Amicus Curiae Brief — Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al., Applicants v. Gwynne A. Wilcox, et al.
Supreme Court briefApr 15, 2025
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
________________
No. 24A966
________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et al.,
Applicants,
v.
GWYNNE A. WILCOX,
Respondent
________________
SCOTT BESSENT, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, et al.,
Applicants,
v.
CATHY A. HARRIS,
Respondent.
________________
On Application for Stay Pending Appeal
________________
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF
AMERICA’S FUTURE, GUN OWNERS OF AMERICA, INC., GUN OWNERS
FOUNDATION, GUN OWNERS OF CALIFORNIA, CITIZENS UNITED,
PUBLIC ADVOCATE OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLIC ADVOCATE
FOUNDATION, U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS LEGAL DEFENSE FUND,
AND CONSERVATIVE LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND
IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR STAY OF INJUNCTION
________________
Jeffrey C. Tuomala
Winchester, VA 22602
John C. Eastman
Alexander Haberbush
Long Beach, CA 90802
Patrick M. McSweeney
Powhatan, VA 23139
Michael Boos
Washington, DC 20003
William J. Olson*
Jeremiah L. Morgan
Robert J. Olson
William J. Olson, P.C.
370 Maple Avenue West, Suite 4
Vienna, VA 22180-5615
(703) 356-5070
wjo@mindspring.com
*Counsel of Record
April 15, 2025
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ARGUMENT
I.
THE APPLICATION FOR STAY SHOULD BE TREATED AS A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT AND SHOULD BE GRANTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II.
THE DISTRICT COURT PUT THE ISSUE PRESENTED INTO A CONTRIVED,
POLITICAL CONTEXT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
III.
THE NATURE OF THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO REMOVE IS BEST
UNDERSTOOD AND SUPPORTED BY MYERS V. UNITED STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
IV.
THE PRESIDENT’S POWER OF REMOVAL MAY NOT BE EXPRESSLY STATED
IN THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IT IS NEVERTHELESS SOLIDLY GROUNDED . . . . . . 11
A.
The Constitutional Role of a President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
B.
The Necessity of Implicit Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
V.
THE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL POWERS HAS INCENTIVIZED CONGRESS TO
LIMIT THE PRESIDENT’S REMOVAL POWER, BUT THAT DOES NOT MAKE IT
CONSTITUTIONAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
VI.
REMOVAL OF RESPONDENT WILCOX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.
Humphrey’s Executor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B.
Morrison v. Olson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
C.
Recent Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CONSTITUTION
Article I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 18
Article II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 11, 16, 17
STATUTES
29 U.S.C. § 153 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2
CASES
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 383 (1857) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
561 U.S. 477 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10, 20-22, 25
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,
565 U.S. 171 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) . . . . . . . 2, 3, 8-10, 21-24
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 18
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 21
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10, 22-24
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9, 17, 19, 22, 24-25
NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. 197
(2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 17, 25
Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 21
MISCELLANEOUS
K. Cheney, “Federal judges in Jan. 6 cases slam Trump’s pardons,”
Politico (Jan. 22, 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Declaration of Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Federalist No. 41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Federalist No. 45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Federalist No. 47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
E. Fitz & K. Saunders, “Distrusting the Process: Electoral Trust, Operational
Ideology, and Nonvoting Political Participation in the 2020 American
Electorate,” 88 Public Opinion Quarterly 843 (July 16, 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . 13
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae America’s Future, Gun Owners of America, Inc., Gun Owners
Foundation, Gun Owners of California, Citizens United, Public Advocate of the
United States, Public Advocate Foundation, U.S. Constitutional Rights Legal
Defense Fund, and Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund are nonprofit
organizations, exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501(c)(3) or
Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, which have filed numerous amicus
curiae briefs in federal and state courts. These amici filed an amicus brief in Wilcox
v. Trump in the Court of Appeals. See Brief Amicus Curiae of America’s Future, et
al., Wilcox v. Trump, D.C. Circuit No. 25-5057 (Mar. 29, 2025).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) members are appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.2 See 29 U.S.C. § 153. The
NLRB was created by Congress in 1935 as an “independent agency.” See Wilcox v.
Trump, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40651 at *11 (D.D.C. 2025) (“Wilcox”). On January
27, 2025, President Donald Trump terminated Respondent Gwynne Wilcox as a
member of NLRB without asserting a basis under the requirement of the National
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which provides Board members may be removed
1
It is hereby certified that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole
or in part; and that no person other than these amici curiae, their members, or their
counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
2
The Government’s Application also addresses a challenge by a member of
the Merit Systems Protection Board to her firing by the President, but this amicus
brief focuses on Wilcox’s challenge.
2
only for “neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(a). President Trump asserts that the NLRA requirements impose an
unconstitutional restriction on his Article II powers to remove principal officers who
exercise executive powers.
Wilcox filed suit, alleging that the President did not have power to remove
her without cause. Wilcox at *12. The government argued, inter alia, that
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), was based on an error,
“that the FTC [was understood] at the time not to exercise any ‘executive power’ ...
and that the NLRB today clearly ‘wield[s] substantial executive power.’” As a
result, the President had authority to fire Wilcox. Wilcox at *21.
The district court relied heavily on Humphrey’s Executor for the proposition
that Congress may “create such expert commissions with quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial authority [with] ‘power to fix the period during which they shall
continue, and to forbid their removal for except for cause in the meantime.’” Wilcox
at *18 (quoting Humphrey’s Executor at 629). The district court rejected the
government’s position, ruling that “cases since Humphrey’s Executor ha[ve]
reinforced the constitutionality of removal restrictions on multimember expert
boards” and that the President did not have authority to fire Wilcox. Id. at *25. It
ordered her reinstatement. Id. at *49.
A motions panel of the D.C. Circuit granted the Government’s motion to stay
the district court order on March 28, 2025. See Harris v. Bessent, 2025 U.S. App.
3
LEXIS 7301 (D.C. Cir. 2025). The D.C. Circuit then acted en banc to reverse the
action of the motions panel and direct Wilcox to assume a position on the NLRB,
while declining to take the case en banc for hearing on the merits. See Harris v.
