Amicus Curiae Brief — Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al., Petitioners v. Dahlia Doe, et al.

Nos. 25-1083 and 25-1084

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

DAHLIA DOE, et al.,

Respondents.

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

FRITZ EMMANUEL LESLY MIOT, et al.,

Respondents.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE

UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND

AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS

BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION

LAWYERS ASSOCIATION AND IMMIGRATION LAW

SCHOLARS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

RESPONDENTS

ALLISON BINGXUE QUE

ALAN SCHOENFELD

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING Counsel of Record

HALE AND DORR LLP

MEGAN HANDAU

2600 El Camino Real

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

Suite 400

7 World Trade Center

Palo Alto, CA 94306

250 Greenwich St.

WILLIAM POWERS

New York, NY 10007

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING (212) 230-8800

HALE AND DORR LLP

alan.schoenfeld@wilmerhale.com

50 California St.

San Francisco, CA 94111 TANISHA GUPTA

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

2100 Pennsylvania Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20037

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE................................... 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................... 3

BACKGROUND ................................................................. 5

ARGUMENT ....................................................................... 6

I.

TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS IS A

CAREFULLY STRUCTURED, STRICTLY

REGULATED STATUTORY MECHANISM...................... 6

A. Congress Expressly Constrained

The Executive Branch’s Discretion

To Terminate A TPS Designation ...................... 6

B. The “National Interest” Inquiry Is

Narrowly Confined ............................................... 9

1.

“National interest” has no role at

the termination stage .................................... 9

2.

Even if national interest could be

considered at termination, its

relevance is limited ...................................... 10

C. The TPS Statute Imposes No Limit

On The Total Duration Of A TPS

Designation .......................................................... 13

D. TPS Holders Are Strictly Vetted

And Continuously Monitored On An

Individual Basis ................................................... 16

II. TPS IS AN IMPORTANT AND

IRREPLACEABLE HUMANITARIAN

PROTECTION ................................................................ 19

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

A. The Potential Availability Of Asylum

Or Other Protections Does Not

Diminish The Critical Importance

Of TPS................................................................... 19

B. TPS Has Enabled Deep Family And

Workforce Ties .................................................... 24

CONCLUSION ................................................................. 27

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

Barnhart v. Thomas,

540 U.S. 20 (2003) ....................................................... 11

D.A. v. Noem,

800 F.Supp.3d 43 (D.D.C. 2025) ................................ 22

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco

Corporation, 529 U.S. 120 (2000) ............................. 20

Kewayfati v. Bondi,

165 F.4th 342 (5th Cir. 2026) ..................................... 14

King v. Burwell,

576 U.S. 473 (2015) ..................................................... 20

Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States,

579 U.S. 162 (2016) ............................................................... 7

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369 (2024) ..................................................... 15

Matter of C-I-G-M & L-V-S-G-,

29 I&N 291 (BIA 2025) .............................................. 21

National TPS Alliance v. Noem,

150 F.4th 1000 (9th Cir. 2025) ................................... 14

Polselli v. IRS,

598 U.S. 432 (2023) ......................................... 10, 11, 13

United States v. Rodgers,

461 U.S. 677 (1983) ....................................................... 7

Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v.

DHS, 50 F.4th 164 (D.C. Cir. 2022) .......................... 14

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

STATUTES

8 U.S.C.

§ 1101 ...................................................................... 14, 20

§ 1158 ................................................................ 18, 20, 22

§ 1182 ............................................................................ 18

§ 1184 ............................................................................ 14

§ 1226 ............................................................................ 22

§ 1231 ...................................................................... 20, 22

§ 1254a ...................................... 3, 5-11, 14, 16-18, 21-23

American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First

Century Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-133,

114 Stat. 1251 .............................................................. 14

EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS

Proclamation No. 10988, Restricting and

Limiting the Entry of Foreign Nationals to

Protect the Security of the United States,

90 Fed. Reg. 59,717 (Dec. 19, 2025) .......................... 23

Employment Authorization Reform for

Asylum Applicants, 91 Fed. Reg. 8616

(Feb. 23, 2026) ....................................................... 22, 23

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

135 Cong. Rec. 25811 (1989) ............................................... 8

135 Cong. Rec. 25837 (1989)

(statement of Rep. Richardson) ................................. 8

135 Cong. Rec. 25838 (1989)

(statement of Rep. Levine) ......................................... 8

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

136 Cong. Rec. H8687 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990)

(statement of Rep. Moakley) .................................... 18

136 Cong. Rec. 19559 (1990)

(statement of Rep. Fish) ........................................... 15

136 Cong. Rec. 19560 (1990)

(statement of Rep. Mazzoli) ...................................... 15

136 Cong. Rec. 27130 (1990)

(statement of Rep. Gray)........................................... 20

136 Cong. Rec. 27130 (1990)

(statement of Rep. Oakar)........................................... 9

136 Cong. Rec. 27132 (1990)

(statement of Rep. Moakley) ...................................... 9

Temporary Safe Haven Act of 1987: Hearing

Before the Subcommittee on Immigration,

Refugees, and International Law of the

House Committee on the Judiciary,

100th Cong. (1987) ........................................................ 8

OTHER AUTHORITIES

American Immigration Council, The

Contributions of Temporary Protected

Status Holders to the U.S. Economy

(Sept. 2023), https://tinyurl.com/583st3xw ............. 26

American Immigration Lawyers Association,

Policy Brief: USCIS’s Unlawful Asylum

Dismissals Increase Government

Inefficiency and Harm Asylum

Seekers (Sept. 22, 2025),

https://tinyurl.com/3zzn9swz .................................... 21

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Chishti, Muzaffar & Kathleen Bush-Joseph,

Trump Administration’s Expansion of

Fast-Track Deportation Powers is

Transforming Immigration Enforcement,

Migration Policy Institute (Sept. 25, 2025),

https://tinyurl.com/urkvczhc ..................................... 21

DHS, Office of Biometric Identity

Management, Biometrics,

https://www.dhs.gov/biometrics

(visited Apr. 13, 2026) ................................................ 17

FWD.US, Temporary Protected Status

Protects Families While Boosting the U.S.

