Petitioners Brief — Republican National Committee, Petitioner v. Mi Familia Vota, et al.

Supreme Court briefAug 28, 2026

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No. 25-1017

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

________________

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE,

Petitioner,

v.

MI FAMILIA VOTA, ET AL.,

Respondents.

________________

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

________________

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS STATE OF

ARIZONA AND ITS ATTORNEY GENERAL IN

PARTIAL SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

________________

KRISTIN K. MAYES

HAYLEIGH S. CRAWFORD

Attorney General

JOSHUA M. WHITAKER

KATHRYN E. BOUGHTON

DANIEL C. BARR

TIMOTHY E. D. HORLEY

Assistant Attorneys

Chief Deputy

Attorney General

General

JOSHUA D. BENDOR

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

OFFICE OF THE ARIZONA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

2005 N. Central Ave.

Phoenix, AZ 85004

(602) 542-8958

Joshua.Bendor@azag.gov

Counsel for Respondents State of Arizona and

Arizona Attorney General Kristin K. Mayes

August 28, 2026

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The RNC’s petition raised two questions:

1) Does the National Voter Registration Act or a

federal consent decree prohibit Arizona from requiring

voter-registration applicants to produce “satisfactory

evidence” of U.S. citizenship when registering with a

state registration form?

2) Does the National Voter Registration Act

prohibit Arizona from implementing a program within

90 days of a federal election to cancel the registrations

of voters who are not U.S. citizens?

The present brief discusses the first question only.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

This Court granted the petition for writ of

certiorari in No. 25-1017 and has not acted on the

petitions in Nos. 25-1019 and 25-1022.

In No. 25-1017, Petitioner is the RNC, and

Respondents are:

•

the United States;

•

Mi Familia Vota and Voto Latino;

•

Living United for Change in Arizona, League of

United Latin American Citizens Arizona, Arizona

Students’ Association, ADRC Action, Inter Tribal

Council of Arizona Inc., the San Carlos Apache

Tribe, and Arizona Coalition for Change;

•

Poder Latinx, Chicanos Por La Causa Inc., and

Chicanos Por La Causa Action Fund;

•

the DNC and the Arizona Democratic Party;

•

Arizona Asian American Native Hawaiian and

Pacific Islander for Equity Coalition;

•

Promise

Arizona

and

Southwest

Registration Education Project;

•

the Tohono O’odham Nation, the Gila River Indian

Community, Keanu Stevens, Alanna Siquieros,

and LaDonna Jacket;

•

the State of Arizona and Arizona Attorney General

Kristin K. Mayes;

•

Arizona Senate President Warrant Petersen and

Arizona House Speaker Steve Montenegro;

•

Arizona Secretary of State Adrian Fontes;

Voter

iii

•

Arizona Department of Transportation Director

Jennifer Toth; and

•

the Recorders of all fifteen of Arizona’s counties.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ........................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... vi

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................... 2

A. From 2013 to 2018, Arizona officials

rejected State Forms unaccompanied by

proof of citizenship, but not Federal

Forms. ........................................................... 2

B. In 2018, Arizona officials agreed to a

consent decree to treat Federal and State

Forms the same. ........................................... 4

C. In 2022, an Arizona law required

rejection of State Forms unaccompanied

by proof of citizenship, contrary to the

consent decree............................................... 6

D. The district court declared that “Arizona

must abide by” the consent decree and

then entered an injunction. .......................... 8

E. This Court stayed the district court’s

injunction. ................................................... 10

F.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district

court’s injunction, citing the consent

decree

and

the

National

Voter

Registration Act.......................................... 11

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................. 12

v

ARGUMENT ............................................................. 13

I.

The National Voter Registration Act does not

prohibit Arizona from requiring proof of

citizenship for State Form users. ...................... 13

A. In Arizona, proof of citizenship is

“necessary to enable the appropriate

State election official” to assess eligibility

of State Form users. ................................... 14

B. Arizona may require proof of citizenship

for State Form users regardless of

whether the State Form is “equivalent” to

the Federal Form. ....................................... 17

II. The consent decree remains binding, but

parties and perhaps affected non-parties may

seek to vacate or modify it. ............................... 20

A. The consent decree remains binding

unless and until it is vacated, even

though it prohibits what Arizona law now

requires. ...................................................... 21

B. Parties to the consent decree and

perhaps affected non-parties may seek to

vacate or modify the decree........................ 24

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 27

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Agostini v. Felton,

521 U.S. 203 (1997) ................................................ 23

Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.,

570 U.S. 1 (2013) ........ 2, 3, 13, 14 ,15, 16, 18, 19, 20

Ayestas v. Davis,

584 U.S. 28 (2018) .................................................. 16

Celotex Corp. v. Edwards,

514 U.S. 300 (1995) .................................... 22, 23, 27

Foster v. Stanek,

689 F. Supp. 3d 975 (D. Kan. 2023) ...................... 25

Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins,

540 U.S. 431 (2004) .......................................... 22, 23

Gonzalez v. Arizona,

D. Ariz. No. CV-06-1268-PHX-ROS, 2013 WL

7767705 (Sept. 11, 2013)........................................ 19

GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.,

445 U.S. 375 (1980) ................................................ 22

Horne v. Flores,

557 U.S. 433 (2009) .......................................... 23, 26

League of United Latin American Citizens of Arizona

et al. v. Reagan et al.,

D. Ariz. No. 17-cv-4102 ............................................ 4

vii

O’Sullivan v. City of Chicago,

396 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2005) .................................. 22

Roberts v. St. Regis Paper Co.,

653 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1981) .................................. 24

Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail,

502 U.S. 367 (1992) .......................................... 21, 22

Sys. Fed’n No. 91 v. Wright,

364 U.S. 642 (1961) ................................................ 22

Thompson v. HUD,

404 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 2005) .................................. 24

United States v. Swift & Co.,

286 U.S. 106 (1932) ................................................ 22

Young v. Fordice,

520 U.S. 273 (1997) .................................................. 2

Constitution and Statutes

Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 2(A)............................................. 2

52 U.S.C. § 20504(c)(2)(B)(ii) .................................... 16

52 U.S.C. § 20505(a)(1) ........................................ 14, 19

52 U.S.C. § 20505(a)(2) .............................................. 14

52 U.S.C. § 20506 ...................................................... 19

52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(6)(A) ....................... 12, 13, 18, 19

52 U.S.C. § 20508(b) .................................................. 14

viii

52 U.S.C. § 20508(b)(1) .................................. 12, 13, 14

A.R.S. § 16-101(A)............................................ 7, 15, 17

A.R.S. § 16-121(A)............................................ 7, 15, 17

A.R.S. § 16-121.01...................................... 7, 15, 17, 25

A.R.S. § 16-166(F) ............................................ 2, 15, 17

A.R.S. § 16-452............................................................. 5

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 ....................................................... 26

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) ............... 10, 12, 20, 23, 25, 26, 27

Other Authorities

2019 Ariz. Elections Procedures Manual ................... 5

2025 Ariz. Elections Procedures Manual ................. 11

Ariz. Op. Att’y Gen. No. I13-011, available at 2013

WL 5676943 ............................................................. 3

Ariz. Op. Att’y Gen. No. I24-015, available at 2024

WL 4357383 ........................................................... 10

House Bill 2492 (2022) .................................. 6, 7, 8, 25

League of United Latin American Citizens et al. v.

Hobbs et al., D. Ariz. No. 22-cv-519, Dkt. #6 (Apr.

5, 2022); Dkt. #19 (Apr. 13, 2022) ....................... 8, 9

ix

League of United Latin American Citizens of Arizona

et al. v. Reagan et al., D. Ariz. No. 17-cv-4102, Dkt.

#57 (Apr. 5, 2022); Dkt. #68 (Apr. 13, 2022) ....... 8, 9

Mi Familia Vota et al. v. Fontes et al., D. Ariz. No. 22cv-509, Dkt. #364 (May 8, 2023), Dkt. #367 and

#369 (May 15, 2023); Dkt. #390, 391, 393, 394, 395,

396, 397, 399, and 400 (June 5, 2023) ..................... 9

Necessary, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).... 16

INTRODUCTION

The State of Arizona and its Attorney General file

this brief to defend Arizona’s authority to require that

a person who seeks to register to vote using Arizona’s

form prove that he or she is a citizen of the United

States. The State and Attorney General also write to

address how federal consent decrees should be

modified when underlying state law changes.

Below, the Ninth Circuit held that the National

Voter Registration Act “does not let Arizona require”

proof of citizenship when registering voters for federal

elections with state-created registration forms. RNC

App.50a–52a. 1 This holding misinterprets the Act.

This Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit on this

point.

The Ninth Circuit also held that a 2018 consent

decree “limits the ability of executive officers in

Arizona to enforce” a state law enacted in 2022, which

requires rejecting state registration forms when proof

of citizenship is absent. RNC App.47a–49a. This

holding is correct, at least for now. The consent decree

is a binding injunction, and parties to the decree (and

affected non-parties when appropriate) may seek to

vacate or modify it given the subsequent change in

Arizona’s law.

1 This brief relies on the appendix to the RNC’s petition.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. From 2013 to 2018, Arizona officials rejected

State Forms unaccompanied by proof of

citizenship, but not Federal Forms.

Arizona’s Constitution provides that only U.S.

citizens may vote. Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 2(A). Arizona’s

Constitution also directs lawmakers to enact laws to

“secure the purity of elections” and “guard against

abuses” of the right to vote. Id. art. 7, § 12.

In 2004, Arizona enacted Proposition 200,

requiring people who register to vote in Arizona to

provide “satisfactory evidence of United States

citizenship.” A.R.S. § 16-166(F). 2

But in 2013, this Court held that the National

Voter Registration Act partially preempted Arizona’s

proof-of-citizenship requirement. Because of the Act,

people who register to vote in Arizona using the

federal mail registration form (the “Federal Form”)

need not satisfy Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship

requirement to vote in federal elections. See Arizona

v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 9–

20 (2013).

The Court’s ruling did not, however, preclude

Arizona from requiring proof of citizenship to vote in

state elections. This is because the National Voter

Registration Act governs registration for “federal

elections.” Id. at 5 (quoting Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S.

273, 275 (1997)).

2 This brief uses the shorthand term “proof of citizenship,” but

the more precise term is “satisfactory evidence of citizenship.”

3

Nor did the Court’s ruling preclude Arizona from

requiring proof of citizenship for applicants using

Arizona’s voter registration form (the “State Form”).

Rather, the Court specified that “state-developed

forms may require information the Federal Form does

not” and “can be used to register voters in both state

and federal elections.” Id. at 12.

After the Court’s ruling, Arizona’s Attorney

General issued guidance on how to apply Arizona’s

proof-of-citizenship requirement. See Ariz. Op. Att’y

Gen. No. I13-011, available at 2013 WL 5676943. As

a result, election officials in Arizona adopted the

following voter registration practice:

•

Applicants with proof of citizenship were

registered for federal and state elections

(assuming they were otherwise eligible),

regardless of whether they used the Federal or

State Form.

