Amicus Curiae Brief — First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc., Petitioner v. Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General of New Jersey

Supreme Court briefOct 21, 2025

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 24-781

In the Supreme Court of the United States

_________________

FIRST CHOICE WOMEN’S RESOURCE CENTERS, INC.,

Petitioner,

MATTHEW J. PLATKIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW

JERSEY,

Respondent.

_______________

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

BRIEF FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF

MASSACHUSETTS, THE STATE OF

WASHINGTON, AND 18 OTHERS AS AMICI

CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

_______________

NICHOLAS W. BROWN

Attorney General

State of Washington

ROBERT A. HYDE

BEN J. BRYSACZ

Assistant Attorneys

General

PETER B. GONICK

Deputy Solicitor

General

800 Fifth Avenue, Suite

2000

Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 464-7744

ANDREA JOY CAMPBELL

Attorney General

Commonwealth of

Massachusetts

TASHA BAHAL*

Deputy State Solicitor

ALLYSON SLATER

MORGAN CARMEN

Assistant Attorneys

General

One Ashburton Place

Boston, MA 02108

(617) 963-2066

Tasha.Bahal@mass.gov

*Counsel of Record

(Additional counsel listed on signature pages.)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ........................... 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................... 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................. 6

I. State Attorneys General Have Long Been

Afforded Broad Investigatory Powers to

Investigate and Enforce State Law .................... 6

A. State Attorneys General Have

Historically Had Broad Powers Rooted in

Common Law ................................................ 6

B. For Decades, State Attorneys General

Have Employed Non-Self-Executing

Subpoenas to Carry Out Investigations

and Enforce State Law ................................. 8

II. Permitting Automatic Federal Litigation Upon

Receipt of a CID Would Dramatically Hinder

the Ability of State Attorneys General to

Investigate and Enforce State Law .................. 14

A. Recipients of Subpoenas or CIDs Have

Legal Avenues to Vindicate Their Rights .. 14

B. Attorneys General Issue CIDs and

Subpoenas for a Variety of Investigative

Purposes ...................................................... 18

III. In the Absence of Article III Standing, State

Courts Are Well Equipped to Handle Federal

Constitutional Issues, and They Do So Every

Day ..................................................................... 24

A. State Courts Properly Analyze First

Amendment Claims in the Context of

CIDs and Investigative Subpoenas ............ 27

B. Allowing State Courts to Continue

Addressing Federal Constitutional

Issues Arising from State Law CIDs and

Investigative Subpoenas is Appropriate .... 31

C. CID Recipients Have Always Had—and

Continue to Have—a Viable Path to a

Federal Forum: This Court ........................ 35

CONCLUSION ....................................................... 36

APPENDIX A: Exemplar State Statutes

Governing Pre-Litigation Subpoenas

and CIDS to Investigate Potential

Violations of State Law ........................ App. 1

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Att’y Gen. v. Bodimetric Profiles,

533 N.E.2d 1364 (Mass. 1989) ............................ 18

Att’y Gen. v. Colleton,

444 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1982) .............................. 27

Bell v. State,

678 So.2d 994 (Miss. 1996) .....................................

Benson v. People,

703 P.2d 1274 (Colo. 1985) ................................. 18

Brixen & Christopher Architects, P.C. v. State,

29 P.3d 650 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) ................. 27, 33

Brookhart v. Janis,

384 U.S. 1 (1966) ................................................. 32

Bund v. Safeguard Props. LLC,

No. C16-920 MJP, 2018 WL 4008039

(W.D. Wash. Aug. 20, 2018) ................................ 23

Camreta v. Greene,

563 U.S. 692 (2011) ............................................. 34

Cardinale v. Louisiana,

394 U.S. 437 (1969) ............................................. 34

Children’s Home Soc’y of Idaho v. Labrador,

572 P.3d 162 (Idaho 2025) ............................ 29, 30

Claflin v. Houseman,

93 U.S. 130 (1876) ............................................... 26

Com. ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton,

516 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1974) .................................... 6

Commonwealth ex rel. Cameron v. Jones &

Panda, LLC,

656 S.W.3d 259 (Ky. Ct. App. 2022) ................... 16

Congregation B’Nai Jonah v. Kuriansky,

172 A.D.2d 35 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) .................. 18

D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462 (1983) ............................................. 34

Edenfield v. State,

379 So.3d 5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2023) ................ 25

Env’t Prot. Agency v. Pollution Control Bd.,

372 N.E.2d 50 (Ill. 1977) ....................................... 7

Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. Schneiderman,

153 A.D.3d 87 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) ............ 31, 34

Ex parte Lowe,

887 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1994) .................................... 30

Fulton Commons Care Ctr., Inc. v. James,

227 A.D.3d 717 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024) ................ 33

Hawai'i Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,

463 U.S. 1323 (1983) ........................................... 26

Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,

420 U.S. 592 (1975) ............................................. 26

In re Att’y Gen. Subpoena re Terminix Int’l USVI,

LLC,

67 V.I. 70 (Super. Ct. 2016) ................................ 15

In re Civil Investigative Demand No. 2016-CPD50,

No. SUCV20162098BLS1, 2016 WL 7742940

(Mass. Super. Oct. 28, 2016) ............................... 15

In re Confidential Consumer Prot. Investigation

(King Fuji),

512 P.3d 904 (Wash. App. 2021) ................... 15, 16

In re GlaxoSmithKline PLC,

699 N.W.2d 749 (Minn. 2005) ............................. 15

In re GlaxoSmithKline plc,

732 N.W.2d 257 (Minn. 2007) ............................. 30

In re KAHEA,

497 P.3d 58 (Hawai'i 2021) ............... 18, 27, 28, 29

In re Mem’l Hermann Healthcare Sys.,

274 S.W.3d 195 (Tex. App. 2008) ........................ 17

Johnson v. Zerbst,

304 U.S. 458 (1938) ............................................. 32

Leone v. Cnty. of Maui,

404 P.3d 1257 (Hawai'i 2017) ............................. 25

Lubin v. Agora, Inc.,

882 A.2d 833 (Md. App. 2005) ............................ 30

Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective

Ass’n,

485 U.S. 439, (1988) ............................................ 34

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,

14 U.S. 304 (1816) ............................................... 35

Meta Platforms, Inc. v. D.C.,

301 A.3d 740 (D.C. 2023) .................................... 30

Minnesota v. National Tea Co.,

309 U.S. 551 (1940) ............................................. 35

Morley v. Berg,

226 S.W.2d 559 (Ark. 1950) .................................. 7

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,

597 U.S. 1 (2022) ................................................. 25

People v. DiCosola,

33 N.E.3d 589 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) ...................... 30

People v. GreenPower Motor Co., Inc.,

113 Cal. App. 5th 43 (2025) .......................... 22, 33

Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region & Sw.

Missouri v. Bailey,

715 S.W.3d 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 2025) ................... 27

Potter v. City of Lacey,

46 F.4th 787 (9th Cir. 2022) ............................... 35

Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co.,

312 U.S. 496 (1941) ............................................. 35

vii

S. Indiana Propane Gas, Inc. v. Caffrey,

56 N.E.3d 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) .................. 23

San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San

Francisco, Cal.,

545 U.S. 323 (2005) ............................................. 33

Schneiderman v. Rillen,

930 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) ................. 9

Sengupta v. Univ. of Alaska,

139 P.3d 572 (Alaska 2006) ................................ 25

St. Augustine Sch. v. Underly,

78 F.4th 349 (7th Cir. 2023) ............................... 34

State ex rel. Attorney General v. Gleason,

12 Fla. 190 (1868) .................................................. 9

State ex rel. Shriver v. Leech,

612 S.W.2d 454 (Tenn. 1981) .............................. 16

State of Fla. ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp.,

526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976) ................................. 7

State v. Akers,

259 A.3d 127 (Me. 2021) ..................................... 25

State v. Brelvis Consulting LLC,

436 P.3d 818 (Wash. App. 2018), amended on

reconsideration (Mar. 12, 2019) .......................... 27

State v. CLA Estate Servs., Inc.,

515 P.3d 1012 (Wash. App. 2022) ....................... 27

viii

State v. Gator’s Custom Guns, Inc.,

568 P.3d 278 (Wash. 2025), as amended (May

14, 2025) .............................................................. 27

Stone v. Powell,

428 U.S. 465 (1976) ............................................. 33

Tafflin v. Levitt,

493 U.S. 455 (1990) ............................................. 26

Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. State,

42 P.3d 531 (Alaska 2002) .................................. 32

Trainor v. Hernandez,

431 U.S. 434 (1977) ............................................. 26

Tunstall v. Bergeson,

5 P.3d 691 (Wash. 2000) ..................................... 34

United States v. Morton Salt Co.,

338 U.S. 632 (1950) ......................................... 8, 12

Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 420 (2000) ............................................. 26

Statutes

15 U.S.C. § 1312 ........................................................ 12

820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 90/30 .......................................... 13

Ga. Code § 10-1-404 ................................................... 13

Idaho Code § 48-109 .................................................. 13

Idaho Code § 48-110 .................................................. 13

Idaho Code § 48-611 .................................................. 13

Idaho Code § 48-614 .................................................. 13

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 5N(9) ............................... 31

N.M. Stat. § 57-12-12 ................................................ 13

Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.618(2) ........................................ 32

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 3, § 809a ....................................... 13

Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.110 .................................... 12

Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.110(7) ................................ 16

Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.110(8) .......................... 31, 32

Other Authorities

A.E. Dick Howard, Commentaries on the

Constitution of Virginia (1974) ............................. 8

Attorney General Office Characteristics, National

Association of Attorneys General (NAAG),

https://www.naag.org/newsresources/research-data/attorney-generaloffice-characteristics/ .......................................... 24

Cindy M. Lott et al., State Regulation and

Enforcement in the Charitable Sector, Urban

Inst. (Sept. 2016) ................................................... 9

Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition

to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary

Injunction, WinRed, Inc. v. Keith Ellison, et.

al., 21-cv-01575, Dkt. 39 (Aug. 19, 2021) ........... 23

Doug Whelan, Laboratories of Antimonopoly: A

Blueprint for Unfair Methods of Competition

Rulemaking in the States,

52 Fordham Urb. L.J. 427 (2024) ......................... 9

Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution,

2 Pierce L. Rev. 1 (2004) ..................................... 10

Ethics, National Association of Attorneys General

(NAAG),

https://www.naag.org/issues/ethics/#:~:text=G

overnment%20attorneys%20are%2C%20like

%20all,unique%20constitutional%20and%20s

tatutory%20obligations ....................................... 24

Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the

Federal Scheme, 58 Ind. L.J. 375 (1983) ............ 10

Ilya Somin, Rehnquist’s Federalist Legacy, Cato

Inst. (Sept. 9, 2005) ............................................. 10

Ingrid Ulrika Jernudd, Federal Versus State

Antitrust Enforcement: Furthering

Competition Through Cooperation,

21 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 577 (2023) .................. 11