Economy (Apr. 7, 2026),

https://tinyurl.com/bdzx6wfp.................................... 25

Nehamas, Nicholas, et., How Trump Purged

Immigration Judges to Speed Up

Deportations, N.Y. Times (Apr. 9, 2026),

https://tinyurl.com/ycyzh3ey .................................... 23

Silva, Daniella, Asylum-Seekers Increasingly

Face Detention While Their Cases Proceed,

in a Departure from the Past, NBC News

(Mar. 13, 2026), https://tinyurl.com/42bpwfcf........... 21

Sullivan, Tim, Asylum-Seekers Stuck in Limbo

As U.S. Orders Them to Countries They’ve

Never Been To, PBS News (Apr. 2, 2026),

https://tinyurl.com/46n47jnn ..................................... 21

TRAC, Immigration Court Backlog: Overall

Down, Asylum Backlog Up (Mar. 20, 2025),

https://tinyurl.com/3ypsw8p6 ................................... 23

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

United States Immigration & Customs

Enforcement, Directive (Feb. 18, 2025),

https://tinyurl.com/4e6vw6p9 ................................... 22

USCIS, Form I-765, Instructions for

Application for Employment Authorization

https://tinyurl.com/yc3j2dpz (visited

Apr. 13, 2026) ................................................................. 22

USCIS, Form I‑821, Application for Temporary

Protected Status, https://www.uscis.gov/i-821

(visited Apr. 13, 2026) .............................................. 16, 17

USCIS, Temporary Protected Status,

https://tinyurl.com/236atxy9 (visited

Apr. 13, 2026) ................................................................... 17

Villero, Jesus, et al., 550,000 Workers Lose

Status by End of 2025: Potential Impact

by State and Industry, Penn Wharton

Budget Model (Nov. 19, 2025),

https://tinyurl.com/yne486vd .................................... 26

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Nos. 25-1083 and 25-1084

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

DAHLIA DOE, et al.,

Respondents.

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

FRITZ EMMANUEL LESLY MIOT, et al.,

Respondents.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE

UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND

AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS

BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION

LAWYERS ASSOCIATION AND IMMIGRATION LAW

SCHOLARS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

RESPONDENTS

2

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amici curiae include an association of more than

18,000 practicing immigration attorneys and 77

individual law scholars who bring complementary

practical and scholarly perspectives to the legal

questions presented in this case.

The brief is joined by the American Immigration

Lawyers Association (“AILA”). Founded in 1946, AILA

is a national, nonpartisan, nonprofit association with

more than 18,000 members throughout the United

States and abroad, including lawyers and law school

professors who practice and teach in the field of

immigration and nationality law. AILA seeks to

promote justice, advocate for fair and reasonable

immigration law and policy, and advance the quality of

immigration and nationality law and practice. AILA’s

members practice regularly before the Department of

Homeland Security, immigration courts, and the Board

of Immigration Appeals, as well as before the federal

courts. AILA has participated as amicus in numerous

cases before the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the U.S.

Supreme Court.

This brief is also joined by law scholars across the

country who focus their research, scholarship, and

teaching on U.S. immigration law. See Appendix for List

of Amici. Amici scholars include experts on Temporary

Protected Status (“TPS”), asylum, and other forms of

humanitarian relief, as well as on executive power and

administrative law in the immigration context. Amici

1

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,

and no entity or person, other than amici curiae, their members, and

their counsel, made a monetary contribution intended to fund the

preparation or submission of this brief.

3

scholars submit this brief in their individual capacities

and reference their university affiliations for

identification purposes only.

Collectively, amici have studied, taught, or practiced

immigration law, including the TPS statute, for

hundreds of years. Through that work, they have

developed a strong professional interest in the proper

administration and faithful interpretation of the TPS

statute, and in ensuring that statutory humanitarian

protections function as Congress intended.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) is a statutorily

authorized humanitarian program that grants the

Executive a specified measure of discretion at the

designation stage, while strictly cabining the

Executive’s discretion to terminate a designation. Once

a country is designated,2 the Secretary of Homeland

Security must conduct periodic review and may

terminate a TPS designation only upon determining that

the statutory conditions that warranted designation no

longer persist. Absent such determination, the statute

mandates continuation. The TPS statute therefore

reflects Congress’s intent to replace prior unpredictable

and opaque safe-haven decisions with a regime that

offers clarity, stability, and predictable administration.

In defending the Secretary’s decisions to terminate

Haiti’s and Syria’s TPS designations, the government

2

The TPS statute authorizes designation of a “foreign state (or

any part of such foreign state).” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1). For

purposes of brevity, this brief refers to designations of a country or

“country-wide” conditions, without intending to suggest that the

statute excludes region-based designations or region-wide

conditions.

4

leans heavily on the Secretary’s invocations of “national

security” and “public safety” concerns. The government

misreads the TPS statute. For one, the statute

references “national interest” only as a narrow

limitation on one of the three designation grounds, not

as a freestanding basis for termination. Separately,

Congress addressed any potential public safety concerns

through the statute’s strict, individualized vetting,

continuous monitoring, and mandatory disqualification

of any TPS holder who poses a risk—not through

authorization for categorical termination of a countrylevel designation.

The government’s contention that long-standing

TPS designations have “outstripped” the statute’s

criteria because they have lasted “many years or even

decades” misunderstands the TPS framework.

Congress could have made duration itself a factor for

termination, but it did not. Instead, the statute ties

continuing designation to a single substantive inquiry:

whether the conditions in the foreign country justifying

designation under the statute continue to exist. Longrunning designations made under the TPS statute are

not a loophole; they are the expected consequence of a

statutory scheme that makes protection contingent on

country conditions rather than elapsed years.

The

government’s

suggestion

that

other

humanitarian protections can substitute for TPS ignores

the designation’s purpose and function. Unlike asylum

or withholding of removal, TPS provides protections to

nationals of a designated country who are present in the

United States in response to enumerated, country-wide

crises—even when they cannot show individualized past

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on one

of the five protected grounds. The statute promotes

stability through specific forms of protection, including

5

protection from removal and detention, as well as work

authorization.

TPS holders and their families,

employers, and communities accordingly have

structured their lives around the statute’s promise of

continued protection and employment authorization

absent a lawful determination that conditions have

changed.

BACKGROUND

TPS is a statutorily authorized humanitarian program

that allows foreign nationals already present in the United

States to stay, live, and work when conditions in their

home countries make return unsafe. Enacted in 1990, TPS

was designed to replace the Executive’s prior ad hoc

practice of granting nationality-based safe haven, such as

Extended Voluntary Departure (“EVD”), with a

structured legislative framework that authorizes country

designations based on armed conflict, natural disasters, or

extraordinary conditions, and grants protection to

nationals of that country who are physically present in the

United States at the time of designation. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a.

Congress preserved the Executive’s ability to respond

quickly to humanitarian crises, while simultaneously

imposing standards, procedures, and oversight lacking in

EVD. In particular, the TPS statute sets forth objective

eligibility criteria, mandatory consultation and review

requirements, and reporting obligations to Congress and

the public. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1), (b)(3), (c)(2)(B), (c)(3)(C),

(i)(1).

