Joint Appendix — Enbridge Energy, LP, et al., Petitioners v. Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, on Behalf of the People of the State of Michigan
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No. 24-783
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LP, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
DANA NESSEL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
MICHIGAN, ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of A ppeals for the Sixth Circuit
JOINT APPENDIX
A nn Maurine Sherman
Counsel of Record
for Respondent
Michigan Department of
Attorney General
G. Mennen Williams
Building
P.O. Box 30212
Lansing, MI 48909
(517) 335-7628
shermana@michigan.gov
A lice Loughran
Counsel of Record
for Petitioners
Steptoe & Johnson LLP
1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 429-6202
aloughran@steptoe.com
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED JANUARY 13, 2025
CERTIORARI GRANTED JUNE 30, 2025
i
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
A PPENDIX A — NOTICE OF REMOVAL
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF MICHIGAN, SOUTHERN DIVISION,
FILED DECEMBER 15, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a
A PPENDI X B — COMPLA INT OF THE
S TAT E OF M ICH IG A N, CI RCU I T
C OU RT F OR T H E 3 0 T H J U DICI A L
CIRCUIT, INGH A M COUNT Y, FILED
JUNE 27, 2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21a
A PPENDI X C — EXCERP T OF STATE
DOCKET SHEET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55a
APPENDIX D — MOTION OF ENBRIDGE,
CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE 30TH JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT, INGH A M COUNT Y, FILED
SEPTEMBER 16, 2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104a
APPENDIX E — EMAIL FROM INGHAM
C OU N T Y CI RCU I T C OU RT, DAT ED
MAY 1, 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167a
APPENDIX F — HEARING TRANSCRIPT
ON CROS S -MOTIONS FOR PA RTI A L
SU M M A RY DISPOSITION HELD ON
MAY 22, 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170a
APPENDIX G — SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
OF ENBRIDGE, CIRCUIT COURT FOR
THE 30TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, INGHAM
COUNTY, FILED JUNE 19, 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . 261a
1a
Appendix
APPENDIX A — NOTICE
OFAREMOVAL OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, SOUTHERN
DIVISION, FILED DECEMBER 15, 2021
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Case No. 1:21-cv-01057-RJJ-RSK
DANA NESSEL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF MICHIGAN, ON BEHALF OF THE
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Plaintiffs,
v.
ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
ENBRIDGE ENERGY COMPANY, INC., AND
ENBRIDGE ENERGY PARTNERS, L.P,
Defendants.
NOTICE OF REMOVAL
PLEA SE TA K E NOTICE TH AT Defendants
Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership; Enbridge Energy
Company, Inc.; and Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P.
(collectively, “Enbridge”) hereby remove this action from
the Circuit Court for the 30th Judicial Circuit, Ingham
County, Case No. 19-474, to the United States District
2a
Appendix A
Court for the Western District of Michigan pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a), 1442, and 1367.
In this action, the Attorney General of Michigan
seeks to permanently enjoin Enbridge from continuing to
operate its international Line 5 pipeline in the Straits of
Mackinac. In finding that removal of a similar suit against
Enbridge was proper, this Court recently held that “this
Court is an appropriate forum for deciding these disputed
and substantial federal issues.” Michigan v. Enbridge, No.
1:20-cv-01142, ECF No. 42 at 15, PageID.1035 (W.D. Mich.
Nov. 16, 2021). This removal is timely because “the initial
pleading lack[ed] solid and unambiguous information
that the case [wa]s removable” and this Notice is being
filed “within 30 days after receipt” of this Court’s order
in Michigan v. Enbridge, which “contains solid and
unambiguous information that th[is] case is removable.”
Berera v. Mesa Medical Group, PLLC, 779 F.3d 352,
364 (6th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added). Removal ensures
that both cases between Enbridge and Michigan officials
concerning the officials’ attempt to shut down the Straits
Pipelines are considered in federal court. Indeed, if the
Court grants the summary judgment motion that it has
authorized Enbridge to file in January, that ruling will
impact resolution of this action as well.
I.
The Attorney General’s Complaint
1. In her Complaint, the Attorney General seeks
declaratory relief and an injunction requiring Enbridge
to cease operation of the Straits Pipelines. A copy of
the Attorney General’s Complaint is attached hereto as
Exhibit A.
3a
Appendix A
2. The Complaint includes a “factual background”
section. It explains that Line 5 was built as a means of
transporting petroleum and other products to Sarnia,
Ontario without interruption. Compl. ¶ 10. In 1953, the
State of Michigan granted Enbridge’s predecessor an
Easement “to construct, lay, maintain, use, and operate”
two 20-inch pipelines on the bottomlands of the Straits
as part of Line 5. Id. at ¶¶ 12-14. Line 5 has operated
continuously since construction was completed in 1954.
Id. at ¶ 15.
3. The Complaint includes three counts. Count I
asserts that the Easement violates the public trust and is
void. Id. at ¶¶ 22-63. Counts II and III assert, respectively
that Line 5 is a public nuisance and that it violates the
Michigan Environmental Protection Act. Id. at ¶¶ 64-70.
4. Enbridge was served with a copy of the Complaint
on or about June 27, 2019. Enbridge has not filed an
answer, and no discovery has taken place in the state
court action. Both parties instead moved for summary
disposition. Those motions have not yet been decided. In
January 2021, both parties and the state court agreed that
the Attorney General’s action should be held in abeyance
pending the outcome of the related proceedings before this
Court. The action remains in abeyance. Prior to the filing
of this Notice, the next planned action in the case was a
status conference requested by the Attorney General and
scheduled for January 7, 2022.
4a
Appendix A
II. Related proceedings before this Court
5. This Court is familiar with the parties’ dispute
from two related cases: Enbridge v. Whitmer, No. 1:20cv-01141 (which remains pending before the Court), and
Michigan v. Enbridge, No. 1:20-cv-01142 (which Michigan
recently voluntarily dismissed).
6. The related proceedings arose out of a November
13, 2020 notice of revocation and termination issued by
Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer and the Director
of Department of Natural Resources. The Governor and
Director notified Enbridge that the 1953 easement was
revoked for violation of the public trust doctrine. They
also notified Enbridge that the easement was being
terminated based on Enbridge’s alleged violation of the
1953 easement’s terms and conditions. The notice directed
Enbridge to cease operating the Straits Pipelines by
May 12, 2021. The Attorney General’s office represented
the State, the Governor, and the Director in the related
litigation.
7. Enbridge filed Enbridge v. Whitmer in this Court
on November 24, 2020. In that action under Ex parte
Young, Enbridge seeks declaratory and injunctive relief
barring the defendants—Michigan’s Governor and the
Director of its Department of Natural Resources—from
violating federal law by seeking to shut down the Straits
Pipelines. Count I of Enbridge’s Complaint claims that
the defendants’ attempt to shut down Enbridge’s pipeline
violates the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution in
light of the express preemption provision of the federal
5a
Appendix A
Pipeline Safety Act. See No. 1:20-cv-01141, ECF No.
1 at 10-13, PageID. 10- 13. Count III claims that the
defendants’ attempt to shut down the pipeline violates
the Foreign Affairs Doctrine, which is rooted in the
Constitution’s assignment of authority over foreign affairs
to the Federal Government. See id. at 16-18, PageID.16-18.
Enbridge seeks declaratory relief and “[a]n injunction
prohibiting Defendants from taking any steps to impede
or prevent the interstate and international operation of
Line 5.” Id. at 18-19, PageID.18-19. Enbridge v. Whitmer
remains pending before this Court, which has authorized
Enbridge’s filing of a motion for summary judgment, due
on January 18, 2022. See No. 1:20-cv-1141, ECF No. 42
(briefing order).
8. Also on November 24, 2020, Enbridge removed
Michigan v. Enbridge to this Court. In that lawsuit, the
State of Michigan sought an injunction forcing Enbridge
to “cease operation of” and “permanently decommission
the Straits Pipelines”—the very outcome that Enbridge
sued to prevent in Enbridge v. Whitmer. No. 1:20-cv01142, ECF No. 1-1 at 23, PageID.37. Enbridge’s grounds
for removal included the Grable doctrine (because the
lawsuit “necessarily raised” federal issues of Pipeline
Safety Act preemption and the Foreign Affairs Doctrine),
federal common law (because of the suit’s implications for
international relations), and the federal officer removal
statute (because Enbridge acts under federal officers in
operating its pipeline). See No. 1:20-cv-01142, ECF Nos.
1, 12.
6a
Appendix A
9. Represented by the Attorney General’s office,
the State moved to remand Michigan v. Enbridge to
state court. See No. 1:20-cv-01142, ECF No. 42. The
State argued that rejection of removal under Grable was
“straightforward, as none of the State’s causes of action
rely on federal law in any way.” Id. at 7, PageID.486.
Rather, the State asserted, the claims were “all matters
of pure state law that fall squarely within the jurisdiction
of Michigan courts,” and “[t]he issues raised by Enbridge
as grounds for federal jurisdiction—alleged statutory
preemption, interstate and foreign commerce, and
foreign affairs and treaties—are simply its defenses,
not elements of the State’s claims.” Id. Indeed, the State
vigorously disputed three of the four factors required for
removal under Grable, contending that the federal issues
Enbridge had identified were not “necessarily raised,”
that those issues were not even “substantial,” and that
allowing this suit to proceed in federal court would upset
the balance between federal and state courts. See id. at
7-16, PageID.486-495. The State also urged that there
was no legal basis for removal under federal common law
or the federal officer removal statute. See id. at 16-27,
PageID.495-506.
10. This Court rejected the State’s arguments and
held that Michigan v. Enbridge was “properly in federal
court” under Grable. No. 1:20-cv-1142, ECF No. 80 at 1,
PageID.1021. This Court held that “[t]he State Parties’
claims ‘arise under’ federal law because the scope of
the property rights the State Parties assert necessarily
turns on the interpretation of federal law that burdens
those rights, and this Court is an appropriate forum for
7a
Appendix A
deciding these disputed and substantial federal issues.”
Id. at 15, PageID.1035.
11. The Governor, however, has made clear that
she “disagree[s]” with this Court’s ruling that it had
jurisdiction. No. 1:20 -cv-1141, ECF No. 39-1 at 1,
PageID.254. Two weeks after issuance of the Court’s
November 16 order, the Governor admittedly directed the
State to “shift[] its legal strategy” to “give Michigan courts
the final say . . . by voluntarily dismissing” its complaint.
Id. The Governor believed that this maneuver, which
deprived this Court of jurisdiction, would “clear[] the way
for the lawsuit filed by Attorney General Dana Nessel to
go forward in Michigan state court,” giving “state courts,
. . . the final say” on the federal issues implicated by the
parties’ dispute. Id. She further noted that “[o]ur goal
here remains the same.” Id. Attorney General Nessel
announced on the same day that she “fully support[s] the
Governor in her decision to dismiss the federal court case
and instead focus on our ongoing litigation in state court,”
which she declared the “most viable path to permanently
decommission Line 5.” Department of Attorney General,
“AG Nessel Provides Statement on Voluntary Dismissal
of Enbridge Lawsuit in Federal Court” (Nov. 30, 2021),
https://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-359-92297_99936573159 –,00.html.
12. Consistent with this Court’s ruling in Michigan
v. Enbridge that “this Court is an appropriate forum for
deciding these disputed and substantial federal issues,”
Enbridge hereby removes Nessel v. Enbridge to this Court
so that it can be resolved along with the still-pending
Enbridge v. Whitmer lawsuit.
8a
Appendix A
III. Removal is timely under the third paragraph of 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b)
13. Generally, a defendant must remove within 30
days of receiving the state-court complaint. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b)(1). The Sixth Circuit has held, however, that
“[t]he 30-day period in § 1446(b)(1) starts to run only
if the initial pleading contains ‘solid and unambiguous
information that the case is removable.’” Berera v. Mesa
Medical Group, PLLC, 779 F.3d 352, 364 (6th Cir. 2015)
(citation omitted). If the case is not unambiguously
removable when it is filed, then “the defendant must file
the notice of removal ‘within 30 days after receipt . . . of a
copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper’
that contains solid and unambiguous information that the
case is removable.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3))
(emphasis added).
14. Nessel v. Enbridge was not unambiguously
removable when it was filed. The Complaint purports to
assert claims under state law only, and the parties are
not diverse. Like the parallel complaint in Michigan v.
Enbridge, the Complaint here arises under federal law
under the Grable doctrine because substantial federal
issues are necessarily raised by the purportedly state-law
claims. When the case was filed, however, its removability
under Grable was far from unambiguous. Indeed, as
set forth above, the State (represented by the Attorney
General) vigorously argued that the broadly similar
complaint in Michigan v. Enbridge was not removable
and that it satisfied just one of the Grable doctrine’s four
requirements.
9a
Appendix A
15. But in its recent order denying the State’s motion
to remand in Michigan v. Enbridge, this Court made it
unambiguously clear that Nessel v. Enbridge is likewise
removable under Grable and is “properly in federal court.”
No. 1:20-cv-1142, ECF No. 80 at 1, PageID.1021.
16. Appellate case law confirms that this Court’s
order in Michigan v. Enbridge constitutes an “order”
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). An order
in a separate federal proceeding is an “order” under
§ 1446(b)(3) “where the same party was a defendant
in both cases, involving similar factual situations, and
the order expressly authorized removal.” Green v. R.J.
Reynolds, 274 F.3d 263, 267-68 (5th Cir. 2001); see also
Doe v. American Red Cross, 14 F.3d 196, 201-02 (3d Cir.
1993). This case falls squarely within this rule: This
Court’s removal order in Michigan v. Enbridge involved
the same Enbridge defendants, the facts and legal theories
are similar, and the order expressly authorized removal.
17. Under § 1446(b)(3) and the Sixth Circuit’s Berera
decision, therefore, Enbridge has the right to remove
Nessel v. Enbridge within 30 days of receipt of the Court’s
order in Michigan v. Enbridge. This Court issued that
order on November 16, 2021. This Notice of Removal is
being filed within 30 days of that order and is therefore
timely.
IV. Grounds for removal in this action
18. Following this Court’s order in Michigan v.
Enbridge, this Court plainly has jurisdiction over this case
10a
Appendix A
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Enbridge submits that removal
is proper on three independent and alternative grounds:
the Grable doctrine, federal common law, and the federal
officer removal statute. Each ground is briefly explained
below.
19. The Grable doctrine. This Court held that the
similar complaint in Michigan v. Enbridge was properly
removed under Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v.
Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308
(2005). See 1:20-cv-01142, ECF No. 80. That ruling
establishes that this case is likewise removable under
Grable.
20. As this Court explained, Grable holds that
“federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims will
lie where the ‘state law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated
federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which
a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any
congressionally approved balance of federal and state
judicial responsibilities.’” Id. at 6, PageID.1026 (quoting
Grable, 545 U.S. at 314). Applying the Grable framework,
this Court held that it had jurisdiction.
21. First, the State’s suit necessarily raised federal
issues because “the Federal Submerged Lands Act
necessarily governs the scope of the State’s property
interest” by reserving to the Federal Government
“paramount” authority over the bottomlands, which the
Federal Government has exercised by burdening the
State’s property rights through the Pipeline Safety Act
and the Transit Pipelines Treaty with Canada. See id. at
10, PageID.1030.
11a
Appendix A
22. Second, these federal issues are plainly disputed
and “raise vitally important questions that implicate
the federal regulatory scheme for pipeline safety and
international affairs.” Id. at 12, PageID.1032.
23. Third, “exercising jurisdiction over the state law
claims” would not “open the federal courthouse doors too
wide” because so few state-law claims necessarily raise
issues under the Act or the Treaty. Id. at 14, PageID.1034.
The Court concluded: “The State Parties’ claims ‘arise
under’ federal law because the scope of the property
rights the State Parties assert necessarily turns on the
interpretation of federal law that burdens those rights,
and this Court is an appropriate forum for deciding
these disputed and substantial federal issues.” Id. at 15,
PageID.1035.
24. The Court’s application of Grable to Michigan
v. Enbridge—which the State voluntarily dismissed
in an admitted effort to avoid this Court’s jurisdiction
(see ECF No. 39 at 2, PageID.248; ECF No. 39-1 at 2-3,
PageID.254-55)—makes clear that Nessel v. Enbridge
likewise “arises under” federal law and belongs in federal
court.
25. Federal common law. This Court also has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the claims
here implicate uniquely federal interests and thus must
be brought, if at all, under federal common law. See, e.g.,
National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe
of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 850 (1985); Illinois v. City
of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972); Sam L. Majors
12a
Appendix A
Jewelers v. ABX, Inc., 117 F.3d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1997);
Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1184
(9th Cir. 2002). While the Complaint purports to state
claims under Michigan law, courts have long recognized
that claims may arise under federal law regardless of
whether the plaintiff purports to plead federal claims.
See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307
(1947) (holding that certain claims asserted under state
law must be governed by federal common law because
they involved “matters essentially of federal character”).
“[I]f federal common law exists, it is because state law
cannot be used.” City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304, 313 n.7 (1981); see also Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 26-28, in BP P.L.C. v. Mayor & City of
Baltimore, No. 19-1189 (U.S. Nov. 23, 2020) (explaining
that removal was proper under federal common law in
climate change lawsuit that was nominally couched in
terms of state-law claims).
26. Enbridge invokes “federal common law based on
foreign relations” as an independent basis for removal to
federal court. The Fifth, Eleventh, and Second Circuits
have recognized that removal is proper when the plaintiff’s
claims “directly and significantly affect American foreign
relations.” Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 113
F.3d 540, 542-53 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Pacheco
de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1377 (11th Cir. 1998);
Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 352
(2d Cir. 1986). That describes this case perfectly. As the
Court observed in holding that Michigan v. Enbridge was
properly removed to federal court, Canada has “formally
invoked the international dispute resolution provision
13a
Appendix A
of Article IX of the 1977 [Transit] Treaty to determine
whether the implementation of the Governor of Michigan’s
shutdown order would violate the binding commitments
the United States made to Canada under international
law in the 1977 Treaty.” 1:20-cv-01142, ECF No. 80 at
4, PageID.1024 (quotation marks omitted). This Court
explained that, “with Canada’s invocation of the dispute
resolution provision in the 1977 Treaty, the federal issues
in this case are under consideration at the highest levels of
this county’s government,” such that the dispute over the
Straits Pipelines “raise[s] vitally important questions that
implicate . . . international affairs.” Id. at 12, PageID.1032.
Nessel v. Enbridge likewise raises issues pertaining to the
continued operation of Line 5 that lay at the heart of the
Treaty dispute resolution proceeding now underway. This
case belongs in federal court no less than did Michigan
v. Enbridge.
27. Federal common law supplies the rule of decision
for the State’s claims, even if the complaint on its face only
invokes state law. “[O]ur federal system does not permit
the controversy to be resolved under state law, either
because the authority and duties of the United States as
sovereign are intimately involved or because the interstate
or international nature of the controversy makes it
inappropriate for state law to control.” Texas Indus.,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981);
see also City of New York v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81,
89-91 (2d Cir. 2021); Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank
AG, 376 F.3d 1227, 1232-33 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus, federal
courts have relied on U.S. foreign policy implications
to find removal is proper, even though the underlying
14a
Appendix A
facts and implications were not alleged in the complaint.
