Amicus Curiae Brief — Johnnie Markel Carter, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefMar 4, 2025
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No. 24-860
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
JOHNNIE MARKEL CARTER,
Petitioner,
V.
UNITED STATES,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF CLINICAL LAW PROFESSORS AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
DAVID H. KORN
JADEN M. LESSNICK
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP
375 Ninth Avenue
New York, NY 10001
ERICA ZUNKEL
Counsel of Record
Criminal and Juvenile
Justice Clinic
University of Chicago Law
School
6020 S. University Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
(773) 702-9611
ezunkel@uchicago.edu
Counsel for Amici Curiae
March 4, 2025
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................ 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 2
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 4
I.
The Circuit Split Produces Severe and
Unjustified Sentence Disparities Based on
Geography Alone. ................................................. 6
II.
The Circuit Split Threatens the Sentencing
Commission’s Considered Judgment. ............... 18
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 24
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Braxton v. United States,
500 U.S. 344 (2001) ................................................. 7
Buford v. United States,
532 U.S. 59 (2001) ......................................... 4, 7, 19
Guerrant v. United States,
142 S. Ct. 640 (2022) ............................................... 6
Hughes v. United States,
584 U.S. 675 (2018) ................................................. 3
Kimbrough v. United States,
552 U.S. 85 (2007) ................................................... 3
Longoria v. United States,
141 S. Ct. 978 (2021) ............................................... 6
Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361 (1989) ......................................... 18, 21
Speech First, Inc. v. Sands,
144 S. Ct. 675 (2024) ............................................... 3
United States v. Andrews,
12 F.4th 255 (3d Cir. 2021) ................................... 10
United States v. Brooker,
976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020) .................................... 6
iii
United States v. Byam,
2024 WL 1556741 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10,
2024) ................................................................ 13–14
United States v. Chavez, ___ F. Supp. 3d
___, 2024 WL 4850808 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 21, 2024) .......................................................... 6
United States v. Crandall,
2020 WL 7080309 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 3,
2020) ................................................................ 14–15
United States v. Crandall,
2024 WL 945328 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 5,
2024) ...................................................................... 15
United States v. Gordon,
585 F. Supp. 3d 716 (E.D. Pa. 2022) .............. 10–13
United States v. Martinez,
2024 WL 866822 (D. Utah Feb. 29,
2024) .................................................................. 9–10
United States v. Rutherford,
120 F.4th 360 (3d Cir. 2024) ................................. 11
United States v. Thacker,
4 F.4th 569 (7th Cir. 2021) ................................... 17
United States v. Uriarte,
___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2024 WL 4111867
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2024) ................................... 16–17
iv
Case Filings
United States v. Crandall,
No. 1:89-cr-00021, Dkt. 214 (N.D. Iowa
Nov. 1, 2023).......................................................... 14
United States v. Gordon,
No. 2:99-cr-00348-HB, Dkt. 212 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 26, 2023) ............................................ 10–11
United States v. Gordon,
No. 2:99-cr-00348-HB, Dkt. 248 (E.D.
Pa. July 15, 2024) ............................................ 12–13
United States v. McFarland,
No. 2:00-cr-01025, Dkt. 496 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 21, 2023) .................................................. 15–16
Statutes & Regulations
88 Fed. Reg. 28,256 ............................................. 20, 24
88 Fed. Reg. 28,258 ................................................... 23
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) .................................................. 9–17
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006) ............................................. 9
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) ................................... 1–4, 19
28 U.S.C. § 994(t) ........................ 2, 4–5, 18–19, 21, 24
First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) ...................................... 9
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2023) ....................................... 5, 12
v
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (2023)
....................................... 2, 5–7, 9, 11–12, 14–18, 23
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(c) (2023) ......................................... 5
Other Authorities
2022-2023 Proposed Amendments and
Public Comment, 88 Fed. Reg. 7180
(Mar. 13, 2023) ........................................ 1–2, 21–24
Commission ’24–’25 Priorities (July 15,
2024) ........................................................................ 2
E. Zunkel & J. Lessnick, Putting the
“Compassion” in Compassionate
Release: The Need for a Policy
Statement Codifying Judicial
Discretion, 35 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 164
(2023) ..................................................................... 20
Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Before the United States Sentencing
Commission (Feb. 23, 2023) .................................... 1
U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Compassionate
Release Data Report Preliminary Fiscal
Year 2024 Cumulative Data Through
4th Quarter (Oct. 2024) .......................................... 8
U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Compassionate Release Data Report Preliminary Fiscal
Year 2025 Cumulative Data Through
1st Quarter (Feb. 2025)....................................... 7–8
vi
U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Compassionate
Release: The Impact of the First Step
Act and COVID-19 Pandemic
(Mar. 2022) ............................................................ 20
U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Proposed
Amendments to the Sentencing
Guidelines (Feb. 2, 2023) ...................................... 21
U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Public Meeting
Minutes (Apr. 5, 2023) .......................................... 12
1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are clinical professors of law who represent
indigent federal prisoners pro bono in sentence-reduction proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
They have extensive experience litigating sentencereduction motions on behalf of individuals in district
courts across the country both before and after Sentencing Commission’s 2023 policy statement took effect. Amici’s clients have been affected directly by the
circuit split at issue here—whether changes in the law
can contribute to “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction. Amici therefore are
well-positioned to explain the far-reaching implications of the circuit split on both an individual and national level.
Amici also are deeply familiar with the Sentencing Commission’s amendment to its policy statement,
which attempted to address the circuit split in the
first instance. Amici and certain of their clients provided written and oral testimony and public comments to the Commission about the sentence-reduction policy statement, especially as it pertains to the
changes-in-law provision at issue here.2
1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici state that no coun-
sel for a party authored this brief in any part, and that no person
or entity, other than amici and their counsel, made a monetary
contribution to fund its preparation and submission. All parties
have been timely notified of the filing of this brief in accordance
with Supreme Court Rule 37.2.
2 See, e.g., Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines Before the United States Sentencing
Commission (Feb. 23, 2023), https://perma.cc/7TY8-ZSWP (written and oral testimony of Professor Zunkel); 2022–2023 Proposed
2
Beyond direct client representation in federal
court and advocacy before the Commission, amici
teach, study, and advise on federal sentence-reduction
legal issues, which includes authoring scholarly publications, directing student research, conducting
trainings, and counseling attorneys around the country on sentence-reduction motions.
Amici submit this brief to offer their insight—
based on practical experience and scholarly research—about the importance of this issue for individual prisoners and for ensuring consistency in the law.