Katherine Mason Jones, Federalism and

Concurrent Jurisdiction in Global Markets:

Why a Combination of National and State

Antitrust Enforcement is a Model for Effective

Economic Regulation, 30 Nw. J. Int’l L. &

Bus. 285 (2010) ................................................ 9, 10

Office of the Attorney General, State of Florida,

Consumer Protection Subpoena Duces Tecum

to Roblox Corporation,

https://www.myfloridalegal.com/sites/default/

files/2025-04/roblox-corporation-signedsubpoena.pdf ....................................................... 20

Press Release, Attorney General Bailey Issues a

Demand Letter to Google and Meta in

Investigation Over Censorship of FirearmRelated Content (June 27, 2025),

https://ago.mo.gov/attorney-general-baileyissues-a-demand-letter-to-google-and-metain-investigation-over-censorship-of-firearmrelated-content/ ..................................................... 4

Press Release, Attorney General Bailey Launches

Consumer Protection Investigation to

Combat Dangerous, Illicit Products (Apr. 17,

2024), https://ago.mo.gov/attorney-generalbailey-launches-consumer-protectioninvestigation-to-combat-dangerous-illicitproducts/ .............................................................. 21

xii

Press Release, Attorney General Bonta Petitions

Court to Compel Plastics Industry

Association and American Chemistry Council

to Fully Comply with Outstanding

Investigative Subpoenas (May 28, 2024),

https://oag.ca.gov/news/pressreleases/attorney-general-bonta-petitionscourt-compel-plastics-industry-associationand ......................................................................... 5

Press Release, Attorney General James Uthmeier

Fights for Florida Crypto Investors, Launches

Investigation Into Robinhood (July 10, 2025),

https://www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrelease/

attorney-general-james-uthmeier-fightsflorida-crypto-investors-launchesinvestigation .......................................................... 4

Press Release, Attorney General James Uthmeier

Fights to Protect Children Online; Subpoenas

Roblox for Child-Protection Policies and

Procedures (Apr. 16, 2025),

https://www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrelease/

attorney-general-james-uthmeier-fightsprotect-children-online-subpoenas-robloxchild ................................................................. 3, 20

Press Release, Attorney General James Uthmeier

Launches Investigation Into Climate Cartel

for Potential Consumer Protection and

Antitrust Violations (July 28, 2025),

https://www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrelease/

attorney-general-james-uthmeier-launchesinvestigation-climate-cartel-potential .................. 4

xiii

Press Release, Attorney General Ken Paxton

Announces Investigation into Food Company

Mars for Deceptive and Illegal Practices (July

16, 2025),

https://texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/release

s/attorney-general-ken-paxton-announcesinvestigation-food-company-mars-deceptiveand-illegal ............................................................ 19

Press Release, Attorney General Ken Paxton

Launches Investigation into Major Baby Food

Manufacturers for Selling Products Tainted

with Dangerous Levels of Heavy Metals (Aug.

26, 2025),

https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/r

eleases/attorney-general-ken-paxtonlaunches-investigation-major-baby-foodmanufacturers-selling-products ......................... 19

Press Release, Attorney General Knudsen

launches investigation into TikTok (Feb. 28,

2022), https://dojmt.gov/attorney-generalknudsen-launches-investigation-into-tiktok/ ..... 22

Shane Goldmacher, How Trump Steered

Supporters Into Unwitting Donations, The

New York Times (Aug. 7, 2021),

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/03/us/politi

cs/trump-donations.html..................................... 23

xiv

State Attorneys General Powers and

Responsibilities, National Association of

Attorneys General (NAAG) (Emily Meyers,

ed. 2018), https://www.naag.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/Powers-and-Duties4th-Edition-Chapter-1.0-Origin-andDevelopment-of-the-Office-CourtesyChapter.pdf.................................................... 6, 7, 8

State of Montana First Civil Investigative

Demand to TikTok, Inc.,

https://dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/202203-03-MT-TikTok-CID-Final.pdf ........................ 22

William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice

Legislation, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 724 (1972)......... 11, 12

Constitutional Provisions

R.I. Const. art. IX, § 12................................................ 7

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE

Amici, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and

the States of Washington, Arizona, California,

Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine,

Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New

Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode

Island, Vermont, and the District of Columbia (“Amici

States”), share interests in preserving the broad

authority of state attorneys general to obtain prelitigation discovery through investigative subpoenas,

often termed “civil investigative demands” (CIDs).

Investigative subpoenas and CIDs are the workhorses

of state civil investigations: attorneys general issue

them to a variety of entities for a variety of reasons,

including to investigate potential violations of state

antitrust, consumer protection, data privacy,

environmental,

insurance,

unlawful

business

practices, and other state laws. In most instances, a

respondent

simply

produces

the

requested

information. Where the respondent takes issue with a

CID, typically state law provides a process for state

judicial review.

The interests of Amici transcend the identities of

the parties and the subject matter of the investigation

at issue here. Although several briefs submitted in

this matter paint this case as highly political—

relating to pregnancy resource centers, nonparty

Planned Parenthood, or abortion—this case is not

about any of that. It involves the narrow but

important procedural question of whether non-selfexecuting subpoenas and CIDs—which are state law

powers used routinely by state attorneys general

across the political spectrum to enforce the law and

serve the public interest—may be challenged in

federal court, without demonstrating Article III injury

and regardless of established state court processes for

review or enforcement.

Petitioner’s position threatens the long-established

powers of state attorneys general to issue non-selfexecuting subpoenas and CIDs without subjecting

Amici States to federal court litigation over the scope

of the discovery requests. Allowing the recipient of a

subpoena or CID to immediately avail themselves of a

federal forum upon receipt of an investigative request

would undermine the authority of state attorneys

general to conduct investigations, diminish the

confidentiality protections afforded by state law to

these investigations and the documents produced

therein, and subject the states to time-intensive and

costly litigation long before any constitutional

questions have ripened for review.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

State attorneys general play a critical role in the

investigation and prosecution of potential violations of

state law. They are endowed with broad common law,

constitutional, and statutory authority to serve the

public interest, including by enforcing state law. One

frequently used—and vital—tool employed by state

attorneys general is the investigative subpoena or

CID. These forms of legal process typically are not selfexecuting, meaning parties who refuse to comply face

no concrete penalties unless and until they are taken

to court and the court imposes such penalties. Use of

these requests is critical to the investigative authority

of the state attorneys general, and attempts to restrict

or otherwise impede their use will prevent officials

from fulfilling their common law, constitutional, and

statutory duties to serve the public interest and

enforce state law.

Subpoenas and CIDs are often used for nonadversarial information gathering. For example, the

recipient may be a witness who has background

information about an industry, or other information

relevant to an open investigation. Other times, these

tools are used to gather information directly from an

individual or company under investigation for

potential violations of state law. In either scenario,

state attorneys general rely on subpoenas or CIDs as

investigatory tools to obtain relevant information that

will inform an investigation. In many cases,

information provided in response to a CID will result

in closing the investigation; in others, such

information will support enforcement litigation.

These tools are widely used by attorneys general

across the political spectrum to perform their jobs as

chief law enforcement officers of their states. For

example, just within this calendar year, the Attorney

General of Florida issued subpoenas to (a) the gaming

platform Roblox, requesting information about how

the platform markets to children, sets age verification

requirements, and moderates chat rooms;1 (b)

1 Press Release, Attorney General James Uthmeier Fights to

Protect Children Online; Subpoenas Roblox for Child-Protection

Policies

and

Procedures

(Apr.

16,

2025),

https://www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrelease/attorney-generaljames-uthmeier-fights-protect-children-online-subpoenasroblox-child.

Robinhood Crypto, LLC. to investigate whether

Robinhood is violating Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair

Practices Act by falsely promoting its cryptocurrency

platform as the least expensive way to purchase

cryptocurrency;2 and (c) CDP (formerly the Climate

Disclosure Project) and the Science Based Targets

Initiative (SBTi) to investigate whether they violated

state consumer protection or antitrust laws by

coercing companies into disclosing proprietary data

and paying for access under the guise of

environmental transparency3—just to list a few.

Similarly, in June 2025, the Missouri Attorney

General issued a CID to Google, YouTube, Facebook

and Instagram (Meta Platforms, Inc.) to determine

whether the companies engaged in unlawful business

practices by suppressing lawful speech and commerce

related to firearms and ammunition on its platforms.4

And the California Attorney General issued an

investigative subpoena to the Plastics Industry

2 Press Release, Attorney General James Uthmeier Fights for

Florida Crypto Investors, Launches Investigation Into Robinhood

(July

10,

2025),

https://www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrelease/attorney-generaljames-uthmeier-fights-florida-crypto-investors-launchesinvestigation.

3 Press Release, Attorney General James Uthmeier Launches

Investigation Into Climate Cartel for Potential Consumer

Protection and Antitrust Violations (July 28, 2025),

https://www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrelease/attorney-generaljames-uthmeier-launches-investigation-climate-cartel-potential.

4 Press Release, Attorney General Bailey Issues a Demand

Letter to Google and Meta in Investigation Over Censorship of

Firearm-Related

Content

(June

27,

2025),

https://ago.mo.gov/attorney-general-bailey-issues-a-demandletter-to-google-and-meta-in-investigation-over-censorship-offirearm-related-content/.

Association, Inc. seeking specific documents regarding

the plastics industry’s alleged campaign of deception

surrounding the recyclability of plastic.5

Whether or not the attorneys general of Amici

States would have initiated the investigation at issue

here, Amici all share the concern that adopting

Petitioner’s and the United States’ radical theory that

receipt of a state investigative subpoena automatically

creates Article III standing would encourage

recipients of such subpoenas to file preemptive

challenges in federal court, thereby frustrating all

States’ legitimate investigations before those

investigations even get off the ground. This Court

should not countenance that result. The bare receipt

of a subpoena or CID does not constitute legal injury,

even to a recipient like Petitioner, who asserts a right

not to comply. Petitioner and others similarly situated

have numerous options for protecting such claims of

right: they are free to negotiate to narrow the scope of

the subpoena, or they can raise in state court any

defenses they have to the subpoena—including federal

constitutional challenges—either when seeking to

quash the subpoena or when opposing an attorney

general’s motion to enforce. State courts routinely and

skillfully handle such discovery disputes and

attendant questions of federal law.