See, e.g., Torres, 113 F.3d at 542-43 ((relying on foreign
government’s protests, not alleged in the complaint, to
find removal was proper); Marcos, 806 F.2d at 353-54
(relying upon an executive order issued by the Philippine
government after the filing of the complaint); Pacheco,
139 F.3d at 1378.
28. Federal common law also governs for an
independent reason: The Complaint is premised on
concerns about environmental harm to the Great Lakes
from international and interstate commerce. It therefore
necessarily implicates uniquely federal interests and must
be governed by federal common law.1 The Supreme Court
has long recognized that “[e]nvironmental protection is
undoubtedly an area within national legislative power” for
which “federal courts may . . . fashion federal common law.”
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410,
419, 421 (2011) (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Illinois v. City
of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99 (1972). For this reason, too,
this case belongs in federal court.
1. In fact, the United States and Canada have long dealt with
environmental issues in the Great Lakes through international
agreements. The agreements include the 1972 Agreement on
Great Lakes Water Quality, Apr. 15, 1972, U.S.-Can., 23 U.S.T.
301, CTS 1972/12. Canada and the United States have also entered
into the Agreement Concerning the Transboundary Movement of
Hazardous Waste, Oct. 28, 1986, Can.-U.S., T.I.A.S. No. 11,099,
CTS 1986/39, and the Canada-United States Joint Inland Pollution
Contingency Plan, July 25, 1994, U.S.-Can., to address releases
and other environmental emergencies along the Canada-United
States border.
15a
Appendix A
29. The federal officer removal statute. Federal
law expressly authorizes the removal of any state-court
action against “any officer (or any person acting under that
officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof . . .
relating to any act under color of such office.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1). “The federal officer removal statute allows
a defendant to remove a case from state to federal court
if the defendant establishes (1) it is a federal officer or a
‘person acting under that officer’; (2) a ‘colorable federal
defense’; and (3) that the suit is ‘for a[n] act under color
of office,’ which requires a causal nexus ‘between the
charged conduct and asserted official authority.’” Ripley
v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 841 F.3d 207, 209-10 (4th Cir. 2016)
(citations omitted); see also, e.g., Bennett v. MIS Corp.,
607 F.3d 1076, 1085 (6th Cir. 2010). All three elements
are satisfied here.
30. First, Enbridge “acted under” a federal officer
because “the government [PHMSA] exert[ed] some
‘subjection, guidance, or control’” over Enbridge’s
operation and safety management of the Straits Pipelines
through its extensive regulation and because Enbridge
thereby “engage[d] in an effort ‘to assist, or to help
carry out, the duties or tasks of the federal superior.’”
Sawyer v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 860 F.3d 249, 255 (4th
Cir. 2017) (quoting Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S.
142, 151-52 (2007)); see also Watson, 551 U.S. at 150 (the
words “acting under” are “broad” and must be “liberally
construed” to effectuate § 1442(a)’s policy objectives—
principally, “to protect the Federal Government from
[state] interference with its ‘operations’”); Caver v.
Central Alabama Electric Cooperative, 845 F.3d 1135,
16a
Appendix A
1143-44 (11th Cir. 2017); California v. H&H Ship Service
Co., 68 F.3d 481, 1995 WL 619293, at *1-2 (9th Cir. 1995)
(unpublished); City of St. Louis v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.,
708 F. Supp. 2d 632, 660 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Indeed, the
federal government recognizes that Enbridge’s pipelines
constitute critical infrastructure whose operation is vital
to the energy supply. See Wazelle v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
2021 WL 2637335, at *3-5 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (holding that
Tyson Foods properly removed under the federal officer
removal statute “because Tyson Foods was designated
as ‘critical infrastructure’ by the federal government”).
31. Second, there is a causal nexus between
Enbridge’s management of the Straits Pipelines pursuant
to PHMSA’s directives and Plaintiffs’ claims concerning
the safety of the Pipelines. Historically, the hurdle set by
the causal nexus requirement was “quite low.” Goncalves
ex rel. Goncalves v. Rady Children’s Hospital, 865 F.3d
1237, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 2017). In 2011, Congress lowered
the bar even further. See Caver, 845 F.3d at 1144; Latiolas
v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286, 291-92 (11th Cir.
2020). The current version of the statute merely requires
that the conduct at issue “relate to” acts under color of
federal office. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). This test simply
requires a “connection or association” between the acts
in the lawsuit and the federal office; the defendant is not
“required to allege that the complained-of conduct itself was
at the behest of a federal agency.” In re Commonwealth’s
Motion to Appoint Counsel Against or Directed to
Defender Association of Philadelphia, 790 F.3d 457, 47071 (3d Cir. 2015). This suit readily clears that low hurdle,
because the allegations here depend on the activities of
17a
Appendix A
Enbridge over the past decades in its management of
the Straits Pipelines—many of which activities were
undertaken in furtherance of PHMSA requirements and,
as warranted, direct oversight. Similarly, in Sawyer, the
Fourth Circuit held that removal was proper where a
military contractor, sued for failing to warn of asbestos
in military equipment, showed extensive federal control
over its activities. This included “highly detailed ship
specifications and military specifications provided by the
Navy,” whereby the Navy exercised “intense direction and
control . . . over all written documentation to be delivered
with” the equipment, deviations from which “were not
acceptable.” 860 F.3d at 253.
32. Third, Enbridge intends to raise numerous
meritorious federal defenses, including preemption,
interstate and foreign commerce, and the foreign affairs
doctrine. These and other federal defenses are more than
colorable. See Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407
(1969) (a defendant invoking § 1442(a)(1) “need not win his
case before he can have it removed”).
33. Removal is thus proper under the federal officer
removal statute.
V. This Court has jurisdiction and removal is proper
34. Enbridge is required to show that this Court has
28 U.S.C. §1331 jurisdiction over at least one claim in the
Complaint. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 563 (2005). It has met this burden here.
This Court has supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
18a
Appendix A
§ 1367(a) over any claims for which it does not have original
federal question jurisdiction because those claims form
part of the same case or controversy as the claims over
which the Court has original jurisdiction. Removal of this
action is accordingly proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a),
1442, and 1367.
35. All Defendants in this action are Enbridge
entities. All consent to removal.
36. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar removal
to federal court. See Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson v.
Magnolia Marine Transp. Co., 359 F.3d 1237, 1239 (10th
Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment’s abrogation of
federal judicial power ‘over any suit . . . commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States’ does not apply
to suits commenced or prosecuted by a State.”); California
ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, 375 F.3d 831, 847-48 (9th Cir.
2004) (same); In re Katrina Canal Litigation Breaches,
524 F.3d 700, 710- 11 (5th Cir. 2008).
37. Upon filing this Notice of Removal, Defendants
will furnish written notice to Plaintiffs’ counsel, and will
file and serve a copy of this Notice with the Clerk of the
Circuit Court for 30th Judicial Circuit, Ingham County
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d).
Accordingly, Defendants hereby remove to this Court
the above action pending against them in the Circuit Court
for 30th Judicial Circuit, Ingham County.
19a
Appendix A
Dated: December 15, 2021
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Peter H. Ellsworth
Peter H. Ellsworth (P23657)
Jeffery V. Stuckey (P34648)
DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC
123 W. Allegan Street, Suite 900
Lansing, MI 48933
(517) 371-1730
pellsworth@dickinsonwright.com
jstuckey@dickinsonwright.com
Phillip J. DeRosier
DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC
500 Woodward Avenue, Suite 4000
Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 223-3866
PDeRosier@dickinson-wright.com
John Bursch
BURSCH LAW PLLC
9339 Cherry Valley Avenue SE, #78
Caledonia, MI 49316
(616) 450-4235
jbursch@burschlaw.com
20a
Appendix A
David H. Coburn
William T. Hassler
Alice Loughran
Joshua H. Runyan
Mark C. Savignac
STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP
1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 429-3000
dcoburn@steptoe.com
whassler@steptoe.com
aloughran@steptoe.com
jrunyan@steptoe.com
21a
Appendix B OF THE STATE
APPENDIX B — COMPLAINT
OF MICHIGAN, CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE
30TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, INGHAM COUNTY,
FILED JUNE 27, 2019
STATE OF MICHIGAN
CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE
30TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
INGHAM COUNTY
No. 19-474-CE
HON. JUDGE JAMES S. JAMO
DANA NESSEL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF MICHIGAN, ON BEHALF OF THE
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
ENBRIDGE ENERGY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
ENBRIDGE ENERGY COMPANY, INC., AND
ENBRIDGE ENERGY PARTNERS, L.P.,
Defendants.
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Dana Nessel, Attorney General of the State of
Michigan, on behalf of the People of the State of Michigan,
by and through the undersigned Assistant Attorneys
General, alleges as follows:
22a
Appendix B
NATURE OF THE CASE
1. The Attorney General brings this action to abate
the continuing threat of grave harm to critical public rights
in the Great Lakes and associated resources posed by the
Defendants’ daily transportation of millions of gallons
of oil in dual pipelines that lie exposed in open water on
State-owned bottomlands at the Straits of Mackinac. This
location—where Lakes Michigan and Huron connect and
multiple busy shipping lanes converge—combines great
ecological sensitivity with exceptional vulnerability to
anchor strikes like those that occurred in 2018, making
it uniquely unsuitable for oil pipelines. Defendants’
continued operation of the Straits Pipelines presents
an extraordinary, unreasonable threat to public rights
because of the very real risk of further anchor strikes, the
inherent risks of pipeline operations, and the foreseeable,
catastrophic effects if an oil spill occurs at the Straits.
2 . The Attor ney General seeks decla rator y
judgments that: (a) the 1953 Easement granted by the
State, which authorized the construction and operation of
the Straits Pipelines, violates the public trust doctrine and
is therefore void; (b) Defendants’ continued operation of
the Straits Pipelines unreasonably interferes with rights
common to the public and is therefore subject to abatement
as a common law public nuisance; and (c) Defendants’
continued operation of the Straits Pipelines is likely to
cause pollution, impairment, and destruction of water and
other natural resources and the public trust therein in
violation of Part 17 (Michigan Environmental Protection
Act) of the Natural Resources and Environmental
23a
Appendix B
Protection Act, MCL 324.1701 et seq. The complaint seeks
injunctive relief requiring the Defendants to (a) cease
operation of the Straits Pipelines as soon as possible after
a reasonable notice period to allow orderly adjustments by
affected parties; and (b) permanently decommission the
Straits Pipelines in accordance with applicable law and
plans approved by the State of Michigan.
PARTIES
3. Dana Nessel is the duly elected Attorney General
of the State of Michigan pursuant to Article V, Section 21
of the Michigan Constitution and is the chief legal officer of
the State of Michigan. She has the statutory and common
law authority to bring this action on behalf of the people
of the State of Michigan.
4. Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership is a
Delaware limited partnership conducting business in
Michigan.
5. Enbridge Energy Company, Inc. is a Delaware
corporation conducting business in Michigan.
6. Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. is a Delaware
limited partnership conducting business in the State of
Michigan.
7. Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership, Enbridge
Energy Company, Inc., and Enbridge Energy Partners,
L.P., (collectively “Enbridge”) control and operate the
Enbridge Line 5 pipeline that extends from Superior,
24a
Appendix B
Wisconsin, across the Upper Peninsula of Michigan,
crosses the Straits of Mackinac through the Straits
Pipelines portion of Line 5, and continues through the
Lower Peninsula to Marysville, Michigan and then crosses
beneath the St. Clair River to Sarnia, Ontario, Canada.
JURISDCITION AND VENUE
8. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this
civil matter under MCL 600.605.
9. Venue for this civil action brought by the Attorney
General is proper in this Court under MCL 14.102 and
MCL 600.1631.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Development of Line 5 and the Straits Pipelines
10. As explained in the Michigan Petroleum
Pipeline Task Force Report (2015), “what is now known
as Enbridge’s Line 5, including the Straits Pipelines,
was conceived and built as a means of transporting crude
oil produced in Alberta to refineries located in Sarnia,
Ontario without interruption. In the late 1940s, Imperial
Oil Company, Limited began producing significant
quantities of crude oil from Leduc oil fields in Alberta. It
formed a subsidiary, Interprovincial Pipe Line Company
(IPL) (a corporate predecessor of Enbridge), which
developed a series of pipelines to transport oil from
Alberta to various refineries. By 1950, a pipeline had been
completed eastward as far as Superior, Wisconsin, on the
25a
Appendix B
shore of Lake Superior. Over the next few years, Imperial
Oil transported approximately 50 million barrels of oil on
a fleet of Great Lakes tankers from Superior, Wisconsin
to refineries near Sarnia, Ontario.”
11. Because of increasing oil production and because
tankers could not operate during winter months on
the Great Lakes, IPL decided, in late 1952, to extend
its pipeline system from Superior to Sarnia. IPL, its
wholly owned American subsidiary Lakehead Pipeline
Company, its primary contractor Bechtel Corporation,
and various other contractors completed the entire process
of designing the 645-mile-long Line 5 pipeline, obtaining
rights of way, securing required approvals, contracting,
and constructing it in approximately one year, between
November 1952 and January 1954. This process included:
• Lobbying the Michigan Legislature to enact
1953 PA 10 [later amended and recodified as
MCL 324.2129] so that the State, through the
Conservation Commission, had the legal authority
to grant pipeline easements on state land and lake
bottomlands.
• Obtaining pipeline easements, including the
Easement for the Straits of Mackinac Pipelines,
from the Conservation Commission.
• Obtaining approval of the construction, operation,
and maintenance of the pipeline in Michigan from
Michigan Public Service Commission under 1929
PA 16.
26a
Appendix B
12. On April 23, 1953, the Conservation Commission
of the State of Michigan granted an easement entitled
“Straits of Mackinac Pipe Line Easement Conservation
Commission of the State of Michigan to Lakehead Pipeline
Company, Inc.” (1953 Easement), a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit 1.
13. The Easement recited that it was issued by the
Conservation Commission under the authority of 1953 PA
10 and in consideration of a one-time payment of $2,450.00
by the Grantee to the Grantor.
14. Subject to its terms and conditions, the Easement
granted the Grantee and its successors and assigns the
right “to construct, lay, maintain, use and operate” two 20
inch diameter pipelines for the purpose of transporting
petroleum and other products, “over, through, under, and
upon” specifically described bottomlands owned by the
State of Michigan in the Straits of Mackinac.
15. Since completing Line 5 in 1954, the Grantee
and its successors have continued to operate it, and over
time significantly increased the quantity of products
transported through it.
16. The Grantee’s present successor, Enbridge,
currently transports an average of 540,000 barrels or
22,680,000 gallons of light crude oil, synthetic light crude
oil, and/or natural gas liquids per day on Line 5, including
the Straits Pipelines.
27a
Appendix B
17. The Straits Pipelines are each approximately
four miles long, run parallel to each other, approximately
1,200 feet apart, and are located approximately three
miles west of the Mackinac Bridge, in waters ranging in
depth to more than 250 feet.
18. While the near-shore sections of each Pipeline
(those located where the water is less than 65 feet deep)
were laid in trenches and covered with soil, most of each
pipeline was placed on or above the lakebed, and remains
exposed in open water, with no covering shielding it from
anchor strikes or other physical hazards.
19. The lakebed beneath the pipelines varies
considerably in depth and is subject to erosion by very
strong currents in and beneath the Straits. Consequently,
while some sections of the pipelines rest directly on
the lakebed, at many other locations, the pipelines are
suspended several feet above the lakebed. This includes
locations where, since 2002, Enbridge has installed more
than 150 anchor support structures in an effort to limit
unsupported lengths or spans of pipeline to less than the
75-foot maximum prescribed in the Easement.
The Critical Public Importance of the
Straits of Mackinac
20. The Straits of Mackinac are at the heart of the
Great Lakes, a unique ecosystem of enormous public
importance. As noted in Independent Risk Analysis for
the Straits Pipelines (Michigan Technological University
(September 2018)), a report commissioned by the State
28a
Appendix B
and carried out by a multi-disciplinary team of experts
(Michigan Tech Report):
The Straits of Mackinac hydraulically link
Lakes Michigan and Huron . . . and are wide
and deep enough . . . to permit the same average
water level in both water bodies, technically
making them two lobes of a single large lake.
The combined Michigan—Huron system forms
the largest lake in the world by surface area
and the fourth largest by volume, containing
nearly 8% of the world’s surface freshwater.
The Straits of Mackinac serve as a hub for
recreation, tourism, commercial shipping, as
well as commercial, sport and subsistence
[tribal] fishing. . . .1
21. An oil spill at the Straits threatens a wide range
of highly valuable resources:
The waters and shoreline areas of Lake
Michigan and Lake Huron including areas
surrounding and adjacent to the Straits of
Mackinac contain abundant natural resources,
including fish, wildlife, beaches, coastal sand
dunes, coastal wetlands, marshes, limestone
cobble shorelines, and aquatic and terrestrial
plants, many of which are of considerable
1 . In d e p e n d e n t R i s k A n a l y s i s , p 2 6 ; h t t p s : / /
mipetroleumpipelines.com/sites/mipetroleumpipelines.com/files/
document/pdf/Straits_Independent_Risk_Analysis_Final.pdf.
29a
Appendix B
ecological and economic value. These areas
include stretches of diverse and undisturbed
Great Lakes shorelines that provide habitat for
many plant and animal species. 2
COUNT I
The 1953 Easement violates the Public Trust
and is Void
22. Paragraphs 1 through 21 above are re-alleged
and incorporated by reference.
The Public Trust Doctrine
23. As the Michigan Supreme Court held in Glass v
Goeckel, 473 Mich 667, 678-679 (2005):
[U]nder longstanding principles of Michigan’s
common law, the state, as sovereign, has an
obligation to protect and preserve the waters
of the Great Lakes and the lands beneath them
for the public. The state serves, in effect, as the
trustee of public rights in the Great Lakes for
fishing, hunting, and boating for commerce or
pleasure. (Citations and footnote omitted.)
24. These public rights are protected by a “high,
solemn and perpetual trust which it is the duty of the
State to forever maintain.” Collins v Gerhardt, 237 Mich
38, 49 (1926).
2. Id., p 168.
30a
Appendix B
25. Both the United States Supreme Court and the
Michigan Supreme Court have held that the public trust
doctrine strictly limits the circumstances under which
a state may convey property interests in public trust
resources. In Illinois Central Railroad Co v Illinois,
146 US 387, 455-456 (1892), the court identified only two
exceptions under which such a conveyance is permissible:
The trust with which they are held, therefore, is
governmental and cannot be alienated, except
in those instances mentioned of parcels used
in the improvement of the interest thus held,
or when parcels can be disposed of without
detriment to the public interest in the lands
and waters remaining.
There, the court held that because neither of those
conditions were satisfied by a state statute purporting
to grant submerged lands along the Chicago lakefront to
a private company, a subsequent state statute revoking
that grant and restoring public rights was valid and
enforceable. Id. at 460.
26. In Obrecht v National Gypsum Co, 361 Mich 399,
412-413 (1960), the Michigan Supreme Court declared that
“[l]ong ago we committed ourselves . . . to the universally
accepted rules of such trusteeship as announced by the
[S]upreme [C]ourt in Illinois Central,” including Illinois
Central’s delineation of the limited conditions under which
public trust resources may be conveyed:
[N]o part of the beds of the Great Lakes,
belonging to Michigan and not coming within
31a
Appendix B
the purview of previous legislation . . . can be
alienated or otherwise devoted to private use in
the absence of due finding of 1 of 2 exceptional
reasons for such alienation or devotion to
nonpublic use. One exception exists where the
State has, in due recorded form, determined
that a given parcel of such submerged land may
and should be conveyed “in the improvement
of the interest thus held” (referring to public
trust). The other is present where the State
has, in similar form, determined that such
disposition may be made “without detriment
to the public interests in the lands and waters
remaining.”