•

Applicants who used the Federal Form without

proof of citizenship were registered only for

federal elections.

•

Applicants who used the State Form without

proof of citizenship were not registered for any

elections.

See RNC App.193a. The following chart summarizes

this practice:

4

Practice after Supreme Court decision (2013)

Applicant used

Federal Form:

Applicant used

State Form:

Proof of

citizenship:

Registered for

federal and

state elections

Registered for

federal and

state elections

No proof of

citizenship:

Registered for

federal

elections only

Not registered

at all

B. In 2018, Arizona officials agreed to a consent

decree to treat Federal and State Forms the

same.

In 2018, Arizona’s Secretary of State and

Maricopa County’s Recorder agreed to a consent

decree in League of United Latin American Citizens of

Arizona et al. v. Reagan et al., D. Ariz. No. 17-cv-4102.

RNC App.193a, 474a–494a. The consent decree

settled allegations that Arizona officials were

violating the U.S. Constitution by treating applicants

who used State Forms differently from those who used

Federal Forms. RNC App.474a–475a.

Arizona’s Secretary of State denied that Arizona’s

voter registration practices were unconstitutional or

otherwise illegal. RNC App.476a. Nevertheless, the

Secretary and Maricopa County’s Recorder agreed to

a consent decree to “treat[] Federal Form and State

Form applications the same,” believing that doing so

was “consistent with the provisions of Arizona law”

that existed at the time. RNC App.476a.

5

Arizona’s Secretary of State also agreed to revise

Arizona’s Elections Procedures Manual in accordance

with the consent decree. RNC App.483a–484a. 3 Thus,

the 2019 Manual followed the consent decree. See

2019 Ariz. Elections Procedures Manual at 6–8. 4 In a

section named “Continuing Jurisdiction,” the consent

decree specified: “The Court shall retain jurisdiction

over this action until December 31, 2020 to enter such

further relief as may be necessary for the effectuation

of the terms of this Consent Decree.” RNC App.494a.

As a result of the consent decree, Arizona officials

began treating Federal Form users and State Form

users the same. For all applicants who did not submit

proof of citizenship, election officials consulted motor

vehicle data, and the results determined next steps:

•

If proof of citizenship was found, the person

was registered for federal and state elections.

•

If evidence of non-citizenship was found, the

person was not registered for any elections

(absent proof of citizenship).

•

If nothing was found, the person was

registered only for federal elections.

In Arizona, the Secretary of State issues an Elections

Procedures Manual every two years upon approval of the

Governor and Attorney General. A.R.S. § 16-452. Current and

prior Manuals are available at https://azsos.gov/elections/aboutelections/elections-procedures/epm.

3

4

The 2019 Manual is specifically available at

https://apps.azsos.gov/election/files/epm/2019_elections_procedu

res_manual_approved.pdf.

6

See RNC App.193a–194a, 484a–492a. The following

chart summarizes this practice:

Practice after consent decree (2018)

Applicant used

Federal Form:

Applicant used

State Form:

Proof of

citizenship:

Registered for

federal and

state elections

Registered for

federal and

state elections

Evidence of

non-citizenship:

Not registered

at all (absent

contrary proof)

Not registered

at all (absent

contrary proof)

No proof

either way:

Registered for

federal

elections only

Registered for

federal

elections only

C. In 2022, an Arizona law required rejection of

State Forms unaccompanied by proof of

citizenship, contrary to the consent decree.

Arizona lawmakers enacted House Bill 2492 in

2022. RNC App.234a–236a. As a result, a legal

premise underlying the 2018 consent decree became

untrue. Whereas Arizona’s Secretary of State and

Maricopa County’s Recorder had agreed to the consent

decree on the understanding that it was “consistent

with the provisions of Arizona law,” RNC App.476a,

House Bill 2492 created unmistakable conflict

between the consent decree and Arizona law.

7

Among other things, House Bill 2492:

•

Lists proof of citizenship as a voter eligibility

requirement and a registration requirement in

A.R.S. §§ 16-101(A) and 16-121(A);

•

Requires election officials to reject State

Forms when proof of citizenship is absent (and

criminalizes the knowing failure to do so) in

A.R.S. § 16-121.01(C); and

•

Requires election officials to verify citizenship

for applicants using Federal Forms when proof

of citizenship is absent as set forth in A.R.S.

§ 16-121.01(D)–(G).

See RNC App.194a–197a, 457a–461a. 5

According to the sponsor of House Bill 2492, the

law was enacted largely as a response to the 2018

consent decree, because the consent decree had

allowed more voters to register for federal elections

without proof of citizenship. RNC App.234a–235a.

It is clear that House Bill 2492 would require

Arizona officials to depart from the 2018 consent

decree when evaluating applicants who use the State

Form without proof of citizenship.

Indeed, as

explained below, Arizona officials have in fact been

departing from the consent decree since this Court

partially stayed the injunction in this case. The

following chart identifies this departure in the bottomright box:

5 The RNC’s appendix appears not to contain A.R.S. § 16-121(A)

even though it was amended in relevant part by House Bill 2492.

8

Practice after Supreme Court stay (2024)

Applicant used

Federal Form:

Applicant used

State Form:

Proof of

citizenship:

Registered for

federal and

state elections

Registered for

federal and

state elections

Evidence of

non-citizenship:

Not registered

at all (absent

contrary proof)

Not registered

at all (absent

contrary proof)

No proof

either way:

Registered for

federal

elections only 6

Not registered

at all

D. The district court declared that “Arizona

must abide by” the consent decree and then

entered an injunction.

