Amicus Curiae Brief — George Peterson, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefApr 2, 2026

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No. 25-1076

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

GEORGE PETERSON,

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE SECOND

AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, NATIONAL

RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,

AMERICAN SUPPRESSOR ASSOCIATION,

CALIFORNIA RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION,

INCORPORATED, SECOND AMENDMENT

LAW CENTER, INC., MINNESOTA GUN

OWNERS CAUCUS, AND THE CITIZENS

COMMITTEE FOR THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND

BEAR ARMS IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

C.D. Michel

Anna M. Barvir

MICHEL & ASSOCIATES,

P.C.

180 E. Ocean Blvd., Ste.

200

Long Beach, CA 90802

(562) 216-4444

cmichel@michellawyers.com

April 2, 2026

Konstadinos T. Moros

Counsel of Record

THE SECOND

AMENDMENT

FOUNDATION

12500 NE 10th Pl.

Bellevue, WA 98005

(425) 454-7012

kmoros@saf.org

Counsel for Amici Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................

AMICUS CURIAE STATEMENT OF

INTEREST ...........................................................

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................

ARGUMENT ........................................................

I. Suppressors Are “Arms” Under the Plain

Text of the Second Amendment ................

II. There Is No Relevant History of

Requiring

Registration

Each

Individual Arm as the NFA Does .............

III. Special Taxes on Protected Arms Lack

Historical Support .....................................

CONCLUSION.....................................................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Barnett v. Raoul,

671 F. Supp. 3d 928 (S.D. Ill. 2023)..........

Benson v. United States,

No. 23-CF-0514, 2026 D.C. App. LEXIS

80 (Mar. 5, 2026) .......................................

District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570 (2008) .......................... 5-7, 10, 16

Duncan v. Bonta,

133 F.4th 852 (9th Cir. 2025) ...................

English v. State,

35 Tex. 473 (1871) .....................................

Heller v. District of Columbia,

399 U.S. App. D.C. 314 (2011) .................10, 11

McDonald v. City of Chicago,

561 U.S. 742 (2010) ...................................

Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. Minnesota

Comm’r of Revenue,

460 U.S. 575 (1983) ................................... 14-15

Morse v. Raoul,

804 F. Supp. 3d 808 (S.D. Ill. 2025)..........

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,

597 U.S. 1 (2022) .................... 5-7, 9, 14, 17, 18

Nunn v. State,

1 Ga. 243 (1846) ........................................

Ortega v. Grisham,

148 F.4th 1134 (10th Cir. 2025) ...............

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Silveira v. Lockyer,

328 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2003) .....................

United States v. Peterson,

161 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2025) ...................

United States v. Rahimi,

602 U.S. 680 (2024) ................................... 9, 17

CONSTITUTION

U.S. Const. amend. II ........... 1-3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11-15

STATUTES

Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271, § 1 ..

1867 Miss. Laws 327–28, An Act To Tax

Guns And Pistols in The County Of

Washington, ch. 249, § 1 ...........................

An Act to Amend and Reduce into One the

Several Acts in Relation to the Revenue

of This State, and for Other Purposes,

ch. 1, § 1, approved Feb. 24, 1844 (Miss.)

An Act Entitled Revenue, ch. 34, § 23, pt.

4, 1856-1857 N.C. Pub. Laws....................

An Act About Powder Money, passed Oct.

16, 1759 (N.H.) ..........................................

Number 21—A Law for the Better

Securing of the City of New York From

the Danger of Gun-Powder, §§ 1–6 ...........

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

COURT FILINGS

Page(s)

First Amended Complaint, Blank v. Santa

Clara County, No. 5:25-cv-08027-EJD

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025) ..........................

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Acts and Laws of His Majesty’s Province of

New Hampshire in New England: With

Sundry Acts of Parliament; by Order of

the Governor, Council and Assembly,

Pass’d October 16th, 1759 (Daniel Fowle,

Portsmouth, NH 1761) ..............................

Acts of the General Assembly of the

Commonwealth of Kentucky (J. Bradford,

Frankfort 1857) .........................................