A complete list of amici is attached as Appendix A.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There is a deep, mature circuit split over whether
courts may consider non-retroactive legal changes
when deciding whether a person has presented “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). That circuit
split existed well before the Sentencing Commission
clarified, pursuant to its express power to “describe
what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons,” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), that such non-retroactive changes may be considered in only very narrow
circumstances, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (2023).
Amendments and Public Comment, 88 Fed. Reg. 7180 (Mar. 13,
2023), https://perma.cc/48QJ-TAK8 (collecting public comments
of certain amici, including Professors Tinto (PDF p. 1023) and
Zunkel (PDF p. 1457)); Commission ’24–’25 Priorities (July 15,
2024), https://perma.cc/Q8H2-9UWQ (collecting public comments of certain amici, including Professors Guernsey (PDF
p. 260); Tinto (PDF p. 1114); and Zunkel (PDF p. 1128)).
3
The Commission’s promulgation of subsection (b)(6),
however, did not resolve the split, and many courts
continue to apply pre-amendment caselaw categorically barring consideration of legal changes. More
than most, this circuit split demands the Court’s immediate resolution because of its practical, on-theground effects.
First, the circuit split creates severe sentence disparities between similarly situated people based on
geography alone. Uniform sentencing for similarly
situated defendants is a core principle that runs
throughout federal sentencing law. See Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 107 (2007) (“[I]t is unquestioned that uniformity remains an important goal of
sentencing.”). Consistency in the law ensures that differences in sentences, sometimes in the order of years
or decades, are justified by the unique characteristics
of the individual or case—not by the coincidence of geography. But now, even under the revised policy
statement, “a defendant’s eligibility for a reduced sentence under 3582(c)[(1)(A)] turns on the Circuit in
which the case arises.” Hughes v. United States, 584
U.S. 675, 684 (2018). The consequences of these geographic disparities are severe. Defendants in restrictive circuits are left serving sentences decades longer
than similarly situated defendants in other circuits,
based on nothing more than the accident of geography. Cf., e.g., Speech First, Inc. v. Sands, 144 S. Ct.
675, 676 (2024) (Thomas, J., joined by Alito, J., dissenting from GVR) (“Yet, because of the split among
the Courts of Appeals, many of these universities face
no constitutional scrutiny, simply based on geography.”). And data show that those disparities affect a
wide swath of federal prisoners across the circuits.
4
Second, the circuit split vitiates the Sentencing
Commission’s expertise in achieving “consistent sentencing results among similarly situated offenders
sentenced by different courts” in the sentence-reduction system. Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59, 66
(2001). The Commission is tasked with “describ[ing]
what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for [a] sentence reduction, including the
criteria to be applied.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). Pursuant
to that clear edict, the Commission reviewed thousands of public comments and received testimony
from a litany of stakeholders on this issue. Its resolution of the circuit split—subsection (b)(6)—is a considered middle ground that allows judges to consider
non-retroactive changes in the law only for a limited
set of defendants in a limited set of circumstances.
That expert decision-making has little to no effect in
at least six circuits.
The Court should grant the Petition.
ARGUMENT
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) allows a judge to reduce a
previously-imposed sentence if three substantive factors are satisfied: (1) the movant presents “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that warrant a reduction; (2) a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission;
and (3) the judge considers the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
sentencing factors in deciding whether and to what
extent a reduction is appropriate.
18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A).
The Sentencing Commission is vested with the
authority to interpret and operationalize the phrase
5
“extraordinary and compelling reasons.” See 28
U.S.C. § 994(t). For several years after the enactment
of the First Step Act of 2018, the Commission lacked
a quorum and therefore had been unable to fulfill its
statutorily required role to describe “extraordinary
and compelling reasons.” It regained its quorum in
2022 and promulgated revisions in 2023 to the sentence-reduction policy statement, § 1B1.13.
In the amended policy statement, the Commission has articulated precise conditions under which
judges may consider non-retroactive changes in the
law in the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” inquiry. Such non-retroactive changes may be considered only if:
1. the defendant is serving “an unusually long
sentence”;
2. the defendant “has served at least 10 years of
the term of imprisonment”;
3. there is a “gross disparity” between the defendant’s unusually long sentence and the sentence
the defendant likely would have received if sentenced under the new law; and
4. the defendant’s “individualized circumstances”
support relief.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (2023). Outside of these circumstances, “a change in the law . . . shall not be considered for purposes of determining whether an extraordinary and compelling reason exists.”
Id.
§ 1B1.13(c).
6
The circuits are split sharply on whether judges
may consider non-retroactive changes in the sentencereduction inquiry. The First, Second, Fourth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits allow judges to consider such
changes. See Pet. 7.3 The Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits do not. See ibid. The
Commission’s promulgation of § 1B1.13(b)(6) did not
resolve this split.
I.
The Circuit Split Produces Severe and
Unjustified Sentence Disparities Based on
Geography Alone.
“The present disagreement among the Courts of
Appeals means that similarly situated defendants
may receive substantially different sentences depending on the jurisdiction in which they are sentenced.”
Longoria v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 978, 979 (2021)
(Sotomayor, J., joined by Gorsuch, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari). The “unresolved divisions among
the Courts of Appeals” on the issue presented here has
“direct and severe consequences for defendants’ sentences.” Guerrant v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 640, 641
(2022) (Sotomayor, J., joined by Barrett, J., respecting
the denial of certiorari).
3 The Second Circuit has not squarely addressed the changes-in-
law issue, but it has recognized the broad discretion of district
courts to consider “the full slate of extraordinary and compelling
reasons that an imprisoned person might bring” and has not limited the consideration of changes in law. United States v.
Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 2020); see, e.g., United States
v. Chavez, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2024 WL 4850808, at *3–5
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2024) (concluding, in the absence of Second
Circuit authority to the contrary, that subsection (b)(6) is valid
and granting a sentence reduction on that basis).
7
The Court appropriately left the question presented by the Petition to the Sentencing Commission
in the first instance, since “Congress intended [the]
Sentencing Commission to play [the] primary role in
resolving conflicts over interpretation.” Buford, 532
U.S., at 66; see, e.g., Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S.
344, 347–349 (2001) (declining to reach an interpretive issue about the Sentencing Guidelines because,
after the Court granted certiorari, the Commission
undertook proceedings that would “eliminate [the] circuit conflict”). But now, more than a year after the
Sentencing Commission weighed in on the issue, the
circuit split has become even more entrenched. Both
nationwide data and individual profiles of defendants
impacted by this split show that, with respect to sentence-reduction motions raising changes in the law
under § 1B1.13(b)(6), the availability of relief between
similarly situated defendants turns solely on geography.
