Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Forrest L. Geist, Petitioner v. Kansas State University Foundation, et al.

No.

EEE

eo 5585855585858 eee

In the

Supreme Court of the Anited States

FORREST L. “LENNY” GEIST,

Petitioner, Pro Se

0.

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY,

KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, ET AL,

Respondents

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court Of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Forrest L. “Lenny” Geist

Petitioner Pro Se

1371 Oakmont St. #9

McPherson, KS 67460

C: (623) 687-4163

KansasFreedomFarms@gmail.com

——

RECEIVED

JAN 10 2025

1

QUESTION PRESENTED

Intellectual Property (IP) is saleable property.

Creators earn, retain, and depend on constitutional

ownership rights like other assets such as real estate,

bonds, cash, inventory, holdings, and similar chattels.

The self-executing Takings Clause applies to IP, too.

This matter involves a state government and

its arms—a public university and commerce dept.—

illegally seizing and monetizing a private citizen’s IP

for comm’] purposes that’s USPTO + SEC registered

by way of inverse condemnation w/o compensation.

I authored business plans w/trade secrets that

have property protection (Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto)

and no expiration. My federal filings earn default

copyright safety as “original literary works fixed to

tangible media of expression” plus Safe Harbor. The

Takings Clause protects all property including IP.

Takings rulings confirm its self-activating nature.

First English, Knick, and DeVillier are examples.

This Court affirmed in First English, Knick and

DeVillier that the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause

was “self-executing” and “[s]tatutory recognition was

not necessary” for claims for compensation because

they “are grounded in the Constitution itself].]” Two

(2) federal circuits disagree causing legal conflicts.

Our nation needs consistent IP protections from gov't

overreach to foster discovery, innovation, and science.

Two (2) other district courts disagree on IP safeguards

and IP creators’ Safe Harbor. The question here is:

Q: May a natural person, whose IP is taken by state

govt w/o payment, seek fair redress under the selfexecuting Takings Clause if that state’s legislation

affirms a justiciable cause of action while disallowing

sovereign immunity as a possible litigation defense?

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This case arises out of a separate state-court action in

McPherson County (KS) District Court that was

removed to the Federal] District Court in Wichita,

Kansas. Plaintiff was: Forrest L. “Lenny” Geist, a

private citizen, Kansas resident, and IP originator.

Plaintiff is sole petitioner w/no third parties involved

while no applicable disclosures are necessary.

Plaintiff/Petitioner was Appellant in 10th Circuit.

Defendants in the district court were Kansas State

University, the Kansas State University Foundation,

the Kansas Department of Commerce, Network

Kansas, the Western Kansas Rural Economic

Development Alliance (WKREDA), the Northwest

Kansas Economic Innovation Center (NWKEIC), and

Grow Hays, Inc., et al.

The same parties were Appellees in the 10th Circuit.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PETITION FOR CERTIORARL.....000....eeeccesceeeseeeees 1

OPINIONS BELOW ...000....eceeccccecceceseeeeeecesseeenseeeneeees 1

JURISDICTION... eee eeeccessecsseeeesteesceeesnesessseessees 1

CONSTITUTIONAL / STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED 000... .ececeeseeeseceeeteeeeeeeeeeeeeesseeeeeeesacesseennees 1

STATEMENT... cece eeeeeeceeeceseccesseeeseceeseeeesseesteees 1

I. Courts disagree if the Takings Clause provides

mandatory remedy. Most do, but some don’t. 12

A. This Court has consistently identified the

Takings Clause’s innate just-compensation

requirement as “self-executing”............... 12

B. Lower courts take this Court at its word and

hold that such lower courts are required to

entertain takings claims that arise directly

under the Takings Clause ..............2::00000- 15

C. Fifth, Ninth Circuits disagree on sovereign

immunity / state legislature disallows it 19

D. DC and Tenth Circuits disagree on IP Safe

Harbor + related property safeguards....21-23

II. The question presented is vitally important as

the Takings Claim applies to property whether

tangible/intangible (Intellectual Property)...22

II. This case is a great vehicle for uniformity.....29

CONCLUSION ............:ccccccccccesceceecsesssscssresessssceeesseees 32

iv

APPENDICES

Appendix A — Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

Opinion (August 16, 2024)............... App. 1-5

Appendix B — District Court for Kansas - Wichita

Opinion (November 21, 2028)......... App. 6-17

Vv

TABLE of AUTHORITIES

Andy Warhol Foundation, Inc. v. Goldsmith, No.

19-2420 (2d Cir. 2021) .csssssssessssssasssccescessscseseanesss 25

Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 948

F.2d 575, (1991) vacated by Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v.

City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1992)

CaaS GSAS SRiSassagiinbeegeunipmem nie eNisresddacodyeseasenceensenrenae 20-21

Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973

F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1992) 2.......ececccecceseesceeceeseeseeee 20

Baker v. City of McKinney, 601 F. Supp. 3d 124 (E.D.

