Amicus Curiae Brief — Chevron USA Incorporated, et al., Petitioners v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, et al.
Supreme Court briefSep 11, 2025
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No. 24-813
In the Supreme Court of the United States
CHEVRON U.S.A. INCORPORATED, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
V.
PLAQUEMINES PARISH, ET AL.,
Respondents.
——————
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE STATES OF
WEST VIRGINIA, ALASKA, IOWA, GEORGIA,
MISSOURI, NEBRASKA, AND OKLAHOMA
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
JOHN B. MCCUSKEY
Attorney General
OFFICE OF THE
WEST VIRGINIA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
State Capitol Complex
Building 1, Room E-26
Charleston, WV 25305
mwilliams@wvago.gov
(304) 558-2021
MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of West Virginia
[additional counsel listed after signature page]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction and Interests of Amici Curiae .................... 1
Summary of Argument ........................................................ 5
Argument .............................................................................. 6
I.
The majority below wrongly narrowed the
“relating to” aspect of the federal-officer
removal statute ............................................................ 6
II.
The Court should protect the paramount
national interest in energy ....................................... 15
Conclusion ........................................................................... 23
II
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Agyin v. Razmzan,
986 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2021) ............................................ 7
Alabama v. California,
145 S. Ct. 757 (2025) ..................................................... 20
Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
552 U.S. 214 (2008) ......................................................... 9
Baker v. Atl. Richfield Co.,
962 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2020) ........................................... 9
Bereslavsky v. Esso Standard Oil Co.,
175 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1949) ........................................... 3
Betzner v. Boeing Co.,
910 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2018) ......................................... 7
Boyle v. United Techs. Corp.,
487 U.S. 500 (1988) ....................................................... 18
California by & through Harrison v.
Express Scripts, Inc.,
139 F.4th 763 (9th Cir. 2025) ......................................... 6
Celotex Corp. v. Edwards,
514 U.S. 300 (1995) ......................................................... 9
Chevron Corp. v. Donziger,
974 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)........................... 22
City & Cnty. of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP,
39 F.4th 1101 (9th Cir. 2022) ....................................... 20
Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v.
Nevils,
581 U.S. 87 (2017) ........................................................... 8
III
DeFiore v. SOC LLC,
85 F.4th 546 (9th Cir. 2023) ........................................... 7
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner,
532 U.S. 141 (2001) ......................................................... 8
Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel,
No. 24-783, 2025 WL 1787715
(U.S. June 30, 2025) ...................................................... 21
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States,
108 F. Supp. 3d 486 (S.D. Tex. 2015) .......................... 13
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States,
No. CV H-10-2386, 2020 WL 5573048
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2020) ............................................... 2
Former Emps. of Chevron Prods. Co. v.
U.S. Sec’y of Lab.,
26 C.I.T. 1272 (2002) ..................................................... 10
Gay v. Ruff,
292 U.S. 25 (1934) ......................................................... 15
Gov’t of Puerto Rico v. Express Scripts,
Inc.,
119 F.4th 174 (1st Cir. 2024) .......................................... 6
Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
453 U.S. 473 (1981) ....................................................... 16
Haig v. Agee,
453 U.S. 280 (1981) ....................................................... 18
Maryland v. 3M Co.,
130 F.4th 380 (4th Cir. 2025) ......................................... 7
McCurdy v. Mountain Valley Pipeline,
LLC,
No. CIV.A. 1:15-03833, 2015 WL
4497407 (S.D.W. Va. July 23, 2015) ............................ 21
IV
Meshal v. Higgenbotham,
804 F.3d 417 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ...................................... 18
In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods.
Liab. Litig.,
399 F. Supp. 2d 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)........................... 21
Moore v. Elec. Boat Corp.,
25 F.4th 30 (1st Cir. 2022).............................................. 9
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U.S. 374 (1992) ......................................................... 8
New Orleans City v. Aspect Energy, LLC,
126 F.4th 1047 (5th Cir. 2025) ....................................... 4
Nessel on behalf of People of Michigan v.
Enbridge Energy, LP,
104 F.4th 958 (6th Cir. 2024) ....................................... 21
Osborn v. Bank of U.S.,
22 U.S. 738 (1824) ......................................................... 16
Patel v. Garland,
596 U.S. 328 (2022) ......................................................... 9
Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n,
552 U.S. 364 (2008) ......................................................... 9
Shell Oil Co. v. United States,
751 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ...................................... 3
Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc.,
551 U.S. 142 (2007) ................................................... 6, 15
West Virginia ex rel. Hunt v.
CaremarkPCS Health, LLC,
140 F.4th 188 (4th Cir. 2025) ......................................... 6
Willingham v. Morgan,
395 U.S. 402 (1969) ......................................................... 6
V
Wyoming v. Livingston,
443 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2006) ..................................... 16
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1442 ............................................................ 6, 7, 9
42 U.S.C. § 15951 ................................................................ 17
N.Y. ENV’T CONSER. LAW § 76-0101 ................................ 21
N.Y. ENV’T CONSER. LAW § 76-0103 ................................ 21
VT. STAT. tit. 10, § 596 ........................................................ 21
VT. STAT. tit. 10, § 599c ...................................................... 21
Other Authorities
Akhil Reed Amar,
A Neo-Federalist View of Article III:
Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction,
65 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 205 (1985) .......................... 16
Anthony G. Amsterdam & James S.
