Amicus Curiae Brief — Cisco Systems, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Doe I, et al.

No. 24-856

IN THE

CISCO SYSTEMS, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

DOE I, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF THE GUERNICA37 CENTRE

FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AS

AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING

RESPONDENTS

ALMUDENA BERNABEU

MICHAEL REED HURTADO

SAÚL CASTRO FERNÁNDEZ

MADELAINE G. ALTMAN

THE GUERNICA37 CENTRE

FOR INTERNATIONAL

JUSTICE

Two Embarcadero Center,

San Francisco, CA 94111

CHRISTINA G. HIOUREAS

Counsel of Record

FOLEY HOAG, LLP

1301 Avenue of the

Americas, New York,

NY 10019

(212) 812-0400

chioureas@foleyhoag.com

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE............................. 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 1

ARGUMENT................................................................ 3

I.

General Principles of Liability in Continental

Law Regimes and Criteria for the Attribution

of Liability ....................................................... 3

II. Liability for damages involving multiple

participants in Continental legal systems ... 10

A. The origins of subjective civil

liability: Roman law and the Lex

Aquilia............................................. 10

B. Extra-contractual civil liability in the

common principles of Civil law of the

European Union.............................. 14

C. Extra-contractual civil liability in

various Continental legal systems . 16

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 31

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1350 .................................................... 32

28 U.S.C. § 1350 note ............................................ 32

Treatises

4 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN

COMENTADO (Marisa Herrera et al. dirs., 1st ed.

2015) .................................................................... 25

EKATERINA ARISTOVA & CATHERINE O’REGAN, CIVIL

LIABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: A

HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS (2022) ............... 30

GERHARD WAGNER, MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM

BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH [MUNICH

COMENTARY ON THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE] (Franz

J. Säcker et al. eds., 8th ed. 2020) ..................... 21

Luis Fernando Reglero Campos, Conceptos

generales y elementos de delimitación, in 1

TRATADO DE RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL [TREATISE

ON CIVIL LIABILITY] (Luis Fernando Reglero

Campos & Jose Manuel Busto Lago eds., 5th ed.

2014) ...................................................................... 5

Luis Fernando Reglero Campos, Los sistemas de

responsabilidad civil, in 1 TRATADO DE

RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL [TREATISE ON CIVIL

LIABILITY] (Luis Fernando Reglero Campos &

Jose Manuel Busto Lago eds., 5th ed. 2014)........ 8

PRINCIPIOS, DEFINICIONES Y REGLAS DE UN

DERECHO CIVIL EUROPEO: EL MARCO COMÚN DE

REFERENCIA (DCFR) [PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS

AND RULES OF A EUROPEAN CIVIL LAW: THE

COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR)] (Carmen

Jerez Delgado coord., 2010) ................................ 15

ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, TRATADO DE LAS

iii

OBLIGACIONES [TREATY OF OBLIGATIONS] (2d ed.

2007) (1761)......................................................... 25

International Materials

4 PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF

EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME

OF REFERENCE [DCFR] (Christian von Bar et al.

eds., 2009) ..................................................... 14, 16

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of

Justice], Apr. 20, 2010, Zeitschrift für

Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 786 (Ger.) ...................... 21

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of

Justice], Feb. 6, 2014, Neue Juristische

Wochenschrift [NJW] 1098 (Ger.) ...................... 20

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of

Justice], July 17, 2012, Zeitschrift für

Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 1552 (Ger.) .................... 21

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of

Justice], July 19, 2012, Neue Juristische

Wochenschrift [NJW] 3439 (Ger.) ...................... 21

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Apr. 14, 1986, Neue

Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1883 (Ger.) ... 22

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Dec. 13, 2001, Neue

Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1042 (Ger.) ... 23

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Feb. 28, 1989,

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 564 (Ger.)22

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Jan. 31, 1978, Neue

Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 832 (Ger.) ..... 23

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], July 13, 2004,

Wertpapier-Mitteilungen [WM] 1768 (Ger.) ...... 22

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Mar. 20, 1995, Neue

Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1739 (Ger.) ... 22

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Mar. 5, 1975,

Wertpapier-Mitteilungen [WM] 559 (Ger.) ........ 22

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Mar. 9, 2010, Neue

iv

Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1877 (Ger.) ... 22

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], May 6, 2008, Neue

Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 2266 (Ger.) ... 22

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Nov. 4, 1997, Neue

Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 535, 1998

(Ger.) ................................................................... 22

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Sept. 24, 1991,

Wertpapier-Mitteilungen [WM] 2034 (Ger.) ...... 22

BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] §

823 (Ger.) ............................................................ 20

BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] §

826 (Ger.) ............................................................ 20

BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] §

830 (Ger.) ............................................................ 21

Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de

San Nicolás [Cám. Apel. Civ. y Com. San

Nicolás] [Civil and Commercial Court of Appeals

of San Nicolás], 9/11/1993, "Gajate, Carlos

Alberto y otra c. González, Gustavo Daniel y

otros/ Daños y perjuicios," DJBA (147-5699), Id.

SAIJ: FA93013088 (Arg.) ................................... 25

Cass. 2e civ., 04/02/1981, Bull. civ. II, No. 21 ...... 19

Cass. civ., 27/02/1951, Bull. civ., No. 77 ............... 19

Cass. Civ., Sez. III civ. [Court of Cassation],

04/03/2024, n. 8778 (It.) ...................................... 24

Cass. Civ., Sez. Un. [Court of Cassation]

04/27/2022, n. 13143, Rv. 664654-01 (It.) .......... 23

CODE CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1240, 1241 (Fr.). .. 19

CODICE CIVILE [CIVIL CODE] art. 2043 (It.) ........... 23

CODICE CIVILE [CIVIL CODE] art. 2055 (It.) ........... 23

CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] (Spain) ....................... 16

CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 186 (Braz.) .......... 27

CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 2314 (Chile) ........ 26

CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 2317 (Chile) ........ 26

CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 2341 (Colom.) ..... 27

v

CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 2344 (Colom.) ..... 29

CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 483 (Port.) .......... 18

CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 927 (Braz.) .......... 27

CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 942 (Braz.) .......... 27

CÓDIGO CIVIL FEDERAL [FEDERAL CIVIL CODE] art.

1830 (Mex.).......................................................... 29

CÓDIGO CIVIL FEDERAL [FEDERAL CIVIL CODE] art.

1910 (Mex.).......................................................... 29

CÓDIGO CIVIL FEDERAL [FEDERAL CIVIL CODE] art.

