Amicus Curiae Brief — First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc., Petitioner v. Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General of New Jersey

Supreme Court briefAug 28, 2025

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 24-781

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

♦

FIRST CHOICE WOMEN’S RESOURCE

CENTERS INC.,

Petitioner,

MATHEW PLATKIN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY,

Respondent.

♦

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit

♦

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE MOUNTAIN STATES

LEGAL FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF

PETITIONER

♦

William E. Trachman

Counsel of Record

James L. Kerwin

MOUNTAIN STATES

LEGAL FOUNDATION

2596 South Lewis Way

Lakewood, Colorado 80227

(303) 292-2021

wtrachman@mslegal.org

August 28, 2025

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

QUESTION PRESENTED

New Jersey’s Attorney General served an

investigatory subpoena on First Choice Women’s

Resource Centers, Inc., a faith-based pregnancy

center, demanding that it turn over most of its donors’

names. First Choice challenged the Subpoena under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court, and the Attorney

General filed a subsequent suit to enforce it in state

court. The state court granted the Attorney General’s

motion to enforce the Subpoena but expressly did not

decide

First

Choice’s

federal

constitutional

challenges. The Attorney General then moved in state

court to sanction First Choice. Meanwhile, the district

court held that First Choice’s constitutional claims

were not ripe in federal court.

The Third Circuit affirmed in a divided per

curiam decision. Judge Bibas would have held the

action ripe as indistinguishable from Americans for

Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 618–19

(2021). But the majority concluded First Choice’s

claims were not yet ripe because First Choice could

litigate its constitutional claims in state court. In

doing so, the majority followed the rule of the Fifth

Circuit and split from the Ninth Circuit. It did not

address the likely loss of a federal forum once the state

court rules on the federal constitutional issues.

The question presented is:

Where the subject of a state investigatory

demand has established a reasonably objective chill of

its First Amendment rights, is a federal court in a

first-filed action deprived of jurisdiction because those

rights must be adjudicated in state court?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED .................................

TABLE OF CONTENTS .....................................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...............................

iii

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS

CURIAE...............................................................

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT....................

ARGUMENT .......................................................

First Choice’s Claims are Both

Constitutionally and Prudentially

Ripe. ..........................................................

First Choice Meets the Test for

Injury .............................................

First Choice’s Injuries are Ripe

for Resolution by the Federal

Courts. ............................................

The Court Should Avoid Recreating a

“Catch-22” Similar to what it

Eliminated in Knick. ................................

CONCLUSION ....................................................

II.

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner,

387 U.S. 136 (1967) ..........................................

Adarand Constructors v. Pena,

515 U.S. 200 (1995) ..........................................

Americans for Prosperity Foundation v.

Bonta,

594 U.S. 595 (2021) .......................................... i, 5, 7

Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.

United States,

424 U.S. 800 (1976) ..........................................

Doe v. Bush,

323 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2003) .............................

8, 9

Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker,

450 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2006) ........................

Knick v. Twp. of Scott,

588 U.S. 180 (2019) ....................................... 2, 10-12

Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp.,

456 U.S. 461 (1982) ..........................................

Laird v. Tatum,

408 U.S. 1, (1972) ............................................. 4, 5, 7

Mitchum v. Foster,

407 U.S. 225 (1972) .......................................... 13, 14

Monroe v. Pape,

365 U.S. 167 (1961) ....................................... 2, 13, 14

NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson,

357 U.S. 449 (1958) ..........................................

NAACP v. Button,

371 U.S. 415 (1963) ..........................................

4, 7

Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. DOI,

538 U.S. 803 (2003) ......................................... 3, 6, 9

Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo,

602 U.S. 175 (2024) ..........................................

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.

Conservation & Dev. Comm’n,

461 U.S. 190 (1983) ..........................................

4, 9

Patsy v. Board of Regents,

457 U.S. 496 (1982) .......................................... 12-14

San Diego Cnty. Gun Rts. Comm. v. Reno,

98 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1996) ............................

San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of S.F.,

545 U.S. 323 (2005) .......................................... 2, 11

Shelton v. Tucker,

364 U.S. 479 (1960) ..........................................

Steffel v. Thompson,

415 U.S. 452 (1974) .......................................... 4, 5, 8

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149 (2014) .........................................

6, 7

Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n,

220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) ..........................

3, 8

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1738 ..................................................