1. Sentencing Commission data show that the
circuit split has real and far-reaching consequences
for hundreds of individuals across the country and has
reified geographic disparities. Despite substantially
similar caselaw among the circuits except on changes
in law, circuits on the permissive side of the split
grant sentence-reduction motions on average 22.2% of
the time, while circuits with restrictive changes-inlaw precedent grant motions only around 9% of the
time. See U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Compassionate Release Data Report Preliminary Fiscal Year 2025 Cumulative Data Through 1st Quarter, Table 3
(Feb. 2025).4 In the Second Circuit, for example,
4 https://perma.cc/55N8-28MR.
8
41.9% of compassionate release motions were granted
last year, while courts in the Eighth Circuit granted
only 6.7%. See ibid.; see also U.S. Sent’g Comm’n,
Compassionate Release Data Report Preliminary Fiscal Year 2024 Cumulative Data Through 4th Quarter,
Table 3 (Oct. 2024) (comparable disparities for
FY 2024).5 Some natural variations in motion success
rates are to be expected, but the more substantial disparities present in the data suggest that the difference
in changes-in-law caselaw drives the outcome in a significant number of cases.
The data from the universe of granted motions
underscore the vast implications of the split, because
subsection (b)(6) comprises a substantial proportion of
such grants. In the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2025,
15.8% of all sentence-reduction grants nationwide
cited subsection (b)(6) as a reason for granting the motion. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Fiscal Year 2025, supra, at
Table 10. Subsection (b)(6) was the single most cited
reason granting a motion during that period—even
though it is largely unavailable in nearly half of the
circuits nationwide.
At bottom, the data quantify the obvious: This
circuit split is of vast consequences for hundreds of
federal prisoners. Judges soundly will exercise their
discretion to consider changes in the law on a case-bycase basis. But only half of them are allowed to do so.
There is every reason to believe that these data trends
will continue without a resolution of the circuit split.
2. Comparing individual case profiles shows precisely how the circuit split produces severe geographic
5 https://perma.cc/34HQ-BFTM.
9
disparities between similarly situated people. Wally
Martinez and Markwann Gordon were convicted of
nearly identical conduct—robbery offenses with multiple 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) firearm charges. Initially, they
were given similar sentences based on the pre-First
Step Act requirement that a second or subsequent
§ 924(c) conviction carried a 25-year mandatory minimum to be served consecutively—i.e., § 924(c) “stacking.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006). In the First Step
Act, Congress clarified that the 25-year mandatory
minimum may be imposed only when there is a prior
§ 924(c) conviction,6 so Martinez and Gordon each
would have received dramatically lower sentences today. But because of the circuit split, only Martinez
has obtained relief—even though the Sentencing
Commission referenced Gordon’s case by name as one
that falls within the ambit of subsection (b)(6).
A. Wally Martinez (Motion Granted, CA10/D.
Utah). In 2001, Martinez received a 65-year sentence
for his participation in three robberies with a firearm.
Only 10 years of the 65-year sentence were attributable to the robberies; the other 55 years were due to
§ 924(c) stacked charges. United States v. Martinez,
2024 WL 866822, at *1 (D. Utah Feb. 29, 2024). If he
were sentenced today, Martinez would likely have received a total sentence of 15 years. Id., at *4. Martinez sought relief under § 1B1.13(b)(6). In granting
his sentence-reduction motion, the district court found
that Martinez had satisfied each component of
§ 1B1.13(b)(6): (1) his 65-year sentence was “unusually long”; (2) he had served over 10 years of his
6 Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, § 403 (2018) (“Clarification
of section 924(c) of title 18, United States Code”).
10
sentence; and (3) the 50-year difference in the sentence he would likely receive today constituted a
“clear, gross disparity.” Ibid. The judge also considered Martinez’s “individualized circumstances,” including that he was in his early twenties when he
committed the offenses, his hundreds of hours of educational programming, and his stellar prison disciplinary record. Id., at *6. After considering the § 3553(a)
sentencing factors, the district court reduced Martinez’s sentence to time served, which amounted to approximately 22 years in custody. Id., at *7–8.
B.
Markwann Gordon (Motion Denied,
CA3/E.D.P.A.). Gordon received a 140-year sentence
for his involvement in multiple bank robberies in the
late 1990s. 125 of these years were the result of
stacked § 924(c) penalties. If he were sentenced for
the same offenses today, Gordon’s minimum sentence
for the § 924(c) counts would be 35 years—a full 105
years shorter than the sentence he received initially.
United States v. Gordon, 585 F. Supp. 3d 716, 719
(E.D. Pa. 2022). In 2022, Gordon moved for a sentence
reduction primarily based on the legal changes to
§ 924(c) stacking. Although the district judge recognized that Gordon “would not receive such a harsh
sentence were he to be sentenced today,” he denied the
motion based on the Third Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255 (3d Cir. 2021), which
concluded that non-retroactive legal changes cannot
be a basis for a sentence reduction. Gordon, 585 F.
Supp. 3d, at 720–721.
In 2023, after the Sentencing Commission’s
amendment to add subsection (b)(6), Gordon again
moved for a sentence reduction. Motion for Compassionate Release, Gordon, Dkt. 212 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 26,
11
2023). Gordon’s motion was denied, see id., at Dkt.
268, this time based on United States v. Rutherford,
120 F.4th 360 (3d Cir. 2024), despite the fact that he
meets all the factors of § 1B1.13(b)(6): (1) he is serving an unusually long sentence; (2) he has been incarcerated for over 10 years; and (3) the multi-decade difference between his sentence and the one he would
likely receive today presents a “gross disparity.” Martinez, 2024 WL 866822, at *4. But because the Third
Circuit categorically forecloses judges from considering any changes in the law in deciding whether a person is eligible for a sentence reduction, Gordon was
denied relief. And as a consequence, the judge could
not consider Gordon’s “individualized circumstances”—including that Gordon was in his early
twenties at the time of his offenses, had completed
over 500 hours of educational programming, and had
not received a single disciplinary violation in over a
decade. Gordon, 585 F. Supp. 3d, at 719–720.
Martinez and Gordon were similarly situated in
nearly all material respects, until Martinez was
granted relief and Gordon was denied it. Both were
serving unusually long sentences—65 years and 140
years, respectively—overwhelmingly the result of
stacked § 924(c) penalties that could not be imposed
today. Both had served more than 10 years of that
sentence. Both would face sentences decades shorter
if sentenced today. Both were young men at the time
of their offenses, and both had compelling records of
rehabilitation.
The difference in outcome between Martinez’s
and Gordon’s cases is solely the product of geography.
In fact, Gordon’s judge remarked that he had “rarely
seen a case as compelling as [Gordon’s] for a
12
defendant’s release from prison.” Gordon, 585 F.
Supp. 3d, at 722. But because of controlling Third Circuit precedent on the changes in law issue, Gordon’s
judge “regrettably” was required to deny the motion.
