Response to application from respondent Svitlana Doe, et al. — Kristi Noem, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Applicants v. Svitlana Doe, et al.
Supreme Court briefMay 15, 2025
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No. 24A1079
In the Supreme Court of the United States
KRISTI NOEM, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL.,
Applicants,
v.
SVITLANA DOE, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION TO STAY THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPENDIX TO RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO STAY
ANWEN HUGHES
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST
121 W 36th Street, Pmb 520
New York, NY 10018
(212) 845-5244
JOHN A. FREEDMAN
LAURA S. SHORES
ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP
601 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 942-5000
JUSTIN B. COX
Counsel of Record
LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN B. COX
JAC Cooperating Counsel
P.O. Box 1106
Hood River, OR 97031
(541) 716-1818
justin@jcoxconsulting.org
ESTHER H. SUNG
KAREN C. TUMLIN
HILLARY LI
LAURA FLORES-PERILLA
BRANDON GALLI-GRAVES
JUSTICE ACTION CENTER
P.O. Box 27280
Los Angeles, CA 90027
(323) 450-7272
APPENDIX TO RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION
TO APPLICATION TO STAY
Description
D. Ct. Doc.
No.
Appendix
page start
Memorandum and Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs’
Emergency Motion for a Stay
97
App-001
Order Granting Class Certification
98
App-042
Declaration of Kika Scott
41-4
App-045
71-1
App-052
88-1
App-065
89
App-067
Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians,
Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, 90 Fed. Reg. 13,611
(Mar. 25, 2025)
USCIS Notice: Termination of Parole, Notice of
Intent to Revoke Employment Authorization
Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’
Emergency Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
District Court Docket
App-095
Huffman Memorandum dated January 20, 2025
41-1
App-128
Higgins email dated January 23, 2025
41-2
App-131
Davidson memorandum dated Feb. 14, 2025
41-3
App-133
24-1
App-137
24-2
App-146
24-3
App-156
24-4
App-167
27-1
App-175
64-3
App-186
64-4
App-195
Declaration of Plaintiff Alejandro Doe (CHNV
beneficiary)
Declaration of Plaintiff Ana Doe (CHNV
beneficiary)
Declaration of Plaintiff Armando Doe (CHNV
beneficiary)
Declaration of Plaintiff Carlos Doe (CHNV
beneficiary)
Declaration of Plaintiff Andrea Doe (Amended)
(CHNV beneficiary)
Declaration of Plaintiff Lucia Doe (CHNV
beneficiary)
Declaration of Plaintiff Miguel Doe (CHNV
beneficiary)
D. Ct. Doc.
No.
Appendix
page start
64-5
App-203
24-9
App-211
24-10
App-219
24-11
App-228
64-6
App-235
71-2
App-244
24-21
App-250
24-22
App-262
24-23
App-267
24-24
App-282
24-25
App-296
Declaration of Esther Sung, counsel for Plaintiffs
24-36
App-309
History of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)
24-37
App-316
David J. Bier, Cato Institute, 126 Parole Orders over
7 Decades: A Historical Review of Immigration
Parole Orders (July 17, 2023), cato.org/blog/126parole-orders-over-7-decades-historical-reviewimmigration-parole-orders.
24-38
App-319
Declaration of Yael Schacher
24-39
App-325
Declaration of Eric Schwartz
24-40
App-347
Declaration of Mort Halperin
24-41
App-364
Description
Declaration of Plaintiff Daniel Doe (CHNV
beneficiary)
Declaration of Plaintiff Sandra McAnany (CHNV
sponsor)
Declaration of Plaintiff Kyle Varner (CHNV
sponsor)
Declaration of Plaintiff Wilhen Pierre Victor (CHNV
sponsor)
Declaration of Plaintiff Gabriela Doe (CHNV
sponsor)
Declaration of Plaintiff Norma Lorena Dus (CHNV
sponsor)
Implementation of a Parole Process for Venezuelans,
87 Fed. Reg. 63507 (Oct. 19, 2022)
Implementation of Changes to the Parole Process for
Venezuelans, 88 Fed. Reg. 1279 (Jan. 9, 2023)
Implementation of a Parole Process for Cubans, 88
Fed. Reg. 1266 (Jan. 9, 2023)
Implementation of a Parole Process for Haitians, 88
Fed. Reg. 1243 (Jan. 9, 2023)
Implementation of a Parole Process for Nicaraguans,
88 Fed. Reg. 1255 (Jan. 9, 2023)
Description
D. Ct. Doc.
No.
Appendix
page start
Declaration of Deb Rogers
24-42
App-419
24-43
App-433
72
App-440
Bo Cooper, INS Gen. Counsel, Legal Opinion: Parole
of Individuals From the Former Soviet Union Who
Are Denied Refugee Status (June 15, 2001).
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their
Emergency Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and
Stay of DHS’s En Masse Truncation of All Valid
Grants of CHNV Parole
Transcript – Oral Argument, April 10, 2025
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
SVITLANA DOE, et al.,
*
*
Plaintiffs,
*
*
v.
*
*
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as *
Secretary of Homeland Security; TODD M. *
*
LYONS, in his official capacity as the
*
Acting Director of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; PETE R. FLORES, *
*
in his official capacity as Acting
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border *
*
Protection; KIKA SCOTT, in her official
capacity as the Senior Official Performing *
*
the Duties of the Director of U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services; and *
*
DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official
*
capacity as President of the United States,
*
*
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-10495-IT
MEMORANDUM & ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR A STAY OF DHS’S EN MASSE TRUNCATION
OF ALL VALID GRANTS OF CHNV PAROLE
April 14, 2025
Among several motions pending before the court is Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and Stay of DHS’s En Masse Truncation of All Valid Grants of CHNV
Parole [Doc. No. 70]. For the reasons that follow, and pending further court order, the court
grants emergency relief staying the Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians,
Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, 90 Fed. Reg. 13611 (Mar. 25, 2025), insofar as it revokes,
without case-by-case review, the previously granted parole and work authorization issued to
noncitizens paroled into the United States pursuant to parole programs for noncitizens from
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Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (the “CHNV parole programs”) prior to the noncitizen’s
originally stated parole end date.
I.
Background
A. The Statutory Parole Authority
Under the Immigration and Nationalization Act, as amended:
The Secretary of Homeland Security may . . . in his discretion parole into the United
States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-bycase basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien
applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not
be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall,
in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served the alien
shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and
thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any
other applicant for admission to the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (emphasis added). 1
B. The CHNV Processes
On October 19, 2022, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) announced an
effort to address the increasing number of Venezuelan nationals arriving at the southern border
of the United States by “coupl[ing] a meaningful incentive to seek a lawful, safe and orderly
means of traveling to the United States with the imposition of consequences for those who seek
to enter irregularly.” Implementation of a Parole Process for Venezuelans, 87 Fed. Reg. 63507
(Oct. 19, 2022). Under the program, individuals who passed a national security and public safety
vetting and who had a supporter in the United States who agreed to provide housing and other
support could receive an advanced authorization to travel to the United States for the purposes of
seeking, on a case-by-case basis, a discretionary grant of parole at an internal port of entry. See
1
An “alien” is “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” Id. § 1101(a)(3).
2
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id. at 63515; see also id. at 63508 (“[o]nly those who meet specified criteria and pass national
security and public safety vetting would be eligible for consideration for parole under this
process.”). 2 The program specified that discretionary grants of parole would be for a temporary
period of up to two years, during which time individuals could seek humanitarian relief or other
benefits and receive work authorization. See id. at 63508. The program specified further that
those “who are not granted asylum or other immigration benefits will need to leave the United
States at the expiration of their authorized period of parole or will generally be placed in removal
proceedings after the period of parole expires.” Id. The process was capped at 24,000
beneficiaries. See id. Individuals who had been ordered removed from the United States in the
past five years, or who crossed into the United States between ports of entry or entered Mexico
or Panama without authorization after October 19, 2022, were barred from the program. Id.
In early 2023, DHS implemented similar processes for nationals of Cuba, Haiti, and
Nicaragua. See Implementation of a Parole Process for Cubans, 88 Fed. Reg. 1266 (Jan. 9,
2023); Implementation of a Parole Process for Haitians, 88 Fed. Reg. 1243 (Jan. 9, 2023);
Implementation of a Parole Process for Nicaraguans, 88 Fed. Reg. 1255 (Jan. 9, 2023).
On October 4, 2024, DHS announced that there would be no “re-parole” beyond the
initial two-year period for the parolees who entered the United States under the CHNV parole
programs. See Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and
Venezuelans, 90 Fed. Reg. 13611, 13614 n.24 (Mar. 25, 2025). 3
2
In contrast, “[a]n alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who
arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney
General, is inadmissible.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
3
Plaintiffs do not dispute that re-parole is not available through the CHNV processes. See Mem.
ISO Second Mot. for PI at 3 n.4 [Doc. No. 72].
3
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C. The January 20, 2025 Executive Orders
On January 20, 2025, President Trump signed numerous executive orders, including two
that are relevant here:
The first order directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to “take all appropriate action
[consistent with applicable law] to . . . [t]erminate all categorical parole programs that are
contrary to the policies of the United States established in my Executive Orders, including the
[CHNV program].” See Exec. Order No. 14165, 90 Fed. Reg. 8467 (Jan. 30, 2025).
The second order directed the Secretary to take “all appropriate action, consistent with
law,” to:
ensur[e] that the parole authority under section 212(d)(5) of the INA (8 U.S.C.
1182(d)(5)) is exercised on only a case-by-case basis in accordance with the plain
language of the statute, and in all circumstances only when an individual alien
demonstrates urgent humanitarian reasons or a significant public benefit derived
from their particular continued presence in the United States arising from such
parole[.]
See Exec Order No. 14159, 90 Fed. Reg. 8443 (Jan. 29, 2025).
D. The Huffman Memorandum
On January 20, 2025, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Benjamin C. Huffman
issued a memorandum stating that “[i]t is evident that many current DHS policies and practices
governing parole are inconsistent with [8 U.S.C § 1182(d)(5)].” See Huffman Memorandum 2
[Doc. No. 41-1]. The memorandum stated that the language and context of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)
“make it abundantly clear that it is a limited use authority, applicable only in a very narrow set of
circumstances,” and that the statute “does not authorize categorical parole programs that make
aliens presumptively eligible on the basis of some set of broadly applicable criteria.” Id. at 1-2
(emphasis in original). The memorandum further stated that “it is generally unlawful to parole
into the United States aliens with pending applications for refugee status filed abroad, and aliens
4
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found to have prima facie asylum claims who are being allowed into the United States to await
adjudication of those claims.” Id. at 2.
The Huffman memorandum ordered that within 60 days, the Director of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”), and the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)
were to compile and review all policies pertaining to parole to determine “which are not strictly
in accord with” 8 U.S.C § 1182(d)(5), and to thereafter “[f]ormulate a plan for phasing out” any
such policies. See id. It further ordered that pending such review, DHS Components would have
“discretion to pause, modify, or terminate any parole program described in [the previous
paragraph] to the extent” that: (1) the policy was not promulgated pursuant to the procedural
requirements of the APA; (2) DHS could take such action while protecting legitimate reliance
interests; and (3) taking such action was otherwise consistent with applicable statutes,
regulations, and court orders. See id.
Huffman concluded his memorandum by stating that “should any court disagree with the
interpretation of the parole statute articulated in this memorandum, I clarify that I am also
implementing this policy as a matter of my discretion to deny parole in any circumstance.” Id.
E. The Davidson Memorandum
On February 14, 2025, Andrew Davidson, the Acting Deputy Director of USCIS, issued a
memorandum authorizing an immediate agency-wide administrative hold on all pending status
readjustment and benefit requests filed by individuals paroled into the United States under the
CHNV programs, pending “the completion of additional vetting flags in ELIS to identity any
fraud, public safety, or national security concerns.” Davidson Memorandum [Doc. No. 41-3].
The memorandum stated that USCIS had suspended parts of the CHNV processes in July 2024
5
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after a USCIS assessment identified potential concerns related to fraudulent sponsorship
requests. Id. at 2. Based on this assessment, the memorandum stated that “benefit requests filed
by aliens who are or were paroled under any of these categorical parole programs need further
review to determine the level of fraud and the possible involvement of beneficiaries.” Id. 4
The Davidson memorandum concluded by stating:
Any case subject to this administrative hold with a litigation need may only be lifted
from the hold on a case-by-case basis, in a subsequent memo to file, with approval
by the USCIS Director or USCIS Deputy Director. This case-by-case requirement
must be followed even when aliens are member of a class that is subject to
injunction, settlement agreement, or other court order. Once USCIS completes a
comprehensive review and evaluation of the in-country population of aliens who
are or were paroled into the United States under these categorical parole programs,
USCIS may issue a subsequent memo lifting this administrative hold.
Id. To date, the “administrative hold” has not been lifted.
F. The March 25, 2025 Federal Register Notice
On March 25, 2025, DHS published a Federal Register Notice (“FRN”) announcing that,
effective immediately, DHS “is terminating the categorical parole programs for inadmissible
aliens from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.” See Termination of Parole Processes for
Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, 90 Fed. Reg. 13611 (Mar. 25, 2025). 5 The
4
The Davidson Memorandum also suspended benefits requests filed by individuals paroled
under the Uniting for Ukraine and Family Reunification Parole programs. See Davidson
Memorandum 1 [Doc. No. 41-3]. The court will address Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Davidson
Memorandum in a separate order.
5
The FRN repeatedly uses the term “inadmissible aliens” in describing the individuals in the
United States pursuant to these parole programs. See e.g. id. at 13614 (referring to “inadmissible
aliens arriving in local communities”); id. at 13618 (“Between October 19, 2022, and January 22,
2025, approximately 532,000 inadmissible aliens received parole into the United States pursuant
to the CHNV parole programs.”) (emphasis added). Parole is authorized for individuals
“applying for admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). In other words, parole
may be granted when an individual has not yet been deemed either admissible or inadmissible.
The FRN gives no reason for mislabeling individuals who received parole through CHNV (or
any other program) as “inadmissible” and, when detailing the statutory scheme, acknowledges
6
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FRN announced further that “[t]he temporary parole period of aliens in the United States under
the CHNV parole programs and whose parole has not already expired by April 24, 2025[,] will
terminate on that date unless the Secretary makes an individual determination to the contrary.”
Id. It directed further that “[p]arolees without a lawful basis to remain in the United States
following this termination of the CHNV parole programs must depart the United States before
their parole termination date.” Id. The FRN detailed further that:
DHS generally intends to remove promptly aliens who entered the United States
under the CHNV parole programs who do not depart the United States before their
parole termination date and do not have any lawful basis to remain in the United
States. DHS retains its discretion to commence enforcement action against any
alien at any time, including during the 30-day waiting period created by this notice.
Id. at 13618. 6
The FRN stated that terminating the CHNV programs and existing grants of parole under
CHNV was consistent with the President’s executive orders, including Executive Order 14165.
