Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Republican National Committee, Petitioner v. Mi Familia Vota, et al.

No. 25-_______

In the Supreme Court of the United States

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE,

v.

Petitioner,

MI FAMILIA VOTA, ET AL.

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Tyler R. Green

CONSOVOY MCCARTHY

PLLC

222 S. Main St., 5th Fl.

Salt Lake City,

Utah 84101

February 19, 2026

Gilbert C. Dickey

Counsel of Record

Conor D. Woodfin

William Bock IV

CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC

1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700

Arlington, Virginia 22209

(703) 243-9423

gilbert@consovoymccarthy.com

Counsel for the Republican

National Committee

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Like every other State, Arizona permits only

United States citizens to vote in federal elections. To

enforce that qualification, Arizona requires every applicant who registers to vote to produce “satisfactory

evidence of citizenship.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. §16121.01(C). If election officials obtain “information”

from periodic inspections of Arizona’s voter rolls that

“confirms” a “person registered is not a United States

citizen,” they “cancel the registration.” Id. §16165(A)(10).

The Ninth Circuit held that the National Voter

Registration Act—52 U.S.C. §§20506(a)(6)(A)(ii),

20508(b)(1), 20507(c)(2)(a)—preempts those provisions of Arizona law. It also held that Arizona cannot

require voter-registration applicants to produce proof

of citizenship because in 2018, a previous Arizona Secretary of State entered a consent decree with private

litigants. This Court has granted an emergency stay

on each issue: One in this case and one in a Fourth

Circuit case. The RNC raises both questions here on

the merits. The questions presented are:

(1) Does the National Voter Registration Act or a federal consent decree prohibit Arizona from requiring voter-registration applicants to produce “satisfactory evidence” of U.S. citizenship when registering with a state registration form?

(2) Does the National Voter Registration Act prohibit

Arizona from implementing a program within 90

days of a federal election to cancel the registrations

of voters who are not U.S. citizens?

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The Petitioner is the Republican National Committee. The RNC was intervenor-defendant in the consolidated district court proceedings and appellant in

the court of appeals proceedings.

The Respondents are Mi Familia Vota, Voto Latino, Living United for Change in Arizona, League of

United Latin American Citizens, Arizona Students’

Association, ADRC Action, Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., San Carlos Apache Tribe, Arizona Coalition for Change, Poder Latinx, Chicanos Por La

Causa, Chicanos Por La Causa Action Fund, Democratic National Committee, Arizona Democratic

Party, Arizona Asian American Native Hawaiian and

Pacific Islander For Equity Coalition, Promise Arizona, Southwest Voter Registration Education Project, Tohono O’odham Nation, Gila River Indian Community, Keanu Stevens, Alanna Siquieros, and LaDonna Jacket. The Respondents were plaintiffs in the

consolidated district court proceedings and appellees

in the court of appeals proceedings.

The State of Arizona, the Arizona Secretary of

State, the Attorney General of Arizona, Arizona Department of Transportation Director Jennifer Toth,

the Apache County Recorder, the Cochise County Recorder, the Coconino County Recorder, the Gila

County Recorder, the Graham County Recorder, the

Greenlee County Recorder, the La Paz County Recorder, the Maricopa County Recorder, the Mohave

iii

County Recorder, the Navajo County Recorder, the

Pima County Recorder, the Pinal County Recorder,

the Santa Cruz County Recorder, the Yavapai County

Recorder, and the Yuma County Recorder were defendants in the consolidated district court proceedings. The State and Attorney General did not appeal

the district court rulings that are the subject of this

Petition.

Warren Petersen, in his official capacity as the

President of the Arizona Senate, and Steve Montenegro, in his official capacity as Speaker of the Arizona

House of Representatives, were intervenor-defendants in the consolidated district court proceedings and

appellants in the court of appeals proceedings.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

District of Arizona:

Mi Familia Vota v. Fontes, No. 2:22-cv-0509 (lead):

Judgment entered May 2, 2024

Living United for Change in Arizona v. Hobbs, No.

2:22-cv-519 (consol.): Judgment entered May 2,

2024

Poder Latinx v. Hobbs, No. 2:22-cv-1003 (consol.):

Judgment entered May 2, 2024

United States v. Arizona, No. 2:22-cv-1124 (consol.):

Judgment entered May 2, 2024

Democratic National Committee v. Hobbs, No. 2:22cv-1369 (consol.): Judgment entered May 2, 2024

iv

Arizona Asian American Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander for Equity Coal. v. Hobbs, No. 2:22cv-1381 (consol.): Judgment entered May 2, 2024

Promise Arizona v. Fontes, No. 2:22-cv-1602 (consol.): Judgment entered May 2, 2024

Tohono O’odham Nation v. Brnovich, No. 2:22-cv1901 (consol.): Judgment entered May 2, 2024

Ninth Circuit:

Mi Familia Vota v. Petersen, No. 24-3188 (lead):

Judgment entered Feb. 25, 2025

Mi Familia Vota v. Mayes, No. 24-3559 (consol.):

Judgment entered Feb. 25, 2025

Promise Arizona v. Petersen, No. 24-4029 (consol.):

Judgment entered Feb. 25, 2025

In re: Ben Toma v. USDC-AZP, No. 23-70179 (mandamus petition regarding legislative privilege):

Judgment entered Nov. 24, 2023

Supreme Court:

Republican National Committee v. Mi Familia

Vota, No. 24A164 (emergency stay of final judgment before 2024 election): Stay granted in part

Aug. 22, 2024

Toma v. USDC-AZP, No. 23A452 (emergency stay

of discovery regarding legislative privilege): Stay

denied Nov. 27, 2023

v

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 29.6, the

Republican National Committee states that it has no

parent corporation and that no publicly held corporation owns 10% of more of its stock.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented .................................................... i

Parties to the Proceeding ............................................ ii

Related Proceedings ................................................... iii

Corporate Disclosure Statement ................................ v

Table of Cited Authorities ....................................... viii

Introduction ................................................................. 1

Opinions Below ........................................................... 4

Jurisdiction .................................................................. 4

Pertinent Provisions of Federal Law ......................... 4

Statement .................................................................... 4

A. Legal Background .......................................... 4

B. Arizona’s Voter-Verification Laws ................ 7

C. Procedural History ....................................... 11

Reasons for Granting the Petition ........................... 17

I.

The Court has recently granted

emergency relief on both questions

presented. ..................................................... 18

II. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion creates one

circuit split and deepens another. ............... 19

III. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling presents an

excellent vehicle to resolve issues of

exceptional importance. ............................... 23

IV. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion is

“profoundly wrong.”...................................... 28

vii

Conclusion ................................................................. 36

Appendix A: Court of Appeals Opinion

(Feb. 25, 2025) .................................... 1a

Appendix B: Court of Appeals Order Denying

Rehearing (Sept. 22, 2025) ............ 155a

Appendix C: District Court Amended Order After

Bench Trial (Feb. 29, 2024) ........... 188a

Appendix D: District Court Summary Judgment

Order (Sept. 13, 2023) .................... 336a

Appendix E: Court of Appeals Order on Stay

Motion (July 18, 2024) ................... 385a

Appendix F: Court of Appeals Order on Motion for

Reconsideration (Aug. 1, 2024) ...... 389a

Appendix G: Supreme Court Order on Stay

Motion (Aug. 22, 2024) ................... 426a

Appendix H: District Court Final Judgment

(May 2, 2024) .................................. 427a

Appendix I: Pertinent Constitutional, Statutory,

and Regulatory Provisions ............. 434a

Appendix J: LULAC Consent Decree, Doc. 37,

No. 2:17-cv-4102 (D. Ariz. 2018) .... 474a

viii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Cases

Agostini v. Felton,

521 U.S. 203 (1997) ............................................ 31

Ala. Coal. for Immigrant J. v. Allen,

No. 2:24-cv-1254 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 16, 2024) ........ 26

Arcia v. Fla. Sec’y of State,

772 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2014) .......................... 22

Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz.,

570 U.S. 1 (2013) 1, 2, 5, 7-9, 15, 23, 24, 26, 28, 30

Beals v. Va. Coal. for Immigrant Rts.,

__ S.Ct. __, 2024 WL 4608863 .............................. 3

Bell v. Marinko

367 F.3d 588 (6th Cir. 2004) ........................ 22, 36

Bost v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections,

__ U.S. __, 2026 WL 96707 ................................... 3

Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd.,

531 U.S. 70 (2000) .............................................. 20

Carson v. Simon,

978 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2020) .......... 20, 21, 24, 32

Cellular Telecomm. & Internet Ass’n v. FCC,

330 F.3d 502 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ............................ 29

Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd.,

553 U.S. 181 (2008) ............................................ 30

Ex parte Siebold,

100 U.S. 371 (1879) .............................................. 5

ix

Fish v. Kobach,

840 F.3d 710 (10th Cir. 2016) ............................ 29

Foley v. Connelie,

435 U.S. 291 (1978) .............................................. 1

Foster v. Love,

522 U.S. 67 (1997) ................................................ 5

Hollingsworth v. Perry,

558 U.S. 183 (2010) ............................................ 18

Horne v. Flores,

557 U.S. 433 (2009) ...................................... 24, 31

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Exec. Off. of

President, __ F. Supp. 3d __,

2025 WL 3042704 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2025) ............ 8

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Exec. Off. of

President, No. 25-5476 (D.C. Cir. 2025) .............. 8

LULAC v. Reagan,

No. 2:17-cv-4102 (D. Ariz. 2018) ........................ 10

McCulloch v. Maryland,

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) ...................... 29, 32

McPherson v. Blacker,

146 U.S. 1 (1892) ................................................ 20

Mi Familia Vota v. Fontes,

129 F.4th 691 (9th Cir. 2025) ............................... 4

Mi Familia Vota v. Fontes,

152 F.4th 1153 (9th Cir. 2025) ............................. 4

Mi Familia Vota v. Fontes,

691 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (D. Ariz. 2023) ................... 4

x

Mi Familia Vota v. Fontes,

719 F. Supp. 3d 929 (D. Ariz. 2024) ..................... 4

Miller v. French,

530 U.S. 327 (2000) ............................................ 31

Moore v. Harper,

600 U.S. 1 (2023) .......................................... 24, 31

Purcell v. Gonzalez,

549 U.S. 1 (2006) .................................... 1, 8, 9, 27

Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Mi Familia Vota,

145 S. Ct. 108 (2024) ...................................... 3, 14

Republican Party of Pa. v. Degraffenreid,

141 S. Ct. 732 (2021) .......................................... 28

Ry. Emps. v. Wright,

364 U.S. 642 (1961) ............................................ 31

Taylor v. Sturgell,

553 U.S. 880 (2008) ............................................ 33

Trump v. CASA, Inc.,

606 U.S. 831 (2025) ............................................ 33

United States v. Alabama,

No. 2:24-cv-1329 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 2024) ...... 26

United States v. Virginia,

No. 1:24-cv-1807 (E.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2025) ......... 26

Va. Coal. for Immigrant Rts. v. Beals,

2024 WL 4577983 (E.D. Va. Oct. 25, 2024) . 19, 26

Va. Coal. for Immigrant Rts. v. Beals,

2024 WL 4601052 (4th Cir. Oct. 27, 2024) .. 19, 23

xi

Statutes

18 U.S.C. §1015 ........................................................... 7

18 U.S.C. §611 ............................................................. 7

28 U.S.C. §1254 ........................................................... 4

52 U.S.C. §20504 ....................................................... 29

52 U.S.C. §20505 ................................................... 6, 30

52 U.S.C. §20506 ............................................ i, 2, 7, 30

52 U.S.C. §20507 ............................ i, 2, 3, 6, 26, 34, 35

52 U.S.C. §20508 ............................................ i, 2, 6, 29

Act of June 2, 2021,

2021 Nev. Stat., ch. 248...................................... 11

An Act Relating to Elections,

2021 Fla. Laws ch. 11 ......................................... 11

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §16-121.01 ............ i, 1, 7, 9, 10, 11, 32

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §16-123 ............................................ 11

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §16-127 ............................................ 11

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §16-165 ..................................... i, 1, 11

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §16-166 .......................................... 7, 9

Election Integrity Act of 2021,

2021 Ga. Laws 9 ................................................. 10

Election Integrity Protection Act of 2021,

2021 Tex. Gen. Laws 3873 ................................. 11

Electoral Count Reform and Presidential Transition

Improvement Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-328,

136 Stat. 4459 ..................................................... 10

xii

John R. Lewis Voting Rights Act of 2022,

2022 N.Y. Laws ch. 226 ...................................... 11

Judiciary Act of 1789,

1 Stat. 78 ............................................................. 33

Other Authorities

Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) ..................... 29

Exec. Order No. 14,248, 2025 WL 929182 ................. 8

Exec. Order No. 35, Off. of the Gov. (Va. Aug. 7,

2024) .................................................................... 19

Letter from ACLU to Mark Goins & Tre Hargett

(June 27, 2024) ................................................... 27

Voter Registration Rules, Vote.Org (2026) ................. 7

Wendy Underhill, States Consider Options to Ensure

That Noncitizens Aren’t Voting, Nat’l Conf. of

State Legislatures (Jan. 30, 2025) ..................... 27

Wright & Miller 21A Fed. Proc., L. Ed. §51:170

(2024) ................................................................... 33

Constitutional Provisions

Ariz. Const. art. VII, §2............................................... 7

U.S. Const. amend. XVII ............................................ 5

U.S. Const. art. I, §2 ............................................... 1, 5

U.S. Const. art. I, §4 ............................................. 5, 31

U.S. Const. art. II, §1 ............................................ 5, 31

U.S. Const. art. III, §2............................................... 33

1

INTRODUCTION

Arizona, like every State, permits only U.S. citizens to vote in its elections. That decision is rooted in

the States’ exclusive authority to set voter qualifications for state and federal elections. U.S. Const. art. I,

§2, cl. 1. It reflects “the choice” and “right” of Arizonans “to be governed by their citizen peers.” Foley v.

Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296-97 (1978). But “the power

to establish voting requirements is of little value without the power to enforce those requirements.” Arizona

v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 570 U.S. 1, 17 (2013).

For years, Arizona has taken common-sense steps

to enforce its citizenship qualification and secure its

elections. Each time, it has had to defend those steps

from federal lawsuits. See, e.g., Purcell v. Gonzalez,

549 U.S. 1 (2006); Inter Tribal Council, 570 U.S. at 6.

“This case,” like those before it, “concerns Arizona’s efforts to enforce that qualification.” Inter Tribal Council, 570 U.S. at 6. Specifically, it concerns two policies

adopted by Arizona’s legislature following the 2020

election: a requirement for applicants using a state

voter-registration form to provide proof of citizenship

and a requirement for state election officials to review

voter rolls and remove noncitizens. Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§§16-121.01(C), -165(A)(10), (G), (H), (J), (K).

A divided Ninth Circuit panel thwarted both mechanisms for enforcing Arizona’s citizenship qualification. The panel barred any enforcement of Arizona’s

proof-of-citizenship requirement because of a consent

decree entered by Arizona’s Secretary of State and a

single county recorder. And it found that National

Voter Registration Act banned the proof-of-citizenship

2

requirement because it was not “necessary” for state

officials to assess an applicant’s eligibility and rendered the state application not “equivalent” to the federal form. 52 U.S.C. §§20508(b)(1), 20506(a)(6)(A)(ii).

Turning to Arizona’s removal of noncitizens from the

voter rolls, the panel concluded that it too violated the

NVRA, reasoning that it was a “program … to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters” that did

not conclude “90 days prior” to any federal election. Id.

§20507(c)(2).

As explained by Judge Bumatay’s panel dissent (at

77a) and several judges dissenting from the denial of

rehearing en banc, “[t]he majority opinion is profoundly wrong.” App.186a (Nelson, J., dissenting).

Starting with the proof-of-residence requirement: A

consent decree entered by a single state executive official cannot bar the legislature from enacting a new

policy. App.104a-105a (Bumatay, J., dissenting). Consent decrees often must yield to statutory changes.

