Petition for Writ of Certiorari — James Skinner, Petitioner v. Louisiana

No. _________

IN THE

JAMES SKINNER,

Petitioner,

v.

LOUISIANA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to Louisiana’s 21st Judicial District Court

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Easha Anand

Jeffrey L. Fisher

Pamela S. Karlan

STANFORD LAW SCHOOL

SUPREME COURT

LITIGATION CLINIC

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305

John R. Mills

PHILLIPS BLACK, INC.

1721 Broadway, Suite 201

Oakland, CA 94612

Jee Park

Counsel of Record

Meredith Angelson

INNOCENCE PROJECT

NEW ORLEANS

4051 Ulloa Street

New Orleans, LA 70119

(504) 943-1902

jeep@ip-no.org

QUESTION PRESENTED

In Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S. 385 (2016) (per

curiam), this Court summarily reversed a Louisiana

postconviction court and vacated Michael Wearry’s

murder conviction. This Court determined that the

State withheld evidence that would have seriously

impeached the State’s star witnesses. “Beyond doubt,”

this Court held, withholding that evidence violated

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Wearry, 577

U.S. at 392.

Petitioner James Skinner was convicted of the

same crime as Mr. Wearry on the basis of the same

star witnesses’ testimony. The State withheld the

same evidence as in Wearry; indeed, Mr. Skinner has

since uncovered still more evidence that the State did

not turn over. Mr. Skinner thus petitioned Louisiana

courts for the same relief as Mr. Wearry: vacatur of his

conviction. In response, the Louisiana postconviction

trial court wrote only: “[T]he Weary [sic] case is

distinguishable enough from the instant case that its

decision does not compel this Court to follow suit.”

This petition presents the following question:

Did Louisiana courts err in refusing to apply

Wearry to Mr. Skinner’s Brady claims?

ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

State v. Skinner, 2023-15992 (La. 21 Dist. 6/23/23)

(application for postconviction relief denied);

State v. Skinner, 2023-0710 (La. App. 1 Cir.

12/27/23) (petition for supervisory writ denied);

State v. Skinner, 2024-00142 (La. 2/25/25), 401

So.3d 665 (petition for supervisory writ denied);

In re Skinner, No. 25-30151 (5th Cir. June 17,

2025) (motion for authorization to file successive

habeas petition granted).

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ........................................... i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ....................................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... viii

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI...............1

OPINIONS BELOW .....................................................1

JURISDICTION............................................................1

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.......1

INTRODUCTION .........................................................1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....................................2

A. James Skinner and Michael Wearry are

both charged with murder .....................................3

B. Mr. Skinner and Mr. Wearry are both

convicted of murder ................................................5

C. This Court vacates Mr. Wearry’s conviction

on the basis of the State’s Brady violations ..........7

D. Mr. Skinner obtains counsel and discovers

even more withheld evidence ...............................11

E. Louisiana courts hold they are not bound by

Wearry and reject Mr. Skinner’s Brady

claims ....................................................................15

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................17

I.

Wearry dictates the outcome in this case ...........18

A. The withheld evidence at issue in this

case is at least as material as the

withheld evidence at issue in Wearry ...........18

B. This case is “distinguishable” from

Wearry only in that Mr. Skinner raises

stronger Brady claims against a weaker

conviction........................................................23

iv

II. This Court’s intervention is warranted...............27

A. Louisiana courts flouted this Court’s

precedent ........................................................27

B. This Court should correct the injustice

now..................................................................30

CONCLUSION............................................................35

APPENDIX

Appendix A, Order of the 21st Judicial District

of Louisiana: denying petition for postconviction relief, June 23, 2023 .......................... 1a

Appendix B, Order of the First Circuit Court of

Appeal: denying petition for a supervisory

writ, December 27, 2023 ..................................... 5a

Appendix C, Order of the Louisiana Supreme

Court: denying petition for a supervisory

writ, February 25, 2025 ...................................... 7a

Appendix D, Order of the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: granting

motion for authorization to file a successive

habeas corpus petition, June 17, 2025 ............... 9a

Appendix E, Indictment of James Skinner,

Randy Hutchinson and Michael Wearry,

Grand Jury of Livingston Parish,

Louisiana, 21st Judicial District Court,

filed June 7, 2000 .............................................. 12a

Appendix F, Homicide Investigation of Eric

Walber, Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff’s Office

April 18, 2000, Statement of Sam Scott ........... 17a

Appendix G, Homicide Investigation of Eric

Walber, Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff’s Office,

April 25, 2000, Statement of Sam Scott ........... 25a

v

Appendix H, Homicide Investigation of Eric

Walber, Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff’s Office,

Police Report in re Kedrick Johnson,

May 17, 2000 ..................................................... 27a

Appendix I, Homicide Investigation of Eric

Walber, Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Office,

March 5, 2002, Statement of Reggie

Jackson .............................................................. 28a

Appendix J, State of Louisiana v. Sam Scott,

Case No. 17290, Plea Agreement,

March 10, 2005 .................................................. 31a

Appendix K, State of Louisiana v. Sam Scott,

Case No. 17290, Minutes of Manslaughter

Plea Proceedings, May 31, 2005 ....................... 33a

Appendix L, Homicide Investigation of Eric

Walber, Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff’s Office,

January 25, 1999, Statement of Eric Brown

in re Dashain Moore Photo Array .................... 36a

Appendix M, Homicide Investigation of Eric

Walber, Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff’s Office,

January 24, 1999, Statement of Eric Brown ... 43a

Appendix N, Homicide Investigation of Eric

Walber, Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Office,

April 12, 1999, Statement of Ben Joy .............. 50a

Appendix O, Excerpts of Trial Examination of

Eric Brown, May 13, 2005................................. 51a

Appendix P, Excerpts of Resentencing Hearing

of Eric Brown, August 11, 2004 ........................ 54a

Appendix Q, Excerpts of Resentencing Hearing

of Eric Brown, September 29, 2005 .................. 56a

vi

Appendix R, Excerpts of Trial Examination of

Ryan Stinson, May 13, 2005 ............................. 58a

Appendix S, Excerpts of Prison Transfer

Settlement Hearing of Ryan Stinson,

July 9, 2007 ....................................................... 71a

Appendix T, Excerpts of Trial Examination of

Raz Rogers, May 14, 2005 ................................. 74a

Appendix U, Homicide Investigation of Eric

Walber, 21st Judicial District Attorney’s

Office, February 15, 2000, Police Notes on

Raz Rogers Confession ...................................... 76a

Appendix V, Homicide Investigation of Eric

Walber, Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff’s Office

Police Notes re Dashain Moore Interview,

May 11–26, 1998 ............................................... 77a

Appendix W, Armed Robbery Investigation of

Gary Stafford, Livingston Parish Sheriff’s

Office, May 12, 1998, Statement of Gary

Stafford .............................................................. 79a

Appendix X, State’s Closing Argument in

Dashain Moore Trial for Armed Robbery,

November 10, 1999 ........................................... 82a

Appendix Y, Homicide Investigation of Eric

Walber, Tangipahoa Sheriff’s Office, JulyAugust 1998 Police Notes in re Jamie Lee ...... 84a

Appendix Z, Homicide Investigation of Eric

Walber, Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff’s Office,

Albany Police Department Complaint

Report re Chad Sziszak Confession,

February 14, 2000 ............................................. 91a

Appendix AA, Homicide Investigation of Eric

Walber, Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff’s Office,

vii

America’s Most Wanted Tip on Chad

Sziszak and Jamie Lee Involvement ................ 93a

Appendix BB, Homicide Investigation of Eric

Walber, Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff’s Office,

Police Notes re Chad Sziszak and Jamie

Lee [undated] ..................................................... 95a

Appendix CC, Homicide Investigation of Eric

Walber, Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff’s Office,

August 7, 1998, Statement of Gwendolyn

Robertson .......................................................... 96a

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Andrus v. Texas,

590 U.S. 806 (2020) (per curiam) .........................34

Bosse v. Oklahoma,

580 U.S. 1 (2016) (per curiam) .............................29

Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963)