Id., at 723. Put another way, but for restrictive circuit
caselaw, Gordon’s sentence would have been reduced
to time served like Martinez’s sentence.
That result is particularly troubling because the
Sentencing Commission specifically cited Gordon’s
case in support of its changes-in-law provision,
§ 1B1.13(b)(6). In announcing the Commission’s
amendments to § 1B1.13, Commission Chair Judge
Carlton Reeves explained, “the Commission’s inability
to describe extraordinary and compelling reasons led
to injustices. I think of . . . Markwann Gordon, a person serving over 1,600 months in federal prison on
robbery and firearms charges who wrote to us to increase opportunities for second chances.” U.S. Sent’g
Comm’n, Public Meeting Minutes at 4–5 (Apr. 5,
2023).7 Chair Judge Reeves highlighted the fact that
Gordon’s judge was unable to exercise his discretion
to grant release because of the circuit split. Ibid.
The disparity between Gordon’s sentence and
Martinez’s is even more obvious in light of recent developments in Gordon’s case. Following a successful
28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenge to several of his § 924(c)
counts, Gordon was resentenced. See Sent’g Tr., Gordon, Dkt. 248 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2024). If he were
able, the judge would have sentenced Gordon to time
served. The judge was “totally convinced that [Gordon
is] totally reformed and that a further punishment is
7 https://perma.cc/UW3B-ZQYE.
13
no longer necessary.” Id., at 52. But under binding
circuit precedent, Gordon was resentenced under preFirst Step Act law. The judge therefore had to impose
a 65-year sentence for the remaining stacked § 924(c)
counts. Id., at 48. This sentence, according to the
judge, “is totally unwarranted at this stage, in 2024.
I think it’s unjustified, and it’s a very painful day for
all of us.” Id., at 54.
Because of the circuit split, Gordon remains imprisoned serving a 65-year de facto life sentence while
Martinez—who also was sentenced to 65 years on materially identical charges—is free.
3. The difference in sentence-reduction motion
outcomes between Edward Byam and Barton Crandall also is striking. Both men were convicted of similar robbery offenses with stacked § 924(c) charges at
a young age, both had support from Federal Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) staff members for their motions, and
both had a record of extensive BOP programming. But
only one man was able to receive relief.
A.
Edward Byam (Motion Granted,
CA2/E.D.N.Y.). Byam was sentenced to 32 years and
one day in prison for his involvement in two armed
robberies when in his early twenties. United States v.
Byam, 2024 WL 1556741, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10,
2024). Thirty-two years of his sentence resulted from
mandatory § 924(c) firearms charges; the judge imposed “only one additional day” for the other charges.
Ibid. If sentenced for the same offenses today, Byam
would face a 14-year mandatory minimum instead of
32 years on the § 924(c) charges. Ibid. In granting
Byam’s sentence-reduction motion in 2024, the court
found that Byam satisfied each factor under
14
§ 1B1.13(b)(6): (1) his sentence was “unusually long”;
(2) he had served over 11 years of his sentence; and (3)
the 18-year difference between the sentence he received and what he would receive today constituted a
“gross disparity.” Id., at *6. The judge also considered
Byam’s individualized circumstances. Id., at *6–8.
Several BOP employees, for instance, corroborated
Byam’s “character, work ethic, responsibility, and
compassion for other inmates.” Id., at *8. The court
highlighted Byam’s “substantial rehabilitation for
over a decade, improving himself as it pertains to education, employability, and other social achievements.” Ibid.
B. Barton Crandall (Motion Denied, CA8/N.D.
Iowa). At age 25, Crandall was sentenced to almost
47 years’ imprisonment for his role in two armed bank
robberies. United States v. Crandall, 2024 WL
945328, at *1 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 5, 2024). Twenty-five
years of his sentence were the result of § 924(c)’s mandatory stacked penalties. Today, Crandall’s likely
sentence would be approximately 18 years, and he has
been incarcerated for more than 10 years. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Reduce Sentence, United States v. Crandall, No. 1:89-cr-00021,
Dkt. 214, at 2 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 1, 2023). The difference
between the sentence Crandall received and the one
he would likely receive today represents a disparity of
29 years, over a decade longer than the disparity supporting Byam’s sentence reduction. The district judge
highlighted Crandall’s “significant strides toward rehabilitation” during his incarceration. Crandall, 2024
WL 945328, at *10. As such, Crandall also met the
exacting criteria of § 1B1.13(b)(6). The district judge,
however, could not analyze the merits of Crandall’s
15
argument, concluding that § 1B1.13(b)(6) exceeded
the Commission’s authority and was inconsistent with
pre-amendment Eighth Circuit caselaw. Id., at *9.
Accordingly, the judge denied Crandall’s motion, as he
had done in 2020 before the Commission’s amendments. See United States v. Crandall, 2020 WL
7080309, at *7 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 3, 2020).
Byam and Crandall were similarly situated, but
geography was dispositive of whose motion could be
considered on the merits. They both had received unusually long sentences for similar offenses. They both
had served more than a decade of those sentences.
And both their sentences presented a “gross disparity”
of more than 15 years when compared to the sentences they likely would have received if sentenced today. The two also were similarly situated with respect
to their individualized circumstances. In fact, their
respective judges used identical language in describing each man’s “significant strides towards rehabilitation.” But, based on the circuit split, Byam’s motion
was granted while Crandall’s was denied.
4. Donte McFarland and Jorge Uriarte provide
another clear example of significant sentence disparities produced by the circuit split, notwithstanding
similar offense conduct, including § 924(c) convictions.
A. Donte McFarland (Motion Granted, CA9/C.D.
Cal.). In 2001, McFarland received a 41-year sentence
that even his own sentencing judge called “beyond
draconian.” United States v. McFarland, No. 2:00-cr01025, Dkt. 496, at 2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2023).
Thirty-two years of that sentence were required by
§ 924(c) stacking. Id., at 6. If he were sentenced for
16
the same offenses today, the low end of his Guidelines
range would be roughly 23 years (amounting to the
time he had already served in prison) and the § 924(c)
counts would mandate 14 years, not 32 years. Ibid.
McFarland brought a motion under § 1B1.13(b)(6).
When granting his sentence-reduction motion, the
district court found that McFarland had satisfied
every prong of § 1B1.13(b)(6). Ibid.
Because § 1B1.13(b)(6) did not conflict with preamendment Ninth Circuit caselaw, see id., at 5, the
court proceeded to a full consideration of McFarland’s
“individualized circumstances” under § 1B1.13(b)(6)
and determined that he presented “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction. Ibid.