Tex. 2022) xcsscevscavscpususeeveucsvenanss Geaacassmastemaceunsseis 11

Boise Cascade Corp. v. Oregon Board of Forestry,

991 P.2d 563 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).............. 5,7,18

Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063

(2021)... ccc ccsceceeecsceceseceaeseececeesseseesssrness 14, 22

Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago,

166 U.S. 226 (1897)..........cccecccscecersseveveeees 15,22

DeVillier v. State of Texas, 601, (2024) 5-10,14-15,23

DLX v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2004).....18

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.

County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)

ssisidlld aaeiaeasts Cadeseneees sbviesmeIwearencsuetes 1,12-14,17,20-23

Greenway Dev. Co. v. Borough of Paramus,

750 A.2d 764 (N.d. 2000)............cscceceecceseveeeece 18

Henderson v. City of Columbus, 827 N.W. 2d

A486 (Neb. 2019)... cscssscisvecasessaceswesessssacawsvncesse 16

Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020)............ 21

vi

Hiji v. City of Garnett, 804 P.2d 950 (1991).......... 23

Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933) .....13-14

Knick v. Township of Scott, 1389 S Ct. 2162 (19) 14

Lapides v. Bd of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (02)...... 6

Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct.

1308, 1332 (2020) 2.0.0... ce cece ceecee eee cec ene eeener ences 27

Manning v. Mining/ Minerals 144 P.3d 87 (‘06)....16

Mills v. Arizona Bd. of Technical Registration...... 11

Molina v. Richardson (9th Cir. 1978).......... 21

Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (187))...... 14

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984 )......6

Scott v. Toledo, 36 F. 385 (C.C.N.D. 1888)........... 15

SDDS, Inc. v. State, 650 N.W.2d 1 (8.D. 2002)..5,16

Sinnickson v. Johnson,17 N.J.L. 129 (1889).......... 15

Speed v. Mills, 919 F. Supp. 2d 122 (2018)............ 18

Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763 (1992)....8

Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes M., LLP..... 1,25,26

United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980)....... 13

United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)............ 22

United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976) 27

Ventures in Property I v. City of Wichita,

225 Kan. 698, Syl. 3, 594 P.2d 671 (79)........... 17

Valancourt Books, LLC v. Merrick Garland

No. 21-5208 (D.C. Cir.)........ccccecceceeeseeceeeoess 2,23

Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992)..........3,20,21

Zito v. N.C. Coastal Resources Commission

8 F.4th 281 (4th Cur. 2021)....... 0.0... cee eee eee eeees 19

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. art. 1, §.9, cl. 2.0... eeeeeeeesseceeseeeee 5

U.S. Const. amend. V............. 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 11-15, 17

U.S. Const. amend. X1...............:cccceeecsereseeeeenees 13, 18

U.S. Const. amend. XIV.............00000... 5, 9, 11, 13, 16

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 12541) 200... ccc ccccccccccceeceeecececceeeeceeeeeeeeeeees 1

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) ........ “peda SU iiss oaUTURS STITT ARETE TTI 4

42 U.S.C. § 1988 ...2....... ccc eeeeeee 2-3, 5-6, 11, 138-14, 16

OTHER AUTHORITIES

2 Story Const...........cccccececscccesceeececcassesccscseeeuaeas 18

Berne Convention ..........c0csceccecceccecesccecceevsvecevecs 4

Defend Trade Secrets Act ...........csscccceecseeecececeucees 2

Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).....2

Uniform Trade Secrets Act .......ccccceceeseecsesceeceeees 2

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to review a US

Court of Appeals judgment in the Tenth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Tenth Circuit opinion is reported on the

PACER website as Geist v. Kansas State University

Foundation, et al., No. 23-3266 (10th Cir. 2024). The

federal district court opinion is on PACER as: 6:23-

CV-01129-JWB-GEB. Both unpublished opinions are

reproduced at Appendices (“App”) as pages App. 1-16.

JURISDICTION

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision

was entered on August 16, 2024. This petition was

filed November 7, 2024 by USPS mail. The petition was

refiled January 2, 2025 to meet native publication (print)

guidelines also by USPS mail. Petitioner invokes this

Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL/STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution

provides, in relevant part, “nor shall private property

be taken for public use without just compensation.”

STATEMENT

This case arises from an inverse condemnation

compliant filed in a Kansas court alleging the Kansas

Dept. of Commerce, Kansas State University, and its

endowment (KSU Foundation) misappropriated my

Intellectual Property to build, own and operate mixeduse, commercial property developments across all 105

Kansas counties using advanced, confidential, and

proprietary angles I designed. I fixed my IP assets to

tangible media of expression w/USPTO registration, a

Securities & Exchange Commission filing (Reg. D),

2

and private correspondences (emails) w/Respondents.

My works are “securities” and are protected by the

Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) as well as the

Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Respondents

agreed to secrecy and sent a Confidentiality Agreement

dated Aug. 23, ‘18. They breached it and started forprofit investment groups (joint ventures) using my IP.

In said written secret agreement, Respondents

conceded my concepts, plans, and sharp vision to

blend multiple innovations, new technologies, and

one-of-a-kind methodologies were “too complex, too

complicated, and far too difficult to explain to other

people.” This confirms the true proprietary, unique

nature of my business plan as well as inventiveness I

had planned for enriching all Kansans. My plans to

install and upgrade resources across several critical

industries and vital local functions were agreed to be

uncommon. My planned improvements are eligible for

several sizeable federal incentives including multiple

tax credits that can be “stacked” as capital used for

investments and deployment of technology among

other applications. This was all “foreign” to them.