While in effect, TPS confers on its recipients three

mandatory protections:

protection from removal,

protection from detention based on immigration status,

and authorization to work. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1)(A),

(a)(1)(B), (d)(4).

6

ARGUMENT

I.

TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS IS A CAREFULLY

STRUCTURED, STRICTLY REGULATED STATUTORY

MECHANISM

A. Congress Expressly Constrained The Executive Branch’s Discretion To Terminate A

TPS Designation

TPS is not an amorphous humanitarian policy, but

instead a carefully designed statutory mechanism. The

TPS statute draws a deliberate distinction between the

Secretary’s authority to designate a country for TPS and

his authority to extend or terminate an existing

designation. At the designation stage, the Secretary

retains substantial discretion to decide whether to act at

all. Once a designation has been made, however,

Congress significantly curtailed that discretion through

mandatory procedures and a presumption of

continuation.

Designation.

Section 1254a(b)(1) governs

designation. That provision authorizes the Secretary,

after consultation with appropriate government

agencies, to designate a foreign country for TPS if the

Secretary finds the existence of any one of three

statutorily defined, alternative grounds for designation:

(1) an ongoing armed conflict posing a serious threat to

the personal safety of returning nationals; (2) an

environmental disaster resulting in “substantial[] but[]

temporary disruption,” such that the foreign state

cannot adequately receive returning nationals and has

officially requested designation; or (3) “extraordinary

and temporary conditions in the foreign state”

preventing safe return, unless the Secretary finds that

permitting the noncitizens to remain temporarily in the

7

United States “is contrary to the national interest of the

United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(A)-(C).

Even when any of these grounds for designation is

found to exist, the statute does not require designation.

Instead, the statute provides that the Secretary “may

designate” a foreign state for TPS, if one of the three

enumerated findings is made. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b)(1)

(emphasis added). As this Court has explained, the word

“may” ordinarily confers discretion. United States v.

Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983). Congress thus

afforded the Secretary broad latitude at the front end of

the program, allowing him to respond quickly—or to

decline to act at all—to developing crises in foreign

countries, even where conditions are severe.

Extension and termination. Once a country has

been designated, however, the statute expressly

narrows the Secretary’s discretion and creates a

presumption of continuation.

In particular, at least 60 days before a designation

expires, the Secretary, in consultation with appropriate

agencies, “shall review” conditions in the foreign state

and “shall determine whether the conditions for such

designation … continue to be met.”

8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a(b)(3)(A) (emphases added). Termination is

authorized only if the Secretary, after the mandatory

periodic review, determines the country “no longer

continues to meet the conditions for designation[.]” Id.

§ 1254a(b)(3)(B). Compared to the designation stage, the

change in statutory language is critical. “Unlike the

word ‘may,’ which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’

usually connotes a requirement.” Kingdomware Techs.,

Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162, 171 (2016).

If the Secretary fails to make a timely

determination—because he concludes that conditions

8

persist or because he does not act at all—the statute

mandates an automatic six-month extension (or 12 or 18

months in the Secretary’s discretion).

8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a(b)(3)(C).

***

The TPS statute’s bifurcated allocation of discretion

was not happenstance. Congress enacted TPS to replace

the “ad hoc” and unpredictable EVD program with a

carefully crafted statutory framework that offers clarity

and stability. See Temporary Safe Haven Act of 1987:

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,

Refugees, and International Law of the H. Comm. on the

Judiciary, 100th Cong. 2 (1987) (statement of Rep.

Mazzoli) (noting decisions under EVD were “being made

on an ad hoc basis without proper guidelines or

standards”); 135 Cong. Rec. 25811, 25837 (1989)

(statement of Rep. Richardson) (precursor to TPS

statute would provide beneficiaries with certainty about

“what [their] rights are, how the Justice Department

determines what countries merit EVD status [and] how

long they will be able to stay”).

Congress designed this structure to ensure

predictability and to insulate humanitarian protection

from shifting political considerations. Referring to

disputes in the 1980s between Congress and the

Executive over whether to protect Central Americans

fleeing armed conflict, one representative cautioned that

“[o]ur recent domestic political squabble over the

relative merits of Salvadorans and Nicaraguans as

political refugees should never be repeated.” 135 Cong.

Rec. 25838 (1989) (statement of Rep. Levine). The TPS

statute was to address the concern that “[t]he current

procedure for extended voluntary departure is so

arbitrary and discretionary that aliens are reluctant to

9

come forward.” 136 Cong. Rec. 27130 (1990) (statement

of Rep. Oakar). The proposed regime was lauded

because it “establishe[d] a statutory framework for

future uses of safe haven protection” and “end[ed] the

current ad hoc approach to dealing with people in need.”

136 Cong. Rec. 27132 (1990) (statement of Rep.

Moakley). In short, Congress replaced EVD with TPS

so that humanitarian protection would no longer be

contingent on opaque and unpredictable Executive

decision-making. The limits Congress imposed on TPS

termination decisions are integral to that design.

B. The “National Interest” Inquiry Is Narrowly

Confined

In defending the Secretary’s termination decisions,

the government relies heavily on the purported

“national interest” or “national security” concern. See

U.S. Br. 3-5, 9, 12-13, 17-18, 22, 39-42. That reliance,

however, is misplaced for two independent reasons.

1. “National interest” has no role at the

termination stage

First, the statutory text makes clear that “national

interest” has no role at all in the periodic review and

termination of a TPS designation. This is because

Congress sharply limited the Secretary’s discretion

during periodic review and termination by confining the

inquiry to conditions in the foreign state. In particular,

before a designation expires, the Secretary “shall review

the conditions in the foreign state … for which a

designation is in effect” and determine whether those

conditions continue to be met. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A)

(emphasis added). And termination is authorized only if

the Secretary “determines under subparagraph (A)”

that the foreign state no longer satisfies those

conditions. Id. § 1254a(b)(3)(B). Because “national

10

interest” necessarily turns on considerations within the

United States, it falls outside the scope of a review

confined to conditions “in the foreign state.”

That limitation is deliberate. Indeed, Congress

expressly referred to both “conditions in the foreign

state” and “national interest of the United States”

considerations in the designation provision itself. 8

U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(C). Instead of folding national

interest into the assessment of conditions abroad, that

provision treats “national interest” as a separate,

additional inquiry for one of the three designation

grounds.

By contrast, Congress directed that periodic review

and termination focus exclusively on “conditions in the

foreign state,” and it omitted any reference to national

interest from subsections (b)(3)(A) and (B). Reading

“national interest” back into these subsections would

collapse

the

distinction

Congress

carefully

drew. Polselli v. IRS, 598 U.S. 432, 439, 441 (2023) (“We

assume that Congress ‘acts intentionally and

purposely’ when it ‘includes particular language in one

section of a statute but omits it in another section of the

same Act.’”).

