Amicus Curiae Brief — South Point Energy Center LLC, Petitioner v. Arizona Department of Revenue, et al.

No. 24-952

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

_________

SOUTH POINT ENERGY CENTER, LLC,

Petitioner,

v.

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE; MOHAVE COUNTY,

Respondents.

________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Arizona

________

BRIEF OF FORT MOJAVE INDIAN TRIBE, INTER

TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZONA, NAVAJO NATION,

GILA RIVER INDIAN COMMUNITY, MORONGO

BAND OF MISSION INDIANS, NATIONAL

CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, UNITED

SOUTH AND EASTERN TRIBES, AND INDIAN

GAMING ASSOCIATION AS AMICI CURIAE IN

SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

________

VERRIN T. KEWENVOYOUMA

CHRISTOPHER LOVE

KEWENVOYOUMA LAW, PLLC

700 E. Baseline Road

Suite C1

Tempe, Arizona 85283

verrin@ntklaw.com

ADAM G. UNIKOWSKY

Counsel of Record

CHARLES W. GALBRAITH

ANDREW C. DEGUGLIELMO

JENNER & BLOCK LLP

1099 New York Avenue NW

Suite 900

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 639-6041

aunikowsky@jenner.com

Counsel for Fort Mojave Indian Tribe

Counsel Continued on Inside Cover

SUSAN B. MONTGOMERY

MONTGOMERY &

INTERPRETER, PLC

3301 Thunderbird Road

Phoenix, AZ 852032

HEATHER L. CLAH

NAVAJO NATION DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE

Post Office Box 2010

Old BIA Club Building,

Window Rock, AZ 86515

Counsel for Inter Tribal

Council of Arizona

Counsel for Navajo Nation

MICHAEL S. CARTER

GILA RIVER INDIAN

COMMUNITY

Post Office Box 2138,

Sacaton, AZ 85147

GEORGE FORMAN

FORMAN SHAPIRO & ROSENFELD

LLP

5055 Lucas Valley Road

Nicasio, CA 94946

Counsel for Gila River

Indian Community

Counsel for Morongo Band of

Mission Indians

GEOFFREY BLACKWELL

NATIONAL CONGRESS OF

AMERICAN INDIANS

1516 P Street NW

Washington, DC 20005

KATIE E. KLASS

UNITED SOUTH AND EASTERN

TRIBES

711 Stewarts Ferry Pike

Nashville, TN 37214

Counsel for National

Congress of American

Indians

Counsel for United South and

Eastern Tribes

DANIELLE HER MANY HORSES

INDIAN GAMING

ASSOCIATION

224 2nd Street SE

Washington, DC 20003

Counsel for Indian Gaming

Association

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................. 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................... 2

ARGUMENT ....................................................................... 3

I.

II.

The Arizona Courts Misconstrued the

IRA. ........................................................................... 3

A.

The IRA Is Part of a

Comprehensive Federal Scheme.

........................................................................ 3

B.

The Tribe Relies on Revenue

from Non-Indian Lessees. .......................... 7

C.

The Arizona Supreme Court

Erred

in

Its

Express

Preemption Analysis. ................................ 13

The Arizona Court of Appeals

Misapplied Bracker. .............................................. 19

CONCLUSION ................................................................. 24

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) ............... 10

Arizona v. Navajo Nation, 599 U.S. 555

(2023) .......................................................................... 9

Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997)..................... 4, 6

Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344

(1991) ........................................................................ 17

California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) ...................................... 22

Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998) ................. 14–15

CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Service, 593 U.S. 209 (2021) ......................................... 15

Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v. Thurston County Board of

Equalization, 724 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.

2013) .......................................................................... 17

Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490

U.S. 163 (1989) ......................................................... 19

Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United States,

23 Cl. Ct. 417 (1991) .................................................. 8

Fort Mojave Tribe v. San Bernadino

County, 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976) ............. 9, 14

Foundation Development Corp. v. Loehmann’s, Inc., 788 P.2d 1189 (Ariz. 1990) ............. 16

iii

Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v.

United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) ....................... 21

Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101 (1915) .......................... 16

Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255 (2023) ............... 16

Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1978) ............................. 3

In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1866) ................. 16

M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) .............. 15

McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 894 (2020) ................... 4

Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.

130 (1982) ................................................................. 15

Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S.

145 (1973) ........................................................... 14, 18

Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community,

572 U.S. 782 (2014) .................................................. 23

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) .............. 15, 18

Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family

Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008) ............... 15

Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S.

832 (1982) ........................................................... 20, 21

Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983)............................ 16

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg, 799

F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2015) ...................................... 17

Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the

Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.

134 (1980) ........................................................... 16, 22

iv

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,

448 U.S. 136 (1980) ...................... 3, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24

Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Watt, 707

F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1983) .......................................... 6

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

25 U.S.C. § 415 ................................................................ 5

25 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (1974) ..................................... 21

25 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. ................................................... 6

25 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. ................................................... 2

25 U.S.C. § 5108 ............................................. 2, 5, 13, 17

42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. ................................................. 10

42 U.S.C. § 4336e(10)(A) .............................................. 10

25 C.F.R. pt. 131 ............................................................. 6

25 C.F.R. pt. 151 ............................................................. 2

25 C.F.R. pt. 162 ......................................................... 2, 6

25 C.F.R. § 162.017(a)............................................... 7, 10

25 C.F.R. § 162.401–162.474 .......................................... 6

25 C.F.R. § 162.445(c) ................................................... 11

40 C.F.R. § 1508.1(w) ................................................... 10

Act of Aug. 9, 1955, ch. 615, 69 Stat. 539 ..................... 5

Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 383, § 3, 26 Stat. 795 ....... 5, 21

Act of Jan. 5, 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-346, 136

Stat. 6198.................................................................... 5

Act of Nov. 4, 1963, Pub L. No. 88-167, 77

Stat. 301...................................................................... 5

v

Albuquerque Indian School Act, Pub. L. No.