In the litigation below, a group of plaintiffs moved

to transfer their lawsuit to the judge who entered the

2018 consent decree (Judge Campbell). See League of

United Latin American Citizens of Arizona et al. v.

Reagan et al., D. Ariz. No. 17-cv-4102, Dkt. #57 (Apr.

5, 2022); League of United Latin American Citizens et

al. v. Hobbs et al., D. Ariz. No. 22-cv-519, Dkt. #6 (Apr.

5, 2022). They explained that their new lawsuit was

closely related to the prior case underlying the consent

6 Under House Bill 2492 as enacted, Federal Form users who

fall within this box (no citizenship proof either way) would be not

only limited to federal elections, but also prevented from voting

for President and voting by mail. But those two additional limits

were enjoined and are not the subject of the RNC’s petition.

9

decree. In their words, the new lawsuit “involves the

same parties,” “directly raises the same claims,” and

“necessarily requires consideration of the underlying

consent decree.” Id.

Judge Campbell declined the transfer.

He

reasoned that, although he “approved the consent

decree” in the prior case, he “did not otherwise address

the merits” and the case “has long been closed.”

League of United Latin American Citizens of Arizona

et al. v. Reagan et al., D. Ariz. No. 17-cv-4102, Dkt. #68

(Apr. 13, 2022); League of United Latin American

Citizens et al. v. Hobbs et al., D. Ariz. No. 22-cv-519,

Dkt. #19 (Apr. 13, 2022). In his view, the judge who

had been assigned the new lawsuit (Judge Bolton)

would be the one to consider “the relationship between

the terms of the consent decree and the challenged

statute.” Id.

Judge Bolton consolidated multiple lawsuits and

heard cross-motions for partial summary judgment.

See Mi Familia Vota et al. v. Fontes et al., D. Ariz. No.

22-cv-509, Dkt. #364 (May 8, 2023), Dkt. #367 and

#369 (May 15, 2023); Dkt. #390, 391, 393, 394, 395,

396, 397, 399, and 400 (June 5, 2023). None of these

motions, however, asked the court to settle the

relationship between the 2018 consent decree and

Arizona’s new law requiring proof of citizenship for

State Form users. Yet the court decided the issue in

its summary judgment ruling. RNC App.365a–366a,

381a, 383a.

Specifically, the court ruled that the 2018 consent

decree “precludes Arizona from enforcing” its new law

requiring proof of citizenship for State Form users.

RNC App.381a. The court reasoned that, although

10

federal courts generally may set aside consent decrees

under Rule 60(b), the 2018 consent decree was “never

set aside” by “Judge Campbell.” RNC App.365a–366a.

Thus, the court declared that “Arizona must abide by”

the consent decree and “register otherwise eligible

State Form users” for federal elections, even when

proof of citizenship is absent. RNC App.383a.

In a footnote, the district court suggested that the

National Voter Registration Act would lead to the

same result. See RNC App.366a–367a.

Accordingly, the district court permanently

enjoined Arizona officials from enforcing the new state

law that requires rejecting State Forms when proof of

citizenship is absent. RNC App.428a–429a.

E. This Court

injunction.

stayed

the

district

court’s

A Ninth Circuit motions panel stayed the district

court’s injunction in part, thus allowing Arizona

officials to implement the new state law that requires

proof of citizenship for State Form users. RNC

App.387a. But then a Ninth Circuit merits panel

vacated the stay. RNC App.393a–394a.

This Court sided with the Ninth Circuit motions

panel and restored the partial stay of the injunction.

RNC App.426a. As a result, Arizona officials have

been implementing the new state law by rejecting

State Forms when proof of citizenship is absent. For

example, Arizona’s Attorney General issued guidance

on how to apply the law. See, e.g., Ariz. Op. Att’y Gen.

No. I24-015, available at 2024 WL 4357383

(answering questions from Secretary of State).

11

Arizona’s Secretary of State issued similar guidance in

the most recent Elections Procedures Manual. See

2025 Ariz. Elections Procedures Manual at 4 & n.5. 7

F. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district

court’s injunction, citing the consent decree

and the National Voter Registration Act.

After this Court partially stayed the injunction,

the Ninth Circuit merits panel affirmed the injunction

in relevant part. The panel majority reasoned that the

2018 consent decree “limits the ability of executive

officers in Arizona to enforce” the new state law that

requires rejecting State Forms unaccompanied by

proof of citizenship. RNC App.47a–49a. Like the

district court, the majority reasoned that the consent

decree “has never been set aside.” RNC App.48a. The

majority thus concluded that the consent decree

“remains an enforceable, binding final judgment” that

“bars Arizona election officials from enforcing” the

contrary state law. RNC App.48a–49a.

The panel majority also reasoned that,

alternatively, the National Voter Registration Act

“does not let Arizona require” proof of citizenship for

people who use State Forms to register for federal

elections. RNC App.50a–52a. The majority cited two

parts of the Act to support this view. First, according

to the majority, proof of citizenship is not “necessary

to enable the appropriate State election official to

assess the eligibility of the applicant.” RNC App.50a

7

The 2025 Manual is specifically available

https://apps.azsos.gov/election/files/epm/2025/ElectionProcedures-Manual-2025--FINAL-12-22-25.pdf.

at

12

(quoting 52 U.S.C. § 20508(b)(1)). Second, according

to the majority, requiring proof of citizenship for State

Form users would render the State Form not

“equivalent” to the Federal Form. RNC App.51a

(quoting 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(6)(A)(ii)).

Judge Bumatay dissented. RNC App.103a–116a.

In his view, interpreting the 2018 consent decree to

preclude enforcement of Arizona’s subsequent law

“raises alarming separation-of-powers concerns.”