See id. at 13611. According to the FRN, the CHNV programs “do not serve a significant public
benefit, are not necessary to reduce levels of illegal immigration, did not sufficiently mitigate the
domestic effects of illegal immigration, are not serving their intended purposes, and are
inconsistent with the Administration’s foreign policy goals.” Id. at 13612. 7 The FRN further
that “a parolee remains an applicant for admission during the period of parole in the United
States.” Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans,
90 Fed. Reg. 13611, 13618 (Mar. 25, 2025).
6
The FRN further stated that “DHS intends to prioritize for removal those who (1) have not,
prior to the publication of this notice, properly filed an immigration benefit request, with
appropriate fee (or fee waiver request, if available) to obtain a lawful basis to remain in the
United States (e.g., adjustment of status, asylum, Temporary Protected Status, or T or U
nonimmigrant status) and (2) are not the beneficiary of an immigration benefit request properly
filed by someone else on their behalf (e.g., petition for alien relative, fiancé petition, petition for
immigrant employee), with appropriate fee (or fee waiver request, if available).” Id. at 13619.
7
The FRN explained in some detail why the original grounds for the CHNV program did not
warrant continuing the program. See id. at 13612-13614 (explaining why, in DHS’s view, the
7
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stated that as to prior arguments or determinations “that these programs were consistent with the
requirement of ‘urgent humanitarian reasons’ for granting parole, DHS believes that
consideration of any urgent humanitarian reasons for granting parole is best addressed on a caseby-case basis consistent with the statute, and taking into consideration each alien’s specific
circumstances.” Id. The FRN concluded that these reasons, independently and cumulatively,
support termination of the CHNV programs. Id.
After addressing DHS’s rationale for terminating the CHNV programs, the FRN turned to
the reliance interests of prospective supporters and parolees. Id. at 13617. The FRN asserted first
that “the temporary and discretionary nature of the programs indicate that reliance on the
continued existence of the CHNV parole programs would be unwarranted,” but that it was
addressing certain reliance interests “in an abundance of caution.” Id.
The FRN addressed first the reliance interests of supporters and potential beneficiaries of
the CHNV programs, concluding that the costs potentially incurred by these individuals were
minimal and “pale in comparison to the U.S. Government’s sovereign interest in determining
who is paroled into the United States.” Id. at 13617-18.
The FRN addressed next the reliance interests of potential beneficiaries with approved
advanced travel authorizations (“ATA”) and their supporters. The FRN stated that “[t]here are no
currently approved ATAs upon which an alien may travel under the CHNV programs,” and that
CHNV programs were unnecessary to achieve border security goals); id. at 13614-15 (explaining
why, in DHS’s view, the CHNV programs did not minimize “the burden on communities, state
and local governments, and NGOs”); id. at 13615-16 (explaining why, in DHS’s view, the
CHNV programs are inconsistent with the new administration’s foreign policy goals); id. at
13616-17 (explaining why, in DHS’s view, other factors do not counsel in favor of maintaining
the CHNV programs).
8
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the interests of any individual whose application for an ATA has been cancelled are outweighed
by the other concerns specified in the FRN. Id. at 13618. 8
Finally, the FRN addressed the reliance interests of individuals with a current grant of
parole under the CHNV programs, including that these individuals “will have departed their
native country; traveled to the United States; obtained housing, employment authorization, and
means of transportation; and perhaps commenced the process of building connections to the
community where they reside.” Id. at 13619. The FRN stated that “any assessment of” these
interests “must account for CHNV parolees’ knowledge at the outset that (1) the Secretary
retained the discretion to terminate the parole programs at any point in time, and to terminate any
grants of parole at any time when, in her opinion, the purposes of such parole have been served;
and that (2) the initial term of parole would be limited to a maximum of two years.” Id.
The FRN concluded that “the potential reliance interests among aliens paroled into the
United States under the CHNV parole programs do not outweigh the U.S. government’s strong
interest in promptly removing parolees when the basis for the underlying program no longer
exists.” Id. DHS stated that it considered the alternative of permitting CHNV parole recipients to
8
The absence of any approved ATA requests followed a directive issued on January 23, 2025, by
Jennifer B. Higgins, then Acting Director of USCIS, to her colleagues to “ensure effective
immediately that your staff do not make any final decisions (approval, denial, closure) or issue a
travel document or I-94 for any initial parole or re-parole application, petition, motion, or other
request” for the CHNV, or other parole programs. See Higgins E-mail [Doc. No. 41-2]. On
January 28, 2025, USCIS provided notice on its website that it was “pausing acceptance” of the
Form I-134A, Online Request to be a Supporter and Declaration of Financial Support used to
initiate the parole processes for the CHNV and certain other programs, “until the Agency had
reviewed all categorical parole programs as instructed by Executive Order (EO) 14165.” See
Kika Scott Decl. ¶ 4 [Doc. No. 41-4]. The court will address Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Higgins
E-mail in a separate order.
9
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remain in the country until the natural expiration of the parole, but the FRN rejected that
alternative on the grounds that it would:
essentially foreclose DHS’s ability to expeditiously remove those CHNV parolees
with no lawful basis to remain in the United States. Under this alternative, CHNV
parolees may begin to accrue more than two years of continuous presence in the
United States, such that DHS would have to initiate section 240 removal
proceedings to effectuate their removal. See INA 235(b)(1)(iii)(II), 8 U.S.C.
1235(b)(1)(iii)(II). As a result, the already overburdened immigration court system
would be further taxed with adjudicating the section 240 removal proceedings for
the pertinent CHNV beneficiary population, a result DHS finds unacceptable.
Id. at 13619-20.
For the same reason, DHS rejected the alternative of more than a 30-day
termination period for existing grants of parole. See id. at 13620.
The FRN concluded by stating DHS’s view that publication of the notice in the Federal
Register constitutes legally sufficient notice to all interested or affected persons. Id.
G. Plaintiffs Who Were Paroled into the United States Under the CHNV Programs 9
Plaintiffs 10 who were paroled into the United States under the CHNV Programs have
supported the pending motions with declarations stating the following:
9
For the purposes of this order, this court addresses only the claims of individuals who received
parole through a CHNV program. The court does not address here the claims of Plaintiffs who
supported individuals or are seeking to support individuals for parole through the CHNV
programs. The court is also not addressing here the claims of Plaintiffs who received parole or
have supported or are seeking to support individuals through any parole program other than
CHNV.
10
These Plaintiffs are proceeding here under pseudonyms pursuant to the parties’ Stipulated
Protective Order Concerning Confidential Doe PII [Doc. No. 57] and this court’s Electronic
Order [Doc. No. 69] granting Plaintiffs’ Second Supplemental Motion to Proceed Under
Pseudonym [Doc. No. 64]. All Plaintiffs except Miguel Doe voluntarily provided their identities
to Defendants, and all Plaintiffs have provided their identities to this court for in camera review.
See Mem. & Order [Doc. No. 79]; Sealed Notice Providing Plaintiffs’ Identities [Doc. No. 81-1].
10
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1. Armando Doe 11
Armando Doe fled Nicaragua due to the dangers he faced stemming from his work
dedicated to documenting government abuse, the arrest of his father-in-law, and the harassment
and persecution of his wife’s family. 12 He lawfully entered the United States pursuant to a twoyear grant of parole in February 2024. He received work authorization in April 2024 and has
been working at a company that makes tractor trailers. The salary he earns helps him provide for
his family here as well as for his parents in Nicaragua, including to pay for their medical
appointments and living expenses. If Armando Doe cannot work in the United States, he will be
forced to returned to Nicaragua and face persecution by the Nicaraguan government. He is
scared to return to Nicaragua and has a pending asylum application, which he submitted in
January 2025. He attended his biometrics appointment for his asylum application in February
2025.
2.
Ana Doe 13
Ana Doe, the wife of Armando Doe, is also a citizen of Nicaragua who received a twoyear grant of parole in February 2024. She received work authorization in April 2024. In
Nicaragua, Ana Doe completed college studies computer engineering. Here, she has been
working for a company that supplies personal protective equipment. She uses her salary here to
provide for her family and for her mother who lives in Nicaragua.
11
See Armando Doe Decl. [Doc. No. 24-3].
12
Armando Doe’s wife is Plaintiff Ana Doe.
13
See Ana Doe Decl. [Doc. No. 24-2].
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Ana Doe has a pending asylum application that she submitted in January 2025 because
she fears persecution by the current governmental regime. She states that she is not even certain
she would be allowed entry into Nicaragua, which would leave her and her family stateless.
3.
Carlos Doe 14
Carlos Doe is a citizen of Nicaragua and is the cousin of Ana and Alejandro Doe. In his
hometown in Nicaragua, the government assassinated 32 people and disappeared more than 50
after protests broke out. The army identified him as being involved in the protests and in
opposition to the government, and soldiers and police officers came to his home several times
and made death threats against him and his family. He and his father fled their hometown and
went into hiding, but later received anonymous calls and more death threats. Soldiers visited his
mother’s home in 2021 and told her that they would imprison Carlos Doe and his father for
treason if they found them. A family member living in the U.S. sponsored him for CHNV parole,
and he was approved to travel to the United States in May 2023. He arrived in the United States
and received a two-year grant of parole, originally set to expire in June 2025.
Carlos Doe obtained work authorization in October 2023. He currently works at a
manufacturing plant performing welding and soldering. He has also worked providing food
delivery services and performing home renovations and has learned English through these jobs.
Carlos Doe has a pending application for asylum that he submitted in January 2025 and
had an appointment with USCIS for his asylum application scheduled for March 4, 2025.
14
See Carlos Doe Decl. [Doc. No. 24-4].
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Andrea Doe 15
Plaintiff Andrea Doe is a citizen of Nicaragua whose husband was sentenced to over 20
years in prison due to his opposition to the Nicaraguan government. In prison, Andrea Doe’s
husband suffered physical and mental torture. While her husband was incarcerated, Andrea
Doe’s home was surveilled, and police vehicles stationed themselves in front of her home. When
Andrea Doe and her children traveled to the penitentiary to visit her husband, police agents
waited at the corner until she and her children got on the bus. After her husband was in prison for
four years, the Nicaraguan government agreed to release 222 political prisoners, including her
husband, on the condition that the United States would take them. The political prisoners were
abruptly released from prison and placed on a flight to the United States. Her husband received
parole into the United States, and the Nicaraguan government stripped him and the other
passengers on the flight of their Nicaraguan citizenship, making Andrea Doe’s husband stateless.
Andrea Doe states that the U.S. government told her husband and other passengers on his
flight to use the CHNV programs to apply for reunification with their family members who were
left behind in Nicaragua. Her husband followed that instruction, and Andrea Doe and their
children arrived in the United States in the summer of 2023, after being sponsored for CHNV
parole by someone outside her family.
In the United States, Andrea Doe received work authorization, and she and her husband
both work at a company that installs vinyl on cars for advertising. Their children attend
elementary school.
15
See Andrea Doe Decl. [Doc. No. 27-1].
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Andrea Doe’s husband included her on his asylum application, which is still pending. She
fears returning to Nicaragua, where government officials saw her visiting her husband in prison
and know she is his wife. She reports that when she and her children were leaving Nicaragua,
they were pulled out of the line, had their passports taken, and were held up at the airport for two
hours. She believes that if she was forced to return to Nicaragua, she would be detained, and the
government would take away her children.
5.
Lucia Doe 16
Plaintiff Lucia Doe is a Venezuelan national who left her home country due to her
family’s difficult financial circumstances. She has a bachelor’s degree in Christian Education
from a university in Puerto Rico, but her salary as Director of Children’s Ministries at a Christian
church in Venezuela was insufficient to provide for basic needs like food, rent, and clothing. Her
family had to rely on financial assistance from her relatives living abroad. She received a twoyear grant of parole in July 2024 and obtained a work permit in August 2024.
Lucia Doe works cleaning apartments, condominiums, houses, schools, and businesses.
Her plan when seeking parole was to use her two-year grant of parole to work to support her
parents and to save money for the future, as well as to pay back her sister for the money her
sister spent helping Lucia Doe obtain a work permit and secure transportation to the United
States. She fears returning to Venezuela, where she says it is especially difficult to find
employment over the age of 40. She has been saving money in case she needs to purchase a lastminute ticket to Venezuela, as to avoid unlawful status in the United States.
16
See Lucia Doe Decl. [Doc. No. 64-3].
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Lucia Doe is concerned about returning to Venezuela with a parole stamp on her passport
and states that other Venezuelans who have returned with such stamps have been forced to pay
money to military officials at the border in order to be allowed to return to Venezuela, while
others have had their passports confiscated, have been imprisoned, or have disappeared.
6.
Miguel Doe 17
Plaintiff Miguel Doe is a Nicaraguan national and is the brother of Alejandro Doe. In
Nicaragua, he struggled to find stable work, after being unable to complete his university studies
due to interruptions from the Covid-19 pandemic, subsequent changes to the curriculum and
course requirements, and the frequent cancellation of courses at his public university. He
received a two-year grant of parole in July 2024 after being sponsored by his cousin. He intended
to use his two-year grant of parole to provide for his family and save money. He never intended
to stay in the United States indefinitely, as his mother needs help caring for herself. Miguel Doe
received work authorization in September 2024 and currently works full-time producing marble
panels.
Miguel Doe fears that the Nicaraguan government will assume he opposes it if he returns
as a deportee and recipient of parole. He believes the risk is even greater if he applies for but
does not receive asylum in the United States. However, he also fears staying in the United States
without lawful status.
7.
Daniel Doe 18
Plaintiff Daniel Doe is a Haitian national. While in Haiti, Daniel Doe worked as a court
interpreter and as an interpreter for the U.S. Embassy, among other groups. On multiple
17
See Miguel Doe Decl. [Doc. No. 64-4].
18
See Daniel Doe Decl. [Doc. No. 64-5].
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occasions, he was followed by people on motorcycles on his way to work; Daniel Doe believes
these individuals were part of a gang and were tracking his and his family’s whereabouts due to
his work as an interpreter and with the U.S. Embassy.
In Haiti, his neighborhood came under the control of a gang, whose members attacked
and kidnapped neighborhood residents. Daniel Doe and his wife left their original neighborhood
after the gang broke into their neighbor’s home, physically attacked the husband of the
household, and kidnapped the wife of the household. In their new neighborhood, a gang attacked
the police station, and there are no longer police forces in the neighborhood.
A friend of Daniel Doe’s father offered to support him for CHNV parole but could only
afford to support Daniel and not his family. Daniel Doe and his wife searched for a supporter
through a matching process so that they could be paroled as a family. They were matched with a
sponsor, but Daniel Doe subsequently received travel authorization through his original
application. He was granted a two-year period of parole in February 2024.
Daniel Doe received work authorization in March 2024. He worked as a tutor and
currently works as an English as a Second Language teacher at two schools. He also obtained his
license as a life insurance agent, is currently taking courses on financial investing, and is seeking
to receive certification to work as an interpreter in the United States. Daniel Doe has also started
a company that promotes education for Haitian immigrants who are new to the United States. He
is the main financial supporter of his wife and daughter who live in Haiti. Without work
authorization, Daniel Doe will not be able to provide for his family.
Daniel Doe received Temporary Protected Status in September 2024, which was
originally set to expire in February 2026. The government has since modified his TPS to
terminate in August 2025.
