Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Henry Weaver, Petitioner v. United States

APPENDIX

Case: 24-60252

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Date Filed: 03/28/2025

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

____________

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 24-60252

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FILED

March 6, 2025

United States of America,

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Henry Weaver,

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:22-CR-42-1

______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Willett, and Ho, Circuit Judges. *

Per Curiam: **

Henry Weaver was convicted of forcibly assaulting, intimidating, and

interfering with a United States Postal Service mail carrier’s performance of

his official duties with a deadly and dangerous weapon, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b). Weaver challenges his indictment and conviction.

Finding no error of the district court, we AFFIRM.

_____________________

*

Judge Ho concurs in the judgment only.

**

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

APP. 001

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I.

On April 23, 2022, Benjamin Jones, a United States Postal Service

mail carrier, was delivering mail in Marks, Mississippi when he was

confronted by Henry Weaver (also known as “Nate Dogg”), about a missing

package. Jones was nearing the end of his usual mail route on Sims Street

when Weaver pulled up in a gray Toyota that stopped in the middle of the

road, preventing Jones’ mail truck from leaving. There were two other

masked individuals in the car. Weaver then stepped out and asked Jones

about a missing package, stating that he knew where Jones and his

postmaster, Sean Shegog, lived, and that he wanted his package or $10,000

within 24 hours. Weaver returned to the Toyota, and when Jones attempted

to drive around the car, Weaver stopped Jones again. Weaver and the other

individuals in the car pointed firearms at Jones from the car while Weaver

threatened: “This is what we shooting.” Jones then drove off the road to

avoid those threatening him.

Soon after the incident, Jones called Shegog to report what happened. 1

Shegog told Jones to return to the post office for his safety, and then called

911. Jones delivered mail to a couple of addresses on a side street near the

incident before returning to the post office to meet with deputies from the

Quitman County Sheriff’s Office (“QCSO”). 2 That same day, the QCSO

generated a report. The Marks Police Department and the United States

Postal Inspection Service (“USPIS”) also investigated the incident.

_____________________

1

Jones testified at trial that he called Shegog “[a]nywhere from three to five

minutes” after Weaver’s threat to him.

2

Though Weaver asserts that Jones “went on and finished his route” before

returning to the post office, a review of the record proves the contrary. Jones, for example,

testified that he did not deliver mail to a nearby housing development, which would have

been the end of his route.

2

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II.

Weaver was indicted by a grand jury on April 28, 2022, for forcibly

assaulting, intimidating, and interfering with a USPS mail carrier engaged in

the performance of his official duties with a deadly and dangerous weapon.

In February 2024, Weaver was convicted of these charges by a jury. Weaver

moved for acquittal. The district court denied his motion and subsequently

sentenced him to 240 months of imprisonment. He timely appealed. On

appeal, Weaver raises six issues. We consider each in turn.

III.

Prior to trial, Weaver moved to dismiss the indictment, asserting that

the grand jury testimony presented by the Government was non-credible and

contradictory. The district court denied his motion. We agree.

A.

“The denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment for Governmental

misconduct is reviewed de novo.” United States v. Cessa, 861 F.3d 121, 141

(5th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). This Court, however, reviews “any district

court factual determinations concerning prosecutorial misconduct before the

grand jury for clear error.” Id. (citing United States v. Bourgeois, 950 F.2d 980,

984 (5th Cir. 1992)).

“As a general matter, a district court may not dismiss an indictment

for errors in grand jury proceedings unless such errors prejudiced the

defendant.” Id. (cleaned up). “Dismissal of the indictment is appropriate

only if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand

jury’s decision to indict, or if there is grave doubt that the decision to indict

was free from the substantial influence of such violations.” Id. (cleaned up).

B.

Weaver alleges two types of prosecutorial misconduct before the

3

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grand jury. First, he argues that the Government presented false evidence to

the grand jury through the testimony of Charlie Tutor, a USPIS inspector,

who investigated the incident. Specifically, Weaver asserts that Inspector

Tutor made contradictory statements, including:

x the number of people who exited the Toyota;

x the name Jones used to identify Weaver;

x whether Jones identified other passengers;

x who called the police; and whether Jones finished his route; 3

x the number of hours Weaver gave Jones to produce the package;

x and the reasons for Jones’ new mail delivery route.