2. Even if national interest could be

considered at termination, its relevance

is limited

Second, even if the statute permitted consideration

of “national interest” at the periodic review and

termination stage, its relevance should be limited to

circumstances where it constituted the grounds for

designation. As discussed above (supra, I.A), the statute

authorizes the Secretary to designate a country for TPS

if any one of three distinct, alternative grounds for

designation is satisfied.

The “national interest”

11

language appears only under the third ground, operating

as a limiting proviso: the Secretary may designate

under subsection (b)(1)(C) “unless [he] finds that

permitting the aliens to remain temporarily in the

United States is contrary to the national interest of the

United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(C). Under

settled principles of statutory interpretation, “a limiting

clause or phrase should be read to modify only the noun

or phrase that it immediately follows.” Barnhart v.

Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 21 (2003). The “national interest”

proviso therefore qualifies only the extraordinaryconditions pathway, not the other two designation

grounds.

That structure carries forward into periodic review.

The statute provides that, before a designation expires,

the Secretary “shall review the conditions in the foreign

state … for which a designation is in effect under this

subsection and shall determine whether the conditions

for such designation under this subsection continue to

be met.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added).

The phrases “for which” and “for such designation” are

limiting: read together, they clearly require the

Secretary to review the specific conditions that justified

the designation in the first instance, not to conduct a

free-ranging

reassessment

under

alternative

designation grounds that were not invoked. Courts

“ordinarily aim to give effect to every clause and word

of a statute,” Polselli, 598 U.S. at 441, and the “for

which” language would be stripped of meaning if

periodic review could pivot to unrelated grounds.

Likewise, termination decisions are expressly

tethered to that same condition-specific review as

explained above. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(B); supra,

I.B.1. Read together, subsections (b)(3)(A) and (B)

establish a coherent rule: termination must rest on the

12

determination that the same statutory conditions

supporting designation no longer exist. Thus, where a

country was designated based on armed conflict or

natural disaster, the Secretary may not terminate that

designation by invoking “national interest,” a

consideration that played no role in the original

designation.

The same logic applies where a country such as

Syria has been designated or re-designated on more

than one ground.

25A952 Opp. 6.

In that

circumstance, a designation supported by multiple

qualifying conditions cannot be terminated based on

only one condition, so long as another continues to

warrant protection. Rather, periodic review must

assess whether each of the conditions “for which” the

designation is in effect continues to exist, and

termination is authorized only if the Secretary

determines that none of those conditions remains

satisfied.

This reading is reinforced by longstanding agency

practice. Prior to 2025, the “sole rationale cited to

justify termination of TPS has been an end to the

temporary country conditions which authorized the

initial designation.” J.A. 296 (Ex. 7) (emphasis

added). In short, the text, structure, and historical

application of Section 1254a foreclose the

government’s attempt to use “national interest” as a

roving blanket justification for termination. To hold

otherwise would permit precisely the kind of

discretionary, post-hoc decision-making Congress

enacted TPS to prevent.

13

C. The TPS Statute Imposes No Limit On The

Total Duration Of A TPS Designation

The government appears to take the position that

TPS designations are necessarily of limited duration.

See U.S. Br. 44 (noting it is “unremarkable” that the

Secretary found “a series of ‘temporary’ designations

that have lasted many years or even decades” “have

outstripped the TPS statute’s criteria”). That is not

what the statute requires or envisions. The plain text of

the statute and legislative history confirm that Congress

intended TPS designations to continue for as long as the

statutory conditions persist, not to lapse after some

implicitly limited period of time.

The TPS statute contains no provision capping the

total length of time a TPS designation may remain in

effect; nor does it impose any limit on the number of

extensions the Secretary may grant.

Instead,

continuation of TPS turns on a single substantive

inquiry: whether the designated country continues to

experience the conditions for which it was designated.

Supra, I.A. Where Congress wished to impose temporal

constraints within TPS, it did so expressly—by fixing

the duration of each discrete designation period or

extension and by requiring periodic review at specified

intervals. Id. Congress’s choice to regulate the timing

of review and the length of each individual designation,

while declining to limit the number of extensions or the

total period of protection, must be given effect. See

supra, p.10 (citing Polselli, 598 U.S. at 439).

Indeed, when Congress intends to limit the

maximum duration of an immigration status or program,

it does so expressly. For example, Congress generally

limited the maximum allowable period a noncitizen may

live and work in the United States pursuant to an H-1B

14

visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4) (providing that H-1B

status “may not exceed 6 years”).3 Congress likewise

capped the duration of Q-1 cultural-exchange visas and

R-1 religious-worker visas. See id. § 1101(a)(15)(Q) (“for

a period not to exceed 15 months”); id. § 1101(a)(15)(R)

(“for a period not to exceed 5 years”); Washington All.

of Tech. Workers v. DHS, 50 F.4th 164, 178 n.3 (D.C. Cir.

2022) (recognizing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(Q) and

(a)(15)(R) “state the maximum allowable time of

admission for that class”). In each instance, Congress

used unmistakable language—“may not exceed”—to

impose a maximum temporal limit.

The statute’s use of the term “temporary” does not

suggest otherwise. As reflected in the statutory design

and legislative history, the word “temporary” describes

both the time‑limited nature of each discrete designation

period and the non-permanent character of the relief

itself. Courts have recognized that TPS does not confer

lawful permanent status and provides no independent

pathway to permanent residence. See, e.g., Kewayfati v.

Bondi, 165 F.4th 342, 348 (5th Cir. 2026); National TPS

All. v. Noem, 150 F.4th 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2025). The

TPS statute itself further requires that a supermajority

of the Senate is required to grant permanent resident

status to TPS holders. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(h)(2). TPS

remains “temporary” even when extended repeatedly

because its protection is contingent on continuing

country conditions.

Where the statutory text establishes a clear rule,

legislative history may properly be consulted to confirm

3

Later, Congress explicitly amended this limitation by

extending the maximum period for specific groups of individuals.

American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of

2000, Pub. L. No. 106-133, 114 Stat. 1251, 1253, 1254.

15

Congress’s design.

See Loper Bright Enters. v.

Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 393 (2024) (“The text of the

APA means what it says. And a look at its history if

anything only underscores that plain meaning.”). In

debating legislative fixes to EVD that eventually

became the current TPS statute, legislators repeatedly

noted their frustrations that “the process by which EVD

grants are made, extended, or terminated” were

“utterly mysterious,” due to the lack of “statutory

criteria to guide the administration in its actions.” 136

Cong. Rec. 19560 (1990) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli).

