Amicus Curiae Brief — Georgia Association of Club Executives, Inc., Petitioner v. Georgia, et al.

No. 24-881

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________

GEORGIA ASSOCIATION OF CLUB EXECUTIVES, INC.,

PETITIONER,

v.

STATE OF GEORGIA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

__________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

__________

BRIEF OF FIRST AMENDMENT SCHOLARS AS

AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

__________

CHRISTOPHER J. PAOLELLA

Counsel of Record

REICH & PAOLELLA LLP

111 Broadway, Suite 2002

New York, NY 10006

cpaolella@reichpaolella.com

(212) 804-7090

Counsel for Amici Curiae

LEGAL PRINTERS LLC ! Washington, DC ! 202-747-2400 ! legalprinters.com

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Authorities ...........................................................ii

Interests of Amici Curiae................................................. 1

Summary of Argument ...................................................... 1

Argument............................................................................. 4

The Court Should Grant Certiorari to Resolve

the Inconsistency between Reed and City of

Renton and Its Progeny ............................................. 4

A.

There is substantial tension between this

Court’s rulings in City of Renton and its

progeny, on the one hand, and Reed, on

the other .............................................................. 4

B.

Lower courts have struggled to reconcile

these inconsistent lines of jurisprudence........ 6

C.

This case provides an attractive vehicle to

resolve the confusion ......................................... 9

Conclusion .......................................................................... 10

Appendix ............................................................................ 1a

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Page

Ashcroft v. ACLU,

542 U.S. 656 (2004) ........................................................... 1

Ass’n of Club Executives of Dallas, Inc. v. City of

Dallas, 83 F.4th 958 (5th Cir. 2023) .............................. 8

Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh,

141 S. Ct. 578 (2021)......................................................... 9

Cahaly v. Larosa,

796 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2015) ............................................ 7

Champion v. Commonwealth,

520 S.W.3d 331 (Ky. 2017) .............................................. 8

Coalition Life v. City of Carbondale,

145 S. Ct. 537 (2025)......................................................... 7

City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin,

LLC, 596 U.S. 61 (2022) .................................................. 7

City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., .... 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

475 U.S. 41 (1986) .................................................6, 7, 8, 9

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,

597 U.S. 215 (2022) ........................................................... 7

Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney General,

825 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 2016) ............................................. 7

Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Skrmetti,

— F. Supp. 3d —, 2024 WL 5248104

(W.D. Tenn. 2024) ............................................................ 8

Hill v. Colorado,

530 U.S. 703 (2000) ................................................... 5, 7, 8

Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v. Mosley,

408 U.S. 92 (1972) ............................................................. 4

iii

Price v. City of Chicago,

915 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 2019) ...................................... 7, 8

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, .................................... 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

576 U.S. 155 (2015) ............................................... 6, 7, 8, 9

Siders v. City of Brandon,

123 F.4th 293 (5th Cir. 2024) .......................................... 8

Ward v. Rock Against Racism,

491 U.S. 781 (1989) ................................................... 2, 4, 5

Constitution and Statutes:

Ga. Code Ann. § 15-21-201 ............................................. 2, 9

U.S. Const. amend. I ...................................... 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9

Other Authorities:

Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, In Defense of Content

Regulation, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 1427 (2017) .................... 7

Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a

Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems

in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. Cal. L.

Rev. 49 (2000) ................................................................... 7

David L. Hudson, Jr., The ContentDiscrimination Principle and the Impact

of Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 70 Case W. Res.

L. Rev. 259 (2019) ............................................................ 7

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 1

Amici are 22 legal scholars who research, teach, and

publish scholarship on the First Amendment’s free speech

clause. Their names, their institutional affiliations, and examples of their relevant scholarship are set forth in the

Appendix to this brief. Amici have no personal interest in

this case; they submit this brief to urge the Court to grant

certiorari to resolve a long-standing inconsistency in its

First Amendment jurisprudence.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The threshold question in deciding whether a government regulation offends the First Amendment’s guarantee

of freedom of speech is whether the regulation discriminates based on the content of the speech. Laws “that target speech based on its communicative content . . . are presumptively unconstitutional.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576

U.S. 155, 163 (2015). They are subject to strict scrutiny,

which requires the government to show that the restriction “is ‘narrowly drawn’ to further a ‘compelling interest’ and that the restriction amounts to the ‘least restrictive means’ available to further that interest.” Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 677 (2004) (citations omitted).