110-453, tit. II, § 207(a), 122 Stat. 5030

(2008) .......................................................................... 6

Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No.

97-459, tit. II, 96 Stat. 2517 (1983) ...................... 5–6

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

S. Rep. No. 91-501 (1969) ............................................... 4

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Aha Macav Power Serv., Fort Mojave Indian Tribe Aha Macav Power Service

Renewable Energy Project Final Report

(2022), https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/04-12-2022-final-report-fort-mojave-aha-macav.pdf .......................... 12

Reid Peyton Chambers & Monroe E. Price,

Regulating Sovereignty: Secretarial

Discretion and the Leasing of Indian

Lands, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1061 (1974) ....... 5, 6, 21–22

Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law

(Nell Jessup Newton & Kevin K. Washburn eds., 2024) ......................................................... 4

Barry A. Currier, Exploring the Role of

Taxation In The Land Use Planning

Process, 51 Ind. L.J. 27 (1975)............................... 15

ERCC Analytics LLC, Fort Mojave Renewable Energy Feasibility Final Report

(2016), https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2016/02/f30/fortmojave03final.pdf ......................................................................... 9

vi

Exec. Order of Dec. 19, 1911, reprinted in

U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Executive Orders Relating to Indian Reservations:

May 14, 1855 to July 1, 1912 (1912)......................... 8

Exec. Order of Feb. 2, 1911, reprinted in

U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Executive Orders Relating to Indian Reservations:

May 14, 1855 to July 1, 1912 (1912)......................... 8

Exec. Order of Sept. 19, 1880, reprinted in

U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Executive Orders Relating to Indian Reservations:

May 14, 1855 to July 1, 1912 (1912)......................... 8

Dep’t of Interior, Final Environmental Impact Statement: Southpoint Power Plant

(Jan. 1999), https://www.energy.gov

/sites/prod/files/2015/04/f22/EIS-0308FEIS.pdf .................................................................. 10

Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory

of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction, 46 Ariz. St.

L.J. 779 (2014)............................................................ 4

Fort Mojave Indian Tribe Constitution,

https://nptao.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/constitution_and_bylaws_fort_mojave_0.pdf ........................................... 9

Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and

Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381 (1993) ........ 15–16

vii

John C. Kelton, Assistant Adjutant Gen.,

Headquarters, Mil. Div. of the Pac., U.S.

Dep’t of War, General Orders No. 19

(Aug. 4, 1870) ............................................................. 8

Land Acquisitions, 88 Fed. Reg. 86,222

(Dec. 12, 2023)............................................................ 4

U.S. Comm’r of Indian Affs., Sixty-First

Annual Report of the Commissioner of

Indian Affairs (1892) ............................................... 8

Residential, Business, and Wind and Solar

Resource Leases on Indian Land, 77

Fed. Reg. 72,440 (Dec. 5, 2012) ..................... 6, 7, 16

Theodore Roosevelt: First Annual Message, The Am. Presidency Project (Dec.

3, 1901), https://www.presidency.ucsb.

edu/node/206187 ........................................................ 4

Harold Shepherd, Conflict Comes to

Roost[:] The Bureau of Reclamation

and the Federal Indian Trust Responsibility, 31 Env’t L. 901 (2001) ................................. 18

Ten Tribes P’ship, Bureau of Reclamation,

U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Colorado

River Basin Ten Tribes Partnership

Tribal Water Study (2018), https://tentribespartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/WaterStudy.pdf ............................ 8–9

Trust Management Reform: Leasing/Permitting, Grazing, Probate and Funds

Held in Trust, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,068 (Jan.

22, 2001) ...................................................................... 6

viii

Charles F. Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The

Rise of Modern Indian Nations (2005) ................. 4

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

1

For more than a century, the Fort Mojave Indian

Tribe and its members have inhabited a reservation that

lies at the tripoint of the States of Arizona, California,

and Nevada. With over 1,400 members, many of whom

reside on its reservation, the Tribe relies largely on

revenues from leases with non-Indians to support its

pursuit of meaningful self-determination through

effective self-government.

Toward that end, and

consistent with authorization by Congress and a

comprehensive regulatory scheme promulgated by the

Department of the Interior (“Interior”) and

administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”),

the Tribe in 1999 executed a fifty-year lease with

petitioner South Point Energy Center, LLC (“South

Point”) for petitioner to construct and maintain a

natural-gas-powered plant on 320 acres of the Fort

Mojave Reservation in Arizona held in trust by the

United States.

Arizona now claims the authority to tax Petitioner

for its entirely on-reservation conduct. The decisions of

the Arizona courts fundamentally misconstrue the

Indian Reorganization Act and drastically discount the

strong tribal and federal interests at stake while

according primacy to the State’s general, nondescript

1

This amici brief is filed with timely notice to all parties. S. Ct. R.

37.2. Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, amici state that this brief

was not authored in whole or in part by counsel for any party, and

that no person or entity other than amici, its members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation

or submission of this brief.

