Amicus Curiae Brief — First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc., Petitioner v. Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General of New Jersey

No. 24-781

In the Supreme Court of the United States

FIRST CHOICE WOMEN’S RESOURCE

CENTERS, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW J. PLATKIN,

Attorney General of New Jersey,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY,

GATEWAY PREGNANCY CENTER, OBRIA MEDICAL

CLINICS PNW, TRUE WOMEN’S CENTER, BRIDGE OF

HOPE MOBILE PREGNANCY CENTER LLC, AND

LIGHTHOUSE PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTER

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

________________

LORI KEPNER

Counsel of Record

STEVEN T. MCFARLAND

LAURA NAMMO

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY

CENTER FOR LAW &

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

8001 Braddock Rd., Ste. 302

Springfield, VA 22151

(703) 642-1070

lkepner@clsnet.org

Counsel for Amici Curiae

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Amici agree with the Petitioner’s statement of the

Question Presented:

Where the subject of a state investigatory demand

has established a reasonably objective chill of its First

Amendment rights, is a federal court in a first-filed

action deprived of jurisdiction because those rights

must be adjudicated in state court?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iv

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ............................. 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 1

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 4

I.

The Third Circuit Erred in Holding

That This Case was not Ripe. .............................. 4

A. This narrow view of ripeness is

unworkable and unjust for

multiple reasons. ............................................. 6

B. The narrow view of ripeness is not

consistent with this Court’s precedent. .......... 9

II. Ripeness Is all the More Important

When First Amendment Claims are

Raised. ................................................................. 12

III. The Experiences of Three Amici Bear

This out. .............................................................. 14

A. Obria Medical Clinics PNW. .............................15

B. Gateway Pregnancy Center. ............................19

C. True Women’s Center. .......................................22

iii

IV. This Case Provides the Court With

the Opportunity to Curtail State

Actors’ Chilling and Obfuscation of

Constitutional Rights. ........................................ 25

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 29

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta,

594 U.S. 595 (2021) ........................................ 13, 14

Bates v. City of Little Rock,

361 U.S. 516 (1960) .......................................... 7, 26

Bantam Books v. Sullivan,

372 U.S. 58 (1963) ...........................................25-27

DeJonge v. Oregon,

299 U.S. 353 (1937) .............................................. 12

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,

597 U.S. 215 (2022) ............................................. 19

Elrod v. Burns,

427 U.S. 347 (1976) ........................................ 10, 11

Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Am. Tobacco Co.,

264 U.S. 298 (1924) ................................................ 9

Fiske v. Kansas,

247 U.S. 380 (1927) ........................................ 12, 13

Frederick Douglass Found. v. District

of Columbia,

82 F.4th 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2023) .......................... 6, 7

Knick v. Twp. of Scott,

588 U.S. 180 (2019) ........................................ 11, 12

v

Cases—Continued

Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP,

366 U.S. 293 (1961) ......................................... 7, 26

Lozman v. Riviera Beach,

585 U.S. 87 (2018) .................................... 13, 14, 27

Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees v. Greenberg,

983 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993) .............................. 28

Nat’l Inst. for Family & Life Advocates

v. James,

746 F. Supp.3d 100 (W.D.N.Y. 2024) ................ 7, 8

New York Times v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. 254 (1964) ........................................ 25, 26

NRA v. Vullo,

602 U.S. 175 (2024) .................................. 25, 27, 28

Obria Grp., Inc. v. Ferguson,

2025 WL 27691 (W.D. Wash., Jan. 3, 2025) ..15-18

Peachlum v. City of York, Pennsylvania,

333 F.3d 429 (3rd Cir. 2003) .......................... 11, 12

Presbytery of New Jersey of Orthodox

Presbyterial Church v. Florio,

40 F.3d 1454 (3rd Cir. 1994) ............................ 7, 10

R.A.V. v. St. Paul,

505 U.S. 377 (1992) ............................................... 8

vi

Cases—Continued

Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,

592 U.S. 14 (2020) ................................................ 10

Shelton v. Tucker,

364 U.S. 479 (1960) .......................................... 7, 13

Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Attorney

Gen. of New Jersey,

105 F.4th 67 (3rd Cir. 2024) ........................ 3, 6, 26

Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Attorney

Gen. of New Jersey,

27 F.4th 886 (3rd Cir. 2022) ................................ 11

Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,

564 U.S. 552 (2011) .............................................. 26

Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs,

571 U.S. 69 (2013) ................................................ 14

Steffel v. Thompson,

415 U.S. 452 (1974) .............................................. 10

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149 (2014) ............................................ 7, 9

Texas v. Johnson,

491 U.S. 397 (1989) .............................................. 12

Twitter, Inc. v. Paxton,

56 F.4th 1170 (9th Cir. 2022) .............................. 12

vii

Cases—Continued

U.S. v. Alvarez,

567 U.S. 709 (2012) .............................................. 13

U.S. ex. rel. Ricketts v. Lightcap,

567 F.2d 1226 (3rd Cir. 1977) .............................. 10

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP v.

Executive Office of the President,

2025 WL 1502329 (Dist. D.C., May 27, 2025) ..... 28

Statutes & Rules

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 37(a)(3) .......................................... 15

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-1 et seq. ......................... 23, 24

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-3 ............................................... 4

Wash. R. Civ. Pro. 37(a)(4) ....................................... 15

Other Authorities

Complaint, Obria Grp., Inc. v. Ferguson,

No. 3:23-cv-06093 (W.D. Wash. 2024) ............15-18

Consumer Alert, “Crisis Pregnancy Centers,”

Dec. 1, 2022, https://www.nj.gov/oag/

newsreleases22/2022-1207_crisispregnancy-centers.pdf .......................................... 22

Declaration of River Sussman, Obria Grp.,

Inc. v. Ferguson, No. 3:23-cv-06093

(W.D. Wash. 2024) ........................................ 16, 18

viii

Other Authorities—Continued

Defendant’s Brief, NJ Consortium of

Pregnancy Ctrs. v. State of New Jersey,

MER-L-394023 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 2024) ................... 24

