Amicus Curiae Brief — Gilbert P. Hyatt, Petitioner v. John A. Squires, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office

No. 25-1049

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

____________________

GILBERT P. HYATT,

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN A. SQUIRES, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED

STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE SMALL BUSINESS

TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL AND THE ASSOCIATION FOR

AMERICAN INNOVATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

CHARLES E. MILLER

ASSOCIATION OF AMICUS COUNSEL

411 MAIN STREET #404

STONEHAM, MA 02180-3595

Tel.: (516) 641-3378

charles.miller@cmilleriplaw.com

Counsel of Record

April 3, 2026

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..............................................i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 5

I. The decision below conflicts with Supreme

Court precedents .................................................... 5

II. This Court should grant certiorari to

review and correct erroneous presumptions

reasonably interpreted to render 30% of

issued patents unenforceable ................................ 6

II.A The six years presumption of

prosecution laches is invalid as it lacks

rational connection between actual facts

and the fact presumed ...................................... 8

III.Congress’ composite statutory and

administrative regulatory framework

foreclosed on the equitable doctrine of

prosecution laches ................................................ 11

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 15

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Pages

CASES

Hyatt v. Hirshfeld, 998 F. 3d 1347

(Fed. Cir. 2021) .......................................... 5, 6, 7, 8

Hyatt v. Stewart, 148 F. 4th 1376

(Fed. Cir. 2025) ......................................................5

In re Amaitis, et al. 2012 Commr. Pat. LEXIS

13 (Comm'r Pat. & Trademarks

February 27, 2012) ...............................................12

In re Colyvas, 2010 Commr. Pat. LEXIS 24

(Comm'r Pat. & Trademarks May 24, 2010) .......12

In re Gilbert et al., 2011 Commr. Pat. LEXIS

328 (Comm'r Pat. & Trademarks

July 14, 2011) .......................................................12

In re Goodman, et al., 1987 Commr. Pat.

LEXIS 19 (Comm'r Pat. & Trademarks

January 28, 1987) ................................................12

National Archives and Records Admin. v.

Favish, 541 US 157 (2004) .....................................7

Petrella v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer, Inc.

572 U.S. 663 (2014) ...................................... 2, 5, 14

PMC v. Apple, Appeal No. 21-2275,

Oral Argument (Fed. Cir. July 7, 2022) ................7

SCA Hygiene Prod. Aktiebolag v. First Quality

Baby Prod., LLC, 580 U.S. 328 (2017) ..............2, 5

Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr.,

568 U.S. 145 (2013) ..............................................14

Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med.,

277 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ..............................5

iii

Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med.,

422 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................10

Wanlass v. Gen. Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334

(Fed. Cir. 1998) ......................................................6

Wirtgen America v. Caterpillar,

746 F.Supp.3d 218 (D. Del. 2024) ..........................6

STATUTES

35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) .....................................................11

42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(3) ............................................14

RULES

37 C.F.R. § 1.111(b) ...................................................12

37 C.F.R. § 1.142(b) .....................................................9

37 C.F.R. § 1.143 .........................................................9

37 C.F.R. § 1.144 .........................................................9

37 C.F.R. § 1.78(f) ......................................................13

37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b) ......................................... 8, 13, 14

37 C.F.R. § 11.18(c) ............................................. 13, 14

42 C.F.R. § 405.1841(b) .............................................14

Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 301 ..........................8

Supreme Court Rule 37.2 ............................................1

Supreme Court Rule 37.6 ............................................1

OTHER AUTHORITIES

50 Fed. Reg. 5172 (Feb. 6, 1985) ...............................13

Br. of SBTC in Support of Rehearing below

(November 13, 2025) ........................................ 7, 11

MPEP § 809 .................................................................9

MPEP § 821.04 ............................................................9

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1

Amici Curiae Small Business Technology

Council (“SBTC”) and the Association for American

Innovation (“AAI”) described further below, are

particularly qualified to aid this Court in

understanding the adverse impact on our inventor

and patent holder members, both when prosecuting

their patent applications at the US Patent and

Trademark Office (“PTO”) or enforcing patents, if the

precedential rulings of the Federal Circuit Panel in

this case are not corrected. For the reasons detailed

below, we support the petition for granting

certiorari.