2

interests in raising revenue. In so doing, those decisions

put the Tribe to an impossible choice—step aside and

abdicate its own regulatory authority, or forego nonIndian development on tribal lands altogether. No

sovereign should be put to that choice. The decisions

below thus subjugate tribal sovereignty and curtail the

ability of all tribes to pursue self-sufficiency consistent

with their sovereign prerogatives. In addition to the

Mojave Indian Tribe, amici are federally recognized

Indian tribes and coalitions thereof that share the

Tribe’s cardinal interests in vindicating the promise of

tribal self-determination and safeguarding the core

attributes of tribal sovereignty that Arizona’s tax

erodes.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Nearly a century ago, Congress enacted the Indian

Reorganization Act of 1934 (“IRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 5101 et

seq., which expressly provided that lands and rights held

in trust by the United States for federally recognized

Indian tribes “shall be exempt from State and local

taxation.” 25 U.S.C. § 5108. The BIA has promulgated

thorough regulations that not only guide the Secretary

of the Interior’s discretion to take land into trust under

the IRA, see 25 C.F.R. pt. 151, but also govern leasing of

tribal lands to non-Indian lessees, see 25 C.F.R. pt. 162.

Consistent with that authority, and with the approval of

the Secretary of the Interior, the Tribe in 1999

negotiated and entered into a fifty-year lease with South

Point under which South Point would construct and

maintain a natural-gas-powered plant (the “Facility”).

After more than a decade of litigation, the Arizona

courts have concluded that the State may impose ad

3

valorem taxes against non-Indian lessees operating on

tribal lands.

That conclusion is wrong and warrants Supreme

Court review. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the

IRA does not expressly preempt the operation of state

law in this context. But that conclusion defies the IRA’s

plain language, creates a demonstrable circuit split, and

leads to untenable results that Congress could not

possibly have intended. The Arizona Court of Appeals

further held that state law is not impliedly preempted

under the balancing test first announced by this Court in

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136

(1980). That conclusion discounted the strong, concrete

tribal and federal interests at stake while improperly

prioritizing the State’s generalized interest.

ARGUMENT

I. The Arizona Courts Misconstrued the IRA.

A. The IRA Is Part of a Comprehensive Federal Scheme.

For more than a century, Congress has devoted close

attention to the subject of leasing on Indian lands.

Congress’s comprehensive framework leaves no room

for states to interject their tax laws.

Congress enacted the IRA to “acknowledge[] the

failure of its policy” of assimilation that marred the

preceding half-century. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,

708 (1978). That policy, implemented in part through the

General Allotment Act of 1887, “sought to pressure

many tribes to abandon their communal lifestyles and

parcel their lands into smaller lots owned by individual

4

tribe members,” made such lands “(eventually) freely

alienable,” and opened unassigned lands to settlement

by non-Indians. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 894, 904

(2020); see Charles F. Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The

Rise of Modern Indian Nations 43 (2005).

The results of allotment were “devastating.” Land

Acquisitions, 88 Fed. Reg. 86,222, 86,234 (Dec. 12, 2023).

Theodore Roosevelt described the General Allotment

Act as “a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the

tribal mass.”

Theodore Roosevelt, First Annual

Message, The Am. Presidency Project (Dec. 3, 1901),

https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/206187. Under

that Act, Indian tribes collectively lost 90 million of the

140 million acres of land that they once possessed. See

S. Rep. No. 91-501, at 12 (1969). And “[t]he resulting

pattern of land ownership generated a complicated

‘checkerboard’ pattern of federal, state, and tribal

jurisdiction that plagues much of Indian country even

today.” Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of

Tribal Civil Jurisdiction, 46 Ariz. St. L.J. 779, 787

(2014). Apart from pervasive checkerboarding, the

“ownership of allotments became increasingly

fractionated” “as allottees passed their interests on to

multiple heirs,” and this “problem proliferated with each

succeeding generation.” Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234,

237–38 (1997).

The IRA “marked a significant” shift “in federal

policy in favor of Native autonomy,” and “was the first

comprehensive federal Indian affairs legislation since

the” General Allotment Act. Cohen’s Handbook of

Federal Indian Law § 2.09[2] (Nell Jessup Newton &

Kevin K. Washburn, eds., 2024). As part of that

5

legislation, Congress delegated to the Secretary of the

Interior authority “to acquire” land or rights into trust

for Indian tribes “for the purpose of providing land for

Indians” and provided that such “lands or rights shall be

exempt from State and local taxation.” 25 U.S.C. § 5108.

Tribes also have the authority to lease tribal lands.

Congress has legislated leasing on tribal lands since

1891. See Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 383, § 3, 26 Stat. 795.

Congress adopted the current leasing statute in 1955,

which “permits leasing for a wide range of purposes,”

including South Point’s activities in connection with the

Facility. Id.; see Act of Aug. 9, 1955, ch. 615, 69 Stat. 539

(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 415) (“1955 Leasing Statute”).

Under the 1955 Leasing Statute, lease periods may be

“up to 25 years, with an option to renew for another 25year period.” Reid Peyton Chambers & Monroe E.

Price, Regulating Sovereignty: Secretarial Discretion

and the Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1061,

1062 (1974).

“Subsequent to 1955,” Congress has repeatedly

amended Section 415 and enacted other statutes “to

extend 99-year leasing authority to” a number of tribes.

Id. Congress in 1963 effectuated such an extension to

the Tribe. See Act of Nov. 4, 1963, Pub L. No. 88-167, 77

Stat. 301. All told, Congress has amended the 1955

Leasing Statute fifty times since enactment, most

recently in 2023. See Act of Jan. 5, 2023, Pub. L. No. 117346, 136 Stat. 6198.

As

yet

another

example

of

Congress’s

comprehensive approach towards leasing on tribal lands,

in 1983, Congress enacted the Indian Land

Consolidation Act (“ILCA”), Pub. L. No. 97-459, tit. II,

6

96 Stat. 2517 (1983) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq.),

to provide a mechanism through which “fractional

interests would escheat to the tribe.” Youpee, 519 U.S.

at 239. Congress has also amended the ILCA on several

occasions, as recently as 2008. See Albuquerque Indian

School Act, Pub. L. No. 110-453, tit. II, § 207(a), 122 Stat.