Obrecht, 361 Mich at 412-413, quoting Illinois Central,
146 US at 455-56 [emphasis added]. The Michigan
Legislature has incorporated that common-law standard
and “due finding” requirement into Part 325 (Great
Lakes Submerged Lands) of the Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Act, MCL 324.32501 et seq.3
3. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.32502 (conveyance of
property interests in submerged lands allowed “whenever it is
determined by the department that the private or public use of
those lands and waters will not substantially affect the public use
of those lands and waters for hunting, fishing, swimming, pleasure
boating, or navigation or that the public trust in the state will not
be impaired by those agreements for use, sales, lease, or other
disposition”); §§ 324.32503, 324.32505 (same).
32a
Appendix B
A.
The 1953 Easement Violated the Public Trust,
and it was Void from its Inception.
27. The 1953 Easement violated the public trust
doctrine because the State never made a finding that the
easement: (1) would improve navigation or another public
trust interest; or (2) could be conveyed without impairment
of the public trust. There is no contemporaneous document
in which the State duly determined that the proposed
Easement met either of the two exceptions to the common
law public trust doctrine’s prohibition of conveyances of
public rights in Great Lakes bottomlands. The Easement
itself contains no such findings. It merely recited:
WHEREAS, the Conservation Commission
is of the opinion that the proposed pipe line
system will be of benefit to all of the people of
the State of Michigan and in furtherance of the
public welfare; and
WHEREAS, the Conservation Commission
duly considered the application of Grantee and
at its meeting held on the 13th day of February,
A.D. 1953, approved the conveyance of an
easement.
2 8. There is no indication the Conser vation
Commission determined that the conveyance of the
Easement and the operation of oil pipelines in the Great
Lakes would somehow improve public rights in navigation,
fishing, or other uses protected by the public trust. Nor is
there evidence that the Commission duly determined that
33a
Appendix B
the operation could not adversely affect those rights. And
the contemporaneous approval of the construction of what
is now Enbridge’s Line 5 in Michigan by the Michigan
Public Service Commission made no such determinations
and suggested that the Line 5 pipeline, which was built
to transport crude oil from Alberta to Ontario, would
enhance joint defenses in times of national emergency
and promote improved trade relations.4
29. In the absence of either of the due findings
required under the public trust doctrine, the 1953
Easement was and remains void.
B. The State’s Continuing Obligation to Protect
Public T r ust Resources Now Requires
Revocation of the 1953 Easement Because
it is Today Clear that Enbridge’s Continued
Transportation of Petroleum Products through
the Straits Pipelines Violates the Public Trust.
30. As noted above, public rights in navigable waters
“are protected by a high, solemn and perpetual trust, which
it is the duty of the State to forever maintain.” Collins v
Gerhardt, 237 Mich at 48. The State did not surrender
its trust authority—or the affirmative responsibilities
that underpin it—when it granted the 1953 Easement to
Enbridge’s predecessor. “The state, as sovereign, cannot
relinquish [its] duty to preserve public rights in the Great
4. Mich Pub Serv Comm’n Op and Order for the 1953 Line
5 pipeline (Mar. 31, 1953); https://www.michigan.gov/documents/
deq/Appendix_A.3_493982_7.pdf.
34a
Appendix B
Lakes and their natural resources.” Glass, 473 Mich at 679.
To the contrary, a state’s conveyance of property rights “to
private parties leaves intact public rights in the lake and
its submerged land. . . . Under the public trust doctrine,
the sovereign never had the power to eliminate those
rights, so any subsequent conveyances . . . remain subject
to those public rights.” Id. at 679-681 [emphasis added].
That all conveyances of bottomlands and other public
trust resources are encumbered by the trust has long
been the law in Michigan. See Nedtweg, 237 Mich at 17 (the
public trust “is an inalienable obligation of sovereignty”
and “[t]he State may not, by grant, surrender such public
rights any more than it can abdicate the police power or
other essential power of government.”).
31. When the State conveys a property interest
in Great Lakes bottomlands, “it necessarily conveys
such property subject to the public trust.” Glass at 679.
Accordingly, even assuming the 1953 Easement was
initially valid, it necessarily remains subject to the public
trust and the State’s continuing duty to protect public
trust resources of the Great Lakes. And, by its terms, the
Easement broadly reserved the State’s rights: “All rights
not specifically conveyed herein are reserved to the State
of Michigan.” 1953 Easement, p 11, paragraph M.
32. As the Supreme Court held in Illinois Central,
a grant of property rights in public trust resources “is
necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust by
which the property was held by the state can be resumed
at any time.” 146 US at 455. There, the State of Illinois
“subsequently determined, upon consideration of public
35a
Appendix B
policy” that it should rescind its prior grant of lake
bottomlands to a private entity and the court upheld that
action.
33. Here, it has now become appa rent that
continuation of the activity authorized by the 1953
Easement—transporting millions of gallons of petroleum
products each day through twin 66-year old pipelines that
lie exposed, and literally in the Great Lakes at a uniquely
vulnerable location in busy shipping lanes—cannot be
reconciled with the State’s duty to protect public trust
uses of the Lakes, including fishing, navigation, and
recreation from potential impairment or destruction. As
outlined below, continued operation of the Straits Pipelines
presents an extraordinary, unreasonable threat to public
rights because of the very real risk of further anchor
strikes to the pipelines, the inherent risks of pipeline
operations, and the foreseeable, catastrophic effects if an
oil spill occurs at the Straits.
1.
The Continuing Risk of Anchor Strikes
Threatens an Oil Spill at the Straits.
34. Independent expert analysis and real-world
experience demonstrate that the Straits Pipelines remain
highly vulnerable to damage caused by inadvertent
deployment and dragging of anchors from the many
vessels moving in the multiple shipping lanes that converge
at the Straits. So long as oil flows through the Pipelines,
the associated threat of a catastrophic spill will continue.
36a
Appendix B
a. The Dynamic Risk Report.
35. In 2016, the State commissioned an expert
consulting firm, Dynamic Risk Assessment Systems,
Inc., to perform an analysis of alternatives to the
Straits Pipelines that included, among other things,
risks associated with continued operation of the existing
pipelines. Dynamic Risk completed a Draft Report in the
summer of 2017 and issued its Final Report in October
2017 (Report). 5 In publicly presenting its analysis,
Dynamic Risk estimated the chance of rupture of the
Straits Pipelines in the next thirty-five years to be not
one in a million, nor one in a thousand, nor even one in
a hundred, but a remarkable one in sixty.6 And of the
various threats the Report canvassed, it determined that
“the dominant threat, representing more than 75% of the
annualized total (all-threat) failure probability, is that . . .
caused by the inadvertent deployment of anchors from
ships traveling through the Straits.” 7
5. Report, Alternatives Analysis for the Straits Pipelines;
https://mipetroleumpipelines.com /document /alternativesanalysis-straits-pineline-final-report.
6. See Statements of James Mihell, P.Eng., at July 6, 2017,
Information Meeting at Holt, Michigan, at 3:11:00-3:12:00; https://
mipetroleumnipelines.com/event/watch-video-july-6-publicinformation-session-holt.
7. Report, Alternatives Analysis for the Straits Pipelines, at
ES-25; https://mipetroleumpipelines.com/document/alternativesanalysis-straits-pipeline-final-report.
37a
Appendix B
36. According to the Report, inadvertent anchor
strikes are known in the industry to be the principal
threat to offshore pipelines. They are both “increas[ing] in
frequency” and “not influenced by mitigation measures”:
In offshore pipelines . . . inadvertent anchor
deployment and dragging . . . represents the
most significant threat due to shipping activity;
all others being of insignificant magnitude
by comparison. The threat associated with
inadvertent anchor deployment and dragging
involves the potential for a pipeline to be
hooked by anchors that are unintentionally
dropped while ships are under way, and
subsequently dragged, and this threat has
seen a heightened focus on the part of pipeline
owners and operators, due to an increase in
frequency. . . . Because this scenario involves
inadvertent deployment, it is not influenced
by mitigation measures, such as warnings
and signage that are taken to discourage ships
from intentionally deploying anchors within
the Straits of Mackinac.8
37. The Report goes on to explain how, “[i]n bad weather
when there is movement in both the ship and the anchor,
snatches may cause the chain stopper to break or jump,”
rendering anchor mechanisms susceptible to inadvertent
anchor deployment even when operating as designed.9
8. Id. at 2-35 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 2-35-36.
38a
Appendix B
Bad weather conditions commonly occur in the Straits of
Mackinac.
38. Moreover, “[a]fter having unintentionally
dropped the anchor, the inadvertent anchor drop may or
may not be discovered within a short period of time,” a
possibility that, as noted below, is borne out all too well
by the recent anchor strikes in the Straits.10
39. According to the Report, the risk of a pipelineanchor incident depends largely on four “vulnerability
factors”:
(1) size of the pipeline;
(2) water depth (relative to anchor chain
length);
(3) pipeline protection (depth of burial, use of
armoring material); and
(4) number and size distribution of ship
crossings per unit of time.
40. The Straits Pipelines score high on all four of
these factors:
[I]t must be noted that with respect to the above
vulnerability factors, the Straits Crossing
segments cross a busy shipping lane. . . . They
10. Id.
39a
Appendix B
are also situated in water that is shallow,
relative to the anchor chain lengths of most
cargo vessels. Furthermore, a 20-in. diameter
pipeline is small enough to fit between the shank
and flukes of a stockless anchor for a large cargo
vessel, and thus, is physically capable of being
hooked.11
41. The Report further notes that because the
Straits pipelines are, for significant portions of their
length, suspended above the lake bottom, they are
“therefore more vulnerable” to anchor hooking.
42. It would be extremely difficult to deliberately
arrange a more ill-advised setting for exposed pipelines
than at the Straits of Mackinac. The Straits are not
simply a “busy shipping lane,” as described in the Report.
They are the point of convergence for multiple lanes of
high-volume domestic and international shipping traffic,
concentrating that traffic into a dense procession and
funneling it daily across a narrow saddle of lake bottom
between two of the largest, deepest, and most heavily
trafficked lakes in the world.12
43. And on that lake bottom, below the heavily
concentrated procession of ships, lie two 20 -inch
pipelines, at many junctures suspended off the lakebed in
relatively shallow water, approximately 1,200 feet apart,
11. Id.
12. See image at http://w w w.shiptraffic.net /20 01/04 /
mackinac-strait-ship-traffic.html.
40a
Appendix B
perpendicular to the ship traffic, ideally sized and situated
to catch within the shank and flukes of a typical shipping
anchor that is inadvertently deployed.
b.
A nchor St r i ke s Have Ac tua lly
Occurred in the Straits.
44. The risk of anchor strikes at the Straits is very
real. In April 2018, a commercial tug and barge vessel
inadvertently dropped and dragged its anchor across the
lakebed at the Straits (and apparently for several hundred
more miles, unknowingly, until it reached Chicago).13 The
anchor severed or dragged several active and abandoned
electrical transmission cables that lie at the bottom of the
Straits in close proximity to the Line 5 Pipelines.
45. Moreover, both Straits Pipelines were also
struck and dented in three places by the anchor, as it
13. See, e.g., Mark Tower, Broken cables capped as Straits of
Mackinac spill response continues, mlive, Apr. 30, 2018; http://
www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/index.ssf/2018/04/broken_
cables_capped_as_strait.html; Elizabeth Brackett, Straits of
Mackinac Spill Raises New Fears of Great Lakes Disaster, wttw
News (May 1, 2018); https://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2018/05/01/
straits-mackinac-spill-raises-new-fears-great-lakes-disaster;
National Transportation Safety Board Marine Accident Brief
19/12 Anchor Contact of Articulated Tug and Barge Clyde S
VanEnkevort/Erie Trader with Underwater Cables and Pipelines
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/
MAB1912.aspx.
41a
Appendix B
dragged across the lakebed14 though neither ruptured.15
Fortunately, these strikes to the Pipelines happened to
occur at locations where they currently rest on the lakebed
rather than other areas where they are suspended above
it and particularly vulnerable to the risk of “hooking”
identified in the Dynamic Risk Report.
46. The 2018 anchor strikes were not an isolated
event. At least one other anchor strike in the Straits
apparently occurred in April 1979. Correspondence dated
June 14, 1979 from Consumers Energy Company to the
Michigan Department of Natural Resources proposing to
repair damaged electrical cables located on an easement
granted by the Department referred to an outage that
occurred on April 12, 1979 and stated: “Based on our
inspection it is assumed that a ship dragging anchor
accidentally hooked the cables, resulting in breaking two
of the cables and damaging the third and fourth.”
47. In sum, the Report and the actual anchor strikes
show that the Straits Pipelines and shipping patterns
together create an extreme vulnerability for a catastrophic
oil spill. While the US Coast Guard has promulgated a
regulation establishing a Regulated Navigation Area in
14 . S ee , e.g., http s: // w w w.br idgem i.com /m ich ig a nenvironment-watch/watch-video-anchor-damage-line-5-straitsmackinac.
15. See, e.g., Keith Matheny, Line 5 oil pipeline in the Straits
of Mackinac dented by ship, Detroit Free Press, Apr. 11, 2018;
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/04/11/
enbridge-line-oil-pipeline-straits-mackinac/507506002/.
42a
Appendix B
the Straits of Mackinac that generally prohibits anchoring
and loitering or vessels there,16 such measures regulating
intentional anchoring cannot, as noted above, mitigate
the principal threat identified in the Report—accidental
anchor deployment. And while the State of Michigan is
currently considering a regulation intended to reduce that
risk by requiring vessels transiting the Straits to verify
the security of their anchors, such a regulation, even if
adopted as an interim measure, cannot ensure compliance
or eliminate the continuing risk.
2.
Continued Operation of the Straits
Pipelines Carries Substantial, Inherent
Risk.
48. Even apart from their unique susceptibility to
damage from anchor strikes, the Straits Pipelines, like all
hazardous materials pipelines, present inherent risks of
environmental harm. Regardless of a pipeline operator’s
safety culture and the sophistication of its integrity
management system, it has become clear that accidents,
manufacturing defects, human error, and failures of
material are an enduring, inherent feature of hazardous
materials pipeline operation. According to United States
Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) data, since
2014, there have been nearly 12,000 reported “incidents”17
16. See 33 CFR 165.994, 83 Federal Register 49283 (October
1, 2018).
17. An “incident” is defined by PHMSA as a pipeline
occurrence resulting in any of the following: a fatality or injury
43a
Appendix B
(an average of 666 per year) on pipelines across the United
States.18 In that time, Michigan has seen an average of
approximately 20 incidents per year.19
49. Between 2006 and 2018, Enbridge reported
126 pipeline “incidents.” 20 Most notably, in July 2010,
Enbridge’s Line 6B ruptured and for hours continued
to pump crude oil into Talmadge Creek, a tributary of
the Kalamazoo River, near Marshall, Michigan. The
resulting damage to the lands, waters, wildlife, and other
resources of that watershed were extensive, requiring
years of clean-up efforts. The National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) has identified the Marshall spill as
requiring in-patient hospitalization; $50,000 (1984 dollars) or
more in total costs; highly volatile liquid releases of 5 barrels or
more or other liquid releases of 50 barrels or more; liquid releases
resulting in an unintentional fire or explosion. See PHMSA,
Pipeline Incident Flagged Files; www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-andstatistics/pipeline/pipeline-incident-flagged-files.
18. See PHMSA Pipeline Incidents (1999-2018).
19. See PHMSA Pipeline Incidents: Michigan (1999-2018).
20. See PHMSA, Pipeline Incident Flagged Files; www.
phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/pipeline-incidentflagged-files. Another recent compilation of federal data indicates
that “the U.S. portion of the pipeline network owned by Enbridge
and its joint ventures and subsidiaries suffered 307 hazardous
liquids incidents from 2002 to August 2018—around one spill every
20 days on average.” Greenpeace Reports, Dangerous Pipelines:
Enbridge’s History of Spills Threatens Minnesota Waters, at
6 (Nov. 2018); https://w w w.greenpeace.org/usa/wp-content/
uploads/2018/11/Greenpeace-Report-Dangerous-Pipelines.pdf.
44a
Appendix B
“the single most expensive on-shore spill in US history.” 21
In examining the causes of the Line 6B spill, the NTSB
determined that Enbridge “staff failed to recognize that
the pipeline had ruptured until notified by an outside caller
more than 17 hours later.” It concluded “that the Line
6B segment ruptured under normal operating pressure
due to corrosion fatigue cracks” and that “[t]he rupture
and prolonged release were made possible by pervasive
organizational failures at Enbridge[.]” 22
50. While the design of the Straits Pipelines differs
from that of Line 6B, and Enbridge has attested to
improvements in its safety culture and pipeline integrity
protocols since the Marshall spill, significant issues
persist. Enbridge has reported 72 pipeline incidents since
2010.23 And, for example, in recent months, explosions have
at least twice occurred on Enbridge natural gas pipelines.
In October 2018, an Enbridge natural gas pipeline
exploded near Prince George, British Columbia, in close
21. See NTSB News Release, Pipeline Rupture and Oil
Spill Accident Caused by Organizational Failures and Weak
Regulations (July 10, 2012); https://www.ntsb.gov/news/pressreleases/Pages/PR20120710.aspx.
22. NTSB, Accident Repor t: Enbridge Incorporated
Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Rupture and Release, Marshall
Michigan, July 25, 2010 (NTSB Line 6B Report), at xiii, 84, 121;
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/
PAR1201.pdf.
23. PHMSA, Operator Information, Enbridge Energy; https://
primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/operator/OperatorIM_
opid_11169.html? nocache=1967#_OuterPanel_tab_2.
45a
Appendix B
proximity to a First Nation village. 24 In January 2019,
another Enbridge pipeline in Ohio failed with the resulting
“fireball” visible from 15 miles away. 25 Apparently, in each
instance Enbridge’s pipeline inspection technology and
improved safety culture did not predict, much less prevent
these failures.
51. As a part of its analysis of various potential
threats to the integ rity of the Straits Pipelines,
Dynamic Risk sought to identify what it classified as the
“Principal Threats,” i.e., “Threats for which an evaluation
of susceptibility attributes indicates a significant
vulnerability, and that have the potential to provide
the most significant contributions to overall failure
probability.” 26 The threats considered included “incorrect
operations,” which were described as follows:
The threats to transmission pipeline integrity
from incorrect operations include, but are
not necessarily limited to accidental overpressurization, exercising inadequate or
improper corrosion control measures, and
24. Global News, Enbridge natural gas pipeline explodes
near Prince George, Oct. 10, 2018; https://globalnews.ca/
video/4531983/enbridge-natural-gas-pipeline-explodes-nearprince-george.
25. CBC News, Enbridge pipeline explosion sends fireball
into Ohio sky, Jan. 22, 2019; https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
calgary/enbridge-ohio-pipeline-explosion-1.4987897.
26. Dynamic Risk Report, p 98 (emphasis added).
46a
Appendix B
i mprop erly ma i nt a i n i ng, repa i r i ng, or
calibrating piping, fittings, or equipment. 27
52. Dynamic Risk concluded that notwithstanding
the various operational and procedural changes that
Enbridge adopted after the Line 6B failure, “incorrect
operations” remain a Principal Threat for the Straits
Pipelines:
. . . [S]ince the Marshall incident in 2010,
Enbridge has undertaken a review and upgrade
of the management systems by which it controls
its pipeline operations. Despite this, numerous
pipeline investigation analyses have shown that
regardless of the direct cause, some element
of incorrect operations, such as procedural,
process, implementation or training factors
invariably plays a role in the root causes of
pipeline failure. Furthermore, it is often
impossible to foresee in advance what sequence
of events and breakdown in management
systems and operating practices might lead to
failure. For this reason, failures that are related
to incorrect operations cannot be discounted,
and are considered a Principal Threat. 28
53. In sum, continued operation of the Straits
Pipelines presents significant, inherent risks of releases
of hazardous substances into the environment.
