Amicus Curiae Brief — Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al., Applicants v. J.G.G., et al.

Supreme Court briefApr 1, 2025

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Case No. 24A931

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

__________

DONALD J. TRUMP, as President of the United

States, Et al., Appellants-Defendants

J.G.G., Et al., Appellees-Plaintiffs

__________

On Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the District of

Columbia, Case 1:25-cv-00766, Hon. James E. Boasberg

__________

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

APPELLANTS-DEFENDANTS by the American Rights

Alliance

__________

Peter Ticktin, Esquire

The Ticktin Law Group

270 SW Natura Avenue

Deerfield Beach, FL 33441

(561) 232-2222

pt@LegalBrains.com

March 31, 2025

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FRAP RULE 26.1 AND

FRAP 29(a)(4)(E) DISCLOSURES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

OF AMICUS CURIAE

ISSUES AND SUMMARY

OF ARGUMENT

II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

III.

ARGUMENT

A. Standard Of Review

B. Governing Law Injunction

C. Court Cannot Intervene On

Challenged Ground When

An Alternative Legal Basis

Exists

D. The Lower Court Has No

Jurisdiction To Usurp The Core

Powers Of The President, Chief

Executive, Head Of The

Executive Branch

E. Designation Of Terrorist Organizations Is A Clear Executive

Power Not Subject To District

Court Challenges

F. Challenges To Executive Authority

Must Be Made Through

Extraordinary Writs, Not District

Court Actions, To End Abusive

Litigation

G. Illegal Aliens Are Already

Deportable With Or Without

The Alien Enemies Act

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1251

H. Illegal Aliens Are Already

Deportable With Or Without

The Alien Enemies Act

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182

IV.

I. Advisory Opinions

CONCLUSION

iii

FRAP RULE 26.1 AND FRAP 29(a)(4)(E))

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

In compliance with Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure ("FRAP") Rule 29(a)

(4)(E), proposed Amicus is a non-profit public

interest organization which does not own nor

is it owned by any other entity. It is

governed by its Board of Directors. Amicus is

not aware of any possibility that any of the

Court’s Judges or staff or their families have

any economic relationship with this small

organization. No investment fund has or

could own any stock in this non-profit

organization.

Amicus may seek donations to defray

the costs of this brief.1 However, none of the

funding or concepts or decisions concerning

this brief have been supplied by any attorney

or staff connected with the underlying case or

these topics. No donor is allowed to

determine the content of this brief or dictate

the professional judgment of the legal staff

drafting it.

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or

in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary

contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of

this brief. No person other than Amicus Curiae, its members,

or its counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation

or submission.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Am. Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. at 435 ................................... 28

Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 137 n.5 (1982) ....................... 28

Bondholders Comm., Marlborough Inv. Co. v. Comm’r, 315

U.S. 189, 192 n.2 (1942) .................................................. 28

Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 182 U.S.App.D.C. 21 (D.C. Cir.

1977 ................................................................................. 35

Collier v. Stanbrough, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 14, 20–22 (1848) ... 29

Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 155 L. Ed. 2d

724 (2003) ....................................................................... 33

Department Of State, Et Al. v. Aids Vaccine Advocacy

Coalition, Et Al., 604 U. S. ____ (2025), U.S. Supreme

Court, Record No. No. 24A831 (March 5, 2025) ............. 16

El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 479 (1999) 27

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) ..................................... 35

Jennings v. Stephens, 574 U.S. 271, 276 (2015) .................. 27

Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191, 26 L.Ed. 377 (1880)

......................................................................................... 36

Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 421–22 (1940) ................ 28

Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 (1866) ...................... 9, 33

Morley Constr. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 300 U.S. 185, 191 (1937)

......................................................................................... 28

Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 US 714, 24 L ed 565 ................. 37

Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n,

783 F.3d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2015 .......................................... 48

Rose v. Himely (1808) 4 Cranch 241, 2 L ed 608 .................. 37

Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 585 n.24 (1982 ............. 28

South Carolina Public Service Authority v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41

(D.C.Cir.2014) .................................................................. 47

Title 8 U.S.C. ........................................................................... 5

Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen

Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 558 U.S. 67, 80 (2009) ....... 27

United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537

(1950) ................................................................................ 5

United States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322, 1338 (11th Cir. 2018)