RNC App.104a. He also concluded that a motion to

vacate or modify the consent decree under Rule 60(b)

was not required. RNC App.108a–109a.

Judge Bumatay also disagreed with the majority’s

reading of the National Voter Registration Act. In his

view, Arizona permissibly determined that proof of

citizenship is “necessary to enable the appropriate

State election official to assess the eligibility of the

applicant.” RNC App.110a–114a (quoting 52 U.S.C. §

20508(b)(1)). And, in his view, the State Form is

sufficiently “equivalent” to the Federal Form despite

the proof-of-citizenship requirement. RNC App.114a–

116a (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(6)(A)(ii)). He also

reasoned that, even if the State Form were not

“equivalent” to the Federal Form, that would not

justify the sweeping injunction that the district court

entered. RNC App.116a.

Eleven judges dissented from the denial of

rehearing en banc. RNC App.155a–187a.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The National Voter Registration Act does not

prohibit Arizona from requiring proof of citizenship for

13

State Form applicants. The Ninth Circuit panel

majority erred in holding otherwise. In Arizona, proof

of citizenship is “necessary to enable” election officials

to “assess the eligibility” of State Form applicants. 52

U.S.C. § 20508(b)(1). And even if State Forms are not

“equivalent” to Federal Forms for purposes of public

assistance agencies’ duties to distribute registration

forms under 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(6)(A), Arizona could

still require proof of citizenship for State Form

applicants.

Unlike the National Voter Registration Act, the

2018 consent decree does limit the ability of election

officials in Arizona to require proof of citizenship for

State Form applicants. The Ninth Circuit panel

majority was correct on this point. The consent decree

binds the defendants in that case until it is vacated or

modified. The separation-of-powers concern raised by

the Ninth Circuit panel dissent is misplaced because

parties to the consent decree (and affected non-parties

when appropriate) may seek to vacate or modify the

decree given the subsequent change in Arizona’s law.

ARGUMENT

I.

The National Voter Registration Act does

not prohibit Arizona from requiring proof of

citizenship for State Form users.

As this Court previously explained, State Forms

“may require information the Federal Form does not”

and “can be used to register voters in both state and

federal elections.” Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of

Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 12 (2013).

Contrary to that explanation, the Ninth Circuit

misread the National Voter Registration Act to

14

prohibit Arizona from requiring proof of citizenship for

State Form applicants for federal elections. This

Court should correct the misreading.

A. In Arizona, proof of citizenship is

“necessary to enable the appropriate

State election official” to assess

eligibility of State Form users.

1. Under the National Voter Registration Act,

States must “accept and use” the mail voter

registration form prescribed by the Federal Election

Commission (known as the Federal Form) for federal

elections. 52 U.S.C. § 20505(a)(1). In addition, States

may “develop and use” their own mail voter

registration form for federal elections if it meets the

criteria in § 20508(b). 52 U.S.C. § 20505(a)(2). These

criteria include requiring “only” such information as is

“necessary to enable the appropriate State election

official to assess the eligibility of the applicant and to

administer voter registration and other parts of the

election process.” 52 U.S.C. § 20508(b)(1).

When evaluating whether information is

“necessary to enable” State election officials to “assess

the eligibility” of registration applicants, 52 U.S.C.

§ 20508(b)(1), federal courts must remember a basic

truth: States define eligibility. The Elections Clause

“empowers Congress to regulate how federal elections

are held, but not who may vote in them.” Inter Tribal

Council of Arizona, 570 U.S. at 16.

Here, Arizona has defined eligibility in a way that

makes clear: proof of citizenship is “necessary to

enable” election officials to “assess the eligibility” of

State Form applicants. In 2004, Arizona required

15

election officials to reject all voter registration forms

that lack proof of citizenship. A.R.S. § 16-166(F). And

in 2022, after this Court’s intervening decision in Inter

Tribal Council of Arizona, Arizona took additional

steps including:

•

Specifying that proof of citizenship is, itself, a

requirement for a resident to be qualified to

register to vote in A.R.S. § 16-101(A);

•

Specifying that proof of citizenship is, itself, a

component of being a qualified elector in A.R.S.

§ 16-121(A); and

•

Reiterating that State Forms must be

accompanied by proof of citizenship and that

election officials must “reject” State Forms that

lack such proof (and criminalizing the knowing

failure of election officials to do so) in A.R.S. §

16-121.01(C).

Given these statutes, an election official in

Arizona who receives a State Form needs proof of

citizenship to assess eligibility. Absent such proof, the

applicant is, by law, ineligible to register to vote.

2. The Ninth Circuit panel majority took a

puzzling route to the opposite conclusion.

The

majority first defined “necessary” as “essential,” a

word that appears nowhere in the National Voter

Registration Act. RNC App.50a. The majority then

stated that proof of citizenship is not “essential” to

assess eligibility of State Form applicants because

such applicants already must check a box attesting to

citizenship. RNC App.50a. This logic is wrong at

every turn.

16

For starters, the word “necessary” may sometimes

mean “essential,” but it may also mean “merely

important or strongly desired.” Ayestas v. Davis, 584

U.S. 28, 44 (2018).

When the National Voter

Registration Act was enacted, Black’s Law Dictionary

explained that “necessary” could, depending on

context, simply mean “useful, appropriate, suitable,

proper, or conducive to the end sought.” Necessary,

Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).

That more flexible definition fits here for two

reasons. First, interpreting the Act strictly to prevent

Arizona from obtaining information it needs to enforce

its voter qualifications would “raise serious

constitutional doubts.”