The court highlighted McFarland’s young age at the
time of the offenses, rehabilitation, and a recent sentence reduction for McFarland’s co-defendant, which
would create an unwarranted sentencing disparity if
relief was not granted. Ibid. After considering the
§ 3553(a) factors, the court granted McFarland’s motion and reduced his sentence to the 23 years it likely
would be today. Id., at 7–8.
B. Jorge Uriarte (Motion Denied, CA7/N.D. Ill.).
Uriarte is serving a 40-year sentence, 30 years of
which resulted from § 924(c) stacking. United States
v. Uriarte, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2024 WL 4111867, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2024). Uriarte was charged with
multiple co-defendants, several of whom were indisputably more culpable in the offenses than him. Ibid.
Today, Uriarte’s mandatory minimum under § 924(c)
would be just 15 years, not 30 years. Ibid. In 2016,
the Seventh Circuit remanded the case for re-sentencing. Ibid. Uriarte was re-sentenced just weeks before
the First Step Act was passed. His co-defendants,
17
however, were re-sentenced after the law’s enactment.
As a result, only the co-defendants, not Uriarte, benefitted from the First Step Act’s monumental changes
to § 924(c) stacking. Id., at *1–2. As the judge put it,
“[o]n remand, accidents of timing produced . . . ‘problematic disparities.’” Id., at *1. Despite “[n]o party
disput[ing]” that Uriarte met subsection (b)(6)’s criteria, the district judge concluded that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569
(7th Cir. 2021), remained “binding” and required
denying the motion. Id., at *5. The court, however,
emphasized that it “would not hesitate to follow”
§ 1B1.13(b)(6) “had it the authority to do so.” Ibid.
The court noted several reasons for this: (1) “the gross
disparity” between Uriarte’s sentence and that of his
“more culpable co-defendants”; (2) the unfairness of
§ 924(c) stacking at the time of sentencing; (3) the increasingly “egregious” unfairness “in light of the fact
that his co-defendants received the benefit” of the
First Step Act’s amendments to § 924(c) stacking and
he did not; and (4) Uriarte’s rehabilitation. Ibid.
“[T]he
court
believes
Jorge
Uriarte’s . . . [m]otion . . . should be granted and his sentence should be reduced to time served.” Ibid.
McFarland and Uriarte were similarly situated
with regard to their lengthy sentences due to § 924(c)
stacking and the disparities produced by the change
in law, but once again, geography was dispositive in
who received relief. Both McFarland and Uriarte
were serving sentences that would be significantly
shorter today. At the time of their motions, both
men’s sentences produced jarring disparities with the
sentences of their more or equally culpable co-defendants. With no conflicting circuit caselaw, McFarland’s
18
judge could consider both disparities under
§ 1B1.13(b)(6). Uriarte’s judge, on the other hand,
was not permitted to consider either disparity. Instead, solely because of Seventh Circuit precedent, the
district court had to deny Uriarte’s motion, despite the
court’s assertion that it would have granted relief if it
had the authority to do so.
5. The foregoing profiles are just a handful of examples of the geographic disparities that pervade the
sentence-reduction landscape and compel review by
this Court. Appendix B is a table compiling additional
cases in which geography is a primary, if not dispositive, factor driving disparate outcomes.
II.
The Circuit Split Threatens the Sentencing
Commission’s Considered Judgment.
The circuit split also must be resolved because it
undermines the Sentencing Commission’s reasonable
and expert resolution of this issue. Amici participated
in the extensive, deeply considered process by which
the Sentencing Commission arrived at its current policy statement, which involved robust debate, testimony, commentary, and other input from experts and
stakeholders over several months. The disuniformity
caused by the circuit split is an anathema to the
scheme Congress created—one characterized by what
Justice Scalia called the Commission’s “special
knowledge and expertise” in matters of sentencing.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 396 (1989).
The decision below impairs the Commission’s comprehensive work, which Congress has instructed must be
the guiding principle under the statute. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(t).
19
1. Uniformity among similarly situated defendants is central to the Sentencing Commission’s mission. As the Court unanimously explained in Buford,
the Commission can “produce more consistent sentencing results among similarly situated offenders
sentenced by different courts.” 532 U.S., at 66. The
process by which it achieves that uniformity is iterative and expert driven. “[T]he Sentencing Commission itself gathers information on the sentences imposed by different courts, it views the sentencing process as a whole,” and it develops “a broad perspective
on sentencing practices throughout the Nation” before
revising its policy statements, the Guidelines, or application notes. Ibid.
Congress could not have been more clear that the
Commission must bring that expertise to bear in implementing a uniform sentence-reduction scheme:
The Commission, in promulgating general policy statements regarding the sentencing modification provisions in section 3582(c)(1)(A) of title 18, shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to
be applied and a list of specific examples.
28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (emphasis added). Therefore, “Congress intended [the] Sentencing Commission to play
[the] primary role in resolving conflicts over interpretation” about § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s phrase “extraordinary
and compelling.” Buford, 532 U.S., at 66.
2. When Congress enacted the First Step Act of
2018, it amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow defendants
20
to file sentence-reduction motions directly with
courts, a departure from the pre-First Step Act rule
that only the BOP could move for sentence reductions.
That change had an unintended effect. The Sentencing Commission’s then-operative policy statement
applied only to BOP-initiated motions. But at the
time, the Commission lacked a quorum to update its
policy statement. See 88 Fed. Reg. 28,256. So, every
Court of Appeals but the Eleventh Circuit held that
the Commission’s operative policy statement was not
“applicable” to defendant-initiated motions. See U.S.
Sent’g Comm’n, Compassionate Release: The Impact
of the First Step Act and COVID-19 Pandemic 2
(Mar. 2022).8
In the interim, district courts exercised broad discretion to identify “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” even if those reasons were not covered by the
inapplicable policy statement. See E. Zunkel &
J. Lessnick, Putting the “Compassion” in Compassionate Release: The Need for a Policy Statement Codifying Judicial Discretion, 35 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 164, 164–
166 (2023). But without the Commission’s guidance,
some circuits developed their own stop-gap limits on
that discretion. In the vacuum left by the Commission’s lack of quorum, a “sharp circuit split” emerged
“as to whether nonretroactive changes in the law can
constitute legitimate bases for compassionate release.” Id., at 168.
3. When the Commission regained its quorum, it
set out to bring uniformity to the sentence-reduction
system. Its process was thorough, rational, and
8 https://perma.cc/KJ5Q-HKCY.
21
expert-driven. The circuit split threatens to usurp the
“special knowledge and expertise,” Mistretta, 488
U.S., at 396, that Congress intended to characterize
the sentence-reduction scheme, see 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).