5 Press Release, Attorney General Bonta Petitions Court to

Compel Plastics Industry Association and American Chemistry

Council to Fully Comply with Outstanding Investigative

Subpoenas (May 28, 2024), https://oag.ca.gov/news/pressreleases/attorney-general-bonta-petitions-court-compel-plasticsindustry-association-and.

ARGUMENT

State Attorneys General Have Long Been

Afforded Broad Investigatory Powers to

Investigate and Enforce State Law

State Attorneys General Have

Historically Had Broad Powers

Rooted in Common Law

The position of attorney general originated in

England where, in 1461, the king designated his

attorney, John Herbert, the “Attorney General of

England.” State Attorneys General Powers and

Responsibilities, National Association of Attorneys

General (NAAG) 3 (Emily Meyers, ed. 2018),

https://www.naag.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/Powers-and-Duties-4thEdition-Chapter-1.0-Origin-and-Development-of-theOffice-Courtesy-Chapter.pdf. Accordingly, the powers

of state attorneys general have roots in common law,

developing from king’s attorney to attorney for the

public. Com. ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d

865, 867 (Ky. 1974) (“[U]nder the democratic form of

government now prevailing the people are the

king . . . so the Attorney General’s duties are to that

sovereign rather than to the machinery of

government.”).

Today, each of the fifty states and D.C.,

American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana

Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands provides

for a state office of the attorney general. Forty-four

states established or acknowledged an attorney

general in their state constitutions, and the remainder

created the position after statehood. State Attorneys

General Powers and Responsibilities, supra at 33–35.

These state attorneys general retain wide-ranging

powers, still sounding in common law, constitution,

and statute, such that they may determine what is in

the public interest and subsequently act to protect the

public. See State of Fla. ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp.,

526 F.2d 266, 268–69 (5th Cir. 1976) (“[T]he attorneys

general of our states have enjoyed a significant degree

of autonomy. Their duties and powers typically are not

exhaustively defined by either constitution or statute

but include all those exercised at common law. . . . And

the attorney general has wide discretion in making the

determination as to the public interest.”).

Most commonly, state legislative action related to

the powers of the attorney general expands the office’s

inherent authority. See, e.g., Morley v. Berg,

226 S.W.2d 559, 566 (Ark. 1950) (“[T]he Legislature

has placed on the attorney general certain statutory

duties, and also ‘all duties now required of him under

the common law.’”); Bell v. State, 678 So.2d 994,

996 (Miss. 1996) (describing the state attorney general

as “a constitutional officer possessed of all the power

and authority inherited from the common law as well

as that specially conferred upon him by statute.”). In

some jurisdictions, state courts and state legislatures

are prohibited from unilaterally abridging a state

attorney general’s authority. E.g., Env’t Prot. Agency

v. Pollution Control Bd., 372 N.E.2d 50, 52 (Ill. 1977)

(“[N]either the legislature nor the judiciary may

deprive the attorney general of his common law

powers

under

the

Constitution.”);

R.I. Const. art. IX, §12 (“The duties and powers of

the . . . attorney-general . . . shall be the same under

this Constitution as are now established, or as from

time to time may be prescribed by law.”). Other states

that constitutionally recognize the attorney general’s

common-law powers have “no doubt that the

legislature may deprive the attorney general of

specific powers; but in the absence of such legislative

action, he typically may exercise all such authority as

the public interest requires.” Shevin, 526 F.2d at 268;

see also A.E. Dick Howard, Commentaries on the

Constitution of Virginia 665–66 (1974) (“In most

states where the constitution says that the attorney

general’s duty shall be ‘as prescribed by law,’ this is

taken to mean that he has such common law powers

as have not been specifically repealed by statute—a

conclusion sometimes bolstered by reference to early

statutory adoption of the common law.”). Any such

legislative action must be explicit in its limitation.

See State Attorneys General Powers and

Responsibilities, supra at 35.

For

Decades,

State

Attorneys

General Have Employed Non-SelfExecuting Subpoenas to Carry Out

Investigations and Enforce State

Law

In addition to defending States’ interests in

court when sued, state attorneys general may

prosecute litigation on behalf of the people of their

states to seek relief for violations of state law in

proceedings commonly known as civil enforcement

actions. Inherent in state attorneys general authority

to enforce the law is the necessity of “exercis[ing]

powers of original inquiry.” United States v. Morton

Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950). And because of the

public dimension of the violations, civil enforcement

actions ordinarily are the result of extensive

investigative efforts.

Since the nineteenth century, state attorneys

general have retained their historical mandate to use

their “large discretion . . . [in] matters of public

concern,” State ex rel. Attorney General v. Gleason,

12 Fla. 190, 213 (1868), and over time, have frequently

used those broad historical powers to pursue

investigations and enforcement actions. See, e.g.,

Cindy M. Lott et al., State Regulation and

Enforcement in the Charitable Sector, Urban Inst. 1112 (Sept. 2016) (tracing state attorneys general

authority to enforce fiduciary duty in charitable trust

matters to common law, though most states have since

codified such authority starting with New Hampshire

in 1943); Schneiderman v. Rillen, 930 N.Y.S.2d 855,

855 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) (“The Attorney General is

permitted broad authority to conduct investigations,

based on the complaint of others or on his own

information, with respect to fraudulent or illegal

business practices.”) (citation omitted).

For instance, even before 1900, states had a

prominent

role

antitrust

regulation.

See Doug Whelan, Laboratories of Antimonopoly: A

Blueprint for Unfair Methods of Competition

Rulemaking in the States, 52 Fordham Urb. L.J. 427,

435-36 (2024); see also Katherine Mason Jones,

Federalism and Concurrent Jurisdiction in Global

Markets: Why a Combination of National and State

Antitrust Enforcement is a Model for Effective

Economic Regulation, 30 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 285,

318 (2010) (“From the 19th century until today, a

significant body of law related to business and

commercial activities has remained exclusively the

province of state legislatures. For example, in the

early 19th century, the primary means of regulating

business activities was state enforcement of its own

corporate law and other bodies of common law such as

the law of partnership and unfair competition.”).

Congress recognized as much in 1890 when it passed

the Sherman Act, which provided a federal forum for

antitrust actions that supplemented, but did not

supplant, state efforts. See Herbert Hovenkamp, State

Antitrust

the

Federal

Scheme,

58 Ind. L.J. 375, 375 (1983) (“The legislative history of

the federal antitrust law indicates that Congress

intended to leave state antitrust enforcement more or

less intact but to provide an additional federal forum

for dealing with restraints of trade which exceeded the

jurisdiction of the courts of any particular state.”).

In the latter half of the twentieth century, state

legislatures actively identified areas of public concern

for state attorneys general and equipped them with

tools to fulfill those statutory duties.6 As the

6 Part of the reason for this may have been a shift away from

federal regulation, allowing focus on state sovereignty and state’s

rights. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Rehnquist’s Federalist Legacy, Cato

Inst. (Sept. 9, 2005) (describing the Rehnquist Court’s emphasis

on federalism, limiting federal government power and elevating

state sovereignty); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist

Revolution, 2 Pierce L. Rev. 1 (2004) (“[T]he Court is restricting

congressional powers and aggressively protecting state

governments.”); Jones, supra, at 325–26 (“A third increase in

state antitrust enforcement in the 1980s corresponded to a

decrease in federal antitrust enforcement during the Reagan era.

marketplace modernized, providing more goods and

services with increasingly elaborate supply chains and

less quality control, states recognized the local impact

of unfair and deceptive practices on their residents.

See William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice

Legislation, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 724, 730 (1972). In the late

1950s and early 1960s, states created mechanisms for

deceptive practices enforcement. See id. at 729, n.13

(“The first states to begin their own deceptive trade

practice enforcement were New York and Rhode

Island in 1957, followed by Washington and Alaska in

1961”). Soon after, the Federal Trade Commission

started working alongside the Council of State

Governments and state officials to develop model

legislation on consumer protection and antitrust

matters. Id. at 730. The model legislation that came

out of the collaboration,7 “The Unfair Trade Practices

and Consumer Protection Act” (UTPCPA), inspired a

wave of state action: by 1972, thirty-five states

enacted legislation similar to the UTPCPA, and thirtyA number of state attorneys general increased their level of

interest in enforcing antitrust prohibitions because they

considered this new enforcement policy to be inadequate to

protect their citizens from illegal anticompetitive activities.”).

7 Federal-state collaboration and interstate collaboration is

now common in a variety of matters. See, e.g., Ingrid Ulrika

Jernudd, Federal Versus State Antitrust Enforcement: Furthering

Competition Through Cooperation, 21 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 577,

580 (2023) (“Because of the widened role for state antitrust

enforcement enabled by the Clayton Act and the HSRA, the

National Association of Attorneys General established its

Antitrust Task Force to better coordinate state efforts under the

HSRA by 1983 . . . . After the Task Force was created, state

antitrust enforcement increased, and the NAAG Task Force

became a visible presence in the antitrust world.”).

four of these laws granted enforcement authority to

state attorneys general.8 Id. at 734. At the time,

twenty-six of these laws specifically allowed attorneys

general to issue CIDs, a tool used to explore

documents, records, witnesses, and other materials

before deciding whether to initiate legal proceedings.9

Id. at 737.

To serve the public interest, state legislatures

empowered state attorneys general offices to use CIDs

to engage their broad investigatory powers without

first filing suit. State attorneys general thus can

ascertain whether actionable wrongdoing has

occurred prior to deciding whether to litigate. E.g.,

Morton Salt Co., at 642–43 (state attorneys general

“can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is

being violated, or even just because it wants assurance

that it is not”). Attorneys general open far more

investigations than they file lawsuits.

Today, all state attorneys general employ CIDs,

also called ‘pre-litigation subpoenas,’ ‘subpoenas,’ or

‘investigative demands’ in statute, as routine

These laws are often called Unfair or Deceptive Acts or

Practices (UDAP) laws.

9 Congress created the federal CID in the 1962 Antitrust Civil

Process Act, taking inspiration from state legislatures that

already provided state attorneys general with CID authority by

statute, to aid in Department of Justice antitrust investigations.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1312 (1962); see also Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.110

(1961).

instruments of state civil investigations.10 State

legislatures gave state attorneys general power to use

CIDs while investigating suspected violations of state

laws related to consumer protection, charities,

antitrust, data protection, civil racketeering, and false

claims, among other subject areas. See Table A (listing

exemplar statutes from each state, as well as the

District of Columbia), attached hereto. State

legislatures have clarified that CIDs are non-selfexecuting subpoenas, directing attorneys general to

state

courts

for

enforcement.