None of these discrepancies are sufficient to warrant the

extraordinary relief that Weaver now requests. This Court “refuses to adopt

the proposition that, absent perjury or government misconduct, an

indictment is flawed simply because it is based on testimony that may later

prove to be questionable.” Cessa, 861 F.3d at 142 (citing United States v.

Sullivan, 578 F.2d 121, 124 (5th Cir. 1978)) (alteration in original). Under this

standard, Weaver’s allegations fail. Furthermore, the discrepancies

identified were immaterial and did not “substantially influence[] the grand

jury’s decision to indict[.]” Id. Weaver’s identified discrepancies do not

impugn this narrative of events.

Second, Weaver argues that the Government “injected prejudicial

and irrelevant information into the grand jury proceeding” when Inspector

Tutor was asked to speculate that the incident arose over a mailed package

containing drugs, and when Inspector Tutor testified to Weaver’s character

and propensity for committing crimes similar to the incident.

_____________________

3

As noted above, supra n.2, Jones did not finish his route before returning to the

post office.

4

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The testimony at issue did not require dismissal of the indictment.

When the Government asked Inspector Tutor why Weaver might have

assaulted Jones over a missing package, it made clear to the grand jury that

its line of questioning was speculation and not based on a set of known facts.4

The Government was also careful when it addressed Weaver’s criminal

history with the grand jury: without presenting evidence of Weaver’s prior

bad acts or convictions, it attempted to prove Weaver’s motive to explain

what might have occurred. 5

The grand jury was aware of the underlying facts and the prosecution

acknowledged that this was a DBhe-said-she-said’ type of case”; yet it still

chose to indict Weaver. On these facts, we are not left with “grave doubt that

the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such

violations.” Cessa, 861 F.3d at 141 (cleaned up).

IV.

Weaver next argues that the district court improperly admitted

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4

For example, in the exchange with Inspector Tutor, the Government explicitly

stated it was asking him to speculate:

“Q: Now, I’m going to ask you for a little speculation. And we’re going to

tell the grand jury right now the next part really is speculation. You’ve

testified to the facts, correct?

A: Yes, sir. Q: Just speculate. Based on your experience as a postal

inspector, what do you think is going on here?”

(emphasis added).

5

For example, the Government asked:

“Q: Let me ask you this question . . . You’ve talk[ed] to some of the local

law enforcement, whether in Quitman County or Panola County,

regarding this, correct?

A: Yes. Q: And I’m not trying to dirty up Henry Weaver on other matters.

But does this incident fit in with what locals know of Henry Weaver?”

5

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evidence of Weaver’s prior drug convictions under FED. R. EVID. 404(b).

We disagree.

A.

We review the admission of evidence of prior convictions under a

heightened abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Miller, 520 F.3d

504, 511 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 484 F.3d 762, 774

(5th Cir. 2007)). Even if the district court abused its discretion in admitting

the Rule 404(b) evidence, we do not reverse if the error was harmless.

Mitchell, 484 F.3d at 774.

Rule 404(b) “excludes extrinsic offense evidence when it is relevant

solely to the issue of the defendant’s character.” United States v. Ridlehuber,

11 F.3d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 1993). “Even if the extrinsic evidence is probative

!*-B*/# -+0-+*. .C- *")$5 40' hdhLM6.0#..#*2$)"(*/$1 *-

intent, the probative value of the evidence must be weighed against its

prejudicial impact.” Id.

United States v. Beechum creates a two-./ +$),0$-4!*-)'45$)"/# 

admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence. 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978).

“First, it must be determined that the extrinsic offense evidence is relevant

to an issue other than the defendant’s character. Second, the evidence must

possess probative value that is not substantially outweighed by its undue

prejudice and must meet the other requirements of [R]ule 403.” Id. Under

this step, the Court considers the following factors: “(1) the [G]overnment’s

need for the extrinsic evidence, (2) the similarity between the extrinsic and

charged offenses, (3) the amount of time separating the two offenses, and (4)

the court’s limiting instructions.” United States v. Juarez, 866 F.3d 622, 627

(5th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). We “give[] great deference to the district

court’s informed judgment in weighing the factors.” United States v. Kinchen,

729 F.3d 466, 473 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).

6

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B.