27. Id., p 124.
28. Id., p 134.
47a
Appendix B
3.
A n O i l S pi ll at t he St r a it s Risk s
C a t a s t r o p h i c E n v i r o n m e nt a l a n d
Economic Consequences, including Severe
Impairment of Public Trust Rights.
54. As noted above, Independent Risk Analysis for
the Straits Pipelines (Michigan Technological University
(September 2018)), is a report commissioned by the State
and carried out by a multi-disciplinary team of experts
(Michigan Tech Report).
55. The Report analyzed the consequences of a
“worst case” spill of oil from the Straits Pipelines under
various seasonal and other conditions, taking into account
the wide range of resources and activities that would likely
be affected by such a spill.
56. Among other things, water currents in the
Straits are unusually strong, complex, and variable:
Water currents in the Straits of Mackinac
can reach up to 1 [meter per second] and can
also reverse direction every 2-3 days flowing
either easterly into Lake Huron or westerly
towards Lake Michigan. . . . Flow volumes
through the Straits can reach 80,000 [cubic
meters per second] and thus play essential
roles in navigation and shipping in this region,
the transport of nutrients, sediments and
contaminants between Lakes Michigan and
48a
Appendix B
Huron, and also the ecology and biodiversity
of this region. 29
57. Consequently, oil spilled into the Straits could
be transported into either Lake, and depending upon the
season and weather conditions, impact up to hundreds of
miles of Great Lakes shoreline. 30
58. Crude oil contains toxic compounds that would
cause both short- and long-term harm to biota, habitat, and
ecological food webs.31 Numerous species of fish, especially
in their early life stages, as well as their spawning habitats
and their supporting food chains are also at risk from an
oil spill. 32 Viewed as a whole, the ecological impacts would
be both widespread and persistent. 33
59. And “[b]ecause of the unique and complex
environment of the Great Lakes and Straits area . . . ,” it
is uncertain how effectively and at what cost the affected
resources could be restored. 34
60. The Michigan Tech Report also estimated
several forms of natural resources and other economic
29. Michigan Tech Report, p 56.
30. Id., pp 68-69.
31. Id., pp 166-168, 176, 181-185.
32. Id., pp 192-199.
33. Id., pp 213-214.
34. Id., pp 261-264.
49a
Appendix B
damages that would likely result from a worst-case oil spill
from the Straits Pipelines. 35 Among other findings, the
Report estimated large damages to recreational fishing,
recreational boating, commercial fishing, and commercial
navigation, 36 all activities within the core rights subject
to the public trust.
61. Finally, the Report estimated that the total of
all cleanup costs and economic damages that it was able
to measure would be $1.878 billion, but that figure was
necessarily incomplete. 37 A different report conducted by
researchers at Michigan State University, using different
assumptions and methods, estimated the damages from a
spill from the Straits Pipelines at $5.6 billion. 38
62. In any event, regardless of the precise details
of these estimates, it is now apparent that the continued
operation of the Straits Pipelines presents a substantial,
inherent risk of an oil spill and that such a spill would have
grave ecological and economic consequences, impairing
public rights in the Great Lakes and its resources. Given
the magnitude of the threatened harm, continuation of oil
35. Id., pp 271-273.
36. Id., pp 285-294.
37. Id., p ES-31.
38. Nathan Brugnone and Robert B. Richardson, Mich.
State Univ. Dep’t of Cmty. Sustainability, Oil Spill Economics:
Estimates of the Damages of an Oil Spill in the Straits of
Mackinac in Michigan. https://flowforwater.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/05/FLOW_Report_Line-5_Final-release-1.pdf.
50a
Appendix B
transport through the Straits Pipelines is fundamentally
unreasonable and inconsistent with the State’s perpetual
duty to protect the inalienable public trust.
63. An actual controversy exists between the Parties
as to whether (a) the 1953 Easement was void from its
inception in the absence of the due findings required under
the public trust doctrine; and (b) Enbridge’s continued
operation of the Straits Pipelines violates the public trust
and is therefore unlawful.
COUNT II
Public Nuisance
64. Paragraphs 1 through 63 above are re-alleged
and incorporated by reference.
65. At common law, including the common law
of Michigan, a condition, action, or failure to act that
unreasonably interferes with a right common to the
general public is a public nuisance. A condition, action, or
failure to act is unreasonable when it is of a continuing
nature and the actor knows it has a significant effect
upon the public right. 39 The attorney general may bring
an action for injunctive relief to prevent or abate such a
public nuisance.
66. The waters and aquatic resources of Lakes
Huron and Michigan within Michigan’s boundaries are
39. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1979).
51a
Appendix B
held in trust for the benefit of the people of the State of
Michigan. The public rights in those waters and resources
include, but are not limited to, fishing, boating, commercial
navigation, and recreation.
67. By continuing to transport oil through the Straits
Pipelines that lie exposed in the waters of the Great
Lakes where multiple shipping lanes converge, despite
the recently demonstrated risks of anchor strikes, the
inherent risks of pipeline operations, and the foreseeable
consequences of an oil spill at the Straits, Enbridge has
created a continuing, unreasonable risk of catastrophic
harm to public rights. As such, Enbridge is maintaining
a public nuisance.
COUNT III
Michigan Environmental Protection Act
68. Paragraphs 1 through 67 above are re-alleged
and incorporated by reference.
69. Part 17 (Michigan Environmental Protection
Act) of the Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Act, 1994 PA 451, provides:
The attorney general or any person may
maintain an action in the circuit court having
jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred
or is likely to occur for declaratory and equitable
relief against any person for the protection of
the air, water, and other natural resources
52a
Appendix B
and the public trust in those resources from
pollution, impairment, or destruction. MCL
324.1701(1).
70. As set forth above, Enbridge’s conduct—
continuing to transport oil though the Straits Pipelines
in the face of substantial risks of grave environmental
harm—is likely to cause pollution, impairment, or
destruction of the water and other natural resources of
the Great Lakes and the public trust in those resources.
RELIEF REQUESTED
For the reasons stated in this complaint, the Plaintiff
requests that this Court grant the following relief:
A. A declaratory judgment that in the absence of
the due findings required under the public trust doctrine,
the 1953 Easement was void from its inception, and that
Enbridge has no further right to maintain and operate
the Straits Pipelines under its terms;
B. A declaratory judgment that under the present
circumstances, the 1953 Easement violates the public trust
and should be revoked, and that Enbridge has no further
right to maintain and operate the Straits Pipelines under
its terms;
C. A decla rator y judg ment that Enbr idge’s
continued operation of the Straits Pipelines is a public
nuisance subject to abatement;
53a
Appendix B
D. A declarator y judg ment that Enbr idge’s
continued operation of the Straits Pipelines is likely to
cause pollution, impairment, or destruction of water and
other natural resources and the public trust therein and
thereby violates the Michigan Environmental Protection
Act;
E. A permanent injunction requiring Enbridge to
(1) cease operation of the Straits Pipelines as soon as
possible after a reasonable notice period to allow orderly
adjustments by affected parties; and (2) permanently
decommission the Straits Pipelines in accordance
with applicable law and plans approved by the State of
Michigan; and
F. Any other relief that the Court finds just and
reasonable.
Respectfully submitted,
Dana Nessel
Attorney General
/s/ Daniel P. Bock
S. Peter Manning (P45719)
Division Chief
Robert P. Reichel (P31878)
First Assistant
Daniel P. Bock (P71246)
Charles A. Cavanagh (P79171)
Assistant Attorneys General
54a
Appendix B
Environment, Natural Resources,
and Agriculture Division
P.O. Box 30755
Lansing, MI 48909
(517) 335-7664
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BockD@michigan.gov
CavanaghC2@michigan.gov
Dated: June 27, 2019
55a
Appendix
C
APPENDIX
C — EXCERPT
OF
STATE DOCKET SHEET
INGHAM COUNTY 30TH CIRCUIT
313 W. Kalamazoo St.
LANSING, MICHIGAN 48933
Case Number
Status
19-000474-CE-C30
OPEN
In The Matter Of
ATTY GEN MI VS
DEFENDANT: ENBRIDGE
ENERGY COMPANY, INC et al
Party
Type
ATTY GEN MI
PLNTF
525 W OTTAWA ST
FL 6
PO BOX 30755
LANSING, MI
48933
ENBRIDGE
ENERGY
COMPANY, INC
DFNDT
Judge
JAMO, JAMES S
Action
COMPLAINT W/
SUMMONS
Attorneys
MANNING, S.
PETER
ASSISTANT
ATTORNEY
GENERAL
P. O. BOX 30755
LANSING, MI
48909
ELLSWORTH,
PETER H.
215 S
WASHINGTON
SQ #200
LANSING, MI
43933
56a
Appendix C
ENBRIDGE
ENERGY
PARTNERS, L. P
DFNDT
ENBRIDGE
ENERGY,
LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP
DFNDT
AMICUS SIERRA
CLUB
INPTY
Opened
Judgment Date
06/27/2019
Comments:
ELLSWORTH,
PETER H.
215 S
WASHINGTON
SQ #200
LANSING, MI
48933
ELLSWORTH,
PETER H.
215 S
WASHINGTON
SQ #200
LANSING, MI
48933
Case Type
CE – ENVIRONMENT
57a
Appendix C
No. Date of Operator Pleadings
Original Balance
Filing
and Actions
Amt
Due
Journal Book- Due/Amt
Page-Nbr
DisRef Nbr missed
1
12/16/21 jliles
EVENT
0.00
0.00
CANCELLED
The following
event: STATUS
CONFERENCE
scheduled for 01/07/2022
at 2:00 pm has been
resulted as follows:
2
Result: CANCELLED
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
Location: COURTROOM 7 –
VETERANS MEMORIAL
Result Staff:
Staff: COURT REPORTER:
WERNER, KELLI
Certification Number: 6610
12/15/21 dmiracle NOTICE OF
0.00
0.00
FILING OF
NOTICE OF
REMOVALW/PS
58a
Appendix C
3
11/30/21 jliles
HEARING
0.00
0.00
SET:
Event: STATUS
CONFERENCE
Date: 01/07/2022 Time: 2:00 pm
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
Location: COURTROOM 7 –
VETERANS MEMORIAL
Result: CANCELLED
4
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kamilton
5
08/18/21
kamilton
6
07/28/21
kamilton
1
1
1
7
02/26/21
wrightt
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0.00
(JOINT
STATUS
REPORT)
NOTICE
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0.00
(JOINT
STATUS
REPORT)
ORDER
0.00
0.00
THAT JOINT
STIPULATED
WRITTEN STATUS
UPDATE BE PROVIDED
TO THIS COURT
BEFORE 8-18-21
JOINT
0.00
0.00
INTERIM
STATUS
REPORT
59a
Appendix C
8
01/20/21
kamilton
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9
10
01/15/21
12/28/20
jliles
jliles
ORDER
0.00
0.00
THAT PROCEEDINGS
IN THIS CASE SHALL
BE HELD IN ABEYANCE
UNTIL FURTHER ORDER
OF THIS COURT
HELD BUT
0.00
0.00
NOT ON THE RECORD
The following event: STATUS
CONFERENCE scheduled for
01/15/2021 at 9:00 am has been
resulted as follows:
Result: HELD BUT
NOT ON RECORD
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
Location: COURTROOM 7 –
VETERANS MEMORIAL
Result Staff:
Staff: COURT REPORTER:
WERNER, KELLI
Certification Number: 6610
HEARING
0.00
0.00
SET:
Event: STATUS
CONFERENCE
Date: 01/15/2021 Time: 9:00 am
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
Location: COURTROOM 7 –
VETERANS MEMORIAL
60a
Appendix C
11
09/24/20
kamilton
1
12
09/23/20
kamilton
1
Result: HELD BUT
NOT ON RECORD
STIPULATION
0.00
AND ORDER OF
THE PARTIES AND
PROPOSED ORDER
TO AMEND THE
THIRD TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING
ORDER AND FULLY
RESOLVE THE
PENDING MOTIONS
FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING
ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS
PROOF OF
0.00
SERVICE
ON 092420
A COPY
OF STIP
& ORDER
BY EMAIL
UPON
ATTY
GENERAL
0.00
0.00
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14
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kamilton
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kamilton
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1
PROOF OF
0.00
SERVICE ON
091820 A COPY OF
(9-18-20 JOINT
STATUS REPORT)
BY MAIL UPON
PARTIES OF
RECORD
PROOF OF
0.00
SERVICE
ON 091820
A COPY OF
(SEPTEMBER 18,
2020 JOINT
STATUS
REPORT)
PROOF OF
0.00
SERVICE ON
091120 A COPY OF
STATUS REPORT
BY MAIL UPON
PARTIES OF
RECORD
(STATUS
REPORT)
0.00
0.00
0.00
62a
Appendix C
16
09/09/20
kamilton
1
17
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kamilton
18
08/24/20
kamilton
1
1
STIPULATION
0.00
TO MODIFY
SECOND
AMENDED
TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING
ORDER TO ALLOW
FOR RESTART OF
EAST LINE IN
ACCORDANCE
WITH PHMSA
SEPTEMBER 4, 2020
LETTER
NOTICE OF
0.00
COMPLETION OF
IN LINE
INSECTION
ON THE
EAST
PIPELINE
ORDER
0.00
SECOND
AMENDED
TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
0.00
0.00
0.00
63a
Appendix C
19
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ksmith
HELD
0.00
BUT NOT
ON THE
RECORD
The following
event: STATUS
CONFERENCE
scheduled for
08/03/2020 at 1:30 pm
has been resulted
as follows:
0.00
Result: HELD BUT
NOT ON RECORD
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
Location: COURTROOM 7 –
VETERANS MEMORIAL
Result Staff:
Staff: COURT REPORTER:
DEXTER, MELINDA
Certification Number: 4629
64a
Appendix C
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ksmith
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tsmith
22
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ksmith
HEARING
0.00
0.00
SET:
Event: STATUS
CONFERENCE
Date: 08/03/2020 Time: 1:30 pm
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
Location: COURTROOM 7 –
VETERANS MEMORIAL
Result: HELD BUT
NOT ON RECORD
DEF 7-27-20
0.00
0.00
STATUS
REPORT
HELD BUT
0.00
0.00
NOT ON THE RECORD
The following event:
STATUS CONFERENCE
scheduled for 07/20/2020
at 3:30 pm has been
resulted as follows:
Result: HELD BUT
NOT ON RECORD
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
Location: COURTROOM 7 –
VETERANS MEMORIAL
Result Staff:
Staff: COURT REPORTER:
DEXTER, MELINDA
Certification Number: 4629
65a
Appendix C
23
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kamilton
24
07/20/20
ksmith
1
NOTICE OF
0.00
0.00
DF’S JULY
17, 2020
STATUS
REPORT
W/PS
HEARING
0.00
0.00
SET:
The following event:
STATUS CONFERENCE
scheduled for 07/20/2020 at
11:00 am has been rescheduled
as follows:
Event: STATUS
CONFERENCE
Date: 07/20/2020 Time: 3:30 pm
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
Location: COURTROOM 7 –
VETERANS MEMORIAL
25
07/20/20
ksmith
Result: HELD BUT
NOT ON RECORD
HEARING
0.00
0.00
ADJOURNED
The following event:
STATUS CONFERENCE
scheduled for 07/20/2020 at
11:00 am has been resulted
as follows:
66a
Appendix C
26
27
28
07/13/20
ksmith
Result: C30 ADJOURNED
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
Location: COURTROOM 7 –
VETERANS MEMORIAL
Result Staff:
Staff: COURT REPORTER:
DEXTER, MELINDA
Certification Number: 4629
HEARING
0.00
0.00
SET:
Event: STATUS
CONFERENCE
Date: 07/20/2020 Time: 11:00 am
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
Location: COURTROOM 7 –
VETERANS MEMORIAL
Result: C30 ADJOURNED
07/09/20 kamilton DFS
0.00
0.00
1
NOTICE
REGARDING IN
LINE INSPECTION
RESULTS FOR WEST
PIPELINE FEATURE
OF INTEREST – W/PS
07/09/20 jwhorton MOTION
20.00
0.00
FEE
Receipt: 467238
Date: 07/09/2020
67a
Appendix C
29
07/08/20
rbuck
30
07/07/20
kamilton
1
31
07/07/20
kamilton
1
32
07/01/20
kamilton
1
TRAN0.00
0.00
SCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS –
JUNE 30, 2020 HEARING
ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
JOINT
0.00
0.00
STATUS REPORT
AND STIPULATION
REGARDING LIST
OF DOCUMENTS
TO BE PRODUCED
AS PROVIDED IN
AMENDED TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
DATED JULY 1, 2020
PL’S
0.00
0.00
SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DFS
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION W/PS
AMENDED
0.00
0.00
TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
68a
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33
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wrightt
34
07/01/20
wrightt
35
06/30/20
ksmith
AMENDED
0.00
TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
NOTICE OF
0.00
DEF’S
SUPPLEMENTAL
SUBMISSION OF
ADDITIONAL
MATERIALS
REFERENCED
DURING
JUNE 30, 2020
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
HEARING
HEARING
0.00
HELD ON
THE RECORD
The following event:
MOTION FOR IN
JUNCTION/TRO
scheduled for 06/30/2020
at 1:30 pm has been
resulted as follows:
0.00
0.00
0.00
69a
Appendix C
36
06/30/20
kamilton
1
37
06/30/20
wrightt
Result: HEARING HELD
ON THE RECORD
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
Location: COURTROOM 7 –
VETERANS MEMORIAL
Result Staff:
Staff: COURT REPORTER:
DEXTER, MELINDA
Certification Number: 4629
MOTION OF
0.00
0.00
CITY OF
MACKINAC ISLAND,
GRAND TRAVERSE
BAND OF OTTAWA AND
CHIPPEWA INDIANS AND
STRAITS OF MACKINAC
ALLIANCE FOR LEAVE
TO FILE AMICUS
CURIAE BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PL’S MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION W/PS
REQUEST
0.00
0.00
FOR FILM AND
ELECTRONIC
MEDIA
COVERAGE
OF COURT
PROCEEDINGS
70a
Appendix C
38
06/30/20
dlopez
39
06/30/20
kamilton
1
40
06/30/20
kamilton
1
MOTION
20.00
FEE
Receipt: 467021
Date: 07/01/2020
REQUEST
0.00
FOR FILM AND
ELECTRONIC
MEDIA COVERAGE
OF COURT
PROCEEDINGS
TO RECORD
HRG ON 063020
@ 1:30 PM
ORDER ON
0.00
MOTION
TO FILE AMICUS
BRIEFS, GRANTS
OF AMERICAN
PETROLEUM
AND AMERICAN
FUEL AND
PETROCHEMICAL
THE CITY OF
MACKINAC
ISLAND, GRAND
TRAVERS BAND
OF OTTAWA
AND CHIPPEWA
INDIANS AND
0.00
0.00
0.00
71a
Appendix C
41
06/30/20
kamilton
1
STRAITS OF
MACKINAW AND
ATTYS GENERAL
OHIO, INDIANA
AND LOUISIANA