See,

e.g.,

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 3, § 809a (outlining the procedures

by which government agencies, including the attorney

general, may enforce subpoenas in court);

Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-404 (describing how the state

attorney general may seek an order compelling

compliance

with

the

CID

court);

Idaho Code §§ 48-109, 48-110, 48-611, 48-614,

(allowing the state attorney general to seek an order

compelling compliance with an investigative demand);

820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 90/30 (“The Attorney General may

compel compliance with investigative demands under

this Section through an order by any court of

competent jurisdiction”); N.M. Stat. § 57-12-12 (“After

service of the investigative demand upon him, if any

person neglects or refuses to comply with the demand,

the attorney general may invoke the aid of the court

in the enforcement of the demand.”).

Often, this variation in naming exists among a single

state’s statutes.

II.

Permitting Automatic Federal Litigation

Upon

Receipt

CID

Would

Dramatically Hinder the Ability of State

Attorneys General to Investigate and

Enforce State Law

Recipients of Subpoenas or CIDs

Have Legal Avenues to Vindicate

Their Rights

Investigatory subpoenas and CIDs are vitally

important to state attorneys general. But acting alone,

a state attorney general cannot sanction a recipient for

failing to comply with an investigative subpoena.

Instead, enforcement is a matter for the state courts,

which may order compliance with the terms of the

subpoena, narrow it, and/or impose sanctions. This

long-standing approach is utilized in most cases where

a state attorney general issues a subpoena or CID and

the recipient refuses to respond in full. Any litigant

who can demonstrate Article III standing will of

course have the federal courts open to them. But mere

receipt of a CID is insufficient.

In a typical case, a CID recipient who believes a

subpoena is objectionable will first contact the state

attorney who signed the subpoena to negotiate and

potentially narrow its scope. As in civil discovery, the

issuing attorney evaluates the scope of the request,

considering the respondent’s concerns and existing

records, and will typically narrow the requests or defer

them until a later date in response to any legitimate

concerns. If such negotiations fail to resolve the

dispute and the recipient refuses to comply with the

CID, the state attorney general’s office may enforce

the subpoena in state court, or a recipient may file a

motion to quash. See, e.g., In re GlaxoSmithKline PLC,

699 N.W.2d 749, 752 (Minn. 2005) (“The state served

a CID on respondent . . . request[ing] the production of

documents . . . Before any documents were produced,

[respondent] and the state entered a Confidentiality

Agreement that [] permitted [respondent] to mark

documents as ‘confidential’[.]”); In re Confidential

Consumer Prot. Investigation (King Fuji), 512 P.3d

904, 909 (Wash. App. 2021) (recognizing that trial

court’s “order enforcing the CID required the [attorney

general] and [respondent] to meet and confer in good

faith on the scope of documents and information to be

produced by [respondent] and provided that if

agreement could not be reached, the court would

resolve whatever issues remained”); In re Civil

Investigative

Demand

No.

2016-CPD-50,

No. SUCV20162098BLS1, 2016 WL 7742940, at *3

(Mass. Super. Oct. 28, 2016) (ordering parties to meet

and confer, observing “the Attorney General argues

that it is premature to delve into relevancy,

burdensomeness and privilege objections because the

parties have not had a meaningful opportunity (as a

result of [respondent’s] position that the CID should

be set aside in toto) to ‘meet and confer’ regarding the

scope of the requests”); In re Att’y Gen. Subpoena re

Terminix Int’l USVI, LLC, 67 V.I. 70, 75 (Super. Ct.

2016) (addressing investigative subpoena issued by

attorney general; “the Court believes it would be

beneficial for the parties to meet and confer in a good

faith effort to resolve as many of the discovery

disputes as possible with minimal judicial

intervention”).

However, even when disagreements over the

scope of a CID move into state court, the court often

instructs the parties to continue their negotiations.

After all, the negotiations process is an efficient means

to address the concerns of all parties. But if CID

recipients were able to go directly to federal court,

regardless of whether they satisfied Article III

requirements, recipients would be disincentivized

from negotiating after receiving a CID.

Further, the investigatory CID process is

typically designed to protect confidentiality of

responses. To safeguard a respondent’s business and

reputational concerns, state statutes often wholly

exempt CID materials from public disclosure,

including in response to FOIA or public records

requests, and prevent voluntary sharing of the

information. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.110(7)

(“documentary material, answers to written

interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony

produced pursuant to a demand, or copies thereof”

produced in response to a CID shall not be produced

“unless otherwise ordered by a superior court for good

cause shown”; limiting voluntary sharing of

documents and information); State ex rel. Shriver v.

Leech, 612 S.W.2d 454, 459 (Tenn. 1981) (“[Tenn. Code

Ann. §] 8-6-407 provides for the confidentiality of

documents turned over to the attorney general

pursuant to a civil investigative demand.”);

Commonwealth ex rel. Cameron v. Jones & Panda,

LLC, 656 S.W.3d 259, 263–64 (Ky. Ct. App. 2022)

(“The [AG] is required to keep [investigative]

subpoenas confidential and may make them public

only to ‘the extent necessary for law enforcement

purposes in the public interest.’”); King Fuji, 512 P.3d

at 908 (“The CID . . . was accompanied by orders the

[attorney general] had obtained several days earlier

[that] . . . prohibited [respondent] from disclosing the

existence or contents of the CID to anyone but its

counsel, retained jurisdiction over subsequent

proceedings, and sealed the case file.”); In re Mem’l

Hermann Healthcare Sys., 274 S.W.3d 195, 199 (Tex.

App. 2008) (Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code § 15.10(i)(1)

“precludes the [attorney general] . . . from disclosing

CID materials unless either (1) the producing person

consents, or (2) the person seeking to examine the

materials obtains a court order permitting access.”).

Indeed, state attorneys general frequently issue CIDs

instead of filing litigation to maintain the

confidentiality of an ongoing investigation and the

materials gathered therein. These confidentiality

provisions protect targets of investigations from

reputational injury prior to a formal decision to file,

protect a case from scrutiny and prejudgment, and

protect witnesses and victims who may fear reprisal

or retaliation for cooperating with an investigation.11

Petitioner’s request to have early access to

federal court upon receipt of a state attorney general

pre-litigation subpoena or CID subverts this

confidential process and would subject state attorneys

general to unnecessary and expensive federal

litigation, even where the subpoena has yet to be

negotiated, narrowed, or enforced.

11 Petitioner and various amici devote significant attention to

the acts of private third parties, but private parties do not direct

or participate in state investigations and are not entitled to

review CID responses, which are typically confidential by law,

including after the conclusion of an investigation in many states.

Attorneys General Issue CIDs and

Subpoenas

for

Variety

Investigative Purposes

State attorneys general have plenary authority

to issue and enforce requests for information in

various forms, so long as they are germane to an

investigation or some other legitimate purpose.

See, e.g., Congregation B’Nai Jonah v. Kuriansky,

172 A.D.2d 35, 39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (noting a state

has a “profound interest in fighting corruption in the

Medicaid industry” and enforcing its laws, which gives

it broad authority to issue demands for information).

Often, CIDs are used for non-adversarial

information gathering, such as issuing CIDs and

investigative subpoenas to third parties. See, e.g., Att’y

Gen. v. Bodimetric Profiles, 533 N.E.2d 1364, 1366–67

(Mass. 1989) (“The Attorney General . . . may require

production of documents from a third party [using a

CID] . . . to aid in the investigation.”); In re KAHEA,

497 P.3d 58, 63 (Hawai‘i 2021) (addressing Attorney

General’s use of an investigative subpoena to obtain

bank records); Benson v. People, 703 P.2d 1274, 1276–

79 (Colo. 1985) (CID to bank for bank records of

investigative target). Thus, not every recipient of a

CID or investigative subpoena is the target of an

investigation.

This is an authority that all state attorneys

general share. Irrespective of political ideology,

attorneys general regularly utilize their investigatory

subpoena and CID powers to investigate potential

violations of state law that may affect the people of

their states. These investigations traverse countless

subject areas, although a common subject involves the

protection of consumers and their families from

dangerous, inaccurately labeled, or misleading

products. For example:

On August 26, 2025, Texas Attorney

General Ken Paxton launched an investigation

into baby food, looking into whether

manufacturers are selling products that may be

tainted with dangerous levels of heavy metals.

Unsurprisingly, as an early step in the

investigation, Attorney General Paxton issued

CIDs to manufacturers such as Gerber and

Plum Organics.12

In July 2025, Attorney General Paxton

opened an investigation into food company

Mars, Incorporated, issuing a CID for

documents related to alleged deceptive trade

practices that violate Texas consumers’

rights.13 This investigation followed on the May

2025 investigation by the Texas Attorney

Press Release, Attorney General Ken Paxton Launches

Investigation into Major Baby Food Manufacturers for Selling

Products Tainted with Dangerous Levels of Heavy Metals (Aug.

26,

2025),

https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/attorneygeneral-ken-paxton-launches-investigation-major-baby-foodmanufacturers-selling-products.

13 Press Release, Attorney General Ken Paxton Announces

Investigation into Food Company Mars for Deceptive and Illegal

Practices

(July

16,

2025),

https://texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/attorneygeneral-ken-paxton-announces-investigation-food-companymars-deceptive-and-illegal.

General into General Mills, which resulted in

General Mills announcing it would remove

artificial dyes from its products.14

On April 16, 2025, Florida Attorney

General James Uthmeier, touting “children’s

safety and protection” as a top priority, issued a

subpoena to the gaming platform Roblox,

requesting information about how the platform

markets to children, sets age verification

requirements, and moderates chat rooms.15

The subpoena itself notes that it is not selfexecuting and that only upon “failure of a

person without lawful excuse to obey a

subpoena. . . the enforcing authority may apply

to the circuit court for an order compelling

compliance.”16

On April 17, 2024, then Missouri

Attorney General Andrew Bailey launched an

investigation into “illicit vape and marijuana

products to ensure compliance with Missouri

law.” The CIDs stated that “[t]he Attorney

14 Id.

15 Press Release, Attorney General James Uthmeier Fights to

Protect Children Online; Subpoenas Roblox for Child-Protection

Policies

and

Procedures

(Apr.

16,

2025),

https://www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrelease/attorney-generaljames-uthmeier-fights-protect-children-online-subpoenasroblox-child.

16 Office of the Attorney General, State of Florida, Consumer

Protection Subpoena Duces Tecum to Roblox Corporation,

https://www.myfloridalegal.com/sites/default/files/202504/roblox-corporation-signed-subpoena.pdf.

