Amicus Curiae Brief — Chevron USA Incorporated, et al., Petitioners v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, et al.

No. 24-813

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

CHEVRON U.S.A. INCORPORATED, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

PLAQUEMINES PARISH, LOUISIANA, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

BRIEF OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE

FUND AND FATHER LAWRENCE MOORE

AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

RESPONDENTS

E. Blair Schilling

Dana Kaersvang*

Ian L. Atkinson

Counsel of Record

Isabel A. Englehart

Hyland Hunt

FISHMAN HAYGOOD LLP Ruthanne M. Deutsch

201 St. Charles Ave.

DEUTSCH HUNT PLLC

46th Floor

300 New Jersey Ave. NW

New Orleans, LA 70170 Suite 300

Washington, DC 20001

Vickie L. Patton

(202) 888-0404

Rosalie Winn

dkaersvang@deutschhunt.com

ENVIRONMENTAL

DEFENSE FUND

*Licensed in Colorado

2060 Broadway

Suite 300

Boulder, CO 80302

Counsel for

Environmental Defense

Fund

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT .........................................................3

ARGUMENT ...............................................................6

I.

State courts fairly resolve cases addressing

costal uses. ............................................................6

A. Cases addressing coastal restoration in

Louisiana involve a complex interrelated

web of local issues, impacts, and tradeoffs. ..................................................................6

B. Louisiana provides a fair forum for

resolving disputes related to oil and gas

production. ......................................................9

II. Petitioners’ unbounded rule is unmoored

from § 1442’s text, context and purpose. ...........12

A. For § 1442 removal, “acting under” a

federal officer entails a close relationship

between the suit and acts directed by

federal officers. .............................................13

B. Petitioners’ boundless interpretation

disregards this Court’s caution that

“relating to” means a significant and

close connection. ...........................................14

(i)

ii

C. Statutory objectives and history confirm

that only significant and close

connections to government-directed

activities count. ............................................16

III. Petitioners’ boundless approach to federal

officer removal would open the floodgates,

needlessly risking gamesmanship and

extended procedural wrangling..........................21

A. Petitioners’ rule would allow removal in

many cases best decided by state courts. ....21

B. Petitioners’ approach would foster delay,

waste judicial resources, and create

illogical outcomes. ........................................23

C. No specter of state interference with

federal operations warrants opening the

doors to such procedural mischief. ..............29

CONCLUSION ..........................................................32

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore,

593 U.S. 230 (2021) .................................. 20, 26, 28

Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf't v.

Dillingham Constr., N.A.,

519 U.S. 316 (1997) .............................................. 16

Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez,

577 U.S. 153 (2016). ............................................. 17

Clark v. Wagner Oil Co., No. 10-18866, 38th

Judicial District Court, Parish of Cameron,

State of Louisiana, Final Judgment on Jury

Verdict (Jan. 3, 2014) ........................................... 10

County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp.,

32 F.4th 733 (9th Cir. 2022) ................................. 20

Dupont v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

No. 3:25-cv-00936,

Dkt. No. 1 (M.D. La. Oct. 25, 2025) ..................... 27

Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v.

Amerada Hess Corp.,

79 So. 3d 246 (La. 2011) ......................................... 8

Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,

532 U.S. 141 (2001). ....................................... 15, 16

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Indus. Corp.,

544 U.S. 280 (2005). ............................................. 28

iv

GEO Group v. Menocal,

No. 24-758 (S. Ct.) ................................................ 17

Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v.

Darue Eng’g & Mfg.,

545 U.S. 308 (2005) .............................................. 12

Hero Lands Co. v. Chevron, No. 64-320, 25th

Judicial District Court, Parish of

Plaquemines, State of Louisiana, Verdict

Form (May 14, 2021) ............................................ 10

Hertz Corp. v. Friend,

559 U.S. 77 (2010). ............................................... 26

Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc.,

45 So. 3d 991 (La. 2010). ........................................ 9

Houssiere v. ASCO USA,

108 So. 3d 797 (La. Ct. App. 2013) ........................ 6

Int’l Primate Prot. League v.

Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund,

500 U.S. 72 (1991) ................................................ 20

Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker,

527 U.S. 423 (1999). ............................................. 12

Jones v. Hendrix,

599 U.S. 465 (2023). ............................................. 24

Kloeckner v. Solis,

568 U.S. 41 (2012). ............................................... 25

Lance v. Dennis,

546 U.S. 459 (2006) .............................................. 28

v

Meaux v. Hilcorp Energy Co., No. 99-72994,

15th Judicial District Court, Parish of

Vermillion, State of Louisiana, Jury Verdict

Form (Aug. 29, 2008) ............................................ 10

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.

Manning,

578 U.S. 374 (2016) .............................................. 12

Mesa v. California,

489 U.S. 121 (1989). ................................. 14, 17, 19

Morales v. TWA,

504 U.S. 374 (1992). ....................................... 15, 16

N.Y. State Blue Cross Plans v.

Travelers Ins. Co.,

514 U.S. 645 (1995) ........................................ 15, 16

Par. of Plaquemines v. Riverwood Prod. Co.,

No. 18-5217, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4974

(E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2022). ....................................... 17

Plaquemines Parish v. Chevron USA, Inc.,

No. 22-30055, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 28733

(5th Cir. Oct. 17, 2022) ................................... 24, 30

Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n,

552 U.S. 364 (2008). ............................................. 16

Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger,

604 U.S. 22 (2025) ................................................ 25

Rutledge v. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n,

592 U.S. 80 (2020) ................................................ 15

vi

Simoneaux v. Amoco Prod. Co.,

860 So. 2d 560 (La. Ct. App. 2003) ...................... 10

State v. La. Land & Expl. Co.,

298 So. 3d 296 (La. Ct. App. 2020),

aff’d, 339 So. 3d 1163 (La. 2022) ........................ 6, 8

Tafflin v. Levitt,

493 U.S. 455 (1990). ............................................. 12

Terrebonne Par. Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc.,

893 So. 2d 789 (La. 2005) ....................................... 8

Watson v. Philip Morris Cos.,

551 U.S. 142 (2007). .......... 12, 13, 17, 18, 20, 22, 29

Willingham v. Morgan,

395 U.S. 402 (1969). ....................................... 16, 17

Statutes

16 U.S.C. § 1454 ......................................................... 7

16 U.S.C. § 1455 ............................................... 3, 7, 31

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). ................................... 4, 13, 14

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). .................................................. 26

28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) .............................................. 17