TPS was drafted to address congressmembers’ concerns

that the EVD determination process had “no criteria …

which specifie[d] when extended voluntary departure

c[ould] be granted.” 136 Cong. Rec. 19559 (1990)

(statement of Rep. Fish). By establishing extensions as

the statutory default and strictly limiting the grounds

for termination, Congress ensured that a TPS

designation—unlike EVD—would remain in place so

long as the designated country continues to meet the

statutory conditions.

Thus, repeatedly renewed TPS designations—such

as those for Syria and Haiti—are not anomalies or

loopholes, but the expected product of the statutory

scheme Congress enacted.

Since Haiti was first

designated in 2010 and Syria in 2012, successive

administrations have repeatedly conducted the

mandatory reviews required by the statute and

concluded that the conditions supporting redesignations and extensions continue to exist. See

25A952 Opp. 5-6; J.A. 638-643. Extensions followed not

because of inertia or administrative indulgence, but

because the statute required them once the relevant

conditions were found to persist.

16

D. TPS Holders Are Strictly Vetted And

Continuously Monitored On An Individual

Basis

The government also attempts to justify the

Secretary’s termination of TPS for Syria and Haiti by

pointing to “public safety” concerns, specifically, the

purported difficulty of reliably vetting applicants from

those countries. See U.S. Br. 9, 13. This administration

has repeatedly and baselessly accused TPS holders of

posing threats to public safety. See, e.g., J.A. 280-293

(Ex. 6) (detailing statements made by the President

against Haitian TPS holders in Springfield, Ohio); J.A.

305-306 (Ex. 8) (X post by former Secretary Kristi Noem

in which she suggests TPS is an “immigration scheme[]

that make[s] Americans less safe”). The TPS statute,

however, leaves no room for such a generalized

rationale. This is because Congress addressed public

safety risks through individualized safeguards: TPS

holders are subject to exhaustive vetting at the outset,

continuous individualized review thereafter, and

mandatory termination or disqualification if they pose a

danger. Nothing in the statute authorizes the Secretary

to treat an entire country designated for TPS as a public

safety risk in lieu of those individualized determinations.

First, the TPS statute imposes rigorous disclosure

and screening obligations as part of the application

process. Applicants must provide detailed information

regarding criminal and immigration history in both the

United States and abroad, including arrest reports,

statements of charges, indictment information, and

certified court dispositions when applicable.

See

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(iv); USCIS, Form I‑821,

Application for Temporary Protected Status. They

must also disclose personal identifying information

concerning their spouses, former spouses, and children,

17

including—where relevant—immigration statuses, alien

registration numbers, addresses, birth dates, marriage

dates, and dates and grounds for dissolution. Id. After

submitting these materials, applicants must appear for

biometrics

appointments,

during

which

their

fingerprints, photographs, and signatures are collected

for identity verification and security screening. USCIS,

Temporary Protected Status; DHS, Office of Biometric

Identity Management, Biometrics. Applicants must

further establish continuous physical presence in the

United States since the effective date of the most recent

designation, and they must apply within the designated

registration window. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A). USCIS

thus receives a comprehensive account of each

applicant’s identity, background, and residence history.

Failure to satisfy these requirements results in denial of

eligibility. Id.

Second, Section 1254a requires ongoing vetting of

TPS holders to ensure continued eligibility and to

identify any emerging security concerns. TPS holders

must re-register at the end of each 12-month period of

protected status. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(3)(C). Reregistration requires renewed biometrics collection and

background checks. USCIS, Temporary Protected

Status. It also requires continued confirmation of

physical presence, subject only to narrow allowances for

brief, casual, and innocent absences that are authorized

or compelled by emergency circumstances. 8 U.S.C. §

1254a(c)(4). If a TPS holder fails to re-register, or if the

Secretary determines that the TPS holder is no longer

eligible, the statute mandates revocation of the TPS

status. Id. § 1254a(c)(3).

Third, based on the information collected in the

vetting process, the TPS statute imposes categorical

eligibility bars excluding noncitizens with criminal

18

records or other security concerns.

Individuals

convicted of any felony or more than one misdemeanor

in the United States are ineligible for TPS. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a(c)(2)(B)(i). Individuals convicted of or involved

with certain serious crimes in the United States or

abroad, including any involvement with terrorist

activity or persecution of others, as well as those for

whom there are “reasonable grounds for regarding

[them] as a danger to the security of the United States,”

are not eligible for TPS. Id. § 1158(b)(2)(A) (crossreferenced and incorporated by § 1254a(c)(2)(B)(ii)); id.

§ 1254a(c)(1)(A)(iii) (citing id. § 1254a(c)(2)(A)); id.

§ 1254a(c)(2)(A)(iii)(III) (citing id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)). The

TPS statute further limits the Secretary’s ability to

waive certain disqualifying conduct, including crimes

involving moral turpitude and other grounds of

inadmissibility tied to threats to the United States. Id.

§ 1254a(c)(2)(A)(iii) (citing id. § 1182). As the relevant

congressional record made clear, the TPS program was

designed to “den[y] protection to anyone convicted of

criminal activity, or who would be inadmissible to the

United States under our immigration laws.” 136 Cong.

Rec. H8687 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep.

Moakley). Against that backdrop, generalized claims

about unreliable vetting in particular countries cannot

justify terminating a TPS designation wholesale.

Vetting under TPS is individualized and continuous, and

the statute provides individualized mechanisms to deny

or withdraw status where an applicant or recipient

presents a risk. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2), (c)(3). By

contrast, once a country has been designated, the statute

authorizes termination of that country-level designation

only on limited grounds tied to enumerated statutory

conditions. See supra, I.A & B.

19

The flaw in the government’s reasoning is especially

evident given that most TPS holders have already

undergone re-registration based largely on verifiable,

U.S.-based conduct and records developed during their

period of authorized presence. The government offers

no coherent explanation why those individuals

nonetheless are dangerous or why they cannot continue

to re-register under the existing system, subject to

renewed background checks and mandatory revocation

if they become ineligible. In sum, the statute already

requires what the government claims to seek: a

rigorous, individualized screening mechanism excluding

those that pose safety and security risks to the United

States.

II. TPS IS AN IMPORTANT AND IRREPLACEABLE

HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION

A. The Potential Availability Of Asylum Or

Other Protections Does Not Diminish The

Critical Importance Of TPS

The government has taken the position that other

forms of humanitarian relief, such as asylum, are

available to TPS holders and can substitute for TPS. See

No. 25A999, U.S. Stay Application 35-36, No. 25A952,

U.S. Stay Application 31. That argument ignores the

TPS statute’s express, controlling purpose and in any

event is belied by the reality confronting TPS holders.

