Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Missouri, ex rel. Jeffrey Weinhaus, Petitioner v. Richard Adams, Warden

NO.

________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

___________________________________________________

JEFFREY WEINHAUS,

Petitioner,

vs.

RICHARD ADAMS, Warden, Eastern Reception Diagnostic and Correctional

Center,

Respondent.

___________________________________________________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT

_____________________________________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

___________________________________________________

Sean D. O’Brien* (#30116)

500 E. 52nd Street,

Kansas City, MO 64110

Phone: (816) 235-6152

Fax: (816) 235-5276

obriensd@umkc.edu

Nicholas T. Hergott (#62940)

105 E, 5th Street, Suite 301

Kansas City, MO 64106

Phone: (816) 221-7555

Fax: (816) 527-8083

nick@mrhlawkc.com

Counsel for Petitioner Jeffrey

Weinhaus

*Counsel of Record

________________________________________________________________________

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

A Missouri State Trooper shot Petitioner in the head, chest and neck, claiming that

he saw Petitioner reach for a holstered legally carried gun. Although the trooper had been

diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder years before the shooting, he concealed

his condition when asked relevant questions in a pretrial deposition. In fact, he was

suspended and eventually terminated after failing multiple fitness-for-duty evaluations

before Mr. Weinhaus’ trial. This remained concealed from Petitioner until, after Mr.

Weinhaus’ appeal and postconviction motions were denied, the Missouri Court of

Appeals published an opinion affirming the denial of the former trooper’s lawsuit against

the Missouri State Highway for failing to accommodate his PTSD-related disability that

prevented him from accurately perceiving threats. This petition presents the following

question:

1. Where State law entitles a prisoner to habeas corpus review of a Constitutional

claim upon a showing of cause and prejudice, does the summary denial of a

facially valid petition violate due process of law?

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The Petitioner is Jeffrey Weinhaus, #1261778, a prisoner incarcerated in the

Eastern Reception Diagnostic and Correctional Center, 2727 Highway K, Bonne Terre,

MO 63628.

The Respondent is Richard Adams, Warden, Eastern Reception Diagnostic and

Correctional Center, represented by Missouri Attorney General Andrew Bailey, Assistant

Attorney General Michael Spillane, P.O. Box 899. Jefferson City, MO 65102.

iii

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

State v. Weinhaus, No. 12AB-CR02409-01, (Franklin Cnty. Cir. Ct. 2013).

Judgment entered November 25, 2013.

State v. Weinhaus, No. ED100807, 459 S.W.3d 916 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2015).

Judgment entered January 27, 2015.

Weinhaus v. Missouri, No. 14-10256, 577 U.S. 855 (2015). Judgment entered

October 5, 2015.

Weinhaus v. Missouri, No. 15AB-CC00117, (Franklin Cty. Cir. Ct. 2015).

Judgment entered November 12, 2015.

Weinhaus v. State, No. ED103834, 501 S.W.3d 523 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2016).

Judgment entered October 18, 2016.

Weinhaus v. Steele, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136251, 2019 WL 3803477 (E.D. Mo.

2019). Judgment entered August 13, 2019).

Weinhaus v. Payne, No. ED109329, (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2020). Judgment entered

December 17, 2020.

Weinhaus v. Adams, No. SC100827, (Mo. 2024). Judgment entered December 23,

2024.

Henry James Folsom v. The Missouri State Highway Patrol, 580 S.W.3d 645 (Mo.

App. August 20, 2019).

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ...................................................................... ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ..................................................................................iii

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS .......................................................... iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................... v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. vi

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ........................................................................ 1

OPINION BELOW.............................................................................................................. 1

JURISDICTION .................................................................................................................. 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED.......................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................ 3

A. Summary of Trial Evidence................................................................................... 3

B. State Habeas proceeding ........................................................................................ 6

1.

Folsom’s Lawsuit Disclosing His Mental Impairments and Conduct Issues………...8

2.

Missouri Courts’ Summary Denial of Habeas Corpus Relief .......................... 10

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .............................................................. 11

I.