Pub. L. No. 112-51, § 2(b)(1)(A),

125 Stat. 545 (2011).............................................. 19

2006 La. Acts 312 ................................................. 8, 11

2025 La. Acts 458. .................................................... 11

vii

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 30:29. ................................. 8, 11

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:214.21 ................................. 3

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:214.25(A)(1)(f) .................... 9

Regulations

43 La. Admin. Code § I-719(M). ............................... 31

Other Authorities

American Chemical Society, U.S. Synthetic

Rubber Program, https://tinyurl.com/yjzazktu

(last visited Nov. 17, 2025). ............................. 22-23

Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) .................. 14

H.R. Rep. No. 112-17 (2011). ................................... 19

Archisha Mehan, Federal Contract Awards Hit

$773.68B in FY24, Small Businesses See $4B

Increase, GovSpend (Feb. 24, 2025),

https://tinyurl.com/2urj7uxk. ......................... 21, 23

Jason P. Theriot, American Energy, Imperiled

Coast: Oil and Gas Development in

Louisiana’s Wetlands (2014) .............................. 6, 7

Jason P. Theriot, Oilfield Battleground:

Louisiana’s Legacy Lawsuits in Historical

Perspective, 57 La. Hist.: J. La. Hist. Assn.

403 (2016) ............................................................ 6, 7

J. Michael Veron, In Pursuit of Bigfoot:

Confronting Oil and Gas Mythology in

Louisiana, 75 La. L. Rev. 1251 (2015). ................ 11

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amici Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and

Father Lawrence Moore have decades of practical and

scholarly expertise with the procedural doctrines

governing the proper interplay between state and

federal courts in adjudicating disputes faced by local

landowners, businesses, and communities in

Louisiana. Local courts play an essential role in

developing solutions to remediate the Louisiana coast

and foster thriving coastal communities.

EDF is a 501(c)(3) non-profit, nonpartisan

organization dedicated to protecting human health

and the environment for people, communities, and the

natural systems on which they depend by addressing

the most serious environmental problems, anchored

in science, economics and law. For decades, EDF has

worked to protect communities, human health,

infrastructure, and the environment in Louisiana,

with staff and over a thousand members in the state.

Since the 1970s, EDF has worked with Louisiana

residents, businesses, and landowners who depend on

the health of coastal Louisiana. In 1988, EDF helped

create Louisiana’s first statewide nonprofit

organization dedicated to coastal restoration. EDF

expanded its engagement in Louisiana following the

2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill when it helped to

form a coalition to restore coastal Louisiana’s globally

1 No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in

part, and no person or entity other than amici curiae, their

members, or their counsel made a monetary contribution

intended to fund the brief’s preparation or submission.

(1)

2

significant wetlands by ensuring federal criminal and

civil penalties from the resulting settlement helped to

benefit restoration projects, and to protect the people,

communities, jobs and wildlife most impacted by the

spill. The coalition works on science-based decisionmaking and project prioritization for regional,

ecosystem-based wetland restoration and riskreduction measures. EDF also works on projects to

identify resources for coastal restoration, as well as

the development of innovative insurance models that

can serve Louisiana communities both before and

after disasters.

Father Lawrence Moore is an ordained Jesuit

Priest and Professor of Law at Loyola University New

Orleans College of Law, and the law school’s former

Interim Dean.2 As the only Jesuit law school in the

South, Loyola is dedicated to serving the communities

of southeast Louisiana. Loyola has a deep

commitment to local land use and environmental

matters, including through its Center on

Environment, Land, and Law Leadership and its

Environmental Policy Lab. Father Moore has taught

federal courts and procedure for forty-two years, and

he has a scholarly interest in promoting the sound

development of the law governing federal officer

removal.

As part of their work with coastal Louisiana

communities, amici have experience studying and

navigating litigation in state and federal courts in

Louisiana. Amici write to explain how state courts

2 Father Moore speaks here in his professional capacity as a

law professor, not for the Society of Jesus.

3

have served as able arbiters in implementing

Louisiana laws designed to restore the Louisiana

coast and resolving disputes to redress current harms

to local landowners and communities. In amici’s view,

informed by years of scholarship and experience,

expanding federal officer removal as proposed by

Petitioners would extend removal far beyond its

statutory textual moorings, inject federal courts into

disputes that Congress never intended to wrest from

fully competent state courts, and create a procedural

quagmire. All for no upside, because these cases

present no risk of state courts impeding federal

officers’ work based on local prejudice—the danger

federal officer removal is designed to address.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT

These cases are about the proper management of

competing uses of the Louisiana coast and decades of

failures to remediate the impacts of the post-war

Louisiana oil boom. They do not concern obstructing

federal war efforts or punishing oil producers for

refining avgas under contract with the federal

government during World War II. They are far

outside both the heartland objectives and plain terms

of the federal officer removal statute.

Spurred by Congress’s support for states

managing their own coastal areas, 16 U.S.C. § 1455,

Louisiana enacted the State and Local Coastal

Resources Management Act of 1978 (“SLCRMA”), La.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:214.21 et seq., to manage the

coast. In the decades since, Louisiana courts have

ably resolved disputes relating to resource

exploration and extraction under the SLCRMA and

4

similar state laws. Such cases address a complex

array of state law issues, implicate a host of

conflicting local interests, and frequently turn on the

particular facts of each case. Sometimes oil and gas

defendants have prevailed; sometimes landowners or

other business interests have carried the day. But

none of these cases—SLCRMA cases included—

suggest that Louisiana courts harbor the sort of local

prejudice against federal programs that provides the

raison d’etre for federal officer removal.

This case, too, has no basis for federal officer

removal. Any connection between these lawsuits

(about oil production and failure to remediate over

decades) and federal directives (World War II refining

contracts) is far too remote. The statute limits

removal to lawsuits against federal officers and

persons “acting under that officer … for or relating to

any act under color of such office.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1442(a)(1). The Fifth Circuit correctly concluded, for

federal contractors seeking to avail themselves of the

protection afforded federal personnel, the statute

requires that the lawsuit have “sufficient connection

with directives” in a federal contract. Pet. App. 29.