5030 (2008).

Interior’s history of regulating tribal land leases with

non-Indian lessees is similarly robust.

The

Commissioner of Indian Affairs promulgated the first

regulations governing tribal land leasing in 1904 in an

effort “to protect against indiscriminate leasing of

allotments.” Chambers & Price, supra, at 1073. For

much of the twentieth century, Interior housed those

regulations at 25 C.F.R. Part 131, see, e.g., id. at 1076 &

n.75, but transferred them to 25 C.F.R. Part 162 by the

mid-1980s. See Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Watt,

707 F.2d 1072, 1073 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1983). In addition to

these amendments throughout the twentieth century,

Interior again revised these regulations in 2001 and

2012.

See

Trust

Management

Reform:

Leasing/Permitting, Grazing, Probate and Funds Held

in Trust, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,068 (Jan. 22, 2001); Residential,

Business, and Wind and Solar Resource Leases on

Indian Land, 77 Fed. Reg. 72,440 (Dec. 5, 2012).

The historical and current regulations impose myriad

rules and requirements governing leases between tribes

and non-Indian lessees of tribal trust lands by which

both parties must abide, subject to approval and ongoing

oversight by Interior. See 25 C.F.R. § 162.401–162.474.

As particularly relevant here, the regulations provide,

“Subject only to applicable Federal law, permanent

7

improvements on the leased land, without regard to

ownership of those improvements, are not subject to any

fee, tax, assessment, levy, or other charge imposed by

any State or political subdivision of a State.” Id.

§ 162.017(a) (emphases added). In promulgating these

regulations, the BIA emphasized that “no improvements

on leased Indian land are subject to State taxation,

regardless of who owns the improvements,” as “State

and local taxation of improvements undermine Federal

and tribal regulation of improvements.” Residential,

Business, and Wind and Solar Resource Leases on

Indian Land, 77 Fed. Reg. at 72,449, 72,448.

B. The Tribe Relies on Revenue from Non-Indian Lessees.

For decades, the Tribe has developed and maintained

collaborative relationships with non-Indian lessees

operating on the Tribe’s lands. Those relationships are

the cornerstone of the Tribe’s pursuit of selfdetermination and self-governance through economic

development. The Arizona courts’ decisions will not only

undermine those existing partnerships, including the

Tribe’s and South Point’s, but it will stifle the Tribe’s

ability to develop new ones.

These inevitable

consequences will erode the Tribe’s capacity to provide

crucial government services to its citizens and will

appropriate the Tribe’s sovereign authority to make

meaningful choices about the uses to which its lands are

put.

The Tribe and its members have inhabited and

exercised sovereignty over the lands comprising the

Fort Mojave Reservation since time immemorial. The

8

United States established a military base on these lands

in 1858 prior to President Grant proclaiming the

Reservation as a military reservation on March 30, 1870,

and the U.S. Department of War declaring its

boundaries on August 4, 1870. See U.S. Comm’r of

Indian Affs., Sixty-First Annual Report of the

Commissioner of Indian Affairs, at 879 (1892); John C.

Kelton, Assistant Adjutant Gen., Headquarters, Mil.

Div. of the Pac., U.S. Dep’t of War, General Orders No.

19 (Aug. 4, 1870). President Harrison issued an

Executive Order on September 19, 1880, causing the

Department of War to transfer superintendence over

the Reservation to Interior to facilitate the

establishment of an Indian boarding school. See Exec.

Order of Sept. 19, 1880, reprinted in U.S. Dep’t of the

Interior, Executive Orders Relating to Indian

Reservations: May 14, 1855 to July 1, 1912 (“Executive

Orders”), at 12–13 (1912). President Taft subsequently

expanded the Reservation through Executive Orders on

December 1, 1910, and February 2, 1911. See Exec.

Order of Dec. 19, 1910, reprinted in Executive Orders at

13; Exec. Order of Feb. 2, 1911, reprinted in Executive

Orders at 13–14; see Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United

States, 23 Cl. Ct. 417, 420 n.1 (1991).

The Reservation today comprises more than 34,000

acres located at the tripoint of the States of Arizona,

California, and Nevada. The Reservation relies heavily

on water from the adjacent Colorado River. See Ten

Tribes P’ship, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep’t of the

Interior, Colorado River Basin Ten Tribes Partnership

Tribal Water Study, fig. 5.6-2 (2018), https://tent

9

ribespartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Wat

erStudy.pdf.

The Tribe adopted a constitution pursuant to the

IRA on March 16, 1957, which Interior approved on May

6, 1957. See generally Fort Mojave Indian Tribe Const.,

https://nptao.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/constitution

_and_bylaws_fort_mojave_0.pdf.

Recognizing the

reality that “[w]ater” in the Colorado River “has long

been scarce, and the problem is getting worse,” Arizona

v. Navajo Nation, 599 U.S. 555, 561 (2023), the Tribe in

the twentieth century launched “a plan for the economic

development of the[] [R]eservation” that relies on

“leases with non-Indian lessees.” Fort Mojave Tribe v.

San Bernadino Cnty., 543 F.2d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir.

1976).

The Tribe quickly developed a “need for increased

energy supplies” as “a direct result of [its] aggressive

and successful economic development projects.” ERCC

Analytics LLC, Fort Mojave Renewable Energy

Feasibility

Final

Report,

at

5

(2016),

https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2016/02/f30/f

ortmojave03final.pdf. Accordingly, the Tribe entered

into the lease at issue in this litigation with the

predecessor of South Point in 1999. Pet. App. 23a. The

lease provided 320 acres of undeveloped reservation

land set aside by the Executive Orders located within

the State of Arizona to the predecessor to construct and

operate an electric power plant. Pet. App. 23a–24a.