This Court Should Grant Certiorari Because Missouri’s Summary Denial

of a Facially Sufficient Petition Invoking a State-Created Right to Adjudicate

Claims Based on Concealed Exculpatory Evidence Violates the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. ............................................................................ 11

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 17

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

American Ry. Exp. Co. v. Levee, 263 U.S. 19 (1923)........................................................ 15

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). ..................................................................... 10, 12

Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294 (1949). ......................................... 14

Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900)........................................................................ 14

Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 (1955). .............................................................................. 15

Folsom v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 580 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. 2019). ............. 6, 9

Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) ..................................................................... 12, 14

Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945). ................................................................................ 15

Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956). .......................................................................... 15

McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961). ........................................................................... 15

Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881). ........................................................................... 14

Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951). ............................................................................... 15

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). ................................................................... 16

Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73 (2011). .................................................................................... 16

Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941). ........................................................................... 15

State ex rel. Clay v. Dormire, 37 S.W.3d 214 (Mo. 2000) (en banc). ............................... 11

State ex rel. Engel v. Dormire, 304 S.W.3d 120 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). ........................... 11

Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S. 385 (2016). ............................................................................... 15

Weinhaus v. State, 501 S.W.3d 523 (Mo. App. 2016). ....................................................... 8

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ............................................................................................................. 1

Missouri Supreme Court Rule 91.01 ................................................................................... 1

Missouri Supreme Court Rule 91.05 ................................................................................... 2

Constitutional Provisions

Article I, § 12 ....................................................................................................................... 1

Fourteenth Amendment ......................................................................... 1, 11, 14, 16, 17, 18

vi

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Jeffrey Weinhaus respectfully petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to

review the judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court entered in this case.

OPINION BELOW

The December 23, 2024, opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court is an unpublished

summary denial. See State ex. rel. Weinhaus v. Adams, No. SC100827, 2024 Mo. LEXIS

405: Appendix, hereafter “App __”, p. 1.

JURISDICTION

The Missouri Supreme Court entered judgment summarily denying Mr. Weinhaus’

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on December 23, 2024. App. 1. This Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case concerns the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

which provides, in relevant part:

“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge

the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United

States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law.”

This case also concerns Article I, § 12 of the Missouri Constitution which states:

“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall never be

suspended.”

This case also concerns Missouri Supreme Court Rule 91.01 which states:

Habeas Corpus--General--Who May Petition for--Form of

Action.

(a) Proceedings in habeas corpus in a circuit court shall be as

prescribed in this Rule 91 and in this Court or the court of

appeals shall be as prescribed in Rule 84.22 to 84.26,

inclusive, and this Rule 91. In all particulars not provided for

by the foregoing provisions, proceedings in habeas corpus

shall be governed by and conform to the rules of civil

procedure and the existing rules of general law upon the

subject. The court may, by order, direct the form of such

further details of procedure as may be necessary to the

orderly course of the action to give effect to the remedy.

(b) Any person restrained of liberty within this state may

petition for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause

of such restraint. Custody of a child may be the subject of a

proceeding in habeas corpus.

(c) A habeas corpus proceeding shall be a civil action in

which the person seeking relief is petitioner and the person

against whom such relief is sought is respondent. If

appropriate, there may be multiple petitioners or multiple

respondents.

This case also involves Missouri Supreme Court Rule 91.05, which provides:

Writ or Show Cause Order to be Granted Without Delay.

A court to which a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

presented shall forthwith grant the writ or issue an order

directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should

not be granted, unless it appears from the petition that the

person restrained is not entitled thereto.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Summary of Trial Evidence

On September 11, 2012, former Missouri State Highway Patrol (“MSHP”)

Sergeant Henry J. Folsom lured Jeffrey Weinhaus to the parking lot of the MFA gas

station on Highway K near St. Clair, Missouri. Folsom had promised to return Mr.

Weinhaus’ computer equipment which he previously seized pursuant to a warrant. In

truth, he intended to execute an arrest warrant for Mr. Weinhaus for possession of

marijuana and pills also found in that search.

Twelve seconds after Weinhaus stepped out of his car to speak with Folsom,

Folsom shot him multiple times in the head, neck, and chest. A. 50. Folsom claimed he

acted in self-defense after allegedly seeing Mr. Weinhaus attempt to draw a pistol secured

in a holster. A. 4-5. Mr. Weinhaus denied this, and no lay witnesses corroborated

Folsom’s account. Miraculously, Mr. Weinhaus survived, and after his release from the

hospital, he was later arrested, charged, and convicted of first degree assault of a law

enforcement officer and armed criminal action based on Folsom’s accusation that

Weinhaus had attempted to draw his weapon. Weinhaus was sentenced to thirty years in

prison. A. 4.