The SBTC (www.nsbaadvocate.org/sbtc) is the

nation’s largest association of small, technologybased companies in diverse fields. SBTC is a council

of the National Small Business Association (NSBA),

the

nation’s

first

small-business

advocacy

organization. NSBA is a staunchly nonpartisan

organization with 65,000 members in every state

and every industry in the US. SBTC advocates on

behalf of the 6000 firms who participate in the Small

Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small

Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs.

1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for the amici

curiae certifies that he fully reviewed this brief that was

authored by amici curiae and that no party or counsel for any

party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person

or entity other than the amici made a monetary contribution

intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief.

Rule 37.2 notice of the intent to file this brief was timely

provided by email to counsel of record for Petitioner and for

Respondent.

-2These SBIR/STTR companies obtain more patents at

the PTO than all the American universities

combined in most years.

The AAI (https://aainnovation.org) is a diverse

coalition of innovation ecosystem stakeholders. From

authors, inventors, scientists, manufacturers, and

engineers to attorneys, intellectual property

professionals, policy experts, entrepreneurs, and

investors, our vision is a world in which America is

the unquestioned leader in technological innovation.

We represent a broad range of technology sectors

and are committed to supporting and promoting

American technological innovation. Our mission is

rooted in a strong belief: innovators must be given

preference

over

implementers.

Without the

breakthrough, there is nothing to build.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The decision below warrants this Court’s review

because it conflicts with this Court’s precedents and

permits an equitable doctrine to extinguish patent

rights in circumstances not authorized by statute.

The Federal Circuit held that the equitable doctrine

of prosecution laches could be applied to render

unenforceable a patent that issued after

“unreasonable

and

unexplained

delay”

in

prosecution. However, this Court’s decisions in

Petrella and SCA Hygiene clarified a principle

holding that when Congress creates a framework

fully governing timeliness requirements, equitable

doctrines of laches cannot override statutory rights.

That principle applies equally to prosecution

conduct, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s continued

reliance on its earlier precedent recognizing

-3prosecution laches and creating uncertainty about

the enforceability of issued patents.

The decision below also adopts a six-year

presumption of unreasonable and prejudicial delay

for applications issued more than six years from

their earliest priority date. This presumption, as

reasonably interpreted, places a substantial portion

of issued patents under a cloud of unenforceability.

Patent prosecution commonly extends beyond six

years from earliest priority for legitimate reasons

inherent in the statutory scheme, including

continuation practice, divisional filings following

restriction requirements, and ongoing developments

of the invention disclosed in Continuation-In-Part

(“CIP”) applications. Statistical evidence shows that

a significant percentage of issued patents’

prosecution exceed this duration, yet those patents

result from ordinary and permissible prosecution

activity overseen by the PTO. The presumption

therefore lacks any rational connection between the

fact proved and the fact presumed and improperly

converts routine prosecution timelines into

presumptive evidence of “unreasonable and

unexplained delay.” By importing a presumption

derived from delay in filing infringement suits—

where patentees control timing after their patent

issues—into the fundamentally different context of

agency-controlled examination, the Federal Circuit

created a rule that is both doctrinally unsound and

practically disruptive.

Independent of that presumption, Congress has

already established a comprehensive statutory and

regulatory framework governing prosecution timing

and applicant conduct, leaving no gap for judicially

created equitable doctrines. The Patent Act

-4authorizes the PTO to regulate applicants’

prosecution conduct, and the agency has

promulgated extensive rules requiring diligence,

good faith, and bona fide advancement of

applications, backed by sanctions including

forfeiture of the application. These regulations are

administered by the expert agency charged with

supervising prosecution and evaluating applicant

conduct, and they directly address the types of

alleged delay that prosecution laches purports to

remedy. Allowing courts to superimpose equitable

judgements of prosecution laches on top of this

detailed framework displaces Congress’s chosen

scheme and invites courts to second-guess agency

determinations regarding prosecution practice.