Acts of the Legislative Council, of the

Territory of Florida, Passed at its

Sixteenth Session, Commencing Monday

January 1st, and Ending Sunday

February 11th, 1838. With also the

Resolutions of a Public or General

Character Adopted by the Legislative

Council (S.S. Sibley, Printer, Tallahassee,

FL 1838) .................................................... 17-18

Bills of 2023: Newsom Signs ‘Sin Tax’ on

Guns and Ammo, Signal SCV (Dec. 31,

2023), https://signalscv.com/2023/12/bil

ls-of-2023-newsom-signs-sin-tax-on-gun

s-and-ammo/ ..............................................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Brandon Pho, State Gun Group May Sue

Santa Clara County Over License Fees,

San José Spotlight (Feb. 27, 2025),

https://sanjose

spotlight.com/statecalifornia-gun-group-may-sue-santaclara-county-over-conceal

ed-carryweapons-permit-license-fees/ ....................

C.D. Michel & Konstadinos Moros,

Restrictions “Our Ancestors Would Never

Have Accepted”: The Historical Case

Against Assault Weapon Bans, 24 Wyo.

L. Rev. 89 (2024) .......................................

Charles Sumner, The Kansas Question,

Senator Sumner’s Speech, Reviewing the

Action of the Federal Administration

Upon the Subject of Slavery in Kansas

(Cincinnati, G.S. Blanchard, 1856) ..........

H. Journal, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 716

(1872) .........................................................

Kevin Sheehan & Ben Kochman, Senior

Citizen Who Saved Himself from WouldBe Mugger Is Heading to Prison Because

of NYC’s ‘Draconian’ Laws, N.Y. Post

(Nov. 20, 2025, 5:16 PM), https://nypo

st.com/2025/11/20/us-news/queens-seniorcitizen-who-fatally-shot-would-be-muggerheaded-to-prison-for-four-years/ ...............

4-5

Laws of the State of Mississippi (C.M. Price

& S. Rohrer 1844)......................................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Laws, Statutes, Ordinances and Constitutions, Ordained, Made and Established,

by the Mayor, Aldermen, and Commonalty, of the City of New York, Convened in

Common-Council, for the Good Rule and

Government of the Inhabitants and

Residents of the Said City (John Holt,

New York 1763) .........................................

Maxim 9 Instruction Manual, SILENCERCO,

https://perma.cc/3VKZ-6CXN (captured

March 28, 2025 7:23 am) ..........................

Nicholas McEntyre, Charles Foehner, Who

Fatally Shot Would-Be NYC Mugger,

Begins Prison Sentence, N.Y. Post (Jan.

16, 2026, 1:43 a.m. ET), https://nypost.

com/2026/01/16/us-news/charles-foehnerwho-fatally-shot-would-be-nyc-muggerbegins-prison-sentence/ .............................

Remarks on the First Part of the

Amendments to the Federal Constitution,

under the pseudonym “A Pennsylvanian”

in the Philadelphia Federal Gazette,

June 18, 1789 ............................................

Slavery Question: Speech of Hon. Edward

Wade of Ohio in the House of

Representatives, August 2, 1856 (Buell &

Blanchard Publishers, 1856) ....................

Thomas M. Cooley, The General Principles

of Constitutional Law in the United

States of America (1898) ...........................

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Census Office,

Population of the United States in

1860 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Office

1864) ..........................................................

AMICUS CURIAE STATEMENT OF INTEREST

Second Amendment Foundation (“SAF”) is a nonprofit membership organization founded in 1974 with

over 720,000 members and supporters in every state

of the union. Its purposes include education, research,

publishing, and legal action focusing on the

constitutional right to keep and bear arms. Currently,

SAF is involved in several Second Amendment-related

lawsuits and thus has great interest in the outcome of

this case. 1

The National Rifle Association of America (NRA) is

America’s oldest civil rights organization and

foremost defender of Second Amendment rights. It

was founded in 1871 by Union veterans—a general

and a colonel—who, based on their Civil War

experiences,

sought

promote

firearms

marksmanship and expertise amongst the citizenry.

Today, the NRA is America’s leading provider of

firearms marksmanship and safety training for both

civilians and law enforcement. The NRA has

approximately four million members, and its

programs reach millions more.