Bessent, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 8151, 8152 (D.C. Cir. 2025).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Government’s Application for Stay raises vital issues of law that fully
justify this Court treating it as a petition for writ of certiorari before judgment and
granting it. Too many lower courts imposing injunctions against the Trump
Administration have tainted their decisions with political observations. Whether
the President of the United States has the authority under Article II to remove
members of multi-member agencies exercising executive power, even when
Congress has purported to limit that authority, should be addressed sooner, not
later. The power to remove is inherent in the President’s appointment powers
under Article II, and to the extent this Court’s decision in Humphrey’s Executor
conflicts with those powers, it should be overturned. The proper analysis of these
issues was expressed by this Court in its 1926 decision in Myers, but the district
court was unnecessarily critical of that decision, describing it as “unreliable” and
“prolix.” So-called “independent agencies” are antithetical to our constitutional
structure of government answerable to the People. Indeed, with the vast expansion
of federal powers and the growth of the administrative state, it becomes even more
necessary that the People have the power to elect a President who can effect real
change in the government, for the preservation of individual liberty.
4
ARGUMENT
I.
THE APPLICATION FOR STAY SHOULD BE TREATED AS A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT AND SHOULD
BE GRANTED.
The Government’s Application, in addition to requesting a stay of the district
court’s injunction, asks this Court to treat the Application as a petition for writ of
certiorari before judgment and to grant it. See Application at 36-38. Treatment of
an application for stay as a petition for certiorari may not be routine, but it
certainly is not unusual. In the last two years, there have been three cases in
which some of these amici filed amicus briefs where this Court granted review
based on an application for stay. On December 1, 2022, in Biden v. Nebraska, No.
22-506, this Court treated an application for stay filed by the United States as a
petition for certiorari before judgment and granted it. On January 5, 2024, in Moyle
v. United States, No. 23-726, this Court treated an application for a stay filed by
Idaho Speaker Moyle as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and
granted it. On February 28, 2024, in Trump v. United States, No. 23-939, this
Court granted the Special Counsel’s request to treat a stay application filed on
behalf of now-President Trump as a petition for a writ of certiorari and granted it.
The issues presented by this case are critical questions involving the
separation of powers. The three questions raised by the Government’s Application
(at 36) all relate to whether the legislative branch can statutorily limit the
executive’s inherent Article II powers.
5
No benefit is likely to come from months or years of percolation of this case.
The district court has already shown shocking animus to the President’s position.
See Section II, infra. Too many lower courts have demonstrated an eagerness to
hamstring the policies of this administration. The injunction granted here would
put back in office a person whose views are inimical to the administration and do
much damage to the President’s agenda. Therefore, no good reason exists to delay a
resolution of these questions now, at the outset of the new administration.
II.
THE DISTRICT COURT PUT THE ISSUE PRESENTED INTO A
CONTRIVED, POLITICAL CONTEXT.
The district court was presented with an important issue of constitutional
law with important legal arguments presented on both sides. Yet the court felt it
necessary to denigrate President Trump’s position by seemingly characterizing the
President’s exercise of his removal power as an arbitrary act of a megalomaniacal
“Man Who Would Be King.”
[T]he Framers made clear that no one in our system of government
was meant to be king — the President included — and not just in
name only. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility
shall be granted by the United States.”). [Wilcox at *3 (emphasis
added).]
Continuing the stream of political accusations bordering on invective, the
district court wrote: “Luckily, the Framers, anticipating such a power grab,
vested in Article III, not Article II, the power to interpret the law,3 including
3
The district court’s view that the President has no “power to interpret the
law” is an extreme position, especially since the Constitution requires only the
President, and not federal judges, to swear an Oath to “preserve, protect and defend
6
resolving conflicts about congressional checks on presidential authority. The
President’s interpretation of the scope of his constitutional power — or, more aptly,
his aspiration — is flat wrong.” Id. at *6-7 (bolding added). The court derided
the President’s legitimate constitutional arguments as “excuse[s]” for “blatantly
illegal” action. Id. at *14 (emphasis added). The court insulted the President’s
arguments, writing that: “They are again misguided. While the Myers Court
made clear that the President has a general removal power for executive officials,
defendants’ myopic focus on this case loses sight of the limitations in its holding, a
point driven home in Humphrey’s Executor....” Id. at *29-30 (emphasis added).
The district court compared the President’s constitutional argument, which
she says would lead to “absolutist” presidential power and a federal government
with “widespread corruption” and “inefficiency,” to that of a former President
with a “controversial legacy.” Id. at *35, n.17 (emphasis added). And worse:
The President seems intent on pushing the bounds of his office
and exercising his power in a manner violative of clear statutory
law to test how much the courts will accept the notion of a
presidency that is supreme ... with the result that the President need
not be subject to criminal or civil legislative constraints.4 The courts
are now again forced to determine how much encroachment on the
legislature our Constitution can bear and face a slippery slope
toward endorsing a presidency that is untouchable by the law. The
the Constitution of the United States.” Article II, § 4. It would be even worse if the
district court meant to endorse the once expressed, but never repeated, assertion
that a Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution constitutes “the supreme
law of the land.” See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
4
Here, the district court appears to be criticizing this Court’s decision in
Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024).
7
President has given no sufficient reason to accept that path here....
Defendants’ hyperbolic characterization that legislative and
judicial checks on executive authority, as invoked by plaintiff, present
“extraordinary intrusion[s] on the executive branch,” is both incorrect
and troubling. Under our constitutional system, such checks, by
design, guard against executive overreach and the risk such
overreach would pose of autocracy. An American President is not a
king—not even an “elected” one.... [Id. at *47-48 (citations omitted)
(bolding added).]
Such disparaging comments from a district court are inappropriate,
demonstrate animus, and only serve to diminish the reputation of the courts in the
eyes of the public.5 These amici urge this court to reject the district court’s
inflammatory and partisan rhetoric which is more suitable for a political diatribe
than a judicial opinion, grant the application for stay, and also issue a writ of
certiorari before judgment.
III.
THE NATURE OF THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO REMOVE IS BEST
UNDERSTOOD AND SUPPORTED BY MYERS V. UNITED STATES.
President Trump has exercised the power of the Presidency to remove at-will
any principal officer of the United States exercising executive power. That act of
the President may violate the terms of a statute, but it is well supported,
particularly by Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). There, this Court ruled
5
Judge Beryl Howell’s comments about January 6 protestors have been
widely reported. See, e.g., K. Cheney, “Federal judges in Jan. 6 cases slam Trump’s
pardons,” Politico (Jan. 22, 2025) (“‘No “national injustice” occurred here, just as no
outcome-determinative election fraud occurred in the 2020 presidential election,’
U.S. District Judge Beryl Howell wrote in an eight-page order in the case of two
Jan. 6 defendants who pleaded guilty to felonies. ‘No “process of national
reconciliation” can begin when poor losers, whose preferred candidate loses an
election, are glorified for disrupting a constitutionally mandated proceeding in
Congress and doing so with impunity.’”).