Liebman,
Loper Bright and the Great Writ,
56 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 54 (2024) .................... 16
Casey Harper,
Jury Verdict Against Oil Industry
Worries Critics, Could Drive Up
Energy Costs,
HIGHLAND COUNTY PRESS
(Apr. 7, 2025),
https://tinyurl.com/vd7bpx52 ...................................... 19
VI
Commander Paul B. Blackburn,
Oil to Burn?,
74 U.S. NAVAL INST. PROCEEDINGS
1482 (Dec. 1948) ............................................................ 12
Cong. Globe,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1880
(Apr. 18, 1866) ............................................................... 23
Energy’s Vital Role in World War II
Offers Vital Lessons for Today,
AM. OIL & GAS REP. (Oct. 2023),
https://tinyurl.com/25n5azxw ........................................ 1
Establishing the National Energy
Dominance Council,
Exec. Order 14213, 90 Fed. Reg. 9945
(Feb. 14, 2025) ............................................................... 17
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81,
(A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ............................... 15
Gerald D. Nash,
Energy Crises in Historical
Perspective,
21 NAT. RES. J. 341 (1981) ........................................... 11
GREGORY J. LENGYEL,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ENERGY
STRATEGY: TEACHING AN OLD DOG
NEW TRICKS (2007),
https://tinyurl.com/32smt7f8 ....................................... 18
H.R. Rep. No. 112–17, pt. 1 (2011) ...................................... 8
Jeff Landry,
The Buddy System, HOUMATODAY
(Sept. 19, 2013)
https://tinyurl.com/msjujvxd ....................................... 19
VII
Jerry P. Sanson,
World War II Industrialization in
Louisiana, 64PARISHES (2023),
https://tinyurl.com/2wwz5fvf ....................................... 12
Jessica Kittleberger & Michael R. Barsa,
No Place for Morality: The Emerging
Threat to Interstate Commerce and the
Extraterritoriality Principle,
57 CREIGHTON L. REV. 491 (2024) .............................. 10
Joseph A. Schremmer,
Technical Operation of Refineries,
3 L. OF ENVTL. PROT. (2024 update) ........................... 10
Julie Cart,
Louisiana’s Love-Hate Relationship
With The Oil Industry,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2010),
https://tinyurl.com/3mm6s5y5..................................... 19
Llewelyn Hughes & Austin Long,
Is There an Oil Weapon? Security
Implications of Changes in the
Structure of the International Oil
Market,
39 INT’L SEC. 152 (2015) .............................................. 12
Lucas Martin,
78 AM. JUR. 2D WAR (May 2025 supp.) ....................... 19
Michael Toth,
A Bad Business on the Bayou,
WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2025),
https://tinyurl.com/48k6wwmy .................................... 19
VIII
NAT’L CAUCUS OF ENV’TL LEGISLATORS,
2025 SUPERFUND LEGISLATION
(CLIMATE) (2025),
https://tinyurl.com/3enh4k2u ...................................... 22
NATIONAL WORLD WAR II MUSEUM,
THE PELICAN STATE GOES TO WAR:
LOUISIANA IN WORLD WAR II (2017),
https://tinyurl.com/27pb6x2v ....................................... 14
NETA C. CRAWFORD,
PENTAGON FUEL USE, CLIMATE
CHANGE, AND THE COSTS OF WAR
(Nov. 13, 2019),
https://tinyurl.com/357dnw9e ...................................... 18
PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATION FOR WAR,
A HISTORY OF THE PETROLEUM
ADMINISTRATION FOR WAR: 1941-1945
(John W. Frey & H. Chandler Ide eds.
1946) ................................................................. 2, 3, 11, 12
Rachel Hudson,
One Size Does Not Fit All Leases—It’s
Time to Amend Bankruptcy Code
Section 365,
38 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 317 (2022) ......................... 17
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787
(Max Ferrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)................................. 15
Relate,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(12th ed. 2024) ................................................................. 8
ROBERT GORALSKI & RUSSELL W.
FREEBURG,
OIL & WAR (2021) ....................................................... 2, 3
IX
Robert M. Howard & Shawn T. Cobb,
Victory Through Production: Are
Legacy Costs of War Scuttling the
“GOCO Model”?,
46 PUB. CONT. L.J. 259 (2017) ....................................... 3
Robert N. Clinton,
A Mandatory View of Federal Court
Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the
Original Understanding of Article III,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984) ...................................... 16
ROBERT PIROG,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32248,
PETROLEUM REFINING: ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE AND CHALLENGES FOR
THE FUTURE (2008) ...................................................... 11
William Howard Taft,
Address to the National Conservation
Congress in St. Paul, Minnesota, THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(Sep. 5, 1910),
https://tinyurl.com/4aw9nw47 ..................................... 17
Unleashing American Energy,
Exec. Order 14154, 90 Fed. Reg. 8353
(Jan. 29, 2025) ............................................................... 17
U.S. Gulf Coast Fuel Oil Imports at
Record Low as Refiners Opt for
Heavier Crude, ENERGYNOW
(July 7, 2025),
https://tinyurl.com/yc4ph2nm ..................................... 17
U.S. PETROLEUM ADMIN. FOR WAR,
PETROLEUM IN WAR AND PEACE (1945) ...................... 2
X
W. Bernard Carlson,
Pipelines are Controversial Now, But
One of the First Big Ones Helped Win
World War II, UVATODAY
(July 22, 2021),
https://tinyurl.com/jzhfdn2p .......................................... 1
INTRODUCTION
AND INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
When America found itself thrust into a global conflict
during World War II, oil offered the means to fight.
Indeed, “[h]istorians of World War II have long
recognized that access to oil and energy supplies largely
determined the course of that conflict.” Energy’s Vital
Role in World War II Offers Vital Lessons for Today, AM.
OIL & GAS REP. (Oct. 2023), https://tinyurl.com/25n5azxw.