1917 (Mex.).......................................................... 30

CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN [CIVIL

AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 1708

(Arg.).................................................................... 24

CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN [CIVIL

AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 1716

(Arg.).................................................................... 24

CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN [CIVIL

AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 1717

(Arg.).................................................................... 24

CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN [CIVIL

AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 1724

(Arg.).................................................................... 24

CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN [CIVIL

AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 1726

(Arg.).................................................................... 24

CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN [CIVIL

AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 1749 . 25

CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN [CIVIL

AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 1881

(Arg.).................................................................... 24

Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme

Court], Primera Sala, 25/09/2023, “Guzmán y

otros con Esval S.A. y otros,” Rol No. 21439-2022

(Chile) .................................................................. 27

Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme

vi

Court], Sala de Casación Civil, M.P. Ariel

Salazar Ramírez, 14/12/2012, Expediente 1100131-03-028-2002-00188-01 (Colom.) .................... 28

Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme

Court], Sala de Casación Civil, M.P. Margarita

Cabello Blanco, 19/12/2018, Sentencia SC56862018, Expediente 2004-00042-01 (Colom.) ........ 28

Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal]

Versailles, 3e ch. 30/06/2016, No. 14/04397 (Fr.)20

Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for

judicial matters] 1e civ., 05/11/1996, Bull. civ. I,

No. 378 (Fr.) ........................................................ 19

DIG. 9.2.7.6 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18) ................... 13

DIG. at 9.2.11.1 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18) ............. 13

DIG. at 9.2.27.9 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18) ............. 13

DIG. at 9.2.9 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18) .................. 13

PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW: TEXT AND

COMMENTARY [PETL] (European Group on Tort

Law ed., 2005) ............................................... 14, 15

S.T.S., 01/02/2007 (ECLI:ES:TS:2007:444) (Spain) ... 17

S.T.S., 01/12/1987 (ECLI:ES:TS:1987:8841) (Spain)... 17

S.T.S., 03/12/1998 (ECLI:ES:TS:1998:7253) (Spain)... 16

S.T.S., 10/03/1994 (ECLI:ES:TS:1994:14835)

(Spain) ................................................................. 17

S.T.S., 12/11/1998 (ECLI:ES:TS:1998:6675) (Spain)... 17

S.T.S., 13/02/2001 (ECLI:ES:TS:2001:954) (Spain) .... 17

S.T.S., 13/06/2006 (ECLI:ES:TS:2006:3463) (Spain)... 17

S.T.S., 14/07/2003 (ECLI:ES:TS:2003:4957) (Spain) ... 17

S.T.S., 25/11/1998 (ECLI:ES:TS:1988:8307) (Spain)... 17

S.T.S., 27/06/2001 (ECLI:ES:TS:2001:5533)

(Spain) ................................................................. 17

Superior Tribunal de Justiça [STJ] [Superior

Court of Justice], Agravo Interno no Agravo em

Recurso Especial No. 997.278/PR, Relator:

Ministro Francisco Falcão, 24/05/2021 (Braz.) .. 27

vii

Supremo Tribunal de Justiça [Supreme Court of

Justice] of 07/05/2012 in Proceedings no.

146/09.0PBEPS.G1.S1 (2012), available at

https://www.dgsi.pt (Port.) ................................. 18

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá [Trib. Sup. Bogotá]

[Superior Tribunal of Bogotá], Sala Civil, M.P.

Luis Roberto Suárez González, 12/07/2015,

Expediente 11001-31-03-007-2010-00567-02

(Colom.) ............................................................... 29

Other Authorities

2 KARL LARENZ & CLAUS-WILHELM CANARIS,

LEHRBUCH DES SCHULDRECHTS [TEXTBOOK ON

THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS] (13th ed. 1994) .......... 6

ALESSANDRO CORBINO, IL DANNO QUALIFICATO E LA

LEX AQUILIA [QUALIFIED DAMAGE AND THE LEX

AQUILIA] (2005) ................................................... 12

ARTURO ALESSANDRI RODRÍGUEZ, DE LA

RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL EXTRACONTRACTUAL EN EL

DERECHO CIVIL CHILENO [ON NON-CONTRACTUAL

CIVIL LIABILITY IN CHILEAN CIVIL LAW] (2005) .. 26

Bjarte Askeland, Principles of European Tort Law

(PETL), in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Jürgen Basedow et al.

eds., 2012). .......................................................... 14

CESARE SALVI, LA RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE [CIVIL

LIABILITY] (1998). .................................................. 9

Diego M. Papayannis, Responsabilidad civil

(concepto) [Civil Liability (Concept)], 21

EUNOMÍA: REVISTA EN CULTURA DE LA LEGALIDAD

294 (2021) .............................................................. 5

ERNST VON BELING, DIE LEHRE VOM TATBESTAND

[THE DOCTRINE OF THE CORPUS DELICTI] (1906) .. 4

Eugenio Llamas Pombo, Prevención y reparación,

las dos caras del derecho de daños, in LA

viii

RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL Y SU PROBLEMÁTICA

ACTUAL (J. A. Moreno Martínez, ed. 2007) .......... 4

FERNANDO PEÑA LÓPEZ, LA CULPABILIDAD EN LA

RESPONSABILIDAD EXTRACONTRACTUAL

[CULPABILITY IN TORT LIABILITY] (2002) .......... 7, 9

FRANZ VON LISZT, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN

STRAFRECHTS [TREATY OF CRIMINAL LAW] (1884) 4

GILBERTO MARTÍNEZ RAVE & CATALINA MARTÍNEZ

TAMAYO, RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL

EXTRACONTRACTUAL [EXTRACONTRACTUAL CIVIL

LIABILITY] (2003) ................................................. 28

Giuseppe Valditara, Damnum iniuria datum

[Damage Unlawfully Caused], in DERECHO

ROMANO DE OBLIGACIONES: HOMENAJE AL

PROFESOR JOSÉ LUIS MURGA GENER [ROMAN LAW

OF OBLIGATIONS: A TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR JOSÉ

LUIS MURGA GENER] 825 (Francisco Javier

Paricio Serrano & Editorial Universitaria Ramón

Areces eds., 1994) ............................................... 11

GUMESINDO PADILLA SAHAGÚN, DERECHO ROMANO

[ROMAN LAW] (4th ed. 2008) ............................... 12

Hartwig Sprau, Introduction to §§ 823 et seq., in

Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] (Christian

Grüneberg et al. eds., 80th ed. 2021) ................. 20

ISABELLA PIRO, DAMNUM ‘CORPORE SUO’, DARE REM

‘CORPORE’ POSSIDERE [DAMAGE ‘BY ONE'S OWN

BODY’, TO GIVE A THING, TO POSSESS ‘BY THE BODY’]

(2004) ................................................................... 11

JEAN DOMAT, LES LOIX CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE

NATUREL [THE CIVIL LAWS IN THEIR NATURAL

ORDER] bk. II, tit. VIII, § 2 (1689). ....................... 9

Johannes von Kries, Über die Begriffe der

Wahrscheinlichkeit und Möglichkeit und ihre

Bedeutung im Strafrecht [On the Concepts of

Probability and Possibility and Their

ix

Significance in Criminal Law], 9 ZEITSCHRIFT

FÜR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT

528 (1889) .............................................................. 7

JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY,

RECOGNIZING WRONGS (2020) ............................... 3

JOSEF ESSER, GRUNDLAGEN UND ENTWICKLUNG DER

GEFÄHRDUNGSHAFTUNG [FOUNDATIONS AND

DEVELOPMENT OF STRICT LIABILITY]. (1941) ........ 9

Julián E. Jalil, Daños causados por los grupos en

el nuevo Código Civil [Damages caused by groups

in the new Civil Code], ELDIAL.COM (Nov. 19,

2014), https://www2020.scba.gov.ar/leyorganica/CCyc30/pdfley/Jalil

_Danios_causadosporlosgruposenelnuevoccyc.pdf25

KARL ENGISCH, LA CAUSALIDAD COMO ELEMENTO

DE LOS TIPOS PENALES [CAUSALITY AS AN

ELEMENT OF CRIMINAL OFFENSE TYPES] (2008)... 7

Luis Carlos Sánchez Hernández, La Lex Aquilia:

La Estructura del Damnum Iniuria Datum y su

Evolución a través de la Interpretatio

Prudentium y la Actividad Pretoria [The Lex

Aquilia: The Structure of Damnum Iniuria

Datum and its Evolution Through the

Interpretatio Prudentium and Praetorian

Activity], 73 THEMIS: REVISTA DE DERECHO 165

(2018) ............................................................. 11, 12

Luis Díez-Picazo, Culpa y riesgo en la

responsabilidad civil extracontractual [Fault and

Risk in Tort Liability], 4 ANUARIO DE LA

FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MADRID 153 (2000) .... 9

Luis Díez-Picazo, La culpa en la responsabilidad

civil extracontractual [Fault in Tort Liability], 54

ANUARIO DE DERECHO CIVIL 1009 (2001) ............ 8

Mario Talamanca, Colpa civile (storia) [Civil Fault

(History)], in 7 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 517

x

(Giuffrè Francis Lefebvre ed., 1969) .................... 8

Pamela Mendoza-Alonzo, Pluralidad de causantes

de un mismo daño: Régimen jurídico aplicable en

Chile [Multiple causes of the same damage: The

applicable legal regime in Chile], 41 REV.