......................................................................................... 23

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990)

......................................................................................... 33

United States v. Verrusio, 762 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ... 23

Williams v. Norris, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 117, 120 (1827) ..... 29

Windsor v. McVeigh (1876) 93 US 274, 23 L ed 914 ............ 37

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 555 U.S. 7

(2008) .............................................................................. 24

Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015) .........................9, 32, 34

STATUTES

50 U.S.C. §§ 21 – 24 ............................................................3, 4

8 U.S.C. § 1182 ............................................................7, 44, 46

8 U.S.C. § 1251 ..............................................................6, 7, 40

8 U.S.C. §1189 ...................................................................... 37

Alien Enemies Act of 1798 ..................................................4, 8

Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 ................................................. 10

vii

Article IV, Section 4, of the U.S. Constitution ...................... 30

Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2071-2077 .......................... 11

OTHER AUTHORITIES

"10 reasons why America’s first constitution failed," National

Constitution Center, November 17, 2022, ...................... 12

“Paso City Hall, Takes Cross-Border Fire, MSM Yawns”

Breitbart, ......................................................................... 31

Associate Professor of Law and Director Jeffrey M.

Anderson, “Right for Any Reason,” Cardozo Law Review,

Volume 44, Issue 3, page 1015 ....................................... 26

Executive Order “Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act

Regarding the Invasion of The United States by Tren De

Aragua” on Friday, March 14, 2025 ................................ 18

Sara Dorn, Molly Bohannon, Forbes, “Everything To Know

About Trump’s ‘Mass Deportation’ Plans—ICE Chief

Removed Amid Push For More Arrests,” Forbes, February

20, 2025 ........................................................................... 17

RULES

FRAP 29(a)(4)(E) ..................................................................... iv

FRAP RULE 26.1 ...................................................................... iv

viii

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF

AMICUS CURIAE

Proposed Amicus Curiae, the American

Rights Alliance (ARA) is an IRS Code

501(c)(3)

nonprofit,

tax

deductible

organization.

ARA is a coalition of legal

professionals,

advocates,

committed

and

defending

strategists

the

First

Amendment, protecting election integrity,

and ensuring transparency in democratic

processes. ARA works to expose fraud,

misconduct,

and

censorship

while

empowering individuals to speak freely and

without fear. We stand as a shield for those

whose voices are marginalized and as a force

holding systems accountable to safeguard the

core principles of a free and just society.

The ARA, founded by attorney Evan Turk and

represented herein by attorney Peter Ticktin,

comprises distinguished legal advocates dedicated to

preserving constitutional governance and protecting

the separation of powers. Treniss Evans, a United

States Citizen and a member of the American Rights

Alliance, supports ARA’s efforts to reinforce

executive authority and end judicial interference in

national security matters.

It is described at

www.AmericanRightsAlliance.org

and

accessible at 303 Evernia Street, Suite 300,

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401.

ISSUES AND SUMMARY OF THE

ARGUMENT

Amicus Curiae makes only two

arguments fleshed out in the following ways:

ISSUE # 1.

This Court must vacate the

District Court’s injunction because of the

well-established rule that if there are

multiple legal grounds for an action,

questions about one assertion does not

invalidate the others.

Invocation of the

Alien Enemies Act codified at 50 U.S.C. §§

21 – 24 may have reasons within the

range of a President’s core constitutional

powers but it is simply not necessary to

legally support the deportation of violent

trans-national criminal gang members.

Where a President has multiple legal

powers available to deport an illegal alien

unlawfully in the United States, whether

the District Court likes or dislikes or

accepts the President’s invocation of the

AEA is simply not relevant.

ISSUE # 2.

The

District

Court

has

inappropriately intervened in deportation

procedures, on the sparsest of factual

records, a President’s authority to deport

members of a transnational terrorist

group engaged in crime, violence, theft,

etc., simply because the District Court

disagreed with the policy objectives of the

President and his interpretation of the

Alien Enemies Act of 1798, codified at 50

U.S.C. §§ 21 – 24, even though the

President

independently

holds

such

authority on independent legal grounds to

do the same exact thing.

ISSUE # 3.

A President possesses inherent,

constitutional, and statutory authority

independent of and separate from the

Alien Enemies Act to deport non-citizens.