The district court—in admitting a stipulation of facts detailing two of

Weaver’s prior drug-related convictions—found that the prior convictions

were relevant because they showed motive and were not unduly prejudicial

under Beechum’s two-step inquiry. 6 We agree.

1.

Weaver acknowledges that motive is valid grounds for admission of

evidence but argues that the admission of his prior convictions fails

Beechum’s first prong because “there is a major logical and relevancy gap

between an allegation of threatening a mail carrier and drug dealing.”

Specifically, Weaver takes issue with the lack of similarity between the drug

convictions and the offense charged.

Weaver is generally correct that the “relevance” of evidence under

Beechum’s first step “is a function of its similarity to the offense charged.”

582 F.2d at 911. But he overlooks the exception for motive. Beechum

- *")$5  /#/ DN$O) */# - *)/ 3/. $!! - )/ ./)-. *! N- ' 1) O

apply[,]” and that “overall similarity is not required when the offense is

introduced to show motive.” Id. at 911 n.15. Here, extrinsic evidence of

Weaver’s prior drug convictions is relevant to motive because they help

establish why Weaver might commit the offense, as threatening a postal

_____________________

6

The stipulation of facts introduced by the Government also included a third prior

conviction for possession of a firearm. On appeal, however, Weaver does not contest the

admissibility of this conviction and focuses his arguments on his prior drug convictions.

Weaver has therefore forfeited these claims. See Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393,

397 (5th Cir. 2021).

7

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worker is not a typical response to a delayed package. 7 See Kinchen, 729 F.3d

at 472. The lack of similarity of the extrinsic acts did not bar their use at trial.

Weaver cites to two cases to support his argument, but both are readily

distinguishable. First, he cites to United States v. Sumlin as an example of an

“unsuccessful attempt by the government to tie together unrelated

charges[.]”489 F.3d 683 (5th Cir. 2007). But Sumlin is inapposite because

this Court found that the evidence was only relevant to the defendant’s

character—not motive—and was therefore inadmissible. See Sumlin, 489

F.3d at 691.

Weaver also cites to Ridlehuber, which is similarly inapplicable. 11 F.3d

516. Ridlehuber involved a gun prosecution in which the Government offered

evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing to establish motive for firearm

possession, and this Court took issue with the Government’s presentation of

evidence, finding that the “evidence . . . presented by the [G]overnment was

quite weak.” Id. at 523. The Court also found that the firearm at issue—a

shotgun that had to be cocked with the use of a tool—undercut the

Government’s theory that the shotgun was used to protect the drug lab, as

such a weapon was “hardly the weapon of choice in a gunfight.” Id.

Here, however, the Government had clear evidence of Weaver’s prior

drug-related convictions, to which Weaver stipulated. And—unlike in

Ridlehuber—the extrinsic acts at issue do not undercut the Government’s

motive theory.

2.

The district court similarly did not abuse its discretion in finding that

_____________________

7

The Government’s theory was that it “is not unreasonable to think that a drug

dealer might threaten his mail carrier when a valuable shipment of drugs is missing.”

8

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Weaver’s prior drug convictions should be admitted under Beechum’s second

step. Specifically, the district court found that: the Government’s need for

the evidence was “rather high” because there was little evidence available

and because evidence of motive was important to help explain the incident; 8

the similarity (or lack thereof) of the extrinsic and charged offenses did not

weigh heavily either way; the balance between temporal remoteness and

probative value was satisfied by admitting Weaver’s more recent prior drug

convictions and excluding the rest; and limiting instructions would be

provided to mitigate prejudice.

Weaver raises two challenges at this juncture. Neither are persuasive.

First, Weaver again argues that because the “extrinsic offenses are clearly

dissimilar” to the charged offense, “the probative value . . . is extremely

low.” This argument fails for the same reason it fails above: “when the

extrinsic evidence is introduced to show motive[,]” “[t]he extrinsic act

evidence need not be similar to the charged offense[.]” Kinchen, 729 F.3d at

472 (citing Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911 n.15).