I began forming my many trade secrets as early

as Feb. 2, 2017. I received a USPTO trademark with

trade dress content plus an exec summary via online

registration. As a pro se registrant, I spoke with two

USPTO staff attorneys for approvals and to establish

legal rights. USPTO filings don’t allow for “Fair Use”.

My IP has copyright shields as “original literary work

fixed to tangible media of expression” at registration.

My secrets don’t require Copyright Office filings, also,

to pursue infringement litigation after thievery. This

was confirmed in Valancourt Books, LLC v. Garland.

The DOJ did not appeal. Why would IP owners need

to file with the Copyright Office after a confiscation?

3

Defendants do not deny accessing and using

the IP in question for comm’! purposes. Defendants

claim they have “discretionary authority” to seize

private property w/o compensation as part of their

duties. They brazenly contacted and communicated

w/my prof. network of people, potential customers and

likely resources (also trade secrets) for investments.

Defendants do not deny this. They are trying to elude

legal obligations and remuneration to the good actor.

Defendants think they’re above the law. They and coconspirators sacrifice civil and constitutional rights at

the altar of greed. My abundant, detailed exhibits in

my petition + appeal certify guilt and demand a trial.

The Kansas Legislature abolished sovereign

immunity in 1979 as a litigation defense. The State

government, arms, officials, and employees had no

plausible defense in the McPherson County District

Court. Defendants removed the case to a preferred

forum and then claimed a federal court must dismiss

it because of the Eleventh Amendment. They argued,

in part, that a property owner could not bring an

inverse-condemnation claims directly under the Fifth

Amendment. They argued the Eleventh Amendment

was superior to the Fourteenth Amendment in hopes

of escaping culpability. I correctly argued Kansas’s

entry into statehood by the Wyandotte Constitution

validates the Fourteenth Amendment as superior to

the Eleventh Amendment as applied to matters of

civil rights, commerce, private property protections

(ownership). The Seventh Amendment guarantees a

jury trial for such contested matters. It applies here.

The 14th Amendment “prohibits states from

depriving any person of life, liberty, or property w/o

due process of law.” There are no gov't functions that

allow property seizures via “discretionary authority.”

4

The Takings Clause validates property owners

are provided just compensation for a government’s

property seizures...spanning all types of property

whether tangible or intangible (IP). This is the central

issue in this matter—gov’t seizure w/o compensation.

I wrote a comprehensive 157-page, customized

business plan (PowerPoint slide deck) I presented and

discussed in confidence and in person w/Respondents

on two occasions in ‘18 prompting their confidentiality

agreement while expressing disinterest toward any

investments/partnerships. In their secrecy letter, the

Respondents verified my incredibly unique IP was

“well beyond their scopes” to the point they did not

want to even be associated with my entrepreneurism

thinking it was far-fetched, futuristic, and unproven.

Thereafter, Defendants colluded and conspired with

my private contacts (including each other) as well as

others to “take over” my initiatives and cut me out of

the financial gains and notoriety my inventive assets

will surely realize. This caused tortious interference.

My filings and evidence accurately exposed such facts.

What would happen if a bad foreign actor who’s

working for (or with) a public university or state gov't

decided to hijack Intellectual Property for the benefit

of his/her native country? This High Court must give

direction uniformly to lower courts to recognize and

protect private property rights of all types to ensure

America’s economic security and autonomy. We can’t

allow a state gov't &/or its representatives to go rogue

and use any private property it wants w/o a checks

and balances system like Takings. Americans need

the Court to fortify takings laws and protect people’s

interests domestically and globally. This will support

our nation within the Berne Convention’s int’] tenets.

5

In a similar case involving property rights and a

state gov't claiming sovereign immunity to avoid

financial obligations from an inverse condemnation,

DeVillier v. Texas, this Court ruled 9-0 for plaintiffs.

Justice Thomas opined in DeVillier: “Because of the

self-executing nature of the Fifth Amendment,

several appellate courts have concluded that a

property owner may sue a state directly for takings in

violation of the federal constitution, without having to

proceed under § 1983. See Manning, 144 P.3d_at

93 (“Mannings' claim does not rely on congressional

action. Rather, the just compensation claim stems

directly from the text of the Constitution through the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”); SDDS, Inc. v.

State, 650 N.W.2d 1, 9 (S.D. 2002) (“[T]he remedy [of

just compensation found in the Fifth Amendment's

Takings Clause] does not depend on statutory

facilitation. Because it is a constitutional provision, it

is a right of the strongest character.”); Boise Cascade

Corp. v. Bd. of Forestry, 991 P.2d 563, 567 (Or. Ct.

App. 1999) (“In short, section 1983 does not provide

for the remedy required by the constitution for a

taking of property by the state.”). This analysis is

sound. Elementary logic supports it, too. “Holding

otherwise would expose citizens to takings without

adequate compensation, contrary to the protections

our Constitution provides.” Manning, 144 P.3d92 As

Petitioner, I concur that Takings applies in this case.