This

authority

Article

derives

directly

the

Constitution,

U.S.

from

affirmed historically by Supreme Court

precedent (see United States ex rel. Knauff

v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950))

recognizing the President’s broad powers

in immigration and national security

matters. Statutory immigration authority

under various provisions of Title 8 U.S.C.

further supports these executive powers.

ISSUE # 4.

The

designation

Terrorist

Organizations is a clear Executive Power not

subject to District Court challenges

ISSUE # 5.

Members

transnational

terrorist organizations such as MS-13 or

Tren de Aragua were excludable at the

time

their

entry

under

existing,

extensive laws addressing terrorism and

national

security

threats.

Specific

statutory authority already provided by 8

U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B), 1189, and related

statutes categorically rendered terrorists

excludable.

Their deportability depends

on being excludable at the time of their

entry into the United States as a matter

of law regardless of when the President

declared MS-13 and/or Tren de Aragua to

be terrorist organizations.

ISSUE # 6.

Chapter 8 U.S.C. § 1251 clearly

authorizes the deportation of aliens who

were excludable at the time of entry or

adjustment of status.

ISSUE # 7.

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1251, any

alien who enters the United States

“without inspection” at an official port of

entry,

who

evades

lawful

procedures

and

points

entry

entry,

unequivocally deportable for that reason

alone.

(A citizen of some other country

might have legal claims for entry, but the

law requires them to go back and try

again, following the law.)

ISSUE # 8.

8 U.S.C. § 1251 empowers a

President to exclude or deport a person

under (a)(1)(C)(i) “Nonimmigrant status

violators: Any alien who was admitted as

a nonimmigrant and who has failed to

maintain the nonimmigrant status in

which the alien was admitted or to which

it was changed under section 1258 of this

title, or to comply with the conditions of

any such status, is deportable”

ISSUE # 9.

8 U.S.C. § 1182 empowers a

President to exclude or deport under (f)

“Suspension of entry or imposition of

restrictions by President: Whenever the

President finds that the entry of any

aliens or of any class of aliens into the

United States would be detrimental to the

interests of the United States, he may by

proclamation, and for such period as he

shall deem necessary, suspend the entry

of all aliens or any class of aliens as

immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose

on the entry of aliens any restrictions he

may deem to be appropriate.”

ISSUE # 10. Federal

judges have

authority

enjoin

legal

presidential

deportation orders solely based on their

differing

interpretation

the

Alien

Enemies Act. Such judicial action would

impermissibly substitute judicial policy

preference over explicit constitutional and

statutory presidential authority, directly

conflicting with established constitutional

separation of powers doctrines.

ISSUE # 11. Federal judges lack constitutional

authority to usurp or countermand the

President’s

core

executive

powers

Commander-in-Chief and chief diplomat

managing foreign relations and national

security.

Supreme

Court

precedent

consistently underscores the primacy of

presidential authority in these domains,

limiting judicial involvement (Zivotofsky

v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015)).

ISSUE # 12. Injunctions and related judicial

orders that seek to enjoin or restrain core

presidential powers are inherently void

from

inception.

Such

actions

exceed

federal judicial jurisdiction, intrude upon

exclusively

violate

executive

constitutional

functions,

and

boundaries

repeatedly reinforced by Supreme Court

jurisprudence (Mississippi v. Johnson, 71

U.S. 475 (1866)).

II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

At its core, this case is about the

President’s duties of national security and

the clear constitutional authority vested in

the President to protect American citizens

from threats.

For 249 years, the Congress and the

President have shown extraordinary

deference to the Judiciary even when Federal

courts reach beyond their limits. The

Constitution explicitly rests in Congress the

power to create or alter the lower Federal

courts, set their jurisdiction, and set the rules

by which the lower courts function. Article I,

Section 8, Clause 9. Yet Congress has

comprehensively and generously delegated

this Constitutional role to the U.S. Supreme

Court to structure the entire Judiciary. See,

e.g., Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 20712077.

To be sure, the Judiciary has continued

and Congress has tolerated a host of legal

concepts, procedures, and mechanisms from

English common law and traditions,

including equitable concepts like injunctions.