DERECHO PRIVADO 213 (2021) ............................ 26

RICARDO DE ÁNGEL YÁGÜEZ, DAÑOS PUNITIVOS

[PUNITIVE DAMAGES] (2012) .................................. 4

RICARDO PANERO GUTIÉRREZ, DERECHO ROMANO

[ROMAN LAW] (2d ed. 2000) ................................. 12

Rodrigo Fuentes Guiñes, Las teorías tradicionales

sobre la causalidad [Traditional Theories on

Causality], 14 REV. DERECHO Y CIENCIAS

PENALES 23 (2010) .............................................. 28

SANDRO SCHIPANI, RESPONSABILITÀ “EX LEGE

AQUILIA”: CRITERI DI IMPUTAZIONE E PROBLEMA

DELLA “CULPA” [RESPONSIBILITY “EX LEGE

AQUILIA”: CRITERIA OF IMPUTATION AND THE

PROBLEM OF “CULPA”] (1969) .............................. 11

Sebastián Antonio Barrios Guerra, Del reparto de

responsabilidades en casos de pluralidad de

actores en la responsabilidad civil

extracontractual [On the allocation of liability in

cases involving multiple parties in noncontractual civil liability], 40 REV. ESTUDIOS

JUSTICIA 107 (2024) ............................................ 26

Stephen A. Smith, Duties, Liabilities, and

Damages, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1727 (2012) ............ 3

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON

THE LAW OF TORTS § 42 (5th ed. 1984) ................ 7

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

The Guernica37 Centre for International Justice

(G37 Centre) is an international, not-for-profit legal

organization that pursues accountability for human

rights violations and other egregious acts. The G37

Centre is committed to upholding the integrity and

fair application of the law, reducing systemic

impunity,

promoting

community-driven

interventions, expanding access to justice, and

fostering both corrective and preventive change.

Moreover, the G37 Centre has a substantial and

cognizable interest in the adjudication of human

rights violations in the United States, as multiple of

its cases are brought in U.S. Federal Courts.

Accordingly, beyond establishing important precedent

for the vindication of human rights abuses, the

present case also carries significant implications for

the G37 Centre’s practice in the United States.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The central thesis of this amicus brief maintains

that nations of the Continental law tradition—also

known as Civil law tradition2—establish and

1 No counsel for a party authored this brief, in whole or in

part, and no one, other than the G37 Centre and its counsel

helped pay for this brief’s preparation or submission.

2 For the sake of clarity, the present amicus curiae will use

the term “legal systems of Continental law” or “Continental legal

systems” to refer to Civil law legal systems.

1

2

uniformly recognize the civil liability of aiders and

abettors within their respective legal systems,

without requiring the existence of a specific statutory

category in civil regulations.

Continental legal systems structure civil liability

around three core elements: the existence of damage;

a basis of attribution—primarily intent, fault or

negligence—and an adequate causal link. Within this

framework, liability is not limited to the direct

perpetrator of the wrongful act; rather, it extends to

any subject whose conduct—whether by act or

omission—has contributed causally to the occurrence

of the harm.

This conclusion is based both upon an

examination of the general principles of law governing

extracontractual civil liability and a comparative

legal-historical analysis, tracing the evolution of this

practice from Roman Law to modern codifications and

contemporary

European

and

Latin-American

principles. All Continental legal systems allow for the

civil liability of any individual who participates in

causing harm, treating as equally liable cooperators,

collaborators, or assistants—and thus, fully obliged to

provide reparations to harmed parties.

Under this premise, restricting civil liability for

damages exclusively to direct perpetrators of the

harm represents a legal anomaly that would separate

the United States of America from the rest of the

world's legal practice.

2

3

ARGUMENT

I. General

Principles

of

Liability

in

Continental Law Regimes and Criteria for

the Attribution of Liability

Continental legal systems, also known as Civil

Law systems, articulate the legal pathways for the

reparation of damages caused to third parties through

what is known as extra-contractual liability. This

body of law—broadly equivalent to the law of torts in

Common Law systems—is inherently distinct from

criminal liability.

Strictly speaking, civil liability in Continental

legal systems is enforced through an action for

damages brought by the person injured by an unjust

interaction or harmful act, enabling that person to

seek compensation from those whose conduct

contributed to the harm. See Stephen A. Smith,

Duties, Liabilities, and Damages, 125 HARV. L. REV.

1727, 1741 et seq (2012); JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG &

BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS 37

(2020). The primary function of extracontractual

liability is reparatory or compensatory in nature, not

preventive or punitive. PABLO SALVADOR CODERCH &

MARÍA TERESA CASTIÑEIRA PALOU, PREVENIR Y

CASTIGAR: LIBERTAD DE INFORMACIÓN Y EXPRESIÓN,

TUTELA DEL HONOR Y FUNCIONES DEL DERECHO DE

DAÑOS [PREVENT AND PUNISH: FREEDOM OF

INFORMATION AND EXPRESSION, HONOUR PROTECTION

3

4

AND FUNCTIONS OF TORTS LAW] 133 et. seq (1997).

Those latter functions are instead ordinarily reserved

to other branches of law, such as criminal or

administrative law. RICARDO DE ÁNGEL YÁGÜEZ,

DAÑOS PUNITIVOS [PUNITIVE DAMAGES] 10–55 (2012).

At the same time, the underlying damage may arise

from a conduct constituting a criminal offense giving

rise to criminal liability.

In Continental legal systems, the existence of

criminal liability is contingent upon satisfying the

requirements

of

criminality,

unlawfulness,

culpability, and punishability to impose a conviction.

See ERNST VON BELING, DIE LEHRE VOM TATBESTAND

[THE DOCTRINE OF THE CORPUS DELICTI] (1906); FRANZ

VON LISZT, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTS

[TREATY OF CRIMINAL LAW] 262 (1884). These

requirements must be sufficiently proven to overcome

the presumption of innocence. Eugenio Llamas

Pombo, Prevención y reparación, las dos caras del

derecho de daños, in LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL Y SU

PROBLEMÁTICA ACTUAL 443, 456 (J. A. Moreno

Martínez ed., 2007).

This is, however, not the case for extracontractual

civil liability. In Continental legal systems,

attributing criminal liability is much more rigid and

strict—as this field is a manifestation of the punitive

power (ius puniendi) of the State—while civil liability

for a harmful act is purely compensatory in purpose,

justifying the application of less strict standards. Luis

Fernando Reglero Campos, Conceptos generales y

4

5

elementos de delimitación, in 1 TRATADO DE

RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL [TREATISE ON CIVIL LIABILITY]

11, 131 et seq. (Luis Fernando Reglero Campos & Jose

Manuel Busto Lago eds., 5th ed. 2014).