Echoing Justice Thomas’s sage, rational, and

very reasonable assessment, the Geist v. Kansas State

University matter provides this Court the chance to

consolidate divergent rulings and craft a consensus

stance predicated on the US Constitution that entails

civil and property rights. These certain inalienable

rights include Intellectual Property creators receiving

judicial and legislative support for marketable works.

6

Justice Thomas went on to write: “Admittedly,

federal courts rarely hear federal takings claims

against a state because a property owner cannot sue

a state in federal court under the Eleventh

Amendment. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S.

613, 616 (2002) (“The Eleventh Amendment grants a

State immunity from suit in federal court by citizens

of other States, and by its own citizens as well.”

(citation omitted)). Virtually, the only time a takings

claim against a state ends up in federal court is when

a state waives {11th} immunity by removing a lawsuit

to federal court. See Id. (holding that “the State's act

of removing a lawsuit from state court to federal court

waives [Eleventh Amendment] immunity.”). That is

what occurred in Geist v. Kansas State University.

“Technically, a property owner could sue a

state directly in federal court and the state could elect

to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by

failing to raise sovereign immunity as a defense.”

“To be clear, an individual is always free to file

suit against a governmental entity, other than a state

or state actor, under § 1983 for the “deprivation” of a

right “secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

This includes the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.

Property owners find it advantageous to sue under §

1983 because a prevailing § 1983 plaintiff may, at the

district court's discretion, obtain attorney's fees. See

Id. § 1988(b). Simply because a § 1983 action cannot

be brought against a state government or a state

actor, however, does not mean that a property owner

is left without a remedy when it comes to a Fifth

Amendment takings claim. In such a situation, a

property owner can sue the State directly under the

Takings Clause. A takings plaintiff is not required to

invoke § 1983.” This assuredly holds true for Geist v.

Kansas State U., et al as it did in DeVillier v. Texas.

7

Justice Thomas cont'd in DeVillier v. Texas:

“the United States Supreme Court has held that the

“constitutional privilege of a State to assert its

sovercign immunity in its own courts does not confer

upon the State an associated right to disregard the

Constitution or valid federal law Alden v. Maine, 527

U.S. 706, 754-55 (1999). Drawing support from Alden,

several state appellate courts have concluded that,

even without an express waiver of sovereign

immunity, the text of the Fifth Amendment mandates

a remedy of just compensation. These courts have

held that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment's

Takings Clause would be subverted if private takings

claims against a state were blocked by sovereign

immunity. See Manning, 144 P.2d at 95 (The Fifth

Amendment's “Takings Clause creates a cause of

action against a state which is actionable in state

court and to which the state may not assert

immunity.”); SDDS, 650 _N.W.2d at 8-9 (‘The Fifth

Amendment and the takings clause in particular are

integral parts of the Constitution, and they are made

applicable to the states through the Fourteenth. It

follows that South Dakota's sovereign immunity is

not a bar to SDDS's Fifth Amendment takings claim

(“{Ajt least some constitutional claims [including

those under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause]

are actionable against a state, even without a waiver

or congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity,

due to the nature of the constitutional provision

involved.”). I agree with and adopt the reasoning

provided by these courts. See also Eric Berger, The

Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign

Immunity Doctrines, 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 493, 498

(2006) (arguing the Takings Clause “trump{s] state

sovereign immunity by automatically abrogating—or

stripping—immunity). Justice Thomas’s opinion and

that of a unanimous Court applies to Geist, as well.

8

In Geist v. Kansas State University, I plead to

the Court on behalf of countless Americans to confirm

Intellectual Prop. is exactly that—property—and it

earns a legal bundle ofrights just as tangible property

does. This bundle prohibits inverse condemnation by

state gov't, etc., and is subject to the Takings Clause.

Of note, this Court ruled (9-0) on a similar IP

matter in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505

U.S. 763 (1992) deciding that trade dress as well as

proprietary language explaining general concepts and

imagery of comm’! endeavors are protectable assets.

SCOTUS held: “Trade that is inherently distinctive is

protectable under § 43(a) without a showing that it

has acquired secondary meaning, since such trade

dress itself is capable of identifying products or

services from a specific source.” The State of Kansas

is using my trade dress and original sources for

comm’! uses. The KSUF is a private entity and has no

sovereign immunity—even if state legislation gave its

gov't immunity. The private sector has no immunity.

The Tenth Circuit incorrectly provided it in Geist.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The US Constitution explicitly mentions only

two remedies. One is habeas corpus. See Art. I, § 9, cl.

2. The other is the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of

Just compensation when private property is taken for

public use. Most courts—including this Court—have

ruled the guarantee of remedy is exactly that—

assurance of an innate rectifier within our doctrines.

These courts hold that the Fifth Amendment is selfexecuting. All property owners (w/o distinction or

categorical delineation of property types) may then

sue states for just compensation w/o first obtaining

legislative permission. Kansas offers this path, and I

took it. This Court should support this legal fabric.

