Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Javier Enrique Barraza-Miranda, Petitioner v. United States

No. ___________

.

__________________

JAVIER ENRIQUE BARRAZA-MIRANDA,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

___________________________________________

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

___________________________________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

___________________________________________

Louis Elias Lopez, Jr.

LOUIS LOPEZ LAW

416 N Stanton St

Ste 400

El Paso, TX 79901

(915) 543-9800

llopez@lelopezlaw.com

Attorney for Petitioner

Twenty-first day of July, MMXXV

United States Commercial Printing Company • www.uscpc.us • (202) 866-8558

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Fifth Circuit erred when they decided that

the United States Government’s failure to take

actions outside of the United States did not

jeopardize the Petitioner’s Right to a Speedy Trial as

guaranteed under the 6th Amendment and the

Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)).

ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States Court of Appeals (CA5):

United States v. Javier Enrique BarrazaMiranda, No. 24-50496 (April 9, 2025;

rehearing effectively denied April 22, 2025)

United States District Court (W.D. Tex.)

United States v. Javier Enrique BarrazaMiranda, USDC No. 3:15-CR-1946-5

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented ................................................... i

Opinions Below ............................................................1

Jurisdiction ..................................................................1

Constitutional Provisions Involved ............................1

Statement of the Case .................................................1

Reasons for Granting the Petition .............................. 5

A.

Standard of Review ......................................6

B.

The Fifth Circuit’s De Novo Review.............7

C.

The Incorrectness of the Fifth Circuit’s

Opinion.......................................................... 8

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

“Mehrdad Ansari” .........................................9

“Paul Mendoza” ........................................... 12

“Artur Tchibassa ......................................... 13

“Marc Gilbert Doggett” ............................... 14

“Juan Alberto Cardona” .............................. 15

Conclusion ................................................................. 15

iv

Appendix

Appendix A

Opinion

[affirmed

District

Court

findings], United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, United

States of America v. Javier Enrique

Barraza-Miranda,

No. 24-50496 (Apr. 9, 2025).........................App-1

Appendix B

Memorandum [denying time extension

to petition rehearing], United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,

United States of America v. Javier

Enrique Barraza-Miranda,

No. 24-50496 (Apr. 22, 2025).......................App-7

Appendix C

Report and Recommendation [denial of

motion

to

dismiss

indictment

recommended], United States District

Court for the Western District of Texas,,

United States of America v. Javier

Enrique Barraza Miranda,

No. 3:15-cr-01946-FM-5 (Nov. 30, 2023).....App-8

Appendix D

Appellant

Miranda’s

Javier Enrique BarrazaUnopposed Request for

v

Extension of Time to File Motion for

Rehearing, United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, United

States of America v. Javier Enrique

Barraza-Miranda,

No. 24-50496 (Apr. 18, 2025).....................App-24

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Barker v. Wingo,

407 U.S. 514 (1972) .......................................... 6, 7, 9

Doggett v. United States,

505 U.S. 647 (1992) ............................................ 7, 14

United States v. Ansari,

48 F.4th 393 (CA5 2022) ................................ 6, 9-11

United States v. Barraza-Miranda,

No. 24-50496 (CA5 Apr. 9, 2025)........................ ii, 8

United States v. Cardona,

302 F.3d 494 (CA5 2002) ................................... 6, 15

United States v. Mendoza,

530 F.3d 758 (CA9 2008) ................................... 6, 12

United States v. Molina-Solorio,

577 F.3d 300, 303-04 (CA5 2009) ............................7

United States v. Tchibassa,

452 F.3d 918 (CADC 2006) .................................... 13

vii

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes

U.S. Const. Amdt. VI ................................................... 1

28 U.S.C. § 1254 .......................................................... 1

viii

(This page is intentionally left blank.)

Javier Enrique Barraza-Miranda respectfully

petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to the judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Fifth Circuit’s decisions are reproduced in

the appendix at App.1-7.

JURISDICTION

The Fifth Circuit’s opinion was entered April 9,

2025. The Fifth Circuit effectively1 denied rehearing

on April 22, 2025. This Court has jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant

part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right to a speedy.” U.S. Const. Amdt. VI.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Sixth Amendment affirms the right to a

speedy trial, requiring the Government to do more

than obtain an indictment, seal it, and then wait for

“something to happen favorable” when they know the

location of a wanted person, while out of the country,

1 Fifth

Circuit denied motion to extend time to petition for

rehearing amid the petitioner’s transfer between Bureau of

Prisons’ Federal Correction Institutions, effectively depriving

him of the right to move for rehearing.