..................... i, 2, 7, 9, 10, 15–18, 22–25, 27, 31–33

Cavazos v. Smith,

565 U.S. 1 (2011) (per curiam) .............................30

Cruz v. Arizona,

598 U.S. 17 (2023) ................................................33

Fiore v. White,

531 U.S. 225 (2001) (per curiam) .........................34

Flowers v. Mississippi,

588 U.S. 284 (2019) ..............................................34

Foster v. Chatman,

578 U.S. 488 (2016) ..............................................34

Giglio v. United States,

405 U.S. 150 (1972) ..........................................9, 32

Glossip v. Oklahoma,

145 S. Ct. 612 (2025) ............................................33

Hutto v. Davis,

454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam) .........................28

James v. City of Boise,

577 U.S. 306 (2016) (per curiam) .........................29

ix

Kyles v. Whitley,

514 U.S. 419 (1995) ..........................................9, 22

Lopez v. Smith,

574 U.S. 1 (2014) (per curiam) .............................30

Marmet Health Ctr., Inc. v. Brown,

565 U.S. 530 (2012) (per curiam) .........................30

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,

14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) ..............................28

Moore v. Texas,

581 U.S. 1 (2017) (Moore I) ............................29, 30

Moore v. Texas,

586 U.S. 133 (2019) (per curiam) (Moore II)

...................................................................29, 30, 33

Mullenix v. Luna,

577 U.S. 7 (2015) (per curiam) .............................29

Parker v. Matthews,

567 U.S. 37 (2012) (per curiam) ...........................30

Ramos v. Louisiana,

590 U.S. 83 (2020) ......................................5, 24, 27

Rippo v. Baker,

580 U.S. 285 (2017) (per curiam) .........................34

Sears v. Upton,

561 U.S. 945 (2010) (per curiam) .............30, 33, 34

Skinner v. Cain,

2011 WL 2802859 (M.D. La. July 15, 2011)........11

State ex rel. Skinner v. State,

2009-2043 (La. 8/18/10), 42 So. 3d 394 ................11

Smith v. Cain,

565 U.S. 73 (2012) ................................................23

x

State v. Skinner,

2005-15992 (La. 21 Dist. 5/14/05) ..........................6

State v. Skinner,

2024-00142 (La. 2/25/25), 401 So.3d 665 .............24

United States v. Agurs,

427 U.S. 97 (1976) ..........................................22, 27

United States v. Bagley,

473 U.S. 667 (1985) ................................................9

United States v. Edmonds,

2022 WL 2340562 (5th Cir. June 29, 2022) ........33

United States v. Johnson,

457 U.S. 537 (1982) ..............................................34

Wearry v. Cain,

577 U.S. 385 (2016) (per curiam)

............................... i, 2, 7–12, 15–24, 26–28, 30–34

Will v. Lumpkin,

2024 WL 1468700 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2024) .........33

Williams v. Pennsylvania,

579 U.S. 1 (2016) ................................................ 34f

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const., amend. XIV...............................................1

U.S. Const., Article III, § 1 .........................................27

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) .......................................................1

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) ......................................17, 32

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) .................................................16

28 U.S.C. § 2254 ....................................................11, 16

xi

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) .....................................................32

Other Authorities

Ahdout, Z. Payvand, Direct Collateral Review,

121 Colum. L. Rev. 159 (2021) .............................33

U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 of

Population and Housing: Summary

Population and Housing Characteristics,

PHC-1-20, Louisiana (Sept. 2002),

https://perma.cc/4TZ4-EAZZ ..................................5

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner James Skinner respectfully petitions

for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the

Louisiana 21st Judicial District Court.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Louisiana 21st Judicial District

is unpublished. Pet.App. 1a–4a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Louisiana 21st Judicial

District Court was entered on June 23, 2023. Pet.App.

1a. The Louisiana Supreme Court issued its denial of

petitioner’s writ of review on February 25, 2025, and

that ruling became final on that date. Pet.App. 7a. On

May 13, 2025, Justice Alito extended the time within

which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and

including June 25, 2025. This Court has jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant

part: “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor

deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

INTRODUCTION

Michael Wearry and petitioner James Skinner

were convicted of the same murder more than twenty

years ago. The State presented no physical evidence of

guilt at either man’s trial. Instead, the State’s case

against both men revolved around the testimony of the

same two key witnesses. Years after Mr. Skinner and

2

Mr. Wearry were convicted, extensive evidence

impeaching those witnesses—evidence withheld by

the State—came to light.

Here, the two men’s paths diverged. In 2016, this

Court vacated Mr. Wearry’s conviction, finding that

the State’s case was a “house of cards” that collapsed

under the weight of the State’s many Brady violations.

Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S. 385, 392 (2016) (per curiam).

The evidence withheld in Mr. Wearry’s case rendered

his trial so fundamentally unfair that summary

reversal was warranted. Today, Mr. Wearry is a free

man.

But Mr. Skinner remains in prison. For nine

years, Louisiana courts have refused to apply Wearry

to Mr. Skinner’s case—even though, as a dissenting

justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court put it, “There

is no legitimate basis to treat the two codefendants

differently.” Pet.App. 8a (Griffin, J., dissenting from

denial of supervisory writ).

This Court’s intervention is necessary. There are

no plausible grounds on which to distinguish Mr.

Skinner’s case from Wearry. In fact, investigative

work by Mr. Skinner’s postconviction team has

brought to light even more withheld evidence than this

Court had before it in Wearry. Because Louisiana

courts have nonetheless flouted this Court’s directive

from Wearry, this Court should summarily reverse or

grant certiorari.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner James Skinner has maintained his

innocence since his arrest more than a quarter century

ago. In the decades since, thousands of pages of

evidence fatally undermining the prosecution’s case

3

have emerged—evidence that the State had but

withheld from Mr. Skinner before his trial.

A. James Skinner and Michael Wearry are both

charged with murder.

1. Eric Walber was killed in the spring of 1998.

Pet.App. 12a, 14a. Within three months, the principal

detective gave up pursuing leads, declared the case

cold, and enlisted a psychic. (The psychic’s readings

turned up nothing.) See id. 86a–87a.

Around the second anniversary of Mr. Walber’s

death, the State faced renewed pressure to charge a

suspect. The media continued to highlight the

unsolved murder: America’s Most Wanted, for

instance, dedicated an episode to it. Supp.App.G.1. 1

Meanwhile,

the

prosecutor

overseeing

the

investigation began representing Mr. Walber’s

grieving mother in her divorce proceedings.

Supp.App.G.3.

Finally, almost two years after the murder, a man

named Sam Scott—then incarcerated—came forward.

Pet.App. 17a. Though Scott presented himself as an

“eyewitness,” his first statement to the police erred in

the most basic details: the year of the crime, how Mr.

Walber was killed, and where his body was found. See

id. 19a, 21a. Mr. Skinner’s name appeared nowhere in

that first statement—or, for that matter, in Scott’s

1

For the Court’s convenience, exhibits relevant to this case—

including complete versions of records excerpted in the Petition

Appendix and the transcripts from Mr. Skinner’s two trials—are

available in an online supplemental appendix at:

https://ip-no.org/skinner-v-louisiana. Citations to the online

appendix are denoted “Supp.App.” and include the section (A-G),

document number, and, where necessary, page number.

4

second statement. See id. 17a–24a; Supp.App.F.4. 75–

82.

In the ensuing weeks, though, Scott revised his

story. Pet.App. 25a; Supp.App.F.4. 73–82, 111–45. He

settled on a list of six participants: himself, Mr.

Skinner, Mr. Wearry, a man named Randy

Hutchinson, and two other accomplices. Supp.App.F.4.

134, 137. In Scott’s final version of events, Hutchinson

flagged down Mr. Walber as he drove by and yanked

Mr. Walber out of his car. Id. 134. Scott, Hutchinson,

Mr. Wearry, and two other men stuffed Mr. Walber

back into the rear of his two-door hatchback. Id. 73,

134. All five men squeezed themselves into the car and

drove off. Id. The group then happened upon Mr.