The American Suppressor Association (ASA) is a

501(c)(6) nonprofit dedicated to the advancement of

1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in

part, nor did such counsel or any party make a monetary

contribution to fund this brief. No person other than the amicus

parties, its members or counsel, made a monetary contribution

intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. The

Parties were notified that this brief would be filed on March 17,

2026, in compliance with Rule 37.2.

pro-suppressor reform nationwide. Founded in 2011,

ASA has lobbied for suppressor rights in dozens of

states, was instrumental in the legalization of

suppressors in Iowa, Minnesota, Vermont, and Guam,

and helped legalize the use of suppressors for hunting

in 19 states. It also played a pivotal role in the

elimination of the transfer tax on suppressors, shortbarreled firearms, and NFA-defined “any other

weapons” as part of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act.

Founded in 1875, California Rifle & Pistol

Association, Incorporated, is a nonprofit organization

that seeks to defend the Second Amendment and

advance laws that protect the rights of individual

citizens. In service of its mission to preserve the

constitutional and statutory rights of gun ownership,

California Rifle & Pistol Association regularly

participates as a party or amicus in Second

Amendment litigation.

Second Amendment Law Center, Inc. is a nonprofit

corporation headquartered in Henderson, Nevada.

Second Amendment Law Center is dedicated to

promoting and defending the individual rights to keep

and bear arms as envisioned by the Founding Fathers.

Its purpose is to defend these rights in state and

federal courts across the United States. It also seeks

to educate the public about the social utility of firearm

ownership and to provide accurate historical,

criminological, and technical information about

firearms to policymakers, judges, and the public.

Minnesota Gun Owners Caucus (“MGOC”) is a

501(c)(4) non-profit organization incorporated under

the laws of Minnesota with its principal place of

business in Shoreview, Minnesota. MGOC seeks to

protect and promote the right of citizens to keep and

bear arms for all lawful purposes. MGOC serves its

members and the public through advocacy, education,

elections, legislation, and legal action. MGOC’s

members reside both within and outside Minnesota.

The Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and

Bear Arms is a non-profit corporation organized under

Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code,

dedicated to promoting the benefits of the right to bear

arms. The Court’s interpretation of the Second

Amendment directly impacts the Committee’s

organizational interests, as well as the Committee’s

members and supporters, who enjoy exercising their

Second Amendment rights. The Committee’s

substantial expertise in the field of Second

Amendment rights would aid the Court in this case.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

At around 2 a.m. on May 31, 2023, 65-year-old

Charles Foehner was walking home in New York

City’s Queens borough when a criminal attempted to

rob him. Security camera footage showed the assailant

charge at Mr. Foehner, who pulled a gun from his

jacket pocket and shot the attacker, killing him. The

Queens District Attorney’s Office chose not to

prosecute Mr. Foehner for the shooting but did go

after him because the gun he used in self-defense was

not registered in New York City. It did not matter that

Mr. Foehner had registered several other guns he

owned, thus proving he was not a prohibited person.

In New York City, every gun must be separately

registered.

For his “crime,” Mr. Foehner accepted a plea deal

and is now spending four of his golden years in

prison. 2 New York City’s harsh treatment of Mr.

Foehner is in stark contrast to the assailant he shot,

who was free to terrorize Mr. Foehner “despite at least

15 arrests dating back to 2004 and a record of mental

illness.” Kevin Sheehan & Ben Kochman, Senior

Citizen Who Saved Himself from Would-Be Mugger Is

Heading to Prison Because of NYC’s ‘Draconian’ Laws,

“He used his last weeks of freedom visiting friends and

family and spending time with his devoted wife, Jenny FoehnerSpeed, and his 8-year-old dog, Biscuit, who was recently

diagnosed with cancer.” Nicholas McEntyre, Charles Foehner,

Who Fatally Shot Would-Be NYC Mugger, Begins Prison

Sentence, N.Y. Post (Jan. 16, 2026, 1:43 a.m. ET),

https://nypost.com/2026/01/16/us-news/charles-foehner-whofatally-shot-would-be-nyc-mugger-begins-prison-sentence/.

N.Y.

Post

(Nov.

20,

2025,

5:16

PM),

https://nypost.com/2025/11/20/us-news/queenssenior-citizen-who-fatally-shot-would-be-muggerheaded-to-prison-for-four-years/.

Does Mr. Foehner’s ordeal sound like the

treatment befitting a constitutional right? Does a

requirement that every individual firearm must be

registered give the Second Amendment the same

scope it was “understood to have when the people

adopted” it? District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.

570, 634 (2008). No serious person can answer that

affirmatively in good faith. And yet, the

unconstitutional laws that imprisoned him persist,

and they will ruin many more innocent lives. This

Court must actively enforce its precedent if the

historical test it announced in Heller and reaffirmed

in Bruen is ever going to be meaningfully respected.