8
that Congress could not condition the removal of a principal officer exercising
executive power on the advice and consent of the Senate. The general principle that
should be drawn from that case is that Congress may place no conditions on the
President’s power to remove principal officers who exercise executive power,
including as with the NLRA.
In reaching the conclusion that Congress could not place restrictions on the
President’s power to remove principal officers who exercise executive powers, the
Myers Court provided a detailed historical survey of the drafting and early
Congressional interpretation of the President’s powers of appointment and removal.
From this survey, the Court identified two rationales for reaching its conclusion.
The first rationale is that the President would be unable to fulfil his
constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithful executed unless he has the
power to remove officers who have lost his confidence. Id. at 117. The Court in
Myers, and others since then, have convincingly supported this rationale.
The second rationale offered by the Myers Court is that the power to remove
is “incident to the power of appointment.” Id. at 122. This amicus brief principally
focuses on this second rationale.
Thereafter, this Court lost sight of the basic principles set out in Myers when
deciding two cases that should be considered outliers — Humphrey’s Executor v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
Those two cases attempted to justify limits placed on Presidents’ removal power,
although the rationales provided in the two cases are at odds not only with Myers,
9
but also with each other. These departures from Myers reflect two major deviations
from the fundamental design of the U.S. Constitution, the hallmarks of which are
the separation of powers among the three branches of government and the limited
number of enumerated powers of the federal government.
President Trump ably and correctly argues that this case can be resolved in
favor of his power to remove principal officers who exercise executive power without
overruling Humphrey’s Executor. See Application at 14. However, these amici
agree with the Applicants that this Court should issue a writ of certiorari to take
this opportunity to set out constitutionally correct principles in order to lay the
groundwork to correct the departure from the Myers path taken in Humphrey’s
Executor and Morrison. See Application at 14 (“the government intends to ask this
Court to hold ... that Humphrey’s Executor was wrongly decided, is not entitled to
stare decisis effect, and should be overruled”).
The district court incorrectly asserts that “an unbroken line of cases since
Humphrey’s Executor has reinforced the constitutionality of removal restrictions on
multimember expert boards....” Wilcox at *25. However, in the past 15 years, this
Court has taken small but important steps to return to the principles undergirding
Myers, with several Justices openly criticizing the Humphrey’s Executor ruling. In
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477
(2010), the Court ruled that Congress could not impose two layers of for-cause
removal restrictions. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts held that
“[t]he President cannot ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ if he cannot
10
oversee the faithfulness of the officers who execute them.” Free Enterprise Fund at
484. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. 197
(2020), this Court ruled that Congress could not create an independent agency
headed by one person removable only for cause. The Chief Justice, writing again for
the majority, distinguished Humphrey’s Executor and narrowly confined it to its
facts. Id. at 204-05, 214-17. Justice Thomas, in a thorough concurrence joined by
Justice Gorsuch, described Humphrey’s Executor as “a direct threat to our
constitutional structure and, as a result, the liberty of the American people.” Id. at
239 (Thomas, J., conc.). He noted that “[c]ontinued reliance on Humphrey’s
Executor to justify the existence of independent agencies,” as the district court
below did, “creates a serious, ongoing threat to our Government’s design,” and while
he acknowledged that the Court undercut Humphrey’s Executor “enough to resolve”
the case before it, he urged that “in the future, we should reconsider Humphrey’s
Executor in toto.” Id. at 251.
Neither of these decisions formally overruled Humphrey’s Executor or
Morrison, but they certainly did not reaffirm Humphrey’s Executor, as incorrectly
asserted by the district court. See Wilcox at *25. Rather, these two cases should, at
minimum, be viewed as harbingers of a return to first principles of constitutional
interpretation, calling into question the continuing validity of Humphrey’s Executor
and Morrison. And the district court’s rejection of Myers provides additional
reasons for granting the Application.
11
IV.
THE PRESIDENT’S POWER OF REMOVAL MAY NOT BE
EXPRESSLY STATED IN THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IT IS
NEVERTHELESS SOLIDLY GROUNDED.
A. The Constitutional Role of a President.
The President of the United States is the only official in America who is
elected by the participation of all the People.6 Thus, whether pundits characterize
the magnitude of his election as sufficient to be termed a “mandate,” the President
has the authority and obligation to advance the platform on which he ran. Article
II provides: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.” Art. II, § 1. One of the duties of his office is to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.” Art. II, § 3. The President takes an oath
swearing: “I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and
will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States.” Art. II, § 1. Presidential races are hotly contested because of the
office’s vast powers. Given these vast responsibilities, including his role often being
described as “leader of the free world,” one would assume that he would have all of
the powers reasonably necessary to succeed.
The basic power a President would need to possess is the ability to recruit
and place persons in his Administration who share his vision and who could assist
him in carrying out his responsibilities. This personnel power would necessarily
include both appointing and removing subordinate officials. Without that power, no
6
President Trump won both the Electoral College (312 to 226) and the
popular vote, with over 77 million votes, and won all seven battleground states.
12
President would be able to perform his constitutional duties to exercise “executive
power,” to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” and to “preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution.” Yet the district court had no problem with
approving ill-advised Congressional legislation which for all too long has usurped
the legitimate powers of the President by labeling them “checks and balances.”
While those serving in the bureaucracy may have cooperated with the agenda of
prior Presidents, few if any were hampered by the internal resistance faced by
President Trump. The refusal of thousands of federal officials to help implement
the agenda that 77 million voters supported has made it necessary for the President
to take on this battle and seek to return to the original constitutional plan.
The district court colorfully describes limits on the power to remove federal
officials as a way to prevent the President from reigning and ruling as a “king.”
Actually, it is the limits on removal which the district court so admires that have a
very different and dangerous effect. Those limits render the President unable to
implement the platform on which he was elected. Without the ability to clear the
decks of those who disagree with him, and replace them with those who would help
him carry out his agenda, there is conflict and paralysis.7 The failure of Presidents
to implement their platforms is one of the main reasons that the American People
7
The onslaught of injunctions entered by federal district judges has certainly
done its part to contribute to the chaos. See Appendix.