Unknown to Folsom, Mr. Weinhaus was wearing a video-recorder watch at the

time of the incident. The footage recovered from the watch contradicted Folsom’s initial

account that Mr. Weinhaus sped into the gravel parking lot and jumped out of his car

tactically, similar to how law enforcement officers are trained. Instead, the video

3

contradicted Folsom’s account by showing Mr. Weinhaus singing religious hymns

enroute highlighting his happy disposition because he was told he would recover his

computer equipment. A.36.

Folsom was the State’s primary witness. His partner, Corporal Mertens, attempted

to support his partner’s allegation, but he contradicted Folsom’s claim that Weinhaus’

gun had cleared his holster. Trial Transcript, hereafter “T. __,” p. 421. The clerk on duty

at the gas station, Heather Clark, was standing in the window when she saw the shooting;

she said that Weinhaus’ hands were raised and empty as he fell forward, T. 599, and that

Folsom continued firing at least six more times as Weinhaus lay on the ground. T. 599. A

photo of the scene shows a bullet pancaked into the gravel parking lot. However, the

prosecutor used Ms. Clark’s display of emotion at seeing the shooting to attack her

credibility. A. 35-36.

Mr. Weinhaus’ defense at trial that Mr. Weinhaus was a non-violent man who

never intended to harm Folsom, A. 63, was supported by both Folsom and Corporal

Mertens. They testified at trial during cross-examination that he did not put on a

bulletproof vest because he “did not believe Jeff to be a violent person,” T. 293, and

according to Corporal Mertens, he viewed Weinhaus as “harmless,” which is why he did

not wear a bulletproof vest either. T. 403. Further, Folsom admitted during crossexamination that Mr. Weinhaus was legally carrying a firearm, A. 10, that he was not

threatened by the gun in the holster, and specifically he felt that his life was not in

danger. T. 310. Moreover, Folsom testified inconsistently about events that occurred at

4

the MFA gas station. While during direct examination he testified that he could hear

Weinhaus accelerating quickly into the parking lot and thought Mr. Weinhaus would hit

Folsom’s car, after watching the video from Mr. Weinhaus’ watch, he admitted during

cross-examination that he could not in fact hear Mr. Weinhaus accelerating nor revving

his engine into the MFA gas station. A. 14.

Testimony between Folsom and Corporal Mertens was also inconsistent. While

Folsom testified that Mr. Weinhaus’ gun nearly cleared the holster, A. 38, Corporal

Mertens testified that he saw Weinhaus’ hand on the gun, but it did not come clear of the

holster. T. 421. Folsom also could not accurately depict where himself, Mr. Weinhaus, or

the other officers were standing when the shooting occurred. When Corporal Mertens

was asked during cross examination to confirm Folsom’s markings, he admitted that the

entire depiction was incorrect because the lines of fire were untrue. T.423.

In spite of defense counsel’s challenges to Folsom’s credibility, the jury found Mr.

Weinhaus guilty and the trial court sentenced him to thirty years in prison. A. 4-6.

Because it was hidden from Mr. Weinhaus’ defense counsel, and because Folsom lied to

defense counsel in his deposition, the jury never learned that Mr. Folsom was under

investigation by his supervising officer at the Missouri State Highway Patrol for

misconduct and behavior symptomatic of PTSD, A. 13, 16, 20, and that his compromised

mental health condition–diagnosed years before he shot Mr. Weinhaus–impaired his

ability to perceive threats accurately. A. 16, 64, 69. The jury never knew that Folsom

failed more than one fitness for duty examination before Mr. Weinhaus’ trial. A. 33-35.

5

Folsom himself expressed the concern in one evaluation conducted after Mr. Weinhaus’

trial that he could mistakenly shoot someone who was reaching for a wallet. A. 23, 32.

Mr. Weinhaus was convicted of assaulting Folsom, and of a related count of

armed criminal action, and sentenced to thirty years on November 25, 2013. A. 4-5. He

was also convicted and sentenced to two years and one year, concurrent, for Possession

of Controlled Substance and Possession of up to 35 grams of marijuana, respectively. Id.