Congress’s addition of “relating to” in the statute

did not transform every suit against a federal

contractor into a removable action, merely because

the contractor could articulate some connection,

however attenuated, between its voluntary conduct

and a federal contract directive. Precedent teaches

that “relating to” language cannot be read in isolation

or stretched to extend to every theoretical

relationship. Its scope must be understood in light of

the statutory objectives: to provide a federal forum to

adjudicate federal immunity defenses and protect

5

federal programs from interference generated by local

hostility against unpopular federal laws. Removing

suits arising from a contractor’s independent choices

outside the bounds of their contractual obligations

advances neither objective. Statutory history

reinforces the limited scope of the “relating to”

language: the 2011 amendments aimed to clarify that

pre-suit discovery matters involving members of

Congress and federal officers were removable, not to

throw open federal courthouse doors to every lawsuit

against a federal contractor presenting a colorable

federal defense.

Allowing removal here would spark a tidal wave

of removal by federal contractors based on activities

so remote in time and substance from any federal

directive that even the defendant would likely not

recognize the supposed link until well into discovery.

It would give rise to gamesmanship, delay, and

illogical outcomes without advancing any federal

interest. The slender connection between this lawsuit

and a federal wartime refining contract contrasts

with the fundamentally Louisiana-based nature of

the controversy—implicating Louisiana law and a

range of Louisiana interests. Removal under these

conditions is unwarranted and contrary to statute.

6

ARGUMENT

I.

State courts fairly resolve cases addressing

costal uses.

A. Cases addressing coastal restoration in

Louisiana

involve

a

complex

interrelated web of local issues, impacts,

and trade-offs.

1. For more than a century, Louisiana has served

as the resource hub of the nation’s energy sector, a

sector which has become a central pillar of the State’s

economy. Jason P. Theriot, American Energy,

Imperiled Coast: Oil and Gas Development in

Louisiana’s Wetlands 5–6 (2014) (hereinafter Theriot,

American Energy); see generally Jason P. Theriot,

Oilfield Battleground: Louisiana’s Legacy Lawsuits in

Historical Perspective, 57 La. Hist.: J. La. Hist. Assn.

403

(2016)

(hereinafter

Theriot,

Oilfield

Battleground).

Energy development began in coastal Louisiana

well before World War II. See, e.g., State v. La. Land

& Expl. Co., 298 So. 3d 296, 301 (La. Ct. App. 2020),

aff’d, 339 So. 3d 1163 (La. 2022) (alleging damages to

soil, and water caused by breach of 1935 mineral

lease); Houssiere v. ASCO USA, 108 So. 3d 797, 800,

803 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (pursuing remediation and

damages for breach of 1928 lease).

Pre-war and wartime oil and gas exploration and

production, however, was eclipsed by the post-war

expansion of activity in Louisiana’s wetlands that

accompanied the offshore boom from the 1950s to the

late 1970s. Theriot, American Energy, supra, at 4, 25

(describing post-war increase in oil and gas

7

production and “major expansion of the pipeline

corridor through the wetlands”); Br. of Gen. Honoré

Sec. I. In the decades following World War II, the

industry drilled thousands of wells and carved

thousands of miles of pipeline canals through the

State’s delicate wetlands. Theriot, American Energy,

supra, at 38, 211.

Intensive oil and gas exploration, well drilling,

and other production activities exacted a profound toll

on Louisiana’s coastal environment—introducing

contamination into its soils and waters, eroding

wetlands, and accelerating the loss of the land that

once served as the State’s first line of defense against

hurricanes and coastal storms, while also functioning

as a natural barrier protecting both the State and the

energy sector’s infrastructure. Br. of Gen. Honoré Sec.

I.A. These practices affecting coastal Louisiana began

before World War II and continued long after. See,

e.g., Theriot, Oilfield Battleground, supra, at 441;

Theriot, American Energy, supra, at 38.

2. Recognizing the local nature of these issues,

Congress encouraged states to address them. See 16

U.S.C. §§ 1454, 1455. Louisiana responded with

tailored and specific legislative and regulatory

measures to address these local issues, including the

SLCRMA, which created a regulatory program

governing activities in coastal Louisiana and was

invoked here by Respondents to redress post-1980

failures to remediate damage to Louisiana’s coast.

Louisiana Br. 6-7.

In the decades that followed, there has been

extensive litigation under SLCRMA and similar

Louisiana environmental statutes addressing the

impacts on Louisiana’s coast from the failure of

8

operators to remediate the foreseeable—or, in most

instances, actually foreseen—impacts of their

production and exploration practices. Such actions

are predominantly brought by Louisiana landowners,

local governmental bodies, and local businesses,

under Louisiana laws, seeking remediation and

damages in Louisiana. This case presents but one

variant of the medley of state-law-based

environmental

remediation

actions

brought

throughout the state.

Landowner-lessors seeking remediation of soil

and water contamination caused by excessive and

unreasonable conduct in violation of mineral leases—

many of which have been resolved in favor of oil and

gas producers—give rise to another common variant

of cases. See, e.g., Terrebonne Par. Sch. Bd. v. Castex

Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789 (La. 2005) (finding that

in the absence of an express lease provision, the

Louisiana Mineral Code did not impose an implied

duty on the lessee to restore the eroded surface estate

to its original condition); Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v.

Amerada Hess Corp., 79 So. 3d 246 (La. 2011)

(applying

Louisiana’s

“subsequent

purchaser

doctrine” to limit landowner recovery for

environmental damage); La. Land & Expl. Co., 339

So. at 1163 (declaring oilfield remediation statute

consistent with Louisiana Constitution in claims for

environmental damage).

These mineral lease cases often turn on nuanced

issues of rights and obligations under Louisiana’s

Mineral Code and Louisiana’s codified procedure for

oilfield contamination cases, “Act 312.” 2006 La. Acts

312 (codified as amended at La. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 30:29). In addition, local land use disputes related

9

to the remediation of environmental damage

frequently involve claims that are particular to

Louisiana’s distinct civil-law legal system and

instruments,

as

well

as

regulations

and

administrative proceedings before local regulators

that are unique to Louisiana and often run parallel to

litigation. Defendants run the gamut from large outof-state oil corporations to smaller, local operators

that

inherited

problems,

and

neighboring

landowners. See, e.g., Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 45

So. 3d 991 (La. 2010).

Despite their varying claims for environmental

remediation in Louisiana, such cases all epitomize a

complex interplay between state law and local tradeoffs—just as Respondents’ cases do. Respondents are

not seeking to hold Petitioners liable for any refining

activity connected to World War II-era federal

contracts. Instead, Respondents’ claims are based on

post-War failures to remediate harms from oil and gas

production under a Louisiana permitting scheme

that, by its terms, applies only to “uses” within the

Louisiana coastal zone that are of “state” and “local

concern.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:214.25(A)(1)(f). As

explained below, Louisiana courts are well-equipped

to handle fairly the complex and nuanced issues of

Louisiana law presented by these cases and the array

of state and local issues at play.