The problem of a court engaging in a futile

exercise of deciding a case only to find that

the subject matter no longer exists is well

established. But since we have only silence

in the Constitution, and Congressional

authority as explicit, the fever of perpetually

expanding the use of injunctions like Kudzu

must be examined with careful scrutiny and

concern. We should recall that the United

States of America had a national government

under the Articles of Confederation, which

were rejected for several defects including a

President too weak to move promptly and

decisively to address national threats. "10

reasons why America’s first constitution

failed," National Constitution Center,

November 17, 2022,

https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/10-reasonswhy-americas-first-constitution-failed The

necessity of a strong executive to deal with

military, foreign policy, and external threats

is not a mere academic debate. We threw out

our first constitution over the defect.

The growing barrage of injunctions issued by

lower district courts represents a severe abuse of

judicial authority, improperly encroaching upon

executive powers. Non-citizens identified as security

threats lack constitutional standing to challenge the

executive’s national security decisions, and the

Supreme Court must decisively affirm this

fundamental principle to halt endless ideological

litigation. This Court must clearly establish that

future challenges to executive authority should be

exclusively pursued through extraordinary writs

directly before appellate courts or the Supreme

Court itself.

That is, nothing in the Constitution or

jurisprudence speaks to lone District Court

judges issuing injunctions. Nothing speaks to

the appellate courts giving undue deference

rather than supervising the extraordinary

disruption immediately up front. When

injunctions “jump the gun” early in a case,

the appellate instinct to wait until after the

end of a case is no longer workable. Nothing

speaks to injunctions outside of the

immediate case and the parties at bar.

Injunctions are being used to pre-decide

the merits, not as a stand-still of the status

quo ante. For example, on extraordinary

evidence of abuse of Federal funds – which

means in violation of the Congressional

authorization and appropriation laws – an

injunction that $2 billion of likely illegal

expenditures (measured against

Congressional appropriations language) must

be disbursed to admittedly less-developed

countries is not preserving the status quo.

Depositing the money in a trust account

might. But if the Administration prevails at

the end of the case, we will never see the $2

billion again. This Court made the

underlying litigation below pointless. See,

Order, on Application to Vacate the Order

Issued by The United States District Court,

Department Of State, Et Al. v. Aids Vaccine

Advocacy Coalition, Et Al., 604 U. S. ____

(2025), U.S. Supreme Court, Record No. No.

24A831 (March 5, 2025).

Instead of preserving the status quo

ante, the spreading practice is focused on predeciding the ultimate case in ways that

deprive the non-moving party of due process.

Who is likely to prevail on the merits? That

is like watching the 2 minute “trailer”

advertisement for the new movie and treating

that as the whole movie. Instead of honoring

“party presentation” and definition of the

questions to the court, the judge is litigating

the case. Injunctions are carried out in the

judge’s imagination rather than in the

courtroom with evidence, experts, etc.

Here, considering only recent examples,

Presidents William Clinton, George W. Bush,

Barack Obama, Donald Trump in this first

term, Joe Biden, and Donald Trump in the

first month of his second term have deported

aliens illegally present in the United States

of America.

“Federal agents deported just

over 37,000 people in Trump's

first month in office, below the

Biden-era 2024 average, Reuters

revealed Friday”

Sara Dorn, Molly Bohannon, Forbes,

“Everything To Know About Trump’s ‘Mass

Deportation’ Plans—ICE Chief Removed

Amid Push For More Arrests,” Forbes,

February 20, 2025,

https://www.forbes.com/sites/saradorn/2025/0

2/20/everything-to-know-about-trumps-massdeportation-plans-as-president-bans17

undocumented-immigrants-from-publicbenefits/

But then Donald Trump issued an

Executive Order “Invocation of the Alien

Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of The

United States by Tren De Aragua” on Friday,

March 14, 2025.2

Prior to this proclamation of March 14,

2025, Donald Trump in his second term had

already deported an estimated 60,000 illegal

aliens. Thus, what justifies the strange

sequence of events from March 14, 2025,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidentialactions/2025/03/invocation-of-the-alienenemies-act-regarding-the-invasion-of-theunited-states-by-tren-de-aragua/

until a Saturday hearing with none of the

Defendants yet served?

Deportations carried out routinely and

regularly for decades suddenly became

unacceptable because President Trump

designated transnational violent gangs

committing murders, assaults, threats to

obtain property, robbery to fund their

terrorist activities, etc.