“On the other hand, so-called ‘content-neutral’ time,

place, and manner regulations” aimed at combating “the

undesirable secondary effects” of expression are subject

to the less exacting standard of intermediate scrutiny. City

of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47, 49

(1986). To survive intermediate scrutiny, a restriction on

speech or expression need only be “narrowly tailored to

Pursuant to Rule 37, all parties were timely notified of the filing of

this brief. No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in

part, and no person, other than the amici and their counsel, contributed money to its preparation or submission.

1

2

serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests”; it need not “be the least restrictive or least intrusive

means of doing so.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491

U.S. 781, 798 (1989).

In most cases, the decision whether to apply strict or

intermediate scrutiny will determine whether the regulation survives. But the line dividing content-based laws and

content-neutral regulations has never been entirely clear.

In recent years, that line has become even blurrier.

In Reed, this Court declared that content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny “regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or

lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.” 576 U.S. at 165. This holding is in obvious

tension with City of Renton’s view that, in at least some

cases, a content-neutral “secondary effects” justification is

enough to escape strict scrutiny—even where a law singles

out a particular type of expressive content for regulation.

Some lower courts have read Reed as undermining City of

Renton and have revisited their prior jurisprudence in this

area.

But other courts continue to apply City of Renton’s

“secondary effects” rationale to uphold laws that, on their

face, discriminate between types of speech. And they apply them in contexts beyond the “time, place, and manner”

restrictions at issue in City of Renton. Here, the Georgia

Supreme Court upheld a tax levied on certain businesses

featuring nude dancing 2—a type of expressive content—

because the ordinance was “ ‘aimed not at the content’ of

adult entertainment, but ‘rather at the secondary effects’ ”

of the expression. Pet. App. 15a (quoting City of Renton,

475 U.S. at 47–48) (emphasis in original). Other courts

2

See Ga. Code Ann. § 15-21-201 et seq.

3

have applied this rationale to uphold laws regulating not

just adult entertainment but also other types of speech, including public protest.

In short, there is incoherence at the center of this

Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. Government

regulators, speakers, and lower courts have no clear guidance as to whether a particular regulation will be viewed

as content-based and subject to exacting strict scrutiny, or

as a content-neutral regulation of secondary effects that

need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny. This confusion has

the potential both to confound good faith attempts at regulation and to chill speech that should be protected by the

First Amendment.

Amici have differing perspectives on the continuing

viability of City of Renton, as well as on the extent to which

the government may constitutionally regulate specific

types of speech based on that speech’s secondary effects.

They therefore take no position on whether City of Renton

should be overruled, limited to a particular context, or

read to cover facts like those here. Nor do they take any

position on how the Court should rule on the challenged

Georgia law.

But they agree that the Court must provide clear guidance as to the level of scrutiny that applies to a law which

singles out a particular type of expressive content but provides a content-neutral justification. Until it resolves the

tension between Reed and City of Renton, lower courts

will continue to be afloat.

The Court should grant certiorari to resolve this fundamental inconsistency in its free speech jurisprudence.

4

ARGUMENT

The Court Should Grant Certiorari to Resolve the Inconsistency between Reed and City of Renton and Its

Progeny.

A. There is substantial tension between this

Court’s rulings in City of Renton and its progeny, on the one hand, and Reed, on the other.

This Court has long held that regulations that discriminate based on the content of speech are subject to the

most exacting scrutiny. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of City of

Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down ordinance generally prohibiting picketing near schools but permitting labor-related picketing:

“Chicago may not vindicate its interest in preventing disruption by the wholesale exclusion of picketing on all but

one preferred subject”).