Skinner, who joined them as they made their way to a

street called Crisp Road. Id. 137–38. Again,

Hutchinson dragged Mr. Walber out of the car. Id. This

time, according to Scott, Mr. Skinner ran Mr. Walber

over. Id.

Around this time, police spoke with a second

supposed eyewitness, Eric Brown. Supp.App.D.1. 536.

As with Scott’s statements, early versions of Brown’s

story did not feature Mr. Skinner at all. Pet.App. 43a–

49a. In later tellings, though, Brown claimed to have

joined the group with Mr. Skinner after Mr. Walber

was kidnapped. Supp.App.B.2. 542–52. Brown claimed

he left the group “a minute” before Mr. Walber was

killed. Id. 395.

2. Within ten days of Scott’s first interview with

police, and within hours of Brown’s revised statement,

prosecutors filed charges regarding the killing of Mr.

Walber. Pet.App. 12a; Supp.App.D.1. 536. Mr. Skinner

was among the men charged. Pet.App. 12a. The State

sought the death penalty for Mr. Skinner and Mr.

5

Wearry. Id. 14a–16a; see also Supp.App.B.1. 857. No

physical evidence tied Mr. Skinner—or any of these

men—to the crime.

Instead of filing these charges in Tangipahoa

Parish—where the crime allegedly occurred, the body

was found, the codefendants (all Black) lived, and the

investigation was spearheaded—the State filed in

neighboring Livingston Parish, where it claimed Mr.

Walber had been initially kidnapped. Pet.App.14a;

Supp.App.G.2. In 2000, Tangipahoa Parish was

approximately 30 percent Black, while Livingston was

over 95 percent white. U.S. Census Bureau, Census

2000 of Population and Housing: Summary Population

and Housing Characteristics, PHC-1-20, Louisiana,

tbl. 5 (Sept. 2002), https://perma.cc/4TZ4-EAZZ.

B. Mr. Skinner and Mr. Wearry are both convicted

of murder.

1. The State tried James Skinner initially for firstdegree capital murder. Pet.App. 14a; Supp.App.C.2;

see also Supp.App.B.1. 857. That first trial ended

when the jury could not reach unanimity.

Supp.App.G.5.

At the time, Louisiana law did not require jury

unanimity to convict in non-capital cases. (This Court

later declared that practice unconstitutional. See

Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83 (2020).) When the

State failed to secure a unanimous verdict in Mr.

Skinner’s first case, it took the death penalty off the

table and tried Mr. Skinner a second time.

Supp.App.C.3.

Because the State had no physical evidence, it

built its case around the testimony of Scott and Brown.

The State conceded that Scott hadn’t always been

6

truthful in his statements about the case.

Supp.App.B.2. 410. Nonetheless, the State sang his

praises to the jury: Scott was a “hero” whose fit of

conscience had broken open a cold case. Id. 1021. So,

too, with Brown, who emphasized that he had never

been charged by the district attorney in this case.

Pet.App. 52a. The State, in turn, assured the jury that

Brown was getting “nothing” in exchange for his

testimony. Supp.App.B.2. 1024.

As relevant here, the State called two additional

witnesses. Raz Rogers testified that Mr. Skinner had

confessed to him at some point while they were

hanging out—although he couldn’t remember much

besides that. Supp.App.B.2. 699–700.

Ryan Stinson told the jury that, although the two

men had never met before, Mr. Skinner confessed to

him in a jail cell immediately after being arrested.

Pet.App. 66a, 69a. Stinson claimed also to have

surreptitiously taken notes during the confession. Id.

68a. Although the two shared a small, single-person

jail cell, Stinson testified that Mr. Skinner hadn’t

noticed his notetaking because Stinson used a “little

bitty old pencil” and because Mr. Skinner “was looking

out the tray hatch.” Id. Aside from placing Mr. Skinner

at the scene of the crime, Stinson’s testimony bore no

resemblance to the stories that Scott and Brown told.

See id. 69a–70a.

This time, the jury—which included only one

Black juror—convicted Mr. Skinner. Transcript of

Proceedings at 1637, State v. Skinner, 2005-15992 (La.

21 Dist. 5/14/05); Supp.App.B.2. 1114. The verdict was

not unanimous. Supp.App.B.2. 1114. Mr. Skinner was

sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of

parole. Id. 1110.

7

2. Around the same time as Mr. Skinner’s first

trial, Mr. Wearry was convicted and sentenced to

death by an all-white jury. Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S.

385, 386 (2016) (per curiam); Petition for Writ of

Certiorari Reply at 7, Wearry, 577 U.S. 385 (No. 1410008). His trial proceeded along similar lines to Mr.

Skinner’s. The State offered no physical evidence of his

guilt. Scott was the “star witness.” Wearry, 577 U.S.

at 387. Brown corroborated Scott’s story. The State

told the jury, again, that Brown had “no deal on the

table” and was getting nothing in return. Id. In place

of Stinson and Rogers, the State called other

witnesses, who testified that they had seen Mr.

Wearry driving around in the victim’s blood-spattered

car, that he had sold the victim’s possessions, and that

he had admitted to being at the crime scene. See

Wearry, 577 U.S. at 400 (Alito, J., dissenting).

C. This Court vacates Mr. Wearry’s conviction on the

basis of the State’s Brady violations.

1. Because Mr. Wearry was sentenced to death, he

was represented by counsel in the state postconviction

process. See Supp.App.G.4. 1. Counsel uncovered

three categories of evidence that the State had

wrongfully withheld from Mr. Wearry’s lawyers at

trial.

First, the State concealed police records that

called into question Scott’s motive for involving

himself in this case. One of Scott’s fellow prisoners told

police that Scott was testifying to settle a personal

score—specifically, to make sure Mr. Wearry “gets the

needle.” Wearry, 577 U.S. at 389–90. Another inmate

reported that Scott had coached him to lie about the

Walber murder, as it would help him to reduce his own

sentence. Id. The State also withheld the details of

8

Scott’s plea to manslaughter: a sweetheart deal that

even gave him credit for time served prior to Mr.

Walber’s murder. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6,

Wearry, 577 U.S. 385 (No. 14-10008). In effect, the

deal let Scott out of prison as soon as he was done

testifying. Id.

Second, the State failed to turn over medical

records showing that Scott’s testimony about Randy

Hutchinson was physically impossible. Scott gave the

jury an account of Mr. Walber’s death in which

Hutchinson was running down the street, lifting Mr.

Walber, and crawling in and out of a hatchback.

Wearry, 577 U.S. at 390. But medical records

documented that, just nine days prior to the crime,

Hutchinson had “undergone knee surgery to repair a

ruptured patellar tendon.” Id. Post-surgery,

Hutchinson was so incapacitated that his father had

to carry him around. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at

11, Wearry, 577 U.S. 385 (No. 14-10008). Had

Hutchinson bent his knee to sit in the back of a small

car—let alone dragged the 190-pound Mr. Walber in

and out of that car as Scott alleged—the device

securing his kneecap would have failed. Wearry, 577

U.S. at 390. But Hutchinson’s medical records showed

that, after the murder, his knee was healing nicely.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Wearry, 577 U.S.

385 (No. 14-10008).

Third, the State withheld evidence that Brown

twice attempted to secure a deal with the State in

exchange for his testimony. The State concealed an

interview in which police promised to “talk to the D.A.”

about the fifteen-year sentence Brown was currently

serving and the five additional felony charges he faced.

Wearry, 577 U.S. at 390. The State also concealed a

9

letter in which one of Brown’s lawyers sought a deal

from the district attorney in exchange for testimony.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19–20, Wearry, 577

U.S. 385 (No. 14-10008).

2. In state postconviction review, Mr. Wearry

asserted that the withheld evidence violated his due

process rights. Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963), the prosecution violates a defendant’s right to

due process if it fails to disclose evidence that is

(i) “favorable” to the defendant’s case and

(ii) sufficiently “material” to undermine confidence in

the verdict. Id. at 87.