High-octane aviation gas—refined by Americans from
American crude—gave Allied planes the added
maneuverability and speed they needed to resist the
German offensive during the Battle of Britain. Americans
ultimately supplied six of the seven billion barrels of oil
used by the Allies during the war. See W. Bernard
Carlson, Pipelines are Controversial Now, But One of the
First Big Ones Helped Win World War II, UVATODAY
(July 22, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/jzhfdn2p. And this
2
“fountain” of oil for America contrasted with continuous
fuel scarcity in Germany, Italy, and Japan. See ROBERT
GORALSKI & RUSSELL W. FREEBURG, OIL & WAR 169,
332-33 (2021). Incredibly, “at no time did [American
armed forces] lack for oil in the proper quantities, in the
proper kinds and at the proper places.” U.S. PETROLEUM
ADMIN. FOR WAR, PETROLEUM IN WAR AND PEACE 204
(1945). So as Stalin himself recognized, “[t]he war was
decided by engines and octane.” GORALSKI & FREEBURG,
supra, at 67.
America’s oil-fueled victory was thanks in large part to
private industry. The federal government’s Petroleum
Administration for War, alongside related federal entities,
led the charge to supply the fuels for planes, tanks,
automobiles, and more. Yet “without the wholehearted
support of the [oil] industry, … th[is] petroleum war
program—upon which all other military and essential
civilian activities had to depend—could never have
succeeded as it did.” PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATION FOR
WAR, A HISTORY OF THE PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATION
FOR WAR: 1941-1945 55 (John W. Frey & H. Chandler Ide
eds. 1946).
Still, the companies’ work wasn’t an entirely volunteer
effort. The government exercised expansive control over
the oil industry during the war. “[C]ompanies that
‘weren’t making essential war materials’ were simply not
able to run their refineries.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United
States, No. CV H-10-2386, 2020 WL 5573048, at *12 (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 16, 2020) (quoting former chief counsel of the
Petroleum Administration for War). And “it was always
the role of Government to determine plans and policies, to
direct and supervise operations requisite to their
fulfillment, and to assume over-all governmental
3
responsibility for all aspects of the oil program.”
PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATION FOR WAR, supra, at 2.
This arranged marriage proved to be a success. When
it came to avgas, for instance, 75% of the nearly $1 billion
spent on the fuel came from industry, producing
“quantities which … would have been considered
miraculous a few years before.” GORALSKI & FREEBURG,
supra, at 183-84. But throughout the war, the government
remained firmly in the driver’s seat, as the avgas “was
manufactured for the government under government
direction, was sold to the government, and was used by the
government.” Bereslavsky v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 175
F.2d 148, 149 (4th Cir. 1949). Through contracts and
commands, “the Government exercised substantial
wartime regulatory control over almost every aspect of
the petroleum industry” at the time World War II avgas
was produced. Shell Oil Co. v. United States, 751 F.3d
1282, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
“Private industry demanded in return nothing more
than a fair and durable allocation of risk.” Robert M.
Howard & Shawn T. Cobb, Victory Through Production:
Are Legacy Costs of War Scuttling the “GOCO Model”?,
46 PUB. CONT. L.J. 259, 262 (2017). Wartime avgas efforts
required oil companies to “undertake extraordinary
modes of operation which were often uneconomical and
unanticipated at the time of refiners’ entry into their avgas
contracts.” Shell Oil, 751 F.3d at 1287 (cleaned up). So
the oil companies, having served their country in a time of
need, were not supposed to be left holding the bag for
those unanticipated burdens. Id. That promise was the
return for having subordinated their private interests to
the national interest in defense.
Now the promise is being broken. Oil companies did
much of their important work during World War II in
4
Texas and Louisiana. But the State of Louisiana and
several coastal parishes are trying to hold oil producers
liable for damages they blame on those wartime, avgasrelated activities, alongside many other decades of lawful
energy-production work in the Delta region. Louisiana
and its partners mean to sue the producers under a law
(the State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act
of 1978) that requires permits for certain post-1980
energy-related work. World War II, of course, came
decades earlier. So faulting the companies for failing to
secure a then-non-existent permit seems to be a
questionable endeavor at best. See, e.g., New Orleans
City v. Aspect Energy, LLC, 126 F.4th 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.
2025) (finding that an SLCRMA claim based on pipeline
canals that were acquired or constructed before 1980 was
“doomed”).
But merits of the case aside, Louisiana also insists that
these cases can’t even be heard outside its local courts.
It’s hard to conceive of a dispute with more federal
flavor—involving a subject of national interest (energy)
dictated by national authorities (civilian-military federal
personnel) with decidedly national consequences (victory
or loss in war). Even so, the majority below sided with
Louisiana by taking a cramped view of the federal-officer
removal statute and embracing an inappropriately
compartmentalized conception of the oil companies’
operations during the war. Although the States here are
no fans of overly expansive removal rights, the decision
below went too far.
The Court should reiterate that this war-driven dispute
belongs in federal court. The decision shows too little
fidelity to the removal statute’s text.
It also
misunderstands how avgas was produced, divorcing
upstream and downstream activities that are necessarily
5
interrelated. And if the Court embraces the Fifth
Circuit’s narrow approach to federal-officer removal, then
all manner of issues of serious import could be relegated
to state courts that prioritize local concerns over national
ones. Especially in the energy space, that choice would
prove disastrous.
The oil industry was there for America when America
needed it most, providing the “ammunition” for the war
machines that powered our troops to victory. Courts
shouldn’t now turn their backs on the industry merely
because that approach might facilitate a boost to local
governments’ troubled balance sheets. The Court should
reverse.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The majority below did not appropriately apply the
federal officer removal statute’s “relating to” provision.