16
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Jurisdiction and Reviewability
Defendants raise numerous challenges to this court’s jurisdiction. While Defendants are
correct that the Secretary’s discretion in this area is broad, their conclusion that the Secretary’s
actions are wholly shielded from judicial review is incorrect. Accordingly, while this court
recognizes that its role in reviewing agency action in this area is limited, within that limited role
the court is not precluded from considering Plaintiffs’ APA claims or from staying the
Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, 90 Fed.
Reg. 13611 (Mar. 5, 2025) insofar as it revokes, without case-by-case review, previously granted
parole and work authorizations for individuals currently in the United States.
A. Standing
“If at least one plaintiff has standing, the suit may proceed.” Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S.
477, 489 (2023). To satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, an injury must be “concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable
by a favorable ruling.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quoting
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)). “At the preliminary
injunction stage . . . the plaintiff must make a ‘clear showing’ that she is ‘likely’ to establish each
element of standing.” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 58 (2024). The court finds that the
Plaintiffs listed above are similarly situated for purposes of this inquiry and are all likely to
establish each element of standing to challenge the FRN’s early termination of their parole and
work authorization.
The Plaintiffs described above attest to the risks they face from the loss of lawful status
and work authorization as well as from a subsequent removal from the United States. See supra
Part I.G. Defendants argue that these injuries are not redressable by a stay of the FRN because
even if the FRN is stayed, the Secretary still retains authority (1) to end the CHNV programs any
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time, without issuing guidance in the Federal Register; and (2) to make individual determinations
terminating Plaintiffs’ parole.
The first argument goes to the underlying merits of this dispute, namely whether the
discretion to end the CHNV program moving forward allows the Secretary to ignore, on a
categorical basis, the specific duration of parole accorded in the grant of parole to each
individual parolee. The first argument does not go to the threshold question of standing. The
second argument is beside the point, where Defendants have made no individual determinations
regarding the revocation of individual grants of parole and Plaintiffs’ challenge is to Defendants’
categorical actions.
The court finds that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the shortening of their grant of
parole. Plaintiffs were paroled into the United States by complying with the immigration
processes made available to them. As lawful parolees, they did not have to fear arrest for being
in the United States, were permitted to legally work if they received work authorization, and
could apply for adjustment of status or other benefits while paroled into this country. The
immediate impact of the shortening of their grant of parole is to cause their lawful status in the
United States to lapse early––in less than two weeks. If their parole status is allowed to lapse,
Plaintiffs will be faced with two unfavorable options: continue following the law and leave the
country on their own, or await removal proceedings.
If Plaintiffs leave the country on their own, they will face dangers in their native
countries, as set forth in their affidavits. For some Plaintiffs, leaving will also cause family
separation. Leaving may also mean Plaintiffs will have forfeited any opportunity to obtain a
remedy based on their APA claims, as leaving may moot those claims.
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If, in the alternative, Plaintiffs remain in the United States and await removal
proceedings, they may be subject to arrest and detention, they will no longer be authorized to
work legally in this country 19 and their opportunities to seek any adjustment of status will
evaporate. In this litigation, Defendants have repeatedly contended that Plaintiffs will have the
opportunity to renew their requests for immigration benefits if placed in removal proceedings. 20
But even if Plaintiffs can renew requests for certain benefits, some requests may very well be
denied simply because Plaintiffs would no longer be in lawful status. Defendants’ positions are
also inconsistent. Despite claiming Plaintiffs could renew requests in removal proceedings,
Defendants: (1) are defending the FRN, which states that the revoking of parole is designed to
ensure expedited removal (thereby avoiding removal proceedings); and (2) insist that Plaintiffs
can be subjected to expedited removal proceedings while acknowledging, at a hearing before this
court, that Plaintiffs could not renew most immigration benefits requests if placed in expedited
proceedings. See infra Part IV.A. Finally, Defendants neglect to mention that the Davidson
Memorandum—which Defendants maintain is lawful—imposed an indefinite suspension of
immigration benefits adjudications, rendering Plaintiffs’ chances of having any benefits
adjudicated outside of removal proceedings a virtual nullity.
In either event, Plaintiffs have standing.
19
Denial of work authorization over the course of this litigation would cause harm to Plaintiffs
that could not be remedied through damages. See supra Part I.G.
20
See, e.g., Opp. to Supp. Mot. for Class Cert. 8 [Doc. No. 90] (“If Rescinded Parolee Plaintiffs
are placed into removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, they can renew their requests for
relief—whether for asylum, withholding of removal, TPS, or adjustment of status—in those
proceedings, which have multiple levels of appellate review.”); Opp. to Mot. for PI 7 [Doc. No.
42] (“If a Parolee Plaintiff who asserts a fear of return to her home country or entitlement to TPS
is placed in removal proceedings under § 1229a, those claims could be raised before the
immigration judge.”).
19
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B. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)
Defendants argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes this court’s review of
Plaintiffs’ claims. See Opp. to Second Mot. for PI 7 [Doc. No. 89]. That is incorrect.
Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips district courts of jurisdiction to review “any [] decision or
action of . . . the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this
subchapter to be in the discretion of . . . the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the
granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title.” 21 The decision to categorically truncate,
without any individual review, grants of parole is not specified in the Subchapter to be within the
Secretary’s discretion.
Defendants argue that the decision whether to terminate parole is within the Secretary’s
discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) and is therefore precluded from review by Section
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). As to the revocation of an individual grant of parole, that statement is
unremarkable: The parole statute, which is in the same subchapter, provides that an alien’s parole
may be terminated “when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of
Homeland Security, have been served[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (emphasis added). Section
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies to matters where discretion is conferred by statute on the Secretary, see
Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 251-52 (2010) (emphasis added), and under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A), Congress has placed individual parole determinations, and the decision of
whether to revoke such individual grants of parole, within the Secretary’s discretion.
But there is a separate question as to whether Congress, by statute, also has given the
Secretary the discretion, after parole has been granted and individuals have entered the country
21
Section 1158(a) pertains to the granting of asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).
20
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on a lawful basis for approved periods, to categorically truncate these grants of parole en masse
and without individual review, such that review of that en masse revocation may be precluded
here under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The answer is no. As this court explains below, the FRN’s
categorical truncation of Plaintiffs’ previously awarded period of parole violates Section
1182(d)(5)(A). That statute requires grants of parole to be made on a case-by-case basis. Thus,
the statute requires that to determine whether the purposes of a grant of parole “have been
served” such that termination is warranted, the Secretary must attend, in some way, to the
reasons an individual alien received parole. See infra Part IV.A. Because the categorical
termination of the period of parole previously awarded to the parolees violates the parole statute,
the same statute cannot be read to give the Secretary the discretion to take such unlawful action.
Therefore, Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) is no bar to review.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kucana points to the same conclusion. The Kucana
Court, in considering whether Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) barred judicial review of an
administrative determination, emphasized “a familiar principle of statutory construction: the
presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.” 558 U.S. at 251. “When a statute
is ‘reasonably susceptible to divergent interpretation, [the Court] adopt[s] the reading that
accords with traditional understandings and basic principles: that executive determinations
generally are subject to judicial review” Id. (internal quotations omitted).” With these principles
in mind, the Kucana Court concluded that Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s limitation on judicial
review applied only to Attorney General determinations made discretionary by statute, and not to
determinations declared discretionary by the Attorney General. Id. at 249-52. 22
22
It is thus of no consequence, despite Defendants’ suggestion to the contrary, see Opp. to
Second Mot. for PI 7 [Doc. No. 89], that the guidance instituting the CHNV programs asserted
21
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Consistent with that distinction, “courts have declined to apply [Section
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)] to claims challenging the legality of policies and processes governing
discretionary decisions under the INA.” Roe v. Mayorkas, 2023 WL 3466327, at *8 (D. Mass.
May 12, 2023) (quoting Aracely, R v. Nielsen, 319 F. Supp. 3d 110, 135 (D.D.C. 2018)); R.F.M.
v. Nielsen, 365 F. Supp. 3d 350, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“The plaintiffs do not seek to litigate
individual claims but rather a policy the agency uses to adjudicate those claims.”); Doe 1 v.
Mayorkas, 530 F. Supp. 3d 893, 909 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“[T]he Court does not find 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which applies to decisions made to individual applications, applicable here
to this challenge of immigration policy.”); Doe v. Trump, 288 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1072 (W.D.
Wash. 2017) (concluding Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) may bar challenge to denial of refugee
admission, but not challenge to failure to act on refugee admissions).
Defendants suggest that there is no reason to distinguish the FRN’s “announcement of the
decision to terminate numerous CHNV parolees’ existing parole terms . . . from an individual
decision to terminate a particular grant of parole for purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).” Opp. to
Second Mot. for PI 7 [Doc. No. 89]. That argument is addressed on the merits below. But as to
the jurisdiction stripping statute, the distinction between an individual revocation of parole and
the categorical truncation of grants of parole is warranted where the presumption of reviewability
has been “consistently applied” to immigration statutes and can only be overcome by “clear and
that “[t]he Secretary retains the sole discretion to terminate the [Parole Program] . . . at any
point” and that the CHNV programs were “being implemented as a matter of the Secretary’s
discretion.” 88 Fed. Reg. 1266, 1277 (Jan. 9, 2023) (alterations in original). Section
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s bar on review applies only to determinations made discretionary by statute
and not to determinations made by the guidance itself.
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convincing evidence” of congressional intent to preclude judicial review. Guerrero-Lasprilla v.
Barr, 589 U.S. 221, 229 (2020) (internal citations omitted).
Nor do cases relied upon by Defendants dictate otherwise, as each finds a stripping of
jurisdiction under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) warranted only after examining the specific
immigration statute at issue, none of which involved Section 1182(d)(5)(A). See Thigulla v.
Jaddou, 94 F.4th 770, 774-76 (8th Cir. 2024) (finding that Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) barred
review of an adjudication hold policy promulgated under authority granted in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255(a)); accord Cheejati v. Blinken, 106 F.4th 388, 394-95 (5th Cir. 2024); Geda v. Dir.
United States Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., 126 F.4th 835, 843-44 (3d Cir. 2025). 23
Defendants cite Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022), for the proposition that “the
statutory bar applie[s] to every decision in the chain leading to [a] particular decision, including,
as relevant to the CHNV termination, the agency’s guidance related to that ultimate discretionary
judgment.” Opp. to Second Mot. for PI 8 [Doc. No. 89]. But the Patel Court was construing
Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which bars review of judgments under five specific statutes providing
for individual, discretionary relief. 24 596 U.S. at 336. While the Kucana Court noted that
23
In Patel v. Jaddou, defendants argued that the challenged action was an act within the
Secretary’s discretion conferred by Section 1255(a), precluding judicial review by the district
court. 695 F. Supp. 3d 158, 166 (D. Mass. 2023). This court determined that the inquiry first
required consideration of the claim on the merits, see id. at 169, and concluded, after a detailed
review of Section 1255(a), that the challenged action “does not contradict § 1255” and was “an
act within the Secretary’s discretion[.]” Id. at 173. The First Circuit, in turn, affirmed the
dismissal based on its review of Section 1255(a), without addressing defendants’ continuing
objection that courts are barred by Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) from even considering the question.
Gupta v. Jaddou, 118 F.4th 475 (1st Cir. 2024).
24
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (listing § 1182(h) (waiver of alien’s inadmissibility based on
single offense of marijuana possession), § 1182(i) (waiver of immigrant’s inadmissibility for
fraud or willful misrepresentation of material fact), § 1229b (cancellation of removal for certain
permanent residents), § 1229c (permission for alien to voluntarily depart the United States), and
§ 1255 (adjustment of status of alien).
23
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decisions shielded from review by Sections 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) “are of a like
kind,” 558 U.S. at 248, Patel focused in large part on language found only in the former Section,
namely that courts are without jurisdiction to review any judgment “regarding the granting of
relief” under the specified statutes. Patel, 596 U.S. at 336-40. The Patel Court parsed this phrase,
including the term “regarding,” which it found “in a legal context generally has a broadening
effect, ensuring that the scope of a provision covers not only its subject [any judgment regarding
the granting of relief], but also matters relating to that subject.’” Id. at 338-39. Given this
language, the Court found that Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) barred review of an immigration judge’s
underlying factual findings in a proceeding under the five statutes identified in Section
1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Id. at 339. The text of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) is distinct and, specifically,
does not include the broadening word “regarding.”
The Court in Patel found its reading of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) reinforced by Section
1252(a)(2)(D), id., “which preserves review of constitutional claims and questions of law” by
appellate courts of the judgments obtained through the individual discretionary-relief process
under the enumerated statutes, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). In contrast, there is no individual
discretionary-relief process before an immigration judge (with appellate review of questions of
law) as to the impending termination of the grant of parole or of the revocation of parole after it
has occurred. 25 Accordingly, if Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes a district court from
25
Instead, an individual who leaves the United States voluntarily may forfeit all claims related to
the original grant of parole. And while an individual who stays may be able to seek review of a
removal order and seek adjustment of status, he would be treated as an applicant for admission,
not a parolee, for the purposes of that petition, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), negating any potential
legal challenge to the categorical termination of his parole.
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considering Plaintiffs’ challenges to Defendants’ categorical actions at issue here, review of that
question of law will not be preserved by Section 1252(a)(2)(D).
As discussed further below, “[t]he APA . . . creates a ‘presumption favoring judicial
review of administrative action.” Sackett v. E.P.A., 566 U.S. 120, 128 (2012) (quoting Block v.
Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984)). “[O]nly upon a showing of ‘clear and
convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial
review.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (citing Rusk v. Cort, 369
U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962)). The reasoning in Patel as to Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not suggest
any clear legislative intent that the categorical actions challenged here are precluded from
judicial review by Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
C. Committed to Agency Discretion by Law
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot challenge the actions at issue here because
Section 1182(d)(5)(A) commits parole and other immigration benefits decisions to the
“discretion” of the Secretary of Homeland Security. See Opp. to Second Mot. for PI 8-9 [Doc.
No. 89]. The APA “establishes a ‘basic presumption of judicial review [for] one ‘suffering legal
wrong because of agency action[,]’” but that presumption may rebutted, including by a showing
that the “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2020) (first alteration in original) (citations
omitted). The Supreme Court has read this exception “quite narrowly, restricting it to ‘those rare
circumstances where the relevant statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful
standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.’” Dep’t of Com. v. New
York, 588 U.S. 752, 772 (2019) (citations omitted).
25
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This is not the rare circumstance in which the agency’s decision is “committed to agency
discretion by law.” As a preliminary matter, as stated above and discussed further below, the
Secretary does not have the discretion to categorically terminate grants of parole. In any event,
the parole statute establishes standards for the Secretary’s exercise of discretion in granting
parole—in that such grants must be made on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian
reasons or public benefit—and the statute also establishes standards for the termination of parole
by requiring a determination by the Secretary that “the purposes of such parole . . . have been
served[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
This court finds further support for the view that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the FRN is
reviewable in the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of
the University of California, 591 U.S. 1 (2020). Rejecting the government’s argument that
decisions related to Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) were committed to
agency discretion by law, the Court determined that DACA was not an unreviewable nonenforcement policy but rather was a program for conferring affirmative immigration relief,
including the conferral of eligibility for work authorization and Social Security. Id. at 18-19. On
that basis, the Court reasoned that “[t]he creation of that program—and its rescission—is an
‘action [that] provides a focus for judicial review.’” Id. at 18 (second alteration in original)
(quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)).