Democrat Bob Ferguson wins Washington

governor’s race, NPR, Nov. 5, 2024 ..................... 16

Gateway.org ............................................................... 19

Open Letter from Attorneys General

Regarding CPC Misinformation

and Harm, Oct. 23, 2023,

https://perma.cc/DL74-3K6L ........................ 16, 20

Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Order to Show

Cause, NJ Consortium of Pregnancy Ctrs.

v. State of New Jersey, MER-L-394-23

(Sup Ct. N.J. 2023)......................................... 23, 24

Press Release, NJ-OAG, Acting AG Platkin

Establishes “Reproductive Rights Strike

Force” to Protect Access to Abortion Care

for New Jerseyans and Residents of Other

States (July 11, 2022), www.njoag.gov/actingag-platkin-establishes-reproductive-rightsstrike-force-to-protect-access-to-abortioncare-for-new-jerseyans-and-residents-ofother-states/ ......................................................... 19

ix

Other Authorities—Continued

Press Release, NJ-OAG, AG Platkin Announces

Actions to Protect Reproductive Health Care

Providers and Those Seeking Reproductive

Care in New Jersey (Dec. 7, 2022),

www.njoag.gov/ag-platkin-announcesactions-to-protect-reproductive-health-careproviders-and-those-seeking-reproductivecare-in-new-jersey/ ............................................... 22

Verified Complaint, NJ Consortium of

Pregnancy Ctrs. v. State of New Jersey,

MER-L-394-23 (Sup Ct. N.J. 2023) ............... 22, 23

1

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1

Christian Legal Society (“CLS”) is a nonprofit,

nondenominational

association

of

Christian

attorneys, law students, and law professors. CLS

defends the sanctity of human life and the First

Amendment rights of all Americans.

Gateway Pregnancy Center, Obria Medical

Clinics PNW, and True Women’s Center (“TWC”)

are organizations who have faced targeted state

actors’ investigative efforts that are considered nonself-executing. Gateway, Obria, and TWC believe

their constitutional rights either have been or may be

infringed, and this narrow view of ripeness would very

likely prevent them from vindicating their

constitutional rights.

Bridge of Hope Mobile Pregnancy Center

LLC and Lighthouse Pregnancy Resource

Center are organizations who are similarly situated

to First Choice, Gateway, Obria, and TWC. They are

the subjects of broad threats issued by the New Jersey

Attorney General and believe their constitutional

rights may be similarly infringed if this narrow view

of ripeness remains.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Amici respectfully request that this Court clarify

that a claim should be found ripe in federal courts

when injury based on First Amendment interests has

1 No party or party’s counsel authored this brief, in whole or in

part. No person except amici contributed to the costs of its

preparation.

2

been clearly and adequately alleged. It is plausibly

alleged, and there is present First Amendment harm,

when the state has taken action to target disfavored

groups and viewpoints, resulting in demonstrated

chilling of First Amendment rights of speech,

association, and free exercise.

When a state investigative tool is properly wielded,

it makes sense that one may not challenge it until

there is an enforcement order. If the alleged harm,

however, is based on the misuse of the tool for

unconstitutional purposes, then the harm is ripe when

the chill to constitutionally protected activity occurs,

not after the tool has successfully been misused and

the constitutional harm has been ongoing for a long

period of time. The decision below will prevent federal

courts from hearing important constitutional

questions.

The Third Circuit’s narrow reading of ripeness in

this case will inevitably lead to permanent exclusion

from federal court for organizations facing

constitutional harm because of a preclusion trap. It

will allow bullying by state actors against small

nonprofits while preventing the latter from timely

raising their First Amendment rights. It will

incentivize state actors to harass organizations they

disfavor by dragging out their investigative activities

and repeating their threats rather than asking courts

to enforce their subpoenas or demands.

Small nonprofits that are being targeted for

holding disfavored views will be uniquely vulnerable,

for they lack revenue from any commercial activity

and are often unable to afford legal support adequate

to withstand state attorneys general. Under the

3

standard articulated by the Third Circuit here, such

organizations may not look to federal courts to

vindicate their First Amendment rights against state

intimidation that chills their message, mission, and

donor support.

Under the Third Circuit’s narrow reading, a claim

is not ripe as long as the state actors do not move to

enforce the investigative tool in court and until the

court issues an order compelling compliance.

Implausibly, the district court, affirmed by the Third

Circuit, dismissed the significant harm caused by the

unconstitutional targeting and said that a plaintiff

simply could decline to comply with the subpoena

“with no legal consequence.” Pet. App. 37a. Then, even

after the state moved to enforce, the Third Circuit said

there was still not “enough of an injury” shown when

the state court had not yet ordered compliance. Pet.

App. 4a. By the time the state court does force

compliance, however, the constitutional claims would

(1) be waived if the party did not raise them in state

court, and (2) be barred by res judicata if the party

does raise them, as occurred in the Smith & Wesson

cases. See Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Attorney

Gen. of New Jersey, 105 F.4th 67, 70 (3rd Cir. 2024).

There must be a way to expose this

unconstitutional game of stifling disfavored

viewpoints by manipulating and threatening

organizations through expertly wielding but not fully

enforcing investigative tools. Using investigative tools

to harass without fully applying enforcement

mechanisms allows the government actor to prevent

targeted organizations (many of which, in this case,

are small, community-based nonprofits) from

4

successfully

challenging

its

actions

as

unconstitutional and instead to require them to either

absorb the harm or give up on their mission and

purpose.

This Court can prevent federal courts from being

thus stripped of jurisdiction over important

constitutional questions. Otherwise, it will lead to

completely disparate outcomes based entirely on a

state AG office’s tactics rather than on a meaningful

consideration of whether constitutional rights have

been violated.

ARGUMENT

I. The Third Circuit Erred in Holding That This

Case was not Ripe.

This case started with the New Jersey AG’s office

seeking to target pregnancy centers through

investigative burdens, claiming broad authority

under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat.