The Federal Circuit’s decision therefore raises an

important

federal

question

affecting

the

enforceability of a substantial portion of issued

patents and the proper relationship between

statutory patent rights, administrative regulation,

and equitable doctrines. Because the decision is

precedential and nationwide in effect, the issue is

unlikely to receive further percolation, yet it

threatens to unsettle expectations of patent

applicants, small businesses, and innovators who

rely on established continuation practice. This

Court’s review is warranted to clarify that equitable

prosecution laches cannot override statutory and

regulatory

mechanisms

governing

patent

prosecution and to restore certainty to the patent

system.

This brief takes no position on the patentability

or the prosecution at the PTO of Petitioner’s

underlying patent applications.

-5ARGUMENT

In the two decisions below at Hyatt v. Hirshfeld,

998 F. 3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Hyatt I”), and

Hyatt v. Stewart, 148 F. 4th 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2025)

(“Hyatt II”), the Federal Circuit has decided an

important federal question in a way that conflicts

with relevant decisions of this Court and also raises

an important question of federal law that has not

been, but should be, settled by this Court. The

decisions below, if uncorrected, will remain a

precedent that presumptively renders unenforceable

30% of issued U.S. patents.

The petition for

certiorari should be granted for the reasons further

explained below.

I. The decision below conflicts with

Supreme Court precedents

The Federal Circuit held that the equitable

doctrine of prosecution laches could be applied to

render unenforceable a patent that issued after

“unreasonable

and

unexplained

delay”

in

prosecution. Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med.,

277 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Symbol I”). It

essentially adopted this holding in the case below.

However, later Supreme Court decisions in Petrella

v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. 572 U.S. 663 (2014),

and SCA Hygiene Prod. Aktiebolag v. First Quality

Baby Prod., LLC, 580 U.S. 328 (2017) on laches in

infringement actions, clarified the general principles

of unavailability of laches. These general principles

also apply to prosecution laches, suggesting that

Symbol I is abrogated.

-6II. This Court should grant certiorari to

review and correct erroneous

presumptions reasonably interpreted to

render 30% of issued patents

unenforceable

. The decision below declared: “In the context of

laches, we have held that a delay of more than six

years raises a ‘presumption that it is unreasonable,

inexcusable, and prejudicial.’” 2 The Panel further

stated: “Consistent with both Cancer Research and

Wanlass, we now hold that, . . . an unreasonable and

unexplained prosecution delay of six years or more

raises a presumption of prejudice, including

intervening rights.”3 There would be little reason for

the Panel to remove the context of bringing suit in

reference to Wanlass, and to mention “consistency”

with Wanlass, had the Panel not intended to import

Wanlass’ six-year delay as triggering the

presumption of “unreasonable, inexcusable, and

prejudicial” delay in prosecution laches. These

statements are justifiably interpreted as creating

such a presumption, as argued by counsel for

accused infringers. 4 These are precedential 5

2 Hyatt v. Hirshfeld, 998 F. 3d 1347, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2021)

(“Hyatt I”). (emphasis added) (Quting Wanlass v. Gen. Elec. Co.,

148 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).

3 Hyatt I, 998 F.3d at 1370 (emphasis added).

4 Wirtgen America v. Caterpillar, 746 F.Supp.3d 218, 227 (D.

Del. 2024) (“Caterpillar cites to Hyatt for the proposition that a

six-year delay is presumptively unreasonable.”) (Emphasis

added); PMC v. Apple, Appeal No. 21-2275, Oral Argument

(Fed. Cir. July 7, 2022) (Apple’s counsel states at 21:50: PMC’s

delay until filing a continuation “was eight years; that’s enough,

-7presumptions applicable broadly—not only to

Petitioner.