B. Louisiana provides a fair forum for

resolving disputes related to oil and gas

production.

Suits for remediation of harm caused by oil and

gas production activity in Louisiana have, to date,

been primarily adjudicated in Louisiana state courts

that are well-equipped to address the local concerns

10

and statutes at issue. Any suggestion that Louisiana

courts and juries are biased, incapable, or otherwise

ill-suited to handle cases for remediation of oil and

gas industry impacts, is unfounded and directly

contradicted by the outcomes of past cases.

Louisiana courts have resolved remediation

cases fairly and expeditiously. Oil and gas defendants

have frequently prevailed in environmental jury

trials in Louisiana coastal parishes, including in cases

brought by Plaquemines Parish landowners against

Chevron. In the same court where Chevron suffered

its loss this year, a Plaquemines Parish jury returned

a verdict in favor of Chevron in a contamination case

brought by a landowner-lessor just four years earlier.

Hero Lands Co. v. Chevron, No. 64-320, 25th Judicial

District Court, Parish of Plaquemines, State of

Louisiana, Verdict Form (May 14, 2021). The jury

determined, inter alia, that Chevron had not operated

unreasonably or excessively under its leases. Id.; see

also Meaux v. Hilcorp Energy Co., No. 99-72994, 15th

Judicial District Court, Parish of Vermillion, State of

Louisiana, Jury Verdict Form (Aug. 29, 2008) (zero

verdict in Vermillion Parish for similar reasons);

Clark v. Wagner Oil Co., No. 10-18866, 38th Judicial

District Court, Parish of Cameron, State of Louisiana,

Final Judgment on Jury Verdict (Jan. 3, 2014) (same).

By the same token, Louisiana courts have

rendered modest judgments for remediation of

contaminated property. See, e.g., Simoneaux v. Amoco

Prod. Co., 860 So. 2d 560 (La. Ct. App. 2003),

(affirming jury’s award of $375,000 for cost of

restoring site contaminated by use of earthen pits for

containment of oilfield wastes instead of the

requested $12,907,440). The criticisms from

11

Petitioners’ amici of the district judge’s decisions in

Respondents’ cases, as well as Louisiana’s judicial

system more broadly, see Br. of Pelican Inst. for

Public Pol’y 11-12, sound in rhetoric, rather than

objective fact or assignment or error. See J. Michael

Veron, In Pursuit of Bigfoot: Confronting Oil and Gas

Mythology in Louisiana, 75 La. L. Rev. 1251, 1271-72

(2015).

Louisiana lawmakers, too, have focused on

facilitating a predictable process for addressing

oilfield contamination and ensuring that recoveries

for environmental damage serve remediation, while

also fostering growth in the energy sector that is so

important for Louisiana’s economy. Just this year, the

Legislature amended the oilfield contamination

statute, Act 312, to limit recoverable damages by

affected landowners, provide more flexibility to

defendants in funding remediation plans, and shield

responsible parties from claims for attorney and

expert fees. 2025 La. Acts 458 § 2 (codified at La. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 30:29).

Louisiana’s roots in the oil and gas industry run

deep, and many of its citizens, including Louisiana

judges, jurors, and legislators, owe their families’

livelihoods across generations to the industry. Br. of

Former Gov. Edwards 2-3. Against that backdrop, it

is reductive to claim that Louisiana courts are overly

hostile to oil and gas interests. More often, the

industry enjoys an ingrained presumption of

legitimacy and goodwill from a citizenry with a long

connection to companies like Chevron. The resulting

setting has historically provided oil and gas

defendants fair hearings, if not a proverbial thumb on

the scale in their favor. Problems do arise, however,

12

when cases become mired in procedural wrangling

based on ever shifting theories of removal, leaving

local property owners and coastal communities

waiting years for relief.

II. Petitioners’ unbounded rule is unmoored

from § 1442’s text, context and purpose.

As amici’s experience confirms, state courts are

“presumptively competent” to handle federal

defenses. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990).

Federal defenses like those raised here are not a basis

for taking cases away from state courts. See, e.g., id.

at 459; see also Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423,

430-31 (1999). Under our constitutional “system of

dual sovereignty,” Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 458, federal

courts must “give due regard” “to the power of the

States to provide for the determination of

controversies in their courts,” Merrill Lynch, Pierce,

Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Manning, 578 U.S. 374, 389

(2016) (citation modified).

Section 1442 operates as a limited exception to

the presumptive competence of state courts and must

be read consistent with its “language, context,

history, and purposes” of protecting the activities of

the federal government from interference by state

courts. Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142,

147-48 (2007). But Petitioners’ reading of § 1442

would instead invite the Court to transform § 1442

into a “welcome mat” for “a horde of … state claims

with embedded federal issues.” Grable & Sons Metal

Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 318

(2005) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1441 removal). The

Court should decline this invitation.

13

A. For § 1442 removal, “acting under” a

federal

officer

entails

a

close

relationship between the suit and acts

directed by federal officers.

Under § 1442, removal is limited to suits against

federal officers and persons “acting under that officer

… for or relating to any act under color of such office.”

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). These requirements each call

for a close connection between the removed suit and

government direction.

As is undisputed, Pet. Br. 5, the “acting under”

element requires government direction or control.

Someone is “[a]cting under” a federal officer only

when under his “‘subjection, guidance, or control.’”

Watson, 551 U.S. at 152. If the removal right extends

to private individuals at all, see infra 19-20 & n.4, “the

private person’s ‘acting under’ must involve an effort

to assist, or to help carry out, the duties or tasks of the

federal superior.” Watson, 551 U.S. at 151-52;

Louisiana Br. 21-23. Federal officer removal is

unavailable to a private person acting only to advance

his own interests or even out of a general desire to

assist the federal government. See Watson, 551 U.S.

at 151-52.

Government direction and control is also central

to the “relating to” element. The tight link is

expressed in the textual command that suits qualify

for removal only if they are “for or relating to” acts

“under color of such office.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).

“Such office” refers to the specific federal office a

person was “acting under.” The “office” is that of the

federal officer. A private person does not have an

“office.”

14

“[A]cts taken under color of office,” are those that

“are vested with, or appear to be vested with, the

authority entrusted to that office.” Black’s Law

Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“color of office”). For an act

to be “under color of such office,” therefore, it must

involve a use of official authority to carry out the

duties of the federal officer directing the action. See

Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 135 (1989).