STATE0.00
MENT
PURSUANT
REGARDING
MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE
AMICUS CURIAE
BRIEF OF CITY
OF MACKINAC
ISLAND, GRAND
TRAVERSE BAND
OF OTTAWA
AND CHIPPEWA
INDIANS AND
STRAITS OF
MACKINAC
ALLIANCE IN
SUPPORT OF PL’S
MOTION FOR
PRELMINARY
INJUNCTION W/PS
0.00
72a
Appendix C
42
06/30/20
kamilton
1
43
06/30/20
kamilton
1
PROOF OF
0.00
SERVICE ON
062920 A COPY OF
SUPPLEMENTAL
SUBMISSION VIA
EMAIL UPON
COUNSEL OF
RECORD
MOTION
0.00
OF THE CITY
OF MACKINAC
ISLAND, GRAND
TRAVERSE BAND
OF OTTAWA
AND CHIPPEWA
INDIANS AND
STRAITS OF
MACKINAC
ALLIANCE
FOR LEAVE TO
FILE AMICUS
CURIAE BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF
PLS MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
– BRIEF IN
SUPPORT W/POS
0.00
0.00
73a
Appendix C
44
06/30/20
kamilton
1
45
06/30/20
kamilton
1
46
06/29/20
kamilton
1
DFS
0.00
SUPPLEMENTAL
SUBMISSION OF
ADDITIONAL
INTERESTED
PARTY LETTERS
IN SUPPORT OF
DFS RESPONSE
TO PL’S
MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
NOTICE
0.00
(LETTER
FROM ACTOHIO/
EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR
MATTHEW
SOLLOSI
ORDER
0.00
GRANTING
PL’S MOTION
FOR LEAVE
TO FILE
REPLY BRIEF
IN EXCESS OF
FIVE PAGES
0.00
0.00
0.00
74a
Appendix C
47
06/29/20
kamilton
1
48
06/29/20
kamilton
1
OHIO
0.00
ATTORNEY
GENERALK
DAVE YOST’S
MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE
AN AMICUS
CURIAE BRIEF
INSTANTER
ON BEHALF OF
THE STATE OF
OHIO THE STATE
INDIANA, AND
THE STATE OF
LOUISIANA
REGARDING
ECONOMIC HARM
RESULTING
FROM A LINE
5 SHUTDOWN
– BRIEF IN
SUPPORT W/PS
ORDER
0.00
THAT THE COURT
GRANTS DFS
MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE
BRIEF IN EXCESS
OF 20 PAGES
AND ACCEPTS
DF BRIEF IN
RESPONSE
0.00
0.00
75a
Appendix C
49
06/29/20
kamilton
1
50
06/29/20
kamilton
51
06/29/20
kamilton
52
06/29/20
kamilton
1
1
1
DFS’
0.00
SUPPLEMENTAL
PROCEEDINGS
SUBMISSION OF
CORRESPONDENCE FROM
PHMSA IN
SUPPORT OF
DFS RESPONSE
TO PL’S
MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
PL’S
0.00
REPLY IN
SUPPORT
OF MOTION
FOR PRELMINARY
INJUNCTION
INDEX
0.00
EXHIBITS
PL’S
0.00
MOTION
FOR LEAVE
TO FILE
REPLY
BRIEF IN
EXCESS
OF FIVE
PAGES W/PS
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
76a
Appendix C
53
54
55
56
06/29/20
DFS
0.00
1
SUPPLEMENTAL
SUBMISSION OF
INTERESTED
PARTY LETTERS
IN SUPPORT OF
DFS RESPONSE
TO PL’S MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
06/29/20 jwhorton MOTIONFEE
20.00
Receipt: 467009
Date: 06/30/2020
06/29/20 kamilton DECLARA0.00
1
TION OF MARK
MAXWELL IN
SUPPORT OF
ENBRIDGE
ENERGY, LP’S
OPPOSITION TO
THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
06/29/20 kamilton AFFIDAVIT
0.00
1
OF MIKE MOELLER
IN SUPPORT
OF ENBRIDGE
ENERGY, LP’S
OPPOSITION TO
PL’S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
kamilton
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
77a
Appendix C
57
06/29/20
kamilton
1
58
06/29/20
kamilton
1
59
06/29/20
tperkins
0.00
NOTICE FROM
PHILLIP
DEROSIER
REGARDING
AFFIDAVI’T OF
MIKE MOELLER
INADVERTENLY
OMITTED PAGE 15
MOTION OF
0.00
AMERICA
PETROLEUM
INSTITUTE
ASSOCIATION OF
OIL PIPE LINES
AND AMERICAN
FUEL &
PETROCHEMICAL
MANUFACTURERS
FOR LEAVE TO
FILE AMICUS
CURIAE BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF DFS
OPPOSITION TO
PL’S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
MOTIONFEE
20.00
Receipt: 467009
Date: 06/30/2020
0.00
0.00
0.00
78a
Appendix C
60
06/29/20
kamilton
1
61
06/29/20
kamilton
62
06/29/20
kamilton
1
1
63
06/29/20
kamilton
1
PROOF OF
0.00
SERVICE ON
062620 A COPY OF
AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT OF DF
RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO
PL’S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
UPON COUNSEL
OF RECORD VIA
INDEX OF
0.00
AFFIDAVITS
DFS
RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO
PL’S MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
PROOF OF
0.00
SERVICE ON
062620 A COPY OF
DF RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO
PL MOTION FOR
PRELMINARY
INJUNCTION
VIA EMAIL UPON
PARTIES OF RECORD
0.00
0.00
0.00
79a
Appendix C
64
06/29/20
kamilton
1
65
06/29/20
kamilton
1
66
06/29/20
tperkins
PROOF OF
0.00
SERVICE ON
062620 A COPY
OF AFFIDAVITS
IN SUPPORT OF
DFS RESPONSE
IN OPPOSITION
TO PL MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION VIA EMAIL
UPON PARTIES OF
RECORD
DFS
0.00
MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE
BRIEF EXCESS
OF TWENTY
PAGES – NOTICE
OF HEARING
MOTION
20.00
FEE
Receipt: 466929
Date: 06/29/2020
0.00
0.00
0.00
80a
Appendix C
67
06/25/20
jliles
68
06/25/20
kamilton
69
06/24/20
kamilton
1
1
HEARING
0.00
SET:
Event: MOTION FOR
IN JUNCTION/TRO
Date: 06/30/2020
Time: 1:30 pm
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
Location:
COURTROOM 7 –
VETERANS
MEMORIAL
Result: HEARING
HELD ON THE
RECORD
TEMPO0.00
RARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
DFS
0.00
RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO
PL’SM MOTION
FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING
ORDER PENDING
HEARING ON
MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION –
EXHIBITS W/PS
0.00
0.00
0.00
81a
Appendix C
70
71
72
06/23/20
PROOF OF
0.00
1
SERVICE ON
062220 A COPY
OF PL’S EX PARTE
MOTION FOR
RESTRAINING
ORDER BY MAIL
UPON COUNSEL
OF RECORD
06/23/20 kamilton PL’S
0.00
1
EXPARTE
MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING
ORDER PENDING
HEARING ON
MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION –
BRIEF IN SUPPORT
– NOTICE OF
HEARING W/PS
06/23/20 jwhorton MOTION
20.00
FEE
Receipt: 466922
Date: 06/29/2020
kamilton
0.00
0.00
0.00
82a
Appendix C
73
06/22/20
kamilton
74
06/02/20
rbuck
75
06/01/20
lciava
SUPPLE0.00
MENTAL
BRIEF IN
SUPPORT
OF DFS
MOTION
FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION W/PS
TRAN0.00
SCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS
STIPULA0.00
TION AND
ORDER FOR
SUBMISSION OF
SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEFS
FOLLOWING
THE MAY 22, 2020
HEARING ON THE
PARTIES’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION – IT
IS ORDERED DEF
SHALL SUBMIT
SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEF ADDRESSING
ISSUES IDENTIFIED
0.00
0.00
0.00
83a
Appendix C
76
05/29/20
lciava
BY THE COURT BY
6/19/20, LIMITED
TO 20 PAGES
(EXCLUSIVE OF
COVER PAGE,
TABLES, INDEXES
AND EXHIBITS) .
THE PLAINTIFF
SHALL RESPOND
TO THE ISSUES
ADDRESSED
IN DEF’S
SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEF BY 7/3/20,
LIMITED
TO 20 PAGES
(EXCLUSIVE OF
COVER PAGE,
TABLES, INDEXES
AND EXHIBITS)
PROOF OF
0.00
SERVICE –
ON 5/29/20 THE
STIPULATION
AND ORDER FOR
SUBMISSION OF
SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEFTS
FOLLOWING THE
5/22/20 HEARING
ON THE PARTIES’
0.00
84a
Appendix C
77
05/22/20
jliles
MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION WAS
SERVED UPON
DANIEL P. BOCK
VIA EMAIL
HEARING
0.00
0.00
HELD ON
THE RECORD
The following event:
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION scheduled
for 05/22/202 at 9:00 am
has been resulted
as follows:
Result: HEARING
HELD ON
THE RECORD
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
Location: COURTROOM 7 –
VETERANS
MEMORIAL
Result Staff:
Staff: COURT REPORTER:
DEXTER, MELINDA
Certification Number: 4629
85a
Appendix C
78
79
05/22/20
02/20/20
jliles
lciava
HEARING
0.00
0.00
HELD ON
THE RECORD
The following event:
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION scheduled
for 05/22/2020 at 9:00 am
has been resulted
as follows:
Result: HEARING
HELD ON
THE RECORD
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
Location: COURTROOM 7 –
VETERANS
MEMORIAL
Result Staff:
Staff: COURT REPORTER:
DEXTER, MELINDA
Certification Number: 4629
ORDER –
0.00
0.00
THE COURT
NOW FINDS
THAT THE
FOLLOWING
PROSPECTIVE
AMICI HAVE
COMPLIED
WITH THE
86a
Appendix C
80
02/11/20
lciava
81
02/11/20
lciava
82
02/07/20
lciava
REQUIRED
DISCLOSURES
AND NOW
ACCEPTS THEIR
SUBMITTED
BRIEFS FOR
CONSIDERATION:
THE SIERRA
CLUB, THE GREAT
LAKES BUSINESS
NETWORK,
FOR LOVE OF
WATER (FLOW)
AND THE CHITY
OF MACKINAC
ISLAND – W/ PS
NOTICE OF
0.00
HEARING
W/ PS
BRIEF OF
0.00
AMICUS
CURIAE
NOTICE OF
0.00
HEARING
W/ PS
(5/22/20
@ 9AM)
0.00
0.00
0.00
87a
Appendix C
83
84
02/07/20
02/07/20
ksmith
ksmith
HEARING
0.00
0.00
SET:
Event: MOTION
FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION
Date: 05/22/2020
Time: 9:00 am
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
Location: COURTROOM 7 –
VETERANS MEMORIAL
Result: HEARING HELD
ON THE RECORD
HEARING
0.00
0.00
SET:
Event: MOTION
FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION
Date: 05/22/2020
Time: 9:00 am
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
Location: COURTROOM 7 –
VETERANS MEMORIAL
Result: HEARING HELD
ON THE RECORD
88a
Appendix C
85
02/05/20
lciava
86
02/03/20
lciava
87
02/03/20
lciava
AMENDED
0.00
0.00
MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE
AMICUS CURIAE
BRIEF OF GREAT LAKES
BUSINESS NETWORK –
WITH BRIEF OF AMICUS
CURIAE GREAT LAKES
BUSINESS NETWORK –
W/ PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE0.00
0.00
MENT PURUSANT
TO MCR 7.212(H)(3)
AND 7.312(H)(4)
REGARDING MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF
OF CITY OF MACKINAC
ISLAND IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF AND
IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS W/ PS
STATE0.00
0.00
MENT PURSUANT
TO MCR 7.212(H)(3)
AND 7.312(H)(4)
REGARDING MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF
OF FOR LOVE OF WATER
(FLOW) IN SUPPORT OF
89a
Appendix C
88
89
01/31/20
01/27/20
jliles
lciava
PLAINTIFF AND
IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS W/ PS
HEARING
0.00
0.00
HELD ON
THE RECORD
The following event:
STATUS CONFERENCE
scheduled for 01/31/2020
at 9:00 am has been resulted
as follows:
Result: HEARING HELD
ON THE RECORD
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
Location: COURTROOM 7 –
VETERANS MEMORIAL
Result Staff:
Staff: COURT REPORTER:
DEXTER, MELINDA
Certification Number: 4629
ORDER –
0.00
0.00
THE AMERICAN
PETROLEUM
INSTITUTE,
ASSOCIATION
OF OIL PIPE LINES
AND AMERICAN
FUEL AND
PETROMECHANICAL
MANUFACTURERS’
90a
Appendix C
90
01/02/20
kamilton
1
91
01/02/20
tperkins
MOTION TO FILE AN
AMICUS BRIEF IS
THEREFORE GRANTED
AND THEIR BRIEF
IS ACCEPTED, AND
THEY DO NOT NEED
TO DO ANYTHING IN
RESPONSE TO THIS
ORDER. W/ PS
MOTION
0.00
0.00
OF AMERICAN
PETROLEUM
INSTITUTE,
ASSOCIATION OF
OIL PIPE LINE AND
AMERICAN FUEL AND
PETROCHEMICAL
MANUFACTURERS
FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMICUS CURIAE
BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF DFS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
– BRIEF IN SUPPORT
MOTION
20.00
0.00
FEE
Receipt: 460469
Date: 01/02/2020
91a
Appendix C
92
12/30/19
wrightt
93
12/30/19
tperkins
94
12/12/19
kamilton
1
95
12/11/19
kamilton
1
MOTION
0.00
0.00
OF THE CITY
OF MACKINAC
ISLAND FOR
LEAVE TO FILE
AMICUS CURIAE
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PL – AMICUS CURIAE
BRIEF OF CITY OF
MACKINAC ISLAND
IN SUPPORT OF PL
AND IN OPPOSITION
TO DEF – W/ PS
MOTION
20.00
0.00
FEE
Receipt: 460348
Date: 12/30/2019
ORDER
0.00
0.00
AND NOTICE
OF STATUS
CONFERENCE
ON 1-31-20 @ 9 AM
ORDER
0.00
0.00
THAT BRIEF
TO BE FILED
ON 1-3-20
92a
Appendix C
96
97
12/11/19
12/10/19
jliles
kamilton
1
98
12/10/19
kamilton
1
HEARING
0.00
0.00
SET:
Event: STATUS
CONFERENCE
Date: 01/31/2020
Time: 9:00 am
Judge: JAMO, JAMES S
VETERANS
MEMORIAL
Location:
COURTROOM 7 –
Result: HEARING HELD
ON THE RECORD
PL’S REPLY
0.00
0.00
BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR
PARTIAL
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION W/PS
REPLY
0.00
0.00
BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF
DFS MOTION
FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION
93a
Appendix C
99
12/10/19
kamilton
1
100 12/10/19
lciava
101 12/06/19
buck
MOTION
0.00
LEAVE TO
FILE AMICUS
CURIAE BRIEF
OF GREAT LAKE
BUSINESS
NETWORK – BRIEF
IN SUPPORT W/PS
MOTION
20.00
FEE
Receipt: 459646
Date: 12/10/2019
AMICUS
0.00
CURIAE BRIEF
OF FOR LOVE OF
WATER (FLOW)
IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION AND
OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION
0.00
0.00
0.00
94a
Appendix C
102 12/06/19
buck
103 12/06/19
buck
104 12/06/19
tperkins
PROOF OF
0.00
SERVICE
MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO
FILE AMICUS
CURIAE BRIEF
OF FOR LOVE OF
WATER (FLOW)
IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF AND
IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANTS
AND BRIEF IN
SUPPORT
MOTION
0.00
FOR LEAVE
TO FILE AMICUS
CURIAE BRIEF
OF FOR LOVE OF
WATER (FLOW)
IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF AND
IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANTS
MOTION
20.00
FEE
Receipt: 459475
Date: 12/06/2019
0.00
0.00
0.00
95a
Appendix C
105 11/27/19
buck
106 11/26/19
kamilton
1
107 11/25/19
kamilton
1
ORDER FOR
0.00
ADMISSION
OF OUT OF
STATE ATTY
FOR AMICUS
SIERRA CLUB
WITH PS
MOTION
0.00
FOR LEAVE
TO FILE
BRIEF AMICUS
CURIAE AND
BRIEF AMICUS
CURIAE OF THE
ATTORNEYS
GENERAL OF
MINNESOTA
CALIFORNIA
AND WISCONSIN
IN SUPPORT
OF PL – BRIEF
IN SUPPORT –
AFFIDAVIT OF
SERVICE
AMENDED
0.00
MOTION FOR
PRO HAC VICE
ADMISSION OF
LAURENS H
SILVER
0.00
0.00
0.00
96a
Appendix C
108 11/25/19
lciava
109 11/18/19
kamilton
1
110 11/18/19
kamilton
1
111 11/18/19
kamilton
1
112 11/15/19
kamilton
1
MOTION
20.00
FEE
Receipt: 458945
Date: 11/26/2019
NOTIFICA0.00
TION PURSUANT
TO MCR 8.126(A)(1)(b)
C/O LAURENS
SILVER
ORDER
0.00
REVERSING
ADMISSION OF
OUT OF STATE
ATTY LAURENS
SILVER
NOTIFICA0.00
TION PURSUANT
TO MCR 8.126(A)(1)(b)
FROM STATE
BAR REGARDING
ELIGIBILITY
ORDER FOR
0.00
ADMISSION
OF OUT OF
STATE ATTORNEY
LAURENS SILVER
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
97a
Appendix C
113 11/15/19
kamilton
1
114 11/14/19
kamilton
1
115 11/14/19
kamilton
1
116 11/14/19
kamilton
1
ORDER FOR
0.00
ADMISSION OF
OUT OF STATE
ATTORNEY OF
LEIGH CURRIE
W/PS
MOTION
0.00
FOR PRO HAC
VICE ADMISSION
OF LAURENS H
SILVER
PL’S SIERRA
0.00
CLUB MOTION
FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION
– BRIEF IN
SUPPORT W/PS
NOTICE OF
0.00
APPEARANCE
OF NICHOLAS
LEONARD AND
LAURENS H
SILVER ON
BEHALF OF
AMICUS CURAE
SIERRA CLUBX
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
98a
Appendix C
117 11/14/19
dlopez
118 11/12/19
kamilton
1
119 11/12/19
kamilton
1
120 11/12/19
kamilton
1
MOTION
20.00
FEE
Receipt: 458368
Date: 11/15/2019
PL’S BRIEF
0.00
IN OPPOSITION
TO DFS MOTION
FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION
ATTY
0.00
GENERAL’S
MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY
ADMISSION OF
OUT OF STATE
ATTORNEY
LEIGH K CURRIE
– AFFIDAVIT OF
LEIGH CURRIE
IN SUPPOT OF
ADMISSION PRO
HAC VICE W/PS
DFS’
0.00
RESPONSE
TO PL’S
MOTION
FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
99a
Appendix C
121 11/12/19
kamilton
1
122 11/12/19
tperkins
123 10/24/19
kamilton
1
124 09/16/19
kamilton
1
PROOF OF
0.00
SERVICE ON
111219 A COPY
OF DFS
RESPONSE TO
PL’S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMM
DISP BY MAIL
UPON PARTIES
OF RECORD
MOTION
20.00
FEE
Rcceipt: 458214
Date: 11/12/2019
STIPULA0.00
TION AND
ORDER
AMENDING
BRIEFING
SCHEDULE FOR
CROSS MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION
DFS’
0.00
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION
– BRIEF IN
SUPPORT –
W/PS
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100a
Appendix C
125 09/16/19
kamilton
1
126 09/16/19
dlopez
127 09/16/19
dlopez
128 08/02/19
kamilton
1
PL’S MOTION
0.00
FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION
– BRIEF IN
SUPPORT –
W/PS
MOTION
20.00
FEE
Receipt: 454961
Date: 09/16/2019
MOTION
20.00
FEE
Receipt: 454951
Date: 09/16/2019
PROOF OF
0.00
SERVICE ON
080119 A COPY
OF ORDER
GRANTING
UNOPPOSED
MOTIONS FOR
TEMPORARY
ADMISSION OF
OUT OF STATE
BY MAIL UPON
PARTIES OF
RECOD
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
101a
Appendix C
129 07/30/19
kamilton
1
130 07/29/19
kamilton
1
ORDER
0.00
GRANTING
UNOPPOSED
MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY
ADMISSION OF
OUT OF STATE
ATTORNEY
JOSHUA RUNYAN;
ATTORNEY ALICE
LOUGHRAN;
ATTORNEY
WILLIAM
HASSLER; DAVID
COBURN WPS
UN0.00
OPPOSED
MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY
ADMISSION OF
OUT OF STATE
ATTORNEY
JOSHUA RUNYAN;
ATTORNEY ALICE
LOUGHRAN;
ATTORNEY
WILLIAM
HASSLER;
DAVID COBURN
WPS
0.00
0.00
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Appendix C
131 07/29/19
dlopez
132 07/24/19
kamilton
1
133 07/23/19
kamilton
1
134 07/22/19
kamilton
1
MOTION
20.00
FEE
Receipt: 452251
Date: 07/29/2019
PROOF OF
0.00
SERVICE ON
072419 A COPY
OF ORDER
EXTENDING
TIME BY MAIL
UPON PARTIES
OF RECORD
STIPULA0.00
TION AND
ORDER
EXTENDING
TIME FOR DEFS
TO RESPOND TO
COMPLAINT AND
TO SET BRIEFING
SCHEDULE AND
PAGE LIMITS FOR
INITIAL CROSS
MOTION FOR
SUMM DISP
APPEAR0.00
ANCE ON BEHALF
OF DFS Attorney:
ELLSWORTH,
PETER H. (23657)
W/PS
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
103a
Appendix C
135 07/12/19
PROOF OF
0.00
0.00
1
SERVICE
ON070119 A
COPY OF
SUMMONS &
COMPLAINT
SERVED UPON
THE CORPORATION
COMPANY
136 06/27/19 bkiesel COMPLAINT 150.00
0.00
FILED
Receipt: 450757
Date: 06/27/2019
137 06/27/19 bkiesel SUMMONS
0.00 0.00
ISSUED
Totals By: COURT COSTS 470.00 0.00
kamilton
INFORMATION
*** End of Report ***
0.00
0.00
104a
APPENDIX D —Appendix
MOTIONDOF ENBRIDGE,
CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE 30TH JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT, INGHAM COUNTY,
FILED SEPTEMBER 16, 2019
STATE OF MICHIGAN
CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE 30TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
INGHAM COUNTY
Case No.: 19-474-CE
Hon. James S. Jamo
DANA NESSEL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF MICHIGAN, ON BEHALF OF THE
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
ENBRIDGE ENERGY COMPANY, INC., AND
ENBRIDGE ENERGY PARTNERS, L.P.,
Defendants.