Patent application prosecution from priority

filing to patent issuance involves objective and

necessary durations spanning several years. A

statistical study reported by SBTC shows that 30%

of US patents have issued more than six years after

their earliest priority date.6 This cannot mean that

patent applicants of 30% of US patents have

presumptively

engaged

in

“unreasonable,

inexcusable, and prejudicial” delay. 7 The holding

below, as reasonably interpreted, presumed facts

that cannot happen under PTO’s regulations. This is

because under the presumption of agency

regularity, 8 the PTO is presumed to have ensured

as [Hyatt I] said, to trigger laches.” www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oralarguments/21-2275_07072022.mp3).

5

Hyatt

I

is

classified

as

“precedential”

at

www.cafc.uscourts.gov/10-12-2021-20-2321-hyatt-v-hirshfeldopinion-20-2321-opinion-10-12-2021_1847303/ and Hyatt II is

classified “precedential” at www.cafc.uscourts.gov/08-29-202518-2390-hyatt-v-stewart-opinion-18-2390-opinion-8-292025_2565719/

6 Br. of SBTC in Support of Rehearing below (November 13,

2025)

(See

Addendum

1

at

https://sbtc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2025/11/SBTC-CAFC-Submission-AmicusBrief-Hyatt-Nov-13-2025-Stamped.pdf#page=32)

(“Br.

of

SBTC”).

7 Hyatt I, 998 F.3d at 1369.

8 National Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 US 157,

174 (2004) (“The presumption of regularity supports the official

acts of public officers and, in the absence of clear evidence to

the contrary, courts presume that they have properly

discharged their official duties.”) (cleaned up).

-8compliance with its regulations, including that any

applicant submission is not “being presented … to

cause unnecessary delay,” in contravention of 37

C.F.R. § 11.18(b)(2)(i). The PTO—not the District

Court—has the specific agency expertise and

experience to make the determination under this

rule and must be presumed to have enforced it

regularly. Accordingly, it is more probable than not,

that the patent applicants of these 30% of issued US

patents have not engaged in “unreasonable and

unexplained delay in prosecution.” Therefore, as

reasonably interpreted, the six years “presumed fact”

of laches in Hyatt I is invalid under Rule 301,

Federal

Rules

of

Evidence,

because

“the

nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable

than its existence.”9

II.A

The six years presumption of prosecution

laches is invalid as it lacks rational

connection between actual facts and the

fact presumed

Even if the equitable defense of laches were

available (which it is not), the six years

presumptions of laches cannot be legally sustained.

First, the panel’s presumptions arose in the context

of an unreasonable delay in filing suit—a charge

that cannot apply to a patent applicant's prosecution

conduct during PTO examination. Second, there

must be “a rational connection between the fact

proved and the fact presumed.” 10 Here, patent

9 FRE 301. Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules.

10Id.

-9applicants have legitimate objective necessity for

filing continuing applications years after the original

filing priority dates, leading to application pendency

of more than six years after their earliest priority

date, during which others may have exploited the

invention.

For example, filing dates of Continuations In

Part (“CIP”) applications are substantially later than

the original priority filing date because they involve

additional disclosure of further improvements

obtained through research and development

activities that took place long after the original filing

date.

Another example is divisional applications for

which the timing for introducing the divisional

claims must be deferred under the PTO rules and

practice, which may even obviate the need for them

(emphasis added below):

1. 37 C.F.R. § 1.142(b) provides for restricted claim

“reinstatement in the event the requirement for

restriction is withdrawn or overruled;” § 1.143

provides for applicant traverse and election of

“one invention for prosecution “in the event the

requirement becomes final”—a finality that only

the examiner may provide; § 1.144 provides that

applicant petition to “the Director to review the

requirement … may be deferred until after final

action on or allowance of claims to the invention

elected, but must be filed not later than appeal.”