Inter Tribal Council of

Arizona, 570 U.S. at 17–18. The more flexible

definition of “necessary” helps avoid such doubts.

Second, another part of the Act suggests that Congress

had a more flexible definition in mind. The Act

specifies that, when someone seeks to register to vote

as part of a driver’s license application, the State may

require “only the minimum amount of information

necessary” to enable officials to assess eligibility. 52

U.S.C. § 20504(c)(2)(B)(ii). If Congress thought that

the word “necessary,” by itself, was already limited to

essential information, there would have been no need

to add the qualification “only the minimum amount.”

Regardless, even if “necessary” means “essential,”

proof of citizenship is essential to enable election

officials in Arizona to assess eligibility of State Form

applicants. This is because Arizona law makes it

essential. The Ninth Circuit panel majority ignored

basic features of Arizona law on this point, including

that (1) Arizona has long required election officials to

17

reject voter registration forms that lack proof of

citizenship, (2) Arizona has now specified that proof of

citizenship is both a voter eligibility requirement and

a registration requirement, and (3) Arizona has now

criminalized the knowing failure to reject State Forms

that lack proof of citizenship. A.R.S. §§ 16-101(A), 16121(A), 16-121.01(C), 16-166(F).

The Ninth Circuit panel majority decided instead

that a checkbox and attestation suffice to ensure that

State Form users are citizens. See RNC App.50a. But

Arizona’s lawmakers reasonably decided otherwise as

a policy matter. Indeed, Arizona long ago specified six

acceptable forms of proof of citizenship—and none is a

checkbox and attestation. A.R.S. § 16-166(F).

More fundamentally, the Ninth Circuit panel

majority asked the wrong question. The question is

not just whether proof of citizenship is necessary to

enable officials to assess whether State Form

applicants are citizens. The question is whether proof

of citizenship is necessary to enable officials to assess

whether State Form applicants are eligible as defined

by state law. Here, Arizona law specifies that proof of

citizenship is itself an eligibility requirement. A.R.S.

§§ 16-101(A), 16-121(A). The panel majority thus

failed to account for Arizona’s authority to define

eligibility.

B. Arizona may require proof of citizenship

for State Form users regardless of

whether the State Form is “equivalent”

to the Federal Form.

1. Under the National Voter Registration Act, if

a voter registration agency is also “an office that

provides service or assistance,” then the agency must

18

“distribute” a voter registration form along with each

application for service or assistance. 52 U.S.C.

§ 20506(a)(6)(A). That form must be (1) the Federal

Form or (2) “the office’s own form if it is equivalent to”

the Federal Form. Id.

Below, Ninth Circuit judges debated whether

Arizona’s State Form is “equivalent” to the Federal

Form for purposes of public assistance agencies’

duties. RNC App.51a–52a, 114a–116a. Other parties

debate the question here.

2. Truth be told, the question does not matter

here. Neither answer justifies the injunction below,

which broadly prohibited Arizona from rejecting State

Forms unaccompanied by proof of citizenship. See

RNC App.428a–429a.

The National Voter

Registration Act simply does not say that States may

use State Forms only if they are equivalent to the

Federal Form. After all, this Court has already

recognized that State Forms “may require information

the Federal Form does not,” Inter Tribal Council of

Arizona, 570 U.S. at 12, which presumably would

make them not “equivalent” in at least some cases.

And by its terms, the “equivalent” clause in

§ 20506(a)(6)(A) is not a restriction on use; it imposes

a positive obligation on state public assistance

agencies to “distribute” voter registration forms,

which may be either the Federal Form or an

“equivalent” state-created form. So if Arizona’s State

Form is not “equivalent” to the Federal Form, the

consequence under the Act is that Arizona public

assistance agencies would have to distribute the

Federal Form (or some other equivalent form).

19

Indeed, that mirrors existing practice: Arizona

and county officials already must make the Federal

Form available through all channels they use to make

the State Form available. This is because of an

injunction entered following this Court’s decision in

Inter Tribal Council of Arizona. See Gonzalez v.

Arizona, D. Ariz. No. CV-06-1268-PHX-ROS, 2013 WL

7767705, at *1 (Sept. 11, 2013).

But whether Arizona’s State Form is “equivalent”

to the Federal Form for purposes of a public assistance

agency’s duty to distribute registration forms does not

determine whether Arizona can require proof of

citizenship for State Form users. Congress knows how

to require States to “accept” specific registration forms

when it wants—as it did for the Federal Form. See 52

U.S.C. § 20505(a)(1). But no such language appears

in § 20506, entitled “Voter registration agencies.”

Moreover, the duty to distribute certain registration

forms is limited to public assistance agencies, not

Arizona as a whole. See 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(6)(A).

Again, Congress knows how to impose duties on the

“State” as a whole—as it did for the Federal Form. See

52 U.S.C. § 20505(a)(1).

3. The Ninth Circuit panel majority decided that

Arizona’s State Form is not “equivalent” to the Federal

Form, since it requires proof of citizenship. RNC

App.51a–52a. From that premise, the panel majority

concluded

that

Arizona’s

proof-of-citizenship

requirement for State Forms “violates” the National

Voter Registration Act. RNC App.52a.

Even assuming that the panel majority is correct

that the State Form is not “equivalent” to the Federal

Form, its conclusion does not follow. To conclude that

20

Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship requirement for State

Forms violates the National Voter Registration Act,

the panel majority must have assumed that the Act

prohibits States from using registration forms that are

not equivalent to the Federal Form. But the Act does

no such thing. Rather, “States retain the flexibility to

design and use their own registration forms.” Inter

Tribal Council of Arizona, 570 U.S. at 12. The Act

simply makes the Federal Form “a backstop” that

“guarantees that a simple means of registering to vote

in federal elections will be available.” Id.