2

but lives within a nation friendly to the United

States.

On November 4, 2015, a federal grand jury,

sitting in the El Paso Division of the Western

District of Texas, indicted Barraza-Miranda on two

counts of an eight-count indictment charging him

with possession of 100 kilograms or more of

marijuana with intent to distribute. The indictment

was sealed. On October 19, 2022, a little under seven

years later, Barraza-Miranda was arrested in San

Jose, Costa Rica, extradited, and appeared in the

Western District of Texas on August 9, 2023.

Barraza-Miranda CA5.Br. On September 6, 2023,

Barraza-Miranda filed a Motion to Dismiss the

Indictment for a violation of his Sixth Amendment

Right to a Speedy Trial following an almost sevenyear delay between his indictment and arrest. The

District Court denied the motion. Barraza-Miranda

then entered a conditional guilty plea on August 15,

2023; subsequently, on June 11, 2024, the District

Court sentenced him to 121 months of imprisonment.

Barraza-Miranda appealed his judgment and

sentence to the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit

affirmed. App.1-3.

Back in 2012, the United States deported

Barraza-Miranda to Mexico. The Government

suspected that from 2012 onward, Barraza-Miranda

resided in Mexico and that his wife crossed into

Ciudad Juarez, Mexico to visit him regularly.

Barraza-Miranda’s wife corroborated this belief in

the affidavit she provided in support of the

defendant’s motion to dismiss. Barraza-Miranda and

3

his wife owned two properties in El Paso, Texas.

Barraza-Miranda’s

wife’s

affidavit

was

uncontroverted and stated that no one ever left any

correspondence at the addresses of the properties

they had jointly owned as early as 1985. She

affirmed that she and Barraza-Miranda did not know

that there was an Indictment against her husband.

The Government sealed the Indictment in November

2015; and a limited unsealing was performed in 2022

to arrest Barraza-Miranda. Barraza-Miranda’s wife

additionally provided an itinerary for a flight inside

Mexico in September 2019 showing BarrazaMiranda’s name; and another flight in September

2022 to Cancun. Both times, Barraza-Miranda’s

name appeared on the ticket.

At Barraza-Miranda’s detention hearing, FBI

Special Agent Ryan Graham affirmed that BarrazaMiranda was arrested with a Mexican identification

card with an address. The agent was unable to verify

if the government had “looked to determine if the

address” was in Mexican records, or a “DMV request”

with Mexico. The agent also testified that he could

not recall if the FBI went to the two registered

addresses that Barraza-Miranda and his wife had in

El Paso. The agent was also asked if he could give

any specific actions that the FBI took to locate

Barraza-Miranda in Mexico to which the agent

demurred and said he was only involved with the

actions in Costa Rica.

Barraza-Miranda’s wife clarified that they

were only going on vacation to Costa Rica, not to live

there; that they had round-trip tickets to Costa Rica

4

from Mexico; and that they would be in Costa Rica

for 8 days. It was also clarified that BarrazaMiranda was not arrested upon entering Costa Rica

but after having been there for seven days.

During cross-examination, the Government

asked Barraza-Miranda’s wife if he had returned to

the United States since being deported. She testified

he had not; rather, he had lived in Mexico the whole

time. She also testified that they traveled normally

within Mexico to Cancún, Mazatlán, and Oaxaca.

The Government presented evidence that they

knew that Barraza-Miranda had been indicted in

November 2015; that they entered his information in

the National Crime Index (NCIC) and renewed that

information annually. Authorities obtained two GPS

tracker warrants to monitor the vehicle of his wife

for travel to the El Paso U.S.-Mexico Border and also

acquired international crossing records for BarrazaMiranda’s wife. They also began reviewing BarrazaMiranda’s Facebook page after installing the

trackers. While the Government could not recall

details of the Facebook posts, they did admit the

dates were, as of most recently, May 2016, when they

pulled up those photos.

The agents also received two addresses for

Barraza-Miranda from the FBI in Mexico City and

received information from an undisclosed source who

had been visiting Barraza-Miranda in Ciudad Juárez,

Mexico. The government sent the address to their

ALAT (Assistant Legal Attaché) in Ciudad Juarez,

who returned information stating that “a house

5

number was not included in the lead, and Calle 30

#2029 does not exist. The lead is considered covered.”

Basically, other than obtaining a sealed

indictment, tracking his wife to the U.S.-Mexico

Border, and obtaining addresses in Mexico, the

United States had not taken any actions to contact,

arrest, or even attempt to confirm Barraza-Miranda’s

location. The District Court found that the

government’s efforts were reasonable and denied the

motion. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Fifth Circuit’s two-page dismissive

Opinion in this case completely snuffs out the

remnants of any residual speedy trial protections

within the Fifth Circuit.