In contractor cases, the contract provides the

critical link to that official authority. A suit is

removable only if the suit “relat[es] to” the acts taken

under color of the office that a person is “acting

under,” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), meaning (for a

contractor) that a suit must relate to acts specifically

directed by the contract. As the Fifth Circuit correctly

held, such relation to the federal officer’s authority

requires “sufficient connection with directives” in the

federal contract. Pet. App. 29. A federal contractor

voluntarily undertaking actions outside the scope of

the federal contract comes nowhere close to satisfying

§ 1442’s requirements for federal officer removal.

B. Petitioners’ boundless interpretation

disregards this Court’s caution that

“relating to” means a significant and

close connection.

Petitioners urge this Court to read “relating to”

as encompassing an unending chain of increasingly

remote connections. In Petitioners’ view, Br. 28, the

statute sweeps in any suit relating to any conduct

that itself relates in a cosmic sense to an “act under

color of [federal] office,” no matter how tenuous the

tie. But relation to some conduct the contractor

decided was “merely useful or efficient … to fulfilling

[a] federal objective” at any point along the path from

15

“raw materials … to [the] manufacture of the finished

product,” Pet. Br. 23, 40, is not enough to invoke

federal jurisdiction under § 1442.

This Court has “recognized that the term ‘relate

to’ cannot be taken ‘to extend to the furthest stretch

of its indeterminacy,’ or else ‘for all practical

purposes’” its reach “‘would never run its

course.’” Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 146 (2001)

(quoting N.Y. State Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins.

Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)) (discussing ERISA

preemption provision). The Court relies not on its

“literal reading” but on its “ordinary” meaning.

Rutledge v. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n, 592 U.S. 80, 93

(2020) (Thomas, J., concurring). Otherwise, the

phrase would “pick up every ripple in the pond,

producing a result that no sensible person could have

intended.” Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 153 (Scalia, J.,

concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).

And the ordinary meaning implies a close

connection. “If someone, for instance, asserted that he

is ‘related to Joe,’ it would be reasonable to presume

a close familial relationship.” Rutledge, 592 U.S. at 94

(Thomas, J., concurring). “No one would assume that

the speaker was referencing a mutual tie to Adam and

Eve.” Id.

Some connections are thus “‘too tenuous, remote,

or peripheral’” to count. Morales v. TWA, 504 U.S.

374, 390 (1992). Grappling with the phrase in the

ERISA preemption context, the Court has concluded

that “relating to” does not sweep in any law that

“affects” ERISA plans. It reaches only those state

laws causing “acute” effects and those that “govern[]

a central matter of plan administration.” Rutledge,

592 U.S. at 87 (citation omitted; emphasis added).

16

Similarly, in construing the preemption provision in

the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization

Act, the Court recognized that a state law does not

“relate to” rates unless it has a “‘significant impact’”

on them. Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S.

364, 375 (2008) (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 388)

(emphasis added by the Court).

Petitioners counter that “relating to” means “a

‘connection or association,’” Br. 26 (font normalized),

but this does not advance their argument. Like

“relating to,” “connected with” cannot be read with

“‘uncritical literalism.’” Cal. Div. of Labor Standards

Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 325

(1997) (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656). Neither

phrase encompasses “infinite connections,” only

significant and close ones. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at

656.

C. Statutory objectives and history confirm

that

only

significant

and

close

connections to government-directed

activities count.

1. Whether a connection is close enough depends

on the “objectives of the … statute.” Egelhoff, 532 U.S.

at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing

ERISA preemption); accord U.S. Br. 19. The

underlying objectives of federal officer removal

confirm that Congress intended only to reach lawsuits

with a close connection to federal directives. Federal

officer removal springs from the federal government’s

need to protect its “very basic interest in the

enforcement of federal law through federal officials”

from interference by state courts. Willingham v.

Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406 (1969). Removal serves

this interest in two primary ways, neither of which

17

would be advanced

interpretation.

by

Petitioners’

boundless

First, “one of the most important reasons for

removal is to have the validity of the defense of official

immunity tried in a federal court.” Watson, 551 U.S.

at 150 (quoting Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407).

Although any “colorable federal defense” satisfies the

jurisdictional requirements, see Mesa, 489 U.S. at

136-37, the “main point” of federal officer removal is

to provide a federal forum specifically for immunity

defenses, Watson, 551 U.S. at 151 (citation omitted).

This objective is relevant to contractors, if at all,

only for suits challenging conduct tightly connected to

a federal contract. While the federal government and

its employees have broad immunity from suit, see,

e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1), “private persons

performing Government work” do not “acquire the

Government’s embracive immunity.” CampbellEwald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 166 (2016). Even if

contractors can claim immunity rather than a defense

from liability, see GEO Group v. Menocal, No. 24-758

(S. Ct.), this protection extends, at most, to acts taken

“pursuant to” federal contracts. Campbell-Ewald, 577

U.S. at 166 (citation omitted). When the challenged

conduct is not directed by a contract—indeed, as here,

when it is not even encompassed within the subject

matter of a contract—there is no immunity defense,

and thus no reason to provide a federal forum for it.3

3 Petitioners

asserted that they were entitled to federal

immunity, but this argument is not even “colorable.” See Par. of

Plaquemines v. Riverwood Prod. Co., No. 18-5217, 2022 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 4974, at *18 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2022). The Fifth

Circuit did not consider immunity, with the dissent considering

18

The primary removal objective of adjudicating federal

officer immunity thus has no bearing here.

Second, federal officer removal aims to prevent

“local prejudice against unpopular federal laws or

federal officials” from infecting the proceedings and

thereby interfering with federal programs. See

Watson, 551 U.S. at 150-51. But such concerns are

wholly absent where, as here, a suit relates not to any

federally directed conduct, but instead to actions not

required by a federal contract. State court

proceedings do not interfere with federal operations

by reviewing actions that are unnecessary to those

federal operations. This is true even when a

contractor’s actions are governed by federal

regulations. Watson, 551 U.S. at 152. And it is

particularly true here, given that this suit involves

Petitioners’ failure to comply with state law decades

after their World War II contracts expired. Louisiana

Br. 8. State courts can fairly resolve this dispute as

they have other claims relating to resource extraction

in Louisiana. See supra Part I.

2. Petitioners contend that removal must be

available for lawsuits regarding any act a contractor

deems “useful or efficient” for fulfilling a contract,

because that was Congress’s intention when it added

“relating to” to the statute in 2011. This argument

fails textually, see supra Part II.A. And the context

and history of the 2011 amendments confirm that

Congress never intended to work any such sea change

in removal law.

only preemption defenses. See Pet. App. 38 (majority); Pet. App.