And while courts must enforce federal law, the panel

relied on a decree entered on “consent alone,” without

any finding of a federal violation. App.106a-107a. Despite that shortcoming, the panel even expanded the

consent decree, holding that it bars all “Arizona election officials” from enforcing the proof-of-citizenship

requirement.

The panel’s finding that the NVRA preempts the

proof-of-citizenship requirement fares no better. This

Court has recognized that “state-developed forms may

require information the Federal Form does not.” Inter

Tribal Council, 570 U.S. at 12. But the panel relegated

Arizona’s form to the same kind of information required by the federal form: an attestation. Arizona’s

3

proof-of-citizenship requirement “would ensure the

citizenship of the voter—a necessary qualification.”

App.112a. And the requirement of an “equivalent”

form doesn’t force States to photocopy the federal

form. A form is equivalent when it has “the same ‘effect’ for purposes of registration.” App.115a.

Turning to the second question, the NVRA does not

insulate noncitizens against removal from voter rolls.

It provides for the registration of “eligible applicant[s].” 52 U.S.C. §20507(a)(1), (5). And it limits the

ability of States to remove these “registrants” from the

list of “eligible voters.” Id. §20507(a)(3)-(4). It does not

extend its protections to noncitizens who were never

qualified to vote, and thus who cannot be “eligible applicants” or “registrants.” The panel’s contrary conclusion would have far-reaching and absurd consequences since improper registration of a noncitizen is

not one of the NVRA’s permitted reasons to remove a

“registrant.” Id.

Last election cycle, this Court granted emergency

relief on both questions. Republican Nat’l Comm. v.

Mi Familia Vota, 145 S. Ct. 108 (2024); Beals v. Va.

Coal. for Immigrant Rts., __ S.Ct. __, 2024 WL

4608863 (Oct. 30, 2024). The Court should not wait for

these issues to return on its emergency docket, when

“democratic consequences can be even more dire.”

Bost v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, __ U.S. __, No. 24568, 2026 WL 96707, at *4 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2026). It

should grant this petition.

4

OPINIONS BELOW

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion and accompanying dissent are reported at 129 F.4th 691 and reproduced at

App.1a-154a. The order denying rehearing en banc

and accompanying opinions are reported at 152 F.4th

1153 and reproduced at App.155a-187a. The District

of Arizona’s amended bench trial opinion is reported

at 719 F. Supp. 3d 929 and reproduced at App.188a335a. The District of Arizona’s summary judgment

opinion is reported at 691 F. Supp. 3d 1077 and reproduced at App.336a-384.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered its judgment and published its opinion on February 25, 2025. The court of

appeals denied rehearing en banc on September 22,

2025. On December 9, 2025, Justice Kagan granted

the RNC’s application to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to February 19, 2026. See

No. 25A673. The Court has jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. §1254(1).

PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL LAW

The pertinent constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions are reproduced in the appendix to

this petition at App.434a-473a.

STATEMENT

A. Legal Background

1. States have exclusive authority to set voter qualifications. The Voter Qualifications Clause provides

that “Electors” voting in House elections are governed

5

by the same “Qualifications” that apply to elections for

the “most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”

U.S. Const. art. I, §2, cl. 1. The Seventeenth Amendment extends that rule to Senate elections. Id.,

amend. XVII.

States also have primary—though not exclusive—

authority over the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.” Id.,

art. I, §4. Congress can “at any time by Law make or

alter such Regulations.” Id. The Elections Clause thus

“invests the States with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections, but only so far as Congress declines to preempt state legislative choices.”

Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) (citation omitted). The presidential Electors Clause is the “counterpart for the Executive Branch,” id., although it gives

Congress power only over the “Time of chusing the

Electors” for the offices of President and Vice President, U.S. Const. art. II, §1.

When Congress exercises its Elections Clause

power, it “supersede[s]” election regulations “made by

the State.” Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 386 (1879).

But that preemption power operates only “so far as the

two are inconsistent, and no farther.” Id. Whether a

state law is inconsistent with federal law is a

“straightforward textual question.” Inter Tribal Council, 570 U.S. at 9.

2. Congress enacted the NVRA to promote election

integrity and the participation of eligible voters. The

NVRA sets standards for registering voters and maintaining voter rolls. It requires States to “ensure that

any eligible applicant is registered to vote.” 52 U.S.C.

6

§20507(a). An eligible applicant who submits a “valid

voter registration form” must be registered. Id. Once

an “eligible applicant” has been “registered,” the

NVRA sets limits on her removal. These “registrants”

can be “removed from the official list of eligible voters”

only for statutorily defined reasons—registrant request, criminal conviction or mental incapacity, death,

and a change in residence. Id. §20507(a)(3)-(4). At the

same time, States must “conduct a general program

that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of

ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters” due to “death” or “a change in the residence of the

registrant.” Id. §20507(a)(4). And each State must

“complete … any program … to systematically remove

the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of

eligible voters” at least “90 days” before any “primary

or general election for Federal office.” Id.

§20507(c)(2)(A).

The NVRA contemplates two kinds of forms for

registering to vote in federal elections. First, voters

can register with the federal “mail voter registration”

form issued by the Election Assistance Commission.

52 U.S.C. §20505(a). The NVRA requires “[e]ach

State” to “accept and use” the federal voter-registration form “for the registration of voters in elections for

Federal office.” Id. Second, a State can develop its own

“mail voter registration” form. Id. State forms must

meet the same “criteria” as the federal form. Id.

§§20505(a), 20508(b). Both forms “may require only

such identifying information … as is necessary to enable the appropriate State election official to assess

the eligibility of the applicant” and administer voter

registration and the election. Id. §20508(b)(1). States

7

must designate certain agencies, including those that

“provide public assistance,” as voter-registration

agencies. Id. §20506(a)(2)(A). A voter-registration

agency that “provides service or assistance” must provide benefit applicants with either the federal form or

the state form “if it is equivalent to” the federal form.

Id. §20506(a)(6)(A)(ii). As in Inter Tribal Council, one

issue here is whether Arizona’s “state-imposed requirement of evidence of citizenship not required by

the Federal Form is ‘inconsistent with’ the NVRA’s

mandate[s].” 570 U.S. at 15.

B. Arizona’s Voter-Verification Laws

Since it joined the Union in 1912, Arizona has required U.S. citizenship as a qualification to vote. Ariz.

Const. art. VII, §2. Arizona isn’t alone. Every State requires that a voter be a U.S. citizen to vote. Voter Registration Rules, Vote.Org (2026), perma.cc/VSC3E5BU. So does federal law. See 18 U.S.C. §§611, 1015.

“Since the power to establish voting requirements is

of little value without the power to enforce those requirements,” Arizona has acted to ensure that election

officials collect “the information necessary to enforce”

its citizenship qualification. Inter Tribal Council, 570

U.S. at 17. It enforces those qualifications by requiring proof of citizenship to vote in state and local elections. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§16-121.01(C), -166(F).

Eligible Arizonans can register to vote using either

of the two mail-registration methods recognized by

the NVRA. They can register using the state form created by Arizona election officials. Or they can register

using the federal form created by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. App.17a. State-form registrants

8

must check a box confirming their citizenship and provide proof of citizenship such as a birth certificate,

driver’s license, or U.S. passport. App.18a, 22a. If

their registration is sufficient, they are registered and

can vote in federal, state, and local elections. App.22a.

Federal-form registrants, by contrast, must only attest to their U.S. citizenship with a signature. They

need not provide documentary proof of citizenship.1

App.18a. Federal-form registrants whose citizenship

cannot be verified are thus designated “federal only”

voters, which permits them to vote in federal elections, but not state or local ones. App.19a. Arizona requires documentary proof-of-citizenship only from

voters who register with the state form. App.18a.

Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship requirement traces

back to a ballot initiative. In 2004, Arizonans adopted

Proposition 200 “to combat voter fraud by requiring

voters to present proof-of-citizenship when they register to vote.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 2 (2006).