The lawsuit in the District Court was

filed at about 2 AM (according to public

reports) on Saturday, March 15, 2025, the

day after the President’s proclamation.

Multiple defendant agencies had yet to be

served. Somehow the lawsuit was brought to

the attention of Judge Boasberg on a

Saturday. Boasberg was not the judge on call

for emergency matters, we are told in the

news. Yet Boasberg then ordered the parties

to appear by a virtual hearing at 4:00 PM on

Saturday, March 15, 2025, rescheduled to

5:00 PM. Clearly, the Clerk of Court on a

Saturday would not have noted much less

processed the case to issue summons in any

other case. There is no “return” of service on

Defendants in the file. (But the Clerk did

issue electronic summons on a Saturday at

lightning speed no other case would enjoy.)

During the hearing that started at 5:00

PM, Judge Boasberg verbally announced his

decision – posted as a Minute Order roughly

at 7:00 PM – that a class action be certified

explicitly consisting of those to whom the

Executive Order applies (that is concededly

terrorists), that the conceded terrorists not be

deported, possibly released into U.S. society.

Judge Boasberg ordered any airplanes

in the air to be returned to the U.S.A., with

no information of whether airplanes would

run out of fuel and crash into the ocean. In

fact, since none of the five Appellees were

affected, why was the question of flights in

the air ever raised?

Worse, still, District Court Judge

Boasberg continues to pursue this in

irregular scheduling and handling as an

effort to whip the President into compliance.

Instead of assuming that there is a stand-still

while the case proceeds, Boasberg appears to

be acting as a zealous criminal prosecutor.

III. ARGUMENT

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In general, this Court reviews questions

of law de novo. United States v. Verrusio, 762

F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

As currently

formulated and presented, this case involves

almost

entirely

questions

law.

addressing the District Court’s ruling, this

Court reviews the District Court's findings of

fact for clear error. United States v. Dixon,

901 F.3d 1322, 1338 (11th Cir. 2018).

B. GOVERNING LAW

INJUNCTION

The formula for an injunction requires:

A. A significant prejudice or burden

to the party or parties requesting

the injunction if it is not granted.

B. A

comparatively

insignificant

prejudice or burden upon the party

or parties affected by the requested

gag order if it is granted.

C. The balance of the equities argues

in favor of issuing the injunction.

The injunction or gag order is in

the public interest.

D. The

moving

party

has

substantial likelihood of prevailing

on the merits.

See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc, 555 U.S. 7 (2008).

Here,

the

stubborn

fact

that

deportations, especially for those guilty of

violent crimes, have been occurring for

decades, undercuts the grounds for issuing an

injunction on a Saturday afternoon by a lone

district judge on a sparse factual record.

C. COURT CANNOT INTERVENE

ON CHALLENGED GROUND

WHEN AN ALTERNATIVE

LEGAL BASIS EXISTS

The

argument

here

addresses

Issues 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9; de novo as errors of law.

Whenever

appellate

court

blocks challenges to governmental excess, the

court will routinely uphold a District Court

decision – particularly concerning actions of

the government – for any reason, even if that

reason has not been asserted by the original

parties or by the District Court:

One such rule of review is “right

for any reason,” the rule that an

appellee may defend a lower

court’s judgment on any grounds

supported by the record—even

grounds that the lower court

rejected or ignored. The

judgment may be right, even if

the reasons are wrong.

Associate Professor of Law and Director

Jeffrey M. Anderson, “Right for Any Reason,”

Cardozo Law Review, Volume 44, Issue 3,

page 1015, accessible at

https://cardozolawreview.com/wpcontent/uploads/2023/04/4.ANDERSON.44.3.2.Website.pdf

Prof. Anderson argues, among other

reforms, at least for the “right for any reason”

interpretive rule to be changed from

“mandatory” to “discretionary.” Id.

This is the rule known as “right

for any reason”: even without

taking a cross-appeal, an

appellee may challenge the

reasoning of the lower court,

asking the appellate court to

affirm the judgment below on

any ground supported by the

record, whether or not the lower

court accepted or even addressed

that ground in its ruling.83

Under this rule, an appellee is

entitled to argue a ground that it

presented but the lower court

ignored (because it relied on a

different ground).84 And the

appellee is entitled to argue a

ground that it presented but the

lower court rejected.85 Thus,

courts sometimes say that a

judgment may be affirmed if it is

right for the wrong reason.86

Id. at 1028-1030. 3

Citing in the Law Review article’s footnote 83

to:

See Jennings v. Stephens, 574 U.S. 271, 276

(2015); Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs

& Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 558 U.S. 67,

80 (2009); El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S.