13
have so little faith in government, so many are disaffected, and so many do not
participate. No matter for whom they vote, most policies stay the same.8
One of the principal reasons that Presidents can be stymied in making
reforms is that there exists an establishment with the power to erect many
impediments to preserve their power. All courts, but particularly this Court, need to
ensure that those in the federal judiciary who believe that the wrong candidate was
elected do not wield their power in a partisan manner. President Trump has now
been in office for almost three months, and as of the date of the preparation of this
brief, the Trump Administration has been subjected to 54 known district court
injunctions. See Appendix. Of these 54 injunctions, 42 were issued by
district judges appointed by Presidents Clinton (6), Obama (16) and Biden
(20). To be sure, there was sophisticated judge shopping, and certain challenges
were dropped once they were assigned to Republican President appointed judges.9
Nevertheless, it appears that many unelected federal judges view themselves as
serving the country by using their equitable powers to block the agenda that
President Trump was elected to implement.
8
See E. Fitz & K. Saunders, “Distrusting the Process: Electoral Trust,
Operational Ideology, and Nonvoting Political Participation in the 2020 American
Electorate,” 88 Public Opinion Quarterly 843 (July 16, 2024).
9
See e.g., The State of New Jersey brought its challenge to the President’s
Birthright Citizenship Executive Order not in New Jersey, but in Massachusetts
(New Jersey v. Trump, 1:25-cv-10139); a challenge to the Birthright Citizenship
Executive Order brought in USDC-DC was dropped after being assigned to Judge
Trevor McFadden (OCA-Asian Pacific American Advocates v. Rubio, 1:25-cv-00287).
14
B. The Necessity of Implicit Powers.
Based on the clear, complete, and unequivocal vesting of executive power,
most discussions of Presidential power are focused on his “executing” specific
constitutional or statutory powers. However, authority for the President to perform
many of his powers cannot be sourced to any specific constitutional provision or
particular section of the U.S. Code. Utilization of these implicit powers is essential
to the operation of the Executive Branch of government. It is essential for a
President to have such implicit powers to carry out his constitutional duties.
The President acts through subordinate officials. Appointing and removing officers
are a necessary means to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
It is true that the Constitution grants Congress a before-the-fact check on the
President’s appointment powers through the “advise and consent” requirement for
principal offices. And it is true that the Constitution grants Congress an after-thefact check on the President’s appointments through the impeachment power.
However, there is no other Constitutional power given to Congress to limit the
removal of officials exercising executive branch powers. Although the NLRB has
been with us for 90 years, longevity does not equate to legitimacy. Dred Scott v.
Sandford10 was considered good law, and so also was Korematsu v. United States,11
10
60 U.S. 383 (1857).
11
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
15
and more recently Roe v. Wade for about 50 years.12 None was good law, even while
in effect.
It is curious that the same lawyers who would bar the President from
removing those who are exercising power in multi-member agencies have no problem
with the Congress exercising powers to regulate Americans by finding penumbras
and emanations in the Constitution, including giving virtually unlimited application
to the Commerce Clause,13 the Spending Power and General Welfare Clause,14 the
Taxing Power,15 and the Necessary and Proper Clause, discussed infra.
12
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), which has never been
overruled, but which on one occasion was described by this Court as “perhaps the
most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity”
which operated to “greatly expand[] the previously defined authority of Congress
under that Clause....” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560, 556 (1995).
Justice Thomas asserted that Wickard’s “substantial effect on interstate commerce”
test was “far removed from both the Constitution and from [this Court’s] early case
law.” Id. at 601 (Thomas, J., concurring).
14
See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-42 (1937), where the Court
defaulted on its obligation to rule whether a particular spending measure was for
the “general welfare” by deferring to Congress’s discretion — a rule still followed.
See also Federalist No. 41 (“It has been urged and echoed, that the power ‘to lay and
collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the
common defense and general welfare of the United States,’ amounts to an unlimited
commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the
common defense or general welfare.... For what purpose could the enumeration of
particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in
the preceding general power?”).
15
See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), where even five Justices
(Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito) found the individual mandate in the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (known as “Obamacare”) not authorized
by the Commerce Clause or Necessary and Proper Clause, five Justices (Roberts,
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) found it to be a lawful exercise of the
16
The powers of appointment and removal are both essential means for
ensuring the execution of the office of the Presidency, but they are not executive
powers in the sense of enforcing the law. These powers are inherent in any
organization as well as nations, but are subject to the restriction of those who are
founders of an organization or of a nation.
Many examples can be drawn from Article II of powers that the people have
delegated to the President that are not executive by nature in the sense of enforcing
the law. The power to make treaties is a foreign affairs power and is neither
executive nor legislative by nature. Until a treaty is made, there is no law to
enforce; and a treaty cannot be made by legislation. Similarly, the power to
recommend legislation to Congress, like the veto power, is generally considered to be
legislative in nature. Likewise, the powers of appointment and removal are not
executive in the sense of enforcing the laws. Thus, they are distinct from legislative,
executive, and judicial powers. Another inherent power that each branch of
government possesses is the power to make rules and regulations for their internal
operation.16
Taxing Power.
16
In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), Chief Justice Marshall noted
that in deciding cases the Court is bound not only by the Constitution and acts of
Congress but by general principles of law. Id. at 170. The Declaration of
Independence identifies the source of authority for these general principles of law,
also known as “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God,” as the “Creator” and
“Supreme Judge of the World.”
17
The Supreme Court has recognized the power of organizations formed by
contract, and those that preexist the state, to appoint and remove officers of their
own choosing to ensure proper functioning of those organizations in pursuance of
their respective missions. In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
518 (1819), the Supreme Court recognized the preexisting right or general principle
of law to form a voluntary organization by contract and to appoint its officers to
execute the terms of its agreement. Similarly, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 184, 191 (2012), the Supreme
Court recognized the preexisting right of churches to appoint and remove officers
according to the tenets of their faith.
The People have placed certain conditions on the President’s inherent power
of appointment. See Article II, § 2. Otherwise, the President has the inherent power
to appoint officers of his own choosing. Similarly, he has the power to remove
officers subject to limitations that the people place on him. The only limit on his
power of removal is that Congress may remove an officer through the impeachment
process that the President would rather retain in office. Article I, § 2, cl. 6; Article I,
§ 3, cl. 6-7; Article II, § 4.