The plant would require significant amounts of water

to operate, but the Tribe “has perfected water rights to

Colorado River water in quantities adequate to meet the

estimated 4,000 acre feet per year consumptive use

10

requirements of the proposed power plant.” Dep’t of

Interior, Final Environmental Impact Statement:

Southpoint Power Plant (“FEIS”), S-5 (Jan.

1999), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/04/f

22/EIS-0308-FEIS.pdf. This Court had previously

affirmed those rights on the heels of extensive litigation

and consistent with the purposes of the Reservation as

embodied in the Executive Orders establishing it. See

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600–01 (1963).

Pursuant to the regulations, the Secretary of the

Interior reviewed and approved BIA Lease No. B-1778FM on August 19, 1999. Pet. App. 83a. As part of that

process, the BIA prepared a comprehensive

Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) consistent

with the directives of the National Environmental Policy

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., which requires such

statements for any major federal action, that is, “an

action that … is subject to substantial Federal control

and responsibility.” 42 U.S.C. § 4336e(10)(A); see also 40

C.F.R. § 1508.1(w). In the EIS, the BIA emphasized

that “Congress has not delegated any authority to state

or local jurisdictions which would apply to the proposed

[Facility].” FEIS at 3.

While the Tribe indisputably has authority to assess

tribal taxes against South Point in relation to the

Facility, see, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 162.017(a), it frequently

allows non-Indian lessees to make lump-sum payments

in lieu of annually assessed taxes. Pet. App. 134a–135a.

In accordance with that sovereign prerogative, the

Tribe and South Point agreed that South Point would

pay the Tribe $2 million per year. Pet. App. 86a, 152a.

The parties made this and several other modifications to

11

the lease, see Pet. App. 83a–89a, each of which required

review by and the approval of the BIA, see 25 C.F.R.

§ 162.445(c). Additionally, the Tribe must regulate

South Point’s emergency preparedness and particular

emissions consistent with various federal environmental

statutes. See Pet. App. 102a–104a.

South Point was also required to comply with

applicable tribal laws, which necessitated that South

Point acquire water use permits, building permits,

certificates of occupancy, and make associated

payments. E.g., Pet. App. 87a, 119a. Pursuant to the

terms of the lease, South Point and the Tribe also

entered into an agreement requiring South Point to

adhere to tribal employment preferences at the Facility.

E.g., Pet. App. 109a.

Reciprocally, the Tribe provides the Facility and

South Point with the full panoply of government

services, including law enforcement, sewer, telephone,

internet, and back-up power. E.g., Pet. App. 81a–82a,

128a–131a, 148a. The Tribe also facilitates fire and

emergency-response services through an agreement

between the Tribe and the Mohave Valley Fire

Department. E.g., Pet. App. 126a–127a.

This Tribe’s partnership with South Point has

benefitted the Tribe tremendously. The lump sum

payments enabled the Tribe to eliminate by its debt by

2017. Pet. App. 133a, 201a. The Tribe had incurred that

debt through costs of tribal government operations and

services to tribal members, as well as the development

of physical and institutional infrastructure. The debt

elimination thus enabled the Tribe to accord greater

focus on the needs of the community. To take just one

12

example, the Tribe successfully constructed and now

operates a 2.3 megawatt solar field that generates

hundreds of thousands of dollars in clean energy on an

annual basis and promotes the Tribe’s self-sufficiency in

meeting energy needs across the Reservation. See

generally Aha Macav Power Serv., Fort Mojave Indian

Tribe AhA Macav Power Service Renewable Energy

Project Final Report (2022), https://www.ener

gy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/04-12-2022-final-repor

t-fort-mojave-aha-macav.pdf. This example is just one

of many within a single industry; the Tribe has achieved

and is actively pursuing development in at least ten

other

industries,

including

agriculture,

telecommunications, education, healthcare, and housing,

to name a few.

These efforts have created

unprecedented economic opportunity within Mohave

County and have enabled numerous tribal members

living off-Reservation to return home and participate

fully in and contribute effectively to the tribal

community. The lease has thus proven instrumental in

the Tribe’s pursuit of meaningful self-determination

through effective self-governance, just as Congress

intended when it enacted the IRA.

Conversely, the Arizona courts’ decisions have

negated the benefits to South Point, which paid more

than $20 million to Arizona as a result of the ad valorem

taxes at issue. By increasing costs and diminishing

benefits in mandating compliance with a state taxation

scheme in addition to the tribal and federal regulatory

regimes with which those lessees must already comply,

Arizona effectively punishes those who choose to do

business with the Tribe on tribal lands. It also punishes

13

the Tribe, which is already required to leverage its own

resources to create strategic opportunities to pursue

economic development through participation in industry

across numerous state and local jurisdictions.

Arizona’s ability to impose these disincentives is

incompatible with foundational principles of tribal

sovereignty and federal Indian law.

And it is

inconsistent

with

the

federal

government’s

comprehensive statutory and regulatory landscape

governing leasing on Indian lands, including the IRA.

C. The Arizona Supreme Court Erred in Its

Express Preemption Analysis.