He does not challenge either drug conviction.

B. State Habeas proceeding

Following Mr. Weinhaus’s conviction in 2013, Assistant Public Defender Amy

Bartholow was appointed as counsel for Mr. Weinhaus’s direct appeal to the Missouri

Court of Appeals Eastern District. A. 41. On January 27, 2015, the Missouri Court of

Appeals Eastern District affirmed the trial court’s judgment. A. 41. Ms. Bartholow did

not know until after Mr. Weinhaus’s direct appeal and postconviction proceedings

became final that the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District issued an opinion in

Folsom v. Missouri State Highway Patrol (WD82081) on August 20, 2019 denying

Folsom’s allegation of discrimination against the MSHP. A. 42. Through the opinion

issued in Folsom’s appeal, Ms. Bartholow discovered evidence from records publicly

filed in the appeal of Folsom’s lawsuit against the MSHP establishing that Folsom was

suffering from and being medicated for PTSD for years before he shot Mr. Weinhaus,

and that he had hidden his condition from his employer until after the shooting. A. 42.

Many of Folsom’s medical records and Missouri State Highway Patrol investigation into

6

his misconduct and impaired mental condition remain under seal, as the courts below

summarily dismissed Mr. Weinhaus’ habeas petition despite his requests for discovery

and fact development. A. 1-3, 44-47.

Trial counsel for Mr. Weinhaus, Mr. Hugh Eastwood, had no access to Folsom’s

medical records detailing his long-prevailing PTSD condition. Mr. Eastwood filed a

written request for discovery of “witnesses, witness statements, and any “material

information within the possession or control of the State, which tends to negate the guilt

of the defendant as to the offense charged, mitigate the degree of the defense charged, or

reduce the punishment.”” A. 46. Mr. Eastwood highlighted that the medical records could

have been used to diminish both Folsom’s and Corporal Mertens’ claim at trial that Mr.

Weinhaus reached for his gun. A. 50. Further, Folsom’s lawsuit cites medical records that

existed at the time of trial establishing that two different doctors, Dr. Paul Detrick and Dr.

Steven T. Akeson, had found Folsom unfit for duty in evaluations conducted November

28, 2012, and January, 2013, well before Mr. Weinhaus’ trial. A. 55, 58. Folsom was also

deposed by Mr. Eastwood on June 6, 2013 prior to trial, and he lied about his condition

during his deposition; when Mr. Eastwood asked Folsom about his hand tremors and if he

was on medication for that condition, Folsom told Mr. Eastwood that he “hadn’t taken

any in years,” and that he had “determined to have a partial paralysis” due to the tremors.

A. 58, 61.

7

1. Folsom’s Lawsuit Disclosing His Mental Impairments and Conduct

Issues

Early in his career, on October 28, 2000, Folsom fought with a man who was the

subject of a domestic violence call. A. 19. The suspect fought for Folsom’s gun, and in

the struggle Folsom shot and killed him. A. 19. Folsom ruptured a testicle during the

fight. A. 19. Following this incident, Folsom was diagnosed with and medicated for PostTraumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). A. 28, 52. Folsom also disclosed that his diagnosis

may even have been before the 2000 shooting; he described himself to Missouri Highway

Patrol Captain Sarah Eberhard as “a disabled veteran with PTSD.” A. 52. He never

reported his condition to the MSHP because he feared losing his job. A. 19.

When he shot Mr. Weinhaus, Folsom was already being investigated by Captain

Eberhard because of misconduct as the supervisor of the Division of Drug and Crime

Control Unit. Captain Eberhard’s inquiry related that subordinates working in the unit

under Folsom “suffered low morale due to Sergeant Folsom’s quickly changing

emotional patterns,” that Folsom “departs from the truth,” and that “the subordinates of

Sergeant Folsom [were] intimidated.” A. 11. Captain Eberhard’s memo of October 14,

2012, detailing her findings about the volatile climate in Folsom’s unit, still has not been

disclosed. A. 54.

Mr. Weinhaus’s state postconviction proceedings concluded on October 28, 2016.