Ann. § 56:8-3. The AG issued burdensome subpoenas

based on political considerations, not consumer

complaints. JA 101-103, 113-114. The evidence of

targeting is strong. JA 104-106; Pet. App. 118a-126a.

The subpoena included requests for names of donors,

staff, and messaging. Pet. App. 127a-129a. The same

AG and Washington’s AG have inflicted the same

tactic on amici Gateway and Obria, respectively.

Amici Bridge of Hope, TWC, and Lighthouse are at

risk of similar harm.

First Choice filed in federal court to raise its First

Amendment claims and request injunctive relief prior

to the subpoena’s compliance date. Pet. App. 111a-

5

147a. The district court dismissed the action, holding

that the claims were unripe because the subpoena was

non-self-executing and that the claim would not be

ripe until the court enforced the subpoena. Pet. App.

80a. The AG then started an enforcement action in

state court; the latter held the subpoena was

enforceable, though it declined to decide the

constitutional objections raised. JA 39; Pet. App.

155a-156a. First Choice provided some documents but

did not disclose its donor information. The AG then

requested sanctions against First Choice, but the

state court determined to wait for the state court

appeal. Pet. App. 62a. When First Choice went back

to federal court after both parties agreed the federal

suit was ripe, the district court again found it unripe

because the state court had not demanded compliance

“under threat of contempt.” Pet. App. 42a.

The district court described New Jersey’s

subpoena enforcement proceedings as a five-stage

process: “(1) subpoena issuance; (2) party response,

after which enforcement proceedings typically begin;

(3) motion practice; (4) appeal; and (5) forced

compliance.” Pet. App. 36a. The court concluded First

Choice’s injuries—ignoring any possible additional

evidence of harm—simply could not rise to the level of

“actual or imminent constitutional injury” before the

fifth stage when its arguments have been fully

considered and the state court is requiring compliance

under threat of contempt. Pet. App. 42a. The court

remarkably concluded that First Choice suffered no

“cognizable injury” at any earlier stage. Pet. App. 38a.

By holding to such a narrow “moment of ripeness,”

Pet. App. 36a, the district court concluded that all

injuries up to that point were hypothetical.

6

The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that there is

not enough injury until there is a court order directly

on point. Pet. App. 4a. This conclusion inevitably

leads to a preclusion trap. See, e.g., Smith & Wesson,

105 F.4th at 83. Yet the Third Circuit continues to

hold that a hearing of constitutional claims in state

court is adequate. Pet. App. 5a; Smith & Wesson, 105

F.4th at 84.

A.

This narrow view of ripeness is

unworkable and unjust for multiple

reasons.

First, the claim that the targeted investigation

produces no harm is a legal fiction, not reality, falsely

assuming neutral power dynamics and equal legal

sophistication at every stage. The AG has the gravitas

of being the state’s legal enforcement office. As such,

it is familiar with all its rules, regulations, and

enforcement tools, including intimidating threats. Its

actions and threats in real life hardly have no

“practical impact,” Pet. App. 37a; neither may a little

nonprofit “simply decline,” id., to respond to threats

from the state’s highest prosecutor.

Second, the lower courts’ unrealistic measure of

injury and ripeness creates different classes of cases

based, not on a different experience of harm by an

investigative target but on the tactic chosen by the

state officers. For example, if a state agent enforces a

statute against a party, that party may challenge the

statute on its face or as applied. See Frederick

Douglass Found., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 82 F.4th

1122, 1138, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2023):

7

The government may not enforce the

laws in a manner that picks winners

and losers in public debates. It would

undermine the First Amendment’s

protections for free speech if the

government could enact a contentneutral law and then discriminate

against disfavored viewpoints under

the cover of prosecutorial discretion.

Pre-enforcement review by federal courts is

common when constitutional harm is involved, see,

e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149,

163 (2014); Presbytery of New Jersey of Orthodox

Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1469 (3rd

Cir. 1994); Nat’l Inst. for Family & Life Advocates v.

James, 746 F.Supp.3d 100, 108 (W.D.N.Y. 2024)

(“NIFLA”), and this should be no different just

because it involves a state investigative process.

Protection is possible if an AG has commenced a civil

enforcement action based on claimed “misleading

and/or false statements” in order to chill protected

speech, NIFLA, 746 F.Supp.3d at 110, 118, or if a

legislature or regulatory agency passes a law or

regulation targeted at certain speech. See, e.g., Bates

v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Shelton

v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Louisiana ex rel.

Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 297 (1961). Yet

there is no opportunity to seek protection in federal

court if the government uses its investigative powers

to target and silence particular speakers. This

distinction is not right, and it creates perverse

incentives for government actors to misuse

investigative processes.

8

For example, in NIFLA, a state AG’s office

similarly targeted crisis pregnancy centers, but it did

so by threatening to take—and taking—enforcement

action under a statute. Unlike below, the district court

in NIFLA found the issue ripe and addressed the

merits of the case. 746 F. Supp.3d at 114 (granting

preliminary injunction to pregnancy centers against

an enforcement action by the AG because of

irreparable harm caused by likely constitutional

violations). The court found ripeness because the

court recognized that the plaintiffs were “now ‘chilled’

from making future statements out of fear of civil

enforcement by the Attorney General,” Id. at 113, and

because the AG had shown willingness to take

enforcement action. Id. The court emphasized the

importance of its role to protect against such

government action, stating that the “very purpose of

the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority

from assuming a guardianship of the public mind

through regulating the press, speech, and religion.”

Id. at 118.

This Court has confirmed that government

regulation may not constitutionally be used

selectively to target. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377

(1992). There, it facially invalidated an ordinance

because the ordinance prohibited only one viewpoint,

even if its goal would be reasonable if applied without

such targeting. Id. at 388, 393-94 (holding that a state

can prohibit obscenity but not “only that obscenity

which includes offensive political messages”). The

“practical operation” of legal standards by a

government actor may result in “actual viewpoint

discrimination.” Id. at 391.