In City of Renton, the Court recognized an exception

to this rule. Applying intermediate scrutiny, it upheld a

zoning ordinance that discriminated against adult movie

theaters—on its face, a content-based distinction. While

recognizing that “regulations enacted for the purpose of

restraining speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment,” the Court concluded

that “the Renton ordinance is aimed not at the content of

the films shown at ‘adult motion picture theatres,’ but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community.” 475 U.S. at 46–47 (emphasis in original).

City of Renton generated a line of caselaw standing

for the proposition that “regulation that serves purposes

unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral,

even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491

5

U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 46–

47) (emphasis added). These cases extend beyond the

adult entertainment context and involve regulations that,

on their face, apply to specific types of expressive content.

Most notably, in Hill v. Colorado, the Court upheld a

criminal statute prohibiting knowingly approaching a person near a healthcare facility “for the purpose of passing a

leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in

oral protest, education, or counseling.” 530 U.S. 703, 707

(2000). Applying the framework elaborated in Ward, the

Court concluded that the law was content-neutral because,

among other factors, “it was not adopted ‘because of disagreement with the message it conveys.’ ” Id. at 719 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). Rather, the Court emphasized,

the statute served the “prophylactic” purpose of “protect[ing] those who wish to enter health care facilities,

many of whom may be under special physical or emotional

stress, from close physical approaches by demonstrators.”

Id. at 729.

City of Renton and its progeny embody the principle

that, even when a law facially singles out a specific type of

expressive content, it can nevertheless escape strict scrutiny if it is justified by a content-neutral purpose, like combating the secondary effects of the speech. In such cases,

intermediate scrutiny applies.

This line of cases is in direct tension with the Court’s

decision in Reed. There, the Court struck down a municipal sign code that classified different types of signs into

categories based on their content, and subjected each category to different regulations. 3 While the town offered

For example, the ordinance allowed “Ideological” signs to be 20

square feet in area and placed in all areas without time limits, while

“Temporary Directional” signs directing the viewer to a meeting of a

3

6

content-neutral justifications for treating different categories of signs differently, the Court concluded that the law

was content-based and applied strict scrutiny:

A law that is content based on its face is subject to

strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of

“animus toward the ideas contained” in the regulated speech. . . . In other words, an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially contentbased law into one that is content neutral.

Reed, 576 U.S. at 165 (citations omitted). And it emphasized that a court must “consider[] whether a law is content neutral on its face before turning to the law’s justification or purpose.” Id. at 166 (emphasis in original). If it is

not, then strict scrutiny applies.

Under City of Renton and its progeny, a law that singles out a specific type of expressive content but relies on

a content-neutral justification is subject to intermediate

scrutiny. Under Reed, a facially content-based law is always subject to strict scrutiny, regardless of its purpose or

justification. While amici take no position on which rule

should prevail, it is clear that these principles are not compatible.

B. Lower courts have struggled to reconcile these

inconsistent lines of jurisprudence.

Reed did not purport to overrule City of Renton or any

of its progeny. But members of this Court have noted the

nonprofit group could only be six square feet and posted no more than

12 hours before the event and one hour afterward. See Reed, 576 U.S.

at 159–60.

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significant tension between the two lines of cases. 4 So have

First Amendment scholars. 5 So have some lower courts. 6

And lower courts struggle to apply these incompatible, but equally binding, precedents in a consistent way. In

the wake of Reed, some courts reject City of Renton-type

“content-neutral justification” arguments and apply strict

scrutiny to regulations that discriminate based on content.

See, e.g., Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399, 405 (4th Cir.

2015) (striking down law prohibiting politically-related robocalls as impermissibly content-based: “Reed has made

clear that . . . the government’s justification or purpose in

See, e.g., Reed, 576 U.S. at 183–84 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[o]ur cases have been far less rigid than the majority admits

in applying strict scrutiny to facially content-based laws”) (citing City

of Renton, 475 U.S. at 48); City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Advert. of

Austin, LLC, 596 U.S. 61, 86 (2022) (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch

and Barrett, JJ., dissenting) (“I would adhere to Reed rather than

echo Hill’s long-discredited approach”); Coalition Life v. City of Carbondale, 145 S. Ct. 537, 539 (2025) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial

of cert.) (“Hill is likewise at odds with Reed”); see also Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 287 & n.65 (2022) (noting that

Hill has “distorted First Amendment doctrines”).