Weinhaus v. State, 501 S.W.3d 523 (Mo. App. 2016). Following the final conclusion of

Mr. Weinhaus’ state postconviction proceedings, counsel for Mr. Weinhaus discovered

Folsom’s PTSD when the Missouri Court of Appeals on August 20, 2019 filed its opinion

8

affirming the dismissal of Folsom’s lawsuit claiming that the Missouri State Highway

Patrol discriminated against him by refusing to accommodate his disability. A. 12;

Folsom v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 580 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. 2019). Although

many documents in that matter were filed under seal, publicly accessible documents and

the court’s opinion itself reflected that Folsom admitted in his Charge of Discrimination

that after shooting Mr. Weinhaus, he was required to submit to a drug test, which showed

that he had Ambien and Prozac in his system. A. 28. Folsom was then ordered to show

his prescription, and he confessed that he had been hiding his PTSD. A. 28. He was

relieved of duty and given a counseling statement. A. 29. On November 14, 2014,

Folsom submitted to, and thereafter failed, a fitness for duty evaluation. A. 29. Following

the first failed fitness evaluation, Folsom was placed on extended medical leave, while

his fitness was repeatedly evaluated. A. 29. Because he failed every succeeding fitness

for duty evaluation, A. 19, Folsom was involuntarily terminated from the MSHP as unfit

for duty. A 55.

The evidence that came to light from Folsom’s lawsuit included the admission that

he had been suffering from PTSD “arising out of an on-the-job shooting and injury that

occurred in October of 2000,” A. 24; that he was taking medication for this PTSD, A. 25;

that after said drug test revealed that Folsom was taking medication for his PTSD, he

“informed Defendant Eberhard of his PTSD.” A. 28. The Attorney General’s Brief in

Folsom v. MSHP quotes a December 2013 medical report of Dr. David J. Lutz that “Mr

Folsom is not psychologically capable of returning to his job with the Missouri State

9

Highway Patrol.” A. 56. Other evaluating doctors, including Dr. Detrick in November

2012 and Dr. Akeson in January 2013, made similar findings before Mr. Weinhaus’ trial.

Dr. Lutz, and Dr. Stillings in June 2014 also found him unfit for duty. A. 30. Every

doctor found Folsom unfit to return to duty A. 29. Moreover, Dr. Stillings’ report said

that Folsom had told him “his PTSD gives him false signals of being under threat, he is

fearful of pulling a gun and shooting someone when they are merely reaching in their

back pocket for a wallet, etc.” A. 19. None of these medical records or investigative

memos were disclosed to Mr. Weinhaus prior to Mr. Weinhaus’s trial, appeal, or state

postconviction proceedings, nor was Folsom’s disclosure made available from his lawsuit

until after the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment against Folsom

in September of 2019.

2. Missouri Courts’ Summary Denial of Habeas Corpus Relief

Ms. Bartholow filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on Mr. Weinhaus’

behalf in the Circuit Court of St. Francois County alleging that “the State of Missouri

violated Brady v. Maryland[, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)] in failing to disclose that when the

State's primary witness, Sgt. Folsom, shot Mr. Weinhaus that Sgt. Folsom was suffering

from and medicated for symptomatic PTSD from prior military service and a prior 2000

on-duty shooting incident.” A. 75. That petition was summarily denied without

discovery, hearing, or explanation. A. 3. Ms. Bartholow filed a de novo Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus raising the same Due Process claim in the Missouri Court of Appeals,

10

Eastern District, which also summarily denied it without any fact-finding procedure, and

without explanation or opinion. A. 2.

Ms. Bartholow was unable to continue her representation of Mr. Weinhaus;

undersigned counsel agreed to represent him pro bono, and subsequently filed a Writ of

Habeas Corpus and Suggestions in Support in the Missouri Supreme Court on October

28, 2024, A, 9, which was also denied without hearing or opinion on December 23, 2024.

A. 1.

This petition follows.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. This Court Should Grant Certiorari Because Missouri’s Summary Denial of a

Facially Sufficient Petition Invoking a State-Created Right to Adjudicate Claims

Based on Concealed Exculpatory Evidence Violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s

Due Process Clause.