The Commission’s early proposal for a changesin-law provision—before any public hearings and testimony—was much broader than the provision it ultimately adopted. The first proposal would have allowed a judge to find an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for a sentence reduction if “[t]he defendant is serving a sentence that is inequitable in light of
changes in the law.” U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Proposed
Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines 6 (Feb. 2,
2023).9
In February 2023, the Commission received thousands of public comments and took hours of testimony
from a wide array of stakeholders on this question.
And after its public hearing, it received even more
public comments. The comments and testimony reflected a panoply of perspectives about the changes in
the law provision. See generally 2022–2023 Proposed
Amendments and Public Comment, 88 Fed. Reg.
718010 [hereinafter “Public Comments”11] (collecting
samples of hundreds of public comments).
The Commission read comments and heard testimony about how the circuit split on this issue created
geographic disparities. See, e.g., id. 1162 (NACDL)
(“the true disparities are the geographic and temporal
9 https://perma.cc/6R4M-AV54.
10 https://perma.cc/PH3V-738S.
11 Pin cites refer to PDF pagination.
22
disparities between similarly situated defendants”),
1256 (Sentencing Project) (“This deep circuit split has
created profoundly unequal and arbitrary access to
post-conviction justice.”), 388 (DOJ) (noting the “uncertainty, circuit conflicts, and sentencing disparities
that have proliferated in the absence of any binding
policy statement”), 1472 (E. Zunkel) (“A person’s ability to obtain relief based on changes in the law is entirely dependent on the luck of their jurisdiction of
conviction.”).
The comments and testimony on the changes in
the law provision allowed the Commission to consider
a diversity of perspectives and alternatives. Some
commentators argued in favor of the wholesale adoption of the Commission’s proposed provision. See, e.g.,
id. 1066 (FAMM) (“this proposed amendment will actually help minimize the sentencing disparity that
currently exists” (emphasis deleted)), 1131 (Law Enforcement Leaders to Reduce Crime & Incarceration)
(“the Commission’s proposal would simply permit
judges in individual cases to determine whether an extreme disparity exists between the sentence a person
received and the sentence they would be exposed to
today”), 299 (Senators Durbin, Booker, and Hirono).
Others advocated for a categorical bar on consideration of changes in the law. See, e.g., id. 321 (Judge
Carnes) (suggesting that if the changes-in-law provision were adopted, “district and appellate courts will
soon be overwhelmed by release motions”, and that
the phrase “inequitable” is too vague), 397 (DOJ).
Many commentators—certain amici among
them—suggested narrowing the changes-in-law provision to minimize any likelihood of conflict with other
statutes. Professor Zunkel, for example, proposed
23
“clarification about the scope of the changes in the law
that [were] covered” by the Commission’s early proposal. Id. 1465 (E. Zunkel); see also id. 1163 (NACDL)
(“However, to make clear that the proposed amendment applies ‘changes in the law’ in an individualized
manner, and not to all defendants en masse, we recommend that the language be modified . . . .”), 956–
957 (Aleph Institute and Center for Justice and Human Dignity).
It is no accident that the Commission’s final policy statement includes the “gross disparity” limitation, the amount-of-time-served limitation (10 years
or more), and the “unusually long sentence” limitation. Those guardrails come straight from recommendations made by many commentators and witnesses.
For example, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP’s Pro Bono
Department suggested providing additional criteria,
namely, “a situation where a change in law has resulted in a defendant’s existing sentence being grossly
disproportionate to the sentence that a defendant
would now receive for the same crime as a result of
the change in law.” Id. 1452 (emphasis added). Other
comments suggested that the changes in the law provision should apply to “unusually long” sentences. Id.
493 (Federal Public and Community Defenders); accord id. 375 (Chief Judge John McConnell, U.S. District Court for District of Rhode Island); cf. id. 392
(DOJ) (“The Department . . . is concerned about equity in the criminal justice system, including as it pertains to unusually long sentences.”).
4. Section 1B1.13(b)(6)—the changes-in-law provision ultimately adopted by the commission—“respond[s] to a circuit split concerning” the non-retroactivity question. 88 Fed. Reg. 28,258. The final rule “is
24
informed by Commission data,” as well as “extensive
public comment, including from the Department of
Justice, the Federal Public and Community Defenders, the Commission’s advisory groups, law professors,
currently and formerly incarcerated individuals, and
other stakeholders in the federal criminal justice system.” Id. 28,256.
Reflecting the iterative process of amending the
policy statement, subsection (b)(6) is far narrower
than the Commission’s early proposal. It applies to
only a limited set of defendants (those who have
served 10 or more years of an unusually long sentence) and in only a limited set of circumstances (if the
change in the law produces a disparity that is grossly
disproportionate to the person’s current sentence, and
only after a judge considers the person’s individualized circumstances).
The circuit split not only reifies sentence disparities, but it also vitiates the Commission’s expertise in
arriving at a narrowly tailored resolution to the nonretroactivity question. The Commission has now spoken directly to the issue. There is nothing more it
could do to address the disagreement over caselaw
about changes in the law. This Court’s intervention is
necessary to enforce Congress’s expectation that the
Commission resolve disparities arising from disagreements over the phrase “extraordinary and compelling.” See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).
CONCLUSION
Amici respectfully urge this Court to grant the
Petition.
25
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID H. KORN
JADEN M. LESSNICK
Cravath, Swaine &
Moore LLP
375 Ninth Avenue
New York, NY 10001
ERICA ZUNKEL
Counsel of Record
Criminal and Juvenile
Justice Clinic
University of Chicago Law
School
6020 S. University Ave.
Chicago, IL 60637
(773) 702-9611
ezunkel@uchicago.edu
Counsel for Amici Curiae
APPENDIX
i
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A: LIST OF AMICI ............................... 1a
APPENDIX B: TABLE OF GEOGRAPHIC
DISPARITIES ........................................................... 2a
1a
APPENDIX A: LIST OF AMICI
Amici file this brief in their individual capacities,
and not as representatives of the institutions with
which they are affiliated.
Ingrid Eagly
Professor of Law
Faculty Co-Director, Criminal Justice Program
University of California-Los Angeles School of
Law
Alison Guernsey
Clinical Professor of Law
Director, Federal Criminal Defense Clinic
University of Iowa College of Law
JaneAnne Murray
Associate Clinical Professor of Law
Director, Clemency Project Clinic
University of Minnesota Law School
Amanda Rogers
Visiting Professor of Law
Georgetown Law School
Katharine Tinto
Clinical Professor of Law
Director, Criminal Justice Clinic
University of California-Irvine School of Law
Erica Zunkel
Clinical Professor of Law
Director, Criminal and Juvenile Justice Clinic
University of Chicago Law School
115
Case Cite
United States
v.