The only possible source of a Congressional power to limit the President’s
removal power is the Necessary and Proper Clause. See, e.g., Myers, 272 U.S. at
180-81 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); Seila Law Inc, 591 U.S. at 267, 295-96 (Kagan,
J., dissenting). That Clause states:
18
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof. [Article I, § 8, cl. 18.]
It is generally recognized that this Clause gives Congress the power to
establish the great departments of government and offices necessary to operate
them. In Marbury, the Court recognized the power of Congress to establish the
State Department and office of Secretary of State. Congress had the power to
channel the Secretary of State’s discretion in the operation of that office, as
evidenced by the particular laws giving Marbury a right to his commission as justice
of the peace for the District of Columbia. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170. The Marbury
Court recognized a general principle of law that the Constitution is supreme and
paramount law because it was adopted by the People, who exercised their original
will in pursuance to their original right to adopt it. Id. at 176. The general principle
of law that the head of an organization has an inherent power of appointment and
removal is operative. Although Congress may believe that independent agencies are
“necessary” (i.e., useful or convenient), they are, rather, not “proper.” The district
court asserted that restrictions on the removal power provide essential checks and
balances, but that is only a pretext to justify allowing Congress — as well as the
judiciary — to usurp an inherent power of the Presidency required for real
separation of powers and federalism.
19
V.
THE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL POWERS HAS INCENTIVIZED
CONGRESS TO LIMIT THE PRESIDENT’S REMOVAL POWER, BUT
THAT DOES NOT MAKE IT CONSTITUTIONAL.
All officers and employees in the executive branch are duty bound to carry out
lawful policies at the chief executive’s direction. The district court’s fear and
consternation that so much power resides in one person is not due to the President’s
constitutional power to remove officials exercising executive authority. Rather the
root problem is that Congress, with the collaboration of the courts, has turned the
United States government from one of enumerated powers into one of general
powers.
In order to govern this legislatively created Leviathan, Congress has created
the administrative state largely with a willing President and compliant judiciary,
thus greatly compromising the twin doctrines of separation of powers and
enumerated powers. To place some limits on the discretion of the President over
such a vast enterprise, Congress created the independent agency, experimented with
an office of independent counsel, and established a civil service system. However,
the desire of Congress to exceed its constitutional powers, and the willingness of the
judiciary to permit it, should not justify denying to the President the rightful powers
of his office, especially when they are so much in alignment with the Supreme
Court’s interpretation in Myers v. United States.
The most dramatic difference between the state governments and the federal
government is that the states have hundreds of officers exercising executive power,
who are elected directly by and are accountable to the people, while the federal
20
government has just one — the President of the United States. Until recently, the
federal government has a 4.4 million-strong workforce. See Free Enterprise Fund at
520 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Undoubtedly, most are employed in the executive
branch, and, therefore, serve at the direction of the President.
It is little wonder that Congress, with the condonation of the federal courts,
has devised several means designed to place some restraints on the exercise of the
President’s executive power. One of the chief means, which is at issue in this case, is
the invention of the independent agency. These agencies, like the NLRB, are
typically headed by a multi-membered decision-making body exercising executive,
legislative, and judicial types of power. They are denominated “independent
agencies” because they do not serve at the pleasure of the President, and their
principal officers or agency heads can be removed from office only for cause, yet they
wield executive, legislative, and judicial power.
The rise of these powerful agencies marks a radical departure from the
foundational doctrine of the separation of powers by which the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers are assigned to three separate branches of government.
Madison wrote that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands ... may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny.” The Federalist No. 47. To this principle, the courts have turned a blind
eye.
In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-81 (1989), this Court actually
appealed to The Federalist No. 47 to justify a “flexible approach to separation of
21
powers” such as it had approved in Humphrey’s Executor. Rather than confine itself
to a formalistic approach to interpreting the Constitution, the Court took a
functionalist approach. The powers of government need not be kept separate in
accordance with the text of the Constitution, and the powers can be realigned so long
as the respective powers of three branches were not unduly aggrandized or
diminished. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380-82.
The demise of the doctrine of separation of powers accompanied the
evisceration of another hallmark of American constitutionalism — the doctrine of
enumerated powers. Perhaps no Supreme Court case is so emblematic of the demise
of federalism as Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). In United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995), this Court started “with first principles” by quoting The
Federalist No. 45: “‘the powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined.’” Id. at 552. Despite that promising start, the
Court affirmed Wickard, although it offered a somewhat more restrictive version of
the substantial effects test.
Between the Court’s Commerce Clause and Tax and Spending Clause
jurisprudence, there are few areas of life that Congress cannot effectively control if it
desires. Justice Breyer gave a brief summary of all the subjects Congress now
provides, regulates, or administers:
taxes, welfare, social security, medicine, pharmaceutical drugs,
education, highways, railroads, electricity, natural gas, nuclear power,
financial instruments, banking, medical care, public health and safety,
the environment, fair employment practices, consumer protection and
22
much else besides. [Free Enterprise Fund at 520 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).]
Nearly every subject Congress cannot reach by the Court’s interpretation of
the power to regulate interstate commerce, it can reach through the Court’s
interpretation of the power to tax and spend. Rather than being a government of
few and enumerated powers, it is a government with potentially unlimited powers.
Yet this expansion of powers does not justify placing unconstitutional limits on the
Presidential removal power.
VI.
REMOVAL OF RESPONDENT WILCOX.
A. Humphrey’s Executor
In Humphrey’s Executor, this Court believed that the FTC exercised only
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power, but not executive power. But, as the
Court has subsequently acknowledged, the FTC’s powers do constitute executive
powers as those powers are understood today. See Morrison at 689 n.28. In other
words, Humphrey’s Executor served the purpose not only of eviscerating the doctrine
of separation of powers by sanctioning Congress placing all three powers of
government in the same hands, but also of burdening the President’s power to
faithfully enforce the law. The Court in Humphrey’s Executor solved the problem of
an apparent inconsistency with Myers by claiming that only what was called
“quasi-judicial” and “quasi-legislative” power had been delegated to the Federal
Trade Commission. In truth, there is nothing “quasi” about these judicial and
legislative powers.
23
Wilcox has argued that the NLRB maintains a separation of executive
functions, performed by its General Counsel, from its judicial and rulemaking
functions, performed by the Board. The General Counsel is removable at the
President’s will, while only members of the Board enjoy for-cause protection from
removal. Complicating the conceptual problem of maintaining the distinction
between executive powers on one hand and judicial and legislative powers on the
other, the President’s counsel argues that the judicial and rulemaking functions of
the NLRB are simply a means of exercising executive powers. To counter the
President’s argument that the NLRA places rulemaking under the General Counsel,
the district court claimed that, in general, rulemaking is accomplished through the
process of adjudication.