That court inappropriately engrafted several additional
requirements onto the text, such as the need for an
express contractual provision speaking directly to the
challenged conduct and the mandate that the “related”
action be the only possible choice for fulfilling a federal
command. No ordinary understanding of the words
“relating to” supports that view. Beyond that, the Fifth
Circuit majority imagined a separation between upstream
and downstream oil activities that doesn’t exist.
Especially during wartime, exploration and production
were intimately connected with—and thus “related” to—
the refining work that these oil companies were
contracted to perform.
II. In construing the federal-officer removal statute,
the Court must keep its purposes top of mind. Among
other things, the statute was designed to ensure that
genuinely national issues were addressed by federal
6
courts. The issues here—concerning energy and our
national defense—are national in the truest sense. They
are an ill fit for state-court adjudication. And if the statute
is applied in the kind of feeble way the Fifth Circuit did
going forward, then state courts could well become a
means for individual states to warp national policy.
Really, that’s already happening today.
ARGUMENT
I.
The majority below wrongly narrowed the
“relating to” aspect of the federal-officer
removal statute.
A. The federal-officer removal statute—28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1)—represents a “congressional promise,” West
Virginia ex rel. Hunt v. CaremarkPCS Health, LLC, 140
F.4th 188, 194 (4th Cir. 2025), or a “legislatively-spawned
value judgment,” Gov’t of Puerto Rico v. Express Scripts,
Inc., 119 F.4th 174, 185 (1st Cir. 2024), that a person acting
under a federal officer may take any related disputes to
federal court. As an “incident of federal supremacy,”
Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405 (1969), the
removal provision assures that federal operations will not
face “interference” from “trial and liability in potentially
hostile state courts,” California by & through Harrison v.
Express Scripts, Inc., 139 F.4th 763, 770 (9th Cir. 2025);
see also Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 551 U.S. 142,
150 (2007) (“State-court proceedings may reflect local
prejudice against unpopular federal laws or federal
officials.” (cleaned up)).
Given how the statute’s promise is “broad,” it also
mandates a “liberal construction.” Hunt, 140 F.4th at 194.
What’s more, “[g]eneral removal principles”—like the
presumption against removability that some lower courts
7
have embraced—are “inverted.” Maryland v. 3M Co., 130
F.4th 380, 388 (4th Cir. 2025); see also DeFiore v. SOC
LLC, 85 F.4th 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Removal rights
under § 1442 thus are much broader than those under
section 1441.” (cleaned up)). And “[n]ot only must the
words of § 1442 be construed broadly[,] but a court also
must credit the defendants’ theory of the case.” Agyin v.
Razmzan, 986 F.3d 168, 175 (2d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
The court below seemed to understand these concepts
when it came to at least part of the statute: the “acting
under” requirement. Section 1442(a)(1) allows someone
other than the federal government to remove when they
are “acting under” a federal officer. The court saw that
the oil producers were doing just that when they produced
avgas. Pet.App.16. “Defendants here were federal
contractors that refined a product … that the government
needed to fight in World War II.” Pet.App.16. And given
that the government (at a minimum) controlled “the size
and manufacturing capacity of their refineries,” the
companies were “acting under” the federal government.
Id. Just as a company is “acting under” the federal
government when it builds military airplanes, Betzner v.
Boeing Co., 910 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 2018), so too is it
“acting under” the federal government when it makes the
avgas to fuel them.
Things fell apart when the Court considered whether
Louisiana and the parishes were challenging actions
“relating to” their federal actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)
(“[A] person acting under [a federal] officer … [may
remove a suit] for or relating to any act under color of such
office.”). The majority thought the plaintiffs were
“target[ing] Defendants’ oil production and exploration
practices.” Pet.App.20. It then focused in on specific
contractual provisions that directed the companies to
8
refine oil into avgas—pointedly ignoring the
Government’s broader control of the oil industry in
general. Pet.App.21-26. But it concluded that the
challenged activities were not “relat[ed] to” the
contractual provisions because none of them specifically
addressed extraction of the crude. Pet.App.30. It so held
even though the “refinery activities” described in the
contracts concededly “have some relation to oil
production.” Pet.App.28.
The Fifth Circuit majority unduly narrowed the
“relating to” part of the statute—even though Congress
specifically “intended to broaden the universe of acts that
enable Federal officers to remove to Federal court” by
adding that language. H.R. Rep. No. 112–17, pt. 1, at 6
(2011).
For one thing, the phrase “relating to” is expansive.
One thing “relates” to another when the former has “some
connection to” or “stand[s] in relation to” the latter.
Relate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024)
(emphasis added). So in all kinds of contexts, the Court
has stressed that this language is exceptionally broad. A
state law “relates” to an ERISA plan, for instance, when
it “has a connection with or reference to such a plan.”
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 147
(2001). In another preemption case, the Court described
how “Congress characteristically employs the phrase
[“relate to”] to reach any subject that has ‘a connection
with, or reference to,’ the topics the statute enumerates.”
Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 581 U.S. 87,
96 (2017).
Elsewhere, the Court has stressed how such language
“has a broad scope, and an expansive sweep, and that it is
broadly worded, deliberately expansive, and conspicuous
for its breadth.” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
9
504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Celotex
Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995) (holding that
“related to” jurisdiction in bankruptcy statute gave
“comprehensive jurisdiction” over “all matters connected
with the bankruptcy estate”). Conversely, one thing may
be not be “related” to another when they bear only a
“tenuous, remote, or peripheral” relationship. Rowe v.
N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 371 (2008).