4

See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr., The Content-Discrimination Principle and the Impact of Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev.

259, 278 (2019); Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, In Defense of Content Regulation, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 1427, 1441 (2017); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Making Sense of Secondary Effects Analysis after Reed v. Town of Gilbert,

57 Santa Clara L. Rev. 385, 414–16 (2017).

5

See, e.g., Price v. City of Chicago, 915 F.3d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 2019)

(“Hill’s content-neutrality holding is hard to reconcile with . . . Reed”);

Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney General, 825 F.3d 149, 161 (3d Cir.

2016) (“if the secondary effects doctrine survives, Reed counsels

against expanding its application beyond the only context to which the

Supreme Court has ever applied it: regulations affecting physical purveyors of adult sexually explicit content”) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted); id. at 174 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (“The secondary effects doctrine thus seems logically irreconcilable with Reed.”).

6

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enacting the law is irrelevant”); Free Speech Coal., Inc. v.

Skrmetti, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2024 WL 5248104, at *14

(W.D. Tenn. 2024) (striking down law requiring websites

containing content deemed harmful to minors to verify the

age of users: “the secondary effects doctrine only applies

to laws that are content-neutral”) (emphasis in original);

Champion v. Commonwealth, 520 S.W.3d 331, 337 (Ky.

2017) (striking down anti-panhandling ordinance as impermissibly content-based: “The government’s purpose is

only relevant . . . after concluding that the regulation is facially content-neutral.”).

Other courts, including the court below, continue to

rely on City of Renton and its progeny and apply intermediate scrutiny to content-based regulations that are justified by a content-neutral rationale. See, e.g., Pet. App. 15a;

Siders v. City of Brandon, 123 F.4th 293, 304 (5th Cir.

2024) (upholding ordinance restricting protests and

demonstrations near public amphitheater: “the Supreme

Court has not overruled Hill” and “the similarity between

this ordinance and the statute in Hill is significant”); Ass’n

of Club Executives of Dallas, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 83

F.4th 958, 964 (5th Cir. 2023) (upholding ordinance restricting hours of sexually-oriented businesses based on

secondary effects: “Plaintiffs argue that Renton is no

longer good law. . . . We reject [that] argument[].”).

While some of those courts note the tension with Reed,

they have concluded, as the Fifth Circuit put it, that

“whether to overrule or modify Renton is the High Court’s

business, not ours.” Ass’n of Club Executives of Dallas, 83

F.4th at 965; see also Price, 915 F.3d at 1111 (“The Court’s

intervening decisions have eroded Hill’s foundation, but

the case still binds us; only the Supreme Court can say otherwise.”).

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This Court’s intervention is required to resolve the

tension between these incompatible strains of its First

Amendment jurisprudence. No purpose is served by forcing lower courts—and speakers and governments—to

guess whether City of Renton remains controlling law or

whether Reed now provides the operative test. Whichever

way the Court resolves this issue, it must be resolved.

C. This case provides an attractive vehicle to resolve the confusion.

This case is a good vehicle to clarify the Court’s jurisprudence. The challenged law, which has been definitively

interpreted by Georgia’s highest court, clearly imposes

burdens based on the content of expression: It taxes “adult

entertainment establishments” which offer “entertainment” consisting of “nude or substantially nude persons

. . . engaged in movements of a sexual nature.” Ga. Code

Ann. § 15-21-201(1)(A). The Georgia Supreme Court expressly relied on City of Renton’s secondary effects framework to apply intermediate scrutiny and uphold the assessment. Pet. App. 15a–18a. Therefore, the continuing vitality and scope of City of Renton and its progeny in cases

involving facially content-based regulation would be directly before this Court on certiorari. And there are no vehicle problems that would weigh against a grant. Cf. Bruni

v. City of Pittsburgh, 141 S. Ct. 578 (2021) (Thomas, J.,

concurring in denial of cert.) (“I agree with the Court’s decision not to take up this case because it involves unclear,

preliminary questions about the proper interpretation of

state law. But the Court should take up this issue in an appropriate case to resolve the glaring tension in our precedents.”).