While the petition at bar does not concern Mr.

Foehner directly, it presents the same question:

Whether a per-arm registration regime, like the one

imposed in the National Firearms Act (NFA), can

withstand constitutional scrutiny. It is historically

baseless, and it is inconsistent with the understanding

of the Second Amendment at the Founding. The NFA’s

taxation scheme suffers from the same defect,

imposing a tax on each individual arm it regulates,

much like New York City’s costly per-firearm

registration requirement.

Granting this petition would not only allow this

Court to resolve both issues, but also to confirm that

suppressors are indeed arms covered by the plain text

of the Second Amendment, as are all firearm parts. As

such, any restrictions on them, including taxation and

registration schemes, must be consistent with this

Nation’s historical tradition. The Petitioner thus

presents this Court with an excellent chance to decide

as many as three critical issues. It should seize that

opportunity.

ARGUMENT

I. Suppressors Are “Arms” Under the Plain

Text of the Second Amendment.

The Fifth Circuit “assumed without deciding” that

suppressors are arms. United States v. Peterson, 161

F.4th 331, 339 (5th Cir. 2025). It did not need to make

that assumption, however, because it could (and

should) have conclusively ruled that suppressors are

indeed arms based on this Court’s existing precedent.

By granting certiorari in this case, this Court can clear

up the persistent “confusion” on this point in the lower

courts.

Here, it is not even a close question whether

suppressors are “arms” that meet the plain text of the

Second Amendment. They are no doubt components of

“weapon[s] of offence” that a person “takes into his

hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.”

Heller, 554 U.S. at 581 (citing founding-era

dictionaries). They also are “modern instruments that

facilitate armed self-defense,” N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol

Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 28 (2022), particularly in

the home where an unsuppressed firearm has a

significant concussive effect and impairs hearing.

“What is more, the Second Amendment as a matter of

plain text covers ‘all instruments that constitute

bearable arms, even those that were not in existence

at the time of the founding.’ ” Id. at 28 (quoting Heller,

554 U.S. at 582). That includes a firearm equipped

with a suppressor.

Of course, a suppressor is just one component 3 of a

suppressed firearm and is harmless on its own. But

that doesn’t make it not an arm. If it did, the

government could prohibit virtually any firearm

component without constitutional consequence. The

sights, the grips, the trigger guard, and so forth, all of

which are also harmless standing alone. Such

reasoning “inevitably means that only the most

dumbed-down or basic version of any component part

of a gun is protected—and many parts of a gun are

entirely unprotected if they aren’t strictly necessary to

make a gun go bang.” Duncan v. Bonta, 133 F.4th 852,

918 (9th Cir. 2025) (VanDyke, J., dissenting); see also

Morse v. Raoul, 804 F. Supp. 3d 808 (S.D. Ill. 2025)

(“Thus, in the view of the Ninth Circuit in Duncan, no

attachment, accessory, or accoutrement, regardless of

its increased efficiency, its safety enhancements, or

historical availability is protected.”)

The D.C. Court of Appeals recently rejected the

very same argument applied to firearm magazines,

saying it “is not a defensible approach to identifying

what constitutes an arm—a gun is also practically

3 Sometimes, suppressors are not just component parts of a

firearm, but integral to them. For example, the SilencerCo

Maxim 9 has a permanently affixed suppressor built into it.

Obviously, the Maxim 9 is an “arm.” See Maxim 9 Instruction

Manual, SILENCERCO, https://perma.cc/3VKZ-6CXN.

harmless and of no use without ammunition, but it is

still obviously an arm.” Benson v. United States, No.

23-CF-0514, 2026 D.C. App. LEXIS 80, at *18 (Mar. 5,

2026). 4

To think of suppressed firearms a different way

using a founding-era example, imagine a musket

affixed with a bayonet. True enough, the musket could

fire with the bayonet removed. But even so, it would

be unserious to assert that a bayonet, even an

unsharpened bayonet, is itself not an arm. 5 In fact, in

the Militia Act of 1792, Congress required the male

citizens of the Nation to provide themselves with

bayonets upon turning 18. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33,

1 Stat. 271, § 1. So clear was bayonets’ status as an

arm that even when the Texas Supreme Court took a

narrow view of the Second Amendment in English v.