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ........................................ i, 2, 5, 10-13

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF

AMICUS CURIAE 1

Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF) is a

nonprofit, public-interest law firm organized under

the laws of the state of Colorado. MSLF is dedicated

to bringing before the courts issues vital to the defense

and preservation of individual liberties, the right to

own and use property, the free enterprise system, and

limited and ethical government. Since its creation in

1977, MSLF attorneys have been active in litigation

regarding the proper interpretation and application of

statutory, regulatory, and constitutional provisions.

See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200

(1995) (MSLF serving as lead counsel). In order to

secure these interests, MSLF files this amicus brief

urging the Court to grant relief to the petitioner.

♦

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The New Jersey Attorney General served a

subpoena on First Choice because he wanted to

burden it and chill its speech. Now, by challenging an

unconstitutionally

chilling

subpoena

seeking

information revealing most of First Choice’s donors,

First Choice alleges a viable constitutional injury. Pet.

for Writ of Cert. at 8. The Third Circuit thus erred in

finding First Choice’s case to be unripe. The Court

1 Per Supreme Court Rule 37.6, the undersigned affirms that no

counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no

such counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to

fund the preparation or submission of the brief.

should allow First Choice’s claims to go forward in

federal court, and allow First Choice a chance to

protect its interests against an attorney general who

has demonstrated hostility toward crisis pregnancy

centers.

First Choice’s claims satisfy both the

constitutional and prudential elements of ripeness.

The First Amendment injury is issuing a subpoena

demanding the identities of First Choice’s donors.

Having done this, Attorney General Platkin

objectively chilled both First Choice and its donors’

associational freedom. Siding with the Third Circuit

would recreate the “Catch-22” the Court dispensed

with in Knick. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 588 U.S. 180,

187 (2019).

In the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, a

federal remedy is “supplementary to any state

remedy, and the latter need not have been first sought

and refused before the federal one was invoked.”

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 168 (1961). The Knick

Court recognized that forcing Fifth Amendment

claims into state court as a prerequisite to ripen a

federal claim may create a “Catch-22.” The case at bar

is analogous. The Third Circuit dismissed First

Choice’s First Amendment argument, in part because

First Choice could make its constitutional arguments

in New Jersey court. If First Choice loses its

constitutional arguments in New Jersey court, the

preclusion trap recognized in San Remo Hotel will

likely spring, barring First Choice from arguing the

merits of its claims in federal court. San Remo Hotel,

L.P. v. City & Cty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 336 (2005).

ARGUMENT

First

Choice’s

Claims

are

Both

Constitutionally and Prudentially Ripe.

Being served with a subpoena is no joke. Apart

from the immediate need to retain counsel, consider

what information to provide, and set aside the time

and energy needed to respond, there is also the matter

of being compelled to produce private, non-public

information to a complete stranger. That concern is

exacerbated when the subpoena is motivated by

political considerations. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v.

Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 180 (2024) (“Government officials

cannot attempt to coerce private parties in order to

punish or suppress views that the government

disfavors.”).

Here, the Court should find that New Jersey

Attorney General Platkin’s subpoena inflicted a

reasonably objective chill, ripening First Choice’s

claim.

“The ripeness doctrine is drawn both from

Article III limitations on judicial power and from

prudential reasons for refusing to exercise

jurisdiction.” Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. DOI, 538 U.S.

803, 808 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The constitutional component of the ripeness inquiry

is usually treated under the rubric of standing, and

often can coincide squarely with standing’s injury in

fact prong. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rts.

Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc); see also Initiative & Referendum Inst. v.

Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2006) (en

banc).

In determining whether a case satisfies

prudential requirements for ripeness, the Court

considers two factors: the fitness of the issues for

judicial decision, and “the hardship to the parties of

withholding court consideration.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.

v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461

U.S. 190, 201 (1983).

First Choice Meets the Test for

Injury.

First Choice has suffered an injury in fact. The

Court exercises the doctrine of ripeness to avoid

entangling itself in “abstract disagreements” See id.

But First Amendment rights “need breathing space to

survive,” and the Court has “found in a number of

cases that constitutional violations may arise from the

deterrent, or ‘chilling,’ effect of governmental

regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition

against the exercise of First Amendment rights.”

Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11, (1972) (emphasis

added); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)

(finding that because First Amendment freedoms

need breathing room to survive, the government may

only regulate speech with narrow specificity).

The Court has long frowned on government

probes prying into organizational membership.

NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 465-66

(1958) (holding compelled disclosure of the NAACP’s

membership lists violated members’ associational

rights); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485, 490

(1960) (striking down a law requiring public school

teachers to disclose all organizations to which they

belonged in the prior five years). And “it is not

necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual

arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a

statute that he claims deters the exercise of his

constitutional rights.” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.

452, 459 (1974). Beyond the possibility of “future

misuse,” the Laird court demanded “objective harm”

for a claim to be actionable. 408 U.S. at 10, 13. Bonta

serves as an illustration of chilling state action

resulting in objective harm.

In Bonta, the California attorney general

sought to force charities to file information about

major donors, including names, total contributions,

and addresses, as part of annual registration and

renewal. See Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594

U.S. 595, 601-02 (2021). This list was already

disclosed to the IRS as a condition of federal taxexempt status, and the plaintiffs did not allege

specific acts of discrimination done by the Attorney

General. Id. at 617–18. The state government sent

deficiency letters to charities who refused to provide

donor information. Id. at 602. In response, the

Attorney General “threatened to suspend their

registrations and fine their directors and officers.” Id.

The charities brought 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims in

federal court, alleging that compelled disclosure

“would make their donors less likely to contribute and

would subject them to the risk of reprisals.” Id. There,

the charities alleged sufficient associational harm

based on the threat of enforcement by the Attorney

General. Id. at 602.

Steffel provides another example:

In Steffel ... police officers threatened to

arrest petitioner and his companion for

distributing

handbills

protesting

the

Vietnam War. Petitioner left to avoid

arrest... Petitioner sought a declaratory

judgment that the trespass statute was

unconstitutional as applied to him. [The

Court] determined that petitioner had

alleged a credible threat of enforcement: He

had been warned to stop handbilling and

threatened with prosecution if he disobeyed;

he stated his desire to continue handbilling

(an activity he claimed was constitutionally

protected).

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159

(2014).

Importantly, the mere threat of state

prosecution was enough to ripen the free speech claim

in Steffel.

Here, First Choice suffered an injury. By

attempting to enforce the subpoena, Respondent

Platkin has advanced the dispute beyond being an

“abstract disagreement” to an injury in fact. Nat’l

Park Hosp. Ass’n v. DOI, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003).

Simply issuing a subpoena is a “credible threat”

that the subpoena will be enforced. Driehaus, 573 U.S.

at 159. But Attorney General Platkin has gone far

beyond merely issuing a subpoena. He has actively

sought its enforcement through the New Jersey

courts. As a result, First Choice’s donors have been

chilled, their views and association almost laid bare

before a government official who remains “openly

hostile” to crisis pregnancy centers like First Choice.

Pet. App. 177a. Multiple donors have signed affidavits

stating they would be less likely to donate to First

Choice if their information was handed over to

Attorney General Platkin. Pet. App. 175a–77a. The

Attorney General’s conduct has confirmed their fears,

taking steps to target crisis pregnancy centers like

First Choice, including issuing a consumer alert

warning targeting crisis pregnancy centers. 2

The chill Platkin’s subpoena has inflicted on

First Choice, and its donors may be a constitutional

violation even if it does not directly punish First

Choice’s speech. Laird, 408 U.S. at 11. Issuing a

chilling subpoena may crowd the “breathing room”

First Amendment rights need to survive. Button, 371

U.S. at 433. Like the charities that prevailed in Bonta,

First Choice alleges a similar constitutional violation,

namely their First Amendment rights would be

chilled by forced donor disclosure to government.

Bonta, 594 U.S. at 601–02. In fact, First Choice’s

situation has ripened beyond the facts the Court ruled

on in Bonta. Here, the Attorney General is actively

seeking enforcement of the subpoena through the New

Jersey courts – not through making threats.

Ruling against First Choice would undermine

Steffel. In Steffel, the threat to prosecute Steffel was

sufficient for the Court to hear the claim. Analogous

to enforcing the subpoena issued to First Choice,

threatening prosecuting for future conduct meets the

bar of a “credible threat” of enforcement. See

Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 159. It is a means to enforce the

law. Barring First Choice’s federal arguments until a

New Jersey Court has ordered First Choice to disclose

2 Consumer Alert, New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs,

https://perma.cc/5J8A-D4LB (Dec. 1, 2022).

its donors would have been like forcing Steffel to wait

to make his claim after a court adjudicated him guilty.

This would be far beyond what standard the Court has

set. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459. To be consistent with

Steffel, the Court should hold First Choice’s claims

ripe.