I.

The Fifth Circuit’s Opinion in this case

deserves review if for no other reason

than to hold the Governmental to a

higher standard; that it will not be

rewarded

for

what

amounts

to

“bureaucratic indifference,” or to phrase

it another way, “a deliberate choice to

not to act,” or even put it more simply

“dialing it in, purposely doing the bare

minimum,” when bringing a person to

trial.

Barraza-Miranda lived in the Republic of

Mexico post-deportation from 2012 until his arrest in

October 2022 in Costa Rica. He did not attempt to

6

hide; but rather, he met his wife, who crossed

regularly from El Paso, Texas, to Ciudad Juarez,

Mexico, to an address that was known by the

government.

The actions of Barraza-Miranda and his lack

of knowledge of the Indictment in this case did not

cause the delay. Rather, the United States failed to

take any actions outside of the United States to bring

the defendant to prosecution. This was substantially

different than the case of United States v. Ansari, 48

F.4th 393 (CA5 2022) and almost mirrored the case

of United States v. Mendoza, 530 F.3d 758 (CA9

2008). Further, the Republic of Mexico is not a

location where the United States has no control and

little influence.” Lastly, as discussed in an

examination of United States v. Cardona, 302 F.3d

494 (CA5 2002), Barraza did not hide, evade, or even

know of the indictment, all agreed to by the United

States.

Barraza-Miranda

contends

that

the

Government was negligent, which was the reason for

the delay in his prosecution. Further, the

Government’s negligence after almost seven years

would be presumed harmful, and all the other Barker

v. Wingo 407 U.S. 514 (1972) factors would favor

Barraza-Miranda, requiring this Court to reverse

and remand for dismissal of the Indictment.

A. Standard of Review

The Sixth Amendment determination requires

consideration of four factors: (1) the extent of the

7

delay; (2) “whether the government or the criminal

defendant is more to blame for that delay”; (3)

whether the defendant was diligent in asserting the

right to a speedy trial; and (4) any prejudice

resulting from the delay. Doggett v. United States,

505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992) (describing the factors

announced in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530

(1972)). The review of the district court’s factual

findings for clear error and its application of the

Barker factors de novo. United States v. MolinaSolorio, 577 F.3d 300, 303-04 (CA5 2009).

B. The Fifth Circuit’s De Novo Review

Here, the Government concedes

that the first and third factors weigh in

Barraza-Miranda’s favor. At issue is

who is more to blame for the delay. The

record here reflects that BarrazaMiranda

remained

beyond

the

Government’s jurisdiction in Mexico

throughout the nearly seven-year delay

between his indictment and arrest. The

Government, among other things, (1)

monitored his wife for clues to BarrazaMiranda’s location, (2) followed leads in

Mexico regarding his whereabouts, (3)

entered and annually renewed his

information into the National Crime

Information Center, and (4) conducted

financial queries into money orders he

received or sent. The Government did

not “act[] in bad faith, intentionally

holding up prosecution for the purpose

8

of prejudicing the defendant.” United

States v. Hernandez, 457 F.3d 416, 421

(CA5 2006). Instead, the Government

diligently pursued Barraza-Miranda,

and, consequently, this factor cuts

against him. See Molina-Solorio, 577

F.3d at 305. Under the fourth Barker

factor, Barraza-Miranda is not entitled

to a presumption of prejudice because

all of the first three factors do not weigh

in his favor. See United States v. Harris,

566 F.3d 422, 432 (CA5 2009). He “must

therefore demonstrate ‘actual prejudice’

that outweighs the other factors.” Id.

Here, the record does not reflect that

Barraza-Miranda underwent oppressive

pretrial incarceration, suffered anxiety

or concern, or that his defense was

impaired. See Id.

United States v. Barraza-Miranda, No. 24-50496

(CA5 Apr. 9, 2025) (App.1-3)

C. The Incorrectness of the Fifth Circuit’s

Opinion

The delay in this matter clearly lies with the

United States government. They agree that the

Defendant did not know of the Indictment, that the

indictment was sealed until the limited unsealing

occurred for arrest, and that the Barraza-Miranda

did not enter the United States after deportation. As

the District Court asked the Government “You know

9

the fundamental issue here. Wh[o] 2 is reasonable?”

The Court’s question is well aimed in that “a

defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the

State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring

that the trial is consistent with due process.” Barker

v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527 (1972). At the lower

levels, the Government succeeds and their actions, or

rather inactions, deemed reasonable. Filing a sealed

indictment, sitting back and waiting for seven years,

or possibly to the end of time, is a-okay.