The Arizona Supreme Court fundamentally

misinterpreted the IRA in holding that 25 U.S.C. § 5108

does not expressly preempt Arizona’s taxation authority

over South Point’s on-Reservation conduct as a nonIndian lessee. That conclusion is antithetical to IRA’s

plain text, to this Court’s jurisprudence, to basic

principles of tribal sovereignty, and to the precepts of

property law that underpin the tribal land leasing

framework. It further creates a demonstrable split that

subjects the Tribe not only to inconsistent state and

federal court jurisprudence, but also to the potentially

divergent taxation schemes of three different states.

Beginning with the text, Section 5108 provides that

“lands or rights” held in trust by the federal government

for Indian tribes “shall be exempt from State and local

taxation.” The IRA thus frames the exemption in terms

of the lands or rights themselves, not the identity of the

entity occupying the lands or exercising those rights.

And it is beyond dispute that “all [R]eservation land is

14

held in trust for the Fort Mojave Tribe” by the federal

government. Fort Mojave Tribe, 543 F.2d at 1255.

Because the IRA exempts that Reservation land and the

Tribe’s rights therein from State taxation, and because

South Point is exercising those rights in that land

pursuant to the lease, Arizona cannot levy a tax against

South Point based on the value of those leased lands, full

stop. That conclusion accords with Congress’ “intent

and purpose” in enacting the IRA, which “was ‘to

rehabilitate the Indian’s economic life and to give him a

chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century

of oppression and paternalism.’” Mescalero Apache

Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973) (quoting H.R.

Rep. No. 1804, at 6 (1934)).

That text also reflects this Court’s recognition that

uses of land that are “so intimately connected with use

of the land itself,” such as the “use of permanent

improvements,” require that “relieving the [land] of

state tax burdens must be construed to encompass an

exemption for the [uses].” Id. at 158–59. For this reason,

this Court has emphasized that improvements “would

certainly be immune from [a] [s]tate’s ad valorem

property tax” because “[i]t has long been recognized

that ‘use’ is among the ‘bundle of privileges that make up

property or ownership’ of property and … a tax upon

‘use’ is a tax upon the property itself.” Id. at 158 (quoting

Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582 (1937)).

And consistent with that recognition, this Court has

acknowledged that states cannot assess ad valorem

taxes on tribal lands where those lands are held in trust

by the federal government. See Cass Cnty. v. Leech

Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 110–11,

15

114–15 (1998). These cases confirm the IRA’s text’s

focus on the lands and rights themselves rather than on

the identity of the entity occupying and exercising them.

The IRA’s language and this Court’s cases further

reflect that “[t]he power to tax is an essential attribute

of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary

instrument of self-government and territorial

management” that “derives not from its power to

exclude, but from its power to govern.” Merrion v.

Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 138, 144 (1982); see

Plains Com. Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.,

554 U.S. 316, 327 (2008) (emphasizing that tribal

sovereignty “centers on the land held by the tribe”).

Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall recognized long ago that

the power “to tax, without limit or control, is essentially

a power to destroy.” M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.

316, 391 (1819).

For this reason, “[e]very tax is in some measure

regulatory,” and taxes often seek “to influence private

conduct.” CIC Servs., LLC v. IRS, 593 U.S. 209, 224

(2021) (quoting Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506,

513 (1937)); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567

U.S. 519, 567 (2012).

Scholars have shared this

understanding for decades, recognizing that “taxes …

affect the timing, intensity, and nature of land use.”

Barry A. Currier, Exploring the Role of Taxation In The

Land Use Planning Process, 51 Ind. L.J. 27, 30 (1975).

As a result, “the [T]ribe’s practical ability to tax the nonIndian [lessee] is inversely related to the [S]tate’s power

to tax that entity.” Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past

and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and

Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 Harv. L.

16

Rev. 381, 437 (1993); see Residential, Business, and

Wind and Solar Resource Leases on Indian Land, 77

Fed. Reg. at 72,448.

This inverse relationship illustrates the manner in

which Arizona’s taxation of South Point supplants the

Tribe’s regulatory choices. But “tribal sovereignty is

dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal

Government, not the States.” Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S.

713, 719 (1983) (quoting Washington v. Confederated

Tribes of the Colville Indian Rsrv., 447 U.S. 134, 154

(1980)); see also Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 273

(2023) (“‘[V]irtually all authority over Indian commerce

and Indian tribes’ lies with the Federal Government.”

(quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,

62 (1996))); see also In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737,

757 (1866). Beyond its inconsistency with the text of the

IRA, Arizona’s tax thus defies centuries of this Court’s

jurisprudence.

The IRA’s text further accords with principles of

property law. This Court has characterized a lease as

representing “a present vested right—‘a freehold

interest’—in the premises” that would otherwise belong

to the lessor. Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101, 113 (1915).

Consistent with that characterization, the Arizona

Supreme Court has described “a lease as a conveyance”

of property. Found. Dev. Corp. v. Loehmann’s, Inc., 788

P.2d 1189, 1193 (Ariz. 1990). It thus necessarily and

unequivocally follows that South Point is exercising the

Tribe’s rights in the leased lands, and it is beyond

dispute that Arizona cannot levy a tax predicated on the

exercise of tribal rights on tribal lands. South Point’s

tribal water use permit, which South Point purchased

17

from the Tribe in order to exercise the Tribe’s water

rights in the Colorado River to support the Facility’s

operation, only bolsters this conclusion.

Altogether, these legal principles illustrate the

myriad reasons why the IRA preempts Arizona’s tax.

The Arizona Supreme Court’s contrary conclusion rests

principally on its attempt to distinguish improvements

owned by tribes and those owned by non-Indians. See

Pet. App. 39a. But, as illustrated above, this is a

distinction without a difference—the IRA speaks to

“lands or rights,” not to the identity of the entity

occupying or exercising them. In addition to ignoring

that text and the related principles of federal Indian law

and property law, the Arizona Supreme Court’s

interpretation creates a clear split of authority between

the Arizona Supreme Court, on the one hand, and the

Ninth and the Eleventh Circuits, on the other.