The CHNV programs similarly created processes for conferring affirmative immigration
relief and related benefits, including lawful entry into the United States and work authorization.
The categorical termination of all grants of parole made pursuant to the CHNV programs creates
a focal point for judicial review. See Regents, 591 U.S. at 10 (DACA Memorandum instructed
ICE to “exercise prosecutorial discretion[] on an individual basis”); see also I.N.S. v. Yueh-
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Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996) (“Though the agency’s discretion is unfettered at the outset,
if it announces and follows—by rule or by settled course of adjudication—a general policy by
which its exercise of discretion will be governed, an irrational departure from that policy (as
opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action that must be overturned as
‘arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion’ within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).”); see also Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (“Judicially manageable standards may be found in formal and informal policy statements
and regulations as well as in statutes[.]”). Therefore, the action challenged by Plaintiffs here is
not committed to agency discretion by law.
Accordingly, Defendants’ arguments that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider
Plaintiffs’ challenge to the truncation of their periods of parole and related benefits fail.
III.
Class Treatment
Because the relief that Plaintiffs seek will have nationwide impact, the court considers
whether Plaintiffs may proceed on a class-wide basis as to this relief.26
“An order that certifies a class action must define the class and the class claims, issues, or
defenses[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B). The order “may be altered or amended before final
judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C).
Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion for Class Certification [Doc. No. 73] proposes a subclass
consisting of “[a]ll individuals who have received parole through humanitarian parole processes,
including but not limited to U4U, CHNV, OAW, FRP, MPIP, and CAM, which parole is subject
26
This court will address class certification in full, including other subclasses proposed by
Plaintiffs and Defendants’ objections to such proposals, in subsequent orders.
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to the March 25 FRN and subsequent similar actions by Defendants to rescind individual grants
of parole on a categorical and en masse basis (the ‘Rescinded Parolee Class’).”
Plaintiffs’ proposed Rescinded Parolee Subclass is defined more broadly than necessary
for the challenge to the March FRN presently before the court. First, it encompasses programs
besides CHNV, which are not the subject of the present order. It also includes “subsequent
similar actions by Defendants,” referring to actions that have not yet occurred, 27 and does not
exclude individuals who have already left the United States. 28 Accordingly, the court considers
whether certification is appropriate only as to the “Early Revocation Parolee Class,” which this
court defines to include:
All individuals who have received a grant of parole that is subject to the
Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and
Venezuelans, 90 Fed. Reg. 13611 (Mar. 25, 2025), rescinding individual grants of
parole on a categorical and en masse basis, except: (1) those individuals who
voluntarily left, and remain outside, the United States prior to the issuance of that
Notice; and (2) those individuals who choose to opt out of the class in order to seek
relief in separate litigation.
A. The Rule 23(a) Requirements
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
27
If Defendants take or threaten further action affecting Plaintiffs, modification of the class
definition might be warranted, but the request here is premature.
28
Individuals who voluntarily leave the United States generally lose their parole authorization.
See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (“Parole shall be automatically terminated without written notice (i) upon
the departure from the United States of the alien, or, (ii) if not departed, at the expiration of the
time for which parole was authorized[.]”).
28
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(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
The Early Revocation Parolee Class satisfies these four requirements. First, the class is
numerous because it includes several hundred thousand members.
Second, there are common issues of law and fact capable of class-wide resolution under
the standard set forth in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (“What
matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common ‘questions’ . . . but rather, the
capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of
the litigation.”) (first alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). All
members of the class challenge the FRN’s categorical revocation of their existing grants of
parole. That categorical revocation was made on the same terms for every class member.
Answering the question of whether such termination was lawful will resolve the issue of
whether, in the absence of individual determinations, all class members’ parole should expire no
later than the date specified in the FRN or, by contrast, on the date set forth on each class
members’ original grant of parole.
Third, the claims of the representative Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class.
“The plaintiff can meet [the typicality] requirement by showing that [their] injuries arise from the
same events or course of conduct as do the injuries of the class, and that [their] claims are based
on the same legal theory as those of the class.” In re Boston Scientific Corp. Secs. Litigation, 604
F. Supp. 2d 275, 282 (D. Mass. 2009). The claims of the representative Plaintiffs described
above are typical in that all Plaintiffs advance the same arguments as to why the categorical
termination of their grants of parole was unlawful.
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Fourth, the representative Plaintiffs fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
“The First Circuit requires two elements to establish adequacy under Rule 23(a)(4): (1) ‘that the
interests of the representative party will not conflict with the interests of any of the class
members,’ and (2) ‘that counsel chosen by the representative party is qualified, experienced and
able to vigorously conduct the proposed litigation.’” Bowers v. Russell, 2025 WL 342077, at *5
(D. Mass. Jan. 30, 2025) (quoting Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 130 (1st Cir.
1985)). The interests of the representative Plaintiffs will not conflict with those of any class
members because the FRN does not differentiate between the different CHNV programs and
instead categorically revokes parole for all individuals paroled through those programs.
Additionally, the FRN’s rationale for why parole was no longer justified for these individuals did
not depend on circumstances specific to any Plaintiff or to Plaintiffs from any of the four
countries at issue. Finally, this court finds that Plaintiffs’ attorneys are qualified, experienced,
and able to vigorously conduct the proposed litigation.
Therefore, the Rule 23(a) requirements are satisfied as to the Early Revocation Parolee
Class.
B. The Rule 23(b)(2) Requirements
Plaintiffs argue that certification is appropriate here under Rule 23(b)(2), which applies
where Defendants have “acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). “Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory
judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize class
certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or
declaratory judgment against the defendant.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360.
30
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Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate here. A stay of the FRN as to the
revocation of existing grants of parole would address each Plaintiffs’ injuries, as described
above. See supra Part II.A.
IV.
Preliminary Relief
Courts weigh four factors in determining whether a stay should issue: “(1) whether the
stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether
the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public
interest lies.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 425-26 (2009).
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
“An agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious if the agency relied on improper
factors, disregarded ‘an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation that runs counter
to the evidence,’ or when a reasonable explanation for the agency’s decision cannot be
discerned.” Gulluni v. Levy, 85 F.4th 76, 82 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n
of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). “[A] court ‘is not to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency’ but rather determine ‘whether there has been a
clear error of judgment.’” Id. (quoting Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009)).
Plaintiffs raise two arguments regarding DHS’s termination of existing grants of parole
made pursuant to the CHNV programs.
First, Plaintiffs argue that the FRN’s explanation for why DHS rejected the alternative of
allowing CHNV parole to expire naturally rather than in 30 days was based on an “obvious legal
error.” Mem. ISO Mot. for Second PI 10 [Doc. No. 72]. The FRN stated that DHS rejected that
alternative because allowing parolees to remain in the United States for longer than 30 days
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would “essentially foreclose” DHS’s ability to deport them via expedited removal because it
would increase the likelihood that they would accrue more than two years of continuous presence
in the United States. See 90 Fed. Reg. at 13620 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1)(iii)(II)).
Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on this argument because they are not subject to expedited
removal even if they have been here less than two years. Section 1225(b)(1), entitled “Inspection
of aliens arriving in the United States and certain other aliens who have not been admitted or
paroled,” provides for screening and expedited removal for a non-citizen “arriving in the United
States” or a non-citizen “who has not been admitted or paroled into the United States, and who
has not affirmatively shown . . . that the alien has been physically present in the United States
continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of
inadmissibility under this subparagraph.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II).
The statute thus allows for expedited removal for a non-citizen “arriving in the United States”
(i.e., arriving at the border or a port of entry) and for a non-citizen who entered the United States
without authorization, except that a non-citizen who entered the United States without
authorization, that is an individual who “has not been paroled or admitted into the United
States,” may not be subject to the expedited removal period if that individual has been present in
the United States for two years. The statute does not subject persons who were authorized to
enter the United States to expedited removal, regardless of how long they have been in the
United States.
Citing a case from the 11th Circuit, Defendants respond that the use of the present perfect
tense (“has not been . . . paroled”) reflects a “state that continues into the present,” meaning such
an alien may be processed for expedited removal under the provision once said alien’s parole has
been terminated or has expired. See Opp. to Second Mot. for PI 12 [Doc. No. 89]. But that case
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merely explained that “the use of the present-perfect tense can, as a matter of pure semantics,
refer to a time in the indefinite past or to a past action or state that continues into the present.”
Turner v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 130 F.4th 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2025) (emphasis in original). That the
present perfect tense may sometimes denote a state continuing into the present is obvious. But
the text of the provision at issue here makes clear its purpose, which is to limit the Secretary’s
authority to utilize expedited removal only with regard to those arriving at the border or a port of
entry, or those who entered the country unlawfully and have not been present in the country long
enough to warrant consideration of any interests their residence may have created.
The government further argues that, in any event, individuals whose parole has
terminated “may also be processed for expedited removal as an alien ‘arriving in the United
States’ under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).” That argument is contrary to the FRN’s rationale. The FRN
justified early termination of the parole periods based on the two-year period of accrual specified
in 1225(b)(1)(iii)(II). If, as Defendants contend, removal is proper under a provision with no
two-year period of accrual, early termination cannot be justified on the grounds that it would
remove an obstacle to expedited removal.
Plaintiffs are thus likely to prevail on their claim that DHS’s sole basis for rejecting the
alternative of allowing parole to expire naturally was based on a legal error. While “DHS was
not required . . . to ‘consider all policy alternatives in reaching [its] decision’ . . . it was required
to assess whether there were reliance interests, determine whether they were significant, and
weigh any such interests against competing policy concerns.” Regents of the Univ. of California,
591 U.S. at 33 (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51). DHS acknowledged the reliance interests of
individuals who are lawfully present in the United States based on grants of parole pursuant to
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the CHNV programs, but its stated reason for terminating parole grants within 30 days lacked a
rational basis. 29
Defendants maintain that even if this justification for rejecting the alternative was in
error, the decision was separately justified by DHS’s conclusion that “neither urgent
humanitarian reasons nor significant public benefit warrants the continued presence of aliens
paroled under the CHNV programs and the purposes of such parole therefore have been served.”
See 90 Fed. Reg. at 13620. But the FRN did not attend to any of the humanitarian reasons
underlying the creation of the CHNV programs and ignores that, under the CHNV programs,
“case-by-case temporary parole” was being used to address the relevant humanitarian concerns. 30
29
DHS’s rationale regarding expedited removal may have a further problem, namely, that
expedited removal proceedings “[do] not apply to an alien who is a native or citizen of a country
in the Western Hemisphere with whose government the United States does not have full
diplomatic relations and who arrives by aircraft at a port of entry.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(F).
30
See, e.g., Implementation of a Parole Process for Venezuelans, 87 Fed. Reg. 63507, 63515
(Oct. 19, 2022) (“The case-by-case temporary parole of individuals pursuant to this process will
address the urgent humanitarian reasons faced by so many Venezuelans subject to the repressive
regime of Nicolás Maduro.”); Implementation of a Parole Process for Cubans, 88 Fed. Reg.
1266, 1275 (Jan. 9, 2023) (“The case-by-case temporary parole of individuals pursuant to this
process will address the urgent humanitarian needs of Cuban nationals who have fled crippling
economic conditions and social unrest in Cuba. The [Government of Cuba] continues to repress
and punish all forms of dissent and public criticism of the regime and has continued to take
actions against those who oppose its positions. This process provides a safe mechanism for
Cuban nationals who seek to leave their home country to enter the United States without having
to make the dangerous journey to the United States.”); Implementation of a Parole Process for
Haitians, 88 Fed. Reg. 1243, 1251 (Jan. 9, 2023) (“The case-by-case temporary parole of
individuals pursuant to this process also will address the urgent humanitarian needs of many
Haitian nationals[.] . . . [E]scalating gang violence, the aftermaths of an earthquake, and a
cholera outbreak have worsened already concerning political, economic, and social conditions in
Haiti.”); Implementation of a Parole Process for Nicaraguans, 88 Fed. Reg. 1255, 1263 (Jan. 9,
2023) (“The case-by-case temporary parole of individuals pursuant to this process will address
the urgent humanitarian needs of Nicaraguan nationals who have fled the Ortega regime and
Nicaragua. The Government of Nicaragua continues to repress and punish all forms of dissent
and public criticism of the regime and has continued to take actions against those who oppose its
positions.”).
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The FRN gave no explanation or support for the conclusion that the CHNV programs were
addressing relevant humanitarian concerns through something other than case-by-case
determinations. The FRN also gave no rationale for its conclusion that such humanitarian
concerns no longer justified the existing parole programs and offered no reasons for categorically
revoking parole despite the humanitarian concerns previously articulated by DHS. Finally,
despite asserting that “DHS believes that consideration of any urgent humanitarian reasons for
granting parole is best addressed on a case-by-case basis consistent with the statute, and taking
into consideration each alien’s specific circumstances,” 90 Fed. Reg. at 13612, the FRN provides
for no individual case-by-case determination as to the humanitarian concerns facing each parolee
whose parole is being truncated.
Given the significant reliance interests at stake—which the FRN recognized as aliens
departing their native countries, incurring expenses traveling to the United States, obtaining
housing and means of transport, and building connections in their communities—DHS was
required to give a justification for terminating existing grants of parole within 30 days instead of
on the original termination dates. Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their claim that DHS’s
justification was inadequate because it was based on a legal error and failed to explain why
humanitarian concerns no longer justified the original periods of parole extended to the CHNV
parolees. Therefore, Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their claim that the early termination of
parole was arbitrary and capricious. 31
31
Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs are improperly seeking to challenge the application of
expedited removal, see Opp. to Second Mot. for PI at 13 [Doc. No. 89], mischaracterizes
Plaintiffs’ argument, which is that a desire to avoid the two-year accrual period of the expedited
removal statute was not a valid reason for early termination of grants of parole.
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Second, Plaintiffs argue that the decision to truncate all existing grants of parole was
contrary to the statutory requirement that parole be exercised “only on a case-by-case basis.” 8
U.S.C § 1182(d)(5)(A). Defendants respond that while Section 1182(d)(5)(A) requires grants of
parole to be made on “a case-by-case basis,” it imposes no similar requirement on terminations
of parole, where “[t]he sole statutory requirement to terminated parole is that, ‘in the opinion of
the Secretary,’ the purposes of parole have been served.” See Opp. to Second Mot. for PI 13
[Doc. No. 89] (quoting 8 U.S.C § 1182(d)(5)(A)). But the text of the statute supports Plaintiffs’
reading. Throughout the provision, Section 1182(d)(5)(A) refers in singular, rather than plural, to
grants of parole:
The Secretary of Homeland Security may . . . in his discretion parole into the
United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a caseby-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien
applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not
be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall,
in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served the alien
shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and
thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any
other applicant for admission to the United States.