2. The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure

(“MPEP”) in § 809 provides that “should any

linking claim be allowable, the restriction

requirement between the linked inventions must

be withdrawn.” Moreover, MPEP § 821.04

- 10 requires the examiner to reconsider “the

propriety of a restriction requirement … when all

the claims directed to the elected invention are in

condition for allowance, and the nonelected

invention(s) should be considered for rejoinder.”

The Federal Circuit has acknowledged that

reasonable delays in prosecution include (i) filing a

divisional application in response to a restriction

requirement—even immediately before issuance of

the parent application; (ii) refiling an application to

present new evidence of an invention's unexpected

advantages; and (iii) refiling an application to add

subject matter to attempt to support broader claims

as the development of an invention progresses. 11

That Court also noted that an applicant may refile

an application for other reasons, “provided that such

refiling is not unduly successive or repetitive.” 12

Therefore, there is no rational connection between

actual facts and the fact the Federal Circuit

presumed. This is particularly so because the

“imported” six-year presumption was based on delay

in bringing infringement suit, a period during which

the patentee sits on an issued patent having full

control in asserting it any time during that period,

as opposed to an applicant engaged in prosecution

and awaiting PTO actions for issuing the patent.

11 Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 422 F.3d 1378, 1385

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Symbol II”).

12 Id.

- 11 III. Congress’ composite statutory and

administrative regulatory framework

foreclosed on the equitable doctrine of

prosecution laches

The extensive provisions of the Patent Act

specify the timeliness, context, and modalities in

which applicants must prosecute their applications.

This

includes

provisions

implemented

and

supplemented by the administrative regulations that

Congress included in this framework. This

framework includes 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2), authorizing

the PTO to “establish regulations, not inconsistent

with law, which shall govern the conduct of

proceedings in the Office.” Accordingly, the PTO

promulgated regulations prescribing applicants’

timeliness and conduct. SBTC lists 132 of these PTO

regulations that have timing and conduct

requirements in all facets of prosecution and

submissions to the Office.13

The PTO administers these 132 regulations and

others based on its expertise as to workflow and

what constitutes proper applicant conduct. Some

rules employ words requiring applicants to act

“promptly,”14 to be “diligent,”15 act in “good faith,”16

13 Br. of SBTC, Addendum 2.

14 See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.6(f)(1)(i); 1.8(b)(1); 1.10(c)(1), (d)(1), (e)(1),

(g)(1), (h)(1), (j)(1); 1.25(a); 1.803(a)(2)(vii); 1.804(b); 1.805(c),

(d); 5.2(c); 11.103; 11.104(a)(1), (a)(4); 11.118(d)(2)(ii); 41.108(c);

41.109(c); 41.120(c); and 41.124(e).

15 See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.701(d)(2); 1.775(d)(1)(ii); 1.776(d)(1)(ii);

1.777(d)(1)(ii); 1.778(d)(1)(ii); 1.779(d)(1)(ii); 1.805(c)(3), (d);

5.25(a)(3)(ii); and 11.103.

- 12 and demonstrate “a bona fide attempt to advance the

application to final action.” 17 The Office developed

specific

practices

to

determine

applicants’

compliance. For example, for determining whether

applicants’ replies “appear throughout to be a bona

fide attempt to advance the application … to final

action” pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.111(b), the

examiners guidance in the MPEP for this rule alone

contains 14 sections addressing facets of this

requirement. 18 More generally, the PTO routinely

demonstrates active use of the timeliness rules when

facing what the Office regards as applicant’s dilatory

conduct. 19 It is simply unreasonable to expect a

16 See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.28(c); 1.29(k); 1.56(a); 1.555(a); 1.765(a);

1.933(a); 5.1(d); and 42.11(a).

17 See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.85(a), 1.97(f), 1.111(b), 1.135(c), and

1.957(d).