Note too how the statute says the removed action must
only relate to “any act under color of such office.” 28
U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (emphasis added). “[R]ead naturally,
the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or
some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” Ali v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219 (2008) (cleaned up).
And pairing the word “any” with other generous terms
(like “relating to”) “has a broadening effect.” Patel v.
Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 338-39 (2022).
Here, the
combination confirms a degree of separation—removal is
not just warranted when it comes to actions premised on
(that is, “for”) acts taken under color of a federal office—
but also the other matters that “relate” to those actions.
The majority below effectively ignored the word “any”
and then folded the “relating to” portion of the statute into
the “for” part. Certainly, a specific federal directive
governing exploration and production (of the kind the
majority was hunting for) would have placed these suits
firmly in the “for” camp. But that wasn’t necessary for
removal. See Moore v. Elec. Boat Corp., 25 F.4th 30, 36
(1st Cir. 2022) (noting how federal-officer removal “does
not demand a showing of a specific government direction,
which goes well beyond the ‘relating to’ requirement.”
(cleaned up)); Baker v. Atl. Richfield Co., 962 F.3d 937, 944
(7th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he Companies did not need to allege
10
that the complained-of conduct itself was at the behest of
a federal agency.” (cleaned up)).
B. Now on to the application. Properly applying the
statute’s standards here, Petitioners frame the key
question the right way: are the exploration and production
activities challenged in the lawsuit “related to” the
refining activities covered in the companies’ federal
contracts?
As a general matter, exploration and production of
crude oil “relates” to its ultimate refinement. See, e.g.,
Former Emps. of Chevron Prods. Co. v. U.S. Sec’y of Lab.,
26 C.I.T. 1272, 1287 n.16 (2002) (describing two “separate
but related ‘production’ processes (one ‘upstream’ and the
other ‘downstream’): the exploration, drilling and
‘production’ of crude oil, or—alternatively—the
‘production’ of refined petroleum products”); accord
Jessica Kittleberger & Michael R. Barsa, No Place for
Morality: The Emerging Threat to Interstate Commerce
and the Extraterritoriality Principle, 57 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 491, 529 (2024) (describing how “production,
refining, and transportation” are “all tied to the immediate
production of the good—fuel—itself”). Exploration and
production, of course, provide the most essential input to
the refining process: crude. Refining cannot happen
without it. And “[t]he kind and quality of crude oil and
other liquids available as inputs” in turn determines “[t]he
details of a refinery’s operations[.]”
Joseph A.
Schremmer, Technical Operation of Refineries, 3 L. OF
ENVTL. PROT. § 29:179 (2024 update). Conversely,
refineries constitute the largest customers of crude oil; it’s
effectively never used in its unrefined state. The two
operations can’t exist apart from one another.
So a refinery must secure crude oil, and the process of
obtaining it necessarily “relates”—in the most central
11
way—to the refinery’s operations.
And indeed,
“[h]istorically, the major oil companies [have] treated the
refining activity as an integrated part of a production
stream that ran from exploration to final retail sale of
petroleum products.” ROBERT PIROG, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., RL32248, PETROLEUM REFINING: ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 18
(2008); see also FTC, MERGERS IN THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY (1982), 1982 WL 623502, at *6 (“[A]ll of the
largest firms in the industry (the ‘majors’), and almost all
of the firms just below the ‘major’ category are fully
integrated and participate in all four levels of operation
[E&P, refining, transportation, and marketing].”). Put
differently, production and refining are two connected
links on the same supply chain; the majority was wrong to
declare them “two entirely separate operations.”
Pet.App.35.
Things were no different during World War II. In fact,
all the various “industry functions” had to be
“synchronized” to perform effectively, as the Petroleum
Administration for War recognized:
In so closely interrelated an industry as oil, such a
synchronization was indispensable, because action
taken in one field produces immediate reaction in
others. In order to increase refinery throughput,
for example, it is necessary to produce more crude
oil; and it is then necessary to make available the
transportation to move this crude oil to the
refineries, and move the products away.
PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATION FOR WAR, supra, at 110;
see also, e.g., Gerald D. Nash, Energy Crises in Historical
Perspective, 21 NAT. RES. J. 341, 347-49 (1981) (describing
how supply constraints with crude oil—not refinery
capacity—might have been the greater concern during the
12
war). In some ways that approach merely reflected the
natural state of the market even before the war, in which
oil supply-chain segments were “integrated into a small
number of international oil companies.” Llewelyn Hughes
& Austin Long, Is There an Oil Weapon? Security
Implications of Changes in the Structure of the
International Oil Market, 39 INT’L SEC. 152, 159 (2015).
Hence, the refining activities covered in the wartime
governmental contracts cannot be divorced from the
exploration and production activities that preceded them.
Certainly the Roosevelt administration didn’t perceive
them that way; rather, “producing oil” was viewed as “a
series of continuing, overlapping situations” that
“required simultaneous attention” and coordination
across “all phases of production.”
PETROLEUM
ADMINISTRATION FOR WAR, supra, at 185.
The record here bears that story out, as the companies
looked to their own crude oil fields to supply the refineries
governed by their government contracts. As Judge
Oldham explained below, “defendants satisfied their
contractual avgas obligations by increasing their own
exploration and production of crude.”
Pet.App.45
(Oldham, J., dissenting). Even the majority conceded that
at least some of the oil from Petitioners’ oil fields went to
Petitioners’ refineries. Pet.App.36. That refined oil then
directly fueled the war effort; a single Standard Oil
refinery in Baton Rouge, for instance, “fueled one in every
fifteen planes used in the war.” Jerry P. Sanson, World
War II Industrialization in Louisiana, 64PARISHES
(2023), https://tinyurl.com/2wwz5fvf; see also, e.g.,
Commander Paul B. Blackburn, Oil to Burn?, 74 U.S.