(Emphasis added). The statute thus seems to contemplate termination of parole on an individual,
rather than categorical, basis. This makes sense: Even under the categorical programs, grants of
parole were to be made on a case-by-case basis. While the reasons underlying grants pursuant to
the CHNV programs were likely fairly consistent, an individual parolee’s application was subject
to case-by-case review. The grant of parole may well have been justified for reasons not
applicable to others paroled through the programs, such that a categorical determination that the
“purposes of such parole” have been served may not attend to the reasons for that individual’s
grant of parole. Certainly, the Secretary has significant discretion to terminate a grant of parole
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under the statute. But by the terms of the statute, such termination must attend to the reasons an
individual alien received parole.
Defendants point to Zheng v. Napolitano, No. 09-cv-00347, 2009 WL 1258908, at *2 (D.
Colo. May 4, 2009), as “rejecting argument asserted in habeas petition that sought to ‘engraft[]
the requirements pertaining to initial parole decisions onto parole revocation decisions.’” See
Opp. to Second Mot. for PI at 14 [Doc. No. 89] (alteration in original). While that court did note
that it had found no case law supporting petitioner’s claim that individual determinations were
required, it explained that petitioner’s notice that his parole had been revoked “specifically
informed him that parole had been granted initially to allow him to acquire appropriate travel
documents,” that such documents had been obtained previously, and there was no reason to
believe that travel documents would not be forthcoming. 2009 WL 1258908, at *2. In other
words, an individual decision was made to revoke his parole. The absence of case law supporting
Plaintiffs’ position may thus reflect DHS’s prior practice of making individual determinations to
revoke parole and does not undermine the textual analysis.
Therefore, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the FRN’s categorical
termination of existing grants of parole was arbitrary and capricious.
B. Irreparable Harm
Absent preliminary relief, the FRN will cause Plaintiffs’ parole to terminate in less than
two weeks, at which time they will be forced to choose between two injurious options: continue
following the law and leave the country on their own, or await removal proceedings. The court
discussed the harmful consequences of either of these two options above. See supra Part II.A.
The first option will expose Plaintiffs to dangers in their native countries and will cause Plaintiffs
forfeit their APA claims. The second option will put Plaintiffs at risk of arrest and detention and,
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because Plaintiffs will be in the United States without legal status, undermine Plaintiffs’ chances
of receiving other forms of immigration relief in the future—potentially permanently. Waiting
for final relief will not spare Plaintiffs from these consequences. 32
C. The Balance of Equities and the Public Interest
The final two factors, the balance of equities and the public interest, “merge when the
Government is the opposing party.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 435. Defendants maintain that preliminary
relief would “limit the Administration’s ability to pursue its foreign policy goals and to exercise
its discretionary powers with respect to immigration.” Opp. to Second Mot. for PI 18 [Doc. No.
89]. However, the relief contemplated in this order would not authorize the entry of any
individual currently outside the United States. Nor would it extend the original grants of parole
awarded by DHS. It would only require the agency to give fuller consideration to the reliance
interests of parolees who entered the United States lawfully and who followed instructions
established by the United States government for seeking discretionary grants of parole, and to
make any decisions terminating grants of parole in an individual, case-by-case manner.
Defendants contend that preliminary relief would “impede the Government’s strong
interest in being able to remove aliens from the United States who lack the ability to obtain more
32
At an April 10, 2025 hearing before the court, Defendants emphasized the FRN’s language
indicating that DHS would not prioritize for removal aliens who had filed requests for benefits
such as TPS or asylum prior to the issuance of the FRN. See 90 Fed. Reg. at 13619. But this
statement is essentially meaningless, where Defendants gave no specificity, in the FRN or at the
hearing, as to what it means in this circumstance for individuals with pending benefits requests to
not be an enforcement priority. Regardless of whether particular individuals are “enforcement
priorities,” they would still be unlawfully present in the United States and therefore subject to the
negative repercussions of that status, including an inability to legally work and the possibility of
being arrested when stepping outside their door. Moreover, Defendants’ Davidson Memorandum
has indefinitely suspended benefits adjudications filed by CHNV parolees, further undermining
Defendants’ enforcement priority argument.
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permanent status.” Id. at 19. The suggestion that these noncitizens “lack the ability to obtain
more permanent status” reflects the Defendants’ choice to not make permanent status more
available to them. Regardless, Defendants have offered no substantial reason or public interest
that justifies forcing individuals who were granted parole into the United States for a specified
duration to leave (or move into undocumented status) in advance of the original date their parole
was set to expire. Nor is it in the public interest to summarily declare that hundreds of thousands
of individuals are no longer considered lawfully present in the country, such that these
individuals cannot legally work in their communities or provide for themselves and their
families. Instead, the early termination, without any case-by-case justification, of legal status for
noncitizens who have complied with DHS programs and entered the country lawfully
undermines the rule of law.
The court finds the balance of equities and public interest weigh in favor of preliminary
relief. 33
33
Defendants argue that, should preliminary relief issue, such relief should be subject to bond.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). “[T]here is ample authority for the proposition that the provisions of
Rule 65(c) are not mandatory and that a district court retains substantial discretion to dictate the
terms of an injunction bond.” Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 925 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture and Piano
Moving, 679 F.2d 978, 999-1001 (1st Cir. 1982)). In Crowley, the court stated that in deciding
whether to set a bond requirement in non-commercial cases, the court should consider “the
possible loss to the enjoined party together with the hardship that a bond requirement would
impose on the applicant,” and, “[s]econd, in order not to restrict a federal right unduly, the
impact that a bond requirement would have on enforcement of the right[.]” Crowley, 679 F.2d at
1000. Here, the court finds: (1) no showing of any monetary loss on the enjoined parties in
staying the early termination of the grants of parole; (2) that requiring a bond would impose a
substantial hardship on the Plaintiffs; and (3) a grave risk that imposing a bond would
undesirably deter individuals from enforcing their procedural rights to challenge agency action
affecting immigration decisions. Accordingly, the court finds that the burden of a bond on
Plaintiffs outweighs any likely loss by the government.
39
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Request for a Stay Pending Appeal
Defendants orally requested a stay of this decision pending appeal. As with Plaintiffs’
request for a stay of the FRN, the court must weigh four factors in determining whether a stay of
the court’s order pending appeal should issue: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably
injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties
interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” See Nken, 556 U.S. at 42526. Here, Defendants have not made a strong showing that they are likely to succeed on the
merits or that they will be injured absent a stay, while the issuance of a stay of the court’s order
would allow for the truncation of parole of hundreds of thousands of parolees. And for the
reasons set forth above, the public interest lies in denying Defendants’ request for a stay.
Accordingly, Defendants’ request for a stay in DENIED.
VI.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the court grants emergency relief as follows:
1. The Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and
Venezuelans, 90 Fed. Reg. 13611 (Mar. 25, 2025), is hereby STAYED pending
further court order insofar as it revokes, without case-by-case review, the previously
granted parole and work authorization issued to noncitizens paroled into the United
States pursuant to parole programs for noncitizens from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela (the “CHNV parole programs”) prior to the noncitizen’s originally stated
parole end date.
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2. All individualized notices 34 sent to noncitizens from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela via their USCIS online account notifying them that their parole is being
revoked without case-by-case review pursuant to the Termination of Parole Processes
for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, 90 Fed. Reg. 13611 (Mar. 25,
2025) are also STAYED pending further court order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
April 14, 2025
/s/ Indira Talwani
United States District Judge
34
See, e.g., Termination of Parole Notice [Doc. No. 88-1] (“Effective March 25, 2025, the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has exercised its discretion to terminate the categorical
parole programs for aliens who are nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and their
immediate family members.”).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
SVITLANA DOE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as
Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.,
Defendants.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-10495-IT
ORDER GRANTING CLASS CERTIFICATION
April 14, 2025
Upon consideration of Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion for Class Certification [Doc. No.
73], the court hereby certifies a class of:
All individuals who have received a grant of parole that is subject to the
Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and
Venezuelans, 90 Fed. Reg. 13611 (Mar. 25, 2025), rescinding individual grants of
parole on a categorical and en masse basis, except: (1) those individuals who
voluntarily left, and remain outside, the United States prior to the issuance of that
Notice; and (2) those individuals who choose to opt out of the class in order to seek
relief in separate litigation.
The court appoints Armando Doe, Ana Doe, Carlos Doe, Andrea Doe, Lucia Doe, Miguel Doe,
and Daniel Doe as Class Representatives 1 and John A. Freedman, Daniel B. Asimow, and Laura
Scott Shores of Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Karen C. Tumlin of Justice Action Center,
and Anwen Hughes of Human Rights First as class counsel.
1
These Plaintiffs are proceeding here under pseudonyms pursuant to the parties’ Stipulated
Protective Order Concerning Confidential Doe PII [Doc. No. 57] and this court’s Electronic
Order [Doc. No. 69] granting Plaintiffs’ Second Supplemental Motion to Proceed Under
Pseudonym [Doc. No. 64]. All Plaintiffs except Miguel Doe voluntarily provided their identities
to Defendants, and all Plaintiffs have provided their identities to this court for in camera review.
See Mem. & Order [Doc. No. 79]; Sealed Notice Providing Plaintiffs’ Identities [Doc. No. 81-1].
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For the reasons set forth in the court’s Memorandum & Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs’
Emergency Motion for a Stay of DHS’s En Masse Truncation of All Valid Grants of CHNV
Parole (“Order on Motion to Stay”) [Doc. No. 97], the court finds, as to the prerequisites set
forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), that (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties 2 are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4)
the interests of the representative parties will not conflict with the interests of any of the class
members; and as to the types of class actions permitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b), that
Defendants have “acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class.” See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Finally, the court finds, based on counsels’ declarations and filings, 3 that
counsel chosen by Plaintiffs are “qualified, experienced and able to vigorously conduct the
proposed litigation.” Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 130 (1st Cir. 1985)).
Accordingly, certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate.
At the time of certification, the court “must appoint class counsel under Rule 23(g).” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B). “Class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4). “In appointing class counsel, the court . . . must consider (i) the
work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; (ii) counsel’s
experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in
2
See Order on Motion to Stay 10-16 [Doc. No. 97]; see also Armando Doe Decl. [Doc. No. 243]; Ana Doe Decl. [Doc. No. 24-2]; Carlos Doe Decl. [Doc. No. 24-4]; Andrea Doe Decl. [Doc.
No. 27-1]; Lucia Doe Decl. [Doc. No. 64-3]; Miguel Doe Decl. [Doc. No. 64-4]; Daniel Doe
Decl. [Doc. No. 64-5].
3
See John A. Freedman Decl. [Doc. No. 46-2] (describing experience litigating class actions and
immigration challenges and attesting to the work of his team in conducting this litigation); Karen
C. Tumlin Decl. [Doc. No. 46-3] (similar); Anwen Hughes Decl. [Doc. No. 46-4] (similar). All
counsel state that they are aware of no conflicts of interest.
2
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the action; (iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) the resources that counsel
will commit to representing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1).
Based on counsels’ declarations and filings, the proposed counsel have conducted factual
investigations leading to this lawsuit, have engaged in class action litigation or other complex
litigation involving immigration matters, have demonstrated knowledge of the applicable
immigration law, and have attested to having adequate resources to represent the class.
Therefore, the Rule 23(g) requirements are satisfied by the appointment of class counsel here.
This order “may be altered or amended before final judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(1)(C). Further relief sought in Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class [Doc. No. 46] and
Supplemental Motion for Class Certification [Doc. No. 73] remains pending.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
April 14, 2025
/s/ Indira Talwani
United States District Judge
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EXHIBIT D
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
SVITLANA DOE, et al.,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as
Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.;
Defendants.
Civil Action No.
1:25-cv-10495-IT
DECLARATION OF KIKA SCOTT
I, Kika Scott, make the following declaration, as permitted by Section 1746 of Title 28 of
the United States Code. I am aware that this declaration will be filed in the above-captioned civil
action with the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. I hereby certify:
1. I am the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services ("USCIS"), a component agency within the United States
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). I have held this position since February 9,
2025. Previously, I was the Chief Financial Officer, USCIS, DHS, since May 27, 2019.
2. The statements contained in this declaration are based upon my personal knowledge, and
upon information provided to me in my official capacity.
3. President Trump signed Executive Order 14165 on January 20, 2025. 1 Pursuant to that
Executive Order, on January 23, 2025, Acting Director Jennifer Higgins directed that
USCIS adjudicators should not make any final decisions (approval, denial, closure) or
issue a travel document or I-94 for any initial parole or re-parole application, petition,
motion, or other request, filed under Uniting for Ukraine (U4U), the parole programs for
Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans (CHNV), Operation Allies Welcome
1
Executive Order 14165, Securing Our Borders, 90 Fed. Reg. R 8467 (Jan. 20, 2025) (published Jan. 30, 2025).
1
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(OAW) re-parole, Family Reunification Parole (FRP) programs, and the Central
American Minors (CAM) parole program. She further instructed that the pause did not
apply to requests for advance parole, non-categorical Form I-131 Humanitarian Parole, or
government referrals for parole filed and adjudicated on a case-by-case basis for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.
4. On January 28, 2025, USCIS provided notice on its website (see, e.g., www.uscis.gov/i134A) that it was pausing acceptance of the Form I-134A, Online Request to be a
Supporter and Declaration of Financial Support, until the Agency had reviewed all
categorial parole programs as instructed by Executive Order (EO) 14165. The Form I134A is used to initiate the parole processes for the U4U, CHNV, and FRP programs.
5. The CHNV parole programs were also previously briefly paused in July 2024 to evaluate
program vulnerabilities, as has been publicly reported. 2 The then-Secretary of Homeland
Security instructed USCIS and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to pause the
CHNV parole programs due to concerns that fraud, public safety, and national security
were insufficiently addressed and that U.S.-based supporters were not sufficiently
screened and vetted.
6. On February 14, 2025, Acting Deputy Director Andrew Davidson issued a USCIS-wide
administrative hold on all pending benefit requests filed by aliens who are or were
paroled into the United States pursuant to INA § 212(d)(5)(A) under the U4U, CHNV,
and FRP programs pending the completion of additional vetting to identify any fraud,
public safety, or national security concerns. The hold was issued pursuant to EO 14165.
7. As of the date of this declaration, the programs have not been terminated. Benefit
requests submitted by U4U, CHNV, and FRP parolees remain pending and on hold until
USCIS completes its review of the programs and the screening and vetting that these
parolees and their supporters received to ensure that it comported with the uniform
See, e.g., Staff of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 119th Cong., The Biden-Harris Administration’s CHNV Parole
Program Two Years Later: A Fraud-Ridden, Unmitigated Disaster (2024), https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evosubsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2024-1120%20The%20Biden%20Harris%20Administration%27s%20CHNV%20Parole%20Program%20Two%20Years%2
0Later%20-%20A%20Fraud-Ridden%2C%20Unmitigated%20Disaster.pdf.
2
2
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baseline that existed on January 19, 2021. USCIS has issued a temporary pause to review
vetting procedures to ensure that only individuals who are eligible for immigration
benefits receive them.