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

CHRISTOPHER J. PAOLELLA

Counsel of Record

REICH & PAOLELLA LLP

111 Broadway, Suite 2002

New York, NY 10006

cpaolella@reichpaolella.com

(212) 804-7090

Counsel for Amici Curiae

APRIL 2025

APPENDIX—TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

List of Amici Curiae ........................................................1a

1a

LIST OF AMICI CURIAE 1

John Acevedo is Associate Dean of Students and Academic Programs and Visiting Associate Professor of Practice at Emory University School of Law. He is the author

of Law’s Gaze, 25 J. Gender Race & Just. 45 (2022), and

The Model Speaks?: Obscenity Laws in the United States,

in Gender and Justice: Theoretical Practices of Intersectional Identity 257 (Elaine Wood ed., 2020).

Thomas C. Arthur is Emory School of Law Distinguished Professor at Emory University School of Law. He

is the author of The Problems with Pornography Regulation: Lessons from History, 68 Emory L.J. 867 (2019).

Loftus Becker is Professor of Law Emeritus at University of Connecticut School of Law. He is the author of

Children's Rights vs. Adult Free Speech: Can They Be Reconciled?, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 893 (1997), and The Liability of

Computer Bulletin Board Operators for Defamation

Posted by Others, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 203 (1989).

Ashutosh A. Bhagwat is Distinguished Professor of

Law and Boochever and Bird Endowed Chair for the Study

and Teaching of Freedom and Equality at University of

California Davis School of Law. He is the author of In Defense of Content Regulation, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 1427 (2017),

and Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Signs of (Dis)Content?, 9

N.Y.U. J. L. & Liberty 137 (2015).

Michael J. Broyde is Professor of Law at Emory University School of Law. He is the author (with Shlomo C.

Pill) of The Concept of Human Rights in Judaism, in The

Concept of Human Rights in Judaism, Christianity and Islam 19 (Catharina Rachik & Georges Tamer eds. 2023), and

All amici join in their individual capacities. Institutional affiliations

are for information only.

1

2a

the editor (with John Witte, Jr.) of Human Rights in Judaism: Cultural, Religious, and Political Perspectives (1998).

Erwin Chemerinsky is Dean and Jesse H. Choper Distinguished Professor of Law at University of California

Berkeley Law School. He is the author of Constitutional

Law (7th ed. 2024) and Content Neutrality as a Central

Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme

Court’s Application, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 49 (2000).

Michael R. Dimino is Professor of Law at Widener

University Commonwealth Law School. He is the author of

It’s My Party and I’ll Do What I Want To: Political Parties, Unconstitutional Conditions, and the Freedom of Association, 12 First Amend. L. Rev. 65 (2014), and Political

Speech, in Oxford Handbook of American Election Law 331

(Eugene D. Mazo ed. 2025).

Paul Finkelman is Visiting Professor of Law at University of Toledo College of Law. He is also the President

William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and

Public Policy Emeritus at Albany Law School. He is the

author of Picture Perfect: The First Amendment Trumps

Congress in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 38 Tulsa L.

Rev. 243 (2002), and Speech, Press and Democracy, 10 Wm.

& Mary Bill Rts. J. 813 (2002).

Richard W. Garnett is Paul J. Schierl Professor of Law

and Director of the Notre Dame Program on Church, State

& Society at Notre Dame Law School. He is the author of

Can There Really Be “Free Speech” in Public Schools?,

12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 45 (2008), and the editor (with

Andrew Koppelman) of First Amendment Stories (2011).

Wes E. Henricksen is Associate Professor of Law at

Barry University School of Law. He is the author of Disinformation and the First Amendment, 96 St. John’s L. Rev.

543 (2021), and (with Broderick Betz) The Stolen Election

3a

Lie and the Freedom of Speech, 127 Penn. St. L. Rev. Penn

Statim 111 (2023).