18 See MPEP §§ 608.01(b); 706.07(h); 707.07(f); 708.02(a);

714.02; 714.03(a); 804; 818.01; 1302.14; 1490; 2141; 2246; 2266,

and 2269.

19 See e.g., In re Goodman, et al., 1987 Commr. Pat. LEXIS 19,

*8, (Comm'r Pat. & Trademarks January 28, 1987) (The

“application became abandoned for failure to [meet 37 CFR §

1.111 and] file a complete response to the first Office action.”);

In re Colyvas, 2010 Commr. Pat. LEXIS 24, *6-9 (Comm'r Pat.

& Trademarks May 24, 2010) (Denying repeated petitions to

withdraw holding of abandonment after extended period of

delay); In re Gilbert et al., 2011 Commr. Pat. LEXIS 328, *1,

*16 (Comm'r Pat. & Trademarks July 14, 2011) (Denying

petition to withdraw the finality of the final Office action after

applicant’s prior attempt at further amendments, thereby

enforcing Rule 1.111(b)); In re Amaitis, et al. 2012 Commr. Pat.

LEXIS 13, *14 (Comm'r Pat. & Trademarks February 27, 2012)

(Denying applicants’ petition to vacate abandonment of the

application under 37 C.F.R. § 1.135(c) because applicants failed

- 13 District Court judge to second-guess the expert

agency on such prosecution timing and workflow

issues.

The PTO, however, is well-equipped to render

such determinations and to enforce compliance. The

PTO’s regulations governing applicants’ conduct

provide that in every submission to the Office,

applicant certifies that it “is not being presented …

to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in

the cost of any proceeding before the Office.” 37

C.F.R. § 11.18(b)(2)(i). This regulation also provides

that “violations of any of [these provisions] are, after

notice and reasonable opportunity to respond,

subject to such sanctions or actions as deemed

appropriate by the [PTO] Director, which may

include, but are not limited to … [t]erminating the

proceedings in the Office.” Id., § 11.18(c)(5). This is

equivalent to forfeiture of the application.20

For example, the PTO reviews submissions of

continuing applications filed in chains spanning

many years to enforce 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(f) (requiring

that “patentably indistinct claims [be eliminated]

from all but one application.”) While doing so, the

PTO expertly evaluates if claiming practice in the

chain constitutes “unreasonable and unexplained

delay,” for example, whether cancelled claims are

reintroduced, or otherwise are opportunistically

to elect between multiple inventions and “the amendment on

its face is not a ‘bona fide attempt to advance the application to

final action.’”)

20 Rule 11.18’s predecessor prior to September 2008, 37 C.F.R.

§ 10.18, was in place since 1985. See 50 Fed. Reg. 5172 (Feb. 6,

1985).

- 14 “presented … to cause unnecessary delay.” If so,

such contravention of § 11.18(b)(2)(i) justifies PTO’s

refusal to enter submissions or even forfeit the

application. § 11.18(c)(5).

Hence, the existing statutory scheme and

implementing regulations are already structured to

produce the outcome that prosecution laches

purports to achieve through undue expansion of

adjudicators’ equitable powers. However, “[s]uch an

expansive role careens away from understandings …

of the essentially gap-filling, not legislationoverriding, office of laches.”21

The Patent Act in its full framework including

implementing regulations leaves no room for the

application of equitable doctrines to supplant

statutes, where agency administrative regulations

specifically do so. See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med.

Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 149 (2013) (Held that equitable

tolling of the 180̻day statutory period for filing an

appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(3) is unavailable

where an administrative process by regulation in 42

C.F.R. § 405.1841(b) fills “gaps,” extending the

period for three years for “good cause.”)

21 Petrella, 572 U.S. at 680.

- 15 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should

grant the petition for certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES E. MILLER

ASSOCIATION OF AMICUS COUNSEL

411 MAIN STREET #404

STONEHAM, MA 02180-3595

TEL.: (516) 641-3378

charles.miller@cmilleriplaw.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

April 3, 2026