The Ninth Circuit has expressly held that

preemption under 25 U.S.C. § 5108 applies “without

regard to the ownership of the improvements.”

Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Rsrv. v. Thurston Cnty.

Bd. of Equalization, 724 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2013).

And the Eleventh Circuit has held that the IRA “barred

Florida from assessing its Rental Tax against the nonIndian lessees of the Tribe’s reservation land.”

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Stranburg, 799 F.3d 1324, 1329

(11th Cir. 2015). The split between the Arizona Supreme

Court and the Ninth Circuit is especially poignant, as the

Tribe’s Reservation is within both jurisdictions, thereby

subjecting the Tribe to inconsistent legal rules resulting

from divergent interpretations of the same statute. See

Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347 (1991) (“A

18

principal purpose for which we use our certiorari

jurisdiction, … is to resolve conflicts among the United

States courts of appeals and state courts concerning the

meaning of provisions of federal law.”).

Moreover, the Tribe’s Reservation is located in three

States. Under the Arizona Supreme Court’s

interpretation, the Tribe would be required to

familiarize itself with three potentially divergent sets of

State tax law and further orient its economic

development strategies accordingly.

These added

complexities

both

exacerbate

the

“serious

jurisdiction[al] and management problems” inherent in

the Tribe’s Reservation, Harold Shepherd, Conflict

Comes to Roost[:] The Bureau of Reclamation and the

Federal Indian Trust Responsibility, 31 Envtl. L. 901,

906 (2001), and further interferes with the IRA’s

“design[] to encourage tribal enterprises ‘to enter the

white world on a footing of equal competition.’”

Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. at 157 (quoting 78

Cong. Rec. 11,732).

Simply put, Arizona’s tax intolerably appropriates

tribal regulatory authority and cannot be squared with

the IRA or the legal landscape in which it operates. The

Court should grant the petition to reaffirm the axiom

that “the ‘power to tax is not the power to destroy while

this Court sits.”’ Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at

573 (emphases added) (quoting Okla. Tax Comm’n v.

Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 364 (1949)).

19

II. The Arizona Court of Appeals Misapplied Bracker.

On remand from the Arizona Supreme Court, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected South Point’s alternative preemption argument based on Bracker. In holding

that Arizona’s interests outweighed those of the Tribe

and the federal government, the Arizona Court of Appeals turned Bracker on its head. This Court’s review is

warranted to correct the Court of Appeals’ fundamental

misinterpretation of this Court’s core precedent.

The Court of Appeals opened by erroneously stating

“that Congress does not intend to pre-empt areas of traditional state regulation, and … the State retains its historic power to regulate.” Pet. App. 16a (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But this Court has directed that “questions of pre-emption in this area are not

resolved by reference to standards of pre-emption that

have developed in other areas of the law, and are not controlled by ‘mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or

tribal sovereignty.’” Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New

Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989) (quoting Bracker, 448

U.S. at 145). By proceeding from a faulty premise, the

Court of Appeals further ignored Bracker’s command—

consistent with the principles discussed above—that

“[a]mbiguities” in this context are “construed generously in order to comport with … traditional notions of

sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging

tribal independence.” Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143–44.

Next, the Court of Appeals improperly relied on the

fact that “South Point is the actual taxpayer and bears

the tax’s legal incidence.” Pet. App. 18a. This Court has

20

repeatedly “decline[d] to allow the State to impose additional burdens on … significant federal interest[s] in fostering” tribal development, “even if those burdens are

imposed indirectly through a tax on a non-Indian … for

work done on the reservation.” Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd.,

Inc. v. Bureau of Rev. of N.M., 458 U.S. 832, 844 n.8

(1982); see Bracker, 448 U.S. at 151 (emphasizing that

“the economic burden of the asserted taxes will ultimately fall on the Tribe”). The Court of Appeals paid no

mind to the practical effects of the State’s tax on the

Tribe’s ability to meaningfully regulate and derive revenues from its land, as also discussed above.

Beyond these threshold errors, the Arizona Court of

Appeals disregarded this Court’s directives by endorsing the State’s justifications for imposing the tax, which

“amount[] to nothing more than a general desire to increase revenues.” Ramah, 458 U.S. at 845. Instead, the

Court of Appeals emphasized that the tax “supports the

local school districts,” “helps Mohave County maintain

roads,” and “supports numerous other state and County

services,” only “some of which aid the [R]eservation.”

Pet. App. 20a. It is difficult to imagine a more generalized interest.

On the other side of the equation, the Arizona Court

of Appeals grossly underestimated the strength of the

federal interests at stake. Although it mentioned the

BIA’s regulations, Pet. App. 15a, the Court of Appeals

failed to consider the “clearly expressed federal interest” reflected in those extensive regulations, let alone

the federal interests encapsulated by the comprehensive

statutory framework authorizing their promulgation.

21

Ramah, 458 U.S. at 842. But this Court has understood

Bracker to require that “[r]elevant federal statutes …

must be examined,” especially “in light of ‘the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of sovereignty

that have developed from historical traditions of tribal

independence.’” Id. at 838 (quoting Bracker, 448 U.S. at

144–45); see Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v.

United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193 (1999) (emphasizing “the

special federal interest in protecting the welfare of Native Americans”).