State, 35 Tex. 473 (1871), it still held that “the musket

and bayonet,” unlike weapons such as “dirks, daggers,

slungshots, sword-canes, brass-knuckles, and bowie

knives,” were protected arms, see id. at 476 (emphasis

Benson may yet be overruled en banc. But even if that

happens, it will not take away the panel decision’s persuasive

merit and faithfulness to this Court’s precedent. Such a move

would instead be further proof of the ongoing hostility of several

courts towards the Second Amendment, and another reason this

Court should grant certiorari in a case like this one immediately.

5 To be sure, a bayonet could be used as a weapon on its own,

so the analogy to a suppressor is not perfect. However, the

purpose of the bayonet is not to be an unwieldy dagger; it is

meant to be attached to a firearm, just like a suppressor. In one

sense, bayonets go even further than suppressors in that they are

an attachment that allows a firearm to be used lethally in total

silence. Yet not one state banned using muskets equipped with

bayonets (whether by banning such muskets or the bayonets

made to be attached to them).

added). There thus can be no doubt that muskets

equipped with bayonets were protected arms at the

founding, even though bayonets were not necessary

for muskets to function.

Yet even if suppressors are somehow not “arms,”

that would not change the result. As the Tenth Circuit

recently explained, “[t]he Second Amendment’s text is

not limited to direct prohibitions on possessing or

using firearms. It states that the ‘right of the people

to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.’” Ortega

v. Grisham, 148 F.4th 1134, 1143 n.3 (10th Cir. 2025);

see also United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 691

(2024) (“when the Government regulates armsbearing conduct, as when the Government regulates

other constitutional rights, it bears the burden to

‘justify its regulation.’ ”).

Given all of that, for suppressors to be restricted,

they must be shown to fall within the historical

tradition of regulating “dangerous and unusual”

weapons. This seems a simple and obvious conclusion

for anyone who has read this Court’s precedent in good

faith. Unfortunately, a number of lower courts are

getting it wrong, and Amici urge this Court to finally

correct them.

II. There Is No Relevant History of Requiring

Registration of Each Individual Arm as the

NFA Does.

In Bruen’s dicta, this Court indicated its approval

of objective licensing regimes that “are designed to

ensure only that those bearing arms in the jurisdiction

are, in fact, ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’” 597

U.S. at 38 n.9. But such licensing of individuals is very

different than requiring the registration of every

single firearm. As the Petitioner also notes, Pet. 2,

then-Judge Kavanaugh concisely explained the

difference between licensing and registration schemes

in a dissent written when he sat on the D.C. Circuit

Court of Appeals: “Registration of all lawfully

possessed guns — as distinct from licensing of gun

owners or mandatory record-keeping by gun sellers —

has not traditionally been required in the United

States and even today remains highly unusual.

Under Heller’s history and tradition-based test, D.C.’s

registration

requirement

therefore

unconstitutional.” Heller v. District of Columbia, 399

U.S. App. D.C. 314, 340 (2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,

dissenting).

While Amici would contend that even licensing is

historically suspect and prone to abuse, 6 they can

agree with Justice Kavanaugh that it is at least far

less abusive than requiring the registration of every

individual firearm:

Licensing requirements mandate that

gun owners meet certain standards or

pass certain tests before owning guns or

using them in particular ways . . .

Registration requirements, by contrast,

require registration of individual guns

and do not meaningfully serve the

purpose of ensuring that owners know

how to operate guns safely in the way

certain licensing requirements can. For

6 As an example, see the discussion of Santa Clara County’s

exorbitant concealed handgun license fees in section III, infra.

that reason, registration requirements

are often seen as half-a-loaf measures

aimed at deterring gun ownership.

Id. at 361.

This is not just some academic exercise in

constitutional theory. A number of otherwise lawabiding people have gotten themselves into deep legal

trouble because they registered some, but not all, of

their firearms. Such was the case in the sad story of

Mr. Foehner that Amici opened this brief with. No

public safety interest is served by locking citizens like

him up in prison; they had already proven they are

qualified to own firearms when their local government

licensed them to do so.

It is also clear that the Founding generation would

have never tolerated such a requirement. Remember,

the Second Amendment was created by people who

had just revolted against a tyrannical government.