9

There are 13 federal circuit courts of appeal in

the United States. Twelve are regional while one is

for jurisdiction over specific types of cases, such as

patent law and claims against the U.S. government.

Eleven of the Thirteen (11/13 = 85%) rule that the

Takings Clause is self-directing. Only two courts, the

Ninth Circuit and Fifth Circuit (DeVillier v. Texas)

disagree. They hold the just-compensation right is

protected only as a matter of legislative discretion and

federal takings claims can be brought only pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. 1983—which, as to Defendants such as

here, means they cannot be brought at all. No less

than eleven (11) circuits rule this is unconstitutional.

This Court can direct all to be consistent as we need.

People who create Intellectual Property must

be consistently afforded inherent litigative ability to

pursue recourse against state govts and their

agencies when the latter choose to become bad actors

and misappropriate trade secrets, patents, and other

intangible assets under the dark cloak of sovereign

immunity. Otherwise, any and all states and their

representatives could and would thieve others’

valuable creations that benefit everyone. Allowing IP

theft would reduce if not eliminate discoveries and

inventiveness to our nation’s sizable detriment.

Like DeVillier, Geist v Kansas State University

addresses a disjointed split of authority—essentially

one between courts that follow this Court’s takings

jurisprudence and other courts that ignore it. Geist

warrants this Court’s intervention. Among other

things, the division of authority matters because it

invites unethical gamesmanship illustrated by this

case. Had this case been litigated in a Kansas state

court (where it was filed and belongs), a Kansas court

would likely have recognized a federal takings claim

without requiring any party(s) to invoke Section 1983.

10

By removing the claim to a given federal court,

K-State, et al attempted to change the substantive law

governing the matter hoping to subvert my fair and

just claim. Therefore, we have a consequential split

w/outcome-determinative effects on individual rights,

which makes the question crucial to all who ideate to

invent and produce commerce that benefit our nation.

This case is a notably straightforward vehicle

for resolving an urgent question. The Geist decision is

a bilateral appeal of the question presented, which

was sought by Kansas itself in a case that the State

removed to a federal court. The Tenth Circuit left this

vital question unresolved—given dismissal confutes

and usurps our Constitution as well as civil rights. It

opens flood gates to more thievery and/or litigation.

As a critical question of law, this Court can—

and surely should—purify the essential question.

America needs this Court to make perfectly clear (or

should we say “patently” clear) that property rights’

inalienable nature must be protected for the greater

good of all. This includes trade secrets as property.

In DeVillier, an undivided Court authored this:

"There is no doubt in my mind that Plaintiffs have

plausibly stated that the State's use of their property

was more than incidental, meaning that the State has

no immunity from lability. Not only have Plaintiffs

alleged that the State knew or was substantially

certain that the concrete barrier would cause flooding

on the northside of IH-10, but they have also pointed

to specific ways in which discovery might help them

to prove those allegations at trial. See Id. at 21-23.

Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to

Plaintiffs, as I must at this early stage, Plaintiffs have

made a valid claim for inverse condemnation under

Texas law that is plausible on its face. (cont'd) =»

11

Because I find that Plaintiffs have made a valid

claim for inverse condemnation, Texas law does not

provide the State with immunity from liability

separate from its immunity to suit. See El Dorado

Land Co., L.P. v. City of McKinney, 395 S.W.3d_ 798,

801 (Tex. 2013) (“A statutory waiver of immunity is

unnecessary for a takings claim because the Texas

Constitution waives govt immunity for the taking,

damaging or destruction of property for public use.”

This is true for Geist v Kansas State University.

My suit enables this Court to align four (4) federal

district courts and our nation’s understanding of IP

laws consistent with, if not wholly within, tangible

assets laws. Disjointed courts create countless future

IP lawsuits. Some suits will come from foreign actors

with bad intentions. We artists, authors, designers,

and inventors in the worlds of art, discovery, science

and technology need our original IP works protected—

this includes safeguards from our own state agencies.

In the matter of Mills v. Arizona Board of Technical

Registration, et al, the Supreme Court of the State of

Arizona ruled that an engineer, the plaintiff, had

justiciable causes and a lower court erred dismissing

them. The same is true for Geist v. Kansas State U.

Further, this Court can direct lower courts that

private entities co-named as defendants in a civil

matter with state governments and/or their arms

unequivocally do not have immunity of any type...

sovereign or otherwise. If not, state gov'ts and actors

become worse actors in respect to misappropriating

private property for economic gains that fall to those

who enlist illegal pursuits. Sovereignty rests with the

people per the Constitution we hold dear and died for.

We must protect IP owners’ civil and property rights.

This matter can amalgamate several divided courts.

12

A. Courts disagree if the Takings Clause

provides a mandatory remedy.

This Court has consistently, for decades, held

the Fifth Amendment’s just-compensation remedy is

self-starting—that is, that the remedy stems directly

from the Constitution and cannot be limited by the

exercise of legislative discretion. Many lower courts

have followed this Court’s directives and held that

they must entertain claims arising directly under the

Takings Clause. But two federal courts of appeals—

the Ninth and the Fifth Circuits—hold otherwise. The

petition should be granted to resolve this split of

authority. We need clear legal uniformity. This is

especially true for Intellectual Property complaints.