Three elements must be established in order to

attribute the obligation to repair harm to one or more

persons: (i) the existence of harm; (ii) a legally

recognized basis for attribution, i.e. a basis for

imputing liability; and (iii) a causal link between the

harm and the conduct in question. See Diego M.

Papayannis, Responsabilidad civil (concepto) [Civil

Liability (Concept)], 21 EUNOMÍA: REVISTA EN

CULTURA DE LA LEGALIDAD 294, 298 (2021); Reglero

Campos, Conceptos generales y elementos de

delimitación, at 52 et seq.

This framework allows for more than one natural

or legal persons to be held liable for the same damage.

In Continental legal systems, civil liability is not

structured around the categories of principal or

accessory liability that are inherent to criminal law.

Instead, assignment of liability to a plurality of actors

is determined by assessing whether each actor’s

conduct independently satisfies the requirements of

attribution and causation. Where it does, each actor

may be held directly liable.

The underlying purpose of this system is to decide

which individuals and which assets must bear the loss

in a specific case. Continental legal systems answer

this question by finding “the party who acted

negligently must be held liable or bear the loss.” 2 KARL

5

6

LARENZ & CLAUS-WILHELM CANARIS, LEHRBUCH DES

SCHULDRECHTS [TEXTBOOK ON THE LAW OF

OBLIGATIONS] 351, 351 (13th ed. 1994).

Following this approach, Continental legal

systems permit an individual to be held liable

irrespective of whether they were, in criminal law

terms, characterized as a principal perpetrator or as

having engaged an accessory conduct. In these

systems, civil liability is not contingent upon such

classifications. Nor does it require express statutory

recognition of different forms of participation. Rather,

the essence (quid) of extra-contractual liability lies in

establishing that one or more individuals contributed

to the generation of a harm through their conduct.

Thus, Continental legal systems do not depend on

the formal notion of “accessory liability” in order to

impose responsibility. It is sufficient to demonstrate a

legally cognizable basis for attribution—such as

intent or fault—and a causal link between the

conduct of the alleged responsible party and the harm.

Establishing a causal link between the conduct

(active or omissive) and the harmful event requires a

two-step analysis:3

1. whether the conduct was a physical or

material antecedent to the damage, as a

3 Luis Fernando Reglero Campos & Luis Medina Alcoz, El

Nexo Casual. La pérdida de oportunidad. Las causes se

exoneración de responsibilidad: culpa de la víctima y

fuerza mayor, in 1 TRATADO 721, 721 et. seq.

6

7

conditio sine qua non;4 and

2. whether the damage was a probable

consequence of the conduct considering the

circumstances and analyzing whether,

according to standards of reasonable certainty

or statistical likelihood, the production of the

harm could have been expected a priori or

should have been prevented through some

protective measures.5

This is closely linked to the criteria of subjective

imputation for fault, as its premise is that the liable

individual could and should have foreseen or

reasonably expected the harm.

Traditionally, the primary basis of attribution in

Continental legal systems has been fault, which gave

rise to what are generally labelled as regimes of

subjective liability. FERNANDO PEÑA LÓPEZ, LA

CULPABILIDAD

EN

LA

RESPONSABILIDAD

EXTRACONTRACTUAL [CULPABILITY IN TORT LIABILITY]

184 et seq. (2002). From the nineteenth century

onward, however, the Industrial Revolution prompted

See generally KARL ENGISCH, LA CAUSALIDAD COMO

ELEMENTO DE LOS TIPOS PENALES [CAUSALITY AS AN ELEMENT

OF CRIMINAL OFFENSE TYPES] (2008) .

5

See Johannes von Kries, Über die Begriffe der

Wahrscheinlichkeit und Möglichkeit und ihre Bedeutung im

Strafrecht [On the Concepts of Probability and Possibility and

Their Significance in Criminal Law], 9 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE

GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 528 (1889); W. PAGE

KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §

42 (5th ed. 1984).

4

7

8

the development of objective (strict) liability regimes

whereby liability is presumed for certain actors by

virtue of the activity or the sphere in which they acted.

Luis Díez-Picazo, La culpa en la responsabilidad civil

extracontractual [Fault in Tort Liability], 54 ANUARIO

DE DERECHO CIVIL 1009, 1018-1019 (2001). While

these strict liability regimes are exceptional and

jurisdiction-specific, imputation based on the

subjective criterion of fault has remained

homogeneous and uniform since Roman Law. See Luis

Fernando Reglero Campos, Los sistemas de

responsabilidad civil, in 1 TRATADO 247, 249 et seq.;

Mario Talamanca, Colpa civile (storia) [Civil Fault

(History)], in 7 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 517

(Giuffrè Francis Lefebvre ed., 1969).

The criteria of civil fault—which encompasses

cooperators, collaborators, and aiders and abettors—

is based on the standard of due diligence expected

from a person, given the context of their conduct, the

particular facts of the case, and the level of care

reasonably expected of an average person placed in a

comparable situation.

This assessment further

requires consideration of the customs, practices, and

inherent risks associated with the relevant activity.

Reglero Campos, Los sistemas de responsabilidad

civil, at 280 et. seq.

Continental legal scholarship since Roman Law

has understood that fault exists when an individual

should have foreseen the harm that would result from

a certain course of conduct—both active and passive—

8

9

according to the rules of ordinary human experience

and under the particular circumstances of the case.

LÓPEZ, at 184 et seq.

During the twentieth century, in various

European legal systems, risk was added to fault as a

factor leading to the attribution of liability. French,6

Italian,7 Spanish,8 and German9 legal scholarship

established that civil liability could be expanded,

legally or through judicial rulings, when the liable

party is the one who controls the source or origin of

the risk. See Díez-Picazo, at 166.

What is relevant to this amicus is that while strict

liability for risk requires a specific law, the principle

of imputation for fault allows for liability to be

attributed to any person for harm generated by their

non-diligent conduct, without the need for an express

statutory provision. This includes the conduct of those

who aided and abetted the harmful conduct.

Continental legal systems do not treat “aiding

and abetting” as a separate legal category of civil

liability, nor do they require express recognition of

6 JEAN DOMAT, LES LOIX CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL

[THE CIVIL LAWS IN THEIR NATURAL ORDER] bk. II, tit. VIII, § 2

(1689).

7 CESARE SALVI, LA RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE [CIVIL LIABILITY]

122 (1998).

8 Luis Díez-Picazo, Culpa y riesgo en la responsabilidad civil

extracontractual [Fault and Risk in Tort Liability], 4 ANUARIO DE

LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MADRID 153, 166 (2000).

9 JOSEF ESSER, GRUNDLAGEN UND ENTWICKLUNG DER

GEFÄHRDUNGSHAFTUNG [FOUNDATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT OF

STRICT LIABILITY] 93 et seq. (1941).

9

10

these accessory forms of liability to impose an

obligation to repair harm upon aiders and abettors.

These systems apply, uniformly and homogeneously,

the general principle of liability based on fault and

causation to any person participating in the causation

of a harm, regardless of whether their role was—in

criminal terms—that of a principal or accomplice to

the wrongdoing.

II. Liability for damages involving multiple

participants in Continental legal systems

Having established the theoretical foundations

governing civil liability in the Continental legal

tradition, it is now appropriate to examine how these

principles have been translated into practice in

various legal systems and jurisdictions, specifically

regarding individuals who have caused civil harm.