9

This Court has also found constitutional harm in

an investigative context, emphasizing that the

government may not just sweep aside Fourth

Amendment rights on the hope that “fishing

expeditions into private papers” might possibly

“disclose evidence of crime.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v.

Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924).

This principle holds just as strongly to government

targeting through investigative means if the victim

claims that its practical operation is viewpoint

discriminatory. Such a claim should therefore be ripe.

B. The narrow view of ripeness is not

consistent with this Court’s precedent.

This Court has found Article III injury when

constitutional claims are alleged—period. It has not

ignored them to wait for a court order. In fact,

threatened enforcement implicating a First

Amendment right combined with other factors can

create Article III injury. See Driehaus, 573 U.S. at

166. In Driehaus, the Court concluded that there was

Article III injury based on a combination of threats of

administrative action and the history of similar

recurring targeting and ongoing stifling of speech. Id.

at 163-64. In finding cognizable injury, this Court

emphasized the threat of enforcement was significant

when a vendor (a billboard owner) refused to display

the plaintiff’s message because the vendor did not

want to be associated with the plaintiff’s group. Id. at

165. The Court also noted the “substantial hardship”

present when a plaintiff must choose between

“refraining from core political speech” or “engaging in

speech [that risks] costly Commission proceedings

and criminal prosecution.” Id. at 167-68. The Court

10

thus recognizes that threats of court proceedings and

significant penalties are, in fact, cognizable harm.

This Court has also held that someone threatened

with arrest did not have to wait until arrested to have

a ripe claim. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459

(1974) (holding an anti-war protestor had an “actual

controversy” based on the fact that he was warned,

threatened, and saw others prosecuted). The Court

held that the federal court may rightly intervene prior

to a state court proceeding to protect a plaintiff’s

“constitutionally protected activity.” Id. at 462.

Similarly, the Third Circuit held that threat of

prosecution is concrete enough to ripen a First

Amendment claim. Florio, 40 F.3d at 1468. There the

Third Circuit panel reversed an order dismissing a

pastor’s claim about a change to a nondiscrimination

law burdening his speech and held his claim was ripe

because the state refused to assure it would not

prosecute him, making the threat “real and

substantial.” Id. The Third Circuit also correctly held

that a deprivation of constitutional rights is sufficient

harm for ripeness purposes. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel.

Ricketts v. Lightcap, 567 F.2d 1226, 1232 (3rd Cir.

1977) (looking at the “practical impact on the

litigants” of the action taken by the prison official and

holding the prisoner alleged sufficient constitutional

injury).

When First Amendment constitutional harms are

involved, such harms should not be disregarded based

on procedural posture. In fact, Petitioner here is

irreparably harmed each day their First Amendment

freedoms are infringed. See Roman Cath. Diocese of

Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14, 19 (2020); Elrod v.

11

Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). The strange posture

of this case (like the Smith & Wesson cases) should not

prevent courts from asking the right questions to

determine ripeness because they automatically

assume there is no harm when a government official

has used a non-self-executing investigative tool. Pet.

App. 38a-39a. Interestingly, in Smith & Wesson, the

court acknowledged that Smith & Wesson “did

nothing wrong” prior to the investigation and that the

investigation was not a sanction. Smith & Wesson

Brands, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of New Jersey, 27 F.4th

886, 892-93 (3rd Cir. 2022). Yet the court also said it

is wrongdoing punishable by the state “when it failed

to respond to the subpoena.” Id. at 893. This undoes

the idea that a party is free to ignore a subpoena

without harm. Pet. App. 41a (district court holding

plaintiff could “simply decline . . . without legal or

practical consequence”). Because the purpose of

ripeness is “to avoid expenditure of judicial resources

on matters which have caused harm to no one,”

Peachlum v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 333 F.3d 429,

434 (3rd Cir. 2003), the determination of whether

there is hardship and harm to the parties is

particularly important.

If constitutional claims cannot be considered based

on the idea that there is no harm until a state court

has ruled, important constitutional claims will end up

being precluded in federal court. That is a result this

Court has found unacceptable. Knick v. Twp. of Scott,

588 U.S. 180, 182 (2019) (holding that a property

owner could raise her Fifth Amendment taking claim

right away in federal court because requiring her to

first seek state court remedies would result in a

preclusion trap). Instead, the Knick court stated that

12

as soon as the taking occurred, the claim could be

brought in federal court. Id. at 181.

Accordingly, this Court should correct the

discrepancy caused by an application of the ripeness

doctrine that ignores constitutional concerns.

Otherwise, the subjects of state investigations—even

when there are claims of unconstitutional targeting—

will have to struggle to function with a “sword of

Damocles” hanging over their heads.

II. Ripeness Is all the More Important When

First Amendment Claims are Raised.

Several circuits have rightly affirmed that

ripeness and standing should be applied “less

stringently in the context of First Amendment

claims.” Twitter, Inc. v. Paxton, 56 F.4th 1170 (9th Cir.

2022); See also Peachlum, 333 F.3d at 434. This is

partly because the First Amendment itself protects

against government overreach. See, e.g., Texas v.

Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410-414 (1989) (holding that

the asserted state interests could not justify

suppressing the expression of a flag burner because it

found it disagreeable).

It may be permissible for states like New Jersey to

regulate commercial speech through consumer

protection laws, but the First Amendment forbids

states from using these laws to target the speech of

disfavored charities based on their viewpoints. See

DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 363 (1937) (holding

that states may “protect themselves” from various

abuses, but that does not mean they may “curtail[] the

right of free speech and assembly” through the

application of a syndicalism law); Fiske v. Kansas, 247

13

U.S. 380 (1927) (holding unconstitutional the

application of the Syndicalism Act to convict someone

advocating membership in a group not shown to be

violent); U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716 (2012)

(holding the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional

because it targeted falsity in speech only about a

particular subject). Even when considering claims of

fraud, courts must be careful not to stifle speech

because even false statements are only outside First

Amendment protection if they involve knowing or

reckless falsehood. Id. at 719.