473, 479 (1999); Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569,

Almost a century before

American Railway Express, Chief

Justice John Marshall wrote in

Williams v. Norris that “[i]f the

judgment should be correct,

although the reasoning, by which

the mind of the Judge was

conducted to it, should be deemed

unsound, that judgment would

certainly be affirmed in the

superior Court.”88 That is an

early statement of “right for any

reason”—but it was only dicta,

because the question before the

Court was simply whether an

opinion of one state supreme

court justice was properly part of

the record in a writ-of-error

proceeding.89 (It wasn’t.90) The

Supreme Court actually applied

“right for any reason” in Collier

585 n.24 (1982); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 137

n.5 (1982); Bondholders Comm., Marlborough Inv.

Co. v. Comm’r, 315 U.S. 189, 192 n.2 (1942); Le Tulle

v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 421–22 (1940); Morley

Constr. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 300 U.S. 185, 191 (1937);

Am. Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. at 435.

v. Stanbrough, affirming a state

supreme court’s judgment on an

alternative ground.91

Id. at 1030. 4 5

Thus, the District Court should

have denied the request for an injunction on

disagreement with the Alien Enemies Act as

being

immaterial

the

result

the

President’s authority to deport dangerous

criminals qualifying as terrorists.

Many may want to vigorously

debate when the Alien Enemies Act applies

Citing in FN 88 to Williams v. Norris, 25 U.S.

(12 Wheat.) 117, 120 (1827).

Citing in FN 91 to Collier v. Stanbrough, 47

U.S. (6 How.) 14, 20–22 (1848)

but, for these Plaintiffs, it is a tangent.

For example, Article IV, Section 4,

of the U.S. Constitution emphasis added)

requires that:

The United States shall

guarantee to every state in this

union a republican form of

government, and shall protect

each of them against

invasion; and on application of

the legislature, or of the

executive (when the legislature

cannot be convened) against

domestic violence.

Our Founders did not envision an

“invasion” as hundreds of Soviet T-34 tanks

in a swirling, massive tank battle. For

decades, many dozens of attacks across the

Southern border with Mexico have occurred.

On June 30, 2010, seven bullets

believed to have been fired from one or more

AK-47s from across the border in Juárez hit

the El Paso City Hall in Texas. See: “Paso

City Hall, Takes Cross-Border Fire, MSM

Yawns” Breitbart,

https://www.breitbart.com/themedia/2010/07/01/el-paso-city-hall-takescross-border-fire-msm-yawns/

D. THE LOWER COURT HAS NO

JURISDICTION TO USURP

THE CORE POWERS OF THE

PRESIDENT, CHIEF

EXECUTIVE, HEAD OF THE

EXECUTIVE BRANCH

This argument addresses Issue 2,

4, 10, 11, 12, ; de novo as errors of law.

The

powers

the

Federal

Government, which are limited in scope and

delegated to the U.S. Government by the

formerly independent nations of Colonies now

known as the United States of America, are

intentionally separated into three co-equal

branches.

10.

Federal judges lack constitutional

authority to usurp or countermand the

President’s

core

Commander-in-Chief

executive

and

powers

chief

diplomat

managing foreign relations and national

security.

Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1

(2015)).

11.

Injunctions and orders that seek

to enjoin or restrain core presidential powers

exceed federal judicial jurisdiction, intrude

upon exclusively executive functions, and

violate constitutional boundaries repeatedly

reinforced by Supreme Court jurisprudence

Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 (1866).

12.

United

States

Verdugo-

Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) confirmed

non-citizens posing national security threats

lack constitutional standing, clearly stating

constitutional protections “do not extend to

non-resident aliens outside the territory of

the United States.” The limited procedural

safeguards of Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,

123 S. Ct. 1708, 155 L. Ed. 2d 724 (2003) do

not undermine executive authority under the

Alien Enemies Act, as the Act specifically

empowers the President during declared

emergencies

involving

hostile

foreign

elements, an element absent in Demore v.

Kim.

13.