Congress enacted TPS with recognition of existing

humanitarian

protections—including

asylum,

withholding of removal, and the Executive’s prior use of

EVD—and with a clear understanding that those

mechanisms did not adequately address the range of

dangers or conditions noncitizens may face. Asylum and

withholding of removal, codified in the Refugee Act of

1980 and its subsequent amendments, protect

20

noncitizens who can demonstrate individualized fear of

persecution on account of their race, religion,

nationality, political opinion, and/or membership in a

particular social group. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A),

1231(b)(3)(A). To obtain asylum, a noncitizen must

establish either past persecution or a well-founded fear

of future persecution in her home country based on at

least one of these protected grounds. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(A)

(citing id. § 1101(a)(42)). To obtain withholding of

removal, a noncitizen must satisfy an even more

demanding standard by demonstrating that she will be

persecuted in her home country on account of a

protected ground. Id. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Those forms of

relief, by design, impose demanding and individualized

evidentiary standards and are therefore limited in scope.

TPS was enacted precisely to fill the gap left by

those regimes. In enacting TPS, members of Congress

acknowledged the fact that “not everyone who needs

protection meets the strict standard of asylum.” 136

Cong. Rec. 27130 (1990) (statement of Rep. Gray). TPS

therefore addresses a different category of risk:

country-wide conditions that endanger entire

populations, even when individualized persecution on

account of one of the five protected grounds cannot be

shown. Because TPS was designed to address a

different category of risk than asylum or withholding of

removal, those forms of relief are not substitutes for

TPS. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (it is a “fundamental canon of

statutory construction that the words of a statute must

be read in their context and with a view to their place in

the overall statutory scheme”); King v. Burwell, 576

U.S. 473, 498 (2015) (looking to congressional intent

when examining the Affordable Care Act, stating,

“Congress passed [it] to improve health insurance

21

markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must

interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the

former, and avoids the latter.”).

Moreover, even for noncitizens who may be eligible

for—and who have applied for—asylum or withholding

of removal, TPS provides distinct and irreplaceable

protections that those statutory frameworks do not

offer.

First, TPS confers affirmative protection against

removal (8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1)(A)), which the asylum

and withholding statutes do not categorically provide.

Indeed, the government has forced both affirmative and

defensive asylum applicants into rushed, truncated

proceedings that foreclose meaningful preparation and

judicial review, detaining them far from their counsel

and family. See Silva, Asylum-Seekers Increasingly

Face Detention While Their Cases Proceed, in a

Departure from the Past, NBC News (Mar. 13, 2026);

Chishti & Bush-Joseph, Trump Administration’s

Expansion of Fast-Track Deportation Powers is

Transforming Immigration Enforcement, Migration

Pol’y Inst. (Sept. 25, 2025); AILA, Policy Brief: USCIS’s

Unlawful Asylum Dismissals Increase Government

Inefficiency and Harm Asylum Seekers (Sept. 22, 2025).

The government has also used so-called Asylum

Cooperative Agreements to remove noncitizens to third

countries where they have no ties, without allowing the

merits of their asylum claims to be heard in the United

States. See Matter of C-I-G-M & L-V-S-G-, 29 I&N 291

(BIA 2025); Sullivan, Asylum-Seekers Stuck in Limbo

As U.S. Orders Them to Countries They’ve Never Been

To, PBS News (Apr. 2, 2026). As for those noncitizens

who have been granted withholding of removal or

Convention Against Torture relief, the government is

engaging in the practice of removing them to third

22

countries in which they face torture or immediate illegal

rendition to their home countries. See D.A. v. Noem, 800

F.Supp.3d 43 (D.D.C. 2025); U.S. Immigr. & Customs

Enf’t, Directive (Feb. 18, 2025) (excerpted copy of email

sent by ICE directing agents to determine the viability

of removing noncitizens granted withholding of removal

or Convention Against Torture relief); 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(A).

By contrast, the government is

statutorily prohibited from removing TPS holders from

the United States while their protected status remains

in effect. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1)(A).

Second, TPS also provides categorical protection

from detention (8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4)), another

protection not afforded to individuals with pending

asylum or withholding claims, who may be subject to

mandatory detention or, if denied bond, discretionary

detention (see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a), 1231(a)(2)).

Third, TPS holders receive automatic work

authorization throughout the protected period. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a(a)(2). By contrast, individuals seeking asylum or

withholding of removal are not statutorily guaranteed

work authorization and must wait 180 days before they

can receive work authorization. Id. § 1158(d)(2). USCIS

claims authority to further delay work authorization for

asylum applicants for various reasons unrelated to an

applicant’s ability and need to work. See USCIS, Form

I-765, Instructions for Application for Employment

Authorization, at 22 (delay for those who reschedule

their asylum interviews, relocate to a different asylum

office or interview location, submit additional evidence

after their interview, or fail to provide a competent

interpreter).

Most recently, the Department of

Homeland Security has proposed a rule change designed

to severely limit asylum seekers’ access to work permits.

See Employment Authorization Reform for Asylum

23

Applicants, 91 Fed. Reg. 8616 (Feb. 23, 2026). If

finalized, the rule would pause any issuance of work

permits to asylum applicants indefinitely—for “as long

as 173 years,” according to Department of Homeland

Security estimates. See id. at 8650. The proposed rule

would also impose new, more demanding requirements

on asylum applicants whenever review begins again. See

id. (considering increasing the pre-application waiting

period, increasing the application processing period, and

imposing additional eligibility requirements).

Even setting aside this proposed rule, the difference

between TPS and asylum status is already pronounced

given the length and futility of the asylum process. As

of March 2025, cases before immigration judges took an

average of 636 days to resolve. TRAC, Immigration

Court Backlog: Overall Down, Asylum Backlog Up

(Mar. 20, 2025). That protracted wait increasingly yields

no relief at all: asylum grant rates have plummeted to

just 7% as of February 2026, the lowest rate in all years

for which data is available. Nehamas et al., How Trump

Purged Immigration Judges to Speed Up Deportations,

N.Y. Times (Apr. 9, 2026). Unlike TPS holders—who are

eligible for statutory protections, including work

authorization, while their applications are pending upon

a prima facie showing of eligibility (8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a(a)(4)(B))—asylum applicants receive no

comparable interim protection and must endure a

lengthy and uncertain process before any relief is

granted.