II. The consent decree remains binding, but

parties and perhaps affected non-parties

may seek to vacate or modify it.

The Ninth Circuit panel majority was on stronger

footing when it held that a 2018 consent decree limits

the ability of officials in Arizona to require proof of

citizenship for State Form users. The consent decree

has not yet been vacated and therefore remains a

binding injunction on the defendants against whom it

was issued, even though Arizona law has materially

changed since then.

The Ninth Circuit panel dissent raised concerns

about the tension between the consent decree and

current Arizona law. The answer to those concerns is

not to undermine the validity of consent decrees, but

to use a simple and existing procedural tool: a motion

for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

Accordingly, the Court should affirm the binding

nature of the consent decree while also making clear

that the parties to the decree (and, as appropriate,

non-parties affected by it) retain the ability to seek to

vacate or modify it.

21

A. The consent decree remains binding

unless and until it is vacated, even

though it prohibits what Arizona law

now requires.

1. As explained, in 2018 Arizona’s Secretary of

State and Maricopa County’s Recorder agreed to a

consent decree to treat Federal Forms and State

Forms the same. See Statement of the Case §§ A and

B above. The Secretary and Recorder concluded that

doing so was “consistent with the provisions of Arizona

law” that existed at the time. RNC App.476a.

But in 2022, Arizona law changed. Arizona’s

lawmakers specified that proof of citizenship is a voter

eligibility qualification and a registration requirement

and that officials must (on pain of criminal penalty)

reject State Forms unaccompanied by proof of

citizenship even though they have a different duty for

Federal Forms. See Statement of the Case § C above.

So now the consent decree is no longer consistent

with Arizona law. But it is still a federal court

injunction and “a final judgment.” Rufo v. Inmates of

Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 391 (1992). So the

defendants whom it binds cannot simply ignore it.

The Ninth Circuit panel majority got this point

right. The panel majority explained that the 2018

consent decree “remains an enforceable, binding final

judgment.” RNC App.48a. This was correct, as the

consent decree has not been vacated or modified. 8

8 Since this Court partially stayed the district court’s injunction

below (which was based on the consent decree), Arizona officials

22

A federal consent decree is “subject to the rules

generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.”

Rufo, 502 U.S. at 378; see also Sys. Fed’n No. 91 v.

Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 650 (1961) (“The result is all one

whether the decree has been entered after litigation or

by consent.” (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286

U.S. 106, 114 (1932))). Thus, if a party does not

establish reason to modify the decree, “the decree

should be enforced according to its terms.” Frew ex rel.

Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441–42 (2004).

Changes to a consent decree’s legal or factual

predicates do not justify “ignoring or defying the

decree.” O’Sullivan v. City of Chicago, 396 F.3d 843,

865 (7th Cir. 2005). Until the decree has been vacated

or modified, it remains binding. Frew, 540 U.S. at

441–42; see also Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S.

300, 306 (1995) (“[P]ersons subject to an injunctive

order issued by a court with jurisdiction are expected

to obey that decree until it is modified or reversed,

even if they have proper grounds to object to the

order.” (quoting GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers

Union of U.S., Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 386 (1980))).

2. The RNC argues that the consent decree must

“yield” to changed state law through review in a

collateral proceeding. RNC Cert. Reply at 10–11. But

while a decree is effective, it must be enforced

according to its terms unless a party persuades the

court to modify it. Frew, 540 U.S. at 442. Generally,

have been following Arizona law and rejecting State Forms

unaccompanied by proof of citizenship, despite the consent

decree. See Statement of the Case §§ D and E above. But if this

Court were to clarify that the consent decree remains binding,

Arizona officials would change course.

23

such modification should be sought through Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), which “encompasses

the traditional power of a court of equity to modify its

decree in light of changed circumstances.” Id. at 441.

This Court’s precedents indicate that “Rule 60(b)(5)

provides the vehicle” for such arguments. Horne v.

Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 439 (2009); see also Agostini v.

Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 215 (1997) (citing previous

precedents).

Allowing a federal consent decree to “yield” to

later-enacted state law in a collateral proceeding,

without undertaking the analysis required by Rule

60(b), risks “seriously undercutting the orderly

process of the law.” Celotex Corp., 514 U.S. at 313.

This Court has emphasized that “Rule 60(b)(5) serves

a particularly important function in what we have

termed ‘institutional reform litigation.’” Horne, 557

U.S. at 447 (citation omitted). And this Court has

developed a body of law regarding Rule 60(b)(5)

motions based on changed circumstances.

For

example, “[t]he party seeking relief bears the burden

of establishing that changed circumstances warrant

relief,” but courts must take a “flexible approach”

which “ensure[s] that responsibility for discharging

the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the

State and its officials when the circumstances

warrant.” Id. at 447, 450 (citation and quotation

marks omitted). Allowing courts to adjudicate the

continued viability of consent decrees outside of the

developed framework of Rule 60(b)(5) invites error and

inconsistency in the law. It could also encourage

forum-shopping and inconsistent decrees, if the

plaintiff seeks to enforce an injunction in the issuing

24

court and the defendant seeks to have it declared void

in another court (or vice versa).

3. The 2018 consent decree stated that the “Court

shall retain jurisdiction over this action until

December 31, 2020 to enter such further relief as may

be necessary for the effectuation of the terms of this

Consent Decree.” RNC App.494a. The RNC cites this

clause as a reason why the consent decree must yield

to the change in Arizona law. See RNC Pet. at 32. But

the clause limits the district court’s ability to grant

further relief based on the decree; it does not limit “the

life of the decree itself.” Roberts v. St. Regis Paper Co.,

653 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Thompson

v. HUD, 404 F.3d 821, 833 (4th Cir. 2005) (“As HUD

concedes, it has obligations under the Consent Decree

that extend well beyond the date that the court’s

jurisdiction over HUD originally was to expire.”).