1. “Mehrdad Ansari”

The starkest contrast to the Government’s

actions with regard to Barraza-Miranda is in United

States v. Ansari, 48 F.4th 393 (CA5 2022). At a

federal jury trial, during the COVID-19 pandemic,

Mehrdad Ansari was convicted on all counts of a

2011 indictment charging him and two coconspirators with a variety of offenses arising from a

scheme to circumvent American export controls

designed to prevent dual-use commodities. Ansari, 48

F.4th at 396. In Ansari, the Government contended,

much like the Government here, that it “employed

every viable means to capture” Ansari after the

indictment. Id. However, unlike Barraza-Miranda’s

case, Ansari took actions that contributed to the

delay and the Government took positive actions with

foreign countries to secure his arrest. Id. Ansari was

an “alias under which he was choosing to conduct his

criminal affairs.” Id. at 398. “Ansari took a postindictment trip to the United States under a

different name (Moienansari) and did misstate on his

2 The District Court’s actual words were “What is responsible?”

10

visa application for the same trip that he did not use

any other names.” Id. The Ansari Court focused on

this trip, and “[Ansari’s] ability to dodge authorities

as the most fateful episode in his lengthy

prosecutorial saga and the chief cause of the delay.”

Id. In fact, the District Court when discussing the

use of the delay, stated that “most (if not all) of the

blame for the delay in bringing Ansari to trial

belonged to Ansari himself.” Id.

In the Ansari case, the Government pursued

specific articulable actions including entering

“Mehrdad Ansari” into the case management system

and promptly correcting the name when it discovered

the visa application displaying “Moeinansari” beside

his picture, Id. at 399, as well as attempting a sting

operation to nab Ansari by luring him back to the

United States as this had worked for a co-defendant.

Id. The Government also publicized his indictment

after it was initially sealed “to invite him to turn

himself in for trial. Id. Further, the Government

issued a press release and placed Ansari and his

companies on the Commerce Department’s Entities

List. Id.

And the Government also worked with

Interpol and foreign nations to the greatest extent

possible. Id. It even dropped charges it had brough

against Ansari to secure his extradition. Id. These

actions were described as having “diligently used

every practical and lawful method to arrest [Ansari]

as quickly as possible. Id. Further, in response, the

Court further stated that “Ansari appears to have

11

been taking active steps to avoid apprehension all

along.” Id. at 400.

Barraza-Miranda is not at all in a similar

situation. The following facts highlight that between

2012 [deportation] and when he was extradited

Barraza-Miranda never came to the United States

and lived in Mexico the whole time. And while

Barraza was guilty of committing a drug offense, and

Ansari of a white-collar type of offense, both received

121 and 123-month sentences of incarceration,

respectively. Barraza-Miranda traveled internally in

Mexico under his own name to Cancún, Mazatlán,

and Oaxaca.

Government action was almost nil. The FBI

entered his name in the NCIC (National Crime Index)

which they renewed annually. They ran a search

through BATIC and found an address of Calle Arroyo

del Valle, number 2834, but did not have a specific

memory of what occurred with that information.

They ran a search through TRAC for money orders

sent to Barraza-Miranda and received a street

address of Valle del Arroyo, but again did not followup. A check of the CLEAR database returned two

addresses in El Paso, TX, on Buena Vista and

Hiawatha. Barraza-Miranda’s wife testified to these

addresses as well. A crossing report was done and

showed Barraza-Miranda had no crossings during

the past 18 months while Barraza-Miranda’s wife

had many.

The indictment in this matter was sealed until

October 2022. In reviewing the above actions and

12

compared to the actions taken by Ansari and the

Government, it is clear that the Government cannot

say that it took actions that it knew or should have

known would result in Barraza-Miranda’s arrest.

Rather, it took a “wait and see” approach until he

landed in Costa Rica and was notified, almost 7

years later, that he was wanted by the United States.

There weren’t any sting operations in Barraza’s case.

And there was a conscious decision not to unseal the

indictment or notify him at either of the two

addresses that he owned in the United States.

Barraza-Miranda, unlike Ansari, did not use any

aliases or make any trips to the United States postindictment. In fact, it appears the government knew,

or should have known, where Barraza-Miranda was,

but simply did not verify that information –

information obtained as early as 2016.

2. “Paul Mendoza”

The Government relied upon United States v.

Mendoza, 530 F.3d 758, 763 (CA9 2008), to argue

that negligence occurs when no serious effort is made

to locate a defendant not evading apprehension.