Proposition 200 requires voter-registration applicants

to produce “satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship” to register to vote. Inter Tribal Council, 570

U.S. at 6. Several documents are “satisfactory evidence of citizenship,” including a driver’s license indi-

Last year, the President directed the Election Assistance

Commission to develop rules that would require proof of citizenship with the federal registration form. Exec. Order No. 14,248,

§2(a), 2025 WL 929182. That executive order remains the subject

of ongoing litigation. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.

Exec. Off. of President, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 3042704

(D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2025), appealed, No. 25-5476 (D.C. Cir. 2025).

1

9

cating U.S. citizenship, a birth certificate, a U.S. passport, naturalization documents, and various tribal

identification documents. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §16-166(F).

Over the past two decades, Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship requirement has been the subject of numerous lawsuits—some of which were resolved by this

Court. When Proposition 200 was first challenged, the

Court granted certiorari and vacated the Ninth Circuit’s order enjoining its enforcement. Purcell, 549

U.S. at 6. But the Court’s decision did not reach the

merits. Id. at 5. The lawsuits continued. Seven years

later, Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship requirement returned to this Court. In Inter Tribal Council, the

Court held that the NVRA preempted Arizona’s law

requiring proof of citizenship to accompany the federal

voter-registration form. 570 U.S. at 20. But it

acknowledged that “state-developed forms may require information the Federal Form does not,” including “proof-of-citizenship.” Id. at 12. That’s at least in

part because “it would raise serious constitutional

doubts if a federal statute precluded a State from obtaining the information necessary to enforce its voter

qualifications,” such as “citizenship.” Id. at 16-17.

Following Inter Tribal Council, Arizona did “exactly what the Court recognized as possible.”

App.416a (Bumatay, J., dissenting from grant of motion for reconsideration). Arizona’s legislature “added

a requirement to its own [voter-registration] form to

ensure its ability to verify citizenship.” App.416a. It

mandated that county recorders reject any state forms

for voter registration that are “not accompanied by

satisfactory evidence of citizenship.” Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§16-121.01(C). The requirement applies only to state-

10

form registrants. Id. Federal-form registrants whose

citizenship can’t be verified are still given a “federal

only” designation that permits them to vote in federal

elections, but not state or local elections. App.19a. As

of July 2023, just over 19,000 Arizonans were registered as active federal-only voters. App.19a.

In 2018, another lawsuit challenged Arizona’s

proof-of-citizenship requirement for state-form applicants. See LULAC v. Reagan, Doc. 37, No. 2:17-cv4102 (D. Ariz. 2018) (reproduced at App.474a). The

then-Secretary of State and Maricopa County Recorder entered into a consent decree. The LULAC consent decree directed the Secretary of State to provide

guidance for county recorders. App.484a-486a. The

Secretary’s guidance was to direct that when a stateform submission is not accompanied by proof of citizenship, the county recorder must search Arizona Department of Transportation records. App.484a-485a.

If the recorder can confirm the applicant’s citizenship,

the applicant is registered as a full-ballot voter; if citizenship cannot be confirmed, the applicant is registered as a “Federal Only” voter. App.486a. The district

court retained jurisdiction over the case until December 31, 2020. App.494a.

After the 2020 election, Arizona—like the federal

government2 and many other3 States—amended various election and registration procedures. The Arizona

2 See Electoral Count Reform and Presidential Transition Im-

provement Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-328, 136 Stat. 4459.

3 E.g., Election Integrity Act of 2021, 2021 Ga. Laws 9 (Georgia

S.B. 202); Election Integrity Protection Act of 2021, 2021 Tex.

11

Legislature passed H.B. 2492 and H.B. 2243, and the

Governor signed the bills into law in 2022. Among

other things, the new law provided that applicants

must provide proof of citizenship to vote for president

and by mail. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§16-121.01(A), (C), (E),

16-127(A). Election officials must reject state registration forms that lack proof of citizenship. Id. §16121.01(C). State-form applicants must provide proof of

residency, disclose their birthplace, and check a box

confirming their citizenship. Id. §§16-121.01(A), 16123. County recorders responsible for maintaining

voter registrations must check the federal Systematic

Alien Verification for Entitlements program if a voter

is registered as federal-only or if they have “reason to

believe” a voter is not a citizen. Id. §16-165(I). County

recorders must periodically check various databases

to research the citizenship status of federal-only voters and, if appropriate, cancel their registrations. Id.

§16-165(A)(10), (G), (H), (J), (K).

The opinion below enjoins State officials from enforcing virtually all those measures. This petition concerns two: Arizona’s requirement of proof of citizenship with the state registration form, and Arizona’s

removal of noncitizens from the voter rolls.

C. Procedural History

1. This case began as eight consolidated preenforcement challenges to Arizona’s 2022 election-integrity laws. The line-up of Plaintiffs includes the

Gen. Laws 3873 (Texas S.B. 1); An Act Relating to Elections,

2021 Fla. Laws ch. 11 (Florida S.B. 90); Act of June 2, 2021, 2021

Nev. Stat., ch. 248 (Nevada A.B. 321); John R. Lewis Voting

Rights Act of 2022, 2022 N.Y. Laws ch. 226.

12

Democratic National Committee, the Arizona Democratic Party, the United States,4 and a bevy of nonprofits representing various interest groups. See

App.14a-15a & n.1. They alleged that several provisions violated or were preempted by the NVRA, the

LULAC consent decree, the Civil Rights Act, and the

Equal Protection Clause. App.13a. The Republican

National Committee intervened at the pleading stage

to defend its concrete interests in the rules governing

Arizona’s elections. Doc.10, No. 2:22-cv-1369 (D. Ariz.)

(motion to intervene); Doc.18 (order granting intervention). The district court resolved several claims on

summary judgment, App.336a, and the rest after a

ten-day bench trial, App.188a.

The court gave the Plaintiffs “virtually everything

they wanted.” App.78a (Bumatay, J., dissenting). Relevant here, the court enjoined Defendants from requiring proof of citizenship with the state voter-registration form. App.364a-366a (Maj. Op.). It based that

ruling on the 2018 LULAC consent decree. App.365a366a. Through that decree, the Court explained, “Arizona agreed to refrain from precisely the conduct” required by the proof-of-citizenship requirement.

App.366a.

The district court also ruled that the NVRA prohibits Arizona from “systematic cancellation of registrations” within 90 days before a federal election, even

if those registrations belong to noncitizens who were

never eligible to register in the first place. App.357a4 The United States has since changed its position and joined

the RNC in asking the Ninth Circuit to rehear the case. See

ROA.283 (9th Cir. No. 24-3188).

13

360a. The court noted that the 90-day provision applied to “any program” for the systematic removal of

registrants. App.358a. And it thought a broad prohibition on removals was consistent with Congress’s

dual purposes of ensuring accurate voter rolls and enhancing participation by eligible citizens. App.358a359a.

On May 2, 2024, the district court issued a final

judgment enjoining enforcement of the provisions it

found unlawful or preempted. App.427a. The RNC,

Arizona Senate President Warren Petersen, and

Speaker of the Arizona House Ben Toma appealed to

the Ninth Circuit. App.14a.

2. The Republican Appellants moved for a partial

stay of the district court’s injunction before the November 2024 election. They sought a stay on three issues: requiring proof of citizenship (1) on the state

voter-registration form, (2) for voting in presidential

elections, and (3) for voting by mail. A unanimous motions panel granted the motion in part, staying the

judgment to the extent it barred Arizona from requiring proof of citizenship on the state voter-registration

form. App.387a. Then, “[i]n an extraordinary move, a

divided merits panel reconsidered the motions panel

order and vacated the partial stay a mere two weeks

later.” App.78a-79a (Bumatay, J., dissenting). Judge

Bumatay dissented, criticizing the panel for “abandon[ing] regularity.” App.405a. Due to “the luck of an

internal Ninth Circuit draw,” two judges “facing identical legal and factual circumstances on an even more

expedited basis” overruled four votes for the stay.

App.406a.

14

The Republican Appellants applied to this Court

for an emergency stay. They sought review of the

same three issues: proof of citizenship for the state

form, presidential elections, and mail-in voting. The

Court partially granted the application, staying the

district court’s order “to the extent it enjoins enforcement of” the proof-of-citizenship requirement for the

state registration form. RNC, 145 S. Ct. 108 (reproduced at App.426a). The stay will terminate after a

judgment from this Court or a denial of certiorari. Id.