Mr. Wearry argued that the evidence was both

“favorable” and “material.” “Favorable” evidence

includes

impeachment

evidence

regarding

government witnesses and, in particular, evidence

that the State offered a witness a deal. See, e.g.,

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676–77 (1985).

As Mr. Wearry explained, evidence of Scott’s

statements to other prisoners, of Hutchinson’s

physical impairments, and of Brown’s potential deal

qualified as “favorable.” See Petition for Writ of

Certiorari at 8–13, 19–20, Wearry, 577 U.S. 385

(No. 14-10008).

Evidence is “material” if there is “any reasonable

likelihood” that it could have “affected the judgment of

the jury.” Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154

(1972). Materiality turns on the cumulative effect of

all the evidence, not on any single piece of evidence.

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 440–41 (1995). Since

evidence need only “undermine[] confidence in the

outcome of the trial,” the materiality standard is met

by less than a preponderance. Id. at 434. Mr. Wearry

argued that the withheld evidence went to the core of

10

the State’s case—the two star witnesses’ testimony—

and was thus “material.” Wearry, 577 U.S. at 392–93.

The Louisiana courts acknowledged that this

evidence was favorable and “probably” should have

been disclosed. But they ultimately concluded that it

was not “material.” Wearry, 577 U.S. at 391.

3. In 2016, this Court summarily reversed the

Louisiana courts, concluding that their “denial of

Wearry’s Brady claim runs up against settled

constitutional principles.” Wearry, 577 U.S. at 392.

Evidence withheld by the State undermined

confidence in Mr. Wearry’s conviction “beyond doubt.”

Id.

In particular, the Court held that “Scott’s

credibility, already impugned by his many

inconsistent stories, would have been further

diminished” by Hutchinson’s medical records and by

Scott’s statements to other prisoners about his true

motives. Wearry, 577 U.S. at 393. “Moreover,” the

Court continued, “any juror who found Scott more

credible in light of Brown’s testimony might have

thought differently” given Brown’s deal with the

prosecution. Id. at 393–94.

This Court also faulted the state postconviction

courts for “evaluat[ing] the materiality of each piece of

evidence in isolation rather than cumulatively” and for

“emphasiz[ing] reasons a juror might disregard new

evidence while ignoring reasons she might not.” Id. at

394.

Justices Alito and Thomas dissented, arguing that

summary reversal was inappropriate. Although the

dissenting justices thought the majority “ably ma[de]

the case for reversal,” they did not believe the

materiality question to be so “open-and-shut.” Wearry,

11

577 U.S. at 397, 402 (Alito, J., dissenting). For

instance, they noted that Wearry had not produced

any evidence that “Brown (unlike Scott) actually

received any deal” for his testimony. Id. at 399 (Alito,

J., dissenting). The two would have either granted

certiorari (and requested briefing and argument) or

waited for federal habeas review. Id. at 402–03 (Alito,

J., dissenting). The majority countered that summary

reversal was preferable to any alternative that forced

“Wearry to endure yet more time on Louisiana’s death

row in service of a conviction that is constitutionally

flawed.” Id. at 396.

4. After this Court vacated his conviction, the

State did not retry Mr. Wearry. Instead, it agreed to a

plea deal that took Mr. Wearry off of death row.

Supp.App.F.6 21. Today, Mr. Wearry is a free man.

D. Mr. Skinner obtains counsel and discovers even

more withheld evidence.

1. Unlike Mr. Wearry, Mr. Skinner was not

convicted of a capital offense and did not receive

counsel for postconviction proceedings. Supp.App.G.4.

2. With Mr. Skinner proceeding pro se, the Louisiana

courts upheld his conviction on state postconviction

review. State ex rel. Skinner v. State, 2009-2043 (La.

8/18/10), 42 So. 3d 394. Mr. Skinner also filed a federal

habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but it was

denied on procedural grounds and without discussion

of the merits. Supp.App.G.4. 2; Skinner v. Cain, 2011

WL 2802859 (M.D. La. July 15, 2011).

2. After this Court decided Wearry, Mr. Skinner

learned for the first time about the evidence withheld

in Mr. Wearry’s case—evidence also withheld in his

own case. See Supp.App.G.4. 3. Armed with that new

12

evidence, Mr. Skinner was able to secure Innocence

Project New Orleans as counsel. Id. Mr. Skinner’s new

lawyers discovered that not only had the State

withheld the evidence discussed in Wearry, but it had

also withheld additional troves of evidence that

further eroded any case against him.

a. Some of this newly uncovered evidence casts

even more doubt on Scott’s and Brown’s credibility.

Mr. Skinner’s lawyers unearthed two statements

from Scott showing that police had fed him key

information about the crime. In one statement, Scott

told detectives that Mr. Walber had been killed on

Blahut Road. Pet.App. 19a. A detective then asked

him if he meant, instead, to say Crisp Road, where Mr.

Walber’s body had been found. Scott then changed his

statement. Id. 25a. In another interview that was

withheld from Mr. Skinner’s defense, police—having

learned of Randy Hutchinson’s knee surgery—asked

Scott if Hutchinson had an injury at the time of the

crime. Scott dutifully added Hutchinson’s injury to his

story. Supp.App.G.6. 22.

Mr. Skinner’s team also discovered additional

statements from Brown. It turned out that not only

had Brown added Mr. Skinner to later statements,

he’d also subtracted a character from his story.

Compare Pet.App. 43a–45a, with Supp.App.B.2. 553–

54. Mr. Skinner’s team learned that Brown had

initially identified that other man as Mr. Wearry’s

companion in a police photo array. Pet.App. 36a. That

man had committed a very similar carjacking and

robbery several weeks after the Walber murder. Id.

79a–81a. He’d even tried to intimidate the victim in

that robbery by saying he had killed “the Walber boy.”

Id. 80a. The State then relied on this other suspect’s

13

confession to the Walber murder to convict him of the

robbery. Id. 83a. None of this material was disclosed

to Mr. Skinner’s trial counsel.

The additional statements from Brown also

revealed that he continued to change his story for over

a year after he first came forward. In one statement,

Mr. Skinner had a gun. See, e.g., Supp.App.D.1. 518.

In another, the group confronted Mr. Walber in the

woods instead of on Crisp Road. See, e.g., id. 531. By

the time of trial, neither the gun nor the woods made

an appearance in Brown’s story.

Mr. Skinner’s postconviction counsel also found

out what had become of police officers’ promise to

Brown to “talk to the DA” about his case. At the time

he came forward, Brown was serving a fifteen-year

sentence on one set of charges and had several other

pending charges. Records withheld from the defense

reveal that on the first day of Mr. Skinner’s first trial,

Brown moved for a reconsideration of his fifteen-year

sentence. Supp.App.F.3. 117. Shortly after Mr.

Skinner was convicted—and years after Brown’s

lawyers had moved for resentencing—Brown’s fifteenyear sentence was replaced with probation. Pet.App.

57a. By way of explanation, the judge said only that

“there are some mitigating circumstances that I’m

willing to address.” Id. 56a.

The pending charges, too, disappeared. Around

the time Brown’s statement implicated Mr. Skinner,

prosecutors signed off on a continuance motion

regarding those charges on the basis that Brown “may

well be a witness” in a Livingston Parish matter.

Supp.App.F.3. 406. Those charges were then

continued indefinitely, meaning that Brown was never

tried or sentenced for them.

14

Finally, Mr. Skinner’s new lawyers learned that

the State also did not turn over several statements

that Brown had made to other prisoners. To one,

Brown had advertised that anyone could “get out of

jail” if they provided information on the murder.

Pet.App. 27a. To another, Brown had admitted that he

had been involved in the crime but wanted to “pin this

crime” on Mr. Wearry. Id. 50a.

b. Withheld documents also undercut the

credibility of Ryan Stinson and Raz Rogers, the two

witnesses who claimed Mr. Skinner confessed to them.