Barraza-Miranda suggests that this case fits exactly

what occurred in his case. Mendoza had an 8-year

delay that triggered his speedy trial claim. United

States v. Mendoza, 530 F.3d at 761. Focusing on the

government’s efforts, the Government attempted

speak with Mendoza through his wife and an

attorney who were unable to get Mendoza to call the

agent. Id. The attorney said he was not representing

Mendoza; and his wife relayed that they separated,

and he went to the Philippines. Id. The Government

indicted him approximately a year later. Id.at 762.

13

And the government put out a warrant. Id. However,

the “warrant was the only attempt to apprehend

Mendoza as the government made no attempt to

contact Mendoza to inform him that he had been

indicted.” Id. (emphasis added). Mendoza was

arrested in October 2004, after returning to the

United States in June 2004.

Counsel submits that the Government in

Barraza-Miranda’s case’s actions are similar to those

in Mendoza’s in that they did nothing to “apprehend”

Barraza-Miranda. Interestingly, the District Court

directly challenged the United States on its efforts

“[b]ut there’s no evidence here—there’s no evidence

here that anyone on behalf of the Government went

out checking to see if the Arroyo del Valle 2834 was

checked on. There’s no evidence of that.” Thus, we’re

left with the same lack of effort that resulted in

dismissal in the Mendoza case.

3. “Artur Tchibassa

The Tchibassa is a case that is clearly

distinguishable, and the United States cannot show

how it applies even though they rely on it in their

Response. Tchibassa’s arrest and delay were

“attributable primarily to his continued residence in

an area over which the United States had no control

and little influence,” Zaire, in Brazzaville, Congo. See

United States v. Tchibassa, 452 F.3d 918, 926 (CADC

2006). In this case, the Government cannot allege or

show how Mexico is the same as Zaire, or an area

where the United States ‘had no control and little

influence.” Id.

14

4. “Marc Gilbert Doggett”

“Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an

accused must allege that the interval between

accusation and trial has crossed the threshold

dividing ordinary from “presumptively prejudicial”

delay, (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S., at 530–531),

since, by definition, he cannot complain that the

government has denied him a “speedy” trial if it has,

in fact, prosecuted his case with customary

promptness.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. at

651–52 (1992). “If the accused makes this showing,

the court must then consider, as one factor among

several, the extent to which the delay stretches

beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial

examination of the claim.” See id. at 652.

This latter enquiry is significant to the speedy

trial analysis because, as we discuss below, the

presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the

accused intensifies over time. Id. The extraordinary

8½ year lag between Doggett's indictment and arrest

clearly suffices to trigger the speedy trial enquiry; its

further significance within that enquiry will be dealt

with later. Id. Further, the Doggett Court’s

statement that “the [G]overnment was not diligent,

concluded that the second Barker factor weighed

heavily in Doggett's favor because “[f]or six years,

the Government's investigators made no serious

effort to test their progressively more questionable

assumption that Doggett was living abroad, and, had

they done so, they could have found him within

minutes.” Id. at 652-53. Here, had the government

taken any action with regards to the Valle del Arroyo

15

address, they could have verified that address

“within minutes.”

5. “Juan Alberto Cardona”

In United States v. Cardona, 302 F.3d 494

(CA5 2002), the Court ruled that a five-year delay in

executing the arrest warrant was not negligent since

Cardona had multiple addresses as well as contact

with law enforcement between 1995 and 2000. Id. at

496. The Cardona Court denied the speedy trial

motion finding no evidence of government negligence.

Id. Similarly, Barraza-Miranda argues that the

Government knew of his whereabouts but failed to

act due to negligence or lack of effort. The Cardona

Court, relying on United States v. Brown, 169 F.3d

344, 349 (CA6 1999), affirmed that the Government

must prove a defendant caused delay, evaded arrest,

or knowingly hid after indictment. Cardona, 302

F.3d at 496. In Barraza-Miranda’s case, there is no

evidence that he was responsible for the delay or

aware of the indictment. In fact, the Government

stated it chose not to notify him.

CONCLUSION

The Government cannot be rewarded for what

amounts to bureaucratic indifference, deliberately

choosing not to act, or purposely doing the bare

minimum when bringing a person to trial. This

Court should reverse the lower court’s opinion and

remand the case to the district court with

instructions to dismiss the indictment in this case.

16

Louis Elias Lopez, Jr.

LOUIS LOPEZ LAW

416 N Stanton St

Ste 400

El Paso, TX 79901

(915) 543-9800

llopez@lelopezlaw.com

Dated: July 21, 2025

Attorney for Petitioner