Second, Weaver argues that the extrinsic acts are too remote in time

to be admissible. Though “[p]robative value is augmented by a lack of

temporal remoteness between the offenses[,]” Juarez, 866 F.3d at 628

(cleaned up), “the amount of time that has passed since the previous

conviction is not determinative[,]” United States v. Arnold, 467 F.3d 880, 885

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8

Weaver also cites to the case United States v. Jackson, 339 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2003)

for support, asserting that the Court’s finding that extrinsic evidence of prior criminal

conduct was inadmissible because it had low probative value but carried substantial risk of

undue prejudice. Jackson is readily distinguishable from the case at hand, however, based

on the Government’s need for evidence. The Court in Jackson found that the prior

conviction “had very little probative value when considering the other evidence going to

intent[.]” 339 F.3d at 356. Here, however, the district court correctly noted that the

Government’s need for evidence was “rather high.”

9

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(5th Cir. 2006). This Court has upheld the admission of Rule 404(b)

evidence “where the time period in between was as long as 15 and 18 years.”

Id. The two drug-related convictions at issue were from 2011 (eleven years

before the charged offense) and 2019 (three years before the charged

offense). Though the temporal proximity of Weaver’s 2011 conviction is

more attenuated, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

this conviction when considering the Government’s high need for evidence. 9

C.

Related to the admissibility of Weaver’s prior drug-related

convictions under Rule 404(b), Weaver raises two additional arguments.

1.

First, Weaver argues that the Government improperly “called

 1 -  B-0"  ' -C $) 1 -4 -"0( )/ /* /#  %0-4 ) . 1 -' 2$/) ..

examinations[,]” “poison[ing] the jury.” This assertion, however, is

factually inaccurate. Other than in the stipulation concerning Weaver’s prior

convictions, the Government referenced drug dealing once during the cross

examination of a witness, and once during closing arguments.

Furthermore, without deciding whether the district court erred in

allowing such references, we conclude that any error was harmless. The

admission of such character references did not have a “substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” United States

v. Wright, 634 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). Weaver’s prior

convictions were included in a stipulation, and the Government only referred

_____________________

9

The district court excluded two additional convictions—one from 2010 and one

from 2001—because the temporal proximity of those convictions were even further

attenuated from the charged offense, and the Government’s need for those convictions “is

diminished in light of the two more recent convictions being admitted.”

10

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to Weaver as a drug dealer once during closing argument. Given the amount

of evidence presented relevant to the elements of the crime at issue, it is not

substantially likely that the Government’s drug dealing references increased

the risk of the jury convicting Weaver for an improper reason.

2.

Second, Weaver argues that the district court permitted the

Government to improperly introduce lay opinion testimony from Inspector

Tutor at trial. He asserts that Inspector Tutor’s testimony “was not the kind

of lay opinion FED. R. EVID. 701 and United States v. Haines . . . permit.”

See 803 F.3d 713 (5th Cir. 2015). Neither argument avails.

Rule 701 defines lay opinion testimony as testimony that is “rationally

based on the witness’s perception.” FED. R. EVID. 701(a). This Court has

interpreted Rule 701 to require that “[a] lay opinion must be based on

personal perception, must be one that a normal person would form from

those perceptions, and must be helpful to the jury.” United States v. Ebron,

683 F.3d 105, 137 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Furthermore, “[t]he

distinction between lay and expert witness testimony is that lay testimony

results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life, while expert

testimony results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by

specialists in the field.” Id. at 136–137 (cleaned up). Under this standard,

Inspector Tutor’s testimony was properly admitted under Rule 701; his

testimony was based on his past experiences formed from firsthand

observation as a postal inspector for the United States Postal Service.

Weaver cites Haines to argue that Inspector Tutor’s testimony was

improperly admitted, but this argument fails. 803 F.3d 713. The

circumstances of Haines—in which this Court determined that drug

/-!!$& -.C %-"*) $.  .+ $'$5  *4 *! &)*2' "  !$/ !*- 3+ -/

testimony—is wholly distinguishable from this case at hand. Id. at 727–28.

11

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There is a notable a lack of drug traffickers’ jargon in the facts here, and

).+ /*-0/*-C./ ./$(*)4$.)*/. *).+ $'$5 *4*!&)*2' " 6

but rather his personal knowledge and experience.

Lastly, Weaver argues that Inspector Tutor’s testimony was more

prejudicial than probative. But—like Weaver’s admitted drug convictions—

Inspector Tutor’s testimony was probative because it helped establish

Weaver’s motive. See supra Section IV(B). Furthermore, the testimony was

not highly prejudicial because Inspector Tutor testified to his general

experience without getting to the specifics of the case at issue.

