Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Richard Roland Laird, Petitioner v. Laurel Harry, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al.

OCTOBER TERM, 2024

No. _____

_______________________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_______________________________

RICHARD ROLAND LAIRD,

Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;

SUPERINTENDENT, S.C.I. SOMERSET,

Respondents.

______________________________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

______________________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

______________________________

— CAPITAL CASE —

Joseph W. Luby*

Cristi A. Charpentier

Assistant Federal Defenders

Federal Community Defender Office

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

601 Walnut Street, Suite 545 West

Philadelphia, PA 19106

(215) 928-0520

Joseph_Luby@fd.org

Cristi_Charpentier@fd.org

*Counsel of record for Petitioner

Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court

CAPITAL CASE

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act prohibits federal habeas

corpus relief on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court, unless

that adjudication contradicted or unreasonably applied clearly established federal

law or unreasonably determined the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The question presented is: When the last state court to review a petitioner’s

claim issues a reasoned merits decision—but only on a single component of a

multiple-component claim, such as the performance or prejudice prong of a claim

under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)—does AEDPA require that a

federal habeas court defer to a lower state court’s earlier ruling on the other

component as the Third and Fifth Circuits have held, or should the federal court

conduct de novo review on that component as the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh

Circuits have held?

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner Richard Laird was the appellant in the court below and is an

indigent prisoner within the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. Respondents

Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, and Superintendent, S.C.I.

Somerset, maintain custody of Petitioner.

No party is a corporation.

ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit:

Laird v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-9000 (habeas corpus appeal after

retrial)

Laird v. Horn, No. 01-9012 (Commonwealth’s appeal of grant of habeas corpus)

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania:

Laird v. Wetzel, Civ. Action No. 11-1916 (habeas proceeding after retrial)

Laird v. Horn, Civ. A. No. 99-2311 (initial habeas corpus proceeding)

Pennsylvania Supreme Court:

Commonwealth v. Laird, No. 683 CAP (postconviction appeal after retrial)

Commonwealth v. Laird, No. 527 CAP (direct appeal after retrial)

Commonwealth v. Laird, No. 194 CAP (initial postconviction appeal)

Commonwealth v. Chester, Nos. 102 E.D. Appeal 1989, 103

(initial direct appeal)

Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, Pennsylvania:

Commonwealth v. Laird, No. CR007461988 (postconviction proceeding after

retrial)

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ............................................................................................. i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ............................................................................ ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS......................................................................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................... v

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................................................................... 1

OPINIONS BELOW ...................................................................................................... 1

JURISDICTION............................................................................................................. 1

STATUTE INVOLVED.................................................................................................. 2

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................................................................... 5

A.

Procedural History ...................................................................................... 5

B.

The 2007 Retrial Evidence ......................................................................... 7

C.

The Postconviction Evidence .................................................................... 13

D.

The Rulings Below .................................................................................... 15

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .......................................................... 17

I.

II.

THE DECISION BELOW WORSENS A CIRCUIT SPLIT ON A RECURRING

ISSUE CONCERNING FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW OF STATE-COURT

DECISIONS UNDER AEDPA. ........................................................................... 18

A.

The Seventh, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits ............................................ 18

B.

The Third and Fifth Circuits .................................................................... 19

THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S APPROACH CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S

PRECEDENTS AND AEDPA’S PLAIN LANGUAGE. ...................................... 20

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 26

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Federal Cases

Abdul-Salaam v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 895 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2018) ............... 24, 25

Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2014) .................................................... 23

Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2005) .......................................... 19, 21, 22

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) ................................................................ 17, 19

Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2008)................................................................ 20

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) .......................................................... 17, 19, 23

California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) ................................................................... 25

Castellanos v. Small, 766 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2014) .................................................. 19

Dunn v. Jess, 981 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2020)........................................................... 18–19

Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) ..................................................................... 21

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) .................................................................. 21

Knight v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 958 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2020) .............................. 18–19

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).......................................................................... 19

Laird v. Horn, 159 F. Supp. 2d 58 (E.D. Pa. 2001)......................................... 5–6, 9, 12

Laird v. Horn, 414 F.3d 419 (3d Cir. 2005) .................................................................. 6

Lentz v. Kennedy, 967 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2020).......................................................... 18

Loden v. McCarty, 778 F.3d 484 (5th Cir. 2015)......................................................... 20

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) .................................................................. 25

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) ....................................................................... 25

Saranchak v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 802 F.3d 579 (3d Cir. 2015) ........................... 20

Smith v. Sec’y N.M. Dep’t of Corr., 50 F.3d 801 (10th Cir. 1995) ........................ 24–25