In addition, First Amendment violations involve

unique harm and may not be backhanded in an

investigative context. Shelton, 364 U.S. at 485-86

(holding unconstitutional a state affidavit condition

on employment for schoolteachers requiring them to

reveal every organization of which they are

participants). In Shelton, the Court acknowledged the

state right to investigate teacher competence to

protect association rights but narrowed the scope of

its authority. The state must avoid “means that

broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when

the end can be more narrowly achieved.” Id. at 488.

First Amendment rights require protection in all

contexts. The use of broad investigative authority to

silence disfavored viewpoints is particularly

problematic. There is the potential of politically

motivated and constitutionally suspect practices, and

a significant First Amendment chill is likely. See

Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S.

595, 608 (2021) (emphasizing the need for narrow

tailoring of government action in situations of

compelled disclosure); see also Lozman v. Riviera

14

Beach, 585 U.S. 87, 99-100 (2018) (noting particular

constitutional concerns when there was evidence of

clear government targeting). In Bonta, this Court

emphasized that when the First Amendment is in

play, then just identifying an important state interest

is not enough; narrow tailoring is required. 594 U.S.

at 609. The government “may regulate in the First

Amendment area only with narrow specificity.” Id. at

610 (cleaned up). For the same reasons, courts should

not allow abstention doctrines to bar these important

First Amendment cases. This Court has already

narrowed abstention to ensure that the federal courts

do not avoid their obligation to decide federal

questions. Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S.

69, 78 (2013).

III. The Experiences of Three Amici Bear This

out.

Obria Medical Clinics PNW, Gateway Pregnancy

Center, and True Women’s Center (“TWC”) can

provide personal examples of the concrete harm

caused by unfounded targeted investigations. Their

experiences may not fairly be characterized as

“conjectural or hypothetical,” but rather as “concrete

and particularized” and an “actual controversy.”

Obria and Gateway both received non-self-executing

investigative documents from their respective state

AG, followed by repeated phone calls, letters,

pressure, and threats. The documents themselves

threatened enforcement if the recipient fails to obey,

emphasizing that the choice to ignore would make the

subsequent enforcement effort more severe.2 These

For example, in Obria’s case, Washington law threatens

monetary sanctions if the party receiving the Civil Investigative

2

15

government actions (not just potential future

enforcement) resulted in specific, negative impacts to

each ministry’s activities and speech. For these amici,

it was not a potential, hypothetical impact but an

actual, present hardship. TWC was harmed

quantifiably after the state AG released a New Jersey

Consumer Alert about pregnancy centers. Yet the

state refused TWC’s request for the facts underlying

the state’s public allegations about and investigations

of pregnancy centers.

A. Obria Medical Clinics PNW.

Obria has served communities in the state of

Washington for over 40 years. It has never been

informed of a complaint against it, and, as an

Accreditation Association of Ambulatory Health Care

clinic, it operates with accountability to the highest

standards of health care. Complaint, Obria Grp., Inc.

v. Ferguson, No. 3:23-cv-06093 (W.D. Wash. 2024),

ECF No. 1, at 6 (“Obria Complaint”). This standard of

integrity carries over to all marketing practices.

The Washington Attorney General’s Office

targeted Obria in 2022. The AG issued a “consumer

alert” and then executed his agenda to target

pregnancy centers. Obria received a CID in May 2022.

See Obria Grp., Inc. v. Ferguson, 2025 WL 27691, at

Demand (CID) does not voluntarily comply unless “opposition

was substantially justified.” Wash. R. Civ. Pro 37(a)(4); see also

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 37(a)(5). It is, therefore, not a neutral option to

ignore the official demand from the state. In addition, the

subpoena duces tecum from the New Jersey AG to Gateway

repeated twice on the first two pages that “Failure to comply with

this Subpoena may render you liable for contempt of court and

such other penalties as are provided by law.”

16

*1 (W.D. Wash., Jan. 3, 2025). The 35 interrogatories

demanded client, donor, financial, staffing, and

volunteer information dating back to 2010. Obria

responded to the CID with over 1,500 pages of

information. Obria Complaint, at 19-20. Dragging out

the process, the AG twice served deficiency letters,

demanding supplemental answers, which Obria

provided. Id.; see also Obria Grp., 2025 WL 27691, at

*1. When the AG uncovered other groups connected

with Obria, it then issued them CIDs as well.

Declaration of River Sussman,

Obria Grp. v.

Ferguson, No. 3:23-cv-06093 (W.D. Wash. 2024), ECF

No. 48, at 2 (“Aug. 26 Declaration”).

At no time was a complaint against, or violation

by, Obria ever identified. This continued and

intensified threat made clear the purpose behind the

onerous, interminable investigation demands. The

Washington AG’s office had clearly and publicly

committed to use “consumer protection laws” to target

pregnancy centers. Open Letter from Attorneys

General Regarding CPC Misinformation and Harm,

Oct. 23, 2023, at 1, https://perma.cc/DL74-3K6L,

(“Open Letter”).

This politically motivated targeting was a blatant

attempt to use what should be neutral investigative

powers intended to ensure protection for the public as

a tool to intimidate and silence an organization whose

messaging and practices the AG believed were

contrary to his policy and political goals.3 The AG’s

Notably, Washington AG Bob Ferguson successfully ran for

governor around the same time this case was progressing. See

Democrat Bob Ferguson wins Washington governor’s race, NPR,

Nov. 5, 2024.

3

17

baseless and viewpoint-discriminatory investigation,

along with his seeming dissatisfaction with the

massive amount of information Obria provided,

prompted Obria to file a complaint on November 29,

2023. Obria Complaint, at 1. Yet the legal process that

unfolded ignored the abusive tactics, and the court

concluded that Obria’s speech was not chilled. Obria

Grp., 2025 WL 27691, at *6-7. The district court said

that because the AG did not bring an action to enforce,

and the CIDs in Washington are considered non-selfexecuting, enforcement was “merely hypothetical”

and that every action Obria took in response to the

CIDs was “voluntary,” making its injuries “selfinflicted.” Id. at *8.