First Choice’s claim satisfies the constitutional

element of ripeness.

First Choice’s Injuries are Ripe for

Resolution by the Federal Courts.

Under the two-prong prudential ripeness test

derived from Abbott Labs, First Choice’s claim is

prudentially ripe. Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S.

136, 149 (1967). Federal courts operate under a

“virtually unflagging” duty to exercise jurisdiction

given to them. Colorado River Water Conservation

Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).

Abbott Labs ruled that when asked to grant

equitable relief, challenging a final agency action, the

Court weighs ripeness using (1) the fitness of an issue

for a judicial review and (2) the harm to the parties of

withholding judicial review. Abbott Lab’ys, 387 at 149.

Later courts have applied these factors beyond the

final agency action context. Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1141

(applying the Abbott Labs test to a First Amendment

challenge to a state law); Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133,

139 (1st Cir. 2003) (applying the Abbott Labs test to

challenge to the constitutionality of a congressional

authorization of military use of force). They describe

the factors as the prudential element of ripeness –

distinct from the constitutional element of ripeness.

Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1138; Doe, 323 F.3d at 139

(calling the Abbott

considerations”).

Labs

factors

“prudential

Claims have been found to be fit for judicial

review when they are predominantly legal. Pac. Gas,

461 U.S. at 191. Legal questions require “little factual

development.” San Diego Cnty. Gun Rts. Comm. v.

Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 1996). First Choice

raising a predominantly legal question weighs in

favor of finding the case ripe.

When analyzing the hardship to the parties of

withholding judicial consideration, courts have set out

a low bar. In the context of challenges to agency

regulations, regulations where irremediable adverse

consequences flowed from requiring a later challenge

are likely to be ripe. Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n, 538 U.S.

at 810.

First Choice would suffer if the Court withheld

review. First Choice and its donors would suffer

“irremediable” harm if the Court forced First Choice

to wait for possible future federal litigation. Id. First

Choice and its donors will never be able to recoup the

time their First Amendment rights were chilled while

state court litigation unfolds. Withholding judicial

review, forces First Choice to litigate its claims in

state court, running up litigation costs. Importantly,

as discussed below, by withholding review First

Choice risks being precluded from ever bringing its

claims in federal court if the New Jersey courts rule

on the validity of First Choice’s First Amendment

claims. This harm would also irremediably flow from

withholding judicial review. Id.

The Abbott Labs test counsels toward finding

the case ripe.

II.

The Court Should Avoid Recreating a

“Catch-22” Similar to what it Eliminated

in Knick.

In Knick, this Court held that federal civil

rights claims ought to have their day in federal court.

See Knick, 588 U.S. at 187. Consistent with Knick, the

Court should allow First Choice’s claims to proceed.

To do otherwise would merely spring a “preclusion

trap” in another context under 42 U. S. C. §1983.

In Knick, the plaintiff sought to vindicate his

rights under the Takings Clause of the Fifth

Amendment. Id. The Court rightfully dispensed with

the Williamson County rule which required property

owners to seek relief through a State “if a State

provides an adequate procedure for seeking just

compensation.” Knick, 588 U.S. at 188. A property

owner could not claim a violation of the Takings

Clause until he used the available state procedure and

been denied just compensation.” Id. Under

Williamson County, state courts were the first stop on

the way to seek relief. Id. But they often became the

last stop as well.

Because state court proceedings are often given

full faith and credit, they will generally preclude

federal courts from hearing the same issue. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1738. 3

In San Remo Hotel, the Court confirmed that a

plaintiff with an unripe claim who was forced into

state court under the Williamson County rule would

be precluded from litigating that claim in federal

court, once the state court ruled. San Remo Hotel, 545

U.S. at 336. The plaintiff attempted to reserve his

federal constitutional argument, arguing his claim

under the state constitution. This failed. His federal

claim was precluded by the state court litigation.

Knick, 588 U.S. at 188. The Knick Court recognized

the “Catch-22,” explaining a plaintiff “cannot go to

federal court without going to state court first; but if

he goes to state court and loses, his claim will be

barred in federal court. The federal claim dies

aborning.” Knick, 588 U.S. at 184–85. The Court ruled

“[t]he availability of any particular compensation

remedy ... cannot infringe or restrict the property

owner’s federal constitutional claim.” Id. at 191.