Starting from the Roman genesis, we observe how

modern European and Latin American Continental

law jurisdictions have maintained a structural

cohesion that allows for the attribution of liability to

those who—through accessory or collaborative

conduct, in criminal law terms—are civilly liable for

the production of a harm.

A. The origins of subjective civil liability:

Roman law and the Lex Aquilia.

10

11

The origin of extra-contractual civil liability,10

which permeates all Continental legal systems, arose

in the year 286 B.C. with the plebiscite approval of the

actio legis Aquiliae damnum iniuria datum, or Lex

Aquilia. This action for liability for damages—

damnum iniuria datum—was initially characterized

by three elements:11

1. the performance of a typical conduct12 that

required direct, immediate, and material

contact between the agent and the harm

produced—that is, the harm had to be directly

linked to a physical effort by the liable actor;13

2. the injustice or social rejection of the harm,

referred to as iniuria, which corresponds to

modern-day fault; and

10 See Giuseppe Valditara, Damnum iniuria datum [Damage

Unlawfully Caused], in DERECHO ROMANO DE OBLIGACIONES:

HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR JOSÉ LUIS MURGA GENER [ROMAN LAW

OF OBLIGATIONS: A TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR JOSÉ LUIS MURGA

GENER] 825, 858 et seq. (Francisco Javier Paricio Serrano &

Editorial Universitaria Ramón Areces eds., 1994).

11 SANDRO SCHIPANI, RESPONSABILITÀ “EX LEGE AQUILIA”:

CRITERI DI IMPUTAZIONE E PROBLEMA DELLA “CULPA”

[RESPONSIBILITY “EX LEGE AQUILIA”: CRITERIA OF IMPUTATION

AND THE PROBLEM OF “CULPA”] 45 (1969).

12 Luis Carlos Sánchez Hernández, La Lex Aquilia: La

Estructura del Damnum Iniuria Datum y su Evolución a través

de la Interpretatio Prudentium y la Actividad Pretoria [The Lex

Aquilia: The Structure of Damnum Iniuria Datum and its

Evolution Through the Interpretatio Prudentium and Praetorian

Activity], 73 THEMIS: REVISTA DE DERECHO 165, 172 (2018).

13 ISABELLA PIRO, DAMNUM ‘CORPORE SUO’, DARE REM

‘CORPORE’ POSSIDERE [DAMAGE ‘BY ONE'S OWN BODY’, TO GIVE A

THING, TO POSSESS ‘BY THE BODY’] 38, 210 (2004).

11

12

3. the ownership by another of the property or

rights that sustained said harm.14

A priori, it might seem that the original action for

civil liability in Roman law only allowed for the direct

and material perpetrator of the damages to be held

liable, exonerating any other participant. This,

however, was not the case. The direct Aquilian

action—the actio ex lege Aquiliana—was expanded in

Roman legal practice through various residual actions

granted by praetors, see Sánchez Hernández, at 187,

which allowed, inter alia, for the liability of those who

had contributed to the generation of the harm through

some form of intervention. CORBINO, 152.

Through actiones in factum, equity-based liability

could be imposed on those who “gave cause” to a harm,

regardless of whether they occasioned it directly or

indirectly. See generally RICARDO PANERO GUTIÉRREZ,

DERECHO ROMANO [ROMAN LAW] (2d ed. 2000);

GUMESINDO PADILLA SAHAGÚN, DERECHO ROMANO

[ROMAN LAW] (4th ed. 2008). Thus, in the Digest—one

of the essential compilations of Roman law dating

from the sixth century—the relevance of these types

of actions is noted. For instance, the illustrious jurist

Ulpian comments: “it matters a great deal to know

whether someone killed, or whether they provided the

cause of death, so that the one who provided the cause

of death is bound not by the Lex Aquilia, but by the

14 ALESSANDRO CORBINO, IL DANNO QUALIFICATO E LA LEX

AQUILIA [QUALIFIED DAMAGE AND THE LEX AQUILIA] 96 (2005).

12

13

actio in factum.” DIG. 9.2.7.6 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18).

The Digest sets forth examples of civil

liability,under this actio in factum, of those indirectly

taking part in the production of a harm, such as: (i)

those who provide a tool to a person with which they

subsequently cause harm, id.; (ii) those who hold a

person down while another inflicts harm upon them,

id. at 9.2.11.1; (iii) the nurse who provides someone

with a medicine that is eventually used to harm

another person, id. at 9.2.9; or (iv) the master who is

negligent in choosing his slaves, and the slave who

carries out his activities negligently and allows for

other slaves to produce harm. Id. at 9.2.27.9. All these

cases of civil liability are based on the premise that

these conducts “gave cause” to the harm without

directly producing it. The jurists in the Digest still

understood that those individuals were liable for their

contribution to the harm.

In summary, at the foundation of modern

Continental legal systems, it was already envisioned

that actions to obtain reparations from civil liability

could be directed against any person involved in the

causation of said harm—including those we

understand today as “aiders and abettors”—and not

only against the direct material perpetrator of the

wrongdoing.

13

14

B. Extra-contractual civil liability in the

common principles of Civil law of the

European Union

Within the European Union, there are two

codification proposals regarding extra-contractual

liability for damages that re-state the prevailing

principles in the modern law of all EU member states:

the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL)15 and

Volume IV of the Draft Common Frame of Reference

(DCFR).16

The PETL outline a set of general principles

common to the extra-contractual liability laws of all

European countries and serve as the foundation for

respective national legislations on the matter. Bjarte

Askeland, Principles of European Tort Law (PETL), in

THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN

PRIVATE LAW (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2012).

Article 9:101 of the PETL addresses the

concurrence of multiple subjects in the production of

harm, expressly recognizing as a principle of

European comparative law the liability of

collaborators, instigators, and facilitators (which

would encompass “aiders and abettors”) under a

regime of joint and several liability with the material

PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW: TEXT AND

COMMENTARY [PETL] (European Group on Tort Law ed., 2005).

16 4 PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF

EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE

[DCFR] (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2009).

15

14

15

wrongdoer. PETL, at art. 9:101.

It states that liability is joint and several when

“the whole or a distinct part of the damage suffered by

the victim is attributable to two or more persons”

indicating that this occurs automatically when a

“person participates in, instigates or encourages an

unlawful conduct of others that causes damage.” Id.

Examples of the application of this rule include cases

where a subject conspires with another to commit

harm, encourages them, or facilitates the commission

of the harmful act in any way, despite not having

participated directly in the harmful conduct. Id. at

arts. 9:101–102.

The DCFR collects the rules, principles, and

definitions of private law that are common to all legal

systems of the European Union. PRINCIPIOS,

DEFINICIONES Y REGLAS DE UN DERECHO CIVIL

EUROPEO: EL MARCO COMÚN DE REFERENCIA (DCFR)

[PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND RULES OF A EUROPEAN

CIVIL LAW: THE COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE

(DCFR)] (Carmen Jerez Delgado coord., 2010). Its

origin lies in the European Parliament’s initiative to

create a European Civil Code to condense common

rules. Currently, it is considered by the courts of

Member States as a reflection of the general principles

of private law. Id.

The DCFR addresses the liability of multiple

participants in Chapter 4 of Book VI, when covering

the causal link between the conduct and the

production of the harm. The principles establish the

15

16

general rule that “a person causes legally relevant

damage to another if the damage can be regarded as a

consequence of that person’s conduct or of a source of

danger for which that person is responsible.” DCFR, at

bk. VI, art. 4:101. Furthermore, Article 4:102

emphasizes that a person will be considered a cause of

the harm if they “collaborate with, instigate or offer

significant assistance to” another in the causation of

harm. Id. at art. 4:102.