During Mr. Skinner’s second trial, Stinson

initially refused to testify, telling the judge that he

didn’t remember anything about the case. Pet.App.

60a–64a. After prosecutors agreed to meet with

Stinson—and promised him a transfer to a different

prison—Stinson’s memory returned, and he took the

stand. Id. 64a, 71a–73a. Mr. Skinner was never told

about either Stinson’s negotiation or his eventual deal.

As to Rogers, the State failed to disclose evidence

that Rogers himself had confessed to the Walber

murder. Pet.App. 76a. The State also failed to turn

over police records showing that Rogers, too, changed

his story. Across months of questioning, including

during two lie detector tests, Rogers told a story of the

crime that did not involve Mr. Skinner at all.

Supp.App.D.2.

673–75;

Supp.App.D.3.

913;

Supp.App.E.1 199. The State also did not disclose

records that would have made clear that Rogers was

lying about even small details in his testimony. For

instance, he told the jury that he had not smoked

marijuana in many years. Pet.App. 74a–75a. But it

turned out he had been arrested for marijuana

possession the night before that testimony—giving

15

him all the more reason to curry favor with the

prosecution. Supp.App.F.5. 10.

c. Finally, the State withheld records that

strongly inculpated other suspects—none of whom

were ever seriously investigated. There was the

suspect whom Brown identified in a photo array, as

well as Raz Rogers, both of whom allegedly confessed.

Pet.App. 36a, 76a. In addition, there were numerous

other credible leads that went unexplored. For

instance, a school guidance counselor, Boy Scout troop

leader, and probation officer all contacted police to

report that one suspect had confessed. Id. 91a–95a.

Another man confessed to his sister. Id. 96a–99a. A

third man—who had been seen covered in blood on the

night of the murder and who had previously robbed

another man under similar circumstances—called

police himself to ask if he was a “prime suspect.”

Pet.App. 84a–85a, 87a. None of this information was

turned over to Mr. Skinner’s defense team.

E. Louisiana courts hold they are not bound by

Wearry and reject Mr. Skinner’s Brady claims.

1. Armed with not only the withheld evidence

before this Court in Wearry, but also masses of

additional withheld evidence, Mr. Skinner filed a

second petition for postconviction relief. The Louisiana

courts found that no procedural obstacles barred Mr.

Skinner’s Brady claims and that he was entitled to

review of those claims on the merits. See

Supp.App.A.1.

Mr. Skinner returned to the state postconviction

trial court to litigate his claim on the merits. During

oral argument on Mr. Skinner’s motion, the state

postconviction trial court twice repeated, without

16

elaboration, that it “does not feel it’s bound by the

Wearry decision.” Id. 6–7.

Just nine days after Mr. Skinner submitted his

brief to the state postconviction court, the court issued

a written decision denying him relief. Pet.App. 1a–4a.

It rejected his Brady claims in less than a paragraph.

See id. 2a–3a. As to this Court’s decision in Wearry, it

offered only the following: “[T]he Weary [sic] case is

distinguishable enough from the instant case that its

decision does not compel this Court to follow suit.” Id.

3a. The court also rejected Mr. Skinner’s Brady claims

on their own terms, holding that Mr. Skinner was

required to offer “further evidence” regarding the

“credibility” of the withheld statements. Id.

2. The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal

denied review. One of the three judges noted his

dissent in light of Wearry. Pet.App. 5a.

3. Four of the seven justices on the Supreme Court

of Louisiana voted to deny review. Pet.App. 7a. A fifth

recused himself, as he had been on the court of appeals

panel that denied review (he had dissented from the

denial of review at that stage). Id. 5a, 7a. The sixth

and seventh would have granted review, with one

explaining that “[t]here is no legitimate basis to treat

the two co-defendants differently.” Id. 8a.

4. Having exhausted his state remedies, Mr.

Skinner returned to federal district court to again seek

federal habeas relief. Because he had previously filed

a pro se Section 2254 petition, he filed a motion for

authorization to file a second or successive habeas

petition in the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). The Fifth

Circuit (Southwick, Willett, Oldham, JJ.) granted his

17

motion, holding that Mr. Skinner had made a “prima

facie showing” that “but for constitutional error, no

reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant

guilty.” Pet.App. 9a–11a. Its grant was “tentative”:

The Fifth Circuit found only that Mr. Skinner had

made “a sufficient showing of possible merit to

warrant a fuller exploration by the district court.” Id.

It added that “the district court must conduct its own

‘thorough review’ of Skinner’s motion and must

dismiss the motion, without reaching the merits, if it

determines that Skinner has not satisfied the

§ 2244(b)(2)(B) requirements.” Id.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Nine years ago, this Court decided Wearry v.

Cain, 577 U.S. 385 (2016) (per curiam), and granted

relief to Mr. Skinner’s codefendant, Michael Wearry.

Mr. Wearry’s conviction rested on the testimony of two

star witnesses—witnesses whose testimony was

fatally undermined, in this Court’s determination, by

evidence withheld in violation of Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963).

Mr. Skinner’s conviction rests on the same tainted

testimony. Because there are no plausible grounds on

which to distinguish Wearry from the instant case—

and because Louisiana courts’ insistence that they are

“not bound by the Wearry decision,” Supp.App.A.1 6–

7, subverts the hierarchy of our judicial system—this

Court should grant review and vacate Mr. Skinner’s

conviction.

18

I.

Wearry dictates the outcome in this case.

A. The withheld evidence at issue in this case

is at least as material as the withheld

evidence at issue in Wearry.

As in Wearry, this case is about whether evidence

withheld by the State was material under Brady. In

Wearry, this Court considered the elements of Mr.

Wearry’s trial, the evidence withheld, and the legal

mistakes made by the Louisiana courts. Every step of

the Court’s analysis in Wearry applies to Mr.

Skinner’s case—if anything, with more force.

1. The key elements of the case against Mr.

Wearry and the case against Mr. Skinner were

identical. The State “presented no physical evidence”

at either trial. Wearry, 577 U.S. at 387. The only

“eyewitnesses” to testify against Mr. Skinner and Mr.

Wearry were Sam Scott and Eric Brown. Id.; see

Supp.App.B.2. 1021–25. And the State touted the

trustworthiness of those star witnesses at both trials,

claiming that Scott was a “hero” and that Brown’s

motives for coming forward were pure. Wearry, 577

U.S. at 387; Supp.App.B.2. 1021–25.

2. In Mr. Skinner’s case, the State withheld the

same three key sets of evidence as in Wearry. But

here, Mr. Skinner has uncovered even more evidence

withheld by the prosecution than was presented to the

courts in Mr. Wearry’s case.

a. First, as in Wearry, the prosecution in Mr.

Skinner’s case withheld evidence that “two of Scott’s

fellow inmates had made statements that cast doubt

on Scott’s credibility.” Wearry, 577 U.S. at 389–90.

Scott told one inmate he was testifying against Mr.

Skinner and Mr. Wearry to settle a personal score by

19

getting Mr. Wearry executed. Wearry, 577 U.S. at 389.

And Scott told the other that lying to the police about

the Walber murder would “help him get out of jail.” Id.

at 390.

After Wearry was handed down, Mr. Skinner

unearthed still more withheld evidence casting doubt

on Scott’s credibility. Recall that Scott’s early

statements to the police didn’t even get the location of

the crime right. Wearry, 577 U.S. at 386–87; see

Pet.App. 19a. But on the stand, he testified to a

version of events that better fit with what the police

knew about the crime. See Supp.App.B.2. 374–97. The

evidence Mr. Skinner uncovered sheds light on how

Scott filled in these gaps. To take just one example:

Police officers specifically asked Scott if he had been

on Crisp Road, where the victim’s body was found,

rather than Blahut Road, as Scott had initially

maintained. Pet.App. 19a, 25a. Immediately

thereafter, Scott revised his statement to include the

correct location. Id. 25a.

b. Second, as in Wearry, the prosecution in Mr.