General has reason to believe that [the

company being investigated] has used

deception,

fraud,

false

promise,

misrepresentation, unfair practices, and/or the

concealment, suppression, or omission of

material facts in connection with the sale or

advertisement of CBD, Delta-8, and Delta-9

THC products.”17

In August 2023, the corporate fraud

section of the California Attorney General’s

Office commenced an investigation into

violations of the California Hybrid and ZeroEmissions Truck and Bus Voucher Incentive

Project (“HVIP”). As part of the investigation,

the Attorney General issued investigative

subpoenas to two companies. The companies

refused to fully comply with the investigative

subpoenas, arguing the subpoenas failed to

meet constitutional standards for enforcement

because they sought irrelevant records and

were excessive for the purposes of the inquiry.

The California Court of Appeals ruled against

the companies, noting the Attorney General’s

investigative

authority,

the

adequate

description of the nature of the investigation,

the relevance of the requests as “reasonably

related” to the investigation, and the Attorney

General’s willingness to work with the target as

Press Release, Attorney General Bailey Launches

Consumer Protection Investigation to Combat Dangerous, Illicit

Products (Apr. 17, 2024), https://ago.mo.gov/attorney-generalbailey-launches-consumer-protection-investigation-to-combatdangerous-illicit-products/.

to the necessary production. People v.

GreenPower Motor Co., Inc., 113 Cal. App. 5th

43, 47, 53-58 (2025).

In February 2022, Montana Attorney

General Austin Knudsen announced an

investigation into social media company TikTok

for possible violations of the Montana Unfair

Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act.18

The CID sought information regarding whether

TikTok had violated Montana law by

“intentionally distributing a dangerous product

without adequate warning to consumers and by

publicly misrepresenting the dangers its

product poses to consumers.”19

In July 2021, Minnesota Attorney

General Keith Ellison, New York Attorney

General Letitia James, Connecticut Attorney

General William Tong; and then Maryland

Attorney General Brian Frosh served

subpoenas and CIDs requesting information

about their use of pre-checked boxes after

several media outlets reported that political

fundraisers from both major political parties

(and in both federal and state elections) were

Press Release, Attorney General Knudsen launches

investigation

into

TikTok

(Feb.

28,

2022),

https://dojmt.gov/attorney-general-knudsen-launchesinvestigation-into-tiktok/.

State of Montana First Civil Investigative Demand to

TikTok, Inc. at 4, https://dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022-0303-MT-TikTok-CID-Final.pdf.

misleading donors into making unintended

recurring or additional contributions.20

Not every case involving a subpoena or CID

results in litigation. See, e.g., Bund v. Safeguard

Props. LLC, C16-920 MJP, 2018 WL 4008039, at *3

n.2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 20, 2018) (“In 2014, the

Washington Attorney General . . . issued a [CID] to

Safeguard which resulted in audits of ten of its

property files; the [Attorney General’s] review

resulted in no action being taken against Defendant,

including no indication that the [Attorney General]

believed that the mortgage contracts’ entry provisions

were illegal or otherwise unenforceable.”); S. Indiana

Propane Gas, Inc. v. Caffrey, 56 N.E.3d 1216, 1218

(Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“The [Attorney General] also

received complaints from other customers and sent

[respondent] a [CID] requesting information

concerning the corporation’s failure to distribute

propane to its prepaid customers. . . . Subsequently, on

December 23, 2014, the [Attorney General] closed its

investigation and advised . . . that it would not pursue

any further action against [respondent].”). Rather, the

subpoena or CID is used as a preliminary

See, e.g., Shane Goldmacher, How Trump Steered

Supporters Into Unwitting Donations, The New York Times (Aug.

7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/03/us/politics/trumpdonations.html. See also Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction,

WinRed, Inc. v. Keith Ellison, et. al., 21-cv-01575, Dkt. 39 (Aug.

19, 2021), at 7-9.

investigative tool that can help understand a potential

problem or to engage with a target about questions.21

III.

In the Absence of Article III Standing,

State Courts Are Well Equipped to Handle

Federal Constitutional Issues, and They

Do So Every Day

Petitioner cautions that state attorneys general

may misuse their broad powers and includes examples

of what it considers abusive investigations.

Pet. Br. 27-28. But the answer to hypothetical

potential abuse is not to curtail the investigatory

powers themselves, but rather to hold state attorneys

general accountable within the systems that already

exist for that purpose. Petitioner implies that state

courts are ill-equipped to handle federal constitutional

issues, or at least not as well-equipped as federal

courts, and that its rights under the U.S. Constitution

21 In addition to the state court processes described above,

state attorneys general are public officials accountable to the

electorate. See Attorney General Office Characteristics, National

Association

Attorneys

General

(NAAG),

https://www.naag.org/news-resources/research-data/attorneygeneral-office-characteristics/ (attorneys general directly elected

in 43 states and appointed by the governor in 5). Moreover, state

attorneys general are subject to the rules and codes that govern

professional conduct for lawyers. See Ethics, National

Association

Attorneys

General

(NAAG),

https://www.naag.org/issues/ethics/#:~:text=Government%20att

orneys%20are%2C%20like%20all,unique%20constitutional%20a

nd%20statutory%20obligations.

can only be protected through the filing of

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in federal court. Backed by the

United States, Petitioner advances a radical,

alternative theory that mere receipt of a CID is

enough to establish standing. This puts the cart before

the horse—while § 1983 guarantees a federal forum

for a plaintiff with Article III standing, it does not

manifest standing for a plaintiff who lacks it. The

argument also ignores both the legal and factual

reality of American judicial federalism; state courts

routinely and faithfully apply the U.S. Constitution.

Article VI of the Constitution mandates that

“the Judges in every State shall be bound” by the

U.S. Constitution, laws, and treaties, and that these

are the “supreme Law of the Land.” State court judges

in every jurisdiction swear such an oath. State courts

regularly analyze and apply the U.S. Constitution in a

broad range of civil and criminal cases. See, e.g.,

Edenfield v. State, 379 So.3d 5, 6–10, reh’g denied, 375

So.3d 930 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2023), review denied,

SC2023-1106, 2023 WL 8710101 (Fla. Dec. 18, 2023)

(analyzing Florida criminal statute under Second

Amendment and New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n

v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)); Sengupta v. Univ. of

Alaska, 139 P.3d 572, 576–78 (Alaska 2006)

(analyzing First Amendment retaliation claim

brought under § 1983); State v. Akers, 259 A.3d 127,

135–38 (Me. 2021) (analyzing warrantless search of

criminal defendant’s curtilage under Fourth

Amendment and Supreme Court precedent); Leone v.

Cnty. of Maui, 404 P.3d 1257, 1261, 1270–78 (Hawai‘i

2017) (analyzing § 1983 inverse condemnation claim

under Fifth Amendment Takings Clause). Federal and

state law “together form one system of jurisprudence,

which constitutes the law of the land for the State; and

the courts of the two jurisdictions are not foreign to

each other, nor to be treated by each other as such, but

as courts of the same country, having jurisdiction

partly different and partly concurrent.” Claflin v.

Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876).

This Court has consistently held that “state

courts have the solemn responsibility equally with the

federal courts to safeguard constitutional rights,” and

steadfastly has refused to sanction any decision that

would “reflect negatively upon a state court’s ability to

do so.” Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443(1977)

(cleaned up); see also Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,

420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975) (“Appellee is in truth urging

us to base a rule on the assumption that state judges

will not be faithful to their constitutional

responsibilities. This we refuse to do.”). Thus, “[u]nder

this system of dual sovereignty,” this Court has

“consistently held that state courts have inherent

authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to

adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United

States.” Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990);

Hawai‘i Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 463 U.S. 1323,

1325 (1983) (noting the “frank recognition that state

courts, as judicial institutions of co-extant sovereigns,

are equally capable of safeguarding federal

constitutional rights”) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers).

The practical reality is that federal

constitutional issues are part and parcel of state court

litigation, and federal constitutional law is interwoven

with day-to-day state court decision making. See, e.g.,

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436–37 (2000) (“state

judiciaries have the duty and competence to vindicate

rights secured by the Constitution in state criminal

proceedings”). Most importantly for the case at bar,

state courts are entrusted to, and frequently, handle

federal constitutional issues arising from CIDs and

investigative subpoenas. State v. Gator’s Custom

Guns, Inc., 568 P.3d 278 (Wash. 2025), as amended

(May 14, 2025) (Second Amendment); Planned

Parenthood of St. Louis Region & Sw. Missouri v.

Bailey, 715 S.W.3d 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 2025) (Fourth

Amendment); Brixen & Christopher Architects, P.C. v.

State, 29 P.3d 650 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (Fourth

Amendment); State v. Brelvis Consulting LLC, 436

P.3d 818 (Wash. App. 2018), amended on

reconsideration (Mar. 12, 2019) (Fifth Amendment

protection against self-incrimination); Att’y Gen. v.

Colleton, 444 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1982) (Fifth

Amendment protection against self-incrimination);

State v. CLA Estate Servs., Inc., 515 P.3d 1012 (Wash.

App. 2022) (Fourteenth Amendment due process).

State Courts Properly Analyze First

Amendment Claims in the Context of

CIDs and Investigative Subpoenas

In addition to handling the full gamut of federal

constitutional issues arising from CIDs and

investigative subpoenas, state courts are wellequipped to address claims regarding First

Amendment retaliation and associational speech in

the context of CIDs and investigative subpoenas.

For example, in In re KAHEA, supra, the

Hawai‘i Supreme Court evaluated the propriety of an

investigative subpoena the Hawai’i Attorney General

issued to a bank for records relating to KAHEA, a

citizen group engaged in environmental protests.22

497 P.3d at 62–63. KAHEA petitioned in the state trial

court to quash the subpoena, arguing that the

subpoena was retaliation for protected First

Amendment speech and that it was “unreasonable,

overly broad and oppressive.” Id. at 63–64. The

Hawai‘i Supreme Court agreed with the lower’s court’s

ruling that roughly half of what the subpoena

requested was improper, noting:

[t]he Attorney General’s discretion under

HRS § 28-2.5(a) is counterbalanced by

courts’ powers under HRS § 28-2.5(e).