Missouri law provides that habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy for the

litigation of previously concealed claims that a prisoner’s conviction was obtained in

violation of the Constitution. Governed by Missouri Rule 91, habeas corpus review is

available where a prisoner can show that his conviction is the product of a “manifest

injustice.” A manifest injustice exists where a prisoner can show “cause and prejudice”

for not having discovered a claim previously, State ex rel. Engel v. Dormire, 304 S.W.3d

120 (Mo. 2010) (en banc), or where the prisoner’s claim is accompanied by a colorable

showing of actual innocence. State ex rel. Clay v. Dormire, 37 S.W.3d 214 (Mo. 2000)

11

(en banc). 1 Once a state voluntarily confers such a right, the Fourteenth Amendment

demands it be administered with fundamental fairness. See Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S.

399, 428 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

Here, Mr. Weinhaus discovered by happenstance previously concealed evidence

showing the State’s key witness concealed a PTSD diagnosis and was under investigation

for dishonesty—facts that cast grave doubt on the State’s narrative. Despite these

genuine factual disputes, the Missouri courts summarily dismissed Mr. Weinhaus’s claim

without a hearing or fact development. By denying the procedures that Missouri law

promises, the State deprived Mr. Weinhaus of his State-created right to litigate his claim

that the state’s concealment of evidence impeaching its primary witness violated Brady v.

Maryland. The State’s concealment of evidence that Folsom’s mental condition impaired

his ability to perceive threats, and that pending internal investigations into other

performance issues related to his disability gave him an incentive to lie to protect his job,

satisfies Missouri’s “cause-and-prejudice” threshold for habeas corpus review. Engel,

304 S.W.3d at 129. Mr. Weinhaus alleged cause by showing that the State concealed

material impeachment evidence that could not have been discovered through reasonable

diligence before or during trial. He alleged prejudice by demonstrating that the concealed

evidence—critical to the credibility of the State’s key witness—undermined confidence

in the outcome of the trial. He alleged nondisclosure by asserting that the prosecution

1

Although Mr. Weinhaus asserted both grounds for invoking habeas corpus review in State

courts, he focuses here on his substantial showing of cause and prejudice.

12

failed to reveal Sergeant Folsom’s PTSD diagnosis, his active misconduct investigations,

and the false deposition answers regarding his medication while withholding his fitness

for duty. A. 16-20.

Mr. Weinhaus also alleged materiality by explaining that the undisclosed

information directly implicated Folsom’s reliability, perception of threats, and honesty,

which were central to the State’s theory of guilt. The State has never claimed that this

impeachment evidence was disclosed to the defense at any stage of Mr. Weinhaus’s

proceedings. Mr. Weinhaus was further denied meaningful discovery into the extent and

impact of Folsom’s concealed impairments despite the materiality of the information to

Mr. Weinhaus’s conviction.

The summary denial of Mr. Weinhaus’s petition raises the question of whether a

prisoner’s right to procedural due process is violated where a State fails to abide by its

own rule requiring that “A court to which a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

presented shall forthwith grant the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show

cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the petition that the

person restrained is not entitled thereto.” This Court has recognized that State courts must

comply with certain minimum norms of constitutional adjudication. For example, where

Florida statute precluded the execution of insane prisoners, Justice O’Connor found the

failure to abide by the standard accoutrements of adversarial fact-finding deprived a

prisoner of procedural due process:

I conclude therefore that Florida law has created a protected

expectation that no execution will be carried out while the

13

prisoner lacks the "mental capacity to understand the nature

of the death penalty and why it was imposed on him." Fla.

Stat. § 922.07(3) (1985). Because Florida's procedures are

inadequate to satisfy even the minimal requirements of due

process in this context, I would vacate the judgment below

with instructions that the case be returned to Florida so that it

might assess petitioner's competency in a manner that accords

with the command of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 430 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the result part

and dissenting in part).

Whether State courts applied reasonable fact-finding procedures to a prisoner’s

Federal claims “is itself a Federal question, in the decision of which this Court, on writ of

error, is not concluded by the view taken by the highest court of the State.” Carter v.

Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900), citing Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881). Thus,

where a prisoner asserts a constitutional claim and offers to introduce witnesses to prove

that allegation, and where the state court “refused to hear any evidence upon the subject,

and overruled the motion, without investigating whether the allegation was true or false,”

then “[t]he necessary conclusion is that the defendant has been denied a right duly set up

and claimed by him under the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Id., at 448-49.

Adherence to basic norms of fair adjudication is “important to a correct and uniform

application of the federal act in the state and federal courts.” Brown v. Western Railway

of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 295 (1949).