Skinner’s case withheld medical records that indicated

Randy Hutchinson was “physically incapable of

performing the role Scott ascribed to him.” Wearry,

577 U.S. at 393. Scott’s account at both the Skinner

and Wearry trials had Hutchinson dragging the 190pound Walber in and out of the two-door hatchback

before squeezing into the back seat of the car with a

half-dozen other people. Supp.App.B.2. 377–79.

The problem? Undisclosed medical records in the

State’s possession showed that Hutchinson had major

reconstructive knee surgery nine days prior to the

murder. Supp.App.E.1. 190. Other medical records

held by the State showed that Hutchinson’s knee was

20

healing nicely in the days after the murder.

Supp.App.E.1. 2455, 2462. But there is no plausible

way Hutchinson could have sat down in the car—let

alone dragged Walber around in the manner Scott

alleged—without reaggravating his injury. See

Wearry, 577 U.S. at 390.

Again, the materiality analysis here is even more

clear cut than in Wearry. The dissent in Wearry was

concerned that Hutchinson’s medical records might

not have been material in Mr. Wearry’s case because

the jury was aware of the “most salient fact revealed

by the medical records”: In Mr. Wearry’s trial,

testimony had at least mentioned Hutchinson’s knee

injury. Wearry, 577 U.S. at 399–400 (Alito, J.,

dissenting). But the same was not true in Mr.

Skinner’s trial. Although the State called the same

witnesses to testify, they did not mention the injury

(nor could Mr. Skinner have known to ask about it on

cross-examination). See generally Supp.App.B.2.

c. Third, as in Wearry, the prosecution in Mr.

Skinner’s case withheld evidence that, “contrary to the

prosecution’s assertions at trial, Brown had twice

sought a deal to reduce his existing sentence in

exchange for testifying.” Wearry, 577 U.S. at 390. In

its closing arguments in both Mr. Wearry’s and Mr.

Skinner’s trials, the State insisted that Brown was

getting “nothing” in return for his testimony.

Supp.App.B.2. 1024; see also Wearry, 577 U.S. at 387

(Brown “has no deal on the table”). Instead, the State

insisted that Brown was a good Samaritan, see

Supp.App.B.2. 1023–24, and “was testifying because

the victim’s ‘family deserves to know.’” Wearry, 577

U.S. at 387. But withheld evidence revealed that police

promised to “talk to the D.A.” if Brown testified and

21

that Brown later sent a letter requesting a reduced

sentence. Wearry, 577 U.S. at 390; Supp.App.D.1. 797;

see also Pet.App. 54a–56a.

The dissent in Wearry worried that the withheld

evidence might not have had “real potential to affect

the trial’s outcome” as “there is no evidence that

Brown (unlike Scott) actually received a deal.”

Wearry, 577 U.S. at 399 (Alito, J., dissenting). But Mr.

Skinner has since unearthed exactly that evidence:

Brown benefited from a special arrangement in which

five felony charges were effectively dropped before

trial and a fifteen-year sentence was replaced with

probation shortly after Mr. Skinner was convicted. See

supra at 13.

What’s more, since Wearry, Mr. Skinner has

uncovered additional withheld evidence impeaching

Brown. It turns out that Brown had all but told a

fellow inmate that he planned to lie on the stand.

Pet.App. 50a. It also turns out that Brown kept

changing basic details about the who, what, and where

of the crime with each statement to police. Supra at 4.

Furthermore, Mr. Skinner has learned that the State

never disclosed that Brown identified a different

suspect in a photo array the first time he spoke with

police. Pet.App. 36a. The State seemingly never

pursued that lead, and the detail was absent from

Brown’s testimony at trial. Id.; Supp.App.B.2. 553–54.

This despite the fact that the suspect had confessed to

the Walber murder while committing a remarkably

similar crime several weeks later. Id. 80a. Indeed, the

same prosecutor who tried Mr. Skinner relied on that

other suspect’s confession to the Walber murder when

she tried the other suspect’s case. Id. 82a–83a.

22

3. Finally, the Louisiana state postconviction

courts made similar legal mistakes as in Wearry,

botching the Brady standard in both cases. In Mr.

Wearry’s case, the state postconviction court

“improperly evaluated the materiality of each piece of

evidence in isolation rather than cumulatively” and

“failed even to mention” some of that evidence.

Wearry, 577 U.S. at 394 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514

U.S. 419, 441 (1995)). In this case, it is not clear that

the state postconviction court evaluated the

materiality of each piece of evidence at all, let alone

cumulatively. See Pet.App. 2a–4a. And it “failed even

to mention” not just some, but all, of the Brady

evidence. Wearry, 577 U.S. at 394; see Pet.App. 2a–4a.

Mr. Wearry’s state postconviction court also

“emphasized reasons a juror might disregard new

evidence while ignoring reasons she might not.”

Wearry, 577 U.S. at 394. Here, the state

postconviction court went far beyond “emphasiz[ing]

reasons a juror might disregard new evidence.” Id. It

demanded that Mr. Skinner offer “further evidence” to

convince it of the “credibility” of the withheld

statements. Pet.App. 3a.

That evidentiary burden appears nowhere in

Wearry, nor for that matter in over fifty years of

precedent applying Brady. It confuses the Brady

materiality standard—which asks only whether the

withheld evidence would “undermine confidence” in a

jury’s verdict, Wearry, 577 U.S. at 392—with a

standard requiring petitioners to prove their actual

innocence. And this Court has squarely rejected even

the argument that Brady claimants must “satisfy the

severe burden of demonstrating that newly discovered

23

evidence probably would have resulted in acquittal.”

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976).

Moreover, the state postconviction court was

confused as to the relevance of the Brady material in

question. Mr. Skinner’s claim for relief turns on the

State’s witnesses’ lack of credibility. Thus, the

relevance of Scott’s prior withheld statements isn’t

that they’re credible, in and of themselves; it’s that

they make Scott’s testimony less so. For example, the

fact that Scott initially stated that Mr. Walber had

been killed on Blahut Road is relevant not because

that’s where the murder occurred, but because it

shows how Scott changed his tune to fit the facts.

“Further evidence” of the “credibility” of the Blahut

Road statement, as the state trial court demanded,

would be beside the point.

4. After considering the course of the trial, the

withheld evidence, and the legal errors by the

Louisiana courts, this Court vacated Mr. Wearry’s

conviction. It should do the same for Mr. Skinner. As

in Wearry, the State’s evidence at trial in Mr.

Skinner’s case “resembles a house of cards.” 577 U.S.

at 392. As in Wearry, “[b]eyond doubt, the newly

revealed evidence suffices to undermine confidence” in

the conviction. Id. And as in Wearry, “[e]ven if the

jury—armed with all of this new evidence—could have

voted to convict,” this Court can have “no confidence

that it would have done so.” Id. at 394 (quoting Smith

v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012)).

24

B. This case is “distinguishable” from Wearry

only in that Mr. Skinner raises stronger

Brady claims against a weaker conviction.

1. Despite the benefit of binding Supreme Court

precedent addressing the same claims on the same

facts, the state postconviction trial court has

repeatedly refused to apply Wearry. By way of

justification, it said only: “[T]he Weary [sic] case is

distinguishable enough from the instant case that its

decision does not compel this Court to follow suit.”

Pet.App. 3a.

“[D]istinguishable” how? The court doesn’t tell us.

It can’t be that the case against Mr. Skinner is more

damning—if anything, the prosecution had a harder

time convicting Mr. Skinner. His first jury hung,

Supp.App.G.5., and his second jury convicted him only

because of Louisiana’s pre-Ramos rule allowing

nonunanimous convictions for second-degree murder.

Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 87 (2020);

Supp.App.B.2. 1114. It can’t be the specific evidence

withheld—Mr. Skinner seeks relief based on all the

same improperly withheld evidence this Court held

material in Wearry. See supra Part I.A. And it can’t be

the materiality of the withheld evidence—several of

the Brady violations in Mr. Skinner’s case were more

likely to affect the jury’s verdict. Id.