This subsection gives trial courts leeway

to hew unreasonable or oppressive

subpoenas – with a battle ax, scalpel, or

butter knife – as justice so requires. The

22 Petitioner mentions In re KAHEA only to (incorrectly)

claim that courts cannot second guess Attorney General

investigations. Pet. Br. 5. While the Hawai‘i Supreme Court

affirmed the Attorney General’s broad discretion in determining

whether an investigation is in the public interest, the court

reaffirmed the judiciary’s role in ensuring such investigations

complied with the U.S. and state constitution:

The Attorney General’s subpoena power under

this statute is broad. But it is not unbounded. It

is hemmed by the constitution and the safeguards

of the statute itself. . . . A subpoena may always

be challenged on state or federal constitutional

grounds. And parties who feel compliance with a

subpoena would be unreasonable or oppressive

may move to quash or modify it under HRS § 282.5(e). But they cannot second-guess the Attorney

General’s discretion under HRS § 28-2.5(a).

497 P.3d at 66.

circuit court in this case was an effective

first

line

defense

against

governmental overreach: it disallowed

nine of the Subpoena’s eighteen requests

and limited its scope to accounts related

to the Aloha ‘Āina Fund.

497 P.3d at 66–67.

The Hawai‘i Supreme Court went on to analyze

the merits of “KAHEA’s position that the Subpoena

unconstitutionally encroaches on its First Amendment

free speech rights,” under binding precedent from this

Court and the Ninth Circuit. 497 P.3d at 67–71.

The court agreed that “KAHEA’s opposition to

development on Mauna Kea falls squarely within the

heartland of the First Amendment’s protections,” and

recognized that the Attorney General likely had a

motive to investigate KAHEA given the parties’

adversarial relationship predating the subpoena. Id.

at 69–70. Nevertheless, the court analyzed and

rejected KAHEA’s First Amendment arguments

because they failed on the merits, not because state

courts are powerless to second-guess the Attorney

General (as Petitioner and amici intimate). Id. at 67–

71.

The Idaho Supreme Court similarly addressed

a CID recipient’s First Amendment freedom of

association arguments in Children’s Home Soc’y of

Idaho v. Labrador, 572 P.3d 162 (Idaho 2025). One of

the CID recipients argued that “the district court

erred when it required her to answer a CID request

that required that she provide a ‘list of all charitable

organizations for which the person is a member, board

member, director, volunteer, or donor.’” Id. at 180.

The Idaho Supreme Court “agree[d] that the Attorney

General’s request for all of [respondent’s] affiliations

is overly broad and infringes on her freedom of

association.” Id. at 181. The Idaho Supreme Court

ruled that the trial court should have either limited or

set aside the CID under Idaho Code § 48-611(2) and

remanded the case to allow the trial court to do just

that. Id. at 182.

Other state courts have analyzed First

Amendment claims relating to CIDs and investigative

subpoenas as well, including limiting those CIDs and

subpoenas on state and federal grounds. See, e.g.,

Meta Platforms, Inc. v. D.C., 301 A.3d 740, 755–60

(D.C. 2023) (analyzing First Amendment free speech

and freedom of association arguments where Attorney

General issued pre-suit subpoena regarding alleged

misrepresentations to consumers regarding COVID19

vaccine);

GlaxoSmithKline

plc,

732 N.W.2d 257, 267–69 (Minn. 2007) (analyzing First

Amendment freedom of association arguments where

Attorney General issued CID to investigate alleged

antitrust violations; recognizing that trial courts have

authority to limit or quash CIDs on First Amendment

grounds); Ex parte Lowe, 887 S.W.2d 1, 2–4

(Tex. 1994) (analyzing First Amendment protections

of Ku Klux Klan membership lists and other

information; vacating contempt order arising from

failure to comply with investigative subpoena in presuit fair housing investigation); People v. DiCosola,

33 N.E.3d 589, 593–95 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (analyzing

investigative subpoena under First, Fourth, and Fifth

Amendments; injunction entered for failing to comply

with subpoena); Lubin v. Agora, Inc., 882 A.2d 833,

842–49 (Md. App. 2005) (affirming trial court’s

quashing of investigative subpoena for company’s

subscriber lists in securities investigation; holding

First Amendment protected such subscriber lists);

Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. Schneiderman, 153 A.D.3d 87,

99–102 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (analyzing First

Amendment challenge to attorney general subpoena

investigating unauthorized practice of medicine;

holding that subpoena was not retaliatory

politically-motivated but limiting subpoena on state

law and First Amendment grounds).

Allowing State Courts to Continue

Addressing Federal Constitutional

Issues Arising from State Law CIDs

and Investigative Subpoenas is

Appropriate

Petitioners and certain amici argue that they

will be left without a remedy unless they can file a

§ 1983 action in district court before a CID is enforced.

Not so. Should the recipient of a CID or investigative

subpoena decide they must vindicate their rights in

court before an attorney general moves to enforce and

before they experience Article III injury, state law

allows them to move to quash or modify the CID or

investigative subpoena. In state courts, CID recipients

typically need not demonstrate standing or injury

before filing an action to quash or modify the CID or

investigative subpoena—receipt of the demand is all

that is required. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code

§ 19.86.110(8); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 5N(9);

Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.618(2).23 Just as with a § 1983

action, the recipient can ordinarily recover fees should

it prevail in state court. E.g., Wash. Rev. Code

§ 19.86.110(8). More than this, though, it makes legal

and practical sense to allow state courts to address the

legal viability of a CID or investigative subpoena’s

demands in the first instance.

First, the challenges that arise from CIDs and

investigatory subpoenas are fact-intensive inquiries.

State courts are more familiar with the CID and

investigative subpoena process (which are creatures of

state law) and the nuances of applicable state law, as

well as the state and federal constitutional challenges

arising therefrom. See, e.g., Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v.

State, 42 P.3d 531, 541 (Alaska 2002) (“Given the

Certain amici argue that the deadlines set forth in

these types of statutes cause automatic injury even without

attorney general action. They suggest that potential

constitutional issues with a CID or investigative subpoena are

not readily apparent within these timeframes, and that entities

risk waiving fundamental constitutional defenses unless they

retain counsel immediately. These arguments are unpersuasive,

for at least two reasons. First, not only is it a bedrock aspect of

civil procedure to identify and assert constitutional and other

defenses within a short period in answering complaints and

responding to discovery, but the argument also presumes that an

extension of time cannot be accomplished with a simple phone

call to the issuing attorney. Second, if accepted, this argument

would require this Court to ignore its own long line of cases

holding that the “question of waiver of a federally guaranteed

constitutional right is, of course, a federal question controlled by

federal law,” Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966), and that

courts must “indulge every reasonable presumption against

waiver of fundamental constitutional rights,” Johnson v. Zerbst,

304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (cleaned up).

superior court’s extensive factual and legal inquiry, as

well as the substantial modifications it made to the

CID, we conclude that the superior court did not abuse

its discretion.”); GreenPower Motor, 335 Cal. Rptr. 3d

(analyzing California and federal law to evaluate

propriety of investigative subpoenas); Fulton

Commons Care Ctr., Inc. v. James, 227 A.D.3d 717

(N.Y. App. Div. 2024) (analyzing New York law to

evaluate propriety of investigative subpoenas);

Brixen, 29 P.3d at 655 (analyzing Utah and federal

law to “evaluate whether the State met its statutory

burden under each prong of the [state law] CID Test”).

This Court has generally deferred to state courts

applying the U.S. Constitution in the context of state

law in the first instance. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel,

L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Cal.,

545 U.S. 323, 347 (2005) (“State courts are fully

competent to adjudicate constitutional challenges to

local land-use decisions. Indeed, state courts

undoubtedly have more experience than federal courts

do in resolving the complex factual, technical, and

legal questions related to zoning and land-use

regulations.”); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35

(1976) (“the argument that federal judges are more

expert in applying federal constitutional law is

especially unpersuasive in the context of search-andseizure claims, since they are dealt with on a daily

basis by trial level judges in both systems”).

Second, allowing state courts the first

opportunity to interpret a CID or investigative

subpoena is practical and desirable because it gives

“the state court the first opportunity to consider a

state statute or rule in light of federal constitutional

arguments” and allows the state court to give the CID,

investigative subpoena, and the underlying state

statutes “a saving construction in response to those

[federal constitutional] arguments.” D.C. Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 n.16 (1983).

Whether or not the state court employs constitutional

avoidance, it may limit the CID or subpoena on state

law grounds. See, e.g., Evergreen Ass’n, 153 A.D.3d at

101–03 (limiting investigative subpoena on state law

and First Amendment grounds). Thus, a state court is

in the best position to construe or limit the CIDs or

subpoenas to avoid running afoul of the federal

constitution, but also to limit or block the CID or

subpoena on independent state court grounds.

See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 439 (1969)

(“[I]n a federal system it is important that state courts

be given the first opportunity to consider the

applicability of state statutes in light of constitutional

challenge, since the statutes may be construed in a

way which saves their constitutionality. Or the issue

may be blocked by an adequate state ground.”).

State courts and this Court agree with the

“longstanding principle of judicial restraint . . . that

courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in

advance of the necessity of deciding them.”

E.g, Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 705 (2011)

(quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective

Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988)); Tunstall v. Bergeson,

5 P.3d 691, 696 (Wash. 2000) (where issue may be

resolved on statutory grounds, court will avoid

deciding issue on constitutional grounds). This is

particularly true when federal constitutional issues

can be avoided if a case can be decided on state law

grounds. See, e.g., St. Augustine Sch. v. Underly, 78

F.4th 349, 358 (7th Cir. 2023) (recognizing “U.S.

Supreme Court’s preference for constitutional

avoidance, if a difficult question can be resolved either

by reliance on state law [] or on statutory grounds”)

(citing Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co.,

312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941)); Potter v. City of Lacey,

46 F.4th 787, 791 (9th Cir. 2022) (“It is wellestablished that [we] should avoid adjudication of

federal constitutional claims when alternative state

grounds are available….”) (citations omitted).

CID Recipients Have Always Had—

and Continue to Have—a Viable

Path to a Federal Forum: This Court

Although

state

courts

routinely—and

properly—address federal constitutional issues in the

context of CIDs and investigative subpoenas, this does

not mean that litigants are entirely shut out of a

federal remedy once the CID is subject to judicial

enforcement. To the contrary, for more than 200 years,

this Court has recognized its authority to ensure state

courts interpret federal law and the Constitution

uniformly, establishing federal supremacy in these

matters. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 34647 (1816); see also Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309

U.S. 551, 557 (1940) (U.S. Supreme Court is

responsible for assuring “that state courts will not be

the final arbiters of important issues under the federal

constitution”).