Obria, in fact, suffered significant and ongoing

harm as a direct result of the AG’s intense targeting.

First, Obria had multiple First Amendment harms,

including chilling of speech. It discontinued operating

its website and instead relied upon the larger Obria

Group website to list its services. Obria Complaint, at

21. Obria also self-censored by no longer making

public statements about Abortion Pill Reversal (APR)

because of fear of reprisal, even though it had a First

Amendment right to speak. Id. The court, however,

brushed aside Obria’s evidence that the investigation

directly caused it to change its speech and stop

distributing materials about the safety and efficacy of

APR, labeling them “conclusory allegations” instead of

recognizing they represent chilled speech. Obria Grp.,

2025 WL 27691, at *7.

Second, Obria faced associational harm, as several

vendors stopped working with Obria because of the

risk that the state government would come after them

18

because of their association with Obria. Obria

Complaint, at 19. The vendors, all of whom resided

outside of Washington, had received CIDs from the

Washington AG requiring their time and expense to

respond. Id. at 19-20. The district court, however, said

such losses were “voluntary choice based on

speculation,” and that it was simply “not a concrete,

legally cognizable harm.” Obria Grp., 2025 WL 27691,

at *9.

Third, Obria suffered financial harm. When Obria

disclosed to its insurer—based on its annual renewal

application questionnaire—it had received CIDs from

the state, the insurer denied the coverage renewal

“[d]ue to the claims.” Aug. 26 Declaration, at 3. Obria’s

broker eventually found a different insurer with a

premium “nearly five times” the previous annual

premium. Id. When this financial consequence came

to light during the course of litigation, and the AG’s

legal team was questioned in a hearing before the

judge, the AG’s office agreed to write a letter

specifically “acknowledging that he had closed his

investigation.” Id. at 27.

This blatant attempt to moot the case

demonstrates the imbalance of legal sophistication

and options that is in play, especially when it involves

some of the state’s best attorneys up against small

nonprofits who often operate with a workforce made

up primarily of volunteers. Such efforts at legal

harassment intended to silence disfavored viewpoints

both disrupt the work being done by these nonprofit

organizations and involve crippling expenses,

violating First Amendment rights.

19

B. Gateway Pregnancy Center.

Gateway Pregnancy Center of New Jersey also

experienced significant, demonstrable harm because

of the subpoena it received. Gateway is a religious

organization with evangelism as its central purpose.

Its volunteer training focuses on spiritual

qualifications and the ability to share the gospel; it

measures its success as a ministry by how many

clients heard the gospel. Gateway’s materials are

infused with Scripture, and it has ministry

relationships with 75 churches. See, e.g., Gateway.org.

When men or women in crisis come through its door,

Gateway focuses on loving and caring for their

needs—spiritual, emotional, and physical. Gateway

shares medical advice only by pointing to the links

and resources of other organizations and experts. It

does not present itself as an expert in APR or any

other medical procedures, keeping its gospel-centered

focus.

The facts predating the subpoena provide important

context for the targeting of pregnancy centers. The AG

established a “Reproductive Rights Strike Force” in

July 2022, the month after Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s

Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022), was decided.4 In

October 2022, Gateway was targeted and “strongarmed” by state officials into registering as a charity

for the first time. In its decades of ministry in New

4 See Press Release, Acting AG Platkin Establishes “Reproductive

Rights Strike Force” to Protect Access to Abortion Care for New

Jerseyans and Residents of Other States (July 11, 2022),

www.njoag.gov/acting-ag-platkin-establishes-reproductiverights-strike-orce-to-protect-access-to-abortion-care-for-newjerseyans-and-residents-of-other-states/.

20

Jersey since being incorporated in 1989, Gateway had

never before been told to register, presumably because

it qualified as exempt as a religious organization.

Gateway’s director called the state and tried to clarify

that Gateway, as an organization “established for

religious purposes,” should not have to be registered.

Gateway had never had any complaints filed against

it and said publicly that it did not offer any medical

services. The state repeatedly told the director that

Gateway must now register and threatened him with

sanctions if Gateway did not register. Then, the AG

staff walked him through the registration process.

Gateway became a registered charity in June 2023,

and the trap was sprung. A couple months later, in

November, the same office issued the subpoena to

Gateway, right after the AG co-authored the open

letter signed by 16 state AGs pledging action against

them. Open Letter, at 1.

When served with the subpoena, Gateway sought

legal advice and had a volunteer attorney who spoke

to the AG’s office on its behalf. The AG sent emails

continuing to pressure Gateway and threatening the

use of additional means “to obtain compliance.” At one

point, in discussing if Gateway should tie its fate to

the AG’s litigation with another pregnancy center

(Petitioner First Choice Women’s Resource Centers),

the AG drafted a proposed agreement that included

language that said, in exchange for a delay in the

enforcement of its subpoena, Gateway would agree it

“will not assert any constitutional or other objections

that are similar” to those raised by the other

pregnancy center. Gateway sought advice from new

counsel and refused to sign away its rights in this

manner.

21

This targeted investigation has harmed Gateway.

First, the threat in the subpoena that Gateway would

face penalties if it did not “preserve Documents and

information relevant or potentially relevant to this

Subpoena from destruction or loss” chilled Gateway’s

speech and religious practice. Gateway understood it

must not alter or update its website to avoid

additional penalties, preventing it from giving

updated information to clients, donors, and

volunteers.

Second, Gateway faced associational harm because

its board could neither find nor train new leadership.

The AG’s threat of legal action caused pressure and

uncertainty to surround all the ministry’s decisions.

The threat was not imaginary; Gateway watched

costly litigation play out against other pregnancy

centers like Petitioner. Gateway’s director had

planned to equip and train a new leader to take over

the ministry he and his late wife had carried on for

decades. Instead, his time was taken up seeking legal

counsel, gathering documents, and experiencing

anxiety over the uncertainty that prevented him from

preparing his ministry for the next generation.