2. In its briefing below, the State hints at its

theory of how this case might be “distinguish[ed]” from

Wearry (a theory, to be clear, that the state courts did

not adopt). At Mr. Skinner’s trial, the State presented

the testimony of Raz Rogers and Ryan Stinson, two

witnesses who claim that Mr. Skinner confessed to

them. See id.; Supp.App.B.2. 609–10, 699–700.

Because Stinson and Rogers did not testify in Mr.

25

Wearry’s case, the State suggests that their testimony

renders the case against Mr. Skinner stronger. See

Brief in Opposition to Petitioner’s Writ Application at

3, State v. Skinner, 2024-00142 (La. 2/25/25), 401

So.3d 665.

That argument is brazen, to say the least. To

argue that its Brady violations as to Scott and Brown

are not material, the State relies on the testimony of

Rogers and Stinson—as to whom the State also

committed Brady violations by withholding important

impeaching evidence.

Start with Raz Rogers. The State relies on Rogers’

testimony that Mr. Skinner confessed to him. But

some key details never made it to defense counsel. For

instance, the State never turned over evidence

showing that Rogers spent months giving statements

to the police about Mr. Walber’s death—including

across two separate lie detector tests—without ever

indicating that Mr. Skinner was involved. See

Supp.App.D.2.

673–75;

Supp.App.D.3.

913;

Supp.App.E.1 199. The State also withheld evidence

revealing that prosecutors lied to the jury about

Rogers’ own involvement in the crime. In its closing

argument at Mr. Skinner’s second trial, the State

insisted that there was not “even one shred of

evidence” that Rogers was involved. Supp.App.B.2.

1025. But that’s wrong. The State had in its

possession, at that time, a statement from another

witness claiming that Rogers himself had confessed to

the murder. Pet.App. 76a.

Next consider Ryan Stinson. Remember, Stinson

claimed that Mr. Skinner gave him (a total stranger)

a confession that conflicted with Scott and Brown’s

accounts. See Pet.App. 65a–70a. What the State

26

neglected to share with defense counsel is that, despite

the prosecutor’s insinuation to the contrary, id. 70a,

Stinson was getting something in return for his

testimony. At first, Stinson refused to testify at Mr.

Skinner’s trial. Id. 60a–64a. He agreed to take the

stand only after the State promised him, in an

undisclosed meeting, a transfer to a different prison.

Id. 71a–73a.

3. To be sure, there are ways in which Mr.

Skinner’s case is “distinguishable” from Wearry—but

those distinctions only make the postconviction court’s

decision less defensible.

As explained supra, Part I.A., in each of the three

categories of withheld evidence regarding Scott and

Brown, Mr. Skinner’s arguments for materiality are

even stronger than those advanced in Wearry. As to

two of the categories, Mr. Skinner unearthed more

withheld evidence than was before this Court in

Wearry; as to the third, the course of Mr. Skinner’s

trial meant that the withheld evidence would have

made a bigger difference.

Mr. Skinner also brings to this Court evidence

withheld from the defense that does more than

impeach Scott and Brown. Consider just the newly

uncovered records detailing alternative suspects, none

of which were before this Court in Wearry. One

potential suspect—the man whom Brown initially

picked out of a photo array—confessed to the Walber

murder during the commission of a very similar

carjacking and robbery several weeks later. Pet.App.

36a–41a; 79a–83a. Another potential suspect was

found covered in blood on the night of the murder. Id.

87a–89a. He later called the police to ask if he was a

suspect. Id. 85a. Police heard from a guidance

27

counselor, a Boy Scout troop leader, and a probation

officer that a third suspect had committed this

murder. Id. 91a–95a. And a fourth suspect’s sister

reported that he had confessed. Id. 96a–100a.

4. Lastly, Mr. Skinner should have a lower burden

under Brady’s materiality standard than the one Mr.

Wearry overcame.

When a verdict is of “questionable validity,” even

“evidence of relatively minor importance might be

sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.” Agurs, 427

U.S. at 113. The verdict in Mr. Skinner’s case is far

more “questionable” than the verdict in Mr. Wearry’s.

Id. While Mr. Wearry was convicted by a unanimous

jury during his first trial, Mr. Skinner has never been

convicted by a unanimous jury—his first jury hung,

and the second convicted him non-unanimously. As

Justice Kavanaugh has explained, the risk of an

erroneous verdict is higher where a jury is allowed to

convict without unanimity. See Ramos, 590 U.S. at

126–27 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). And

nonunanimous juries make a difference “especially in

cases involving black defendants,” like this one. Id. at

127.

If Mr. Wearry’s Brady claim succeeded “beyond

doubt,” the same is necessarily true here. Wearry, 577

U.S. at 392. Mr. Skinner marshals more withheld

Brady evidence against a more “questionable” verdict.

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 113.

28

II. This Court’s intervention is warranted.

A. Louisiana

precedent.

courts

flouted

this

Court’s

1. “[V]ertical stare decisis is absolute, as it must

be in a hierarchical system with ‘one supreme Court.’”

Ramos, 590 U.S. at 124 n.5 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring

in part) (quoting U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1). When lower

courts disregard Supreme Court authority, they

undermine the legitimacy of the whole judicial

enterprise. Thus, “unless we wish anarchy to prevail

in the federal judicial system,” lower courts must

follow Supreme Court precedent, “no matter how

misguided the judges of those courts may think it to

be.” Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (per

curiam). As Justice Story explained 200 years ago, if

state courts were permitted to disregard this Court’s

rulings on federal law, the “public mischiefs that

would attend such a state of things would be truly

deplorable.” Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1

Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816).

The Louisiana postconviction court’s handling of

this case challenges those bedrock principles. In 2016,

this Court granted Mr. Wearry a new trial because

Louisiana courts had “egregiously misapplied settled

law” in his postconviction proceedings. Wearry, 577

U.S. at 395. Mr. Skinner’s case presented the same

courts with a claim involving the same characters, the

same withheld evidence, the same crime, and a

virtually identical trial. And as discussed supra, Part

I.A, the impact of the suppressed evidence on Mr.

Skinner’s trial was at least as substantial as its impact

on Mr. Wearry’s.

29

But instead of heeding Wearry, the state

postconviction court in Mr. Skinner’s case doubled

down. At the postconviction hearing, the judge told

Mr. Skinner’s counsel—without explanation—that

“the Court does not feel it’s bound by the Wearry

decision.” Supp.App.A.1. 6. The state court’s

subsequent opinion shrugged off this Court’s

precedent in one sentence: “[T]he Weary [sic] case is

distinguishable enough from the instant case that its

decision does not compel this Court to follow suit.”

Pet.App. 3a. And neither the state court of appeal nor

the Louisiana Supreme Court intervened, despite

dissents protesting that the trial court had defied this

Court’s precedent. Id. 5a–8a.

2. On the rare occasion where a lower court flouts

this Court’s precise directions, this Court has not

hesitated to intervene. Take Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S.

1 (2017) (Moore I). In Moore I, this Court held that the

lower court had improperly analyzed a capital

defendant’s claim to intellectual disability. But on

remand, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals merely

“repeat[ed] the analysis” that this Court “previously

found wanting.” Moore v. Texas, 586 U.S. 133, 139

(2019) (per curiam) (Moore II). This Court summarily

reversed in Moore II, stepping in because Texas courts

ignored this Court’s directives. Id. And though he

dissented on the merits in Moore I, the Chief Justice

took the Texas court to task in a concurrence in Moore

II for “repeat[ing] the same errors that this Court

previously condemned.” Moore II, 586 U.S. at 143

(Roberts, C.J., concurring).

The Moore saga is not an outlier. It is but the most

recent instance of this Court summarily reversing

lower courts that flout this Court’s holdings. See, e.g.,

30

Bosse v. Oklahoma, 580 U.S. 1, 3 (2016) (per curiam)

(summarily reversing where lower court refused to

follow Supreme Court precedent and claimed it had

been “implicitly overruled”); James v. City of Boise,

577 U.S. 306, 307 (2016) (per curiam) (summarily

reversing because “once the Court has spoken, it is the

duty of other courts to respect that understanding of

the governing rule of law”); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S.