8. Although certain categorical parole programs have been paused pending further review,
DHS and USCIS continue to accept and process certain individual parole requests filed
on Form I-131, Application for Travel Documents, Parole Documents, and
Arrival/Departure Records, on a case-by-cases basis, for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit, including requests based on military parole in place (MIL PIP),
Immigrant Military Members and Veterans Initiative (IMMVI), U.S. Government
referrals for parole, as well as individual parole requests not under a particular program
or process. 3 Additionally, in some instances where an alien needs to remain in the United
States after their period of parole terminates, the alien may request a new period of
parole, also known as re-parole, by filing Form I-131 with USCIS from within the United
States. Such requests are also adjudicated on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian
reasons or significant public benefit which warrants the new period of parole.
9. The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) confers upon the Secretary of Homeland
Security (“Secretary”) the narrow discretionary authority to parole aliens into the United
States “temporarily under such conditions as [DHS] may prescribe only on a case-by-case
basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit . . . but such parole of
such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of
such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served
the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was
paroled....” .” See INA 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 8 CFR 212.5(a)
and (c) through (e) (discretionary authority for establishing conditions of parole and for
terminating parole). Pursuant to EO 14165, the Secretary is evaluating categorical parole
programs to determine whether to exercise her discretion in this way, evaluating whether
See, e.g., Humanitarian or Significant Public Benefit Parole for Aliens Outside the United States
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian_parole
3
3
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the programs still serve their intended purposes and are consistent with the goals of the
current Administration.
9. In this case, DHS, including USCIS, would be harmed if a preliminary injunction were
granted to require DHS to resume review of requests filed under certain parole programs
before the Secretary of DHS has completed her review. Requiring USCIS to review
requests related to parole under the paused parole programs while the Secretary’s review
is taking place would require USCIS to allocate resources away from other
Administration priorities, even though the Secretary may decide not to exercise her
discretion to continue these categorical parole programs. Further, to the extent that fraud,
public safety, and national security concerns exist among individuals seeking to support a
potential beneficiary and among potential beneficiaries under the paused programs,
requiring DHS to continue screening, vetting, and reviewing individuals’ requests to be a
supporter or applications for parole or re-parole would harm the agency’s ability to fulfill
its mission for the reasons explained below.
10. From their inception, DHS has expressly advised the public that the parole programs are
discretionary. In establishing the CHNV parole programs, DHS stated that “[t]he
Secretary retains the sole discretion to terminate the [Parole Program] … at any point” 4
and that “DHS may terminate parole in its discretion at any time.” 5 The CHNV parole
programs were “being implemented as a matter of the Secretary’s discretion. [They are]
not intended to and [do] not create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable by
any party in any matter, civil or criminal.” DHS made similar statements regarding FRP,
including explaining, “The Secretary retains the sole discretion to terminate this FRP
process at any point.” 6 In establishing the CAM program, DHS explained, “DHS may
terminate parole in its discretion at any time.” 7
4
E.g., 88 FR at 1268 (Cuba).
5
E.g., 88 FR at 1272 (Cuba).
6
88 FR 43611 at 43619 (FRP for Salvadorans).
7
88 FR at 21698 (CAM).
4
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11. In most instances, potential beneficiaries of these parole programs are currently outside
of the United States. If individuals are engaged in fraud, or wish to cause harm to the
United States, requiring DHS to resume these programs would facilitate the arrival of
aliens who may be bad actors onto U.S. soil. Further, once paroled into the United States,
DHS would need to expend additional resources to terminate parole and remove the alien,
as appropriate.
13. Permitting aliens to travel to the United States, if they are engaged in fraud, also
undermines the integrity of the immigration system. If the American public believes that
DHS does not have thorough vetting and that aliens who do not warrant a favorable
exercise of discretion are paroled into the United States, then there is less trust in the
immigration system. Further, perception that DHS is not combatting fraud is likely to
encourage more fraudulent applications, petitions, and requests. In this instance, there is
reason to believe that there is fraud occurring in these parole programs, based on USCIS’
findings in its prior review of the CHNV programs.
14. USCIS would also be harmed if the February 14, 2025 Davidson Memo to pause
adjudication of immigration benefits filed by aliens who were paroled into the United
States under these programs were enjoined. A temporary hold on processing of
immigration benefit requests filed by aliens paroled into the United States under the U4U,
CHNV, and FRP programs allows USCIS, in coordination with other partners in DHS, to
determine the scope of any further fraud, and implement measures to prevent those
individuals from obtaining further immigration benefits in the United States.
15. USCIS may, in its discretion, issue temporary holds on adjudication of certain benefits to
conduct investigations and vetting to determine that an individual is eligible for the
benefit sought. USCIS has an obligation to only grant immigration benefits to individuals
who are eligible for them, and to investigate the individual’s background to ensure
eligibility. In this instance, as articulated in the February 14, 2025 Davidson Memo,
USCIS determined that parolees whose immigration benefits are subject to the hold may
not have received screening and vetting to the maximum degree possible or that comports
5
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with the uniform baseline that existed on January 19, 2021, as required per EO 14161,
prior to being granted parole. Without this hold, and taking the time to flag cases where
the parolee (and/or their supporter) may have committed fraud or pose a national security
or public safety concern for additional review, USCIS may inadvertently grant
immigration benefits to aliens who are either ineligible for the benefit sought as a matter
of law or where the benefit is discretionary, does not warrant a favorable exercise of
discretion. Further, while parole is not a permanent benefit, many aliens who were
paroled into the United States under these programs now have applications pending that
would provide them permanent status in the United States. If USCIS later determines that
these benefits were improperly granted, it may be difficult and time-consuming to rescind
or terminate.
16. I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true
and correct to the best of my knowledge. Executed this 20th day of March, 2025, in
Camp Springs, Maryland.
KIKA M SCOTT
Digitally signed by KIKA M
SCOTT
Date: 2025.03.20 23:01:49
-04'00'
__________________________________
Kika Scott
Senior Official Performing the Duties of the
Director
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Department of Homeland Security
6
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EXHIBIT 1
to Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and
Stay of DHS’V (Q0DVVH Truncation of all Valid Grants of CHNV
Parole
Doe et al. v. Noem et al., 1:25-cv-10495-IT (D. Mass.)
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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 56 / Tuesday, March 25, 2025 / Notices
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1
below in advance of the meeting. The
open session will be videocast and can
be accessed from the NIH Videocasting
website (http://videocast.nih.gov/).
The meeting will be closed to the
public in accordance with the
provisions set forth in sections
552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 U.S.C.,
as amended. The grant applications and
the discussions could disclose
confidential trade secrets or commercial
property such as patentable material,
and personal information concerning
individuals associated with the grant
applications, the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.
Name of Committee: Council of Councils.
Date: April 21, 2025.
Open: April 21, 2025, 10:00 a.m. to 12:15
p.m.
Agenda: Welcome and Opening Remarks;
Announcements, and NIH Program Updates;
Presentations; and Other Business of the
Committee.
Place: National Institutes of Health
Building 1, 1 Center Drive, Bethesda, MD
20892 (Virtual Meeting).
Closed: April 21, 2025, 12:15 p.m. to 01:15
p.m.
Agenda: Review of Grant Applications.
Place: National Institutes of Health
Building 1, 1 Center Drive, Bethesda, MD
20892 (Virtual Meeting).
Open: April 21, 2025, 01:15 p.m. to 04:35
p.m.
Agenda: NIH Program Updates;
Presentations; and Other Business of the
Committee.
Place: National Institutes of Health
Building 1, 1 Center Drive, Bethesda, MD
20892 (Virtual Meeting).
Contact Person: Franziska Grieder, D.V.M.,
Ph.D., Executive Secretary, Council of
Councils, Director, Office of Research
Infrastructure Programs, Division of Program
Coordination, Planning, and Strategic
Initiatives, Office of the Director, NIH, 6701
Democracy Boulevard, Room 948, Bethesda,
MD 20892, GriederF@mail.nih.gov, 301–435–
0744.
Any interested person may file written
comments with the committee by forwarding
the statement to the Contact Person listed on
this notice. The statement should include the
name, address, telephone number and when
applicable, the business or professional
affiliation of the interested person.
Information is also available on the
Council of Council’s home page at http://
dpcpsi.nih.gov/council/ where an agenda and
any additional information for the meeting
will be posted when available.
(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance
Program Nos. 93.14, Intramural Research
Training Award; 93.22, Clinical Research
Loan Repayment Program for Individuals
from Disadvantaged Backgrounds; 93.232,
Loan Repayment Program for Research
Generally; 93.39, Academic Research
Enhancement Award; 93.936, NIH Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome Research Loan
Repayment Program; 93.187, Undergraduate
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:03 Mar 24, 2025
Jkt 265001
Scholarship Program for Individuals from
Disadvantaged Backgrounds, National
Institutes of Health, HHS)
Dated: March 20, 2025.
Bruce A. George,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory
Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2025–05010 Filed 3–24–25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Termination of Parole Processes for
Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and
Venezuelans
ACTION: Notice.
SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland
Security (‘‘DHS’’) is terminating the
categorical parole programs for
inadmissible aliens from Cuba, Haiti,
Nicaragua, and Venezuela and their
immediate family members (hereinafter
referred to as ‘‘CHNV parole programs’’)
that DHS announced in 2022 and 2023.
This Federal Register notice is intended
to provide context and guidance to the
public regarding the termination of the
CHNV parole programs and related
employment authorization.
DATES: DHS is terminating the CHNV
parole programs as of March 25, 2025.
The temporary parole period of aliens in
the United States under the CHNV
parole programs and whose parole has
not already expired by April 24, 2025
will terminate on that date unless the
Secretary makes an individual
determination to the contrary. Parolees
without a lawful basis to remain in the
United States following this termination
of the CHNV parole programs must
depart the United States before their
parole termination date.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Ihsan Gunduz, Border and Immigration
Policy, Office of Strategy, Policy, and
Plans, Department of Homeland
Security, 2707 Martin Luther King Jr.
Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20528–0445;
telephone (202) 447–3459 (not a toll-free
number).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Over the previous two years, DHS has
implemented programs through which
inadmissible aliens who are citizens or
nationals of designated countries, and
their immediate family members, could
request authorization to travel to the
United States in order to be considered
for parole into the country.1 Under these
1 Implementation of a Parole Process for Cubans,
88 FR 1266 (Jan. 9, 2023); Implementation of a
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categorical parole programs, potentially
eligible beneficiaries were adjudicated
on a case-by-case basis, for advance
authorization to travel to a U.S. port of
entry (‘‘POE’’) in the interior of the
country to seek a discretionary grant of
parole.
On January 20, 2025, President Trump
issued Executive Order 14165,
‘‘Securing Our Borders.’’ 2 Section 2 of
the Order establishes a policy of the
United States to take all appropriate
action to secure the borders of our
Nation through a range of means,
including deterring and preventing the
entry of illegal aliens into the United
States, and removing promptly all aliens
who enter or remain in violation of
Federal law. Section 7 of the Order
directs the Secretary of Homeland
Security to, consistent with applicable
law, take all appropriate action to
‘‘[t]erminate all categorical parole
programs that are contrary to the
policies of the United States established
in [the President’s] Executive Orders,
including the program known as the
‘Processes for Cubans, Haitians,
Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans.’ ’’
Consistent with the President’s
direction, and for the independent
reasons stated in this notice, this notice
terminates the CHNV parole programs.
Although DHS established the
categorical programs for each country
through a separate notice in the Federal
Register, the justification for the
establishment of each of the four
categorical programs was very similar,3
and the rationale for termination is
largely consistent for all four parole
programs. Thus, DHS is announcing the
termination of all four parole programs
by publishing this single notice in the
Federal Register.
II. DHS Parole Authority
The Immigration and Nationality Act
(‘‘INA’’) confers upon the Secretary of
Homeland Security (‘‘Secretary’’) the
narrow discretionary authority to parole
inadmissible aliens into the United
States ‘‘temporarily under such
conditions as [DHS] may prescribe only
on a case-by-case basis for urgent
Change to the Parole Process for Cubans, 88 FR
26329 (Apr. 28, 2023); Implementation of a Parole
Process for Haitians, 88 FR 1243 (Jan. 9, 2023);
Implementation of a Change to the Parole Process
for Haitians, 88 FR 26327 (Apr. 28, 2023);
Implementation of a Parole Process for Nicaraguans,
88 FR 1255 (Jan. 9, 2023); Implementation of a
Parole Process for Venezuelans, 87 FR 63507 (Oct.
19, 2022); Implementation of Changes to the Parole
Process for Venezuelans, 88 FR 1279 (Jan. 9, 2023).
2 See Executive Order 14165, Securing Our
Borders, 90 FR 8467 (Jan. 20, 2025) (published Jan.
30, 2025).
3 Compare, e.g., 88 FR at 1260–63, with 88 FR at
1248–52 (setting out the justifications for the parole
programs for Nicaragua and Haiti, respectively).
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humanitarian reasons or significant
public benefit.’’ See INA 212(d)(5)(A), 8
U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 8 CFR
212.5(a) and (c) through (e)
(discretionary authority for establishing
conditions of parole and for terminating
parole). Additionally, upon a finding by
DHS that the purpose of the temporary,
discretionary parole has been served,
the alien is required to depart the
United States ‘‘or be returned to the
custody from which he was paroled and
thereafter his case shall continue to be
dealt with in the same manner as that
of any other applicant for admission to
the United States.’’ INA 212(d)(5)(A), 8
U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A).
A review of the history of the parole
authority supports the contention that
discretionary parole determinations
were intended by Congress to be
narrowly tailored to specific instances
and not based on a set of broadly
applicable eligibility criteria.4 Under the
law, the determination to parole an
alien into the country should only be
made on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account each alien’s unique
circumstances. The ultimate
determination whether to parole an
alien into the United States upon the
alien’s arrival at a POE is made by U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (‘‘CBP’’)
officers. See 8 CFR 212.5(a).
Parole is inherently temporary, and
parole alone is not an underlying basis
4 Parole was codified into immigration law in the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. As
envisioned then, the 1952 Act authorized the
Attorney General to parole aliens temporarily under
such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent
reasons or reasons deemed strictly in the public
interest. As expressed then, ‘‘the parole of aliens
seeking admission is simply a device through
which needless confinement is avoided while
administrative proceedings are conducted.’’ See
Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958).
However, the parole authority, whether intended to
be narrow or broad, has in fact been used in an
increasingly broad manner since its inception, often
earning the criticism of Congress, which in 1996
wrote, ‘‘[i]n recent years, however, parole has been
used increasingly to admit entire categories of
aliens who do not qualify for admission under any
other category in immigration law, with the intent
that they will remain permanently in the United
States. This contravenes the intent of section
212(d)(5), but also illustrates why further, specific
limitations on the Attorney General’s discretion are
necessary.’’ See H.R. Rep. 104–469, pt. 1, at 140
(1996). Furthermore, the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996
(‘‘IIRIRA’’) struck from INA 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C.
1182(d)(5)(A), the phrase, ‘‘for emergent reasons or
for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest’’
as grounds for granting parole into the United States
and inserted ‘‘only on a case-by-case basis for
urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public
benefit.’’ See Public Law 104–208, div. C, § 602(a).
‘‘The legislative history indicates that this change
was animated by concern that parole under 8 U.S.C.