3. Back at the Ninth Circuit, a divided panel upheld the district court’s entire injunction of Arizona’s

election laws—even the portion that this Court

stayed. “[I]gnoring the Supreme Court’s direction,”

the panel concluded that Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship laws violate the 2018 LULAC consent decree.

App.79a (Bumatay, J., dissenting). Indeed, the panel

thought “that the district court didn’t go far enough in

overturning Arizona’s voter-verification laws.”

App.79a. It also held that requiring proof-of-citizenship for state registration forms violates the NVRA.

App.110a. And it reversed “the district court’s factual

findings and all but declare[d] H.B. 2243 the product

of discrimination.” App.79a.

Relevant to this petition, the panel reasoned that

the 2018 LULAC Consent Decree was a “binding final

judgment” that “remain[s] in force” and “permanently” prohibits Arizona from enforcing its proof-ofcitizenship requirement for state-form voter-registration applicants. App.47a-48a. The panel then went

further, holding that the NVRA preempts the proofof-citizenship requirement for state-form applicants.

It reasoned that the proof requirement isn’t strictly

15

“necessary to enable” officials “to assess the eligibility

of the applicant” because the state form’s checkbox

provides “proof of citizenship by an attestation.”

App.50a. And it found that the proof requirement rendered the state form not “equivalent” to the federal

form because they are no longer “virtually identical.”

App.51a-52a.

Finally, the panel held that the NVRA prohibited

county recorders from removing noncitizens from the

voter rolls within 90 days before a federal election.

App.41a. The panel reasoned “any program” for the

removal of “ineligible voters” must be given “an expansive meaning.” App.42a.

Judge Bumatay dissented in a 77-page opinion.

The panel’s opinion was “[u]nprecedented yet again.”

App.79a. Judge Bumatay would have upheld Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship requirement for the state

voter-registration form. App.103a. On the NVRA, he

relied on this Court’s statement that “‘state-developed

forms may require information the Federal Form does

not.’” App.111a (quoting Inter Tribal Council, 570

U.S. at 12). Requiring proof of citizenship doesn’t violate the NVRA’s requirements that information be

“necessary” because this information “would ensure …

a necessary qualification.” App.112a. And the state

form need not be “identical” to be “‘equivalent’” to the

federal form as long as it has “the same ‘effect’ for purposes of registration.” App.115a. The LULAC consent

decree also couldn’t bar Arizona’s law, and the panel’s

contrary ruling “that a settlement by a single state executive-branch official may forever curtail the state

legislature’s lawmaking power presents disturbing

separation-of-powers concerns.” App.103a-109a. Such

16

a settlement must yield to intervening statutory

change, at least when it “is not a judicial remedy necessary to enforce federal law” but rests on “consent

alone.” App.106a.

Turning to the NVRA’s 90-day provision, Judge

Bumatay pointed out that the panel opinion “contradict[s]” Supreme Court precedent in “Inter Tribal

Council” and splits with “the Sixth Circuit.”

App.119a-127a. The opinion’s “acontextual interpretation” of the NVRA means that “foreign citizens are

immune from removal” from the voter rolls, creating

“an absurdity that Congress never established.”

App.126a-127a. The better reading, Judge Bumatay

explained, is that the 90-day provision protects “ineligible voters” who once were eligible—not noncitizens

who were never eligible voters. App.125a. In other

words, the statutory term “ineligible voters” refers

only to “registrants” who at some point were “eligible

applicants” able to meet the requirements. App.124a125a. Noncitizens fall outside those bounds.

4. The Ninth Circuit denied Republican Appellants’ petition for rehearing en banc. App.163a.

Eleven judges dissented from the denial of review.

App.163a, 187a. Judge Nelson, joined by six others,

wrote that “[m]ost egregiously, the panel majority ignored both Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent when it upheld the district court’s injunction enjoining Arizona’s documentary proof of citizenship …

requirement for voters registering through Arizona’s

state form.” App.164a. Judge Bress (and two others)

wrote separately that “[a]t a minimum, [the court]

17

should have reevaluated the panel majority’s incorrect and consequential decision upholding the injunction of Arizona’s documentary proof of citizenship requirement for state-form applicants—the portion of

the injunction that the Supreme Court already

stayed.” App.187a (citation omitted). On the 90-day

provision, Judge Nelson (and five others) observed

that the panel’s opinion “created a circuit split with

the Sixth Circuit” by “upholding the district court’s injunction” of Arizona’s law that “task[s] county recorders with periodically conducting citizenship checks

and removing ineligible applicants from the rolls.”

App.184a.

The dissenters warned that the panel’s ruling deprives Arizona of the legal means of “deterring voter

fraud” committed by noncitizens, undermining “the

fundamental right of citizen voters” to vote in fair elections. App.165a. The panel “skirted Supreme Court direction in this case and again in a case with nearly

identical issues.” App.186a. The decision “is profoundly wrong” and “does a grave injustice to republican government.” App.186a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Last election cycle, the Court granted emergency

stays on both questions presented in this petition. One

was in this case. The other was in a Fourth Circuit

case that the Ninth Circuit chose to follow here. In

both cases, the Court’s intervention was justified. The

orders it stayed deepened circuit splits, raised significant issues of national importance, and flouted this

Court’s precedent. When the Ninth Circuit had the

18

chance to correct those problems, it doubled down. The

Court should grant the petition.

I.

The Court has recently granted emergency

relief on both questions presented.

In the run up to the 2024 elections, this Court

granted emergency stays on both questions presented

in this petition. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S.

183, 190 (2010) (explaining that a stay will be granted

if, among other requirements, there is “a reasonable

probability that four Justices will consider the issue

sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari”). The first

question arose in this case, when the Court partially

stayed the district court’s judgment. The second question arose just two months later, when this Court

stayed the Eastern District of Virginia’s preliminary

injunction in Beals v. Virginia Coalition for Immigrant Rights.

Start with the first question—whether States can

require proof of citizenship with state registration

forms. After the district court entered its final judgment, the Republican Appellants moved for a partial

stay. Though they raised three issues, the Ninth Circuit granted the stay on just one, allowing Arizona to

require proof of citizenship with the state form.

App.387a. After the merits panel “abandon[ed] regularity” by overruling the motions panel, the Republican Appellants sought a stay from this Court.

App.405a. The Court granted the application in part,

again staying the district court’s decision enjoining

the proof-of-citizenship requirement for state-form applicants. App.426a.

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Two months later, the Court granted a stay on the

second question in this petition—whether the NVRA

prohibits States from cancelling the registrations of

noncitizens within 90 days of a federal election. In August 2024, then-Virginia Governor Glenn Youngkin issued an executive order directing the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles and Board of Elections to

share citizenship data of registered voters more often,

and to certify compliance with existing law. Exec. Order No. 35, Off. of the Gov. (Va. Aug. 7, 2024). In late

October, a district court preliminarily enjoined state

officials “from continuing any systematic program intended to remove the names of ineligible voters from

registration lists less than 90 days before the November 5, 2024, federal General Election.” Va. Coal. for

Immigrant Rts. v. Beals, 2024 WL 4577983, at *1

(E.D. Va. Oct. 25, 2024). The Fourth Circuit largely

affirmed. 2024 WL 4601052, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 27,

2024). Three days later, this Court stayed the injunction. No. 24A407, 2024 WL 4608863.

This petition would allow the Court to address

both of these important questions with the benefit of

full briefing, and outside the emergency context in the

run up to an election.

II. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion creates one circuit split and deepens another.

The Ninth Circuit created or deepened a circuit

split on both questions presented. By holding that a

state executive official can use a consent decree to

bind the state’s legislature from exercising its constitutional authority to regulate elections, the Ninth Circuit created a split with the Eighth Circuit. And in

20

holding that the NVRA prohibits Arizona from removing noncitizens from the voter rolls within 90 days before an election, the Ninth Circuit deepened a split

among the Eleventh, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits.