President Trump asked the Court of Appeals to strike the for-cause removal
provision from the NLRA. He claims that granting this relief does not require
overruling Humphrey’s Executor because it was premised on the claim that the FTC
exercised only quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers and not executive powers.
Since the NLRB exercises all three powers of government, the facts of this case can
be distinguished from Humphrey’s Executor.
B. Morrison v. Olson
The Court’s opinion in Morrison may have led to unintended consequences
when it ruled that the Independent Counsel was an inferior officer. This justified
the appointment of the Independent Counsel by someone other than the President
and without securing advice and consent of the Senate. The Morrison Court also
24
wrote that it changed its mind about its basis for distinguishing Humphrey’s
Executor from Myers. The Court wrote that Congress could give officers exercising
purely executive power for-cause removal protection. To justify this conclusion, the
Court said Congress could place this limit on the President so long as it did not
undermine his ability to faithfully execute the law too much.
The Independent Counsel in Morrison was an inferior officer, while members
of the NLRB are admittedly principal officers. Therefore, the controlling precedent
is Myers, as it involved the removal of a principal officer exercising executive power.
Of course, one can easily distinguish the situation in Myers from the situation in this
case, but this Court can do better by deciding based on principle.
In Myers, this Court ruled that the President has the power to remove at-will
principal officers exercising executive powers. Then, Humphrey’s Executor
distinguished the facts of that case from Myers, claiming that Congress had
delegated only quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers to the FTC. More
recently, Morrison acknowledged that the FTC did in fact exercise executive powers.
Although the Independent Counsel in Morrison exercised purely executive power,
the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could place for-cause removal power in the
Attorney General so long as it did not interfere with the President’s exercise of his
constitutional power too much.
C. Recent Cases
The Myers-Humphrey’s-Morrison-Mistretta line of cases, reasoning, and
distinctions this Court has made have the feel not of an integrated body of law, but
25
of a splendid work of sophistry unmoored by principle. It is impossible to discern
whether this Court’s reasoning in Free Enterprise Fund (prohibiting two layers of
for-cause removal) and Seila Law, Inc. (prohibiting an independent agency headed
by a single person) constitutes steps in a return to Myers.
The district court faulted the President as wanting to exercise the powers of a
king in claiming the right to remove officers exercising executive power at-will. No
fault has been placed on Congress for the impact its laws have had of centralizing
power in the federal government. The basic problem is not the President’s claim of
power to remove principal executive branch officers at will, but rather that he is
attempting to shrink the size of a bloated government which many seek to protect.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should intervene to prevent lower courts
injunctions from encroaching upon a co-equal branch of government. It also should
issue a writ of certiorari to address and affirm that the President’s inherent
authority to manage agencies which are part of the Executive.
Respectfully submitted,
Jeffrey C. Tuomala
114 Creekside Ln.
Winchester, VA 22602
John C. Eastman
Alexander Haberbush
CONSTITUTIONAL COUNSEL GROUP
444 W. Ocean Blvd. Ste. 1504
Long Beach, CA 90802
William J. Olson*
Jeremiah L. Morgan
Robert J. Olson
WILLIAM J. OLSON, P.C.
370 Maple Avenue West, Suite 4
Vienna, VA 22180-5615
(703) 356-5070
wjo@mindspring.com
*Counsel of Record
April 15, 2025
26
Patrick M. McSweeney
3358 John Tree Hill Road
Powhatan, VA 23139
Michael Boos
CITIZENS UNITED
1006 Pennsylvania Ave., SE
Washington, DC 20003
APPENDIX
App.1
FEDERAL COURT INJUNCTIONS AGAINST
THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
(January 20, 2025 through April 15, 2025)
BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP
1. New Hampshire Indonesian Community Support v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-00038 —
Judge Joseph N. Laplante (G. W. Bush) of the District of New Hampshire enjoined
any enforcement of Trump’s birthright citizenship EO within the state.
2. Washington v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-00127 — Judge John C. Coughenour (Reagan)
of the District of Washington enjoined any enforcement of Trump’s birthright
citizenship EO nationwide. The case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit and the
Supreme Court, where it is pending.
3. New Jersey v. Trump; Doe v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-10139 — Judge Leo T. Sorokin
(Obama) of the District of Massachusetts enjoined any enforcement of Trump’s
birthright citizenship EO within the state. The case was appealed to the First
Circuit and the Supreme Court, where it is pending.
4. CASA Inc. v. Trump, 8:25-cv-00201 — Judge Deborah L. Boardman (Biden) of the
District of Maryland enjoined any enforcement of Trump’s birthright citizenship EO
nationwide. The case was appealed to the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court,
where it is pending.
IMMIGRATION
5. J.G.G. v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00766 — Judge James E. Boasberg (Obama) of the
District of D.C. ordered flights of gang members and terrorists rerouted back to the
United States, and then ordered that Trump cannot deport anyone under the Alien
Enemies Act without a hearing. Upheld by D.C. Circuit, and appealed to SCOTUS.
6. Chung v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-02412 — Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald (Clinton) of
the Southern District of New York issued a temporary restraining order preventing
Trump from deporting a Columbia student for pro-Hamas activism.
7. Phila. Yearly Meeting of The Religious Soc’y of Friends v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., No. 8:2025-cv-00243 — Judge Theodore D. Chuang (Obama) of the Maryland
district court enjoined ICE raids in houses of worship.
8. Khalil v. Joyce, 2:25-cv-01963 — The above case was transferred on March 19, and
Judge Michael E. Farbiarz (Biden) of the District of New Jersey ordered on that
App.2
same day that “Petitioner shall not be removed from the United States unless and
until the Court issues a contrary Order.”
9. Parra v. Castro, 1:24-cv-00912 — Judge Kenneth J. Gonzales (Obama) of the
District of New Mexico enjoined the transfer of three Venezuelans to Gitmo. They
were then removed to their home country instead, and voluntarily dismissed their
case.
10. Vizguerra-Ramirez v. Choate, 1:25-cv-00881 — Judge Nina Wang (Biden) of the
District of Colorado enjoined the ICE deportation of a Mexican citizen.