Filed September 16, 2019
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Defendants Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership,
Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., and Enbridge Energy
Partners, L.P. (collectively, “Enbridge”) move for
summary disposition of the Attorney General’s Complaint.
105a
Appendix D
As further discussed in Enbridge’s supporting brief,
Count I.A. should be dismissed under MCR 2.116(C)(7)
and/or (8) because the Attorney General cannot show
that the 1953 Easement within which Enbridge’s Line 5
dual pipelines operate was invalid from its inception and,
in any event, her challenge to the Easement’s issuance
comes far too late. Count I.B. should be dismissed under
MCR 2.116(C)(4) and/or (8) because the Attorney General’s
public trust claim has been subsumed by the Michigan
Environmental Protection Act (MEPA), MCL 324.1701 et
seq., improperly seeks termination on grounds not provided
in the Easement itself and is preempted by federal law.
Count II (public nuisance) should be dismissed under MCR
2.116(C)(8) because the alleged risk of harm inherent in
Line 5’s continued operation is impermissibly speculative.
Finally, Count II (request for relief under MEPA) should
be dismissed under MCR 2.116(C)(8) because the Attorney
General’s Complaint does not adequately allege that harm
to the environment has “occurred or is likely to occur.”
Accordingly, Enbridge respectfully requests that
the Court grant its motion for summary disposition and
dismiss the Attorney General’s Complaint in its entirety.
Respectfully submitted,
STEPTOE & JOHNSON
LLP
David H . Coburn
(DC 241901)
William T. Hassler
(DC 366916)
DICKINSON WRIGHT
PLLC
By: /s/ Peter Ellsworth
Peter H. Ellsworth
(P23687)
106a
Appendix D
Alice Loughran
(DC 470792)
Joshua Runyan
(DC 977664)
1330 Connecticut
Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 429·8063
Jeffery V. Stuckey (P34648)
Ryan M. Shannon (P74535)
215 South Washington
Square, Suite 200
Lansing, MI 48933
(517) 371-1730
Phillip J. DeRosier
(P55595)
500 Woodward Avenue,
Suite 4000
Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 223-3866
Attorneys for Defendants
Dated: September 16, 2019
107a
Appendix D
STATE OF MICHIGAN
CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE 30TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
INGHAM COUNTY
Case No.: 19-474-CE
Hon. James S. Jamo
DANA NESSEL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF MICHIGAN, ON BEHALF OF THE
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
ENBRIDGE ENERGY COMPANY, INC., AND
ENBRIDGE ENERGY PARTNERS, L.P.,
Defendants.
[Tables Intentionally Omitted]
Glossary
Short Form
Description
Conservation
Commission
Michigan Conservation Commission,
predecessor to the Michigan
Department of Natural Resources
108a
Appendix D
DEQ
Dual Pipelines
Dynamic Risk
GLSLA
Easement or
1953 Easement
Enbridge
Lakehead
Line 5
Michigan Depa r tment of
Env i ron ment a l Q u a l it y, now
called the Michigan Department
of Environment, Great Lakes, and
Energy
Four miles of Line 5 where it
crosses the Straits of Mackinac and
splits into two, parallel lines
Dynamic Risk Assessment Systems,
Inc., an expert consulting firm
commissioned by the State in 2016
to study alternatives to the existing
Dual Pipelines
Great Lakes Submerged Lands
Act of 1955, CLS 1956, § 322.701
et seq.
Easement granted by the Michigan
Conservation Commission on April
23, 1953 to Lakehead Pipe Line
Company, Inc.
All three defendants in this action
Lakehead Pipe Line Company.
Inc., the former name of Enbridge
Energy Company, Inc.
645-mile pipeline that transports
p et roleu m produc t s bet we en
Superior, Wisconsin and Sarnia,
Ontario, Canada
109a
Appendix D
MDNR
MEPA
PAWSA
PHMSA
PIPES Act
PSA
Task Force
Tunnel
Michigan Department of Natural
R e s ou r c e s , suc c e s s or t o t he
Michigan Conservation Commission
Michigan Environmental Protection
Act, MCL 324.1701 et seq.
Process initiated by the U.S. Coast
Guard on June 10, 2019 to study
additional measures that could
reduce the risk of an anchor strike
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration, a federal
agency within the U.S. Department
of Transportation charged with
responsibility for the promulgation
and enforcement of federal pipeline
safety standards
Protecting our Infrastructure of
Pipelines and Enhancing Safety
Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114-183, 130
Stat. 527 (2016)
Pipeline Safety Act, 49 USC 60101
et seq.
Michigan Petroleum Pipeline Task
Force, a multi-agency group formed
in 2 014 to address petroleum
pipelines in Michigan
Tunnel in the bedrock underneath
the Straits that would house a
replacement for Line 5 and possibly
other third-party utilities
110a
Appendix D
1x10-4
1x10 -4 = 0.01% or 1/10,000
3.5x10-4
3.5x10 -4 = 0.035% or 3.5/10,000
4.5x104
4.5x10 -4 = 0.045% or 4.5/10,000
1 in 60 over 35
years
Equivalent to an annual rate of
(1/60)/35 = 4.76x10 -4 = 0.0476%
Introduction
This case concerns an interstate pipeline built over
six decades ago. This pipeline (Line 5) transports crude
oil used for refining into vehicle, aviation, and other fuel
products and natural gas liquids used to make propane.
It extends more than 600 miles from Superior, Wisconsin
to Sarnia, Ontario. At issue here is a segment of the
pipeline that crosses the bottomlands of the Straits of
Mackinac (“Straits”) within an easement issued by the
State of Michigan. The Easement was granted in 1953
in furtherance of a statute enacted by the Michigan
Legislature. In the more than six decades since the
pipeline was installed, there have been no releases of Line
5 product in the Straits and no efforts by any prior State
administration to force closure of this Line 5 segment.
Sixty-six years after the Easement was granted, the
Attorney General now, for the first time, seeks to endrun its terms. She starts by claiming that the Easement
was void from its inception. This clearly was not the
view of the Attorney General in 1953 or in any of the
many years since then. In fact, the Office of the Attorney
General approved the Easement in 1953 as to legal form
111a
Appendix D
and effect. The Attorney General then claims that, even
if the Easement was valid when issued, it should now be
declared invalid under common-law doctrines and the
Michigan Environmental Protection Act (“MEPA”), MCL
324.1701 et seq.
The Attorney General’s Complaint is a direct attack
on the separation of powers and on the ability of the
Michigan Legislature to determine environmental
policy—authority that has been placed squarely within
the legislative sphere by Article 4, Section 52 of the
Michigan Constitution. This attack manifests itself in
three particular ways. First, the Complaint, by its very
design, is an attempt to circumvent the limitations on
the Easement’s termination. The 1953 Easement was
based upon a legislative grant of authority, and it set
forth specific grounds on which the Easement may be
terminated—none of which are invoked in the Attorney
General’s Complaint. Second, the Complaint invokes
the common law public trust doctrine, but this claim is
subsumed by MEPA. Under MEPA, the Attorney General
could pursue essentially the same relief she now seeks if
she could meet the statutory criteria; she has not, however,
met that criteria here. The public trust doctrine cannot
be used to undermine the specific framework that the
Legislature has established in this area. Third, the
displacement of the Attorney General’s public trust claim
is underscored by other legislative actions. In December
2018, the Legislature enacted new legislation authorizing
the construction of a Tunnel under the Straits that would
ultimately house a replacement pipeline and, according
to the State-commissioned Dynamic Risk report cited in
112a
Appendix D
the Attorney General’s Complaint, would render the risk
of a spill into the Straits “un-quantifiably low.” While the
Attorney General may desire a different approach, the
Legislature has already balanced the relevant public
interests with respect to Line 5.
Because the common law has been subsumed by
legislative enactments and because, for reasons described
below, the Attorney General has failed to state a cause of
action for public nuisance or under MEPA, the Complaint
should be dismissed in its entirety.
Factual and Procedural Background
A.
Line 5 and the Dual Pipelines Across the
Straits of Mackinac
Line 5 transports petroleum products between
Superior, Wisconsin and Sarnia, Ontario, Canada. The
645-mile line extends across the Upper Peninsula of
Michigan, crosses the Straits and then travels in a
southeast direction toward Sarnia. This case focuses on
the approximately four miles of Line 5 that crosses the
Straits. At the point where it crosses the Straits, Line 5
splits into two parallel lines (the “Dual Pipelines”). The
Complaint does not allege that the Dual Pipelines have
ever released oil into the Straits.
B. Conveyance of the 1953 Easement
Prior to the construction of Line 5, oil moving from
Superior to Sarnia was transported on the Great Lakes
113a
Appendix D
by tanker. According to the Complaint, approximately
50 million barrels of oil moved by tanker over the Great
Lakes in the years after 1950. (Complaint, ¶ 10.)
La kehe a d P ip e Li ne Compa ny, Inc .—wh ich
subsequently changed its name to Enbridge Energy
Company, Inc.—submitted on January 24, 1953, its
application for a permit to lay the Dual Pipelines in
the Straits. The Michigan Conservation Commission
(“Conservation Commission”) initially considered the
application on February 13, 1953.1 The Michigan Public
Service Commission on March 19, 1953. granted Enbridge
the right to issue securities to finance the Pipelines,
further evidencing the State’s thorough process to
authorize the Pipelines. 2
Following the Conservation Commission’s initial
consideration of the application, the Michigan Legislature
on March 28, 1953, enacted 1953 PA 10, which provided:
The conser vation commission is hereby
vested with the power and authority to grant
easements, upon such terms and conditions as
the said commission deems just and reasonable,
for the purpose of erecting, laying, maintaining
and operating pipe lines . . . over, through,
under and upon any and all lands belonging
1. See Easement, Third W hereas Clause (Exh. 1 to
Complaint).
2. See Lakehead Pipe Line Co v Dehn, 340 Mich 25, 37; 64
NW2d 903 (1954).
114a
Appendix D
to the state of Michigan which are under the
jurisdiction of the conservation commission
or the department of conservation, and over,
through, under and upon any and all of the
unpatented overflowed lands, made lands and
lake bottom lands belonging to or held in trust
by the state of Michigan.
The Conservation Commission then considered the
application a second time and granted the Easement on
April 23, 1953. The Easement granted Enbridge the right
to “construct, lay and maintain” the Dual Pipelines “over,
through, under and upon certain lake bottom lands” in the
Straits. (Complaint, Ex. 1 at 1). Attached to the Easement
is a sworn statement by an Assistant Attorney General for
the State stating that the Easement had been “[e]xamined
and approved 4/23/53 as to legal form and effect.” (Id. at
13).
The Commission specifically found in granting the
Easement that the proposed line would benefit the people
of Michigan:
WHEREAS, the Conservation Commission
is of the opinion that the proposed pipe line
system will be of benefit to all of the people of
State of Michigan and in furtherance of the
public welfare.
Easement, Second Whereas Clause (Complaint, Ex. 1 at
1) (emphasis added).
115a
Appendix D
During 1953 and 1954, landowners in Bay County,
Michigan, challenged the right of Lakehead (now Enbridge
Energy Company, Inc.) to condemn land for construction
of Line 5. One of the grounds cited by the landowners
was that the company was seeking to take property by
condemnation for a “private purpose.” Lakehead Pipe
Line Co v Dehn, 340 Mich 25, 30; 64 NW2d 903 (1954).
The trial court rejected this claim, and the Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that construction and operation of Line
5 was “for a public use benefiting the people of the State
of Michigan.” Id. at 37.
C. Construction and Current Operation of Line 5
Construction of Line 5, including the Dual Pipelines,
was completed in 1954. Line 5 has continued to operate
since that date (Complaint, ¶ 15) and there have been no
releases of Line 5 product in the Straits. Eight different
governors of both parties have led the State’s executive
department and seven different attorneys general have
been elected but no prior State administration made
efforts to force closure of the Dual Pipelines segment of
Line 5.
D. Recent State Commissioned Reports on Line
5 Discussed in the Complaint
The Complaint relies on and cites to the following
studies relating to the Straits. Additional studies exist
that are not mentioned in the Complaint, and that thus do
not serve as a basis for the current motion.
116a
Appendix D
1.
2015 Michigan Petroleum Pipeline Task
Force Report
In 2014, the then-Attorney General and then-Director
of the Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”)
formed a multi-agency Petroleum Pipeline Task Force
(“Task Force”) to address petroleum pipelines in Michigan
(including Line 5). The Task Force published its report in
2015. (Complaint, ¶ 10.)
2.
2017 Dynamic Risk Alternatives Analysis
One of the recommendations of the 2015 Task
Force Report was that the State obtain an independent
analysis of alternatives to the existing Dual Pipelines.
See 2015 Task Force Report at 56. In 2016, the State
commissioned an expert consulting firm, Dynamic Risk
Assessment Systems, Inc. (“Dynamic Risk”), to perform
the recommended alternatives analysis. (Complaint,
¶ 35.) Dynamic Risk published its final Report in October
2017. (Id.) The Complaint incorporates the Dynamic
Risk Report by a link in note 5 (¶ 35) and relies on it in
numerous places. 3
Dynamic Risk concluded that the annual probability
of failure for the existing Dual Pipelines for all risks
combined was approximately 4.5x10 -4 (or 0.045%) per
year.4 To reach this conclusion, Dynamic Risk considered
separately different causes of potential releases, including
3. See Complaint, ¶¶ 35-41, 45, 47, 51-52.
4. See Dynamic Risk at ES-25 and 2-71 to 2-73.
117a
Appendix D
“anchor hooking” and incorrect operations (abbreviated
as “Inc Ops” in the chart below), as well as the risk posed
by “all threats” combined. The results of that analysis are
shown in the chart below, which appears at page ES-25
of the Dynamic Risk Report:5
Figure ES-4:
Annual Failure Probability Over
Time – Existing Straits Crossing
Segments
The Complaint alleges (at ¶ 35) that Dynamic Risk—
in a town hall meeting held three months before the
final report was issued—orally stated that the chance
of “rupture” “in the next thirty-five years” was “one in
sixty.”6 (See Complaint, ¶ 35 n.6.) The Complaint does not,
5. The Dynamic Risk Report included a much more detailed
discussion of each of these risks, as well as other, lesser risks. See,
e.g., Dynamic Risk at 2-41 to 2-73 and Figure 2-12.
6. A “one in sixty” chance of a strike over 35 years is
equivalent to an annual risk of 0.0476% per year. This annual risk
is calculated by dividing 1/60 by 35 years.
This equivalent allegation is relatively close to the approximate
value published by Dynamic Risk of 0.045% (shown in the chart
above). To the extent that the two estimates differ slightly, the
118a
Appendix D
however, allege that the Dual Pipelines are expected to
operate for thirty-five more years.
The Complaint (at ¶ 52) alleges that Dynamic Risk
concluded that “incorrect operations” were a “Principal
Threat” to the Dual Pipelines. The actual quantitative
risk that Dynamic Risk calculated for this risk, however,
is 0.01% per year (as shown in the chart above). Similarly,
the Dynamic Risk Report, which is incorporated in the
Complaint (¶ 35), calculates the annual probability of
failure due to a vessel anchor accidentally striking the
lines. According to Dynamic Risk, the annual probability
of failure from this type of risk was 3.5x10 -4 (or 0.035%)
per year (as shown in the chart above).
E. Related Matters: Enactment of 2018 PA 359
The Dynamic Risk Report looked in detail at possible
replacement of the existing Dual Pipelines with a segment
that would be located in a Tunnel built in bedrock under
the Straits. Dynamic Risk determined that a replacement
Tunnel was feasible, and the risk of a potential release
from a tunnel crossing to be “un-quantifiably low.” See
Dynamic Risk Report, § 3.2.2 (addressing “Alternative
4b”) and § 3.6 at 3-60.
In December 2018, the Michigan Legislature enacted
legislation (2018 PA 359) allowing the construction of
facts alleged in the Complaint are assumed to be true for purposes
of this Motion—i.e., that the risk of release is a “one in sixty”
chance over the next 35 years, or an annualized risk of 0.0476%
per year.