David L. Hudson Jr. is Associate Professor of Law at

Belmont University College of Law. He is the author of The

Content-Discrimination Principle and the Impact of Reed

v. Town of Gilbert, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 259 (2019), and

The Secondary-Effects Doctrine: Stripping Away First

Amendment Freedoms, 23 Stanford L. & Pol’y Rev. 19

(2012).

Leslie Gielow Jacobs is Anthony Kennedy Professor

of Law at University of the Pacific McGeorge School of

Law. She is the author of Making Sense of Secondary Effects Analysis after Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 57 Santa

Clara L. Rev. 385 (2017), and Clarifying the ContentBased/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 McGeorge L. Rev. 595 (2003).

Allen R. Kamp is Professor Emeritus of Law at University of Illinois Chicago Law School. He is the author of

Constitutional Interpretation and Technological Change,

49 New Eng. L. Rev. 201 (2015), and Jurisprudence: A Beginner’s Simple and Practical Guide to Advanced and

Complex Legal Theory, 2 The Crit: Critical Stud. J. 62, 66

(2009).

Genevieve Lakier is Professor of Law and Herbert &

Marjorie Fried Teaching Scholar at University of Chicago

Law School. She is the author of Reed v. Town of Gilbert,

Arizona, and the Rise of the Anti-Classificatory First

Amendment, 2016 Sup. Ct. Rev. 233 (2017), and A CounterHistory of First Amendment Neutrality, 131 Yale L.J. Forum 873 (2022).

Paul E. McGreal is James L. Koley, JD’54, Professor

of Constitutional Law at Creighton University School of

Law. He is the author (with Charles W. Rhodes) of Skills &

Values: The First Amendment (2022) and (with James J.

4a

Alifini) First Amendment Limits on the Regulation of Judicial Campaign Speech: Defining the Government’s Interest, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 76 (2008).

Clare R. Norins is Clinical Associate Professor of Law

at the University of Georgia School of Law and director of

its First Amendment Clinic, which litigates challenges to

content-based municipal policies. She is the author of

Stitch Incoming: Lindke v. Freed’s Impact on Social Media Blocking Litigation, 82 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online

172 (2024), and Campbell v. Reisch: Dangers of the Campaign Loophole in Social Media Blocking Litigation, 25

U. Pa. J. Const. L. 146 (2023).

Michael J. Perry is Robert W. Woodruff Professor of

Law Emeritus at Emory University School of Law. He is

the author of Constitutional Rights as Human Rights:

Freedom of Speech, Equal Protection, and the Right of Privacy, 57 Wake Forest L. Rev. 931 (2022).

Stacey L. Sobel is Professor of Law and Associate

Dean for Research & Faculty Development at Western

State College of Law at Westcliff University. She is the author of 303 Creative v. Elenis, in SCOTUS 2023: Major Decisions and Developments of the U.S. Supreme Court 63

(Morgan Marietta & Howard Schwerber eds. 2024).

Nadine Strossen is the John Marshall Harlan II Professor of Law Emerita at New York Law School. She is the

author of Free Speech: What Everyone Needs to Know®

(2023) and HATE: Why We Should Resist It with Free

Speech, Not Censorship (2018).

Tyler Valeska is Assistant Professor of Law at Loyola

University Chicago School of Law. He is the author of

Speech Balkanization, 65 B.C. L. Rev. 903 (2024), and

First Amendment Limitations on Law Enforcement Livestreaming Protests, 121 Colum. L. Rev. Forum 8 (2021).

5a

Eugene Volokh is Thomas M. Siebel Senior Fellow at

the Hoover Institution and Gary T. Schwartz Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus at UCLA School of

Law. He is the author of The First Amendment and Related Statutes: Law, Cases, Problems and Policy Arguments (8th ed. 2024) and Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 Cornell

L. Rev. 1277 (2005).

Timothy Zick is Robert & Elizabeth Scott Research

Professor and John Marshall Professor of Government and

Citizenship at William & Mary Law School. He is the author of The First Amendment: Cases and Theory (4th ed.

2022) and Managed Dissent: The Law of Public Protest (2023).