62-63 (dissent). But state courts are well-equipped to consider

federal preemption defenses.

19

a. The addition of “relating to” was part of a

package of amendments designed to clarify that

§ 1442 permitted removal of pre-suit discovery

matters after a member of Congress was unable to

remove such a proceeding. H.R. Rep. No. 112-17, at 2

(2011). Congress changed the definition of “civil

action” and “criminal prosecution” to include ancillary

proceedings. Id. at 6, 8. Congress also made

“conforming amendments” to other portions of the

statute, including the addition of “relating to,” to

clarify that the actions giving rise to removal went

beyond ongoing litigation. See Pub. L. No. 112-51, §

2(b)(1)(A), 125 Stat. 545, 545 (2011) (font normalized).

For pre-suit discovery proceedings, there may not be

a suit for the officer’s act, but discovery would relate

to the officer’s act. See Br. of Former Governor

Edwards Sec. II.A.2.a.

Before and after the 2011 amendments, § 1442

has thus consistently focused on “grant[ing] district

court jurisdiction over cases in which a federal officer

is a defendant.” See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 136 (emphasis

added). Nothing in the 2011 amendments shifted this

focus to federal contractors. See generally H.R. Rep.

No. 112-17 (2011) (discussing federal officers); Br. of

Former Governor Edwards Sec. II.A.2.b.

b. Petitioners nevertheless suggest (Br. 27-28)

that the amendments were intended to broaden the

scope of suits that contractors could remove beyond

those that have a causal nexus to the federal contract.

This

argument

reflects

a

fundamental

misunderstanding of the legal backdrop against

which Congress legislated.

Watson held that heavily regulated private

entities could not remove without determining

20

“whether and when particular circumstances may

enable private contractors to invoke the statute.” See

Watson, 551 U.S. at 154.4 That was the state of the

law when the 2011 amendments were enacted.

Some lower courts had permitted contractors to

remove “at least when the relationship between the

contractor and the Government is an unusually close

one,” id. at 142, and a handful of decisions specifically

addressed the causal-nexus requirement for

contractors, see Pet. Br. 26-27 (citing cases). But it is

“most unlikely” that this uneven level of lower-court

consensus was “so broad and unquestioned” that the

Court should presume Congress legislated against it.

See BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 593 U.S. 230,

244 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Ultimately, whatever the relevance of “relating

to” for contractors might be, nothing supports the

claim that Congress intended the amendment to

allow removal of suits about any and all acts that a

contractor deemed “useful or efficient” at any point in

the causal chain of fulfilling its contractual

obligations. Adopting Petitioners’ rule that “relating

to” should be read to include voluntary acts merely

useful or efficient to a federal contractor in achieving

any remote contractual objective would eliminate any

meaningful connection between the lawsuit and the

4 Contrary to Petitioners’ theory that only non-government

actors are covered by the “acting under” clause, Pet. Br. 37, the

clause might instead serve to clarify that the statute applies to

all government employees, not just officers who exercise

“significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.”

See Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund,

500 U.S. 72, 81 (1991); County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp.,

32 F.4th 733, 756 (9th Cir. 2022).

21

federally directed acts. Petitioners’ rule would allow

removal if, for example, a contractor paid by the

federal government to remove plants, chose—for

expediency and with no explicit directive—to use

Agent Orange. That would be a nonsensical use of a

procedural rule designed to protect federal officer

immunity.

III. Petitioners’ boundless approach to federal

officer removal would open the floodgates,

needlessly risking gamesmanship and

extended procedural wrangling.

A. Petitioners’ rule would allow removal in

many cases best decided by state courts.

Petitioners’ theory is not only unmoored from

the text and history of federal officer removal, it

would transform § 1442 from a provision directed at

protecting the federal government from interference

with its officers into one that allows removal of almost

any case with a federal contract lurking anywhere in

the background.

1. The implications would be tremendous. In

2024, the government awarded contracts to over

100,000 companies. See Archisha Mehan, Federal

Contract Awards Hit $773.68B in FY24, Small

Businesses See $4B Increase, GovSpend (Feb. 24,

2025), https://tinyurl.com/2urj7uxk. And that’s just

2024. As this case illustrates, defendants with

contracts in the distant past would also claim a

relationship to litigation today—even if the suit

involved a failure to remediate harms in the

intervening decades—exponentially multiplying the

numbers.

22

These numbers would further skyrocket if, as

Petitioners posit, federal regulations could support

contractor removal. Pet. Br. 23. But this Court has

already held that a private firm is not “acting under”

a federal officer when it complies with federal

regulations “even if the regulation is highly detailed

and even if the private firm’s activities are highly

supervised and monitored.” Watson, 551 U.S. at 153.

The answer should be no different when regulations

are considered under the “relating to” element.

Otherwise, any suit where a contractor could raise a

federal preemption defense could be removed on the

theory that the preemptive regulations supply the

government direction over the challenged conduct

that the contract lacks.

No less than in Watson, Petitioners’ theory

“would expand the scope of the statute considerably,

potentially bringing within its scope state-court

actions filed against private firms in many highly

regulated industries,” even though such suits are not

“likely to disable federal officials from taking

necessary action” or raise federal immunity defenses.

Watson, 551 U.S. at 153.

2. Petitioners invoke World War II as an

exceptional circumstance. But the World War II

context fails to cabin Petitioners’ theory of removal.

One of the ways that World War II was exceptional

was its widespread effect on American industry. For

example, seventy percent of rubber used in

manufacturing today is “a descendant of” synthetic

rubber created during World War II when natural

sources of rubber became unavailable or were

insufficient to meet wartime needs. See American

Chemical Society, U.S. Synthetic Rubber Program,

23

https://tinyurl.com/yjzazktu (last visited Nov. 17,

2025). Imagine a state court design defect suit about

rubber produced in 1980, where an expert report

years into the litigation mentions that one part of the

formula depends on a chemical discovery first made

during World War II. A car accident case involving a

blown-out tire that was manufactured with a World

War II era formula would involve lurking ties to

wartime federal interests. Would these suits become

removable? Would the right to remove depend on the

happenstance of whether the defendant happened to

have had a contract with the government during

World War II? What if the company had a federal

contract to supply tires but could have used any

formula for the rubber? What about a federal contract

to supply vehicles with any sort of tires? Under

Petitioners’ approach, any choice by the contractor,

anywhere along the product supply chain, opens the

door to federal court if the contractor deems it useful

for fulfilling the contract. That is a limitless “test.”5

B. Petitioners’ approach would foster

delay, waste judicial resources, and

create illogical outcomes.