Although Justice O’Connor in Ford found a procedural due process violation in

similar circumstances involving a state created right, Mr. Weinhaus’s petition alleged the

violation of a firmly established federal constitutional right to the prosecution’s

14

disclosure of material exculpatory evidence. At a minimum, the State must provide a

prisoner a full and fair opportunity to prove his facially adequate allegations; “where a

denial of these constitutional protections is alleged in an appropriate proceeding by

factual allegations not patently frivolous or false on a consideration of the whole record,

the proceeding should not be summarily dismissed merely because a state prosecuting

officer files an answer denying some or all of the allegations.” Pennsylvania ex rel.

Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 118-19 (1956), citing Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329

(1941); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951);

Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 (1955). A “federal right cannot be defeated by the forms

of local practice.” Id., at 297, citing American Ry. Exp. Co. v. Levee, 263 U.S. 19,

21(1923). Thus, where a prisoner asserted in the state court facts and circumstances

which, if true, established entitlement to relief, “the allegations themselves made it

incumbent on the Florida court to grant petitioner a hearing and to determine what the

true facts are.” McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 117 (1961). Accord, Palmer v. Ashe, 342

U.S. 134 (1951).

The constituent elements of a Brady violation are amply satisfied by Mr.

Weinhaus’ pleading. Evidence of Folsom’s mental impairment and pending investigation

into his misconduct were not disclosed. His testimony was the primary evidence against

Weinhaus, and corroborating evidence was sparse and contrary evidence was not

inconsequential. Since Folsom was a critical witness, and the impeachment evidence

uncontroverted, “denial of [Weinhaus]’s Brady claim runs up against settled

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constitutional principles.” Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S. 385, 393 (2016); accord, Smith v.

Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2011), finding evidence impeaching the State’s key witness to be

material where other evidence is not “strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict.”

There is no evidence in the record below that disclosure was made, nor can it be

contested that the undisclosed evidence is exculpatory. Though the State may argue

materiality, the record below demonstrates that Mr. Weinhaus was provided no

opportunity to join that issue with evidence, nor did he have an opportunity to conduct

discovery of other clearly exculpatory evidence that remains undisclosed.

This Court should grant certiorari to reinforce the obligation of States to adjudicate

constitutional questions in a meaningful way, i.e., that State postconviction litigation

procedures must “compor[t] with fundamental fairness[.]” Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481

U.S. 551, 559 (1987). It would confirm that states cannot extend post-conviction rights in

name only, then withdraw them with cursory dismissals—even where newly discovered

evidence undermines the core of the conviction. Without such guidance, prisoners with

substantial claims may never receive the fair opportunity for relief in State proceedings as

required by the Fourteenth Amendment. By granting certiorari, the Court can reaffirm

that when a state undertakes to provide habeas remedy, it must furnish procedures that

truly safeguard due process rights. That core constitutional principle is at stake here and

warrants this Court’s intervention.

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CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

___________________________

Sean D. O’Brien* (#30116)

500 E. 52nd Street,

Kansas City, MO 64110

Phone: (816) 235-6152

Fax: (816) 235-5276

obriensd@umkc.edu

________________________for_

_ Nicholas T. Hergott (#62940)

105 E, 5th Street, Suite 301 Kansas

City, MO 64106

Phone: (816) 221-7555

Fax: (816) 527-8083

nick@mrhlawkc.com

Counsel for Petitioner Jeffrey

Weinhaus

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a member in good standing of the bar of this Court and that two

true and correct copies of petitioner’s “Petition for a Writ of Certiorari” on petition for a

writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and one

copy of petitioner’s “Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis” in the case of Weinhaus v.

Adams, No.___________, were forwarded pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.5(b),

postage prepaid, this 1st day of May, 2025, to:

Andrew Bailey, Missouri Attorney General

Michael Spillane, Assistant Attorney General

P O Box 899

Jefferson City, MO 65102

Ten copies of petitioner’s “Petition for a Writ of Certiorari” and two copies of

Petitioner’s “Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis” were forwarded to:

Scott S. Harris, Clerk

United States Supreme Court

One First Street N.E.

Washington, DC 20543

pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 39.5, this 19th day of May, 2025.

____________________________________

Counsel for Petitioner

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