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

NICHOLAS W. BROWN

Attorney General

State of Washington

ANDREA JOY CAMPBELL

Attorney General

Commonwealth of

Massachusetts

PETER B. GONICK

Deputy Solicitor

General

ROBERT A. HYDE

BEN J. BRYSACZ

Assistant Attorneys

General

800 Fifth Avenue, Suite

2000

Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 464-7744

TASHA BAHAL*

Deputy State Solicitor

ALLYSON SLATER

MORGAN CARMEN

Assistant Attorneys

General

One Ashburton Place

Boston, MA 02108

(617) 963-2066

Tasha.Bahal@mass.gov

*Counsel of Record

KRISTIN K. MAYES

Attorney General

State of Arizona

2005 N. Central Ave.

Phoenix, AZ 85004

DANA NESSEL

Attorney General

State of Michigan

P.O. BOX 30212

LANSING, MI 48909

ROB BONTA

Attorney General

State of California

1300 I Street

Sacramento, CA 95814

KEITH ELLISON

Attorney General

State of Minnesota

102 State Capitol

75 Rev. Dr. Martin

Luther King Jr. Blvd.

St. Paul, MN 55155

PHILIP J. WEISER

Attorney General

State of Colorado

1300 Broadway, 10th Fl.

Denver, CO 80203

AARON D. FORD

Attorney General

State of Nevada

100 North Carson Street

Carson City, NV 89701

WILLIAM TONG

Attorney General

State of Connecticut

165 Capitol Avenue

Hartford, CT 06106

RAÚL TORREZ

Attorney General

State of New Mexico

Department of Justice

408 Galisteo Street

Santa Fe, NM 87501

KATHLEEN JENNINGS

LETITA JAMES

Attorney General

State of New York

State of Delaware

Delaware Department of 28 Liberty Street

Justice

New York, NY 10005

820 N. French Street

Wilmington, DE 19801

BRIAN L. SCHWALB

Attorney General

District of Columbia

400 6th Street, NW,

Suite 8100

Washington, D.C. 20001

JEFF JACKSON

Attorney General

State of North

Carolina

114 W. Edenton St.

Raleigh, NC 27603

KWAME RAOUL

Attorney General

State of Illinois

115 S. LaSalle Street

Chicago, IL 60603

DAN RAYFIELD

Attorney General

State of Oregon

1162 Court Street NE

Salem, OR 97301

AARON M. FREY

Attorney General

State of Maine

6 State House Station

Augusta, ME 04333

PETER F. NERONHA

Attorney General

State of Rhode Island

150 South Main Street

Providence, RI 02903

ANTHONY G. BROWN

Attorney General

State of Maryland

200 Saint Paul Place

Baltimore, MD 21202

CHARITY R. CLARK

Attorney General

State of Vermont

109 State Street

Montpelier, VT 05609

October 21, 2025

APPENDIX

App. 1

APPENDIX A: Exemplar State Statutes

Governing Pre-Litigation Subpoenas and CIDS

to Investigate Potential Violations of State Law

Alabama

Ala. Code § 13A-6-161 (pre-litigation subpoenas in

human trafficking investigations); Ala. Code § 8-19-9

(pre-litigation subpoenas in consumer protection

investigations); Ala. Code § 8-19H-5 (pre-litigation

subpoenas in investigations of online obscene

material for minors)

Alaska

Alaska Stat. § 45.50.592 (investigative demands in

antitrust investigations); Alaska Stat. § 45.50.594

(investigative demands in false medical claims

investigations); Alaska Stat. § 44.23.080

(administrative subpoena in investigations of child

exploitation and endangerment); Alaska Stat. §

45.50.495 (pre-litigation subpoena in investigations

of deceptive trade practices)

Arizona

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1524 (pre-litigation

subpoenas in unfair competitive practices

investigations); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1406

(investigative demands in antitrust investigations);

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6-1242 (investigative demands

in money laundering investigations)

Arkansas

Ark. Code § 20-77-904 (investigative in Medicaid

fraud investigations); Ark. Code § 4-88-111

(investigative demands in deceptive trade practice

investigations)

App. 2

California

CA Gov. Code §11181 (pre-litigation subpoenas in

investigations into business activities and subjects

under the state attorney general’s jurisdiction,

violations of any rule promulgated by the office, and

any other matters as provided by law)

Colorado

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25.5-4-30 (CIDs in Medicaid

fraud investigations); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-17107 (CIDs in racketeering investigations); Colo. Rev.

Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-107; 6-1-108 (pre-litigation

subpoenas in deceptive trade practice investigations);

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-31-1207 (pre-litigation

subpoenas for Colorado False Claims Act

investigations); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6-12-104 (prelitigation subpoenas in investigations related to

prohibited communications concerning patients);

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-111.5 (pre-litigation

subpoenas in Unfair Practices Act investigations);

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-111 (pre-litigation

subpoenas in Colorado Antitrust Act investigations)

Connecticut

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 3-129e (pre-litigation subpoena in

Dodd-Frank Act investigations); Conn. Gen. Stat. §

35-42 (pre-litigation subpoena in Connecticut

Antitrust Act investigations); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53392d (pre-litigation subpoenas in academic crime

investigations); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 3-129f (prelitigation subpoenas in investigations into allegations

of intimidation based on bigotry or bias); Conn. Gen.

Stat. § 3-129g (pre-litigation subpoenas in

investigations related to potential interference with

App. 3

rights under state or federal law); Conn. Gen. Stat. §

22a-245 (pre-litigation subpoenas in waste

management investigations)

Delaware

Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2106 (investigative demands

in antitrust investigations); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §

1509 (investigative demands in organized crime or

racketeering investigations)

District of Columbia

D.C. Code § 28-4505 (CIDs in antitrust

investigations); D.C. Code Ann. § 32-1455 (prelitigation subpoenas in employment investigations);

D.C. Code § 1-301.88d (pre-litigation subpoenas in

unfair, deceptive, unconscionable, or fraudulent trade

practices investigations)

Florida

Fla. Stat. § 542.28 (CIDs in antitrust investigations);

Fla. Stat. § 501.206 (pre-litigation subpoenas in

consumer protection investigations)

Georgia

Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-403 (investigative demands in

consumer protection investigations); Ga. Code Ann. §

23-3-125 (CIDs in false claims investigations); Ga.

Code Ann. § 10-15-5 (CIDs in business records

investigations)

Hawai‘i

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 842-10 (CIDs in racketeering

investigations); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-18 (CIDs in

antitrust investigations); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 28-2.5

(pre-litigation subpoenas in investigations related to

App. 4

alleged violations of the law); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 285.2 (administrative subpoenas in charitable assets

investigations); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 467B-9.3 (prelitigation subpoenas in investigations related to the

solicitation of funds from the public)

Idaho

Idaho Code § 48-611 (investigative demands in

consumer protection investigations); Idaho Code § 48109 (investigative demands in antitrust

investigations)

Illinois

110 Ill. Comp. Stat. 26/35 (pre-litigation subpoenas in

Illinois Credit Card Marketing Act investigations);

815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/3 (pre-litigation subpoenas in

Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business

Practices Act investigations); 740 Ill. Comp. Stat.

175/6 (pre-litigation subpoenas in Illinois False

Claims Act investigations); 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/7.2

(pre-litigation subpoenas in Illinois Antitrust Act

investigations)

Indiana

Ind. Code § 4-6-3-3 (CIDs in investigations related to

consumer protection, environment, health, antitrust,

regulated occupations, “or any other statute enforced

by the attorney general”); Ind. Code § 24-15-9-1

(CIDs in consumer data protection investigations);

Ind. Code § 16-21-15-4 (CIDs in investigations

related to hospital mergers); Ind. Code § 24-4-23-16

(CIDs in investigations related to age verification for

“adult oriented websites”); Ind. Code § 5-11-5.7-10

(CIDs in Medicaid false claims investigations); Ind.

App. 5

Code § 4-6-13-4 (pre-litigation subpoena in identity

theft and fraud investigations)

Iowa

Iowa Code § 685.6 (CIDs in false claims

investigations); Iowa Code § 715D.8 (CIDs in

consumer protection investigations); Iowa Code §

714.16 (pre-litigation subpoenas in consumer fraud

investigations)

Kansas

Kan. Stat. § 50-631 (pre-litigation subpoenas in

consumer protection investigations); Kan. Stat. § 50153 (pre-litigation subpoenas in antitrust

investigations)

Kentucky

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.240 (investigative demands in

consumer protection investigations); Ky. Rev. Stat. §

248.353 (pre-litigation subpoenas in tobacco

discrimination investigations)

Louisiana

La. Stat. § 22:1931.10 (CIDs in insurance fraud

investigations); La. Stat. § 51:1411 (CIDs in

consumer protection investigations); La. Stat. §

3:3616 (CIDs in Right to Farm and Forest Act

investigations)

Maine

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 211 (pre-litigation CIDs

in unfair trade practice investigations); Me. Rev.

Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1107 (pre-litigation summons

related to investigations into potential antitrust

violations)

App. 6

Maryland

Md. Code Ann., State Fin. & Proc. § 16-303

(investigative demands in investigations related to

debarment as a contractor for a public entity or the

state); Md. Code Ann., State Gov't § 6-901 (prelitigation subpoenas in health care fraud

investigations); Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-405

(pre-litigation subpoenas in Consumer Protection Act

investigations); Md. Code Ann., Bus. Reg. § 6.5-102

(pre-litigation subpoenas in charitable assets

investigations); Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 11-205

(CIDs in antitrust investigations)

Massachusetts

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 5N (CIDs in false claims

investigations); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 6 (CIDs

in consumer protection investigations); Mass. Gen.

Laws ch. 93, § 8 (CIDs in antitrust investigations)

Michigan

Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.776 (investigative demands

in antitrust investigations); Mich. Comp. Laws §

445.2586 (investigative demands in pyramid scheme

investigations); Mich. Comp. Laws § 752.1008

(investigative demands in health care false claims

investigations); Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.610

(investigative demands in Medicaid False Claims Act

investigations)

Minnesota

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 8.31 (broad CID authorization for

investigations into “violations of the law of this state

respecting unfair, discriminatory, and other unlawful

practices in business, commerce, or trade”)

App. 7

Mississippi

Miss. Code § 97-45-2 (pre-litigation subpoenas in

identity theft investigations); Miss. Code § 7-5-59

(pre-litigation subpoenas in investigations related to

computer crimes involving minors); Miss. Code § 4313-221 (pre-litigation subpoenas in Medicaid fraud

investigations); Miss. Code § 75-24-27 (pre-litigation

subpoenas in consumer protection investigations);

Miss. Code § 79-11-521 (pre-litigation subpoenas in

investigations related to nonprofits or religious

organizations); Miss. Code § 77-3-725 (pre-litigation

subpoenas in Telephone Solicitation Act

investigations); Miss. Code § 7-5-307 (pre-litigation

subpoenas in insurance fraud investigations)

Missouri

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 407.040 (CIDs in deceptive

advertising or sales practices investigations); Mo.