NAVAL INST. PROCEEDINGS 1482, 1484 (Dec. 1948) (noting
how “usage of petroleum” was greatly expanded even as
civilian use declined by about 14%); contra
13
Parishes.BIO.20 n.40 (contending that avgas production
did not drive increase in crude production).
The majority below mistakenly tried to create distance
between upstream and downstream activities by noting
that the Petroleum Administration for War decided when
and where to allocate crude oil to specific refineries. See
Pet.App.36 (suggesting that the “allocation program
severed any connection” between production and
refining). So it imagined a world in which the Petroleum
Administration did not allocate any of Petitioners’ own oil
to their refineries.
It then concluded that this
counterfactual shows the two are not related.
But while it might be true that the Petroleum
Administration was legally empowered to direct the crude
elsewhere, that’s not what happened. And cases turn on
reality, not imagination. Ultimately, Petitioners did use
their own oil as the key ingredient for their governmentcontrolled avgas operations. (No surprise, seeing as it was
a convenient input for these integrated companies.)
Anyway, individual refineries “were all treated as units in
one vast national refinery,” such that some diversion from
one to another would have been beside the point. Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 3d 486, 495
(S.D. Tex. 2015). So the production of that oil did in fact
“relate” to the refining operations. Whether exploration
and production were “related to” refining in the
reallocation scenario the Fifth Circuit described was not a
question before the court.
The lower court majority was also wrong—both
factually and legally—to think that the exploration and
production activities were unrelated because the
companies could have instead bought oil from the “open
market” to refine. Pet.App.29-30.
14
Legally, the court seems to have incorrectly defined
“related” activities to reach only those things that were
the singular, necessary predicate to the acts under
federal control. Yet as explained above, no ordinary
understanding of “relating” requires such a constrained
view. Two distinct possibilities—buying oil or producing
it—can simultaneously “relate” to the ultimate act of
refining it.
Factually, the majority was wrong to assume that the
companies could have secured the necessary volumes of
crude at speed, volume, and price necessary to satisfy
their avgas contracts. The last assumption (on price) was
especially dubious. If the companies had chosen to stop
production and instead buy crude from others, the price
would have surely skyrocketed as avgas refiners
competed for a shrinking pool of oil. And all that assumes
sufficient quantities would have been available (which
ignores how more crude is needed to make higher-octane
fuels like avgas). See Pet.App.46 (Oldham, J. dissenting)
(“Without that increase [in production], it is unclear how
defendants could have met their contractual obligations
with the federal Government.”). Instead—necessity being
the mother of invention—“[o]il companies discovered 29
new Louisiana oil fields during the war,” and tapped those
and others to supply their refineries. NATIONAL WORLD
WAR II MUSEUM, THE PELICAN STATE GOES TO WAR:
LOUISIANA
IN
WORLD
WAR
II
5
(2017),
https://tinyurl.com/27pb6x2v.
***
The majority transformed the “relating to” standard
into the sort of direct-causation requirement that
Congress amended the statute to avoid. Under the
ordinary meaning of “relating to,” the companies’
exploration and production activities were “related” to
15
their governmentally directed refining work. By all
accounts, the two sets of activities were operationally
integrated,
economically
interdependent,
and
strategically coordinated as part of a unified wartime
mission. And if activities like these don’t satisfy the
statute, then it’s hard to imagine what would. As other
amici from all quarters have recognized, see, e.g.
Joint.Chiefs.Br.13-14, sending these suits back to State
court will empower local governments “hostile to the
Government” to impede crucial federal efforts in the exact
way the statute means to foreclose, Watson, 551 U.S. at
142-43. The Court should not countenance it.
II.
The Court should protect the paramount
national interest in energy.
A. In construing the federal-officer removal statute,
the Court should keep its animating purpose firmly in
mind: to protect the national interest. After all, Section
1442’s statutory predecessor was adopted as a response to
one state’s effort to “nullif[y]” national laws. Gay v. Ruff,
292 U.S. 25, 32 (1934). Thus, the Court should be
especially reluctant to construe the statute in a way that
would eject cases from federal court even though they
raise clear federal or national interests.
Federal courts are better positioned to deal with issues
of national import. Madison warned that “[c]onfidence”
cannot always “be put in the State Tribunals as guardians
of the National authority and interests.” 2 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 28 (Max Ferrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966); see also, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 81,
547 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (“State judges,
holding their offices during pleasure, or from year to year,
will be too little independent to be relied upon for an
inflexible execution of the national laws.”) Indeed, “the
16
constitution itself supposes that they may not always be
worthy of confidence, where the rights and interests of the
national government are drawn in question.” Osborn v.
Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 811 (1824). “Local factionalism”
cannot be permitted to “pollute ‘the law of the Union.’”
Anthony G. Amsterdam & James S. Liebman, Loper
Bright and the Great Writ, 56 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
54, 78 (2024) (quoting Madison); see, e.g., Wyoming v.
Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1213, 1214 (10th Cir. 2006)
(discussing one state’s attempt to prosecute federal
agents for reintroducing wolves into a state that was
“heavily dependent on livestock” and thus “vehement[ly]
… opposed” the program).
At least when it comes to truly national issues, the
Framers were right to spot a difference between federal
and state courts.
Life tenure, salary guarantees,
appointment by the President and confirmation by the
Senate, and status as national officers provide nationaloriented checks that don’t exist in state courts. See Akhil
Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III:
Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65
BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 205, 235-38 (1985); accord Robert
N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court
Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original
Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 81214 (1984); see also Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
453 U.S. 473, 483-84 (1981) (listing factors supporting
federal-court jurisdiction such as “the desirability of
uniform interpretation” and “the assumed greater
hospitality of federal courts to peculiarly federal claims”).