119a
Appendix D
the Tunnel that would house a replacement for Line 5
and possibly other third-party utilities. The Legislature
did not order a shutdown of Line 5. In substance and
practical effect, the Attorney General is asking in this
case for the Court to override the Legislature’s solution
to environmental concerns about Line 5.
On March 28, 2019, the new Attorney General issued
an opinion asserting that 2018 PA 359 failed to comply with
the Title-Object Clause of the Michigan Constitution and
was therefore invalid. See Attorney General Opinion No.
7309. On the same day the new Governor directed state
agencies to take no further action to implement the various
2018 agreements to construct a tunnel. See Executive
Directive No. 2019-13.
On June 6, 2019, Enbridge filed suit against the
State in the Court of Claims. Enbridge Energy, Limited
Partnership, et al. v State of Michigan, et al, No. 19000090-MZ. Enbridge’s suit seeks a declaration that 2018
PA 359 complies with the Michigan Constitution and that
related contractual agreements entered with the State
pursuant to 2018 PA 359 are enforceable, including an
agreement allowing Enbridge to continue operating the
Dual Pipelines until the replacement Tunnel is complete.
On June 27, 2019, the State moved for summary disposition
of the case. On August 1, 2019, Enbridge opposed and
cross-moved for summary disposition. The State has
replied to Enbridge’s motion and the case is now awaiting
decision by the Court of Claims.
120a
Appendix D
Standard of Review
“A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal
sufficiency of the complaint.” Maiden v Rozwood, 461
Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). “A movant is entitled
to summary disposition under MCR. 2.116(C)(8) if ‘[t]he
opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief
can be granted.’” Henry v Dow Chem Co, 473 Mich 63, 71;
701 NW2d 684 (2005), quoting MCR 2.116(C)(8).
Summary disposition may be granted under MCR
2.116(C)(7) when an action is barred by a statute of
limitations. Vance v Henry Ford Health Sys, 272 Mich
App 426, 429; 726 NW2d 78 (2006). See also Dep’t of
Environmental Quality v Gomez, 318 Mich App 1; 896
NW2d 39 (2016) (analyzing latches argument under MCR
2.116(C)(7)); Knight v Northpointe Bank, 300 Mich App
109; 832 NW2d 439 (2013) (same). “A defendant who files
a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7)
may file supportive material such as affidavits, depositions,
admissions, or other documentary evidence.” Vance, 272
Mich App at 429.
Summary disposition of a claim under MCR 2.116(C)
(4) is appropriate when federal preemption deprives the
court of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the claim.
See Packowski v United Food & Commercial Workers
Local 951, 289 Mich App 132, 138; 796 NW2d 94 (2010)
(addressing federal preemption under subrule (C)(4)).
“For jurisdictional questions under MCR 2.116(C)(4), th[e]
Court ‘determine[s] whether the affidavits, together with
the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary
121a
Appendix D
evidence, demonstrate . . . [a lack of] subject matter
jurisdiction.’” Id. at 138-139 (citation and some internal
quotations omitted).
Summary of Argument
This Court should grant summary disposition in favor
of Enbridge. As an initial matter, the Attorney General’s
entire complaint—which seeks to force Enbridge to
remove the Dual Pipelines for supposedly threatening
the Straits—is inconsistent with the separation of
powers imposed by the Michigan Constitution. Under the
Constitution, the duty to safeguard Michigan’s natural
resources is expressly assigned to the Legislature. Where,
as here, the Legislature has made a considered judgment
about how best to fulfill its duties, the Attorney General
has no authority to second-guess that judgment—or to
ask the courts to do so. The Attorney General’s claims
must be evaluated with the constitutionally mandated
separation of powers in mind.
Count I.A claims that the 1953 Easement has been
invalid all along, based on the supposed failure of the
Legislature and the Conservation Commission to jump
through a procedural hoop created (on the Attorney
General’s reading) by dicta in a Supreme Court ruling
issued seven years after the Easement was granted,
Obrecht v National Gypsum Co, 361 Mich 399; 105
NW2d 143 (1960). This claim fails for many reasons.
For one, there is no ground to apply the Obrecht dicta
retroactively—to the contrary, Obrecht relied on a 1955
statute that is not retroactive, and the very language of the
122a
Appendix D
opinion that the Attorney General cites makes clear that
it has no application to grants addressed by preexisting
legislation. By its own terms, that language is also
limited to cases where submerged lands are given over
to private use, yet contemporaneous case law involving
Line 5 makes clear that the construction of a pipeline is
a quintessentially public use, regardless of whether the
pipeline is constructed by a private company. Even if the
Obrecht dicta did apply to preexisting easements, the
Conservation Commission’s express findings would he
more than sufficient to satisfy the procedural requirement
that the Attorney General draws from Obrecht. The
Attorney General’s invocation of Obrecht also comes far
too late and is barred by the statute of limitations. If
the express grant of an easement across the Straits was
invalid in 1953, then Enbridge has long since acquired an
easement by prescription. Finally, the Attorney General
is estopped from denying the Easement’s validity so late
in the day.
Count I.B asserts that the Dual Pipelines pose a risk
of an oil spill in the Straits in violation of the common law
public trust doctrine. But such attempts to regulate the
complex modern economy by means of an amorphous,
non-legislative public trust doctrine have been displaced
by MEPA. Count I.B also fails because it is inconsistent
with the 1953 Easement, which itself provides the
exclusive conditions and procedures under which it can be
terminated (and leave no role for the Attorney General).
Finally, the Attorney General’s attempt to regulate
pipeline safety through judicial application of the public
trust doctrine is preempted by the federal Pipeline
Safety Act (“PSA”), which assigns responsibility not
to the 50 state attorneys general but rather to a single
123a
Appendix D
expert federal agency, and more broadly by the Federal
Government’s pervasive occupation of the entire field of
pipeline safety.
Count II asserts that the Dual Pipelines constitute a
public nuisance. Yet Michigan law recognizes claims for
anticipatory public nuisance only where the feared harm
is either certain to come to pass or at least very probable.
Here, the Attorney General alleges no facts that could
suggest that the risk of an oil spill from the Dual Pipelines
is anything but exceptionally low. This unduly speculative
claim must therefore be dismissed. The Attorney General’s
own Complaint undermines any suggestion that harm
arising from Line 5’s operation is certain or probable. To
protect the public interest served by Line 5, the Attorney
General seeks to defer immediate action to allow users
of the line a “reasonable notice period” to adjust to the
proposed closure. (Complaint, ¶ 28).
Finally, Count III alleges violation of MEPA. This
claim has basically the same fatal flaw as the public
nuisance claim: MEPA authorizes an action by the
Attorney General only when harm to the environment
has “occurred or is likely to occur,” (MCL 324.1701(1)),
yet the Complaint fails to plead facts that any alleged
harm is “likely.” To the contrary, the Attorney General
relies heavily on a report that puts the annual failure
probability for the Dual Pipelines at less than 0.05%. Such
a speculative risk falls far short of the statutory threshold.
Moreover, the Attorney General’s own proposed deferral
of any closure of Line 5 for a “reasonable notice period”
entirely undermines her MEPA claim.
124a
Appendix D
Argument
I.
The Attorney General’s Complaint transgresses
limits imposed by the Constitution and endorsed
by the Supreme Court.
The Court’s analysis of the Complaint should begin
with the proper constitutional framework. The Michigan
Constitution recognizes a duty to conserve the State’s
natural resources, and it delegates that specific duty to
the Legislature:
The conservation and development of the
natural resources of the state are hereby
declared to be of paramount public concern in
the interest of the health, safety and general
welfare of the people. The legislature shall
provide for the protection of the air, water
and other natural resources of the state from
pollution, impairment and destruction.
Const 1963, art 4, § 52. The Constitution also provides
that “[n]o person exercising powers of one branch shall
exercise powers properly belonging to another branch
except as expressly provided in this constitution.” Const
1963, art 3, § 2.
Addressing the separation of powers, the Supreme
Court has explained that environmental protection is
a legislative function. For example, in Kyser v Kasson
Township, 486 Mich 514; 786 NW2d 543 (2010), the Court
held that “Michigan’s constitution directs the Legislature,
not the judiciary, to provide for the protection and
125a
Appendix D
management of the state’s natural resources.” id. at
536 (emphasis added). The Court made this statement
in concluding that a judicially-created rule governing
extraction of natural resources violated the separation of
powers because Section 52 of Article 4 gives the authority
to protect natural resources to the Legislature, not the
courts. The Kyser Court also pointed out that trying to
apply a judicially-created rule would require courts “to
engage in an expansive and detailed analysis of landuse considerations as to which they have no particular
expertise,” and that such regulatory matters are thus
appropriately left to the Legislature. Id. at 537. See also
Oscoda Chapter of PBB Action Comm, Inc v DNR, 403
Mich 215, 231; 268 NW2d 240 (1978) (observing that “Const
1963, art 4, § 52, confers no authority on the courts”).
Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized even before the
1963 Constitution that regulation of the public’s interest
in the lake bottomlands falls within the Legislature’s
purview. See Nedtweg v Wallace, 237 Mich 14, 22-23; 208
NW 51 (1926) (“The Legislature is vested with power
to determine whether the public interests will be best
served by leaving lake bottom, unsuited to purposes of
navigation, in a wild state and wholly unproductive of any
public revenue or of benefit, except to hunters, or permit
use thereof, under suitable regulations, to the greater
benefit of the public.”).
Here, the Michigan Legislature has struck a balance
of the relevant public interests in three different ways. The
Legislature established the initial framework for pipeline
operations by vesting the Conservation Commission with
authority to “grant pipeline easements on state land and
126a
Appendix D
lake bottomlands.” (Complaint, ¶ 11; 1953 PA 10). The
Legislature also established a future framework for
continued operations by authorizing the construction and
operation of the Tunnel in which a replacement for the
existing Dual Pipelines could be located. (2018 PA 359). The
Legislature did so without taking any action to discontinue
operations of the Dual Pipelines in the meantime. Finally,
the Legislature has enacted a statutory framework for
courts to enjoin public or private entities from taking
action that will likely impair natural resources or the
public trust therein—the relief that the Attorney General
seeks in this case—provided that certain substantive
standards are satisfied. See MCL 324.1701(1). As discussed
below, however, the Attorney General has failed to allege
a prima facie case under MEPA.
Because the Michigan Constitution delegates the
protection of natural resources to the Legislature, each
count in the Complaint should be analyzed in light of
the policy judgments made by the Legislature and the
procedures authorized for challenging likely risks to the
environment.
II. Count I.A should he dismissed because the Attorney
General cannot show that the Easement was invalid
from its inception.
A.
The 1953 Easement was issued under a valid
grant of legislative authority.
In Count I.A, the Attorney General claims that the
1953 Easement was void “from its inception.” (Count I.A.)
127a
Appendix D
Specifically, Count I.A complains that “the State never
made a finding that the easement: (1) would improve
navigation or another public trust interest; or (2) could
be conveyed without impairment of the public trust.”
(Complaint, ¶ 27). To be clear, the Attorney General’s
argument is that the 1953 Easement is invalid regardless
of whether it in fact improved a public trust interest,
simply because “[t]here is no contemporaneous document”
in which the State used the particular verbal formula that
she says is necessary to make any such Easement valid.
(Complaint, ¶ 27). This argument fails as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Count I.A under
MCR 2.116(C)(8).
As the Attorney General admits, the 1953 Easement
was issued pursuant to a legislative grant of authority.
(Complaint, ¶ 11). In 1953, the Legislature authorized
the Conservation Commission “to grant easements for
the erecting, laying, maintaining and operating of pipe
lines . . . over, through, under and upon any and all of
the unpatented overflowed lands, made lands and lake
bottom lands belonging to or held in trust by the state
of Michigan.” 1953 PA 10 (emphasis added). Consistent
with that legislative authorization, the Conservation
Commission then proceeded to grant an easement for
the construction and operation of the pipeline across the
Straits. (See 1953 Easement (Complaint, Ex. 1); Complaint,
¶ 11). In April 1953, the Attorney General approved the
easement as to legal form and effect. (Complaint, Ex. 1
at 13).
Because the Legislature enacted the statutory
framework for granting pipeline easements and the 1953
128a
Appendix D
Easement was granted pursuant to that framework,
there is no basis for declaring the Easement void from
its inception.
B. The Attorney General’s reliance on Obrecht to
retroactively change the legal framework is
misplaced.
The Attorney General nevertheless complains now
that the Conservation Commission failed to intone certain
magic words in the 1953 Easement. (Complaint, ¶ 28).
She does not contend that any Michigan statute or court
decision on the books as of 1953 required such language.
The Attorney General instead draws this theory from
language in Obrecht—a case decided seven years after
the 1953 Easement was granted and six years after Line
5 began operating.
Obrecht’s holding does not help the Attorney General.
Obrecht involved a landowner who claimed the right
to build without first obtaining the State’s consent.
Specifically, in Obrecht, a riparian landowner sought (i)
to construct a large loading dock that extended over 800
feet into Lake Huron, in an area predominantly devoted
to recreational uses, and (ii) to dredge more than a mile
of deep channel. See Obrecht, 361 Mich at 404-405. The
landowner did not rely on an easement but claimed that
it could construct docks and dredge channels of unlimited
length without the State’s consent under a riparian
landowner’s common law right to wharf out to navigable
waters. See id. at n.2. The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, explaining that “the public title and right
129a
Appendix D
is supreme as against [landowner’s] asserted right of
wharfage” and that “the latter may be exercised by the
[landowner] only in accordance with the regulatory assent
of the State.” Id. at 413. Because the State had not given
assent, and “for that reason alone,” the landowner’s
actions were unlawful. See id. at 414 (emphasis added).
Obrecht’s holding is clearly inapposite here. Enbridge
does not claim any right to go beyond what the State
has expressly authorized. Enbridge built and operated
the pipeline pursuant to an Easement issued by the
Conservation Commission under authority from the
Legislature. Because Obrecht’s holding does not help
her case, the Attorney General instead relies upon the
following dicta in the Court’s opinion:
Turning to pages 453 through 460 of [Illinois
Central Railroad Co v State of Illinois, 146
US 387 (1892),] and reading those pages in
conjunction with [the 1955 GLSLA], it will be
found authoritatively that no part of the beds
of the Great Lakes, belonging to Michigan and
not coming within the purview of previous
legislation . . . can be alienated or otherwise
devoted to private use in the absence of due
finding of one of two exceptional reasons for
such alienation or devotion to nonpublic use.
One exception exists where the State has, in
due recorded form, determined that a given
parcel of such submerged land may and should
be conveyed “in the improvement of the interest
thus held” (referring to public trust). The other
130a
Appendix D
is present where the State has, in similar form,
determined that such disposition may be made
“without detriment to the public interests in
the lands and waters remaining.” [Obrecht, 361
Mich at 412-13 (emphases added; quotations in
original), cited in Complaint, ¶ 28].
The Attorney General’s reliance on this quoted
language is legally flawed for three separate reasons.
First, the Obrecht passage that the Attorney General
relies upon states that “no part of the beds of the Great
Lakes, belonging to Michigan and not coming within the
purview of previous legislation . . . can be alienated or
otherwise devoted to private use in the absence of” the
findings described by Obrecht. Of course, the Easement
was granted in 1953 pursuant to 1953 PA 10. Obrecht
was not decided until 1960, so the 1953 easement plainly
“com[es] within the purview of previous legislation.”
That makes the language in Obrecht relied upon in the
Complaint inapplicable by its very terms.
Second, the language would not apply retroactively to
Enbridge’s easement. The quoted passage from Obrecht
derives from two sources: an excerpt from the U.S.
Supreme Court’s opinion in Illinois Central read “in
conjunction with” the 1955 GLSLA. Obrecht, 361 Mich
at 412-413. The cited pages from Illinois Central simply
recognize the public interest exception to the public trust
doctrine: state control cannot be relinquished except as
“parcels . . . used in promoting the interests of the public
therein.” Illinois Central, 146 US at 453. The GLSLA
requires that, where it applies, the state agency make
131a
Appendix D
determinations about the public trust before conveying
or leasing bottomlands. See, e.g., MCL 324.32503(1).
The GLSLA, however, was not in effect in 1953 when the
Easement was issued and thus is not applicable here.7
Third, the Obrecht passage speaks only about
submerged lands “devoted to private use.” Obrecht, 361
Mich at 412 (emphasis added). The use for which the
Easement was granted—running a common carrier
pipeline across the Straits—is a classic example of a
public use. In 1954—the same year that Line 5 went into
operation, and not long before Obrecht—the Supreme
Court expressly held that Enbridge’s use of land for Line 5
constituted a public use. See Lakehead Pipe Line Co, 340
Mich at 27. There, landowners challenged a proceeding
initiated by Lakehead (now Enbridge Energy Company,
Inc.) to condemn their land interests “for the construction
of a pipe line for the transportation as a common carrier
of petroleum products”—i.e., Line 5. Id. The landowners
argued that Lakehead “was seeking to take property by
condemnation for a private purpose”—the transportation
of a private corporation’s oil—in violation of “the general
rule” that “private property may not be taken under the
power of eminent domain for other than a public use.” Id.
at 30, 39. The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
explaining that the right-of-way was a public necessity: “It
is our conclusion that [Lakehead] was entitled to proceed
under the act in question to acquire property necessary
7. Moreover, none of the criteria recognized by the Supreme
Court as weighing in favor of retroactivity applies. See LaFontaine
Saline, Inc v Chrysler Group, LLC, 496 Mich 26, 38-39; 852 NW2d
78 (2014).
132a
Appendix D
for the public use claimed.” Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
See also id. at 38 (“Unquestionably the construction of
the bridge [held to be a public use in an earlier decision]
benefited the people of Michigan. A like result may be
anticipated in the case at bar from the construction,
maintenance and operation of the pipe line in question.”).
The Court explained that the existence of a private
commercial interest in the pipeline did not undermine its
holding that the easement was for a public use: “Doubtless
the Imperial Oil Company [which indirectly owned a stake
in Lakehead at the time] will be benefited by the fact that
the pipe line system provides a method for transporting
its oil to the refineries. It cannot be said, however, that,
because of such situation, [Lakehead] is seeking to exercise
the power of eminent domain for a private purpose. The
private benefit, if such there is, is merely incidental to the
main purpose.” Id. at 40. 8
Because the submerged lands subject to the 1953
Easement were not “alienated or otherwise devoted to
private use,” Obrecht, 361 Mich at 412, the passage that
the Attorney General points to is inapplicable by its own
terms. Enabling a common carrier to build transportation
infrastructure is a textbook example of a “public use.”
In short, the Attorney General’s reliance on Obrecht to
invalidate the Easement is legally flawed.
8. In describing Line 5, the Lakehead Court expressly noted
that it “extend[ed] across the upper peninsula to the Straits of
Mackinac” and that “[t]he use of two 20-inch pipes across the
Straits of Mackinac [had been] approved.” Lakehead Pipe Line
Co, 340 Mich at 27-29. The Court plainly was referring to the Line
5 Dual Pipelines.
133a
Appendix D
C.
The 1953 Easement states that the pipeline
system advances the public interest.
Even if Obrecht set forth a test applicable to all
easements on the books, it is absurd to criticize the 1953
Easement simply for failing to use the exact words used
seven years later in Obrecht. The far more important
point is that the Conservation Commission relied on
ample evidence of benefits to the public, as well as express
Legislative authorization, when it granted the 1953
easement. This is reflected in the terms of the Easement,
which is attached as an exhibit to the Complaint.