The “discovery and exploration” community cannot

move forward capably or with pervasive distrust of

state governments and their actors if any such public

agency or official is allowed—worse yet—empowered

to misappropriate private citizens’ personal assets.

B. SCOTUS rulings confirm Takings

just-compensation is “self- executing.”

The simplest basis on which to conclude that

a property owner may bring inverse-condemnation

claims arising directly under the Takings Clause is

that this Court has long recognized that “a landowner

is entitled to bring an action in inverse condemnation

as an apparent result of ‘the self-executing character

of the constitutional provision with respect to

compensation[.]” First English Evangelical Lutheran

Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315

(1987). First English is particularly instructive here.

In that case, a property owner filed suit alleging that

a Los Angeles ordinance worked a taking, and the

California courts held that no damages remedy was

available for regulatory takings. Jd. at 308-09.

13

SCOTUS reversed, holding a damages remedy

for takings of private property is mandatory. The

same is true for private property seizures of all types.

If a state government or public university illegally

acquires private, intellectual assets registered with the

USPTO, SEC, or any applicable authority, there must

be a remedy for damages, as there is here. Both the

SCOTUS and Kansas Constitution confirm such.

The Court's analysis in First English began

with text of the Takings Clause, which (unlike other

provisions in the Bill of Rights) is not prohibitory—‘it

is designed not to limit the governmental interference

with property rights per se, but rather to secure

compensation in the event of otherwise proper

interference amounting to a taking.” Id. at 314-15.

The consequence of this constitutional design is that

“a property owner is entitled to bring an action in

inverse condemnation as a result of ‘the self-executing

character of the constitutional provision with respect

to compensation... .” Id. 315 (quoting United States

v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)). Put simply, these

claims for just compensation “are grounded in the

Constitution itself].]” Jbid. And these claims could

proceed of their own force: “Statutory recognition was

not necessary” for a claim to proceed because suits for

just compensation “were [ ] founded upon the

Constitution of the United States.” Ibid. (quoting

Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933).

The United States had urged this Court to take

a contrary view—to instead hold that “the

Constitution does not, of its own force, furnish a basis

to award money damages against the government.”

Id. at 316 n.9 (quoting Brief for United States as

Amicus Curiae 14). But the Court directly rejected

that argument, pronouncing it “refute[d]” by a line of

cases stretching back to 1893. Ibid.; see also id. at 316

14

(collecting cases). Contrary to the arguments of the

United States, the only lesson that could be drawn

from this Court’s precedents was that “it is the

Constitution that dictates the remedy for interference

with property rights amounting to a taking.” Id. at

316 n.9. This position holds true for this matter, Geist

v. Kansas State University, given the Defendants/

Respondents are beholden to this same legal and

logical reasoning and cases of more than 130 years.

This Court’s wise decisions in First English,

Knick, and DeVillier are fair and just. Over a century

of unbroken precedent demonstrates this Court has

“never tolerated” a rule under which “the government

appropriates private property w/o just compensation

so long as it avoids formal condemnation.” Cedar

Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2068, 2076 (2021);

accord Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2172

(2019) (“In the event of a taking, the compensation

remedy is required by the Constitution.”).This applies

to private assets (IP) in Geist v. K-State, et al, too.

As the Court firmly emphasized in Knick, these

modern cases rest on a solid foundation. In Knick, the

Court pointed to Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13

(1933), which “made clear that, no matter what sort

of procedures the government puts in place to remedy

a taking, a property owner has a Fifth Amendment

right to compensation as soon as the government

takes his property without paying for it.” 139 S. Ct. at

2170 (citing Jacobs, 290 U.S. at 16). And “the same

reasoning applies to takings by the States.” Ibid. That

reasoning—that government takings give rise to a

right to fair/just compensation—has been repeatedly

acknowledged throughout this Court’s history. Even

in pre-incorporation cases like Pumpelly v. Green Bay

Company, this Court favorably cited the idea that it

15

was a “settled principle of universal law that the right

to compensation is an incident to the exercise of [the]

power” to take private property. 80 U.S. 166, 178

(1871) (quoting Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129,

145 (1839)). And in Chicago, Burlington and Quincy

Railroad v. Chicago, this Court approvingly quoted

Justice Jackson’s opinion (riding circuit) in Scott v.

Toledo, which held that the Fourteenth Amendment

necessarily forbade states from “appropriate[ing]

private property for the public benefit or to public

uses without compensation to the owner[.]” 166 U.S. 226,

239 (1897) (quoting Scott v. Toledo, 36 F. 385, 395-96

(C.C.N.D. 1888)). In short, whether the government is

building a street (as in Scott) or causing a flood (as in

DeVillier v. Texas), property owners have long been

unquestionably entitled to compensation for the

taking of their property by gov't agencies and actors.

C. Lower courts yield to SCOTUS and feel

they must hear takings claims directly.