Both bodies of European law recognize, as an

inherent feature of all the legal systems in the

European Union, that civil liability for unjust harm is

not limited to the direct perpetrator. On the contrary,

they show that civil liability can be triggered by any

faulty conduct that contributed causally to the

production of a harm, including that of “aiders and

abettors.”

C. Extra-contractual civil liability in

various Continental legal systems

Article 1902 of the Spanish Civil Code provides

that “[a]ny one who by act or omission causes damage

to another, involving fault or negligence, is obliged to

repair the damage caused.” CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE]

art. 1902 (Spain). Based on the literal text of this

provision, the Spanish Supreme Court has repeatedly

held that where multiple actors contribute to a single

injury, they are jointly and severally liable. S.T.S.,

03/12/1998 (ECLI:ES:TS:1998:7253) (Spain). This

16

17

applies both when actors are conscious co-participants

in the wrongful act17 and when their independent

actions produce the harm without prior concerted

cooperation,18 even in cases where the conduct of a

single actor would not have been sufficient, on its own,

to cause the final injury.19

The Spanish Supreme Court has noted that joint

liability is “not precluded by a plurality of behaviors,

acts and omissions, that may be independent and

autonomous, simultaneous or successive, but which

obviously concur or concatenate in the production of

the

harmful

result.”

S.T.S.,

14/07/2003

(ECLI:ES:TS:2003:4957) (Spain). To hold all

participants jointly and severally liable for the totality

of the damages, the Court requires that it be

“impossible to individualize the relevance of each

concurrent action in the harmful result or to estimate

the specific liability of each participant.” S.T.S.,

01/12/1987

(ECLI:ES:TS:1987:8841)

(Spain).

Otherwise, liability is apportioned based on the causal

relevance of each actor’s conduct. S.T.S., 25/11/1998

(ECLI:ES:TS:1988:8307) (Spain).

The Portuguese Civil Code, one of the most

modern in Europe, addresses extra-contractual

liability for harmful acts in Article 483, stating:

17 S.T.S., 13/02/2001 (ECLI:ES:TS:2001:954) (Spain); S.T.S.,

27/06/2001 (ECLI:ES:TS:2001:5533) (Spain); S.T.S., 13/06/2006

(ECLI:ES:TS:2006:3463)

(Spain);

S.T.S.,

01/02/2007

(ECLI:ES:TS:2007:444) (Spain).

18 S.T.S., 10/03/1994 (ECLI:ES:TS:1994:14835) (Spain).

19 S.T.S., 12/11/1998 (ECLI:ES:TS:1998:6675) (Spain).

17

18

“[w]hoever, with intent or mere fault, unlawfully

violates the rights of another or any legal provision

intended to protect the interests of others, shall be

obliged to indemnify the injured party for the damages

resulting from such violation.” CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL

CODE] art. 483 (Port.). This article establishes a

system of subjective liability based on fault.

In cases involving multiple participants, Article

490 of the Portuguese Code provides that “if there are

several principals, instigators, or accomplices of the

illicit act, all of them shall be liable for the damages

they have caused.” Id. at art. 490. The Supreme Court

of Justice (Supremo Tribunal de Justiça) interprets

this provision as imposing joint and several liability

upon both direct perpetrators and others who

“facilitate in any way the commission of the damage

or provide any type of material or psychological aid.”

Supremo Tribunal de Justiça [Supreme Court of

Justice] of 07/05/2012 in Proceedings no.

146/09.0PBEPS.G1.S1

(2012),

available

at

https://www.dgsi.pt (Port.). Like the Spanish regime,

the Portuguese framework clearly encompasses those

who “aid and abet” within its scope of civil liability for

damages.

Similarly, in France, Articles 1240 and 1241 of the

Code Civil establish a subjective liability system

based on fault. These rules provide, respectively, that

“[a]ny act of a person which causes damage to another

obliges the person, through whose fault it occurred, to

make a reparation” and that “[e]veryone is responsible

18

19

for the damage they have caused, not only by their

actions, but also by negligence or imprudence.” CODE

CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1240, 1241 (Fr.). As in other

Continental legal systems, French extra-contractual

liability requires three elements: (i) a damage

(dommage); (ii) the conduct causing the harm (fait

générateur or faute); (iii) and a causal link (lien de

causalité) between the two. Cour de cassation [Cass.]

[supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,

05/11/1996, Bull. civ. I, No. 378 (Fr.).

The second of these elements—the conduct

causing the harm—has been interpreted by French

courts to mean that a mere breach of a standard of

conduct or duty of care is sufficient for liability. This

duty may arise from the context in which the actor is

situated, regardless of whether it is expressly codified

in statutes or regulations. Cass. civ., 27/02/1951, Bull.

civ., No. 77. In other words, French civil liability does

not require an intentional element; rather, it

objectifies fault in connection with the duties of care

that all persons must observe in their dealings with

others.

In cases involving multiple participants, French

court rulings establish that all actors involved,

regardless of the magnitude or relevance of their

conduct, are jointly and severally liable for the totality

of the harm. Cass. 2e civ., 04/02/1981, Bull. civ. II, No.

21. The sole requirement is that all behaviors

converge in the production of the same harm. Cour

d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Versailles, 3e

19

20

ch. 30/06/2016, No. 14/04397 (Fr.). Again, it is clear

that French law embraces a notion of civil liability

that covers those considered “aiders and abettors.”

The core of civil liability in German law is found

in Sections 823 and 826 of the Bürgerliches

Gesetzbuch (BGB). German law is distinctive in that

it recognizes two primary paths for extra-contractual

liability.

The first, Section 823 of the BGB, is tied to the

infringement of a specific right, specifying that “[a]

person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully

injures the life, body, health, freedom, property or

another right of another person is liable for the damage

arising therefrom.” BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH

[BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 823 (Ger.). To impute liability,

this section requires the breach of a duty of care.

Hartwig Sprau, Introduction to §§ 823 et seq., in

Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] ¶ 11 (Christian

Grüneberg et al. eds., 80th ed. 2021).

The second, Section 826 of the BGB, stipulates

that “[a] person who, in a manner contrary to public

policy, intentionally inflicts damage on another person

is liable to the other person for the damage.” BGB, at §

826. German judicial rulings have defined such

wrongful acts or omissions as those that offend the

“sense of decency of all those who think with

impartiality and justice.” Bundesgerichtshof [BGH]

[Federal Court of Justice], Feb. 6, 2014, Neue

Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1098 (Ger.);

GERHARD WAGNER, MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM

20

21

BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH [MUNICH COMENTARY ON

THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE] (Franz J. Säcker et al. eds.,

8th ed. 2020).

Regarding harm caused by multiple participants,

Section 830 of the BGB enumerates the methods for

attributing liability to participants and other

contributors. It states that “[i]f several persons have

caused damage by a jointly committed tort, each is

liable for the damage” even “[i]f it cannot be

determined which of the participants caused the

damage by their individual act.” BGB, at § 830.

Paragraph (2) expressly affirms: “instigators and

accomplices are treated in the same way as joint

actors.” Id. This legislative formula is broad enough to

encompass a wide spectrum of responsible parties,

including those categorized as “aiders and abettors.”