The case at bar is analogous to Knick. First

Choice seeks a federal forum to make a claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pet. App. 114a. By rejecting their

claim as unripe, the Third Circuit recreated, in the

First Amendment context, the “Catch-22” remedied in

Knick. 588 U.S. at 184–85. By stating that it

contemplated future federal litigation, the Third

3 There is a notable exception to the full faith and credit doctrine

where the state court willfully ignores a litigant’s constitutional

rights. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482

(1982) (finding decisions which violate the Due Process Clause

are not entitled to Full Faith and Credit in state or federal

courts).

Circuit seems unaware its decision may eliminate any

future federal litigation. Pet. App. 5a. If First Choice

loses its constitutional argument in New Jersey’s

courts, First Choice could be precluded from arguing

New Jersey’s subpoena was unconstitutional in

federal court.

Notably, the Third Circuit’s language even

parallels the defunct Williamson County language,

switching out “adequate procedures for seeking just

compensation” for “adequately adjudicate First

Choice’s constitutional claim.” Id; Knick, 588 U.S. at

188.

Here, the Court should apply its well-reasoned

analysis in Knick. 588 U.S. at 184–85. Just as holding

the Knick plaintiff’s claim unripe because of the

availability of a state court remedy was inappropriate,

holding First Choice’s claim unripe because the state

court may adequately adjudicate its claim is similarly

incorrect. Id. Moreover, the Court should view the

Third Circuit’s finding that First Choice may

“continue to assert” its constitutional arguments as

evidence that the Third Circuit infringes on First

Choice’s right to a federal forum by teeing up a

preclusive decision in New Jersey court. Id. at 191;

Pet. App. 4a. Consistent with Knick, the Court should

find the case is ripe.

Precedent demands 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 claims

should be litigated in federal court. Section 1983 gives

a right to pursue “suits in equity.” 42 U.S.C.§ 1983.

“[A] court should not defer the exercise of jurisdiction

under a federal statute unless it is consistent with

[Congressional] intent.” Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457

U.S. 496, 501–02. The Court has repeatedly held

plaintiffs need not run to state court to open the doors

of federal court in Section 1983 cases.

Just the opposite is true. The Court has

recognized that “[t]he 1871 Congress intended § 1 to

throw open the doors of the United States courts to

individuals who were threatened with, or who had

suffered, the deprivation of constitutional rights.”

Patsy, 457 U.S. at 504 (internal quotation marks

omitted). 4 The Act sought to “interpose the federal

courts between the States and the people, as

guardians of the people’s federal rights.” Mitchum v.

Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). When a plaintiff’s

constitutional rights are offended, a federal remedy is

“supplementary to any state remedy, and the latter

need not have been first sought and refused before the

federal one was invoked.” Monroe, 365 U.S. at 168.

When litigating Section 1983 claims, the Court has

recognized Congress intended for plaintiffs—not

courts—to “choose the forum in which to seek relief.”

See Patsy, 457 U.S. at 506.

The Third Circuit’s reasoning was incorrect.

Reasoning that because a “state court will adequately

adjudicate First Choice’s constitutional claim,” it need

not exercise jurisdiction, undermines the Act. Pet.

App. 5a. First Choice seeks the equitable relief

guaranteed to it under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Pet.

App. 112a. While First Choice may make a

constitutional argument in New Jersey court, here

First Choice asks for relief under a statute, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, and Congress has not suggested federal courts

4 § 1 refers to the statute known today as 42 U.S.C § 1983. See

Patsy, 457 U.S. at 504.

defer jurisdiction in these cases. Under Patsy, the

Court should not defer jurisdiction. Ruling the claim

is unripe would force First Choice’s claims into state

court. This would potentially preclude First Choice

from ever raising its arguments in federal court,

undermining the Act’s aim of “throwing open” the

doors of the federal courts. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 504.

Rather than federal courts being “interpose[d]”

between the States and people, requiring state

judicial proceedings would do the opposite. Mitchum,

407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). Following an investigatory

demand, any state’s judiciary would hold the keys to

any federal courthouse, and could lock the doors,

protecting their state government. Id. By issuing

rulings precluding the federal courts from hearing

claims, the actors the law was meant to check would

instead control. In the crucial context of free speech,

the Court should not eliminate the supplementary

remedy that Congress has provided. Monroe, 365 U.S.

at 168.

First Choice’s First Amendment claims should

be heard in federal court.

♦

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the Court should rule

First Choice’s case is ripe.

Respectfully submitted,