Unsurprisingly, this Court's repeated

admonitions that the just-compensation requirement

is “self-executing” has led many lower courts to treat

the requirement as self-executing. The highest courts

within New Mexico, Nebraska, and South Dakota all

squarely hold that the language of the Takings Clause

means that the federal just-compensation remedy is

mandatory. They hold inverse-condemnation claims,

therefore, can be brought to state courts without

statutory authorization. A host of other state courts of

last resort, along with a plethora lower courts, have

adopted this same principle in various contexts. I ask

this Court to consider the implications as well as the

ramifications of mixed applications of law and the

uneven public messaging IP theft w/o fair payment

causes to society and int'l] actors whether good or bad.

16

Let’s look at New Mexico first. See Manning v.

Mining & Minerals Div. of the Energy, Mins. and Nat.

Res. Dept., 144 P.3d 87 (2006). In Manning, the

plaintiffs sued directly under the federal Constitution

because they lacked a cause of action—the defendant

agency did not have the power of condemnation and

so, it said, could not be sued in inverse condemnation.

Manning, 144 P.3d at 91-92. The New Mexico

Supreme Court disagreed, holding that this Court’s

precedents required it to recognize a takings claim

brought directly under the “self-executing” Takings

Clause. Id. at 95-98. To be sure, the court said, most

of the rights secured under the Fourteenth

Amendment require Congress to create a remedy to

vindicate them. Id. at 97. But the just-compensation

requirement of the Fifth Amendment is a remedy

specifically required by the Constitution, which

means that “[t]he Takings Clause creates an

individual right to the remedy of just compensation.”

The same is true in Nebraska, which holds that

“[a] landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse

condemnation as a result of the _ self-executing

character of the takings clauses of the U.S. and

Nebraska Constitutions.” Henderson v. City of

Columbus, 827 N.W.2d 486, 493 (Neb. 2013). Indeed,

Nebraska distinguishes inverse-condemnation claims

(Takings) from civil rights claims in the same lawsuit.

South Dakota’s highest court has held the justcompensation remedy is “self-executing and does not

depend on statutory facilitation.” SDDS, Inc. v. State,

650 N.W.2d (S.D. 2002). All South Dakota property

owners have an absolute right to federal takings

claims in state courts—even without authorization(s).

This is true in Kansas where jury trials are a right.

17

Other high courts, at least through countless

observations, say the same. In Kansas, specifically,

where this property case was filed, the state’s high

court consistently acknowledges the federal and state

takings clauses operate to “waive[ ] the government’s

immunity from lawsuits” and clearly “require the

government to compensate property owners when it

takes their property for public use,” a waiver of the

immunity “that otherwise often insulates the public

treasury from claims for damages.” In Kansas, the

highest court said, in Ventures in Property I v. City of

Wichita, 225 Kan. 698, Syl. J 3, 594 P.2d 671 (1979),

inverse condemnation was defined as follows:

"Inverse condemnation is an action or eminent domain

proceeding initiated by the property owner rather than

the condemner. It is available when private property

has been actually taken for public use without formal

condemnation proceedings and where it appears there

is no intention or willingness of the taker to bring the

action." Defendants inversely condemned my property.

Connecticut follows similar rules. A plaintiffs claim

that is otherwise barred by sovereign immunity

nonetheless fully retains the right to “seek just

compensation for the state’s taking of its property.”

There is no language in Kansas law that

opposes these positions and legal standards. There

are no Kansas laws defining Intellectual Property as

an asset category with reduced rights to ownership or

legal protections against thievery. IP is a bankable,

intangible, broad asset class that holds the same legal

security as other assets. In commerce, private equity

holdings are financial securities. Registration-exempt

(SEC) offers are legal securities cited in my complaint.

Respondents are raising money using my SEC filings.

18

New Jersey’s high court held a state tort-claims

act cannot bar inverse-condemnation claims under

the Fifth Amendment due to a federal “constitutional

prohibition against unconstitutional takings is selfexecuting.” Greenway Dev. Co. v. Paramus, 750 A.2d

764, 770 (N.J. 2000). (“Accordingly, the Court holds

that, because the Fifth Amendment is self-executing,

[plaintiffs] claim under the Fifth Amendment

Takings Clause is not dependent upon the § 1983

vessel.”); Speed v. Mills, 919 F. Supp. 2d 122, 128

(D.D.C. 2013) ([Tlhe Supreme Court held takings

claims can be stated directly under the Fifth

Amendment, without recourse to a statutory remedy,

because of ‘the self-executing character of the

constitutional provision for just compensation ... .”’);

Boise Cascade Corp. v. State ex rel. Or. State Bd. of

Forestry, 991 P.2d 5638, 568 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).

These higher courts are not alone in their

understanding of this Court’s precedents. At least two

federal circuits, in the context of explaining the

interplay between the Takings Clause and the

Eleventh Amendment, have explicitly stated that the

Takings Clause allows for inverse-condemnation

claims outside the context of Section 1983. In DLX,

Inc. v. Kentucky, the Sixth Circuit held that the

Eleventh Amendment protected Kentucky from being

sued in federal court against its will but “that the

Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is a self-executing

remedy, notwithstanding sovereign immunity.” 381

F.3d 511, 527 (6th Cir. 2004). As such, the Eleventh

Amendment might function as a barrier to filing suit

in federal court, but property owners nonetheless had

a right to bring a claim against the State arising

directly under the Fifth Amendment, and Kentucky

courts “would have [| ] to hear that federal claim.” Ibid.