1. Petitioners’ attempt to impose limitations on

their limitless test creates an oddly gerrymandered

path to federal court, distinguishing between

contractors based on criteria far removed from

Congress’s interests in allowing federal officer

removal. “The illogical results of applying such an

5 Further expanding the reach of their already limitless rule,

Petitioners never say it is limited to the World War II context.

Military contracting is extensive, with the Navy, Air Force and

Army regularly spending more on contracts than any other

federal agency. Mehan, supra.

24

interpretation … argue strongly against the

conclusion that Congress intended these results.”

Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 480 (2023) (citation

omitted; alteration in original).

Petitioners

repeatedly

invoke

vertical

integration as the master key unlocking the federal

courthouse door. See Pet. Br. 3, 9, 10, 16, 40. In their

view, large “vertically integrated” businesses with

government contracts anywhere in their expansive

corporate structure can remove any case to federal

court, so long as some aspect of their business has

ever been, in any sense, “useful or efficient in fulfilling

the federal contract.” Pet. Br. 34, 40.

As the Fifth Circuit explained, “illogical and

disparate” results abound under Petitioners’ test,

with removal outcomes diverging based on nothing

but corporate structure or happenstance. See Pet.

App. 35-37. Crude oil producers that were not

vertically integrated—i.e., lacked refineries, and

therefore refining contracts—cannot remove under

Petitioners’ test, despite identical federal regulation

of crude oil production. See id. at 37; Plaquemines

Parish v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 22-30055, 2022 U.S.

App. LEXIS 28733, at *9-10 (5th Cir. Oct. 17, 2022)

(Plaquemines II). And even some vertically integrated

companies, like Humble Oil, cannot remove because

“none of the crude oil it produced in the relevant

Operational Area was sent to its refinery.” Pet. App.

36.6

6 The United States’ fix for this acknowledged asymmetry is

to advocate for an even more expansive view of removal

jurisdiction where the Petroleum Administration in War’s

(PAW’s) “extensive supervision of the wartime oil industry” by

25

The usual rules about federal defenses crumble,

too, in the face of vertical integration. Federal

preemption or constitutional defenses are not a

gateway to federal court. Federal question

jurisdiction must be “based only on the allegations in

the plaintiff’s ‘well-pleaded complaint’—not on any

issue the defendant may raise.” Royal Canin U.S.A.,

Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 26 (2025) (citation

omitted).

But for a vertically integrated company, any

colorable federal defense related to any aspect of its

operations will suffice for removal even if unrelated to

the federal contract or any acts directed by it. See Pet.

App. 34-35 (describing Petitioners’ argument); Pet.

App. 62-63 (dissent reasoning that Petitioners’

ordinary preemption defense qualifies). The breadth

of Petitioners’ removal theory would erode the

certainty of the well-pleaded complaint rule—at least

for larger businesses with multiple product lines and

divisions, one of which happens to contract with the

federal government—opening federal courts to many

cases with no federal claims.

Worse still, Petitioners’ test is manipulable,

turning fully on private businesses’ choices about

corporate structure. Congress has long strived to

avoid such manipulability in rules governing access to

regulation is enough, regardless of any federal refining contract,

effectively arguing for a “unique wartime” carveout to Watson.

See U.S. Br. 30-34. Two wrong turns don’t make a right. The

Court has rejected the government’s proposed “exit route” to

“avoid ‘absurd results’” when the government’s “own

misreading” generated those absurd results. Kloeckner v. Solis,

568 U.S. 41, 55 (2012). The Court can again avoid the problem

by rejecting the “misreading” that creates it. See supra Section

II.A.

26

federal courts. For example, Congress amended the

statute governing corporate citizenship in diversity

cases to shut down corporations’ ability to

“manipulate federal-court jurisdiction” and “open[]

the federal courts’ doors” in States where they

conduct most of their operations. Hertz Corp. v.

Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 85-89 (2010). Such manipulation

was “at odds with diversity jurisdiction’s basic

rationale” of protecting “out-of-state parties” from

“local prejudice.” Id. at 85. The same rationale holds

here. Manipulation of corporate structure cannot

create an otherwise absent federal interest in

removal.

2. Manipulability is not the only problem; the

potential for procedural gamesmanship and wasteful

delay goes hand-in-hand.

The removal statute reflects Congress’s “obvious

concern with efficiency.” BP, 593 U.S. at 245. The

statute mandates early resolution of removal

questions, at the outset or “within 30 days” of receipt

of the “first” paper from which a defendant can

“ascertain[]” that the case has become removable. 28

U.S.C. § 1446(b).

But throwing open the courthouse doors to

situations far from the purpose of the statute,

especially under a manipulable test, will lead to

extended and costly threshold wrangling. Here,

removal questions have been litigated for over a

decade, with three rounds of removal attempts since

2013, and federal officer removal only being raised

five years after the complaints were filed, in response

to an expert report. Pet. App. 4-6.

The United States mostly blames Respondents

for the delay, objecting (Br. 26) to their “choice to fight

27

for a state forum.” But not only are plaintiffs master

of their complaint, they can hardly be faulted for

choosing a forum without regard to attenuated

federal contracts with no apparent ties to the actions

giving rise to the lawsuit. Facts relevant to any

attempted federal officer removal under Petitioners’

approach—the reason why corporate division A

judged some act “efficient or useful” for fulfilling a

federal contract entered into by division B—are likely

to be solely in the defendant’s possession. Petitioners’

rule is therefore especially vulnerable to latespringing removals and the associated potential for

gamesmanship.

And this case is far from unique. In Dupont v.

Exxon Mobil Corporation, for example, landowners in

and near a subdivision built on land where a pumping

station had previously operated filed a state court

lawsuit in 2014 seeking damages for personal injuries

and contamination of their property. No. 3:25-cv00936, Dkt. No. 1, at 2, 16 (M.D. La. Oct. 25, 2025)

(notice of removal). The defendant disclaims any

connection between the pumping station and its

Baton Rouge refinery. Id. at 13. Nonetheless, citing

this case and the Court’s grant of certiorari, id. at 4

n.9, the defendant only months before trial recently

removed the case based on federal wartime refining

contracts—due to a mere remark in an export report

that the pumping station was an “arm” of a

contracting refinery, id. at 2.