Ann. Stat. § 127.040 (CIDs in investigations related

to state election laws); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 407.472

(CIDs in charitable solicitations investigations); Mo.

Ann. Stat. § 130.188 (CIDs in campaign financing

investigations); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 416.091 (CIDs in

antitrust investigations)

Montana

Mont. Code § 30-14-2817 (CIDs in consumer

protection investigations); Mont. Code § 82-15-204

(pre-litigation subpoenas in price discrimination of

petroleum products investigations)

Nebraska

Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 87-1121 (CIDs in Data Privacy

Act investigations); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4-213 (in

App. 8

Foreign Adversary and Terrorist Agent Registration

Act investigations); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 59-1611

(CIDs in antitrust investigations)

Nevada

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598A.100 (investigative demands in

unfair trade practices investigations)

New Hampshire

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7:6-b (investigative demands

in investigations related to the use of communication

common carriers for unlawful purposes); N.H. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 147-A:8 (investigative demands in

hazardous waste management investigations); N.H.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 159-F:3 (pre-litigation subpoenas in

Firearms Purchaser’s Privacy Act investigations);

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 356:10 (pre-litigation

subpoenas in antitrust investigations); N.H. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 358-A:8 (pre-litigation subpoenas in

consumer protection investigations)

New Jersey

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-128 (CIDs in Casino Control

Act investigations); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:32C-14

(CIDs in false claims investigations); N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 2C:41-5 (investigative demands in racketeering

investigations); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-130 (prelitigation subpoenas in waste management

investigations); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:9-9 (prelitigation subpoenas in antitrust investigations); N.J.

Stat. Ann. § 56:8-3 (pre-litigation subpoenas in unfair

trade practices investigations)

App. 9

New Mexico

N.M. Stat. § 6-4-22 (CIDs in Tobacco Escrow Fund

Act investigations); N.M. Stat. § 6-27-9 (CIDs in

Affordable Housing Act investigations); N.M. Stat. §

47-6-25.1 (CIDs in New Mexico Subdivision Act

investigations); N.M. Stat. §§ 57-22-9.1; 57-22-9

(CIDs related to charitable organization

investigations or investigations under the Charitable

Solicitations Act); N.M. Stat. § 57-1-5 (CIDs in

restraints of trade investigations)

New York

Ag. & Mkts. Law § 408(5) (pre-litigation subpoenas in

pet dealer investigations); Art & Cult. Affairs Law §

60.06 (sports memorabilia); Civ. Rights Law § 79-n(3)

(pre-litigation subpoenas in investigations related to

bias-related harassment or intimidation); Elec. Law

§ 17-214(2) (pre-litigation subpoenas in

investigations related to voter intimidation or

obstruction); Exec. Law § 63(12) (pre-litigation

subpoenas in investigations related to consumer

fraud); Exec. Law § 175(2)(h) (pre-litigation

subpoenas in investigations related to charities

regulation); Gen. Bus. Law § 349 (prelitigation

subpoenas in investigations related to deceptive

business practices); N-PCL 112(b)(6) (pre-litigation

subpoenas in investigations of not-for-profit or

charitable corporations)

North Carolina

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-10 (pre-litigation production

demands in consumer protection and antitrust

investigations); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 131F-23; 131F-24

(pre-litigation subpoenas in charitable solicitations

and contributions investigations); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-

App. 10

614 (CIDs in false claims investigations); N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 108A-63.1 (investigative subpoenas in health

care fraud investigations)

North Dakota

N.D. Cent. Code § 50-24.8-12 (CIDs or administrative

subpoenas in Medicaid fraud investigations); N.D.

Cent. Code § 12-60-08.1 (administrative subpoenas to

aid the criminal bureau in investigations); N.D. Cent.

Code § 12.1-20-05 (administrative subpoenas in

investigations related to “[l]uring minors by

computer or other electronic means”); N.D. Cent.

Code § 10-33-123 (pre-litigation subpoenas in

nonprofit corporation investigations); N.D. Cent.

Code § 51-09-04 (pre-litigation subpoenas in unfair

discrimination in commerce investigations); N.D.

Cent. Code § 51-10-05.1 (pre-litigation subpoenas in

unfair trade practices investigations); N.D. Cent.

Code § 13-07-07 (pre-litigation subpoenas in

investigations related to consumer credit counseling

services)

Ohio

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1331.16 (CIDs in antitrust

investigations); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3734.43 (CIDs

in solid and hazardous waste investigations); Ohio

Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.06 (pre-litigation in consumer

protection investigations); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §

1334.07 (pre-litigation subpoenas in business

opportunity plans investigations); Ohio Rev. Code

Ann. § 4719.11 (pre-litigation subpoenas in telephone

solicitation laws investigations); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.

§ 4549.47 (pre-litigation subpoenas in Odometer

Rollback and Disclosure Act investigations); Ohio

Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.52 (pre-litigation subpoenas

App. 11

related to investigations into consumer credit

reporting agencies); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4722.06

(pre-litigation subpoenas in Home Construction

Service Law investigations); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §

109.87 (pre-litigation subpoenas in Telemarketing

and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act

investigations)

Oklahoma

Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 757 (investigative demands in

Consumer Protection Act investigations); Okla. Stat.

tit. 79, § 210 (CIDs in antitrust investigations); Okla.

Stat. tit. 18, § 552.14a (CIDs in Oklahoma

Solicitation of Charitable Contributions Act

investigations)

Oregon

Or. Rev. Stat. 646.618 (CIDs in Unlawful Trade

Practices Act investigations); Or. Rev. Stat. 646.618

(CIDs in consumer protection investigations); Or.

Rev. Stat. 646.750 (CIDs in antitrust investigations);

Or. Rev. Stat. 180.775 (CIDs in false claims

investigations); Or. Rev. Stat. 646A.589 (CIDs in

investigations related to privacy statute violations);

Or. Rev. Stat. 180.448 (CIDs in tobacco

investigations)

Pennsylvania

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 911 (CIDs in racketeering

investigations); 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 307-3 (prelitigation subpoenas in consumer protection

investigations); 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 232.5 (prelitigation subpoenas in Price Gouging Act

investigations); 62 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4509 (prelitigation subpoenas in antibid-rigging

App. 12

investigations); 62 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4509 (prelitigation subpoenas in radioactive waste disposal

investigations); 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2250.8 (prelitigation subpoenas in Unsolicited

Telecommunication Advertisement Act

investigations); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5743

(administrative subpoenas in investigations related

to the use of online services for the sexual

exploitation of children)

Rhode Island

6 R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-7 (CIDs in deceptive trade

practices investigations); 5 R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-38.3-5

(CIDs in Motor Vehicle Repair Shop Act

investigations); 40 R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-8.2-14 (CIDs

in medical assistance fraud investigations); 7 R.I.

Gen. Laws § 7-15-7 (CIDs in racketeering and

corrupt organizations investigations); 6 R.I. Gen.

Laws § 6-36-9 (investigative demands in antitrust

investigations)

South Carolina

S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-70 (investigative demands in

unfair trade practices investigations); S.C. Code Ann.

§ 23-3-75 (administrative subpoenas in investigations

related to fraud-related offenses by financial

institutions, communications providers, and private

or public utilities); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-30-125

(administrative subpoenas to gain information

related to an emergency incident involving

incarcerated people or a person holding hostages)

South Dakota

S.D. Codified Laws § 37-24-12 (investigative

demands in consumer protection and deceptive trade

App. 13

practices investigations); S.D. Codified Laws § 55-1220 (investigative demands in cemetery care

investigations); S.D. Codified Laws § 37-1-11.1 (prelitigation subpoenas in antitrust investigations); S.D.

Codified Laws § 37-30-18 (pre-litigation subpoenas

telephone solicitation investigations)

Tennessee

Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-6-402 (authorizing the state

attorney general to use broad CID power in

investigations or inquiries); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-183307 (CIDs in Tennessee Information Protection Act

investigations); Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-204 (CIDs in

employment, housing, and public accommodation

investigations)

Texas

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ch. 17 § 17.61 (CIDs in

consumer protection investigations); Tex. Bus. &

Com. Code Ch. 15 § 15.10 (CIDs in antitrust

investigations); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 610.003

(CIDs in unauthorized transaction investigations);

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 541.153 (CIDs in data

protection investigations); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §

314A.201 (CIDs in hospital merger investigations);

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 140B.052 (CIDs in

civil racketeering investigations)

Utah

Utah Code Ann. § 76-16-506 (in antitrust

investigations); Utah Code Ann. § 26B-3-1114 (CIDs

in Utah False Claims Act investigations); Utah Code

Ann. § 4-41a-201.1 (CIDs in investigations related to

anticompetitive behavior by cannabis production

establishments and dispensaries); Utah Code Ann. §

App. 14

77-22a-1 (administrative subpoenas related to

controlled substances investigations); Utah Code

Ann. § 76-16-402 (pre-litigation subpoenas in unfair

market discrimination investigations)

Vermont

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2460 (pre-litigation subpoenas

in consumer protection investigations); Vt. Stat. Ann.

tit. 2, § 267a (pre-litigation subpoenas in

investigations related to the registration of lobbyists);

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 642 (CIDs in false claims

investigations)

Virginia

Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-216.10 (CIDs in false claims

investigations); Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-9.10 (CIDs in

antitrust investigations); Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-201.1

(CIDs in consumer protection investigations)

Washington

Wash. Rev. Code 19.86.110 (CIDs in consumer

protection investigations); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §

19.09.410 (pre-litigation subpoenas in charitable

solicitations investigations)

West Virginia

W. Va. Code Ann. § 46A-7-104 (pre-litigation

subpoenas in West Virginia Consumer Credit and

Protection Act investigations); W. Va. Code Ann. § 97-3 (pre-litigation in Medicaid fraud or abuse

investigations); W. Va. Code Ann. § 47-18-7 (prelitigation subpoenas in antitrust investigations)

App. 15

Wisconsin

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 133.11 (pre-litigation subpoenas in

investigations related to unfair trade practices, price

discrimination, and other anti-competitive behavior)

Wyoming

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-12-112 (pre-litigation subpoenas

in consumer protection investigations); Wyo. Stat.

Ann. § 40-3-111 (pre-litigation subpoenas in

multilevel and pyramid schemes investigations);

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-2-2003 (investigative subpoenas

related to audits); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-1-618 (prelitigation subpoenas in investigations related to

whether a conveyance threatens national or state

security); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-1-640 (pre-litigation

subpoenas in investigations related to the online

exploitation or attempted exploitation of children)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.