unfettered “discretion to consider relevant

factors.” Pet. Br. at 26, 37.

Indeed, the Government seems to suggest that

requiring Secretary Noem to engage in a reasonable

good-faith analysis in accordance with the express

terms of the statute “upends the statutory scheme

Congress enacted.” Pet. Br. at 26. The Government’s

position rests on its claim that, in TPS, “Congress

deliberately preserved [the] Executive Branch

discretion” featured in the pre-TPS EVD regime. Pet.

Br. at 23. Just the opposite is true. As discussed

above, TPS was enacted in explicit rejection of exactly

that feature of the EVD landscape.

Secretary Noem’s decision, and the explanation

offered in support of it, are so unmoored from the

actual, verifiable facts on the ground in Haiti that she

cannot possibly have engaged in the reasoned

decision-making process required under the law and

mandated by the moral imperative to give due regard

for the lives and humanity of Haitian TPS holders.

The record before her showed a country where

conditions were getting worse by every available

metric. She found the opposite. Her decision, and the

process failure it reflects, violated both the TPS

statute and the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

III. SECRETARY NOEM’S “NATIONAL

INTEREST” RATIONALES ARE

UNSUPPORTED, ILLOGICAL, AND

CONTRARY TO THE STATUTE’S

PURPOSE.

Despite the catastrophic conditions in the

country, the Secretary could still revoke Haiti’s TPS

status if “permitting the aliens to remain temporarily

in the United States is contrary to the national

interest of the United States.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a(b)(1)(C). It is not.

Secretary Noem purported to make such a

finding on three primary bases. Pet. Br. at 12–13.

First, she claimed that TPS acts as a “pull factor” for

illegal immigration from Haiti. Id.; 90 Fed. Reg. at

54737. Second, she found that “Haiti lacks a

functioning central authority capable of maintaining

or sharing” information. Pet. Br. at 13; 90 Fed. Reg.

at 54737. This lack of a functioning government

supposedly “limit[s] the U.S. government’s ability to

screen and vet Haitians in the United States with

[TPS].” Pet. Br. at 13; 90 Fed. Reg. at 54737. Third,

she concluded that ending TPS for Haiti would

“reflect[] a necessary and strategic vote of confidence”

in Haiti’s future. Pet. Br. at 13; 90 Fed. Reg. at 54738.

In addition, she cited the “added strain on local

communities” that results when aliens “overstay

nonimmigrant visas,” notwithstanding the fact that

TPS holders are not within that class of persons. Pet.

Br. at 41–42; 90 Fed. Reg. at 54736. 5 None of these is

a legitimate ground for her decision.

The “national interest” may be an expansive

standard (90 Fed. Reg. at 54735), but it cannot

encompass sophistry and non-sequiturs. TPS cannot

credibly “pull” Haitians to the United States when the

statute’s protections are, by its express terms, limited

to those who are already in the United States at the

time of designation and the administration has

already separately barred Haitians from entering the

country. J.A. 690–91. Likewise, the lack of a

functioning government (which seemed to figure

nowhere in Secretary Noem’s analysis as to whether

Haiti was unsafe) and alleged inability to “vet” TPS

holders makes no sense in the context of persons who

are already in the United States and subject to

eligibility requirements. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c).

The third basis is frightening in its

implications. The Government suggests that it is in

our national interest to force hundreds of thousands

of Haitian nationals to return to Haiti—where they

are likely to experience significant suffering, terror,

and death—so that we can project and message

“confidence” in Haiti’s future.

That messaging goal has nothing to do with the

effect of Haitian TPS holders on our country, their

contributions to our communities, or any risks or

The Government’s brief refers to “the ‘added strain’ TPS

holders place on public resources and ‘an already limited job

market.” Pet. Br. at 41. This grossly misstates the Federal

of “aliens who overstay nonimmigrant visas” rather than TPS

holders. 90 Fed. Reg. at 54736.

dangers they (might allegedly) pose. Secretary Noem

would treat Haitian TPS holders as pawns to be used

in service of vague international messaging so that

“[t]he United States can[] call for bold change on the

ground [without] signaling doubt from afar”

(whatever that is supposed to mean). 90 Fed. Reg. at

54738. Her logic is gruesome. “[E]ven if . . . there

existed conditions that were extraordinary and

temporary that prevented Haitian nationals . . . from

returning in safety” (and such conditions

unquestionably exist here), she advises that it is in

our national interest to force Haitian TPS holders

back anyway so that we can project an unwarranted

message of “confidence.” In other words, the

Government proposes to sacrifice human lives for a

press release.

Haitian TPS holders (like all TPS holders) are

first and foremost human beings. They are here

because Haiti is and has been descending deeper into

chaos, struggling to recover from devastating natural

disasters that opened the door to political violence,

assassinations, and gang control across the country.

Amnesty Int’l, Gang Violence and Unrest in Haiti,

https://www.amnesty.org/en/projects/gang-violencein-haiti/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2026). They are

taxpayers, workers, entrepreneurs, students, friends,

valued community members and congregants, and in

every other meaningful way cherished members of

the societies in which they live. See J.A. 693–94, 710–

13; Brief of Amicus Curiae Springfield Neighbors

United in Opposition to Application to Stay, Trump v.