Late removals designed to avoid impending

trials based on strained factual connections to federal

contracting will no doubt become the norm if this

Court allows it here. Congress’s acceptance of some

efficiency loss for heartland cases raising real

28

concerns about state court interference with federal

operations, see BP, 593 U.S. at 245, should not be

pushed beyond its bounds to countenance extended

delays in cases far afield from federally directed

operations.

3. Delayed removal is just the start of the

procedural slowdowns engendered by Petitioners’

rule. If Petitioners prevail, cases addressing nearidentical issues and a complex interplay between

state and federal law will end up proceeding in state

and federal courts at the same time. The proof is in

the pudding here: Even the same vertically integrated

oil producer could have one case remanded and

another removed, depending on whether it refined

avgas from any of the crude oil that it produced in the

relevant area. See Pet. App. 36; supra 24 (describing

remand of Humble Oil case).

Parallel litigation in state and federal courts

inherently raises complicated issues that burn up

time and resources on procedural wrangling instead

of the merits. When “there is parallel state and

federal litigation,” “[c]omity or abstention doctrines

may, in various circumstances, permit or require the

federal court to stay or dismiss the federal action in

favor of the state-court litigation.” Exxon Mobil Corp.

v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005).

Once a case reaches judgment in state or federal

court, complicated preclusion issues can arise. See

Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (resolving a

question regarding the interplay between preclusion

and Rooker-Feldman abstention). Cases may get

bogged down in procedural skirmishes inherent to

complex,

multi-forum

litigation—rather

than

expeditiously resolving the merits. By contrast, state

29

courts have ably shepherded the cases remanded (or

never removed) to merits resolutions. See supra Part

I.

C. No specter of state interference with

federal operations warrants opening the

doors to such procedural mischief.

Petitioners cast this case as one where they face

state liability “for doing the federal government’s

bidding during wartime,” Pet. Br. 48, akin to state

harassment of federal officers enforcing a trade

embargo during the War of 1812, id. at 4. They invoke

traditional removal concerns of “‘local prejudice’

against unpopular federal laws” and risk of

“imped[ing] … enforcement of … federal law.”

Watson, 551 U.S. at 150. But Petitioners do not face

liability for doing the government’s bidding and these

suits create no risk of local prejudice impeding federal

operations.

1. The government’s contractual “bidding” was

limited to refining quantities. The contracts gave

Petitioners “complete latitude … to forego producing

any crude and instead buy it on the open market,” Pet.

App. 30 (alteration in original). Because the contracts

did not require Petitioners to produce crude oil, they

included no directive to produce oil or provision

regarding production practices. See Pet. App. 23

(describing Petitioners’ “recognition that their

refinery contracts are silent as to oil production”). The

refining contracts required Petitioners to refine

certain quantities of avgas, and in some cases to

expand their facilities to do so. Pet. App. 21-23. But

the government never required a production increase

and left them free to buy crude on the open market.

30

See Br. of Gen. Honoré Sec. II. The Fifth Circuit

correctly limited its “relating to” analysis to

“directives in Defendants’ federal refining contracts.”

Pet. App. 19.

To surmount the complete contractual silence

about crude oil production, Petitioners throw PAW

regulations into the “government bidding” mix. Pet.

Br. 43-45. But many PAW regulations were

“recommendations” to follow “voluntarily.” U.S. Br.

32. And wartime needs did not swallow up the whole

crude oil market, as Petitioners suggest; 70% of crude

oil production during World War II went to civilians.

C.A. Rcd. 31811. Even if the government tightly

regulated crude oil production, that does not create or

reinforce a qualifying relation between crude oil

production and the government’s contractual

direction over refining. Crude oil regulation applied to

producers independent of any refining contracts or

operations. See Plaquemines II, 2022 U.S. App.

LEXIS 28733, at *9-10. The happenstance of a

refining contract is an exceptionally slender reed on

which to pull into federal court all lawsuits about

anything to do with any “raw material” element (Pet.

Br. 40). The lack of a qualifying connection is

particularly stark here; Petitioners could have

avoided liability by complying with Louisiana law

when it took effect in 1980. See Louisiana Br. 8.

2. Nor is this case about state interference with

federally-directed

wartime

oil

production

operations—even assuming such operations had been

federally directed. Petitioners face liability for actions

after the State and Local Coastal Resources

Management Act of 1978 took effect in 1980—decades

after World War II—including their failure to clean

31

and restore production sites as closely as possible to

their original state. See, e.g., 43 La. Admin. Code § I719(M). Petitioners’ attempt to avail themselves of a

state law defense based on a “grandfather” clause is

the only reason that any aspect of their World War II

production activities are at issue. Louisiana’s

incorporation of this grandfather clause defies any

suggestion of any state effort to impede (retroactively)

the federal government’s war effort. If there were any

doubt, Louisiana courts’ fair and unbiased handling

of cases involving the oil and gas industry would

resolve it.

What’s more, this litigation can hardly be cast as

Louisiana versus the United States. Though

Petitioners gloss over it, Pet. Br. 12, SLCRMA was

enacted under the auspices of a federal program

providing grants to states that enact coastal

management plans meeting certain federal

requirements. 16 U.S.C. § 1455. Rather than shy

away from local involvement in this context, federal

law invites it under this scheme of cooperative

federalism.

*****

Louisiana courts have shown themselves well

able to even-handedly adjudicate cases enforcing

state law against entities that have harmed

Louisiana’s coast. No dangers of local prejudice or

federal interference justify broadening federal officer

removal to reach a case like this one, where any

attenuated connection between the oil production and

federal direction of refining activities is post hoc and

created solely at the private company’s option. Such

an expansion of federal officer removal pushes far

beyond the statute’s text, wreaks procedural havoc,

32

and trammels on important state interests with no

upside.

CONCLUSION

The judgment should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Dana Kaersvang*

E. Blair Schilling

Counsel of Record

Ian L. Atkinson

Hyland

Hunt

Isabel A. Englehart

Ruthanne

M. Deutsch

FISHMAN HAYGOOD LLP

DEUTSCH HUNT PLLC

201 St. Charles Ave.

300 New Jersey Ave. NW

46th Floor

Suite 300

New Orleans, LA 70170 Washington, DC 20001

(202) 888-0404

Vickie L. Patton

dkaersvang@deutschhunt.com

Rosalie Winn

ENVIRONMENTAL

DEFENSE FUND

*Licensed in Colorado

2060 Broadway

Suite 300

Boulder, CO 80302

Counsel for

Environmental Defense

Fund

November 20, 2025