That’s not to say that state courts are somehow inferior—
the States here think well of their own courts and the
courts of others—but only that certain disputes are
sometimes better handled by one forum over another.
17
This case most obviously implicates America’s national
interest in energy production. According to Congress, “it
serves the national interest to increase petroleum refining
capacity … wherever located within the United States.”
42 U.S.C. § 15951(a)(1); see also, e.g., Rachel Hudson, One
Size Does Not Fit All Leases—It’s Time to Amend
Bankruptcy Code Section 365, 38 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.
317, 345-46 (2022) (“When it comes to the oil and gas
industry as a whole, there is very little doubt that a federal
interest exists.”). The executive branch, too, has long been
“directly concerned both in encouraging rational
development and at the same time insuring the longest
possible life to the oil supply.” William Howard Taft,
Address to the National Conservation Congress in St.
Paul, Minnesota, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(Sep. 5, 1910), https://tinyurl.com/4aw9nw47.
More
recently, President Trump has proclaimed that it is “in the
national interest to unleash America’s affordable and
reliable energy and natural resources,” oil included.
Unleashing American Energy, Exec. Order 14154, 90 Fed.
Reg. 8353, 8353 (Jan. 29, 2025); see also, e.g., Establishing
the National Energy Dominance Council, Exec. Order
14213, 90 Fed. Reg. 9945, 9945 (Feb. 14, 2025) (“We must
expand all forms of reliable and affordable energy
production.”). “Refineries along the Gulf Coast account
for more than 55% of total U.S. refining capacity.” U.S.
Gulf Coast Fuel Oil Imports at Record Low as Refiners
Opt for Heavier Crude, ENERGYNOW (July 7, 2025),
https://tinyurl.com/yc4ph2nm. So imposing liability on
these seemingly local operations really has a direct effect
on the national fuel supply.
This national interest in energy is tied directly to our
national security. Even in peacetime, the Department of
Defense is the “single largest consumer of energy in the
United States,” using tens of millions of gallons of fuel
18
each day. GREGORY J. LENGYEL, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE ENERGY STRATEGY: TEACHING AN OLD DOG
NEW TRICKS 14 (2007), https://tinyurl.com/32smt7f8.
Military operations consume roughly 80% of all
government energy consumption. NETA C. CRAWFORD,
PENTAGON FUEL USE, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND THE COSTS
OF WAR 4 (Nov. 13, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/357dnw9e.
This demand only grows during times of war. So critical
military operations depend on the very sort of production
and refining activities targeted in these suits.
It’s almost a tautology to say that national security
issues like these give rise to a national interest. See Haig
v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307, (1981) (“It is obvious and
unarguable that no governmental interest is more
compelling than the security of the Nation.” (cleaned up)).
And “the procurement of [military] equipment by the
United States is an area of uniquely federal interest,”
especially when “[t]he imposition of liability on
Government contractors will directly affect the terms of
Government contracts” by forcing contractors (like the oil
companies here) to either “raise [their] price[s]” or bail
from the obligation. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487
U.S. 500, 507 (1988).
Yet even as it recognized that these energy-related
claims are deeply entangled with military matters, the
Fifth Circuit below seemed anxious to ship this case out of
a federal forum better able to grapple with such concerns.
But why? “Federal courts frequently decide cases raising
national security issues and are well equipped to handle
them.” Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 446 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (Pillard, J., dissenting). In contrast, “[w]hen the
federal government acts within the field of its
constitutionally granted war powers, it is not subject to
interference from a state government or from state laws
19
since the federal government is supreme in all war
activities[.]” Lucas Martin, 78 AM. JUR. 2D WAR § 14 (May
2025 supp.). Sending such exceptional matters to state
court, then, is invitation for disaster.
Here, these principles aren’t academic; they’re playing
out in real time. Louisiana local courts are being asked
whether to greenlight serial windfalls from out-of-state
energy companies with whom the State already has
sometimes-fraught relationships.
See Julie Cart,
Louisiana’s Love-Hate Relationship With The Oil
Industry,
L.A.
TIMES
(Sept.
15,
2010),
https://tinyurl.com/3mm6s5y5.
Especially as some
parishes are still working their way back from the
destruction of Hurricane Katrina, a sudden influx of funds
is much needed. And one parish has already secured a
$744 million verdict, with 40 more cases to come. See
Casey Harper, Jury Verdict Against Oil Industry
Worries Critics, Could Drive Up Energy Costs,
HIGHLAND
COUNTY
PRESS
(Apr.
7,
2025),
https://tinyurl.com/vd7bpx52. Even the former Attorney
General of Louisiana—and now Governor—recognized
that “[t]he oil and gas industry developed the natural
resources of [Louisiana] in accordance with state and
federal laws.”
Jeff Landry, The Buddy System,
HOUMATODAY (Sept. 19, 2013) https://tinyurl.com/
msjujvxd. So litigation like this, he said, amounted to
“extortion,” “racketeering,” and an “ambulance-chasing
free-for-all.” Id. In other words, these cases are showing
how national interests can quickly fall by the wayside
when politics, local fiscal needs, and flush defendants come
together. See Michael Toth, A Bad Business on the
Bayou, WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/
48k6wwmy. And it can all happen because of the odd view
taken by the Fifth Circuit that federal refining is divorced
from oil production.