According to the rulings of the German Federal

Court (Bundesgerichtshof or ‘BGH’), the accessory

conducts described in Section 830 apply to any

contribution that favors the commission of the

principal wrongful act and is relevant to its

causation,20 including mere psychological support to

the material wrongdoer,21 provided that it facilitated

the harmful act.22 No express agreement or promise of

20 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Apr.

20, 2010, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 786 (Ger.).

21 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], July

17, 2012, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 1552 (Ger.).

22 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], July

19, 2012, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 3439, 3441

(Ger.).

21

22

assistance between the intervenors is required.

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Mar. 9, 2010, Neue

Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1877 (Ger.).

The BGH has affirmed that, within the German

civil law of torts, participation in a civil wrong is

governed by principles derived from criminal law.

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Mar. 20, 1995, Neue

Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1739 (Ger.);

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], July 13, 2004, WertpapierMitteilungen [WM] 1768 (Ger.). Participants must

have a general knowledge of the circumstances of the

conduct to which they contribute. Bundesgerichtshof

[BGH], Mar. 9, 2010, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift

[NJW] 1877 (Ger.). This general knowledge is

satisfied when the participants are willfully blind to

the consequences of their acts,23 when they recklessly

violate professional duties,24 or when the conduct is so

imprudent that they are presumed to have accepted

the risk of contributing to the harm25 or to have left

the outcome to chance.26 This applies even if the

23 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Nov. 4, 1997, Neue Juristische

Wochenschrift [NJW] 535 (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Feb.

28, 1989, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 564 (Ger.).

24 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], May 6, 2008, Neue Juristische

Wochenschrift [NJW] 2266 (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH],

Mar. 5, 1975, Wertpapier-Mitteilungen [WM] 559 (Ger.);

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Sept. 24, 1991, WertpapierMitteilungen [WM] 2034 (Ger.).

25 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Apr. 14, 1986, Neue Juristische

Wochenschrift [NJW] 1883, 1986 (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof

[BGH], May 6, 2008, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW]

2266 (Ger.).

26 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Dec. 13, 2001, Neue Juristische

22

23

collaborators acted with different purposes or

internally

disapproved

the

resulting

harm.

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Jan. 31, 1978, Neue

Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 832 (Ger.).

In Italian civil law, Article 2043 of the Codice

Civile states that “[a]ny intentional or negligent act

that causes an unjust injury to others obliges the one

who committed it to provide compensation for the

damage caused.” CODICE CIVILE [CIVIL CODE] art.

2043 (It.). Like the previous systems, this codifies a

subjective liability regime.

The plurality of participants in civil wrongs is

regulated in Article 2055 of the Codice Civile, which

states that “[i]f the harmful event is attributable to

more than one person, all are jointly and severally

liable for the compensation of the damage.” Id. at art.

2055. Italian judicial practice refers to these

situations as “concorso di cause” (concurrence of

causes) and understands that the only requirement is

that the harmful event be attributable to several

parties, even when the “[h]armful conducts are

independent of each other and even if the grounds for

liability are different.” Cass. Civ., Sez. Un. [Court of

Cassation] 04/27/2022, n. 13143, Rv. 664654-01 (It.).

The Supreme Court of Cassation (Corte Suprema

di Cassazione) has emphasized this point, explaining

that “[w]here acts attributable to several persons

concur—whether simultaneous or successive—all

Wochenschrift [NJW] 1042 (Ger.).

23

24

must be recognized as having causal efficacy, provided

they created a situation such that, but for one or the

other, the event would not have occurred.” Cass. Civ.,

Sez. III civ. [Court of Cassation], 04/03/2024, n. 8778

(It.). Italian legal practice confirms that civil liability

extends to those who intervene as “aiders and

abettors.”

This widespread trend providing for “aiding and

abetting” liability is further illustrated in Latin

American systems. These systems similarly follow the

Continental European tradition.

In the Argentine civil system, extra-contractual

liability is regulated under Title V of the Civil and

Commercial Code of the Nation (Código Civil y

Comercial de la Nación). CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL

DE LA NACIÓN [CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE

CODE] arts. 1708, 1881 (Arg.). It establishes the duty

to repair any unjustified damage that has an adequate

causal link with the generating event. Id. at arts.

1716, 1717, 1726. Liability can be founded on

objective or subjective factors, the latter defining

subjective fault as the omission of due diligence

required by the nature of the obligation and the

circumstances of the persons, time, and place. Id. at

art. 1724.).

Regarding the plurality of individuals in the

perpetration of a harm, the Argentine Code adopts

broad criteria within the regime of direct liability.

Article 1749 of the Civil and Commercial Code

stipulates that when several persons participate in

24

25

the production of a harm with a single cause, the rules

of joint and several obligations apply. Id. at art. 1749.

This includes not only the material perpetrators or

wrongdoers but also those who intervene as coparticipants or accomplices, whom the Code classifies

as directly liable. 4 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA

NACIÓN COMENTADO 469 (Marisa Herrera et al. dirs.,

1st ed. 2015). Consequently, all of them—including

those who would be held as “aiders and abettors”—are

liable to the victim for the totality of the damage.

ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, TRATADO DE LAS

OBLIGACIONES [TREATY OF OBLIGATIONS] 138 (2d ed.

2007) (1761); Julián E. Jalil, Daños causados por los

grupos en el nuevo Código Civil [Damages caused by

groups in the new Civil Code], ELDIAL.COM (Nov. 19,

2014),

https://www2020.scba.gov.ar/leyorganica/CCyc30/pdfley/Jalil_Da

nios_causadosporlosgruposenelnuevoccyc.pdf.

This approach has been consistent in Argentinean

legal practice, where it is recognized that liability for

negligent acts extends jointly and severally to all

participants

in

the

harm—including

direct

perpetrators, advisors, and accomplices—equating it

in this regard to liability derived from criminal acts.

Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de San

Nicolás [Cám. Apel. Civ. y Com. San Nicolás] [Civil

and Commercial Court of Appeals of San Nicolás],

9/11/1993, "Gajate, Carlos Alberto y otra c. González,

Gustavo Daniel y otros/ Daños y perjuicios," DJBA

(147-5699), Id. SAIJ: FA93013088 (Arg.).

25

26

In Chilean law, extra-contractual liability is

regulated in Title XXXV of Book IV of the Civil Code,

which establishes that whoever commits an illicit act

that causes harm to another is obliged to indemnify

them, regardless of potential criminal consequences.

CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 2314 (Chile).

When several persons intervene in the

commission of a harm, the Code establishes that all

are jointly and severally liable for the total damage.

Id. at art. 2317. This includes those acting jointly as

well as those contributing to the harm through their

own conduct. Thus, the degree of participation of each

intervener does not affect the victim’s right to claim

the full amount from any of them. ARTURO

ALESSANDRI RODRÍGUEZ, DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL

EXTRACONTRACTUAL EN EL DERECHO CIVIL CHILENO [ON

NON-CONTRACTUAL CIVIL LIABILITY IN CHILEAN CIVIL

LAW] 41 (2005); Pamela Mendoza-Alonzo, Pluralidad

de causantes de un mismo daño: Régimen jurídico

aplicable en Chile [Multiple causes of the same

damage: The applicable legal regime in Chile], 41 REV.

DERECHO PRIVADO 213 (2021); Sebastián Antonio

Barrios Guerra, Del reparto de responsabilidades en

casos de pluralidad de actores en la responsabilidad

civil extracontractual [On the allocation of liability in

cases involving multiple parties in non-contractual

civil liability], 40 REV. ESTUDIOS JUSTICIA 107, 107 et

seq (2024). The Chilean Supreme Court has specified

that this solidarity requires the existence of a single

common illicit act. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.]