Bracker itself, for example, discerned “a firm federal

policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic

development” not only from the IRA, but also from the

Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq.,

and its stated purpose “to help develop and utilize … resources … to a point where Indians will fully exercise

responsibility for the management of their own resources and where they will enjoy a standard of living

from their own productive efforts comparable to that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities.” 448

U.S. at 143 & n.10 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1451). The Court

of Appeals here did not consider the IRA, the Indian Financing Act, or any statute for that matter. But these

and other statutes like the ILCA and the 1955 Leasing

Statute bespeak a paramount federal interest in promoting tribal self-determination by facilitating tribal economic development through tribal land use.

Indeed, the predecessor to the 1955 Leasing Statute

was first enacted in 1891, see Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch.

383, § 3, 26 Stat. 795, and amended several times between 1891 and 1910, see Chambers & Price, supra, at

22

1073. And, as discussed above, Interior has maintained

regulations pursuant to that statutory authority since

1904. Congress thus situated the 1934 IRA within a substantial, preexisting federal framework governing tribal

land leasing, which illustrates the continuity of this paramount federal interest for more than a century.

Beyond eliding the strength of the federal government’s interests, the Court of Appeals outright ignored

the Tribe’s. This Court has emphasized that tribal interests “in raising revenues for essential government programs” are “strongest when the revenues are derived

from value generated on the reservation by activities involving the Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services.” Colville, 447 U.S. at 156–57. Conversely, the state taxation interests are “strongest when

the tax is directed at off-reservation value and when the

taxpayer is the recipient of state services.” Id. at 157.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that “South Point

demands few direct services from the state or Mohave

County,” Pet. App. 19a, yet prioritized to Arizona’s interests regardless. And the Court of Appeals entirely

failed to consider the extensive government services

provided by the Tribe to South Point or the demonstrable and various benefits that the Tribe’s development efforts provide to Mohave County at large.

The Court of Appeals further overlooked that tribal

“[s]elf-determination and economic development are not

within reach if the Tribes cannot raise revenues.” California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S.

202, 219 (1987). But if states remain able to assess taxes

on non-Indian lessees like South Point, and “if Tribes

23

were to impose their own taxes on these same sources,

the resulting double taxation would discourage economic

growth.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S.

782, 811 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The very

prospect of double taxation would cause “[m]any businesses” to “find it easier to avoid doing business on …

reservations” altogether. Id. (quoting Enterprise

Zones: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,

102d Cong. 234 (1991) (statement of Peterson Zah, President of the Navajo Nation)).

This reality puts the Tribe—and all federally recognized Indian tribes—to an impossible choice. The Tribe

can either reduce or eliminate the revenue that non-Indian lease activities on Reservation lands would otherwise generate, or they can forego leasing their lands altogether. Either outcome is irreconcilable with the

Tribe’s pursuit of meaningful self-determination

through effective self-governance, and with the extensive federal statutory and regulatory schemes expressly

designed to promote these ends.

At bottom, this case is on all fours with Bracker:

“[T]he Federal Government has undertaken comprehensive regulation of the [Tribe’s leasing activities], … a

number of the policies underlying the federal regulatory

scheme are threatened by the taxes respondents seek to

impose, and … respondents are unable to justify the

taxes except in terms of a generalized interest in raising

revenue[.]” 448 U.S. at 151. There, as here, the “exercise of state authority is impermissible” because it is

flatly incompatible with basic notions of tribal

24

sovereignty. Id. And even if the legal incidence of the

State’s tax falls on South Point, it cannot seriously be

disputed that “the economic burden … will ultimately

fall on the Tribe.” Id. Proper balancing of the relevant

sovereign interests compels the conclusion that Arizona’s tax is impliedly preempted, and only Supreme

Court review can correct the course.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, amici curiae respectfully

urge this Court to grant the petition and reverse the

decisions of the Arizona courts, to hold that the IRA

expressly preempts the State’s tax, and to recognize

that the tax is impliedly preempted in view of the strong

tribal and federal interests at stake.

Respectfully submitted,

VERRIN T. KEWENVOYOUMA

CHISTOPHER LOVE

KEWENVOYOUMA LAW,

PLLC

700 E. Baseline Road

Suite C1

Tempe, Arizona 85283

verrin@ntklaw.com

ADAM G. UNIKOWSKY

Counsel of Record

CHARLES W. GALBRAITH

ANDREW C. DEGUGLIELMO

JENNER & BLOCK LLP

1099 New York Avenue NW

Suite 900

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 639-6041

aunikowsky@jenner.com

Counsel for Fort Mojave Indian Tribe

25

SUSAN B. MONTGOMERY

MONTGOMERY &

INTERPRETER, PLC

3301 Thunderbird Road

Phoenix, AZ 852032

HEATHER L. CLAH

NAVAJO NATION DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE

Post Office Box 2010

Old BIA Club Building,

Window Rock, AZ 86515

Counsel for Inter Tribal

Council of Arizona

Counsel for Navajo Nation

MICHAEL S. CARTER

GILA RIVER INDIAN

COMMUNITY

Post Office Box 2138,

Sacaton, AZ 85147

GEORGE FORMAN

FORMAN SHAPIRO & ROSENFELD

LLP

5055 Lucas Valley Road

Nicasio, CA 94946

Counsel for Gila River

Indian Community

Counsel for Morongo Band of

Mission Indians

GEOFFREY BLACKWELL

NATIONAL CONGRESS OF

AMERICAN INDIANS

1516 P Street NW

Washington, DC 20005

KATIE E. KLASS

UNITED SOUTH AND EASTERN

TRIBES

711 Stewarts Ferry Pike

Nashville, TN 37214

Counsel for National

Congress of American

Indians

Counsel for United South and

Eastern Tribes

DANIELLE HER MANY HORSES

INDIAN GAMING ASSOCIATION

224 2nd Street SE

Washington, DC 20003

Counsel for Indian Gaming

Association