V.

Weaver also argues that the district court improperly excluded

evidence of 911 calls following the initial incident for lack of relevance.

Though the district court admitted the initial 911 call by Shegog reporting the

incident, Weaver asserts that the entire 911 call recording was crucial

evidence showing that: (1) Jones did not call 911 himself, and (2) that the

QCSO “did not act as if someone had been assaulted.” We review for abuse

of discretion, subject to harmless error. See United States v. Yanez Sosa, 513

F.3d 194, 199–200 (5th Cir. 2008). We see none.

The remainder of the 911 call recording was not relevant under FED.

R. EVID. 401 and was properly excluded by the district court. Rule 401

defines relevant evidence as evidence having “any tendency to make a fact

more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and . . . the fact

is of consequence in determining the action.” FED. R. EVID. 401(a)–(b).

It is undisputed that Jones did not call 911 himself, and the remainder

of the 911 call recording did not prove that the QCSO did not take action.

The recording at issue consisted of various calls or radio communications

between unknown and unidentified law enforcement officials discussing

12

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whether the city or the county had jurisdiction over the incident. The district

court did not abuse its discretion here.

VI.

On appeal, Weaver argues that the district court abused its discretion

when it excluded a hearsay statement—.0((-$5$)" *) .C .// ( )/. /*

law enforcement—included in the QCSO incident report during trial.10

Weaver asserts that the statement should have been admitted under FED. R.

EVID. 801(d)(1), which states that a declarant-witness’s prior statement

under certain conditions is not hearsay.

Weaver, however, acknowledges that the statement in question is a

third party’s summary of Jones’ statement—not Jones’ own statement. That

admission ends the inquiry: a statement by someone other than the witness

cannot be considered a “prior statement” of the witness. See FED. R. EVID.

801(d)(1). The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Yanez Sosa, 513

F.3d at 199.

Weaver cites to Eleventh Circuit caselaw to assert that he should have

been permitted to present the statement to Jones to determine if Jones would

adopt it for impeachment purposes. See United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702,

710 (11th Cir. 1993). But his argument fails to persuade us. Even if Jones had

adopted the statement at trial, the statement would remain inadmissible.

Rule 801(d)(1) imposes specific conditions to prior inconsistent statements;

such statements must have been “given under penalty of perjury at a trial,

hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition[.]” FED. R. EVID.

801(d)(1)(A). Jones’ statement does not meet these conditions.

_____________________

10

The district court admitted other portions of the QCSO’s incident report.

13

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VII.

Weaver challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for

judgment of acquittal. In his request for acquittal, Weaver focused on Jones’

credibility, arguing that “Jones was so non-credible that a reasonable juror

should not have placed any weight on his testimony in returning a verdict.”

On appeal, Weaver repeats his arguments, providing examples of Jones’

testimony that he believes were contradictory and insufficient to support a

guilty verdict. We find that the district court properly denied Weaver’s

motion for judgment of acquittal.

A.

This Court reviews de novo the denial of properly-made motions for a

judgment of acquittal under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. See United States v. Valle,

538 F.3d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 2008). In reviewing such motions, the Court must

determine “whether the relevant evidence, viewed in a light most favorable

to the [G]overnment, could be accepted by a jury as adequate and sufficient

to support the conclusion of the [D]efendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.” United States v. Shoemaker, 746 F.3d 614, 619 (5th Cir. 2014)

(citation omitted). “In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we must

bear in mind that the jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions

of the evidence, even when certain evidence conflicts or suggests

innocence.” Id. (cleaned up).

B.

The district court denied Weaver’s request for acquittal, finding that

Jones’ testimony sufficiently met the elements of a charge under 18 U.S.C.

§ 111(a)(1), (b). We agree.

Jones testified at trial and stated that a man he knew as “Nate

Dogg”—subsequently identified as Henry Weaver and confirmed in court by

14

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Jones as the Defendant—threatened him at gunpoint while he was delivering

mail on April 23, 2022. Weaver’s “evidence of Jones’ lack of credibility”—

that Jones did not call 911, that there was “total lack of action or even

investigation on the part of any law enforcement,” and that Weaver did not

live on Sims Street or receive mail there—was not material to the elements

of the crime. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, the

evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Weaver’s conviction.