11. National TPS Alliance v. Noem, 25-cv-01766 — Judge Edward M. Chen (Obama)
of the Northern District of California enjoined ending Temporary Protected Status
(“TPS”) for 350,000 to 600,000 Venezuelans.
12. Pacito v. Trump, 2:25-cv-00255 — Judge Jamal Whitehead (Biden) of the
Western District of Washington granted a nationwide preliminary injunction on
February 28 blocking President Trump’s Executive Order indefinitely halting entry
through the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit partially granted the Trump administration’s emergency motion to stay. On
April 3, Plaintiffs filed a motion asking the district court to enforce the first
preliminary injunction, and Defendants replied April 8 arguing Plaintiffs’ reading of
the Ninth Circuit’s stay order is too narrow and requesting the court hold Plaintiffs’
motion in abeyance pending the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on their pending appeals.
TRANSGENDER
13. Talbott v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-00240 — Judge Ana C. Reyes (Biden) of the
District of D.C., a lesbian, enjoined Trump’s rule preventing “transgender” persons
from serving in the military. The case is on appeal to the D.C. Circuit.
14. PFLAG v. Trump, 8:25-cv-00337 — Judge Brendan A. Hurson (Biden) of the
Maryland district court granted an injunction against Trump’s order denying federal
funding to institutions performing chemical or surgical “transgender” mutilation on
minors.
15. Washington v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-00244 — Judge Lauren J. King (Biden) of the
Western District of Washington enjoined Trump’s order denying federal funding to
institutions performing chemical or surgical “transgender” mutilation on minors.
The case is on appeal to the 9th Circuit.
16. Ireland v. Hegseth, No. 1:25-cv-01918 — Judge Christine P. O’Hearn (Biden) of
the New Jersey district court enjoined the Air Force from removing two
App.3
“transgender” service members pursuant to Trump’s order banning “transgender”
service members.
17. Doe v. McHenry; Doe v. Bondi, 1:25-cv-00286 — Judge Royce C. Lamberth
(Reagan) of the District of D.C. enjoined the transfer of twelve “transgender women”
to men’s prisons under Trump’s order, and terminating their taxpayer-funded
hormone treatments. The injunction has been appealed to the D.C. Circuit.
18. Moe v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-10195 — Senior Judge George A. O’Toole Jr. (Clinton)
of the Massachusetts district court enjoined the transfer of a “transgender woman”
to a men’s prison under Trump’s order. This case has been transferred to another,
unidentified, district.
19. Jones v. Trump, 1:25-cv-401 — Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan) of the D.C.
district court enjoined the transfer of three “transgender women” to men’s prisons
and termination of their taxpayer-funded hormone treatments under Trump’s order.
20. Shilling v. Trump, 2:25-cv-00241 — Judge Benjamin H. Settle (G.W. Bush) of the
Western District of Washington enjoined Trump’s order to remove “transgender”
service members. The 9th Circuit denied a request for a stay of the injunction.
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
21. Dellinger v. Bessent, No. 1:25-cv-00385 — Judge Amy B. Jackson (Obama) of the
District of D.C. issued a restraining order invalidating Trump’s firing of U.S. special
counsel Hampton Dellinger. The order was upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court, then was temporarily lifted by the Court of Appeals
on March 5; on March 6, Dellinger announced that he was dropping his case.
22. American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Office of
Personnel Management, No. 3:25-cv-01780 — Judge William H. Alsup (Clinton) of
the Northern District of California enjoined Trump’s order for six federal agencies to
dismiss thousands of probationary employees. The injunction was upheld by the
Ninth Circuit, but the Supreme Court issued a stay based on standing.
23. Wilcox v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-00334 — Judge Beryl A. Howell (Obama) of the
D.C. district court enjoined Trump’s firing of National Labor Relations Board
member Gwynne Wilcox, a Democrat, and ordered her reinstated to finish her term.
The D.C. Circuit stayed then injunction, then reinstated it, and an application for a
stay has been filed at the Supreme Court, and the district court decision stayed by
Chief Justice Roberts.
App.4
24. Harris v. Bessent, No. 1:25-cv-00412 — Judge Rudolph Contreras (Obama) of the
D.C. district court enjoined Trump’s firing of Merit Systems Protection Board
member Cathy Harris and ordered her reinstated. The D.C. Circuit stayed then
injunction, then reinstated it, an application for a stay has been filed at the Supreme
Court, and the district court decision stayed by Chief Justice Roberts.
25. American Foreign Service Association v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-00352 — Judge Carl
J. Nichols (Trump) of the D.C. district court issued a temporary restraining order
against Trump’s firing of USAID employees. He later vacated the TRO and denied a
preliminary injunction against the firings.
26. Does 1-9 v. Department of Justice, No. 1:25-cv-00325 — Judge Jia M. Cobb
(Biden) of the D.C. district court enjoined Trump from releasing the names of any
FBI agents who worked on the January 6 investigation.
27. Doctors for America v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, No. 1:25-cv-00322 —
Judge John D. Bates (G.W. Bush) of the D.C. district court ordered that CDC and
FDA webpages that “inculcate or promote gender ideology” be restored after Trump
ordered them removed.
28. Perkins Coie v. DOJ, No. 1:25-cv-00716 — Judge Beryl A. Howell (Obama) of the
D.C. district enjoined Trump’s directive barring government agencies doing business
with Perkins Coie and banning PC attorneys from federal buildings.
29. Jenner Block v. DOJ, No. 1:25-cv-00916 — Judge John D. Bates (G.W. Bush) of
the D.C. district court enjoined Trump’s directive barring government agencies from
doing business with Jenner Block and banning that firm’s attorneys from federal
buildings.
30. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP v. Executive Office of the President,
No. 1:25-cv-00917 — Judge Richard J. Leon (G.W. Bush) of the D.C. district court
enjoined Trump’s directive barring government agencies from doing business with
Wilmer and banning that firm’s attorneys from federal buildings.
31. Susman Godfrey LLP v. Executive Office of the President, No. 1:25-cv-01107 —
Judge Loren L. Alikhan (Biden) of the D.C. district court enjoined Trump’s directive
barring government agencies from doing business with Susman Godfrey and
banning that firm’s attorneys from federal buildings.
32. American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Ezell, No. 1:25-cv10276 — Senior Judge George A. O’Toole Jr. (Clinton) of the District of
Massachusetts issued a temporary restraining order against Trump’s buyout of
App.5
federal employees. The judge later lifted the TRO and denied an injunction,
allowing the buyout to go forward.