Donato, 2024
WL 1513646
(E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 8, 2024)
50
65
10 years on
United States
Drug offenses;
§ 924(c)
v. Vasquez,
49 (after
15 years on
Hobbs Act;
counts + any
735 F. Supp.
prior reduc§ 924(c)
stacked
additional
3d 124
tion)
counts
§ 924(c)s
sentence on
(E.D.N.Y.
other counts
Carjacking;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
Likely
Sentence
Principal
Disparity
if Imposed
Offense(s)
(years)
Today
(years)
Second Circuit (Permissive)
Granted
Granted
Outcome
APPENDIX B: TABLE OF GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES
2a
May 23,
2024)
United
States v.
Aguiar, 735
F. Supp. 3d
136
(E.D.N.Y.
May 28,
2024)
United
States v.
Monk, 2024
WL 3936351
(S.D.N.Y.
Case Cite
Three life
terms and
concurrent
10-year
term
24
Drug offenses
Drug offenses; § 851
enhancement
Principal
Offense(s)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
15
30 to life
9
--
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Granted
Granted
Outcome
3a
Aug. 26,
2024)
United
States v.
Chavez,
2024 WL
4850808
(S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 21,
2024)
United
States v.
Patterson,
2024 WL
4872784
Case Cite
55
25
Drug offenses; § 851
enhancement;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Drug offenses;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Principal
Offense(s)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
15
40
10
15
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Granted
Granted
Outcome
4a
United
States v.
Rutherford,
120 F.4th
360 (3d Cir.
2024)
United
States v.
Carter, 711
F. Supp. 3d
428 (E.D.
(S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 21,
2024)
Case Cite
42.5
70
Hobbs Act
Robbery;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Armed Bank
Robbery;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
38.5 to 42.8
24.5
31.5 to
27.2
18 years
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Third Circuit (Restrictive)
Principal
Offense(s)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
Denied
Denied
Outcome
5a
Pa. Jan. 12,
2024)
United
States v.
Johnson,
2024 WL
665179
(E.D. Pa.
Feb. 16,
2024)
United
States v.
Norwood,
2024 WL
2151239
Case Cite
69.5
41.5
Bank Robbery; stacked
§ 924(c)s
Bank Robbery; ACCA;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Principal
Offense(s)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
31.5 or less
“significantly
shorter”
At least 10
years
--
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Denied
Denied
Outcome
6a
(D.N.J. May
13, 2024)
United
States v.
Wilson,
2024 WL
4793713
(E.D. Pa.
Nov. 14,
2024)
Case Cite
Bank Robbery; stacked
§ 924(c)s
Principal
Offense(s)
43.25
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
25.25
18
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Denied
Outcome
7a
United
States v.
Legrand,
2024 WL
2941282 (D.
Md. June
11, 2024)
United
States v.
James Baylor, 2024
WL 3093573
(E.D. Va.
Case Cite
40
42.8
Conspiracy to
Commit Robbery; Hobbs
Act Robbery;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Hobbs Act
Robbery;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
23–25.4
22
17.4–19.6
18
Likely
Sentence
Principal
Disparity
if Imposed
Offense(s)
(years)
Today
(years)
Fourth Circuit (Permissive)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
Granted
in Part
Granted
in Part
Outcome
8a
June 20,
2024)
Reed v.
United
States, 2024
WL 3153221
(E.D. Va.
June 24,
2024)
United
States v.
Troy Baylor,
2024 WL
3732460
(E.D. Va.
Case Cite
65
52
Drug offenses;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Hobbs Act
Robbery;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Principal
Offense(s)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
34
50
18
15
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Granted
Granted
Outcome
9a
United
States v.
Brown, 715
Aug. 6,
2024)
United
States v.
Bell, No. CR
RDB-09219, 2024
WL 3849533
(D. Md.
Aug. 16,
2024)
Case Cite
27.6 (after
prior reduction)
As low as
14 years
Armed Bank
Robbery;
132
52
80
13.6
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Fifth Circuit (Restrictive)
Armed Robbery; stacked
§ 924(c)s
Principal
Offense(s)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
Denied
Granted
in Part
Outcome
10a
United
States v.
Savoca,
2024 WL
stacked
§ 924(c)s
F. Supp. 3d
992 (S.D.
Tex. 2024)
United
States v. Allen, 2024
WL 2784802
(E.D. La.
May 30,
2024)
240
--
Bank Robbery; stacked
§ 924(c)s
77.25
--
--
--
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Sixth Circuit (Restrictive)
Drug offenses; § 851
enhancement
Principal
Offense(s)
Case Cite
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
Denied
Denied
Outcome
11a
50.8
35
Principal
Offense(s)
Bank Robbery; stacked
§ 924(c)s
Armed Bank
Robbery;
Case Cite
4711307
(N.D. Ohio
Nov. 7,
2024)
United
States v.
Yaromich,
2024 WL
4987404
(N.D. Ohio
Dec. 5,
2024)
United
States v.
Mitchell,
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
20
20.8
15
30
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Denied
Denied
Outcome
12a
46.8
50.25
Carjacking;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
2024 WL
3673533
(E.D. Mich.
Aug. 6,
2024)
United
States v.
Wilson,
2024 WL
1556313
(N.D. Ohio
Apr. 10,
2024)
United
States v.
Drug offenses;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Principal
Offense(s)
Case Cite
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
26.25
31.8–38.8
24
8–15
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Denied
Denied
Outcome
13a
stacked
§ 924(c)s
McHenry,
2024 WL
1363448
(N.D. Ohio
Mar. 29,
2024)
United
States v.
Smith, 2021
WL 4502861
(M.D. Tenn.
Oct. 1,
2021)
Drug offenses; § 851
enhancement
Principal
Offense(s)
Case Cite
Life
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
15–23
Decades
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Denied
Outcome
14a
United
States v.
Brown,
2024 WL
4728896
(C.D. Ill.
Nov. 8,
2024)
United
States v.
Watford,
2024 WL
3633906
(N.D. Ind.
Case Cite
Life
66.8
Drug offenses; § 851
enhancement
Bank Robbery; stacked
§ 924(c)s
36.8
25
30
Decades
Likely
Sentence
Principal
Disparity
if Imposed
Offense(s)
(years)
Today
(years)
Seventh Circuit (Restrictive)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
Denied
Denied
Outcome
15a
July 30,
2024)
United
States v.
Billingsly,
2024 WL
3520366,
(S.D. Ind.
July 23,
2024)
Case Cite
Drug offenses;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Principal
Offense(s)
35
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
--
--
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Denied
Outcome
16a
United
States v.
Neubert,
2024 WL
3520361
(S.D. Ind.
July 23,
2024)
United
States v.
Taylor, __ F.
Supp. 3d __,
2024 WL
3520358
(S.D. Ind.