In the Easement, the Conservation Commission
expressly found that “the proposed pipe line system will
be of benefit to all of the people of the State of Michigan
and [operate] in furtherance of the public welfare.”
(Complaint, Ex. 1 at 1.) The Complaint itself concedes
that “the contemporaneous approval of the construction
of what is now Enbridge’s Line 5 in Michigan by the
Michigan Public Service Commission . . . suggested that
the Line 5 pipeline . . . would enhance joint defenses in
times of national emergency and promote improved trade
relations.” (Complaint, ¶ 28.) Thus, even if Obrecht imposed
a retroactive magic words requirement, as the Complaint
asserts, the Legislature’s authorization of the Easement
and Commission’s findings in the Easement itself satisfied
it. As noted, the Attorney General approved the Easement
as to legal form and effect in 1953. (Complaint, Ex. 1 at 13.)
In short, the Attorney General’s allegation that the
Easement was invalid from its inception is legally flawed.
For this reason alone, the Court should dismiss Count I.A.
134a
Appendix D
D.
The Attorney General’s argument comes far
too late.
In addition, the Attorney General’s challenge comes
far too late. If she were right that the 1953 grant was
invalid from its inception, then Enbridge has long since
acquired a prescriptive easement across the Straits. “An
easement by prescription results from use of another’s
property that is open, notorious, adverse. and continuous”
for the applicable statutory period. Mulcahy v Verhines,
276 Mich App 693, 699; 742 NW2d 393 (2007), quoting
Plymouth Canton Community Crier, Inc v Prose, 242
Mich App 676, 679; 619 NW2d 725 (2002). The applicable
statutory period here is 15 years, as explained below.
Open and notorious. “To make good claim of title
by adverse possession, the true owner must have actual
knowledge of the hostile claim or the possession must be
so open, visible, and notorious as to raise the presumption
of notice to the world that the right of the true owner is
invaded intentionally.” Thomas v Rex A Wilcox Trust,
185 Mich App 733, 737; 463 NW2d 190 (1990), quoting
Burns v Foster, 348 Mich 8, 15; 81 NW2d 386 (1957)
(emphasis added). See also Martin v Arndt, 356 Mich
128, 135; 95 NW2d 858 (1959) (same). As the disjunctive
“or” indicates, where the owner has actual knowledge of
the claimant’s use, the requirement is satisfied even if the
use is underground or underwater: “A use that is actually
known to the owner of the servient estate satisfies the
requirement even though it is not open.” Restatement
(Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 2.17 comment h. Thus,
“if the installation of underground utilities is open and
135a
Appendix D
their location remains notorious, either because actually
known to the owner or widely known in the community,
the prescriptive period will continue to run even though
evidence of the use is subsequently buried.” Id.
Here, the State has known full well, going back all
the way to 1953, that Enbridge has been using the Straits
bottomlands to operate Line 5. Thus, even though Line 5
crosses the Straits deep underwater, Enbridge met the
requirement of open and notorious use because the State
had actual knowledge of its use.
Adverse. “Adverse or hostile use is use that is
inconsistent w ith the right of the owner, w ithout
permission asked or given, that would entitle the owner
to a cause of action against the intruder for trespassing.
The use of another’s property qualities as adverse if made
under a claim of right when no right exists.” Mulcahy,
276 Mich App at 702 (citation omitted). The adverse-use
requirement is met where the claimant claims a right
under an express easement that it mistakenly believes to
be valid: “[i]f a claimant has obtained a conveyance of an
easement which is ineffective, his use of the subservient
estate, made on the assumption that the conveyance was
legally effective, is adverse and not made in subornation
to the owner of the burdened estate.” Cook v Grand River
Hydroelectric Power Co, 131 Mich App 821, 826; 346
NW2d 881 (1984). In short, “use under an invalid easement
may establish an easement by prescription.” Plymouth
Canton, 242 Mich App at 684. See also Mulcahy, 276
Mich App at 702.
136a
Appendix D
Enbridge ran the Line 5 Dual Pipelines across the
Straits under a claim of right: the 1953 Easement, which
says that Enbridge has the right to do so. The Attorney
General’s position now is that no right actually existed,
because the grant was “void from its inception.” If that is
true, then Enbridge’s use was adverse.
Continuous for the statutory period. “[A]ssuming all
other elements have been established, one gains title by
adverse possession when the period of limitation expires.”
See Gorte v Dep’t of Transp., 202 Mich App 161, 168; 507
NW2d 797 (1993) (“the expiration of the period of limitation
terminates the title of those who slept on their rights and
vests title in the party claiming adverse possession”). The
Legislature “specifically enacted a statute of limitations
which require[d] the state to commence an action to
recover [] lands within 15 years after the right or title of
the people of the state first accrued.” Caywood v Dep’t of
Natural Resources, 71 Mich App 322, 331; 248 NW2d 253
(1976).9 See 1948 CL 609.11 (setting a 15-year limitations
period until 1963); MCL 600.5821(1) (1961) (setting a 15year limitations period between 1963 and 1988).
9. In 1988, Michigan “reinstated the common-law rule that
one cannot acquire title to state-owned property through adverse
possession.” Gorte, 202 Mich App at 166. See MCL 600.5821(1)
(1988). The 1988 amendment, however, did not apply retroactively
to interfere with rights gained by adverse possession prior to the
amended statute’s effective date. Gorte, 202 Mich App at 167-168.
See id. at 167 (“where a period of limitation has expired, the rights
afforded by that statute are vested and the action in question is
barred”). Thus, the 1988 amendment did not affect Enbridge’s
prescriptive easement across the Straits, which vested when the
15 year limitations period expired in 1969.
137a
Appendix D
Enbridge has continuously used the Easement
from 1954 until the present day. Indeed, the Attorney
General acknowledges that “[s]ince completing Line 5 in
1954, the Grantee [of the Easement] and its successors
have continued to operate it, and over time significantly
increased the quantity of products transported through
it.” (Complaint, ¶ 15). It follows that, if the 1953 Easement
was “void from its inception” as the Attorney General
claims, in 1969 (15 years after the Dual Pipelines went into
operation) Enbridge acquired a prescriptive easement.
Even if one assumes that Enbridge did not acquire a
prescriptive easement, the Attorney General is estopped
from pursuing Count I.A of the Complaint. In Michigan,
“the State as well as individuals may be estopped by
its acts, conduct, silence, and acquiescence.” Oliphant v
Frazhe, 381 Mich 630, 638; 167 NW2d 280 (1969). Here,
the Office of the Attorney General approved the easement
in 1953 as to legal form and effect. (Complaint, Ex. 1 at
13). Enbridge relied upon the State’s representations in
the easement, making significant expenditures on the
construction and operation of this pipeline, both across
the Straits and throughout the entire Upper and Lower
Peninsulas. Enbridge would be prejudiced if the State
were allowed, sixty-six years later, to deny the existence
of the Easement’s terms. The Court should dismiss Count
I.A in the Complaint.
III. Count I.B should be dismissed because the Attorney
General’s public trust claim fails as a matter of law.
In Count I.B, the Attorney General claims that
“Enbridge’s continued transportation of petroleum
138a
Appendix D
products through the straits pipelines violates the public
trust” because (in her view) there is a “very real risk of
further anchor strikes to the pipelines, the inherent risks
of pipeline operations, and the foreseeable, catastrophic
effects if an oil spill occurs at the Straits.” (Complaint,
¶¶ 30, 33). Count I.B should be dismissed for alternative
reasons: (1) it is subsumed by the MEPA, (2) it is
inconsistent with the terms of the 1953 Easement, and
(3) it is preempted by federal law.
A.
The Attorney General’s public trust claim
has been subsumed by her MEPA claim in the
context of this case.
The Court should dismiss Count I.B under MCR
2.116(C)(8) because it is subsumed by the Attorney
General’s MEPA claim. The Michigan Court of Appeals
previously has implied that public trust claims are
completely subsumed by MEPA. See Highland Recreation
Def Found v Natural Res Comm’n, 180 Mich App 324,
331; 446 NW2d 895 (1989) (“We also agree that the claims
raised by plaintiff under its public trust argument are
duplicative of its claims under MEPA.”).
The public trust doctrine is a common law doctrine.
PPL Montana, LLC v Montana, 565 US 576, 603 (2012).
The doctrine is “a matter of state law,” and “the States
retain residual power to determine the scope of the
public trust[.]” Id. at 603-604. Under Michigan law, the
Legislature has the authority to supersede or change
common law by statute. See, e.g., Kyser, 486 Mich at 539543. See also Stout v Keyes, 2 Doug 184, 189; 1845 WL
139a
Appendix D
3119 (1845) (“[L]aws in force [when the state constitution
was passed] are retained until they should expire by
their own limitations, or be altered or repealed by the
legislature.”). The Michigan Constitution delegates
implementation of the duty to protect the state’s natural
resources to the Legislature. Const 1963, art 4, § 52.
“Michigan Constitution’s directs the Legislature, not the
judiciary, to provide for the protection and management
of the state’s natural resources.” Kyser, 486 Mich at 536.
The Legislature has enacted a statutory framework to
address how protections to the state’s resources are to
be implemented and thus common law must yield to the
statute. See Kyser, 486 Mich at 536; PBB, 403 Mich at 231.
See also Pulver v Dundee Cement Co, 445 Mich 68, 75 n 8;
515 NW2d 28 (1994) (“[I]f there is a conflict between the
common law and a statutory provision, the common law
must yield.”); City of Milwaukee v Illinois and Michigan,
451 US 304, 315 (1981) (“Our commitment to the separation
of powers is too fundamental to continue to rely on federal
common law by judicially decreeing what accords with
common sense and the public weal when Congress has
addressed the problem.”) (citation and internal quotations
omitted); Arizona v California, 373 US 546, 565 (1963)
(“[W]here Congress has so exercised its constitutional
power over waters, courts have no power to substitute
their own notions of an ‘equitable apportionment’ for the
apportionment chosen by Congress.”).
The Michigan Legislature, through its enactment of
MEPA, has expressly defined when a facility may present
an unreasonable risk of release to public trust resources
so as to warrant cessation of its operations. Specifically,
140a
Appendix D
Section 324.1701(1) of MEPA expressly provides that the
“attorney general . . . may maintain an action in the circuit
court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation
occurred or is likely to occur . . . against any person for the
protection of the air, water, and other natural resources
and the public trust in these resources from pollution,
impairment, or destruction.” (emphasis added).
MEPA was enacted pursuant to the Legislature’s
authority under the Michigan Constitution, which squarely
places protection of the State’s “air, water and other
natural resources” within the legislative sphere. See Const
1963, art 4, § 52. Accordingly, the Legislature, pursuant
to its authority to regulate public trust resources, has
established under MEPA a legal mechanism to address the
precise situation alleged by the Attorney General—where
a pipeline operator allegedly “is likely to pollute, impair,
or destroy the air, water, or other natural resources or
the public trust in these resources.” MCL 324.1703(1).
MEPA specifically creates a remedy by which “the
Attorney General or any person” can maintain an action
for protection of the public trust. In light of this legislative
determination, the Attorney General must follow the
remedial framework established in MEPA.
Courts in other jurisdictions have found that statutory
provisions displaced the common law public trust doctrine.
See Sanders Reed v Martinez, 350 P3d 1221, 1225-27
(NM App, 2015) (“[W]here the State has a duty to protect
the atmosphere under Article XX, Section 21 of the New
Mexico Constitution, the courts cannot independently
regulate greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere
as Plaintiffs have proposed, based solely upon a common
141a
Appendix D
law duty established under the public trust doctrine as a
separate cause of action.”); Alec v Jackson, 863 F Supp
2d 11, 12, 16-17 (D DC, 2012) (“Thus, a federal common
law claim [under the public trust doctrine] directed to
the reduction or regulation of carbon dioxide emissions
is displaced by the [Clean Air] Act”), aff’d 561 Fed Appx
7 (CA DC, 2014).
Analogous U.S. Supreme Court precedent confirms
that when the legislature enacts a statute that “speak[s]
directly” to the question, the common law is displaced.
American Electric Power Co v Connecticut (MEP), 564 US
410, 424 (2011), quoting Mobil Oil Corp v Higginbotham,
436 US 618, 625 (1978). In AEP, the U.S. Supreme Court
considered whether a public nuisance claim against
greenhouse gas emitters could be maintained under
federal common law after enactment of the federal Clean
Air Act. 564 US at 415. The Court held unambiguously that
“the Clean Air Act and the [Environmental Protection
Agency] actions it authorizes displace” any such commonlaw claim. Id. at 424. The Court’s holding in AEP was not
limited to nuisance claims: the Court held broadly that
the legislative regime “displace[s] any federal common law
right to seek abatement of” the greenhouse gas emissions.
564 US at 424, 426 (emphasis added).
The same reasoning applies here. Through MEPA,
the Legislature, exercising the authority granted to it by
the Constitution under Article 4, § 52, has established a
legislative framework that speaks directly to the alleged
problem identified in the Complaint. It is that framework
that controls here and to which the Attorney General
142a
Appendix D
must turn for relief. The common law public trust doctrine
cannot be used to create “an ad hoc environmental policy.”
Kimberly Hills, 114 Mich App 495, 503; 329 NW2d 668
(1982). As the Supreme Court cautioned in PBB, courts
do not have “plenary power . . . to do whatever they may
think preferable in environmental cases.” PBB, 403 Mich
at 231. See also Milwaukee, 451 US at 320 (holding that
because “the problem of effluent limitations” had been
“thoroughly addressed” by the legislature, there was
“no basis for a federal court to impose more stringent
limitations”). Accordingly, the Attorney General should
fail in her attempt to convince this Court to do something
that it should not—allow Count I.B to proceed where it
has clearly been subsumed by the Legislature’s enactment
of MEPA.10
B. The Attorney General’s Claim I.B should be
dismissed because it seeks termination on
grounds not provided in the Easement.
The Attorney General’s Count I.B fails for the
additional reason that the 1953 Easement can only be
terminated as provided under the termination provision in
the Easement. The Attorney General does not purport to
comply with the substantive and procedural requirements
of that provision. Accordingly, Court I.B should be
dismissed under MCR 2.116(C)(8) for this reason as well.
10. While MEPA offers a framework that could allow the
Attorney General to challenge the continued operation of the Dual
Pipelines, the very high bar set by MEPA for such a challenge has
not been met here, as discussed in Section V below.
143a
Appendix D
In furtherance of its authority to regulate the protection
of the public trust resources, the Michigan Legislature
expressly vested the Conservation Commission with
power and authority to grant easements over the bottom
lands “upon such terms and conditions” as the Commission
deems just and reasonable to protect the public trust
authority. 1953 PA 10. See Nedtweg, 237 Mich at 22-23
(confirming the Legislature’s authority to determine
whether use of the bottomlands is in the public interest).
On the basis of 1953 PA 10, the Conservation Commission
issued the 1953 Easement after concluding that the
“proposed pipe line system will be of benefit to all of the
people of the State of Michigan and in furtherance of
the public welfare.” Easement, Second Whereas Clause
(Complaint, Ex. 1 at 1).
As relevant here, the Easement also specifies the
limited circumstances under which it may be terminated.
Specifically, under Paragraph C of the Easement, the
Easement “may be terminated by Grantor:
(1) If, after being notified in writing by Grantor
or any specified breach of the terms and
conditions of this easement, Grantee shall
fail to correct said breach within ninety
(90) days, or, having commenced remedial
action within such ninety (90) day period,
such later time as it is reasonably possible
for the Grantee to correct said breach by
appropriate action and the exercise of due
diligence in the correction thereof;”
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Appendix D
(2) If Grantee fails to start construction of
the pipe lines authorized herein within
two years from date of execution of this
instrument; or
(3) If Grantee fails for any consecutive threeyear period to make substantial use of said
pipe lines commercially and also fails to
maintain said pipe lines during said period
in such condition as to be available to
commercial use within thirty (30) days.
Easement at 7-8 (Complaint, Ex. 1 at 7-8). The Grantor
of the Easement is expressly defined by the introductory
paragraph of the Easement to mean the Conservation
Commission, which was conferred by 1953 PA 10 with
authority to issue the Easement to Enbridge. The
Conservation Commission’s successor is the Michigan
Department of Natural Resources (“MDNR”), not the
Attorney General.
Michigan courts recognize that an easement (or other
property conveyances) must be administered based on
the conveying instrument’s own terms. See Blackhawk
Dev Corp v Village of Dexter, 473 Mich 33, 42; 700 NW2d
364 (2005) (explaining that “[t]he task of determining the
parties’ intent and interpreting the limiting language is
strictly confined to the ‘four corners of the instrument’
granting the easement.”). Here, the above-quoted terms
of the Easement relative to termination are not ambiguous
or otherwise open to dispute. The Easement may be
terminated, as per the termination provisions clearly set
145a
Appendix D
forth in Paragraph C, only when the Grantor (now MDNR)
asserts a “breach of the terms and conditions of this
easement.” The terms and conditions to which Paragraph
C refers are those specified in the Easement.11 At no point
does the 1953 Easement invest the Attorney General with
the right to seek Easement termination, refer to the public
trust as a termination ground, or provide for termination
based on any of the amorphous safety concerns being
asserted by the Attorney General in her Complaint. Nor
has the Michigan Legislature provided any other method
by which the 1953 Easement can be terminated, i.e., 1953
PA 10 does not speak to termination and no other Michigan
statute provides for the termination of the 1953 Easement.
Because the public trust claim is inconsistent with the
Easement’s own terms, Count I.B should be dismissed.
C.
Federal law preempts the Attorney General’s
claims based on pipeline safety
Count I.B is also preempted by federal law. Specifically,
the Attorney General’s effort to terminate the Easement
11. See Easement at Paragraph A (concerning specifications),
Paragraph B (concerning notice requirements), Paragraph D
(concerning construction timing), Paragraph E (concerning
requirements for seeking approval for relocation, replacement,
major repair, or abandonment), Paragraph F (maximum operating
pressure), Paragraph G (concerning requirements to address a
release), Paragraph H (abandonment requirements), Paragraph
I (inspection and record retention requirements), Paragraph J
(financial assurance requirements), and Paragraph K (notification
of assignment).
146a
Appendix D
based on speculative concerns over a hypothetical
release from Line 5 constitutes a form of regulation of
the pipeline’s safety. As such, it is expressly preempted
by federal pipeline safety law and regulation. It is also
impliedly preempted by federal, pipeline safety law and
regulation, as well as federal Coast Guard regulation.
Dismissal is warranted under MCR 2.116(C)(4).12
Express Preemption. Pursuant to its Commerce
Clause powers, Congress enacted the federal Pipeline
Safety Act (PSA), 49 USC 60101 et seq., in 1979. The
purpose of the PSA is to “provide adequate protection
against risks to life and property posed by pipeline
transportation and pipeline facilities by improving the
regulatory and enforcement authority of the Secretary
of Transportation.” 49 USC 60102(a)(1).
The PSA establishes a two-fold scheme for regulating
interstate pipeline safety. First, Congress vested the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA)—a federal agency within the US Department
of Transportation—with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
the transportation of petroleum products on interstate
pipelines (such as Line 5, which not only traverses two
states, but also an international boundary). PHMSA’s
regulatory authority reaches to, among other matters,
a pipeline’s design, installation, inspection, construction,
12. When reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4), the Court
may consider affidavits, pleadings, dispositions, admissions
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