A. Start with the consent-decree split. In Carson v.

Simon, the Eighth Circuit held that a state executive

official entering a consent decree “has no power to

override” the state legislature’s regulation of elections. 978 F.3d 1051, 1060 (8th Cir. 2020). There, Minnesota’s Secretary of State entered into a consent decree with private litigants purporting to change the

statutorily mandated absentee ballot receipt deadline

from election day to eight days after election day for

Minnesota’s 2020 presidential election. Id. at 1054. A

state court approved the decree. Id. at 1056.

The Eighth Circuit preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the consent decree. Id. at 1060. Because state

legislatures regulate federal elections under a “‘direct

grant of authority’” in the U.S. Constitution, “only the

Minnesota Legislature, and not the Secretary, has

plenary authority to establish the manner” of conducting the election. Id. (quoting Bush v. Palm Beach

Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000)). “[T]he

Secretary has no power to override the Minnesota

Legislature,” including through entry of a consent decree that ignores the legislature’s instructions. Id.

(quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892)).

Thus, “the Secretary’s attempt to re-write the laws

governing the deadlines” for Minnesota’s election “is

invalid.” Id.

21

The Ninth Circuit split with Carson. The panel

held that the 2018 LULAC consent decree “permanently” overrode the legislature’s election rules.

App.47a. Because the LULAC decree was “an enforceable, binding final judgment,” the court of appeals

held that it “bars Arizona election officials from enforcing” Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship requirement for

state-form applications. App.48a-49a.

These decisions cannot be reconciled by the Ninth

Circuit’s focus on enforcement of the proof-of-citizenship requirement. In Carson, Minnesota’s Secretary of

State also “agreed to not enforce” the challenged state

law, and instead to “issue guidance” to local election

officials that contradicted state law. 978 F.3d at 1056.

But the Eighth Circuit found that “the Secretary’s actions are likely to be declared invalid.” Id. at 1060. The

state legislature’s “plenary authority” meant that

their rules “must be followed notwithstanding the Secretary’s instructions.” Id. Putting aside that the Ninth

Circuit barred enforcement by officials who were not

parties to the LULAC decree, the Ninth Circuit’s dismissal of the legislature’s authority because an order

“limits the ability of executive officers … to enforce

legislation” cannot be reconciled with Carson.

App.48a-49a.

B. Turning to the second question presented, the

Ninth Circuit deepened a split among the Eleventh,

Fourth, and Sixth Circuits on whether the NVRA prohibits States from removing never-eligible voters, like

noncitizens, from their voter rolls within 90 days of an

election. The Sixth Circuit held in Bell v. Marinko that

the NVRA doesn’t “bar the removal of names from the

22

official [state voter rolls] of persons who were ineligible and improperly registered to vote in the first

place.” 367 F.3d 588, 591-92 (6th Cir. 2004). The

NVRA does not prohibit States from removing individuals when they “were improperly registered in the

first place, and as a result, the voting rolls were inaccurate.” Id. at 592 (voters improperly registered because they never resided in the State). Instead, a

State “necessarily remove[s]” the names of persons

who were never eligible to vote to begin with. Id. In

doing so, the State advances the NVRA’s legislative

purposes of “protect[ing] the integrity of the electoral

process,” and “ensur[ing] that accurate and current

voter registration rolls are maintained.” Id. (cleaned

up). The Sixth Circuit’s conclusion about never-resident voters applies directly to noncitizens: Because

they “were improperly registered in the first place,”

the NVRA does not “bar the removal” of their names.

Id. at 591-92.

The Ninth Circuit disagreed, putting it “on the

wrong side” of the “split.” App.165a (Nelson, J., dissenting). The panel held that even if Arizona election

officials confirm that a noncitizen is registered to vote,

the NVRA prohibits them from removing that noncitizen from the rolls within 90 days of a federal election.

App.41a-47a. The Ninth Circuit joined the Eleventh

Circuit, which has held that the NVRA’s “90 Day Provision” bars programs “to remove non-citizens.” Arcia

v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 772 F.3d 1335, 1344 (11th Cir.

2014). The Fourth Circuit joined those courts in its

stayed order, finding that “efforts to remove noncitizens” are covered by the NVRA’s 90-day “Quiet Period

23

Provision.” Beals, 2024 WL 4601052, at *1-2, stayed,

2024 WL 4608863.

III. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling presents an excellent vehicle to resolve issues of exceptional

importance.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision threatens States’ ability to protect the integrity of their elections. Arizona

passed laws “protecting the right of all citizens to vote,

and … ensuring non-citizens do not vote.” App.163a

(Nelson, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit’s decision

striking those measures down “undermines republican government, shreds federalism and the separation of powers, and imperils free and fair elections.”

App.163a-164a. The Court should grant certiorari to

correct those errors.

A. Start with the panel’s “mangl[ing]” of the NVRA

to strike down Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship requirement for state-form applicants. App.178a (Nelson, J.,

dissenting). The Ninth Circuit turned the NVRA into

a federal ban on proof of citizenship. In Inter Tribal

Council, this Court recognized that “state-developed

forms may require information the Federal Form does

not,” including “proof-of-citizenship.” 570 U.S. at 12.

The States retain authority to “prescrib[e] voter qualifications.” Id. at 17. Conferring that power on Congress, Madison warned, could have allowed them to

“‘by degrees subvert the Constitution.’” Id. (quoting 2

Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p.250 (M.

Farrand rev. 1966)). But the State’s power to set “voting requirements is of little value without the power

to enforce those requirements.” Id. Inter Tribal Coun-

24

cil thus recognized that “it would raise serious constitutional doubts if a federal statute precluded a State

from obtaining the information necessary to enforce

its voter qualifications.” Id. But that’s exactly what

the Ninth Circuit held here.

The panel’s holding that the LULAC consent decree bars Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship requirement

likewise “raises alarming separation-of-powers concerns.” App.104a (Bumatay, J., dissenting). The panel

held that the LULAC consent decree precludes Arizona from rejecting state-form registrations lacking

proof of citizenship. “Under that view, state executivebranch officials can permanently circumvent legislative authority by entering whatever arrangements

they want with private parties.” App.104a. This Court

has cautioned that consent decrees can “improperly

deprive future officials of their designated legislative

and executive powers.” Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433,

449-50 (2009) (cleaned up). Those concerns are “particularly acute in the election-law context, where state

legislatures enjoy express constitutional authority to

act.” App.104a (Bumatay, J., dissenting) (citing Moore

v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 10 (2023); Carson, 978 F.3d at

1060). Left alone, the Ninth Circuit’s decision will

have a “profound effect … on the structure of Arizona’s

government.” App.109a.

Two features of the Ninth Circuit’s decision make

these structural concerns particularly acute. First, the

LULAC court “[a]t no point” found “that the requirement of proof-of-citizenship violates federal law.”

App.106a (Bumatay, J., dissenting). The Secretary at

the time “denie[d]” that Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship

law was “illegal under state or federal law.” App.476a.

25

Instead, the parties entered the decree simply because

they “desire[d] to make it as easy possible for Arizona’s citizens to register to vote,” App.476a. The decree is based on “consent alone,” which is “no basis to

upset the balance of power among the branches of

state government or the balance of power between the

state and federal governments.” App.106a-107a

(Bumatay, J., dissenting).

Second, the Ninth Circuit applied the consent decree’s limitations beyond the parties to the decree. The

panel opinion noted that “the Secretary of State of Arizona and the Maricopa County Recorder” were the

“parties to the decree.” App.48a, 474a. But it nonetheless announced that the decree “limits the ability of

executive officers in Arizona to enforce legislation contrary to the final judgment.” App.48a-49a; see also

App.49a (“We hold that the LULAC Consent Decree

bars Arizona election officials from enforcing H.B.

2492’s mandate to reject state-form applications without DPOC.”). This broad application of a consent decree “beyond the case in which [it was] entered violates the strictures of Article III and raises grave separation of powers concerns.” App.171a-172a (Nelson,

J., dissenting).

B. On the second question, the Ninth Circuit further hamstrung the States’ ability to prevent noncitizens from voting in their elections. The panel opinion

prohibits “cancellation of an improperly registered foreign citizen’s registration” because it ostensibly “violates the NVRA’s ‘90-Day Provision.’” App.119a

(Bumatay, J., dissenting). That misconstruction poses

serious practical problems: It effectively “forc[es] a

State to allow a foreign citizen to vote in its elections.”