The Founders sought to guarantee the People had a

final recourse should the new government they were

forming also turn tyrannical. Tench Coxe, a delegate

to the Annapolis Convention in 1786 and the

Continental Congress in 1788, wrote of Madison’s

draft of the Second Amendment that “[w]hereas civil

rulers, not having their duty to the people duly before

them, may attempt to tyrannize, … the people are

confirmed by the article in their right to keep and bear

their private arms.” Remarks on the First Part of the

Amendments to the Federal Constitution, under the

pseudonym “A Pennsylvanian” in the Philadelphia

Federal Gazette, June 18, 1789, p. 2 col. 1 (as quoted

in the Federal Gazette, June 18, 1789).

Coxe’s view dominated the Founding era and

Nineteenth Century. And the Second Amendment’s

original meaning was not understood to have changed

thereafter. In a speech in the House of

Representatives, Abolitionist Representative Edward

Wade said the “right to ‘keep and bear arms,’ is thus

guarantied, in order that if the liberties of the people

should be assailed, the means for their defence shall

be in their own hands.” Slavery Question: Speech of

Hon. Edward Wade of Ohio in the House of

Representatives, August 2, 1856 (Buell & Blanchard

Publishers, 1856).

Senator Charles Sumner’s “The Crime Against

Kansas” speech likewise bristled at the notion that

slavery opponents in Kansas should be disarmed of

their Sharps rifles by the proslavery government:

“Never was this efficient weapon more needed in just

self defence, than now in Kansas, and at least one

article in our National Constitution must be blotted

out, before the complete right to it can in any way be

impeached.” Charles Sumner, The Kansas Question,

Senator Sumner’s Speech, Reviewing the Action of the

Federal Administration Upon the Subject of Slavery in

Kansas 22–23 (Cincinnati, G.S. Blanchard, 1856).

Thomas Cooley, a longtime Michigan Supreme

Court Justice, similarly wrote that “[t]he right

declared was meant to be a strong moral check against

the usurpation and arbitrary powers of rulers, and as

necessary and efficient means of regaining rights

when temporarily overturned by usurpation.” Thomas

M. Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional

Law in the United States of America 298 (1898).

Additional examples abound, and Amici’s counsel

collected dozens of them in a law review article. See

C.D. Michel & Konstadinos Moros, Restrictions “Our

Ancestors Would Never Have Accepted”: The Historical

Case Against Assault Weapon Bans, 24 Wyo. L. Rev.

89, 90 (2024). But there is no need to belabor the point:

in addition to enabling personal self-defense, the

Second Amendment exists as a last-resort check on

government power, a failsafe to enable collective

defense in the event a tyrant or foreign invader ever

usurps our constitutional order. There can be no

historical tradition of the government requiring the

registration of each individual arm, when one of the

Second Amendment’s main purposes was to be a

“doomsday provision” for the People to protect

themselves from that very government if it became

tyrannical. Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 570 (9th

Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Barnett

v. Raoul, 671 F. Supp. 3d 928, 940 (S.D. Ill. 2023)

(“[A]lthough ‘most undoubtedly thought [the Second

Amendment] even more important for self-defense

and hunting’ the additional purpose of securing the

ability of the citizenry to oppose an oppressive

military, should the need arise, cannot be

overlooked.”). In short, registration of every firearm,

let alone registration of individual firearm

components, is antithetical to the Second

Amendment’s origins as an anti-tyranny provision.

If “shall not be infringed” means anything at all, it

must mean that the People do not need individualized

government documentation for each gun they own.

There is no serious historical tradition that supports

arguing otherwise, and this Court should grant the

Petition so it can confirm as much.

III. Special Taxes on Protected Arms Lack

Historical Support.

A recent tactic that some states and localities that

are hostile to the Second Amendment are engaging in

to undermine Bruen is raising the financial burden of

exercising the right to keep and bear arms. For

example, getting a concealed handgun license in

Santa Clara County, California, now costs

approximately $2,000 in total expense. Brandon Pho,

State Gun Group May Sue Santa Clara County Over

License Fees, San José Spotlight (Feb. 27, 2025),

https://sanjosespotlight.com/state-california-gungroup-may-sue-santa-clara-county-over-concealedcarry-weapons-permit-license-fees/. 7

Also in California, in 2023, the legislature adopted

a law that places an additional 11% tax on all gun and

ammunition sales, calling it a “sin tax.” Bills of 2023:

Newsom Signs ‘Sin Tax’ on Guns and Ammo, Signal

SCV (Dec. 31, 2023), https://signalscv.com/2023/12/

bills-of-2023-newsom-signs-sin-tax-on-guns-andammo/. This is on top of a federal 11% excise tax, an

approximately $37 background check fee in

California, and regular sales tax.