In addition, USCIS has paused adjudications of

asylum applications for individuals from 39 nations,

including Syria and Haiti. See Proclamation No. 10988,

Restricting and Limiting the Entry of Foreign

Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States,

90 Fed. Reg. 59,717 (Dec. 19, 2025). This means that

24

thousands of asylum seekers from Syria and Haiti have

had both their asylum applications—and their lives—put

on hold indefinitely. TPS provides these individuals a

measure of stability in the United States while their

asylum cases remain pending.

B. TPS Has Enabled

Workforce Ties

Deep

Family

And

TPS designations are designed to remain in effect so

long as the statutory conditions in the foreign country

justifying designations persist. Supra, I.A & C. TPS

holders have reasonably structured their lives around

this statutory framework. They have affirmatively

come forward, identified themselves to the government,

and built families, careers, and community ties in this

country on the understanding that the TPS designation

would not be terminated arbitrarily or prematurely

while conditions in their home countries remain dire.

First, many TPS holders—particularly those not

already in removal proceedings or the asylum process—

rendered themselves uniquely vulnerable to adverse

immigration enforcement action by affirmatively

participating in the TPS program. As discussed above,

to obtain TPS, these individuals had to submit personal

identifying information, including biometric data, and

other sensitive personal information not just of

themselves but also their immediate family members.

See supra, I.D. In the ordinary course, the disclosure of

such information to the Department of Homeland

Security could expose a noncitizen to enforcement

action. TPS holders nonetheless did so with the

understanding, consistent with the legislative intent and

plain statutory text, that their TPS would remain valid

so long as their home country’s dangerous conditions

remained.

25

That vulnerability is not an inevitable feature of

holding a temporary status. It is the direct consequence

of the government’s decision to solicit and collect

enforcement-relevant information under a statutory

promise of continued protection. If TPS status is

terminated, the very disclosure the government

required will now likely be used to subject TPS holders

to detention, deportation, and family separation. See

supra, II.A. Thus, participation in the TPS program

itself has placed TPS holders in a uniquely precarious

position where the very act of complying with the

program’s disclosure requirements has created the risk

of severe adverse consequences if a TPS designation is

terminated prematurely.

Second, TPS holders have built families in the

United States during the extended periods in which

Congress authorized them to live and remain present

here. As of 2025, TPS holders live with more than

390,000 U.S. citizen children, and more than 410,000 U.S.

citizen adults. FWD.US, Temporary Protected Status

Protects Families While Boosting the U.S. Economy

(Apr. 7, 2026). As courts below correctly noted, removal

or detention following the revocation of TPS would

expose those families to separation. J.A. 29, 706. While

TPS holders understood that their status was not

permanent, Congress designed TPS precisely to allow

individuals to live, work, and remain present in the

United States for as long as conditions in their home

countries made return unsafe. Family formation over

extended periods is therefore not an incidental

byproduct of TPS; it is the foreseeable and intended

result of a protection that may, and often does, last for

decades.

Third, TPS holders have likewise built their careers

pursuant to the work authorization expressly granted by

26

the statute. That authorization has enabled TPS holders

to participate in the U.S. workforce at exceptionally

high rates. In 2021, 94.6% of TPS holders nationwide

were employed.

American Immigr. Council, The

Contributions of Temporary Protected Status Holders

to the U.S. Economy 2 (Sept. 2023). Many TPS holders

have built substantial careers, obtained professional

licenses, and pursued long-term economic advancement

in reliance on their lawful ability to work. In this very

case, Respondents include a neuroscientist researching

Alzheimer’s disease, a software engineer at a national

bank, a laboratory assistant in a toxicology department,

a college economics major, and a full-time registered

nurse. J.A. 633. TPS holders’ deep integration into this

country’s workforce and society again reflects the

statutory design, which encourages TPS holders to

support themselves and integrate productively into

American society while return to their home countries

remains unsafe.

The premature and unlawful

termination of their TPS status would immediately

force self-sufficient, fully authorized workers into

unemployment and destroy careers built over decades,

with cascading effects on their families, employers,

communities, and local economies. Villero et al., 550,000

Workers Lose Status by End of 2025: Potential Impact

by State and Industry, Penn Wharton Budget Model

(Nov. 19, 2025) (finding that “TPS workers are 5.4 times

more likely to work in building and grounds cleaning, 3.2

times more likely work in construction, and twice as

likely to work in transportation, making them critical to

these sectors” and that “TPS workers generated $35.9

billion in GDP in 2023”); American Immigr. Council, The

Contributions of Temporary Protected Status Holders

to the U.S. Economy 3 (finding that, in 2021, TPS holder

households generated $10.3 billion in total income, paid

$1.3 billion in federal taxes and $966.5 million in state and

27

local taxes, and held $8 billion in consumer spending

power).

Thus, when the government terminates a TPS

designation despite the continued existence of the

statutory predicates for protection, it does more than

end a “temporary” benefit. It instead upends settled

expectations the statute itself created and penalizes

reliance Congress expressly encouraged. The severe,

ensuing harms therefore are not an inevitable feature of

TPS’s temporary nature, but the predictable

consequence of unlawful, premature agency action.

CONCLUSION

The text, structure, and history of the TPS statute

confirm that Congress did not confer unbounded

discretion on the Executive to terminate protections at

will. The Court should affirm the orders of the district

courts postponing the effective date of the Secretary’s

TPS terminations.

28

Respectfully submitted.

ALAN SCHOENFELD

ALLISON BINGXUE QUE

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING Counsel of Record

MEGAN HANDAU

HALE AND DORR LLP

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

2600 El Camino Real

HALE AND DORR LLP

Suite 400

7 World Trade Center

Palo Alto, CA 94306

250 Greenwich St.

WILLIAM POWERS

New York, NY 10007

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING (212) 230-8800

HALE AND DORR LLP

alan.schoenfeld@wilmerhale.com

50 California St.

San Francisco, CA 94111 TANISHA GUPTA

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

2100 Pennsylvania Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20037

APRIL 2026

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

List of Amici Curiae .......................................................... 1a

1a

AMICI CURIAE

Lucas Guttentag, Professor of the Practice of Law,

Stanford Law School; and Martin R. Flug Lecturer in

Law and Senior Research Scholar in Law, Yale Law

School.

Elora Mukherjee, Jerome L. Greene Clinical Professor

of Law & Director, Immigrants' Rights Clinic, Columbia

Law School.

Jonathan Weinberg, Distinguished Professor of Law,

Wayne State University.

Kate Melloy Goettel, Associate Clinical Professor,

University of Iowa College of Law.

***

Raquel Aldana, Martin Luther King Jr, Professor of

Law, University of California Davis School of Law.

Ashley B. Armstrong, Professor, St. John's University

School of Law.