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ................................................. i, 17–18

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) ..................................................................... 17

Thomas v. Clements, 789 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2015) .............................................. 18, 22

Thornell v. Jones, 602 U.S. 154 (2024) ................................................................. 25–26

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) ............................................................... 21, 25

Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122 (2018)............................................... 4, 5, 18, 19, 20, 21

Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15 (2009) ....................................................................... 25

v

Federal Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254 ............................................................................................................. 1

28 U.S.C. § 1331 ............................................................................................................. 1

28 U.S.C. § 2254 ........................................................ i, 1, 2, 3, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24

State Cases

Commonwealth v. Chester, 587 A.2d 1367 (Pa. 1991) .................................................. 5

Commonwealth v. Flor, 259 A.3d 891 (Pa. 2021) ......................................................... 3

Commonwealth v. Gibson, 19 A.3d 512 (Pa. 2011) ....................................................... 3

Commonwealth v. Laird, 119 A.3d 972 (Pa. 2015) ....................................................... 6

Commonwealth v. Laird, 726 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1999) ....................................................... 5

Commonwealth v. Laird, 988 A.2d 618 (Pa. 2010) ....................................................... 6

State Statutes

42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9541–9546 (Post Conviction Relief Act) ................................................ 5

42 Pa. C.S. § 9711 .......................................................................................................... 9

Other

U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 10 ....................................................................................................... 18

Am. Bar Ass’n, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense

Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (2003) ....................................................................... 10

Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) ................................................................. 24–25

vi

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Richard Laird respectfully requests that a writ of certiorari issue to

review the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,

affirming the district court’s judgment denying Laird’s petition for writ of habeas

corpus.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals affirming the denial of habeas corpus relief

is reported at 129 F.4th 227 (3d Cir. 2025) and appears in the Appendix at A1. The

memorandum of the district court denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus is

unreported and appears in the Appendix at A38. The order of the district court

granting in part and denying in part Petitioner’s motion to alter or amend the

judgment is unreported and appears in the Appendix at A143. The district court’s

memorandum accompanying the order on the motion to alter or amend the judgment

is unpublished and appears in the Appendix at A146. The opinion of the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court affirming the denial of postconviction relief is reported at 119 A.3d

972 (Pa. 2015) and appears in the Appendix at A175. The opinion of the Bucks County

Court of Common Pleas denying postconviction relief is unreported and appears in

the Appendix at A216.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals issued its opinion affirming the district court’s judgment

on February 26, 2025. A2. The court of appeals denied Laird’s petition for rehearing

on April 8, 2025. A251. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1). The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2254.

1

STATUTE INVOLVED

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides, in pertinent part:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Richard Laird and an accomplice were sentenced to death for

murdering Anthony Milano in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. A2–3. The prosecution

theorized, and the evidence showed, that Laird singled out Milano because of the

victim’s perceived sexual orientation. NT 2/5/07 at 28. Although the jury declined to

credit the proposed aggravating circumstance that the murder involved torture, see

Trial Ex. CP-4 (Third Circuit App. at 235–37), the crime was unusually violent.

Milano was repeatedly slashed in the neck with a box-cutter knife or similar

instrument, and the wounds were so deep that Milano was nearly decapitated. NT

2/7/07 at 90, 93–94.

In both state and federal court, Laird has asserted that trial counsel performed

ineffectively in developing mitigating evidence. Although the jury heard evidence

that Laird had been sexually abused as a child, it did not know that Laird was

routinely raped by his father, both orally and anally, from the age of five until the

age of eleven. NT 5/24/12 at 76–77, 112–13. Neither did the jury hear expert evidence

2

about the effects of that abuse. On later postconviction review, Psychologist Dr. David

Lisak stated that Laird suffers flashbacks to the “tactile experiences” of sexual

assault, including “involuntary gag reflexes” mirroring “the tactile experience of his

father’s ejaculate in his throat.” Id. at 199–200; A262. 1 Male-on-male sexual abuse is

“utterly humiliating” and violates “the core norms of masculinity.” A259. Laird

developed a “persona of hyper-masculinity to counter what he really felt about

himself.” NT 5/24/12 at 115; A267. Laird harbored “intense negative feelings about

male-to-male touch,” and he reportedly “hated homosexuals.” A271. Dr. Lisak

explained that Laird’s crime may have reflected that Laird “in an extremely

intoxicated state” acted from a “long, pent-up rage he was capable of feeling towards

any male whom he perceived as wanting to touch him against his will.” A272; NT

5/24/12 at 207–08.