None of this is permissible, as it has long been

established that constitutional rights may not be

taxed. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v.

7 Some of the Amici here are now suing the County of Santa

Clara due to those exorbitant fees. See First Amended Complaint,

Blank v. Santa Clara County, No. 5:25-cv-08027-EJD (N.D. Cal.

Nov. 14, 2025).

Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).

That should apply to the Second Amendment as well,

as it is not a “second-class right, subject to an entirely

different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights

guarantees that we have held to be incorporated into

the Due Process Clause.” McDonald v. City of Chicago,

561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010).

This case presents an excellent opportunity for this

Court to begin to address the growing problem of the

government

financially

burdening

Second

Amendment conduct. It can make clear that special

taxes on protected arms (as opposed to generally

applicable sales taxes) are unconstitutional, and it

should do so because our historical tradition is clear

on this point.

The earliest possible historical analogues of taxes

on firearms were not taxes at all, but fines for various

violations. For instance, a 1762 New York colonial law

barred storing more than 28 pounds of gunpowder for

those who lived in New York City, and if violated, a

fine of Ten Pounds was assessed. Laws, Statutes,

Ordinances and Constitutions, Ordained, Made and

Established, by the Mayor, Aldermen, and

Commonalty, of the City of New York, Convened in

Common-Council, for the Good Rule and Government

of the Inhabitants and Residents of the Said City 39–

40 (John Holt, New York 1763) (Number 21—A Law

for the Better Securing of the City of New York From

the Danger of Gun-Powder, §§ 1–6).

If someone chose to have more than 28 pounds of

gunpowder, they had to store it at a designated

“Powder-House,” which required a fee of three

shillings per barrel of powder. But that was less of a

“tax” and more of a fee for using the powder-house,

and in any case, would only apply to those who wanted

to have more than 28 pounds of gunpowder. Powderstorage laws in general were not motivated by a desire

for taxation or even gun control, but fire-prevention;

black powder was extremely combustible, and thus a

major safety hazard to the densely packed and mostly

wooden cities of the time. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 632

(characterizing colonial powder storage laws as

pertaining to fire-safety and not gun control).

Other early examples demonstrate the limits of

relying on colonial history. A 1759 New Hampshire

law required foreign ships coming into port to pay a

tax of two shillings per pound of gun powder, in order

to financially support “his Majesty’s fort and

fortifications within this province.” Acts and Laws of

His Majesty’s Province of New Hampshire in New

England: With Sundry Acts of Parliament; by Order of

the Governor, Council and Assembly, Pass’d October

16th, 1759 63 (Daniel Fowle, Portsmouth, NH 1761)

(An Act About Powder Money, passed Oct. 16, 1759).

While superficially similar in that this was a tax

on gunpowder, a necessary component to firearms, it

is not the same as the NFA’s far higher tax on each

suppressor sold, and it only applied to foreign ships.

Moreover, with similar laws being sparse or

nonexistent, this seems to be an outlier, and “in using

pre-ratification history, courts must exercise care to

rely only on the history that the Constitution actually

incorporated and not on the history that the

Constitution left behind.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 723

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

In the Nineteenth Century, some laws began to

appear that were slightly more similar to the NFA’s

taxes. For example, an 1844 Mississippi law taxed

Bowie knives at one dollar, and dueling or pocket

pistols at two dollars. Laws of the State of Mississippi

57–58 (C.M. Price & S. Rohrer 1844) (An Act to Amend

and Reduce into One the Several Acts in Relation to

the Revenue of This State, and for Other Purposes, ch.

1, § 1, approved Feb. 24, 1844). But to understand the

critical distinction, it is important to note what was

not taxed: the prevailing civilian-owned combat

weapons of the time. Bowie knives and pocket pistols

were seen as a criminal threat when carried concealed

in that era, when those who carried lawfully did so

openly. See Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846)

(contrasting constitutionally protected open carry

from concealed carry). The tax did not apply to other

arms which were typically openly carried. See also

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 47–49 (1686 colonial law was not

analogous to modern New York carry laws because it

only restricted the concealed carry of pocket pistols,

which were not in common use for lawful purposes at

the time).