The consent decree imposes duties on the parties

and does not state that those duties have an expiration

date. See RNC App.483a–94a. Thus, despite not

having jurisdiction to enter further relief, “the court

retains jurisdiction to determine whether the parties

are fulfilling their obligations under the decree.”

Roberts, 653 F.2d at 172. The consent decree remains

in force until it is modified or vacated.

B. Parties to the consent decree and

perhaps affected non-parties may seek

to vacate or modify the decree.

1. The Ninth Circuit panel dissent reasoned that

“consent decrees cannot be used to handcuff

governments in perpetuity.” RNC App.105a. The

State and its Attorney General agree with this

25

principle. For this reason, there must be a way to seek

vacatur or modification of the 2018 consent decree,

especially given the change in Arizona law.

And there is. The clearest option is for one of the

governmental parties to the consent decree—Arizona’s

Secretary of State or Maricopa County’s Recorder—to

seek relief from the decree under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b). Either party would have a strong

case for relief. Now that Arizona law requires them to

do something the consent decree prohibits, they are

between a rock and a hard place. Indeed, a key

premise of the consent decree was that its terms were

consistent with Arizona law. RNC App.476a. This

premise is no longer true, given the enactment of

House Bill 2492. Continuing to apply the decree may

well be “no longer equitable,” and the new state law

may well be a “reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 60(b)(5), (6); see, e.g., Foster v. Stanek, 689 F. Supp.

3d 975, 983–89 (D. Kan. 2023) (granting relief from

consent judgment based on change in state law).

The subsequent change in Arizona law is not the

only consideration, however. After all, the consent

decree settled allegations that treating State Forms

and Federal Forms differently was unconstitutional.

RNC App.474a–475a. And now Arizona law expressly

requires treating State Forms and Federal Forms

differently. A.R.S. § 16-121.01(C)–(F). So a court that

decides whether to modify or vacate the decree may

also need to consider whether doing so would create

constitutional problems.

2. The Ninth Circuit panel dissent pointed out

that a Rule 60(b) motion for relief is generally

available only to parties in the underlying case. RNC

26

App.108a. But non-parties who are affected by a

judgment may become parties by intervening under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. For example, if

Arizona’s Legislative Leaders believe that the 2018

consent decree is thwarting current Arizona law, they

may be able to intervene if they meet the requirements

of Rule 24 (and any other applicable requirements).

By analogy, consider Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433

(2009). The district court in that case entered

injunctions against Arizona officials when Arizona’s

Legislature was “not then a party.” Id. at 441–42. The

principal defendants were “siding with the plaintiffs”

in ways that affected Arizona’s Legislature, so

Arizona’s Senate President and House Speaker moved

to intervene “as representatives of their respective

legislative bodies.” Id. at 443. After intervening, they

sought relief under Rule 60(b). Id. Although the

district court denied their motion (and the Ninth

Circuit affirmed), this Court reversed. Id. at 443–45.

3. Here, no one has sought Rule 60(b) relief from

the 2018 consent decree.

This omission was

understandable given the procedural history below.

But the absence of Rule 60(b) analysis renders vacatur

or modification of the decree premature.

As explained, some plaintiffs moved to transfer

their lawsuit to the judge who entered the 2018

consent decree, because their lawsuit involved the

same parties and the same claims that led to the

consent decree and would require consideration of the

decree. See Statement of the Case § D above. The

judge declined the transfer, reasoning that another

judge would consider the relationship between the

consent decree and the new Arizona law. Id.

27

Then the other judge decided the issue at a time

no one asked. None of the motions for summary

judgment asked the court to settle the relationship

between the 2018 consent decree and Arizona’s new

law requiring proof of citizenship for State Form

users. See Statement of the Case § D above. But the

court decided the issue on summary judgment. Id.

In these circumstances, it is understandable why

parties did not seek relief from the 2018 consent

decree under Rule 60(b). The judge who entered the

decree seemed to suggest that he was not the right

judge to ask. And the judge who then decided the

relationship between the consent decree and Arizona’s

new law did so at a time no one asked, without the

benefit of briefing that might have explained the

importance of Rule 60(b) analysis.

Even so, the absence of Rule 60(b) analysis means

that the 2018 consent decree remains binding for now.

As explained, the Rule 60(b) procedure exists for good

reason, and ignoring it risks “seriously undercutting

the orderly process of the law.” Celotex Corp., 514 U.S.

at 313. The Court should affirm that the 2018 consent

decree remains binding so that parties (and affected

non-parties as appropriate) will know to pursue Rule

60(b) relief if they wish.

CONCLUSION

The Court should reverse the judgment of the

court of appeals in part.

28

Respectfully submitted,

KRISTIN K. MAYES

Attorney General

DANIEL C. BARR

Chief Deputy

Attorney General

JOSHUA D. BENDOR

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

HAYLEIGH S. CRAWFORD

JOSHUA M. WHITAKER

KATHRYN E. BOUGHTON

TIMOTHY E. D. HORLEY

Assistant Attorneys

General

OFFICE OF THE ARIZONA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

2005 N. Central Ave.

Phoenix, AZ 85004

(602) 542-8958

Joshua.Bendor@azag.gov

Counsel for Respondents State of Arizona and

Arizona Attorney General Kristin K. Mayes

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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