The Third Circuit in this case affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas

relief. A1–37. Departing from the parties’ briefs and the district court’s reasoning, the

Third Circuit declined to review the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling that Laird

was not prejudiced by counsel’s performance. A28, 36–37. Observing that the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not reached the question of whether trial counsel

1 Dr. Lisak’s report is among the “evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (emphasis added). Although the postconviction court declined

to admit the report, Laird presented the document and moved for its admission as

substantive evidence as Pennsylvania law allows. A253–73; NT 5/24/12 at 5–6, 199,

218–19; see also Commonwealth v. Flor, 259 A.3d 891, 912 (Pa. 2021); Commonwealth

v. Gibson, 19 A.3d 512, 516 (Pa. 2011).

3

performed deficiently, the Third Circuit reviewed the trial-level postconviction court’s

ruling that found no such deficiency. A28–36. The Third Circuit concluded that the

lower court’s ruling reasonably applied federal law under AEDPA. A29–36. It

therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment, even while criticizing as “erroneous”

the district court’s de novo review of counsel’s performance—such de novo review

itself following from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s silence on that question.

A28–37.

The procedural history of Laird’s claim calls to mind this Court’s opinion in

Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122 (2018), which described the “straightforward inquiry”

that guides federal habeas review when “the last state court to decide a prisoner’s

federal claim explains its decision on the merits in a reasoned opinion.” Id. at 125. In

that instance, “a federal habeas court simply reviews the specific reasons given by

the state court and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable.” Id.

A related question that this case presents continues to divide the federal courts

as it did before Wilson: What review is mandated when the highest state court

resolved some, but not all, of the elements of a claim? Should the federal habeas court

give deference only to the decision of the state’s highest court, or must it also defer to

lower state courts that have addressed elements of the claim that the highest court

left undecided? Wilson does not answer that question, but it points in a particular

direction: a federal court should review the state courts’ last reasoned merits decision

on a claim, regardless of whether that decision resolves all elements of the claim.

That approach makes sense; it advances AEDPA’s interest in comity and efficiency

4

by reviewing the opinion of a state’s highest court as that state’s authoritative

decision.

The Third Circuit below, unlike other courts of appeals, did not follow Wilson’s

sign-pointing. Instead, it deferred to the lower postconviction court’s determination

that counsel performed effectively. The Third Circuit’s opinion mirrors the approach

taken by the Fifth Circuit, but it conflicts with decisions from the Seventh, Ninth,

and Eleventh Circuits, all three of which defer only to the last explained merits ruling

from a state court. The Court should grant certiorari to resolve the conflict in favor of

the majority position and to simplify habeas review for courts and litigants alike.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Procedural History

Richard Laird and Frank Chester were tried together in the Bucks County

Court of Common Pleas for murder and related charges arising from the 1987 death

of Anthony Milano. In 1998, both men were convicted on all charges, including first,

second, and third degree murder; both were sentenced to death. Laird’s convictions

and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Chester, 587

A.2d 1367 (Pa. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Laird v. Pennsylvania, 502 U.S. 849

(1991). After holding an evidentiary hearing in 1997, the trial court denied relief to

Laird under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). See 42 Pa. C.S.

§§ 9541–9546. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v.

Laird, 726 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1999). Laird then obtained federal habeas relief from the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which ruled

that the jury’s instruction on first degree murder violated due process. See Laird v.

5

Horn, 159 F. Supp. 2d 58, 81–85 (E.D. Pa. 2001). The Commonwealth’s appeal was

unsuccessful. See Laird v. Horn, 414 F.3d 419 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub nom.

Beard v. Laird, 546 U.S. 1146 (2006).

With his lesser homicide convictions unaffected by the grant of habeas relief,

Laird was separately retried for first degree murder in 2007. A Bucks County jury

convicted him of the offense and sentenced him to death, and the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Laird, 988 A.2d 618

(Pa.), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1069 (2010). The Court of Common Pleas conducted an

evidentiary hearing under the PCRA and denied relief in 2014. As relevant to this

petition, the PCRA court ruled that retrial counsel did not perform ineffectively, and

that Laird was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to develop more particularized

evidence describing Laird’s childhood sexual abuse and its effects. A240–41. The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Laird, 119 A.3d 972 (Pa.

2015); A175. The court questioned the PCRA court’s ruling that expert evidence on

the issue “would have been insignificant,” but it ruled that Laird was not prejudiced.

119 A.3d at 997–99 (A200–02). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not decide

whether retrial counsel performed ineffectively with respect to this issue. Id.