33. Maryland v. United States Department of Agriculture, No. 1:25-cv-00748 —
James K. Bredar (Obama) of the District of Maryland issued a TRO ordering 38
agencies to stop firing employees and reinstate fired employees. On April 9, the
Fourth Circuit stayed the district court injunction, noting the Supreme Court’s stay
in AFGE, AFL-CIO v. OPM and Ezell).
34. Does 1-26 v. Musk, No. 8:25-cv-00462 — Judge Theodore David Chuang (Obama)
of the Maryland district court ordered DOGE to reinstate email access for fired
USAID employees.
35. American Federation of Teachers v. Bessent, No. 8:25-cv-00430 — Judge Deborah
L. Boardman (Biden) of the District of Maryland enjoined DOE and Office of
Personnel Management from disclosing personal information of employees to DOGE.
On April 7, the Fourth Circuit granted a stay to the Defendants pending the appeal.
36. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v.
Social Security Administration, No. 1:25-cv-00596 — Judge Ellen L. Hollander
(Obama) of the District of Maryland granted an injunction forbidding the Social
Security Administration from providing personal information to DOGE. The Fourth
Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack jurisdiction.
37. Brehm v. Marocco, No. 1:25-cv-00660 — Judge Richard J. Leon (G.W. Bush) of
the D.C. district court issued a temporary restraining order forbidding Trump from
removing Brehm from, and appointing Marocco to, the U.S. African Development
Foundation.
38. American Oversight v. Hegseth, No. 1:25-cv-00883 — Judge James E. Boasberg
(Obama) of the D.C. district court issued an order “as agreed by the parties,” for the
government to preserve all Signal communications related to the leak to an Atlantic
editor of DoD conversations in Houthi strike.
FUNDING
39. National Treasury Employees Union v. Vought, 1:25-cv-00381 — Judge Amy B.
Jackson (Obama) of the D.C. district court halted Trump’s budget cuts and layoffs at
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. On March 31, the government appealed
Judge Jackson’s preliminary injunction order to the D.C. Circuit; which on April 11
ordered a partial stay of the preliminary injunction.
App.6
40. AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition v. Department of State, No. 1:25-cv-00400 —
Judge Amir H. Ali (Biden) of the D.C. district court ordered Trump to unfreeze and
spend $2 billion in USAID funds. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 ruling with Justices
Alito, Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Gorsuch dissenting, left the order in place. On Apr.
2, defendants appealed Judge Ali’s Mar. 10 preliminary injunction order to the D.C.
Circuit.
41. Nat’l Ass’n of Diversity Officers in Higher Educ. v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-00333 —
Judge Adam B. Abelson (Biden) of the Maryland district court enjoined Trump’s
order blocking federal funding for DEI programs. On March 14, the Fourth Circuit
granted the government’s petition for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending
appeal.
42. National Council of Nonprofits v. OMB, No. 1:25-cv-00239 — Judge Loren L.
AliKhan (Biden) of the Maryland district court blocked Trump’s order to pause
federal aid while reviewing to determine if it aligned with administration policy.
43. Massachusetts v. NIH, No. 1:25-cv-10338 — Judge Angel Kelley (Biden) of the
Massachusetts district court issued a preliminary injunction on March 5 prohibiting
implementation of the NIH Guidance “in any form with respect to institutions
nationwide.”
44. New York v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00039 — Judge John J. McConnell Jr. (Obama) of
the District of Rhode Island enjoined Trump’s order to freeze federal spending while
reviewing to determine that it aligned with administration policy. The First Circuit,
March 26, denied defendants’ motion for a stay pending appeal of the district court’s
preliminary injunction order.
45. California v. Department of Education, No. 1:25-cv-10548 — Judge Myong J.
Joun (Biden) of the District of Massachusetts granted a temporary restraining order
blocking Trump’s withdrawal of funds to schools teaching DEI. The First Circuit
denied a motion for stay pending appeal. On April 4, the Supreme Court granted a
stay pending appeal, writing “the Government is likely to succeed in showing the
District Court lacked jurisdiction” and that the case may need to be brought in the
Court of Federal Claims.
46. RFE/RL, Inc. v. Lake, No. 1:25-cv-00799 — Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan)
of the D.C. district court issued a temporary restraining order forbidding Trump
from cutting funds to Voice of America.
47. Massachusetts Fair Housing Ctr. v. HUD, No. 3:25-cv-30041 — Judge Richard G.
Stearns (Clinton) of the Massachusetts district court enjoined Trump’s cuts to HUD
grant funding and ordered spending reinstated.
App.7
48. Climate United Fund v. Citibank, N.A., 1:25-cv-00698 — Judge Tanya S.
Chutkan (Obama) of the D.C. district court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining EPA’s Termination of Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund Grants.
49. Association of American Medical Colleges v. NIH, No. 1:25-cv-10340 — Judge
Angel Kelley (Biden) of the District of Massachusetts enjoined Trump’s NIH grant
funding cuts. The Case has been appealed to the First Circuit.
50. American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education v. McMahon, 1:25-cv00702 — Judge Julie R. Rubin (Biden) of the Maryland district court issued an
injunction requiring reinstatement of terminated education grant funds. Defendants
appealed the preliminary injunction to the Fourth Circuit. On April 1, the Fourth
Circuit denied Plaintiffs’ motion to place the case in abeyance, and on April 10
granted the defendants’ motion for stay pending appeal.
51. Chicago Women in Trades v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-02005 — Senior Judge Matthew
F. Kennelly (Clinton) of the Northern District of Illinois entered a temporary
restraining order commanding the reinstatement of DEI grants.
52. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore et al. v. Vought, No. 1:25-cv-00458 — Judge
Matthew J. Maddox (Biden) of the District of Maryland issued a TRO preventing
Trump from defunding the CFPB.
53. Association of American Universities v. Department of Health and Human
Services, No. 1:25-cv-10346 — Judge Angel Kelley (Biden) of the District of
Massachusetts issued a nationwide injunction against Trump’s NIH funding cuts.
Defendants appealed to the First Circuit on April 9.
54. Doe 1 v. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, No. 1:25-cv-00300 — Judge
Anthony J. Trenga (G.W. Bush) of the Eastern District of Virginia issued an
“administrative stay” against firing DEI employees with CIA and DNI. The court
then considered and rejected imposing a TRO to the same effect.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.