Other similar taxes existed around this lateantebellum period, like an 1838 law from territorial

Florida that taxed dealers (but not buyers) of dirks,

pocket pistols, and bowie knives $200 per year. Acts of

the Legislative Council, of the Territory of Florida,

Passed at its Sixteenth Session, Commencing Monday

January 1st, and Ending Sunday February 11th,

1838. With also the Resolutions of a Public or General

Character Adopted by the Legislative Council 36 (S.S.

Sibley, Printer, Tallahassee, FL 1838) (No. 24, § 1).

That law also taxed those who publicly carried those

specific weapons ten dollars per year. But again, these

were not the civilian-owned combat arms of their time,

but rather weapons seen as “dangerous and unusual”

that were used in petty crimes and personal disputes.

Moreover, these taxes existed almost exclusively in

Southern states and territories, and we have to be

careful about relying too heavily on laws from the

South given that Bruen looks for a national tradition.

Still, even if these laws were representative of the

nation as a whole, there remains the problem that the

taxes they enacted did not apply to the sorts of arms

in common use for lawful purposes. A North Carolina

law from 1856 makes this especially clear, specifically

exempting pistols used for mustering from a $1.25 tax

that otherwise applied on all pistols and bowie knives

(though the tax applied only if the weapons in

question were carried publicly, mere possession was

untaxed). An Act Entitled Revenue, ch. 34, § 23, pt. 4,

1856-1857 N.C. Pub. Laws.

After the Civil War, many southern territories

under reconstruction adopted “Black Codes,” which

aimed to keep newly freed former slaves repressed,

often with the assistance of the Ku Klux Klan.

Strategic disarmament of Black Americans was part

of this nefarious project, as even President Grant

complained to Congress. See H. Journal, 42nd Cong.,

2d Sess. 716 (1872). It’s thus no surprise that the Jim

Crow era also saw a much more rapid adoption of

taxes on certain weapons in the South.

Some of these were barely veiled at all. An 1867

Mississippi law assessed a tax of between five dollars

and fifteen dollars on “every gun and pistol,” and if the

tax was not paid, the Sheriff was obligated to seize

that gun. This seems to be a very close NFA analogue,

given it applied to all guns, and the tax was

considerable, ranging from $108 to $325 per gun in

today’s dollars. 1867 Miss. Laws 327–28, An Act To

Tax Guns And Pistols in The County Of Washington,

ch. 249, § 1. But the law only applied in Washington

County, Mississippi, and not the whole state.

According to the 1860 census, Washington County was

made up of 92% enslaved people, and even to this day

is still over 70% African American. See U.S. Dep’t of

the Interior, Census Office, Population of the United

States in 1860, 270 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Office

1864). This law was therefore not some general tax on

guns; it was a racist effort to price freedmen out of

firearm ownership.

The last large category of taxes related to weapons

and arms in the latter parts of the Nineteenth

Century are occupational taxes on dealers. These were

not assessed on a per-gun basis and are not similar to

the NFA’s scheme. For example, an 1885 Kentucky

law imposed a tax of fifty dollars on dealers of pistols

and bowie knives. Acts of the General Assembly of the

Commonwealth of Kentucky 154 (J. Bradford,

Frankfort 1857).

While the above is not a comprehensive listing of

every historical tax on weapons and arms, it does

provide a representative sample of the sorts of pre1900 laws that existed imposing such taxes. There is

simply no historical tradition of taxing the possession

of arms used for lawful purposes. This Court should

confirm the same by granting certiorari in this case.

CONCLUSION

As Chief Justice Roberts put it just recently, “it’s a

new world. It’s the same Constitution.” Registration

and taxation of individual arms are requirements that

make a mockery of the Second Amendment’s historical

tradition and are exactly the sort of abuses the

founders would never have tolerated. For the reasons

discussed above and in Petitioner’s brief, this Court’s

intervention is appropriate here, as it would provide

an opportunity to address numerous critical

questions.

April 2, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

Konstadinos T. Moros

Counsel of Record

THE SECOND

AMENDMENT

FOUNDATION

12500 NE 10th Pl.

Bellevue, WA 98005

(425) 454-7012

kmoros@saf.org

Counsel for Amici Curiae

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.