Third, the targeted pressure on Gateway—and the

AG’s determination to deny Gateway’s religious

status and evangelistic nature—burdened Gateway’s

free exercise of religion. The AG’s bullying threats

distracted Gateway from its mission: to singlemindedly spread the Gospel of Christ to every

inquirer.

22

These unconstitutional harms are neither

hypothetical nor voluntarily self-inflicted; they are a

direct result of the targeted plan of the same AG

(Respondent).

C. True Women’s Center.

In December 2022, the NJ AG’s office issued a

press release5 about actions it was taking to ensure

“access to abortion care in New Jersey,” Verified

Complaint ¶ 8, NJ Consortium of Pregnancy Ctrs. v.

State of New Jersey, MER-L-394-23 (Sup Ct. N.J., Feb.

27, 2023) (“Verified Complaint”). It also put out a

“Consumer Alert: Crisis Pregnancy Centers,”6

alleging that the centers utilize deceptive and

manipulative tactics. Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. The Consumer

Alert identified “crisis pregnancy centers” by the

content of their speech—the AG determined that only

those pregnancy-related centers that do not perform

or refer for abortion were “crisis pregnancy centers

falling under the alert.” The press release was widely

published and continues to be published, causing

direct harm to pregnancy centers, notwithstanding

that the centers disputed the allegations contained in

the alert. Shortly after being informed of the AG’s

actions, True Women’s Center’s (“TWC”) volunteer

medical director, a local physician, abruptly resigned,

5 Press Release, NJ-OAG, AG Platkin Announces Actions to

Protect Reproductive Health Care Providers and Those Seeking

Reproductive Care in New Jersey (Dec. 7, 2022),

www.njoag.gov/ag-platkin-announces-actions-to-protectreproductive-health-care-providers-and-those-seekingreproductive-care-in-new-jersey/.

6 Consumer Alert, “Crisis Pregnancy Centers,” Dec. 1, 2022,

https://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases22/2022-1207_crisispregnancy-centers.pdf.

23

indicating he was concerned about the risk to his

practice of being affiliated with organizations

disfavored by the government. When that happened,

TWC had to cancel numerous scheduled ultrasounds,

because it was committed to its high standards of

having a qualified ob-gyn read the scans. TWC was

also forced to suspend ultrasound services to its

clients for about a month before it could resume

normal operations again. Even then, it had additional

costs that had not been budgeted into its operating

budget because, given the unexpected impact of the

alert, it had to pay a qualified physician to review and

interpret ultrasound scans at a cost charged per scan,

which had been covered by a volunteer physician

previously. This cost continued until additional

volunteer physicians could be recruited.

The unfounded allegations contained in the

Consumer Alert were alarming. A consortium of

pregnancy centers sought to clear their names by

finding out the claimed factual basis for the consumer

alert through a request based on New Jersey’s Open

Public Records Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 et seq. After

revealing there had been no complaints made against

any pregnancy center in New Jersey but being

wrongly denied access to most of the remaining

information they sought, the consortium, which

included TWC, filed suit in New Jersey on February

27, 2023, seeking an order to produce the documents.

See Verified Complaint. The AG’s records custodian

denied access to records, claiming the requests were

overbroad while neither admitting nor denying

whether records involving investigations of CPCs

existed. Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Order to Show

Cause at 10, 15, 16, NJ Consortium of Pregnancy Ctrs.

24

v. State of New Jersey, MER-L-394-23 (Sup Ct. N.J.,

Mar. 1, 2023). The consortium was seeking to simply

see “the supporting factual data recited in the Alert.”

Id. at 24. The court ordered the production of some

records, and the AG produced some redacted

materials but refused to produce any evidence about

whether it had investigations in progress. Defendant’s

Brief at 4, NJ Consortium of Pregnancy Ctrs. v. State

of New Jersey, MER-L-394023 (Sup. Ct. N.J., Jan 19,

2024) (“Defendant’s Brief”). It continued to assert that

its privilege applied and that to release such “records

would be inimical to the public’s interest,” citing

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a), and could “hamper an ongoing

investigation.” Defendant’s Brief at 5, 21. It

preposterously claimed that the privilege also

protected the “reputational harm” of those being

investigated,

particularly

when

no

“public

enforcement action” had yet been taken. Id. at 10-11.

This might be true if it had waited to issue its

consumer alert until after it had done its

investigations. Instead, it intentionally caused the

“reputational harm” first and then cut off all

possibility of repairing it, all while claiming it was

simply seeking to protect the public.

This is another example of the misuse of the state’s

investigative tools in a way that avoids accountability,

even when there is strong evidence of viewpoint

discrimination occurring. The AG issued sweeping

and unsupported allegations of misuse against

pregnancy centers; it then claimed it could not reveal

anything about the basis for those conclusions

because it was in the process of investigating the

pregnancy centers, trying to find the very evidence it

had assumed was there in its public declaration.

25

Groups like TWC experienced significant harm from

baseless, organized government efforts to harass and

discredit them, with no means to challenge the efforts

because the AG’s office intentionally kept its efforts

within the realm of its investigative authority, instead

of its enforcement authority, where constitutional

challenges can clearly be raised.

As the stories of these amici demonstrate, the

government should not be able to suppress indirectly

what it cannot do directly. See, e.g., New York Times

v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964); Bantam Books

v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963) (holding

unconstitutional practices of a Rhode Island

Commission seeking to suppress and stop circulation

of certain “obscene” publications); NRA v. Vullo, 602

U.S. 175 (2024) (holding a government official violated

the First Amendment by seeking to suppress a group’s

advocacy through coercion and manipulation of other

entities). This Court should apply this principle to

prevent these unconstitutional and targeted crusades

by state AGs.

IV. This Case Provides the Court With the

Opportunity to Curtail State Actors’

Chilling and Obfuscation of Constitutional

Rights.