Case Cite
32
37
Armed Robbery; stacked
§ 924(c)s
Armed Robery;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Principal
Offense(s)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
16
14
21
18
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Denied
Denied
Outcome
17a
July 23,
2024)
United
States v.
Spaulding,
2024 WL
3252397
(S.D. Ind.
June 28,
2024)
United
States v.
Robinson,
2024 WL
2816925
Case Cite
30 years
and 1 day
35
Drug offenses;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Armed Bank
Robbery;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Principal
Offense(s)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
20
10
15
20
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Denied
Denied
Outcome
18a
(S.D. Ind.
May 31,
2024)
United
States v.
Buggs, 2024
WL 2130566
(N.D. Ind.
May 13,
2024)
United
States v.
Williams,
742 F.
Supp. 3d
Case Cite
31.5
45.5 (defendant 1);
37 (defendant 2)
Armed Bank
Robbery;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Armed Bank
Robbery;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Principal
Offense(s)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
22.5 (defendant 1);
15 (defendant 2)
As low as
10 years
and 1 day
23 (defendant 1);
22 (defendant 2)
20+ years
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Denied
Denied
Outcome
19a
United
States v.
Black, 715
F. Supp. 3d
1069 (N.D.
Ill. 2024)
United
States v.
Tichenor,
2024 WL
3252501
(S.D. Ind.
823 (C.D.
Ill. 2024)
Case Cite
40
25
Conspiracy;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Armed Robbery; stacked
§ 924(c)s
Principal
Offense(s)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
7–8.75
20
16.25–18
20
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Denied
Denied
Outcome
20a
United
States v.
Henderson,
2024 WL
June 28,
2024)
United
States v.
Robinson,
2024 WL
2816925
(S.D. Ind.
May 31,
2024)
Case Cite
35
15
Drug offenses; § 851
enhancement
Life
24.3–30.4
Decades
20
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Eighth Circuit (Restrictive)
Armed Robbery; stacked
§ 924(c)s
Principal
Offense(s)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
Granted
Denied
Outcome
21a
42 (29.4
after prior
reduction)
Life
Principal
Offense(s)
Hobbs Act
Robbery;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Drug offenses; § 851
enhancement
Case Cite
881253
(E.D. Mo.
Feb. 23,
2024)
United
States v.
Loggins, No.
02-cr-142,
dkt. 197
(S.D. Iowa
Mar. 4,
2024)
United
States v. Delacruz, 2023
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
As low as
25 years
As low as
24 years
Decades
18
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Denied
Denied
Outcome
22a
United
States v.
Conmy, No.
WL 5628357
(D.N.D.
Aug. 31,
2023)
United
States v.
Gashe, 2020
WL 6276140
(N.D. Iowa
Oct. 26,
2020)
Case Cite
44
24
Decades
20
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Ninth Circuit (Permissive)
Drug ofAs low as
fenses; § 851
Life
10 years
enhancement
Drug offenses;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Principal
Offense(s)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
Granted
Denied
Outcome
23a
2:05-cr-83KJD-GWF,
dkt. 211,
220 (D. Nev.
Feb. 16,
2024)
United
States v.
Blackbird,
2024 WL
3552446 (D.
Mont. July
26, 2024)
United
States v.
Case Cite
25
39
Drug offenses; § 851
enhancement
Armed Bank
Robbery;
Principal
Offense(s)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
21.25–24
15
17.75–15
10
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Granted
Granted
Outcome
24a
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Vidrine,
2024 WL
3917152
(E.D. Cal.
Aug. 23,
2024)
United
States v.
Wiley, 2024
WL 3992325
(D. Nev.
Aug. 29,
2024)
Armed Robbery; stacked
§ 924(c)s
Principal
Offense(s)
Case Cite
69 and 1
month (after resentencing)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
11.83
57
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Granted
in Part
Outcome
25a
United
States v.
Pineda,
2024 WL
4480213
(Oct. 11,
2024)
United
States v.
Jones, 482
F. Supp. 3d
969 (N.D.
Cal. 2020)
Case Cite
Life
29.75
Drug offenses; § 851
enhancement
Armed Robbery; stacked
§ 924(c)s
Principal
Offense(s)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
14.75
14–25
15
Decades
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Granted
Granted
Outcome
26a
United
States v. Lii,
528 F.
Supp. 3d
1153 (D.
Haw. 2021)
United
States v.
Mitsuyoshi,
2022 WL
819436 (D.
Haw. Mar.
17, 2022)
Case Cite
Life
20
Drug offenses; § 851
enhancement
Drug offenses; § 851
enhancement
Principal
Offense(s)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
10.83–13.5
15
6.5–9.17
Decades
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Granted
Granted
Outcome
27a
United
States v.
Rutkowski,
2022 WL
1597382 (D.
Haw. May
19, 2022)
United
States v.
Jordan,
2021 WL
3612400 (D.
Nev. Aug.
13, 2021)
Case Cite
Life
60.83
Drug offenses; § 851
enhancement
Armed Robbery; stacked
§ 924(c)s
Principal
Offense(s)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
22.83
27 or fewer
38
Decades
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Granted
Granted
Outcome
28a
United
States v.
Cisneros,
2022 WL
17417284
(D. Haw.
Dec. 5,
2022)
United
States v.
Wells, 2022
WL 1720987
(D. Nev.
May 27,
2022)
Case Cite
Life
107 (after
prior reduction)
Drug offenses; § 851
enhancement
Armed Robbery; stacked
§ 924(c)s
Principal
Offense(s)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
35
20
72
Decades
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
Granted
Granted
Outcome
29a
United
States v.
Brooks, 717
F. Supp. 3d
1087 (N.D.
Okla. 2024)
United
States v.
Eads, 2024
WL 4201605
(D. Colo.
Sept. 16,
2024)
Case Cite
36.25
Life + 30
Robbery;
stacked
§ 924(c)s
Drug offenses; § 851
enhancement
85
18.25
Decades
18
Likely
Sentence
Principal
Disparity
if Imposed
Offense(s)
(years)
Today
(years)
Tenth Circuit (Permissive)
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
Granted
Granted
Outcome
30a
Principal
Offense(s)
United
States v.
Drug ofDoddles,
2024 WL
fenses;
4521379
stacked
(W.D. Okla.
§ 924(c)s
Oct. 17,
2024)
United States
v. Barkley,
2024 WL
Armed Robbery; stacked
5233183
(N.D. Okla.
§ 924(c)s
Dec. 27,
2024)
Case Cite
15
24–26.5
43.25
Granted
Granted
16.75–
19.25
Outcome
25
Likely
Sentence
Disparity
if Imposed
(years)
Today
(years)
40
Original
Sentence
Length
(years)
31a
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