7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (summarily reversing where

Court had “previously considered—and rejected—

almost th[e] exact formulation” of a rule); Lopez v.

Smith, 574 U.S. 1, 6 (2014) (per curiam) (summarily

reversing where Court had “before cautioned the lower

courts” against a specific legal mistake); Parker v.

Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 48 (2012) (per curiam)

(summarily reversing where Court had rebuked

“identical error” two terms earlier); Marmet Health

Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 531 (2012) (per

curiam) (summarily reversing because “[w]hen this

Court has fulfilled its duty to interpret federal law, a

state court may not contradict or fail to implement the

rule so established”); Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 9

(2011) (per curiam) (summarily reversing where Court

had vacated and remanded the judgment before, but

the panel “persisted in its course”); Sears v. Upton, 561

U.S. 945, 955 (2010) (per curiam) (citation omitted)

(summarily reversing where lower court repeated an

error this Court “categorically rejected”).

The Court should similarly intervene here to

vindicate its authority. The state postconviction

court’s disregard of Wearry is even more flagrant than

the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ disregard of

Moore I. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals at least

paid lip service to this Court’s holding in Moore I,

dedicating ten pages (albeit misguided ones) to

31

distinguishing Moore I. See Moore II, 586 U.S. at 138.

But here, the Louisiana postconviction court didn’t

even attempt to explain how its holding might be

squared with Wearry. See Pet.App. 1a–4a. Even more

than in Moore II, then, this Court’s intervention is

necessary here.

B. This Court should correct the injustice now.

This Court’s reasons for summarily reversing in

Wearry apply with equal force in Mr. Skinner’s case.

Summary reversal is particularly appropriate here

because this Court already waded through a nearly

identical record in Wearry. The Court need only port

that case’s analysis over to this one. Alternatively, this

Court could grant certiorari, call for full briefing, and

set this case for argument, as the dissenters in Wearry

proposed in that case. Wearry, 577 U.S. at 403 (Alito,

J., dissenting).

But regardless of how it does so, this Court should

intervene now, rather than await federal habeas

proceedings.

1. Like Mr. Wearry, Mr. Skinner filed a federal

habeas petition shortly after the denial of state

postconviction relief from the Louisiana Supreme

Court. See Supp.App.F.7. The pendency of litigation

on that federal petition should not affect this Court’s

decision here any more than it did in Wearry. Indeed,

the case for immediate intervention is stronger in Mr.

Skinner’s case than it was in Mr. Wearry’s for at least

three reasons.

First, three judges on the Fifth Circuit believe

that prosecutors’ misconduct in this case may well

have had an impact on the outcome—indeed, a more

significant impact on the outcome than the Brady

32

materiality standard requires. Pet.App. 9a–11a. A

panel of the Fifth Circuit authorized Mr. Skinner to

file a “second or successive” federal habeas petition,

meaning that it concluded he’d made a prima facie

case that (i) he could not have discovered the facts

underlying his Brady claim earlier “through the

exercise of due diligence”; and (ii) “the facts underlying

the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence

as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear

and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional

error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him]

guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(2)(B).

That second showing is far more substantial than

Brady materiality, which requires only a “reasonable

likelihood” that the withheld evidence could have

“affected the judgment of the jury”—not near-certain

proof that a jury would have acquitted. See Wearry,

577 U.S. at 392 (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405

U.S. 150, 154 (1972)). The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion is,

of course, on top of this Court’s opinion in Wearry. Mr.

Skinner’s entitlement to relief is thus far clearer than

was Mr. Wearry’s at this same juncture.

Second, although Mr. Skinner’s claims are as

strong or stronger than Mr. Wearry’s, he has a far

longer road to travel than Mr. Wearry would have on

federal habeas. Like Mr. Wearry, Mr. Skinner will

have to show not only a Brady violation but that the

state-court decisions were “contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law” or “an unreasonable determination of the

facts.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). But Mr. Wearry’s

federal habeas petition was his first. Because Mr.

Skinner is filing his second petition, he would also

33

have to satisfy the requirements for a second or

successive petition. Although the Fifth Circuit found

Mr. Skinner had made a “prima facie showing” on

those elements, its grant was “tentative:” The district

court still “must dismiss the motion, without reaching

the merits, if it determines that Skinner has not

satisfied the § 2244(b)(2)(B) requirements.” Pet.App.

10a–11a (citation omitted).

Third, and most importantly, this Court found

untenable the prospect that Mr. Wearry would

“endure yet more time” in service of a “constitutionally

flawed” conviction. Wearry, 577 U.S. at 396. Nine

years after Wearry, Mr. Skinner is still serving time

for a conviction that this Court has already all-butheld is “constitutionally flawed.” Id. Were he to await

federal habeas review, he’d likely serve another half

decade or more before obtaining meaningful relief.2

2. Intervention at this juncture also conveys a

message only this Court can. This Court does not

await federal habeas where a lower court exhibited

flagrant disregard for this Court’s authority.3 Nor does

this Court await federal habeas where a conviction is

2

See, e.g., United States v. Edmonds, 2022 WL 2340562 (5th

Cir. June 29, 2022) (dismissing a non-capital habeas petition six

years after authorizing the successive petition); Will v. Lumpkin,

2024 WL 1468700, at *1, *15 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2024) (criticizing

delay in successive federal habeas litigation authorized by the

Fifth Circuit in 2020, especially given that “[o]ver two decades

have passed since [petitioner’s] conviction”).

3

See generally Z. Payvand Ahdout, Direct Collateral

Review, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 159 (2021); see also Cruz v. Arizona,

598 U.S. 17 (2023); Moore v. Texas, 586 U.S. 133 (2019) (per

curiam); Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945 (2010) (per curiam).

34

so obviously tainted that fundamental fairness

demands immediate intervention.4

Both are true here. As explained supra, Part II.A,

the Louisiana courts have flouted this Court’s express

directions in Wearry with nary an explanation. And

the thousands of pages of withheld documents at issue

in this case—pages that inculpate alternative

suspects, capture police officers tampering with

witnesses, and fatally undermine the testimony of the

State’s star informants—confirm that Mr. Skinner did

not receive a fair trial.

3. Finally, this Court has often decried the “actual

inequity that results when the Court chooses which of

many similarly situated defendants should be the

chance beneficiary” of its intervention. United States

v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 556 n.16 (1982) (emphasis

omitted); see also Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228–29

(2001) (per curiam).

That “actual inequity” is at its apex here. Had Mr.

Skinner come to this Court in tandem with Mr.

Wearry, this Court almost certainly would have

resolved them in the same way. But because Mr.

Skinner did not receive counsel until well after Mr.

Wearry, he comes to this Court nearly a decade later.

Two codefendants, convicted of the same crime,

raising the same constitutional claims, should receive

4

See generally Ahdout, Direct Collateral Review, supra n.3;

see also Glossip v. Oklahoma, 145 S. Ct. 612 (2025); Andrus v.

Texas, 590 U.S. 806 (2020) (per curiam); Flowers v. Mississippi,

588 U.S. 284 (2019); Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488 (2016);

Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016); Rippo v. Baker, 580

U.S. 285 (2017) (per curiam); Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945 (2010)

(per curiam).

35

this Court’s intervention at the same procedural

juncture.

For the reasons it granted review in Wearry, and

for the additional reason that Wearry is already in the

U.S. Reports, this Court should intervene in Mr.

Skinner’s case.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ

of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Easha Anand

Jeffrey L. Fisher

Pamela S. Karlan

STANFORD LAW SCHOOL

SUPREME COURT

LITIGATION CLINIC

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305

John R. Mills

PHILLIPS BLACK, INC.

1721 Broadway, Suite 201

Oakland, CA 94612

June 25, 2025

Jee Park

Counsel of Record

Meredith Angelson

INNOCENCE PROJECT

NEW ORLEANS

4051 Ulloa Street

New Orleans, LA 70119

(504) 943-1902

jeep@ip-no.org