26

App.126a. It also raises “serious constitutional

doubts.” Inter Tribal Council, 570 U.S. at 17. Prescribing voting qualifications “forms no part of the power

to be conferred upon the national government.” Id.

The state “power to establish voting requirements is

of little value without the power to enforce those requirements.” Id. But the panel opinion prohibits Arizona from enforcing the most basic qualification of citizenship. And it would have the effect of banning removal of noncitizens even outside the 90-day window:

Improper registration of a non-citizen is not one of the

NVRA’s permitted reasons to remove a “registrant,” so

treating noncitizens as “registrants” would bar their

removal. See 52 U.S.C. §20507(a)(3)-(4).

Arizona is not the only state whose efforts to clean

its voter rolls are threatened by the Ninth Circuit’s

reading. Already mentioned is the Virginia injunction

that this Court stayed. See Beals, 2024 WL 4577983,

at *1. That case had a companion suit brought by the

Department of Justice, which was voluntarily dismissed last year. See United States v. Virginia, Doc.

139, No. 1:24-cv-1807 (E.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2025). The

DOJ also sued Alabama for attempting to remove

noncitizens from its rolls before the 2024 election. See

United States v. Alabama, No. 2:24-cv-1329 (N.D. Ala.

Sept. 27, 2024). That case was also voluntarily dismissed, id., Doc. 68, but not before a federal court preliminarily enjoined Alabama “from continuing the

program intended to systematically remove” noncitizens from its voter rolls, Ala. Coal. for Immigrant J.

v. Allen, Doc. 90, No. 2:24-cv-1254 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 16,

2024). Ohio, Georgia, and Texas took similar steps to

27

curb noncitizen registrations.5 The ACLU even threatened to sue Tennessee for reminding suspected noncitizens that they “may violate” state law if they vote.6

C. The panel’s “opinion makes our elections less

safe.” App.186a (Nelson, J., dissenting). “A State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the

integrity of its election process.” Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4

(cleaned up). And maintaining “[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is essential to the

functioning of our participatory democracy.” Id. The

Ninth Circuit’s opinion “prevent[s] states from deterring voter fraud.” App.165a (Nelson, J., dissenting). It

gets “fundamental legal principles wrong.” App.164a.

And “it undermines the fundamental right of citizen

voters” to participate in fair elections. App.165a. In

doing so, the Ninth Circuit “does a grave injustice to

republican government.” App.186a.

This petition is an excellent vehicle to resolve these

problems. Whether brought by private interest

groups, political parties, the Department of Justice, or

(as here) all three, each time a State takes measures

to stop noncitizens from voting, lawsuits stand at the

ready. Often those lawsuits are accompanied by preliminary injunction motions. Before the election, the

litigation raises Purcell problems. After the election,

the “litigation is truncated by firm timelines.” Republican Party of Pa. v. Degraffenreid, 141 S. Ct. 732, 735

5 Wendy Underhill, States Consider Options to Ensure That

Noncitizens Aren’t Voting, Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures (Jan.

30, 2025), perma.cc/ZG5P-MRPG.

6 Letter from ACLU to Mark Goins & Tre Hargett (June 27,

2024), perma.cc/S9Z8-3YS9.

28

(2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). This petition presents none of those common

vehicle problems in election cases. The Court can resolve two issues that appeared on its emergency

docket last election cycle. Rather than deal with those

same questions in an emergency posture, the Court

“ought to use available cases outside that truncated

context to address these admittedly important questions.” Id. at 737. And this time, the Court has the

benefit of full briefing on a well-developed record.

IV. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion is “profoundly

wrong.”

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion contradicts this

Court’s precedents. It twists the NVRA and a consent

decree to prohibit exactly what the Court permitted in

Inter Tribal Council, 570 U.S. at 12. And it twists the

NVRA further by effectively “forcing States to accept

foreign citizens in their voting booths.” App.126a

(Bumatay, J., dissenting).

A. Start with the first question presented. In Inter

Tribal Council, the Court recognized that “state-developed forms may require information the Federal

Form does not,” including “proof-of-citizenship.” 570

U.S. at 12. At all times, “States retain the flexibility

to design and use their own registration forms.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit flouted the Court’s clear instruction.

The panel gave three reasons it deviated from Inter

Tribal Council. First, it claimed that proof of citizenship is not “‘necessary’” to assess an applicant’s eligibility because “the state form’s checkbox requirement

supplies proof of citizenship by an attestation.”

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App.50a (quoting 52 U.S.C. §20508(b)(1)). But as

Judge Bumatay explained, “there’s no reason to read

‘necessary’ information as meaning only the bare minimum amount of information.” App.111a. This Court

“‘long ago rejected the view’” that “necessary” means

“‘absolutely necessary.”’ Cellular Telecomm. & Internet Ass’n v. FCC, 330 F.3d 502, 509-10 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)

316, 414-15 (1819)). Rather, in the “legal” context,

“necessary” means “‘appropriate and well adapted to

fulfilling an objective.’” Id. at 509 (quoting Necessary,

Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999)). And proof of

citizenship “obviously would ensure the citizenship of

the voter—a necessary qualification.” App.112a

(Bumatay, J., dissenting).

Statutory context undermines the panel’s cramped

reading of “necessary.” The NVRA distinguishes between “information” that is “necessary” in the eyes of

state officials (§20508) and “information” that is the

“minimum amount ... necessary” for “motor voter” applications (§20504). See Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710,

734 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that §20504(c)(2)(B) imposes a “stricter principle” than §20508(b)(1)). Under

the panel’s reasoning, “states could never collect any

information” from a voter, since the voter’s “attestation … theoretically covers all eligibility information,”

rendering any other information “inessential.”

App.178a (Nelson, J., dissenting). That illogical holding “mangle[s] §20508” and conflicts with this Court’s

precedents. App.178a.

Second, the panel claimed that requiring proof of

citizenship violated the requirement that state forms

supplied to public assistance agencies be “equivalent”

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to the federal form. App.51a (quoting 52 U.S.C.

§20506(a)(6)(A)(ii)). It insisted that “equivalent”

means the state form must be “virtually identical.”

App.51a-52a. Again, the panel’s cramped reading

“misconstrued” the NVRA. App.179a (Nelson, J., dissenting). “First, ‘equivalent’ doesn’t always mean

‘identical.’” App.114a (Bumatay, J., dissenting). In

context, a state form is “equivalent” to the federal

form if it has “the same ‘effect’ for purposes of registration.” App.115a. That’s how this Court read the

term in Inter Tribal Council when it reasoned that

“state-developed forms may require information the

Federal Form does not.” 570 U.S. at 12. It makes no

sense to permit States to develop their own forms but

require “state public assistance agencies [to] use a

form that is identical to the federal form.” App.115a.

If left intact, the panel’s holding “would render

§20505(a) void and contravene [Inter Tribal Council].”

App.115a.

The conflicts don’t end at Inter Tribal Council. The

Ninth Circuit’s holding that the NVRA preempts Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship requirement also conflicts

with “[t]he logic underlying Crawford.” App.182a n.3

(Nelson, J., dissenting). There, prospective Indiana

voters had to produce proof-of-citizenship documents

to obtain a photo identification from the State. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198

n.17 (2008). The Court upheld Indiana’s photo identification requirement in part based on the NVRA. Id.

at 192. The NVRA “indicate[s] that Congress believes

that photo identification is one effective method of establishing a voter’s qualification to vote.” Id. at 193.

The Ninth Circuit disagreed, concluding that those

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documents are not “‘necessary’ to assess an applicant’s

eligibility.” App.37a. Crawford “demonstrates why the

[panel’s] analysis” of the NVRA “fails” since the Court

made clear that requiring voter identification “do[es]

not impede the NVRA’s underlying purposes.”

App.182a n.3 (Nelson, J., dissenting).