VIII.

Last, Weaver contends that the district court abused its discretion

when it granted an Allen charge after the jury indicated that it was deadlocked

following over three hours of deliberation. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S.

492 (1896). We review the use of an Allen charge for abuse of discretion,

United States v. Andaverde-Tinoco, 741 F.3d 509, 515 (5th Cir. 2013), and find

none.

A.

“In order to uphold an Allen charge, (1) the semantic deviation from

approved Allen charges cannot be so prejudicial as to require reversal and (2)

the circumstances surrounding the giving of an approved Allen charge must

not be coercive.” United States v. Winters, 105 F.3d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1997).

“We evaluate the Btotality of the circumstances’ surrounding the use of the

charge in assessing its coercive effect.” Andaverde-Tinoco, 741 F.3d at 517

(citing United States v. Lindell, 881 F.2d 1313, 1321 (5th Cir. 1989)). Weaver

does not contest the language of the approved Allen-charge, so we focus on

whether the circumstances surrounding the use of the charge were coercive.

B.

Weaver argues that the “lack of circumstances in the record”

indicates coercion because he is unable to assess whether the circumstances

15

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surrounding the charge were coercive. Without legal support or citation, he

asserts that the charge was given without any context, and that three hours

“is not generally accepted as lengthy deliberations in a criminal case.”

Weaver’s arguments are unconvincing. The case involved a onecount indictment with a few witnesses, and the trial was conducted in one

afternoon. After the jury deliberated for over three hours, it notified the

district court that it was deadlocked, and the court issued an Allen charge to

instruct the jury to continue its deliberations. There was nothing coercive

about the district court’s use of the Allen charge here.

Furthermore, this Court has affirmed Allen charges with similar

lengths of deliberations. For example, in United States v. Andaverde-Tinoco,

we affirmed a charge where the jury reported itself deadlocked after two

hours of deliberations and reached a verdict two-and-a-half hours after

receiving an Allen charge. 741 F.3d at 515, 518; see also, e.g., United States v.

Scruggs, 583 F.2d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 1978) (charge given after four-and-a-half

hours of deliberation, verdict returned 48 minutes after charge); United

States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 664–665 (5th Cir. 1972) (charged given after

three-and-a-half hours of deliberation, verdict returned one-and-a-half hours

after charge). Weaver cites no authority where an Allen charge was deemed

coercive under similar circumstances.

IX.

Finding no error of the district court, we AFFIRM Weaver’s

conviction.

16

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United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

_____________

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 24-60252

_____________

FILED

March 6, 2025

United States of America,

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Henry Weaver,

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:22-CR-42-1

______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Willett, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

This cause was considered on the record on appeal and the briefs on

file.

IT IS ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the

District Court is AFFIRMED.

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Case: 24-60252

Document: 67-2

Page: 2

Date Filed: 03/28/2025

No. 24-60252

The judgment or mandate of this court shall issue 7 days after the time

to file a petition for rehearing expires, or 7 days after entry of an order denying

a timely petition for panel rehearing, petition for rehearing en banc, or motion

for stay of mandate, whichever is later. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b). The court

may shorten or extend the time by order. See 5th Cir. R. 41 I.O.P.

Certified as a true copy and issued

as the mandate on Mar 28, 2025

Attest:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

2

APP. 018

Case: 24-60252

Document: 67-3

Page: 1

Date Filed: 03/28/2025

United States Court of Appeals

FIFTH CIRCUIT

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

LYLE W. CAYCE

CLERK

TEL. 504-310-7700

600 S. MAESTRI PLACE,

Suite 115

NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130

March 28, 2025

Mr. David Crews

Northern District of Mississippi, Oxford

United States District Court

911 Jackson Avenue

Room 369

Oxford, MS 38655

No. 24-60252

USA v. Weaver

USDC No. 3:22-CR-42-1

Dear Mr. Crews,

Enclosed is a copy of the judgment issued as the mandate and a

copy of the court’s opinion.

Sincerely,

LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk

By: _________________________

Christy M. Combel, Deputy Clerk

504-310-7651

cc:

Mr. Goodloe Tankersley Lewis

Mr. Robert J. Mims

APP. 019