19

The Fourth Circuit, too, holds that the

Eleventh Amendment bars Takings Clause suits

directly against states in federal court “when the

State’s courts remain open to adjudicate such claims.”

Zito v. N.C. Coastal Res. Comm’n, 8 F.4th 281, 286

(4th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). The

Fourth, though, unlike the Sixth, has not squarely

addressed whether the inverse-condemnation remedy

is mandatory—that is, “whether a State can close its

doors to a takings claim [or] whether the Eleventh

Amendment would ban a takings claim in federal

court if the State courts were to refuse to hear such a

claim.” Yet, it nonetheless recognizes those claims—

wherever brought first—exist and ensure Due Process.

In sum, a Takings Clause claim brought under

the Fifth Amendment rather than Section 1983 would

certainly be viable in state courts across the country.

It would almost certainly be viable if it were removed

to the Fourth or Sixth Circuits. But, as discussed

below, two federal jurisdictions disagree and hold that

the claim brought here fails because Section 1983 is

the sole vehicle by which a property owner may

vindicate his or her rights under the Takings Clause.

D. Fifth and the Ninth Circuits disagree.

Two courts of appeals split from the consensus

described above and hold that property owners may

not vindicate their right to just compensation unless

Congress has expressly authorized them to sue under

Section 1983. Neither court squares with this Court’s

rulings in First English or DeVillier any of the Court’s

other Takings Clause jurisprudence. Fortifying this

solid point, Kansas abolished sovereign immunity in

1979. Through legislation, Kansans spoke loudly in

regard to the preservation of civil and property rights.

20

The first decision on this side of the split came

from the Ninth Circuit. See Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City

of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992)

(“Azul-Pacifico If’). But Azul-Pacifico II was itself a

departure from the Ninth Circuit’s original rule, as

articulated in its first opinion in the very same case.

When the Ninth Circuit first considered the

Azul-Pacifico matter, it held (1) that the challenged

rent-control ordinance worked a physical taking and

(2) that the Takings Clause’s just-compensation

remedy was self-executing. Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City

of Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575 (1991) (‘Azul-Pacifico I’),

vacated by Azul-Pacifico I, 973 F.2d 704. Relying on this

Court’s Takings Clause cases, the Azul-Pacifico I panel

held that “[t]he Constitution itself provides both the cause

of action and the remedy” for an uncompensated taking of

private property, and “[tjhis is equally true of an action

against a state subdivision.” Azul-Pacifico I, 948 F.2d at

586. “If there was any doubt on this score it was removed

by the Supreme Court in First English.” Ibid.

The panel’s first holding, about the rent-control

ordinance, was not long for this world. Shortly

thereafter, this Court decided Yee v. Escondido, in

which it analyzed a similar rent-control ordinance as

a regulatory, rather than physical, taking. 503 US.

519, 532 (1992). The Ninth Circuit panel promptly

granted rehearing and changed course in light of Yee.

Azul-Pacifico IT, 973 F.2d at 705. But it did not simply

follow Yee and analyze the ordinance through the

rubric of regulatory takings. Instead, it now held

(without citing this Court’s Takings Clause cases)

that “a litigant complaining of a violation of a

constitutional right must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983[,]”

even for a Takings Clause claim. Ibid. As Petitioner,

I hold with or w/o § 1983, the 7* Amendment applies.

21

In the foresaid matter, this odd change went

unexplained. Nothing in Yee abrogates First English

or suggests that the Fifth Amendment is not selfexecuting. And nothing in the authorities cited by

Azul-Pacifico IT addresses First English either. To the

contrary, at least one of Azul- Pacifico ITs citations

points in just the opposite direction, noting that “the

propriety of allowing actions directly against

municipalities directly under the Constitution may

depend on the specific right being protected” and that

the Ninth Circuit had already “recognized the

possibility of an action against a local government

for the uncompensated taking of property[.]” Molina

v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846, 853 n.14 (9th Cir. 1978).

None of these flaws prevented the Fifth Circuit

from expressly adopting Azul-Pacifico IPs rule in its

published opinion below. App. 2a. However, it did so

without any real explanation. The opinion provides a

single sentence of analysis: “[W]e hold that the Fifth

Amendment’s Takings Clause as applied to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide

a right of action for takings claims against a state.”

Ibid. It cites none of the cases holding to the contrary.

It does not cite or try to harmonize its decision with

this Court’s Takings Clause cases. It does not explain

why it adopts a position that First English declared

“refuted.” 482 U.S. at 316 n.9. Instead, it cites only

two cases: Azul-Pacifico IT and Hernandez v. Mesa,

140 S. Ct. 735 (2020), in which this Court declined to

extend a Bivens remedy to the context of a crossborder shooting. Premise(s) of cases that find the justcompensation remedy to be self-executing is that the

Takings Clause (by specifying a remedy) is materially

different from other constitutional rights. Nothing in

the Fifth Circuit’s opinion or cited cases explains why.

[OCR skipped on page(s) 31-42]

[Read from a scan; the first 30 pages.]