While ripeness is an important prerequisite for

federal court jurisdiction, the barrier must not be so

extreme that important constitutional claims may not

be heard at all. In concluding that “the Subpoena

must be enforced in an unconstitutional form before

this

Court

can

consider

the

Subpoena’s

constitutionality,” Pet. App. 31a, the district court

here created a catch-22 for Petitioner, with no way to

26

get to federal court to preserve its constitutional

claims. Waiting for state court enforcement of an

unconstitutional subpoena means the party must

raise its constitutional claims in state court during the

enforcement process; the state court will decide on

those claims as part of its order; and the claims will,

therefore, likely be precluded in federal court. See

Smith & Wesson, 105 F.4th 67.

Even if a state has legitimate policy goals, it may

not advance them through indirect means that

“restrain[] certain speech by certain speakers.” Sorrell

v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (holding a

Vermont law violated the First Amendment when it

hindered marketing communications); Louisiana ex

rel. Gremillion, 366 U.S. at 297 (“regulatory measures

. . . cannot be employed in purpose or in effect to stifle,

penalize, or curb the exercise of First Amendment

rights”). The government needs “so cogent an interest”

“to justify the substantial abridgment of associational

freedom” caused by certain disclosure demands.

Bates, 361 U.S. at 524 (holding unconstitutional

ordinances enacted to hamper civil rights

organizations by demanding the disclosure of

members). Constitutional protection, particularly

based on the First Amendment, should not vary based

“upon the truth, popularity, or social utility of the

ideas and beliefs which are offered.” New York Times,

376 U.S. at 271 (cleaned up).

This Court has clarified “[i]t is characteristic of the

freedoms of expression in general that they are

vulnerable to gravely damaging yet barely visible

encroachments.” Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 66. These

rights, therefore, “must be ringed about with

27

adequate bulwarks.” Id. In Bantam Books, the

commission was not directly banning books, but

rather threatened to invoke legal sanctions. Id. at 67.

The Court said there that “the record amply

demonstrates” what the commission was trying to

do—visible when the Court “look[ed] through forms to

the substance” of their actions—and noted it

“succeeded in its aim.” Id. This Court has also found

that evidence of a First Amendment claim should not

be easily dismissed based on the government having

another explanation and clear authority generally for

its official actions when there is evidence of a

premeditated plan to intimidate and target. See

Lozman, 585 U.S. at 99-100 (holding that typical

retaliatory arrest considerations and bars are

different when there is evidence that the “government

itself orchestrates the retaliation . . . against protected

speech”).

This is an example of what the Court again

prohibited in Vullo, where a government official tried

to indirectly suppress First Amendment rights by

misusing the power of her office. The Court looked at

the facts and said “[o]ther allegations, viewed in

context, reinforce the [] First Amendment claim.” 602

U.S. at 193. “Ultimately, the critical takeaway is that

the First Amendment prohibits government officials

from wielding their power selectively to punish or

suppress” First Amendment rights. Id. at 198. In

Vullo, the right was speech; here, the rights are

speech and free exercise of religion and association.

Courts need to be able to look at the process

involved in a government action, even if an individual

similar act could be legitimate in many situations.

28

The judiciary may scrutinize the “methods used” by

the government to gather information, even if it may

not directly review the subsequent decision that is

within the granted discretionary authority of the

executive to make. E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees

v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

(holding the court should consider Fifth Amendment

constitutional challenges and address their merits,

not deny judicial review); Wilmer Cutler Pickering

Hale & Dorr LLP v. Executive Office of the President,

2025 WL 1502329, *12 (Dist. D.C., May 27, 2025)

(holding that plaintiff could challenge the “process”

the government used in suspending security

clearances, not whether it had the authority to

suspend them). This is because it is the way to ensure

that the power of the state is not being misused “to

punish or suppress disfavored expression.” Vullo, 602

U.S. at 188.

The way the New Jersey AG is applying its

investigative tools to unconstitutionally target

pregnancy

centers—by

wielding

investigative

authority to intimidate and coerce but not fulfilling

his threat of court enforcement—fails to provide

constitutional safeguards. There is real constitutional

harm here: intimidation and exploitation of unequal

power resulting in self-censorship.

Ultimately, the Third Circuit’s ripeness doctrine

here means the opportunity of nonprofits like

Petitioner and several of the amici here to obtain

protection in federal court from First Amendment

harms perversely depends on the state AG. It is based

not on the harm the organization experiences, but

rather on whether the government actors decide they

29

can accomplish their goals through investigative

pressure and threats or through filing in court. This

framework gives state investigative agencies free

rein—with no accountability other than the political

process—to

launch

onerous

and

protracted

investigations into religious organizations or

disfavored ideological organizations with threat of

sanctions, so long as they don’t ask a court to enforce

them. They can burden their enemies with official

investigative demands, drag out negotiations, and

syphon off their enemies’ energy and resources, all

without it being considered “harm.”

As noted above, three of the amici here have

suffered or are likely to suffer under such

manipulative tactics by state actors, including the

same Respondent. Similarly situated parties should

be able to raise their constitutional rights in federal

court, even when the state actor expertly wields his

power through investigative weapons instead of

through direct statutory enforcement.

CONCLUSION

This case is about whether or not organizations

facing significant harm from the application of state

investigative authority in a targeted, viewpointdiscriminatory manner can have the opportunity to

raise their federal constitutional claims in federal

court at all. Because Petitioner (and three of the amici

curiae here) alleges the government would not have

taken investigative action but for their disfavored

protected speech, that First Amendment right should

30

be able to be vindicated in federal court. An overly

narrow ripeness doctrine must not prevent that.

Respectfully submitted.

August 28, 2025

LORI KEPNER

Counsel of Record

STEVEN T. MCFARLAND

LAURA NAMMO

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY

CENTER FOR LAW &

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

8001 Braddock Rd., Ste. 302

Springfield, VA 22151

(703) 642-1070

lkepner@clsnet.org

Counsel for Amici

Counsel for Amici Curiae