1182(d)(5)(A) was being used by the executive to
circumvent congressionally established
immigration policy.’’ Cruz-Miguel v. Holder, 650
F.3d 189, 199 n.15 (2d Cir. 2011).
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for obtaining any immigration status,
nor does it constitute an admission to
the United States. See INA
101(a)(13)(B), 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(13)(B), 1182(d)(5)(A). Once an
alien is paroled into the United States,
the parole allows the alien to stay
temporarily in the United States for the
duration of the parole period unless and
until the parole expires or is otherwise
terminated. See 8 CFR 212.5(e).
Paroled aliens, including those
paroled under the CHNV parole
programs, may apply for any
immigration benefit or status for which
they may be eligible, including
discretionary employment authorization
under the (c)(11) employment eligibility
category. See 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(11). In
the absence of any subsequent
application conferring an immigration
benefit or status, and upon termination
of parole, such alien will remain an
arriving alien. See 8 CFR 1.2; see also
INA 101(a)(13)(B), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(13)(B).
III. Rationale for Initial
Implementation
When DHS established the CHNV
parole programs, DHS provided several
justifications for their promulgation.
See, e.g., 88 FR at 1248–51
(Implementation of a Parole Process for
Haitians). Overall, DHS stated that the
programs would provide a significant
public benefit for the United States and
address the urgent humanitarian reasons
underlying the high levels of migration
from those countries.
With respect to the significant public
benefit, DHS wrote that the CHNV
parole programs would: (i) enhance
border security by reducing illegal
immigration between the POEs, (ii)
minimize the domestic impact of high
levels of illegal immigration by CHNV
nationals, particularly in border
communities; (iii) improve vetting for
national security and public safety; (iv)
reduce the strain on DHS personnel and
resources; (v) disincentivize a dangerous
journey that puts migrant lives and
safety at risk and enriches smuggling
networks; and (vi) fulfill important
foreign policy goals to manage migration
collaboratively in the hemisphere.
For the reasons discussed below, DHS
has determined that it is now
appropriate and necessary to terminate
the CHNV parole programs. These
programs do not serve a significant
public benefit, are not necessary to
reduce levels of illegal immigration, did
not sufficiently mitigate the domestic
effects of illegal immigration, are not
serving their intended purposes, and are
inconsistent with the Administration’s
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foreign policy goals.5 Regarding
previous arguments or determinations
that these programs were consistent
with the requirement of ‘‘urgent
humanitarian reasons’’ for granting
parole, DHS believes that consideration
of any urgent humanitarian reasons for
granting parole is best addressed on a
case-by-case basis consistent with the
statute, and taking into consideration
each alien’s specific circumstances.
These reasons, independently and
cumulatively, support termination of
the CHNV parole programs.
Accordingly, the Secretary, in her
discretion, is terminating the CHNV
parole programs. Consistent with her
statutory authority, the Secretary retains
discretion to continue to extend parole
to any alien paroled under CHNV—
temporarily under such conditions as
she may prescribe only on a case-bycase basis for urgent humanitarian
reasons or significant public benefit. See
INA 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C.
1182(d)(5)(A). The decision to do so, or
not do so, is committed to the
Secretary’s sole discretion.
1. The CHNV Parole Programs Are
Unnecessary To Achieve Border
Security Goals
From the announcement of the parole
program for Venezuelans and their
immediate family members on October
12, 2022, through the subsequent
addition of the programs for Cubans,
Haitians, Nicaraguans, and their
immediate family members in January
2023, and until January 22, 2025,
approximately 532,000 inadmissible
aliens were granted advance
authorization to travel to the United
States and receive consideration for
parole into the United States.6
One justification for these 532,000
discretionary paroles was to ‘‘enhance
border security’’ at the southwest border
of the United States.7 DHS reasoned that
by ‘‘incentivizing individuals to seek a
lawful, orderly means of traveling to the
United States, while imposing
5 See INA 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A)
(‘‘. . . when the purposes of such parole shall, in
the opinion the Secretary of Homeland Security,
have been served the alien shall forthwith return or
be returned to the custody from which he was
paroled.’’).
6 Office of Homeland Security Statistics (‘‘OHSS’’)
analysis of advanced travel authorizations data
provided by CBP Passenger Systems Program
Directorate and valid as of January 22, 2025.
Beneficiary travel authorizations excluded expired
applications. The Venezuelan program started on
October 18, 2022, and the Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua
parole programs started January 6, 2023.
7 See, e.g., 88 FR at 1255 (‘‘The [Nicaraguan]
parole process is intended to enhance border
security by reducing the record levels of Nicaraguan
nationals entering the United States between
POEs.’’).
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consequences to irregular migration,
. . . the new parole process will
mitigate anticipated future surges’’ of
illegal immigration. See, e.g., 88 FR at
1249 (Implementation of a Parole
Process for Haitians). DHS pointed to
past experience with rapidly increasing
‘‘encounters of Guatemalan and
Honduran nationals from January 2021
until August 2021’’ along the southwest
border, explaining that the resumption
of repatriation flights to Guatemala and
Honduras helped reduce the amount of
illegal immigration but was insufficient
to address the sheer numbers.8
Accordingly, the CHNV parole programs
contemplated enhancing border security
by combining ‘‘a consequence for
[nationals seeking] to enter the United
States [in an unlawful manner between
POEs (i.e., removal or return to a third
country, such as Mexico), while
introducing] an incentive to use [a]
lawful process to request authorization
to travel by air to and enter the United
States, without making the dangerous
journey to the border.’’ 9
Upon review, DHS concludes that this
‘‘deterrent’’ and ‘‘incentive’’ approach
did not result in a sufficient and
sustained improvement in border
security, and has exacerbated challenges
associated with interior enforcement of
the immigration laws. Encounters of
CHNV nationals, particularly at POEs,
remained unacceptably high while the
CHNV parole programs were in effect,
and overall migration of CHNV
nationals to the United States increased
between October 12, 2022 and January
22, 2025. In addition, the CHNV parole
programs have at best traded an
unmanageable population of unlawful
migration along the southwest border
for the additional complication of a
substantial population of aliens in the
interior of the United States without a
clear path to a durable status.
As an initial matter, DHS
acknowledges that in establishing the
CHNV parole programs, and in
subsequent DHS evaluations of these
programs, DHS focused, in part, on a
goal of reducing encounters of CHNV
nationals between POEs.10 And it is true
that there was a reduction in encounters
8 See, e.g., 87 FR at 63509.
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9 See, e.g., 87 FR at 63510.
10 See, e.g., 87 FR at 63507 (‘‘The parole process
is intended to enhance border security by reducing
the record levels of Venezuelan nationals entering
the United States between POEs, while also
providing a process for certain such nationals to
lawfully enter the United States in a safe and
orderly manner.’’); see also Circumvention of
Lawful Pathways 88 FR 31314, 31317 (May 16,
2023) (noting that in the first weeks following
implementation of the CHNV parole programs,
encounters of CHNV nationals between POEs
dropped significantly).
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of CHNV nationals between POEs from
FY 2022 through FY 2024—from around
600,000 encounters in FY 2022 to
416,000 in FY 2023 and 183,000 in FY
2024.11 But in implementing the CHNV
parole programs, DHS also focused on
the importance of reducing pressures at
the southwest border generally. It was
for this reason that the CHNV parole
programs required, for instance, that
CHNV nationals ‘‘fly at their own
expense to an interior [POE] rather than
entering at a land POE’’ 12 and rendered
ineligible those CHNV nationals who
irregularly entered the United States,
Mexico, or Panama after the programs’
announcement.13
Consistent with that focus and in light
of the reality that DHS’s border security
mission involves activities at southwest
border POEs as well, DHS has
concluded that the present assessment
of the efficacy of the CHNV parole
programs should include encounters at
such land POEs. If one includes
encounters of CHNV nationals at POEs,
the actual reduction in southwest border
encounters of CHNV nationals is much
more muted: encounters of CHNV
nationals at and between southwest
border POEs dropped from
approximately 626,000 in FY 2022 only
to 584,000 in FY 2023 and to 535,000
in FY 2024.14 This is due to a significant
increase in encounters of such aliens at
southwest border POEs over that time
period: from 26,250 in FY 2022 to
168,010 in FY 2023 and 352,790 in FY
2024.15 The increase can be attributed to
the use of the CBP One mobile
application (‘‘CBP One app’’ or ‘‘CBP
One’’) to schedule appointments at
southwest border POEs,16 which
resulted in very high numbers of CHNV
nationals placed into removal
proceedings pursuant to section 240 of
the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1229a, (‘‘section 240
removal proceedings’’) and released into
11 OHSS analysis of January 2025 OHSS Persist
Dataset.
12 See, e.g., 87 FR at 63507; see also id. at 63512
(explaining that by ‘‘diverting flows of Venezuelan
nationals to interior POEs through a safe and
orderly process,’’ DHS could relieve pressure on
border communities).
13 See, e.g., 87 FR at 63515.
14 OHSS analysis of January 2025 OHSS Persist
Dataset.
15 OHSS analysis of January 2025 OHSS Persist
Dataset.
16 Section 7 of Executive Order 14165 also
directed the Secretary to, consistent with applicable
law, take all appropriate action to cease using the
CBP One app. as a method of paroling or facilitating
the entry of otherwise inadmissible aliens into the
United States. DHS has ceased the use of the CBP
One app for this purpose. See CBP, Press Release,
CBP Removes Scheduling Functionality in CBP
OneTM App (Jan. 21, 2025), https://www.cbp.gov/
newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-removesscheduling-functionality-cbp-one-app (last updated
Jan. 22, 2025).
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U.S. border communities,17
exacerbating the immigration court
backlog and the poor incentives that the
backlog creates.18 Finally, it is
important to emphasize that in addition
to these southwest border encounters,
DHS must also consider the 532,000
parolees who entered the United States
under the CHNV parole programs.
The decision to terminate the
discretionary and temporary parole
programs is further informed by the
actions of the prior administration,
which found the CHNV parole
programs, even when paired with the
Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule,
to be insufficient to address very high
levels of illegal immigration.19 For
example, DHS and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) promulgated the Securing
the Border framework 20 as an
emergency measure to address ongoing
high levels of unlawful immigration
between southwest border POEs.21 The
Departments explained that ‘‘at the
current levels of encounters and with
current resources, [DHS] cannot
predictably and swiftly deliver
consequences to most noncitizens who
cross the border without a lawful basis
to remain . . . [DHS’s] ability to refer
and process noncitizens through
expedited removal thus continues to be
overwhelmed, creating a vicious
cycle.’’ 22 This conclusion—that DHS’s
ability to swiftly impose consequences
for illegal immigration ‘‘continue[d] to
be overwhelmed’’ 23—followed nearly
two years of the CHNV parole programs,
whose chief justification had been
facilitating operational control of the
17 A total of 582,800 CHNV nationals with CBP
One registration numbers were encountered at
southwest border POEs from Jan. 1, 2023–Jan. 31,
2025, including 576,900 (99 percent) that were
issued NTAs. OHSS analysis of January 2025 OHSS
Persist Dataset.
18 See, e.g., Securing the Border, 89 FR 81156,
81181 (Oct. 7, 2024) (explaining that particularly in
light of the immigration court backlog, ‘‘releasing
individuals who may otherwise be referred for
expedited removal may inadvertently incentivize
increased irregular migration and the exploitation
of the asylum system, especially by human
smugglers who encourage migrants to claim fear
once they are encountered by USBP as it will allow
them to remain in the United States for years
pending resolution of their case and, where
appropriate, removal.’’).
19 88 FR 31314 (May 16, 2023).
20 See 89 FR 48710 (June 7, 2024) (interim final
rule); 89 FR 81156 (Oct. 7, 2024) (final rule).
21 ‘‘On June 3, 2024, the President signed
Proclamation 10773 under sections 212(f) and
215(a) of the INA, finding that because border
security and immigration systems of the United
States were unduly strained, the entry into the
United States of certain categories of [aliens] was
detrimental to the interests of the United States, and
suspending and limiting the entry of such [aliens].’’
See 89 FR at 81157–58.
22 89 FR at 48714.
23 89 FR at 48715.
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southwest border of the United States.
Promulgation of the Securing the Border
interim final rule in June 2024 reflected
the reality that the CHNV parole
programs and Circumvention of Lawful
Pathways rule did not sufficiently
enhance border security.24
Finally, to whatever extent the CHNV
parole programs could be characterized
as reducing encounters of CHNV
nationals at the southwest border from
the very high levels that existed in late
2022, DHS does not believe that the
programs are necessary to achieve such
reductions at this time. In December
2022—the last full month prior to
implementation of all four programs—
the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP)
encountered around 84,000 CHNV
nationals at the southwest border.25
That figure has been below 12,000 every
month since January 2024, and below
6,000 every month since June 2024,
when DHS and DOJ issued the Securing
the Border rule.26 In January 2025, even
with the CHNV parole programs paused,
USBP encountered around 3,400 CHNV
nationals at the southwest border.27
Whatever the need for these programs
may have been in late 2022, the
situation at the southwest border now,
and the set of tools implemented by
DHS to deter illegal immigration, are
quite different.
Moreover, with the implementation of
President Trump’s policies beginning on
January 20, 2025, border encounters
generally have continued to drop
notwithstanding the ongoing pause on
these programs. Southwest border
encounters between POEs fell from an
average of about 1,180 aliens per day in
the two-week period ending on January
20, 2025, to an average of about 640 per
day in the two-week period from
January 21 to February 3, 2025, and fell
further to an average just under 260 per
day in the two-week period from
February 12, 2025 to February 25,
2025.28 Over those same three time
periods, southwest border releases from
USBP custody fell from an average of
about 240 per day to an average of about
24 DHS notes that on October 4, 2024, the prior
administration announced that there would be no
‘‘re-parole’’ beyond the initial two-year period for
the parolees who entered the United States under
the CHNV parole programs. The decision of the
prior administration to decline renewal or
extension of the CHNV related parole coincided in
large part with other actions of DHS to promulgate
policies to reduce illegal immigration.
25 OHSS analysis of January 2025 OHSS Persist
Dataset.
26 OHSS analysis of January 2025 OHSS Persist
Dataset.
27 OHSS analysis of January 2025 OHSS Persist
Dataset.
28 OHSS analysis of data downloaded from UIP
February 25, 2025.
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50 per day and then an average of fewer
than 5 per day.29
The need to break the ‘‘vicious cycle’’
of unlawful immigration supports this
DHS action to terminate the CHNV
parole programs in favor of new
presidential directives that address the
demand for enhanced border security
beyond the 2024 Securing the Border
framework.30 Executive Order 14165,
‘‘Securing Our Borders,’’ 31 and
Executive Order 14159, ‘‘Protecting the
American People Against Invasion,’’ 32
exemplify more reasoned and realistic
initiatives to control unlawful
immigration at the southwest border of
the United States.
2. The Domestic Effects of Illegal
Immigration Continued To Be Felt
Throughout Implementation of the
CHNV Parole Programs
Although one goal of the CHNV
parole programs was to ‘‘help minimize
the burden on communities, state and
local governments, and NGOs who
support the reception and onward travel
of arriving migrants at the SWB,’’ the
programs did not have this effect. As
discussed in the preceding section,
overall levels of CHNV migration at and
between southwest border POEs did not
fall dramatically year-over-year in FY
2023 and FY 2024. In addition, if one
takes into account the 532,000 parolees
who entered the United States at an
interior POE, CHNV migration may have
increased over the relevant time period.