Third, the panel hid behind the 2018 LULAC consent decree. But that decree—which never found a violation of federal law and applied to only two state officers—cannot permanently displace the Arizona Legislature’s authority to make election rules. Consent

decrees often must yield to intervening changes in the

law. See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 347

(2000). Federal courts should not disregard “changed

circumstances” that transform an injunction into an

“instrument of wrong.” Ry. Emps. v. Wright, 364 U.S.

642, 648, 651-53 (1961). These changed circumstances

include “subsequent changes in either statutory or decisional law.” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 215

(1997). Otherwise, federal judgments could be used to

“bind state and local officials to the policy preferences

of their predecessors” and “‘improperly deprive future

officials of their designated legislative and executive

powers.’” Horne, 557 U.S. at 449.

These principles apply with special force when

state legislatures set election rules. The Constitution

directs state legislatures to “prescribe[]” rules for federal elections. U.S. Const. art. I, §4, cl.1; see also id.,

art. II, §1, cl.2. Under those Clauses, “state legislatures” have the “duty to prescribe rules governing federal elections.” Moore, 600 U.S. at 10 (cleaned up). A

“Secretary” thus “has no power to override the [state]

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Legislature” by stipulating to a consent decree. Carson, 978 F.3d at 1060.

These principles direct that the LULAC decree

must yield to the legislature’s intervening law. The

consent decree directed the Secretary of State to provide written guidance to county recorders. App.483a485a. The guidance was to instruct that the recorder

must register an applicant as either a full-ballot voter

(if citizenship is verified) or a federal-only voter (if citizenship cannot be verified). App.487a-489a. The ordinary course to enforce any consent decree is to reopen

that case. But the Court “retain[ed] jurisdiction” to enforce the decree only “until December 31, 2020.”

App.494a. Even if the Court had purported to retain

ongoing jurisdiction, Arizona’s legislature has displaced the Secretary’s agreement by directing county

recorders to “reject any [state-form] application for

registration that is not accompanied by satisfactory

evidence of citizenship.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. §16121.01(C). That choice falls well within the legislature’s constitutional purview.

No doubt federal courts must enforce federal

rights, which may sometimes require them to displace

state law. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4

Wheat.) 316, 436 (holding that a state law that conflicts with “the operations of the constitutional laws

enacted by congress … is unconstitutional and void”).

But that principle provides no basis for the Ninth Circuit’s decision: The LULAC decree rested on “consent

alone.” App.106a (Bumatay, J., dissenting). The LULAC court never found any violation of federal law.

App.106a-107a; see also App.476a (LULAC decree).

The panel’s conclusion that “that a settlement by a

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single state executive-branch official may forever curtail the state legislature’s lawmaking power” finds no

support in federal law. App.104a (Bumatay, J., dissenting). Instead, “when a change in statutory law

conflicts with a consent decree, it’s the statute that

governs.” App.105a-106a (collecting cases).

Far from adhering to these limits, the panel expanded the reach of the LULAC decree. The panel ignored the consequences of its observation that the decree applied only to “the Secretary of State of Arizona

and the Maricopa County Recorder.” App.48a. For

one, that means the parties here (and nearly all the

county recorders) are “not bound by [that] judgment.”

See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 898 (2008); see

also Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 842 (2025)

(“‘As a general rule, an injunction’ could not bind one

who was not a ‘party to the cause.’”). But the panel

concluded that the decree “bars Arizona election officials from enforcing” the State’s proof-of-citizenship

requirement. App.49a. That decision did not give effect to a “final judgment.” Contra App.47a-49a. It

stretched the judgment beyond both its terms and the

historical limits on federal courts. See U.S. Const. art.

III, §2; Judiciary Act of 1789, §11, 1 Stat. 78; CASA,

Inc., 606 U.S. at 847.

Nor does it make any sense to suggest that the Petitioners must move to modify the consent decree under Rule 60(b). See App.108a-109a (Bumatay, J., dissenting). It is black letter law that “‘only a party to the

action’ can move under Rule 60.” App.108a (quoting

Wright & Miller 21A Fed. Proc., L. Ed. §51:170

(2024)). “And no one here was a party to the LULAC

Consent Decree.” Id. This posture results not from the

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Petitioner’s decisions, but from the unusual litigation

brought by Respondents: They brought a collateral action seeking facial relief against a newly enacted state

law based on a consent decree.

None of the panel’s reasons justifies putting a

“straitjacket on the States,” forbidding them from developing their own standards for their own voter-registration forms. App.111a (Bumatay, J., dissenting).

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling conflicts with Inter Tribal

Council, conflicts with Crawford, renders much of the

NVRA dead-letter, and creates serious separation-ofpowers problems. The Court should review and correct those errors.

B. On the second question presented, the “Sixth

Circuit got it right, and the panel majority did not.”

App.185a (Nelson, J., dissenting). The panel held that

the NVRA prohibits Arizona from “periodic cancellation of registrations” within 90 days before a federal

election, even if those registrations belong to noncitizens who were never eligible to register in the first

place. App.41a-47a. The NVRA mandates that, with

some exceptions, “[a] State shall complete, not later

than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general

election for Federal office, any program the purpose of

which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters.” 52

U.S.C. §20507(c)(2)(A). “But because the phrase ‘ineligible voters’ in the 90-Day Provision doesn’t include

foreign citizens, the provision doesn’t apply to Arizona’s cancellation program.” App.119a (Bumatay, J.,

dissenting).

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The panel failed to read the 90-day provision in

context, glossing over the NVRA’s distinct terms. Provisions governing the pre-registration phase refer to

“applicant[s]” and “eligible applicant[s].” 52 U.S.C.

§20507(a)(1), (5). Those terms imply a third category:

“ineligible applicants,” such as noncitizens who apply

anyway. States must register only “eligible applicant[s]” who submit a “valid voter registration form.”

Id. §20507(a)(1). At the post-registration phase, these

“eligible applicant[s]” become “registrant[s].” Id.

§20507(a)(3). And at the removal phase, these “registrant[s]” become either “eligible voter[s]” or “ineligible

voter[s].” Id. §20507(c)(2)(A). “Once placed within the

overall statutory scheme, foreign citizens aren’t included in the protection of ‘ineligible voters’ in the 90Day Provision,” because they were never “eligible applicants” in the first place. App.124a-125a (Bumatay,

J., dissenting). So they can’t be “registrants,” “eligible

voters,” or even “ineligible voters.” The NVRA doesn’t

bar their removal.

The panel’s reading would lead to “absurd results.”

App.125a-126a. The NVRA lists only four reasons a

State can remove a “registrant” from the rolls: at the

registrant’s request; due to criminal conviction or

mental incapacity; the registrant’s death; or a change

of residence. 52 U.S.C. §20507(a)(3)-(4). None of those

reasons indicate that a person who was never eligible—like a noncitizen—has been properly registered.

But if noncitizens (and other never-eligible applicants) are “registrants,” then the NVRA would prevent a State from removing them at all. The more sensible reading is that never-eligible applicants are not

“registrants” protected by the NVRA.

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The panel’s contrary holding “effectively grant[s],

and then protect[s], the franchise of persons not eligible to vote.” Bell, 367 F.3d at 592. It conflicts with the

Sixth Circuit. It ignores this Court’s stay of an identical ruling in Virginia. See Va. Coal. for Immigrant

Rts., 2024 WL 4577983, stayed, 2024 WL 4608863.

And it warrants the Court’s review.

*

*

*

When given the opportunity to correct these errors,

the Ninth Circuit doubled down. In doing so, it

“shirk[ed]” this Court’s emergency stay ruling.

App.186a (Nelson, J., dissenting). And it failed to heed

the Court’s stay of the same flawed interpretation of

the NVRA’s 90-day provision. The Court should grant

certiorari and finally resolve those issues.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant the petition for a writ of

certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Tyler R. Green

CONSOVOY MCCARTHY

PLLC

222 S. Main St., 5th Fl.

Salt Lake City,

Utah 84101

February 19, 2026

Gilbert C. Dickey

Counsel of Record

Conor D. Woodfin

William Bock IV

CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC

1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700

Arlington, Virginia 22209

(703) 243-9423

gilbert@consovoymccarthy.com

Counsel for the Republican

National Committee