Miot, No. 25-A-999, at 7–9, 16–23 (U.S. Mar. 16,

2026).

The “national interest” cannot be so expansive

a standard as to encompass any determination or

judgment the Secretary might make and on whatever

basis she might do so. If it were, the TPS program

would be no less discretionary than the EVD regime

Congress sought to improve upon. Indeed, the

Secretary’s reliance on rationales unrelated to the

statutory question—whether conditions in Haiti

prevent safe return—is itself further evidence that

she did not conduct the analysis the statute requires.

Further, any conception of what is “contrary to”

our “national interest” that allows the Government to

sacrifice Haitian TPS holders for the purposes of

international messaging is wholly inconsistent with

the moral imperatives that drove Congress to create

TPS in the first place. Congress enacted TPS to fulfill

“our deep moral obligation to protect innocent

victims.” 136 Cong. Rec. at H8687. It acted because

the EVD regime left vulnerable populations “at the

whim of procedural discretion and administration

lethargy.” Id. at H8685. To use TPS holders as

instruments of international messaging—to force

them back to a country the Government itself warns

is too dangerous to visit—is to replicate the very

moral failure Congress sought to cure.

Secretary Noem’s decision was “unmoored from

the purposes and concerns of the [statute]” and so

“cannot pass muster” under the APA. Judulang v.

Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 64 (2011).

CONCLUSION

Amici believe Haiti can have a better future—

that “the light shines in the darkness, and the

darkness has not overcome it.” John 1:5. But that

hope does not reflect current reality. Haiti’s present is

darker than ever. Secretary Noem offered no credible

explanation for her contrary conclusions because none

exists. The evidence before her showed a country in

accelerating collapse, yet she found the opposite. Her

decision reflects precisely the kind of arbitrary

exercise of executive discretion that Congress enacted

TPS to prevent.

Our traditions teach that we bear a solemn

obligation to protect those who cannot safely return to

their homes. Congress honored that obligation when

it enacted TPS. This Court should hold the

Government to it and demand the statute’s process be

followed.

Dated: April 13, 2026

Respectfully Submitted,

Robert E. Shapiro

Counsel of Record

Corwin J. Carr

Joshua W. Mahoney

Jill M. Doherty

M. Olivia Glass

BARACK FERRAZZANO

KIRSCHBAUM &

NAGELBERG LLP

200 W. Madison St., Suite

3900

Chicago, IL 60606

(312) 984-3100

rob.shapiro@bfkn.com

TABLE OF APPENDICES

LIST OF AMICI CURIAE ........................................ 1a

APPENDIX

List of Amici Curiae

1. Faith in Action

2. Sister Sherline Sasuveur

3. Sister Patricia Dillon

4. Reverend Wayne Watts

5. Reverend Joseph P. Edwige Carre

6. Reverend Doctor Wilguymps Charles

7. Reverend Doctor Wadler Jules

8. Reverend Doctor Evens Jules

9. Reverend Daniel Jeanty

10. Prophet Archer Segur

11. Reverend Pierre Grégoire Saint-Louis

12. Patricia Wawzyneicki

13. Pastor Ronald Surin

14. Pastor Perry Tima

15. Pastor Guylou Louis

16. Pastor Chris Cassagnol

17. Pastor Carlot Celestin

18. Doctor Mary Susan Carlson, M.D.

19. Doctor David Schmidt, M.D.

20. Cheryl Nichols

21. Chaplain Anne Gibbons

22. Bishop Fred Ulysse

23. Reverend Doctor Keny Felix

24. Gail Grady

25. Sister Charlotte Destine

26. Sister Anne Marie Gardiner

27. Sister Mary Nolan

28. Apostle Maureen Manoly

29. Doctor Ralph Cheriza

30. Reverend Sharon Woomer

31. Reverend Tim Hickey, CSSp

32. Reverend Mark Woomer

33. Brother Jean Martin Valliere

34. Reverend Doctor Jean Marc Desire

35. Reverend Doctor Dieufort Fleurissaint

36. Sister Margaret O’Shea

37. Sister Joanne Ralph

38. Reverend Viles Dorsainvil

39. Father Yves Geffrard

40. Reverend Doctor Frantz D. Eugene

41. Reverend Betty Voigt

42. Pastor Hector Clerveaux

43. Reverend Jocelin Maurilus

44. Reverend Founa Augustin Badet

45. Reverend Jennifer Joseph

46. Doctor Leluxe Alexis

47. Reverend Pierre JeanLouis

48. Reverend Timothy Shreenan

49. Reverend Doctor Jean-Yves Marcelon

50. Reverend Doctor Ricardo Bonachy Telemaque

51. Pastor Emmanuel Louiseau

52. Pastor Eddy Jean

53. Reverend Laura Everett

54. Bishop Frantz Saintilma

55. Reverend Doctor Myrlande

DesRosiers

56. Reverend Doctor Varnel Antoine

57. Bishop Serge Jerome

Guillaume-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.