20
B. This case exemplifies a vast and troubling trend:
state courts positioning themselves as forums to override
national policy through nuclear verdicts, onerous
injunctions, and more. Louisiana dismisses concerns like
these—concerns about the obvious broader implications of
a narrower removal doctrine—as “pure lawyer-speak.”
Louisiana.BIO.17. But Louisiana is wrong. When state
courts can effectively nullify national energy policy
through ruinous verdicts, the constitutional balance
between state and federal authority breaks down. Each
State could then exercise a veto over any disfavored
energy source. Proper application of federal officer
removal doctrine provides a crucial check against this
overreach.
So-called climate-change litigation provides one
example of the problem. States, local governments, and
other anti-energy actors have been using any number of
state-law-based
theories—consumer
protection,
securities law, public nuisance, and more—to sue oil
companies. See Alabama v. California, 145 S. Ct. 757
(2025). But no matter the theory, the sought-after remedy
is largely the same: the plaintiffs want to punish energy
producers with crushing damage awards for activities that
were concededly lawful (and often federally endorsed) at
the time. Because at least some of these energy-related
activities bore a close nexus with federal officer-led
actions—such as sales of fuel to the military—defendants
sometimes sought to remove under the federal-officer
removal statute. See, e.g., City & Cnty. of Honolulu v.
Sunoco LP, 39 F.4th 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2022). Yet lower
courts largely rejected those efforts by applying a narrow
view of federal-officer removal.
Another case currently on the Court’s docket shows
how States are seeking injunctive relief against specific
21
pieces of energy infrastructure and then wielding
cramped conceptions of removal to ensure their claims are
heard in friendly forums. In Nessel on behalf of People of
Michigan v. Enbridge Energy, LP, 104 F.4th 958 (6th Cir.
2024), the State of Michigan sought to enjoin the operation
of a midstream pipeline across the Straits of Mackinac.
The pipeline’s operation tied in with all national and
international laws and agreements, so Enbridge removed.
Id. at 966. Yet the lower court dispensed with certain
usual principles of statutory construction and sent the
case back to state court. The Court has now granted
certiorari. Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel, No. 24-783,
2025 WL 1787715, at *1 (U.S. June 30, 2025). But there
again, we see national interests (energy security)
subjugated to more local ones (a waterway passage). And
unfortunately, similar efforts have even happened in the
States’ own backyards. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Mountain
Valley Pipeline, LLC, No. CIV.A. 1:15-03833, 2015 WL
4497407, at *7 (S.D.W. Va. July 23, 2015) (remanding
dispute over eminent domain rights connected to
interstate natural-gas pipeline).
Decisions like these reverse an earlier recognition that
energy-production activities, particularly those under the
direction of the federal government, do belong in federal
court; they can thus be removed under provisions like the
federal-officer removal statute. See, e.g., In re Methyl
Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d
356, 367-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
The problem is likely to only get worse. States like
Vermont and New York have passed laws that seek to
impose billions of dollars of retroactive, strict liability on
out-of-state energy producers. See N.Y. ENV’T CONSER.
LAW §§ 76-0101 to -0103; VT. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 596-599c.
Other states are considering similar laws. See NAT’L
22
CAUCUS OF ENV’TL LEGISLATORS, 2025 SUPERFUND
LEGISLATION (CLIMATE) (2025), https://tinyurl.com/
3enh4k2u. These jurisdictions appear to be trying to
“leverage the expense, risks, and burden to [the oil
companies] of defending [themselves] in multiple
jurisdictions” to secure a much-needed cash stream.
Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 475
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). Now play the tape through to the end: if
energy companies don’t just give in to the shakedown,
then they’re likely to find themselves sued in state courts.
And without effective pathways for removal, the story
playing out in Louisiana will repeat seriatim. The national
energy industry will be crippled.
At bottom, state courts have little business deciding
critical energy-related issues entangled with nationalsecurity concerns. Beyond concerns of institutional
competence, this ad hoc approach could upset the
carefully calibrated, cooperative federalism scheme that
currently governs energy and environmental matters. If
energy producers play by those rules, they shouldn’t have
to worry that they’ll nevertheless face potentially
catastrophic liability decades down the road when the
political winds change. In an increasingly competitive
global energy market, that’s too much to ask. Especially
so when they are supporting key federal operations.
And let’s be clear: the problem extends beyond energy.
If individual States can weaponize their own state-court
systems to attack out-of-state actors for things that were
nationally embraced as lawful and necessary at the time
they were done, then there’s no obvious limiting principle
to the power of States to regulate far beyond their own
borders. Federal courts stand as a bulwark against that
threat.
23
***
“A great many vexatious suits have been brought” in
which those working under federal officers “have been
pushed very hard and put to great hardships and expense
… for doing things … they were ordered to do and which
they could not refuse to do.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1880 (Apr. 18, 1866) (remarks of Sen. Clark). If the
Court doesn’t reverse the Fifth Circuit’s decision here,
then no doubt a great many more will be brought against
critical energy suppliers in the years to come.
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse and remand with
instructions to allow this case to proceed in federal court.
Respectfully submitted.
JOHN B. MCCUSKEY
Attorney General
OFFICE OF THE
WEST VIRGINIA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
State Capitol Complex
Building 1, Room E-26
Charleston, WV 25305
mwilliams@wvago.gov
(304) 558-2021
MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of West Virginia
24
ADDITIONAL COUNSEL
STEPHEN J. COX
Attorney General
State of Alaska
BRENNA BIRD
Attorney General
State of Iowa
CHRIS CARR
Attorney General
State of Georgia
CATHERINE HANAWAY
Attorney General
State of Missouri
MICHAEL T. HILGERS
Attorney General
State of Nebraska
GENTNER DRUMMOND
Attorney General
State of Oklahoma
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.