Recent policy interventions have proven
more effective than the CHNV parole
programs in addressing very high levels
of illegal immigration.
29 OHSS analysis of data downloaded from UIP
Feb. 25, 2025. DHS also notes that to whatever
extent the incentives created by the parole programs
for Cubans and Haitians deterred illegal
immigration by sea—a particularly dangerous form
of migration—the parole programs are not necessary
for such deterrence and raise other issues, some of
which are outlined in sections III.2–4 of this notice.
DHS has adopted a more robust enforcement
posture in general, and will monitor trends in
maritime migration and respond as appropriate.
Through early February 2025, DHS has yet to see
a return to the very high levels of maritime
migration observed in 2022.
30 The streamlined procedures offered by the
Securing the Border framework and complementary
actions permitted DHS to more than triple the
percentage of aliens processed for expedited
removal under INA 235(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1),
and decrease the number of aliens released by
USBP pending immigration court proceedings by 89
percent, a number that has only improved further
with the end of ‘‘catch and release.’’ Encounters and
releases based on OHSS analysis of January 2025
OHSS Persist Dataset. Processed for ER based on
OHSS analysis of September 2024 OHSS
enforcement Lifecycle and CBP data downloaded
from UIP ER Daily Report Data Dashboard as of
February 4, 2025.
31 90 FR 8611 (Jan. 20, 2025).
32 90 FR 8443 (Jan. 20, 2025).
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Over the past few years, there has
been extensive public discussion of the
effects of high levels of illegal
immigration and inadmissible aliens
arriving in local communities. Although
public accounts of these effects do not
always distinguish between aliens
strictly on the basis of how they entered
the country or their status (e.g., CHNV
parolees; aliens whom DHS encountered
at a southwest border POE placed in
section 240 removal proceedings; and
aliens present without admission or
parole), localities nationwide have
experienced the effects of very high
levels of migration.33 CHNV parolees
and other recent arrivals have competed
for limited resources such as housing,
food, transportation, education, legal
services, and public benefits.34 Some
localities experienced surges of CHNV
parolees in particular.35
The domestic impact of the CHNV
parole program was also felt at the
Federal level in at least three ways.
First, the CHNV parole programs
resulted in expanded eligibility for
Federal public benefits. This is because,
for instance, an alien who is paroled
into the United States under INA
212(d)(5) for a period of at least 1 year
is considered a ‘‘qualified alien.’’ See 8
U.S.C. 1641(b)(4). Because DHS
generally issued two-year periods of
parole from the outset, CHNV parolees
generally were considered qualified
aliens. Although qualified aliens are
generally subject to a five-year waiting
period before becoming eligible for
certain Federal public benefits, see, e.g.,
8 U.S.C. 1613(a) (five-year waiting
period for Federal means-tested public
benefits); 8 U.S.C. 1612(a)(2)(L) (general
five-year waiting period before a
qualified alien can receive supplemental
nutrition assistance program (SNAP)
benefits), such waiting periods do not
apply to all CHNV parolees with respect
to all public benefit programs. For
instance, a parolee under the age of 18
may be eligible for SNAP benefits, see
33 See, e.g., Adam Shaw, Fox News, Biden Admin
Faces Mounting Pressure to Dismantle Migrant
Parole Program Amid ‘Stress’ on Small Towns (Oct.
31, 2024), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/bidenadmin-faces-mounting-pressure-dismantle-migrantparole-program-stress-small-towns; Muzaffar
Chishti & Colleen Putzel-Kavanaugh, After Crisis of
Unprecedented Migrant Arrivals, U.S. Cities Settle
into New Normal, Migration Policy Institute (Aug.
1, 2024), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
us-cities-innovations-integrate-arrivals.
34 See Muzaffar Chishti & Colleen PutzelKavanaugh, After Crisis of Unprecedented Migrant
Arrivals, U.S. Cities Settle into New Normal,
Migration Policy Institute (Aug. 1, 2024), https://
www.migrationpolicy.org/article/us-citiesinnovations-integrate-arrivals.
35 Nick Mordowanec, Map Shows Hotspots for
Migrants Flying Into U.S., Newsweek (May 1, 2024),
https://www.newsweek.com/migrants-dhs-flyingborder-illegal-1896239.
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7 CFR 273.4(a)(6)(ii)(J), as might ‘‘a
Cuban or Haitian entrant (as defined in
section 501(e) of the Refugee Education
Assistance Act of 1980),’’ see 7 CFR
273.4(a)(6)(ii)(E). Similarly, some states
have extended Medicaid and Children’s
Health Insurance Program benefits
without a five-year waiting period to
‘‘lawfully residing’’ children and
pregnant women, which includes an
alien who is paroled into the United
States under INA 212(d)(5) for a period
of at least 1 year.36
Second, the CHNV parole programs
have exacerbated backlogs, or risked
exacerbating backlogs, for the
immigration system writ large. For
example, the population of aliens
paroled into the United States and who
have filed an application for asylum
contributes to an already taxed
immigration system with historically
high backlogs before USCIS and the
Executive Office for Immigration
Review (‘‘EOIR’’).37 Many such parolees
may not otherwise have come to the
United States and have exacerbated
such backlogs or are likely to eventually
do so. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (‘‘USCIS’’) recently reported
that as of the end of December 2024, the
USCIS asylum backlog had increased to
over 1.4 million cases.38 CHNV parolees
account for approximately 75,000
affirmative asylum applications.39 In
addition, when a CHNV parolee’s twoyear parole period ends, if the CHNV
parolee has no lawful basis to remain in
the United States, DHS may place the
alien in section 240 removal
proceedings. But, due in part to the
overwhelmed expedited removal
system, EOIR’s immigration court
backlog has already been growing
rapidly, and will be further strained by
the initiation of additional removal
proceedings for the CHNV parolee
population once their parole period
ends. The immigration court backlog
increased by approximately 44 percent
between the end of FY 2023 (2.5 million
cases) and FY 2024 (3.6 million cases).40
Third, the CHNV parole programs had
a disruptive impact for CBP operations
at interior air POEs. A progressive
increase in beneficiaries of the CHNV
parole programs arriving at POEs with
advance travel authorizations ‘‘(ATAs’’)
were ultimately not granted parole due
to CBP’s determination that the alien
did not warrant a discretionary grant of
parole, for instance due to evidence of
fraud or confirmation that the alien was
a citizen or resident of a non-CHNV
country. As a result, CBP processed
these aliens for another appropriate
disposition under Title 8, including
detention or referral into expedited
removal proceedings or section 240
removal proceedings, as appropriate.
This caused further processing delays
and coordination with air carriers for
return flights when appropriate, and
further contributed to the immigration
court backlog.
The overwhelmed immigration
systems in particular may incentivize
aliens to enter the United States,
without regard to the strength of any
potential claims for immigration status,
as aliens who are subject to expedited
removal may nevertheless be placed in
section 240 removal proceedings when
the system is strained beyond its
processing capacity. As a result, many
remain in the United States until their
immigration benefit requests are
adjudicated or their section 240 removal
proceedings conclude and any resultant
removal order is executed. Any further
strain to the immigration systems
resulting from aliens pursuing the
CHNV parole programs exacerbates
these detrimental incentives.
In short, the domestic impact of the
CHNV parole programs do not warrant
continuing to operate these programs.
Implementation of these programs
coincided with an overall increase in
CHNV migration, significant pressures
on localities throughout the country, an
expansion of public benefits eligibility,
and a further exacerbation of USCIS and
immigration court backlogs.
36 See 42 U.S.C. 1396b(v)(4) (Medicaid); 42 U.S.C.
1397gg(e)(1)(O) (CHIP).
37 See Holly Straut-Eppsteiner, Cong. Rsch. Serv.
IN12492, FY2024 EOIR Immigration Court Data:
Caseloads and the Pending Cases Backlog (2025);
see also Elizabeth Jacobs, Affirmative Asylum
Backlog Exceeds One Million for the First Time
(Center for Immigration Studies) (July 26, 2024),
https://cis.org/Jacobs/Affirmative-Asylum-BacklogExceeds-One-Million-First-Time.
38 USCIS, Performance Data, Asylum Division
Monthly Statistics Report (Dec. 2024), https://
www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/data/
asylumfiscalyear2025todatestats_241231.xlsx (last
visited Feb. 25, 2025).
39 USCIS Office of Performance & Quality.
40 EOIR, Executive Office for Immigration Review
Adjudication Statistics (Jan. 16, 2025), https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344791/dl?inline.
3. The CHNV Parole Programs Are
Inconsistent With the Administration’s
Foreign Policy Goals
One of the stated goals of the CHNV
parole programs was to promote the
foreign policy objectives of the prior
administration. Indeed, DHS explained
repeatedly in its notices promulgating
the CHNV parole programs that their
implementation would advance the
foreign policy objectives of the thencurrent administration.41 The foreign
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41 See e.g., 87 FR at 63516 (‘‘the implementation
of [the Venezuela process] will advance the
Administration’s foreign policy goals’’); 88 FR at
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policy objectives underlying the CHNV
parole programs, however, are not
consistent with those of the current
Administration.
Executive Order 14150, ‘‘America
First Policy Directive to the Secretary of
State’’ (Jan. 20, 2025) clearly sets out the
President’s vision that ‘‘the foreign
policy of the United States shall
champion core American interests and
always put America and American
citizens first.’’ 42 Executive Order 14159,
‘‘Protecting the American People
Against Invasion’’ (Jan. 20, 2025) states
that it is the policy of the United States
to ‘‘faithfully execute the immigration
laws against all inadmissible and
removable aliens, particularly those
aliens who threaten the safety or
security of the American people.’’
Further, it is the policy of the United
States to achieve the ‘‘total and efficient
enforcement of those laws, including
through lawful incentives and detention
capabilities.’’ 43
Whereas implementation of the CHNV
parole programs was contingent upon
the Government of Mexico (‘‘GOM’’)
making an independent decision to
accept the return or removal of CHNV
nationals who migrated illegally, the
U.S. Government is pursuing a range of
other policy initiatives that would allow
DHS to return, remove, or deter the
illegal migration of CHNV nationals and
other aliens. Section 13 of that
Executive Order 14159 specifically
addresses repatriation, and directs the
Secretaries of State and Homeland
Security to take all appropriate action to
cooperate and effectively implement, as
appropriate, the sanctions provided by
section 243(d) of the INA (8 U.S.C.
1253(d)), and ensure that diplomatic
efforts and negotiations with foreign
states include the foreign states’
acceptance of their nationals who are
subject to removal from the United
States. Section 13 further directs the
Secretaries to eliminate all documentary
barriers, dilatory tactics, or other
restrictions that prevent the prompt
repatriation of aliens to any foreign
state. The Order provides that any
failure or delay by a foreign state to
verify the identity of a national of that
state shall be considered in carrying out
section 243(d) sanctions and shall also
be considered regarding the issuance of
1253 (‘‘[the Haiti process] is fully aligned with
larger and important foreign policy objectives of
this Administration’’).
42 See Executive Order 14150, America First
Policy Directive to the Secretary of State, 90 FR
8337 (Jan. 20, 2025) (published Jan. 29, 2025).
43 See Executive Order 14159, Protecting the
American People Against Invasion, 90 FR 8443 (Jan.
20, 2025) (published Jan. 29, 2025).
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any other sanctions that may be
available to the United States.
Further, as noted above, Executive
Order 14165, ‘‘Securing Our Borders’’
states that DHS shall ‘‘terminate all
categorical parole programs that are
contrary to the policies of the United
States established in [the President’s]
Executive Orders, including the
program known as the ‘Processes for
Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and
Venezuelans.’ ’’ 44 In the same Order, the
President directed that as soon as
practicable, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in coordination with the
Secretary of State and the Attorney
General, shall take all appropriate action
to resume the Migrant Protection
Protocols in all sectors along the
southern border of the United States and
ensure that, pending section 240
removal proceedings, aliens described
in section 235(b)(2)(C) of the INA (8
U.S.C. 1225(b)(2)(C)) are returned to the
territory from which they came.
The President has pursued the
cooperation of foreign partners in other
ways as well. For instance:
• On January 23, 2025, President
Trump in his call with Salvadoran
President Nayib Bukele discussed
working together to stop illegal
immigration and crack down on
transnational gangs like Tren de
Aragua.45
• On January 26, 2025, the
Government of Colombia agreed to the
unrestricted acceptance of all illegal
aliens from Colombia returned from the
United States, including on U.S.
military aircraft, without limitation or
delay.46
• On January 27, 2025, President
Trump had a productive conversation
with Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi, who agreed to ‘‘do what’s right’’
in regard to illegal migration.47
• Beginning on February 1, 2025,
President Trump has issued a number of
tariff-related executive orders in
connection with the situation at the
southern border.48
44 See Executive Order 14165, Securing Our
Borders, 90 FR 8467 (Jan. 20, 2025) (published Jan.
30, 2025).
45 The White House, ‘‘Readout of President
Donald J. Trump’s Call with President Nayib
Bukele’’ (Jan. 23, 2025), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/01/
readout-of-president-donald-j-trumps-call-withpresident-bukele/.
46 The White House, ‘‘Statement From the Press
Secretary’’ (Jan. 26, 2025), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/01/
statement-from-the-press-secretary/.
47 Meryl Sebastian, Trump Says India ’Will Do
What’s Right’ on Illegal Immigration BBC News
(Jan. 27, 2025), https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/
cj91z842wlmo.
48 See, e.g., Executive Order 14194, Imposing
Duties to Address the Situation at Our Southern
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• On February 16, 2025, Panama
received a first U.S. military plane
transporting 119 deportees of various
nationalities, who will then be
repatriated to their own respective
countries. Panamanian President Jose
Raul Mulino has offered his country as
a stopover for aliens expelled from the
United States.49
Multiple agencies of the U.S.
Government are actively pursuing the
President’s foreign policy goals. For
instance, the Department of State has
announced multiple discussions with
neighboring countries regarding DHS’s
ability to remove or return illegal
aliens,50 consistent with Secretary of
State Rubio’s January 22, 2025
announcement that a key priority of the
Department of State is to curb mass
migration and secure our borders.51 In
that announcement, the Department of
State made clear that it ‘‘will no longer
undertake any activities that facilitate or
encourage mass migration’’ and that
‘‘[o]ur diplomatic relations with other
countries, particularly in the Western
Hemisphere, will prioritize securing
America’s borders, stopping illegal and
destabilizing migration, and negotiating
the repatriation of illegal
immigrants.’’ 52 Additionally, pursuant
to his authority under section 219 of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1189,53 Secretary of State
Border, 90 FR 9117 (Feb. 1, 2025) (published Feb.
7, 2025); Executive Order 14198, Progress on the
Situation at Our Southern Border, 90 FR 9185 (Feb.
3, 2025) (published Feb. 10, 2025); Executive Order
14227, Amendment to Duties to Address the
Situation at Our Southern Border, 90 FR 11371
(Mar. 2, 2025) (published Ma
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