David Baluarte, Academic Dean & Professor of Law,

City University of New York School of Law.

Lenni Benson, Distinguished Chaired Professor

Immigration and Human Rights Law, New York Law

School.

Diana Blank, Visiting Assistant Clinical Professor and

William R. Davis Clinical Teaching Fellow, Asylum and

Human Rights Clinic, University of Connecticut School

of Law.

Matthew Boaz, Assistant Professor of Law, University

of Kentucky, J. David Rosenberg College of Law.

Richard Boswell, Professor of Law and Director,

Immigrants’ Rights Clinic, University of California

College of the Law, San Francisco.

2a

Kristina Campbell, Professor of Law and Rita G. and

Norman L. Roberts Faculty Scholar Director, Beatriz

and Ed Schweitzer Border Justice Initiative, Gonzaga

University School of Law.

Violeta Chapin, Clinical Professor of Law, University of

Colorado Law School.

Gabriel Chin, Edward L. Barrett Jr. Distinguished

Professor of Law, University of California Davis School

of Law.

Marisa Cianciarulo, Dean and Professor of Law,

Western State College of Law.

Sara Cressey, Visiting Professor, Refugee and Human

Rights Clinic, University of Maine School of Law.

Alina Das, Professor of Law, New York University

School of Law.

Lauren DesRosiers, Assistant Professor; Director,

Immigration Law Clinic, Albany Law School.

Niels Frenzen, Sidney M. and Audrey M. Irmas

Endowed Clinical Professor of Law, University of

Southern California Gould School of Law.

Denise Gilman, Co-Director, Immigration Clinic, The

University of Texas School of Law.

Adam Goodman, Associate Professor of Latin American

and Latino Studies, University of Illinois Chicago.

Jennifer Gordon, Professor, Fordham University School

of Law.

Susan Gzesh, Instructional Professor, The University of

Chicago.

Jonathan Hafetz, Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law

School.

3a

Nicole Hallett, Clinical Professor

University of Chicago Law School.

of

Law,

The

Dina Francesca Haynes, Lecturer in Law, Research

Scholar in Law, Yale Law School.

Susan Hazeldean, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law

School.

Emily Heger, Clinica Associate Professor & Immigrant

Rights Clinic Director, Texas A&M University School of

Law.

Mackenzie Heinrichs, Associate Professor of Law,

University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law.

Barbara Hines, Retired Clinical Professor of Law, The

University of Texas School of Law.

Alan Hyde, Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Rutgers

Law School.

Daniel Kanstroom, Professor of Law, Boston College

Law School.

Jennifer Lee Koh, Associate Professor of Law,

Pepperdine Caruso School of Law.

Daniel M. Kowalski, Editor-in-Chief,

Immigration Bulletin, LexisNexis.

Bender's

Christopher Kozoll, Assistant Professor of Law,

University of Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis School of

Law

Aly Madan, Adjunct Professor of Law, New England

Law Boston.

Lynn Marcus, Clinical Law Professor; Director,

Immigration Law Clinic, University of Arizona James E.

Rogers College of Law.

Fatma Marouf, Professor of Law, Texas A&M

University School of Law.

4a

Susan Martin, Donald G. Herzberg Professor Emeritus

of International Migration, Georgetown University.

Estelle McKee, Clinical Professor of Law, Cornell Law

School.

M Isabel Medina, Victor H. Schiro Distinguished

Professor of Law, Loyola University New Orleans

College of Law.

Eugenio Mollo, Jr., Clinical Associate Professor of Law,

The University of Toledo College of Law.

Daniel Morales, Associate Professor of Law, University

of Houston Law Center.

Craig B. Mousin, Adjunct Professor of Law, DePaul

University College of Law.

Lindsay Nash, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo

School of Law.

Sarah Paoletti, Practice Professor of Law, University of

Pennsylvania Carey Law School.

Caitlin Patler, Associate Professor of Public Policy,

University of California Berkeley.

Talia Peleg, Associate Professor of Law, City University

of New York School of Law.

Huyen Pham, Professor, Texas A&M University School

of Law.

Michele Pistone, Professor of Law,

University, Charles Widger School of Law.

Villanova

Jayesh Rathod, Professor of Law, American University

Washington College of Law.

Jessica Rofé, Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers Law

School.

5a

Carrie Rosenbaum, Associate Professor of Legal

Writing, University of San Francisco School of Law.

Rubén G. Rumbaut, Distinguished Professor

Sociology, University of California Irvine.

of

Kevin Ruser, Professor of Law, University of Nebraska

College of Law.

Theodore Ruthizer, Retired Lecturer in Law, Columbia

Law School and Past President, American Immigration

Lawyers Association.

Leticia Saucedo, Professor of Law, University of

California Davis School of Law.

Faiza Sayed, Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law

School.

Anne Schaufele, Assistant Professor of Law & CoDirector, Immigration and Human Rights Clinic,

University of the District of Columbia, David A. Clarke

School of Law.

Erica Schommer, Clinical Professor of Law, St. Mary's

University School of Law.

Ragini Shah, Clinical Professor of Law, Suffolk

University Law School.

Rebecca Sharpless, Professor, University of Miami

School of Law.

Sarah Sherman-Stokes, Clinical Associate Professor of

Law, Boston University School of Law.

Doug Smith, Legal Programs Director, Lecturer in

Immigration and Human Rights, The Right to

Immigration Institute, Brandeis University.

Gemma Solimene, Clinical Associate Professor of Law,

Fordham University School of Law.

6a

Elissa Steglich, Clinical Professor, The University of

Texas School of Law.

Juliet Stumpf, Edmund O. Belsheim Professor of Law,

Lewis & Clark Law School.

Maureen Sweeney, Law School Professor, University of

Maryland, Francis King Carey School of Law.

Veronica Thronson, Clinical Professor of Law, Michigan

State University College of Law.

Enid Trucios-Haynes, Bernard Flexner Chair and

Professor of Law, University of Louisville, Louis D.

Brandeis School of Law.

Tania N. Valdez, Associate Professor of Law, George

Washington University Law School.

Deborah Weissman, Reef C. Ivey II Distinguished

Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina

School of Law.

John Willshire Carrera, Co-Managing Director of

Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program at

Greater Boston Services.

Amelia Wilson, Assistant Professor, Pace Law School.

Michael Wishnie, William O. Douglas Clinical Professor

of Law, Yale Law School.

Lauris Wren, Clinical Professor of Law and Director of

Clinical Programming, Maurice A. Deane School of Law

at Hofstra University.

Stephen Yale-Loehr, Retired Professor of Immigration

Law Practice, Cornell Law School.