26

27

[Supreme Court], Primera Sala, 25/09/2023, “Guzmán

y otros con Esval S.A. y otros,” Rol No. 21439-2022

(Chile).

In Brazilian law, extra-contractual liability is

regulated in the Civil Code, which defines an illicit act

as a negligent action or omission that causes harm,

CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 186 (Braz.), and

establishes the duty to repair it. Id. at art. 927. When

there is more than one responsible party, the Code

indicates that co-principals and accomplices in the

illicit act are jointly and severally liable for the

totality of the damage. Id. at art. 942. This rule

includes direct perpetrators and those who contribute

to the harmful result through their own faulty

conduct.

Brazilian judicial application has consistently

applied these criteria, affirming that joint and several

liability reaches all those who contribute causally to

the harm, even if their conducts are not identical.

Superior Tribunal de Justiça [STJ] [Superior Court of

Justice], Agravo Interno no Agravo em Recurso

Especial No. 997.278/PR, Relator: Ministro Francisco

Falcão, 24/05/2021 (Braz.).

In Colombian law, extra-contractual liability

stems from the general principle established in Article

2341 of the Civil Code, which states that anyone who

causes harm through a crime or fault is obliged to

repair the damages. CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art.

2341 (Colom.). Colombian legal practice applies the

“theory of adequate causation,” focusing on the

27

28

suitability of each individual’s conduct to determine a

result based on logic and probability. See Rodrigo

Fuentes Guiñes, Las teorías tradicionales sobre la

causalidad [Traditional Theories on Causality], 14

REV. DERECHO Y CIENCIAS PENALES 23, 27 (2010);

Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court],

Sala de Casación Civil, M.P. Ariel Salazar Ramírez,

14/12/2012, Expediente 11001-31-03-028-2002-0018801 (Colom.). Furthermore, the Colombian system is a

mixed liability system, starting from subjective fault

but creating cases of strict liability for “dangerous

activities” through judicial rulings. GILBERTO

MARTÍNEZ RAVE & CATALINA MARTÍNEZ TAMAYO,

RESPONSABILIDAD

CIVIL

EXTRACONTRACTUAL

[EXTRACONTRACTUAL CIVIL LIABILITY] (2003).

The Colombian Supreme Court of Justice has

applied these principles to impose corporate liability

for harm arising from avoidable risks. In the case

known as Machuca, an armed group bombed a

pipeline, triggering a fire that devastated the village

of Machuca and caused numerous fatalities. The

Colombian Supreme Court of Justice held the oil

company Ocensa civilly liable on the ground that it

had created a risk that could have been avoided

through the exercise of due diligence, particularly in

light of its knowledge of the potential impact on third

parties. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme

Court], Sala de Casación Civil, M.P. Margarita

Cabello Blanco, 19/12/2018, Sentencia SC5686-2018,

Expediente 2004-00042-01 (Colom.).

28

29

Regarding multiple participants, Article 2344 of

the Colombian Civil Code establishes a regime of joint

and several liability when two or more persons

contribute to the harm: “each shall be jointly and

severally liable for all damage proceeding from the

same fault.” CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 2344

(Colom.). This notion of joint causation allows the

injured party to sue any of the responsible parties for

the total obligation. Tribunal Superior de Bogotá

[Trib. Sup. Bogotá] [Superior Tribunal of Bogotá],

Sala Civil, M.P. Luis Roberto Suárez González,

12/07/2015, Expediente 11001-31-03-007-2010-0056702 (Colom.). From this, it is clear that the Colombian

civil liability regulations extend even further the

spectrum of liability, including to “aiders and

abettors.”

Finally, in the Mexican legal system, extracontractual liability is primarily subjective (based on

fault). According to Article 1910 of the Federal Civil

Code “anyone who, acting unlawfully or against good

customs, causes damage to another, is obliged to repair

it, unless he proves that the damage was produced as

a result of inexcusable fault or negligence of the

victim.” CÓDIGO CIVIL FEDERAL [FEDERAL CIVIL CODE]

art. 1910 (Mex.).

According to Article 1830 of the Mexican Federal

Civil Code, an act is illicit if it is contrary to public

order laws or good customs. Id. at art. 1830. This

includes infringing upon a generic duty of care

expected by one’s role or activity. EKATERINA

29

30

ARISTOVA & CATHERINE O’REGAN, CIVIL LIABILITY FOR

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: A HANDBOOK FOR

PRACTITIONERS 423 (2022).

Mexican law does not distinguish between

principal actors and accessory or auxiliary actors for

the purposes of determining civil liability; it is

sufficient to prove that the conduct of multiple persons

was causally related to the harm. In these cases,

Article 1917 of the Federal Civil Code specifies that

“persons who have caused a harm in common are

jointly and severally liable to the victim for the

reparation.” CÓDIGO CIVIL FEDERAL [FEDERAL CIVIL

CODE] art. 1917 (Mex.). This ensures that anyone who

participates or assists—including “aiders and

abettors”—is fully responsible to the injured party.

In summary, from a systematic and comparative

perspective, there is no conceptual vacuum or obstacle

preventing the affirmation that one who contributes

significantly to the production of a harm must be

capable of being held civilly responsible. The

uniformity of these systems of Continental law,

founded on the principles of full reparation and

adequate causation, consistently extend liability to

any individual whose conduct facilitated or made the

harmful result possible. This includes those

considered “aiders and abettors” in the Common law

tradition. Denying this would introduce an unjustified

zone of non-liability incompatible with the preventive

and compensatory functions of tort law and with the

common practice of civilized nations.

30

31

CONCLUSION

The answer to whether nations within the

Continental legal tradition impose civil liability on

those who would be characterized as aiders and

abettors is unequivocally yes. Continental legal

systems do not condition civil liability on criminal law

categories such as principals and accomplices. Rather,

they apply general principles of subjective imputation

and causation to hold liable any person whose conduct

contributed to the harm.

The development of Continental Law, from

Roman law to the most recent rulings of Supreme

Courts in Europe and Latin America, confirms that

any person who facilitates, instigates, or materially

assists the commission of a harmful act may be held

civilly liable for the resulting injury, typically under a

regime of joint and several liability. Although the

distinction between a principal and an aider and

abettor is central in criminal law, it fades in the

context of extra-contractual liability where the

analysis turns on the defendant’s contribution to the

harm and the breach of the applicable duty of care.

Therefore, the civil liability of those who assist,

encourage or enable a wrongful act is not exceptional

but rather reflects a well settled and shared general

principle within Continental legal systems.

Accordingly, recognizing aiding and abetting

liability under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §

31

32

1350, and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1350 note, in this case would not constitute a legal

anomaly in comparative perspective. To the contrary,

it would ensure that those who participate in the

infliction of harm may be held accountable in the

United States just as they are under Continental legal

systems.

For these reasons, this Court should affirm the

decision of the Ninth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

ALMUDENA BERNABEU

MICHAEL REED HURTADO

SAÚL CASTRO FERNÁNDEZ

MADELAINE G. ALTMAN

THE GUERNICA37 CENTRE

FOR INTERNATIONAL

JUSTICE

Two Embarcadero Center,

San Francisco, CA 94111

32

CHRISTINA G. HIOUREAS

Counsel of Record

FOLEY HOAG, LLP

1301 Avenue of the

Americas, New York, NY

10019

(212) 812-0400

chioureas@foleyhoag.com