The federal district court denied Laird’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, and

it later denied Laird’s Rule 59(e) motion in relevant part. A38–174. After granting a

certificate of appealability on the ineffective-assistance claim at issue here, the court

of appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment on February 26, 2025. A1–37. The

Third Circuit denied rehearing on April 8, 2025 (A251), and this petition follows.

6

B.

The 2007 Retrial Evidence

This petition relates to Laird’s 2007 retrial at which he was re-convicted of first

degree murder and re-sentenced to death—and during which the defense presented

little of the sexual-abuse evidence described above. The prosecution’s evidence

showed that on the night of the crime, Laird and Chester encountered the decedent

(Anthony Milano) at the Edgely Inn, a bar frequented by Chester in Bristol,

Pennsylvania. NT 2/5/07 at 190–92, 200–03. That evening, Laird and Chester started

drinking alcohol in the early evening hours. NT 2/7/07 at 41–56. After they consumed

over a case of Budweiser at Laird’s apartment, Laird and Chester arrived at the

Edgely Inn along with Laird’s girlfriend and her nine-year-old son, as well as two

friends of Chester. NT 2/7/07 at 41–56; NT 2/6/07 at 23–27, 64–69.

At the Edgely Inn, Laird and Chester drank four sixty-four-ounce pitchers of

beer and several shots of liquor. NT 2/5/07 at 210–11; A66–68. Laird called another

patron a “faggot” and a “pussy” and threatened to “stick a pool cue up his ass.” NT

2/6/07 at 29. Milano had arrived and sat at the bar shortly after midnight. NT 2/5/07

at 195. Laird shouted across the bar and ordered Milano to buy him a drink; Laird,

Milano, and Chester then drank beers and shots of liquor. Id. at 202–03, 210–11. A

toxicologist estimated that Laird’s blood-alcohol level reached 0.45 that evening. A9,

43, 71, 74–75. At one point Laird or Chester said, “I don’t like fucking faggots.” NT

2/5/07 at 208–09. Laird commented, “I could beat this pussy[;] . . . I could beat this

faggot.” NT 2/6/07 at 29. At another point Laird commented, “I’m just sick and tired

of these people trying to infiltrate us.” NT 2/5/07 at 216. He and Chester also slow-

7

danced with one another to a song on the jukebox while laughing. Id. at 211–13, 258.

Laird insisted that Milano buy another round of shots, which Milano did despite

indicating that he did not want another. Id. at 208–09.

Laird asked Milano for a ride home after the bar closed. Id. at 211, 217–18.

Chester bought a six-pack of beer, and the three were seen leaving the Edgely Inn

between 2:00 and 2:30 AM. Id. at 115–17, 217, 251. Laird, Chester, and Milano

stopped at a nearby 7-Eleven store and then ended up in an area of Bristol Township

(Venice Ashby) known for the sale of drugs. NT 2/8/07 at 154–55; NT 2/5/07 at 163;

NT 2/6/07 at 153; NT 5/18/88 at 475–78.

Milano did not return home the following morning, and his parents reported

him missing. NT 2/5/07 at 50–52, 80–81. Police located Milano’s burned car on the

side of the road in Venice Ashby and later found his body. Id. at 72–74, 83–98. The

medical examiner described numerous deep slash wounds to the neck and throat,

nearly severing Milano’s head from his body. NT 2/7/07 at 93–94.

Laird and Chester were arrested and charged with murder soon after the

discovery of Milano’s body. The Commonwealth’s theory was that Laird and Chester

murdered Milano because he was gay. NT 2/5/07 at 28 (“They didn’t like him because

he was different. They didn’t like him because maybe he dressed differently from

them, acted differently. They didn’t like him because they thought he was a

homosexual.”). Defense counsel acknowledged Laird’s involvement in the murder, but

contested his conviction for first degree murder on grounds that Laird lacked the

specific intent for that crime due to the combined effects of his pre-existing brain

8

damage and severe intoxication on the night of the offense. Id. at 40–43, 174–75, 240–

47, 252–59, 268–70; NT 2/6/07 at 43–44, 99–105, 115–17, 163–65; 2/7/07 at 41–56; NT

2/8/07 at 27–32, 81–90, 127–45. The jury found Laird guilty of first degree murder.

NT 2/9/07 at 93–95.

The Commonwealth alleged two aggravating factors at the penalty phase:

murder in the course of committing a felony (kidnapping) under 42 Pa. C.S.

§ 9711(d)(6), and murder by means of torture under 42 Pa. C.S. § 9711(d)(8). NT

2/12/07 at 13–19. In light of Laird’s still-intact kidnapping conviction from his initial

trial, the parties stipulated to the (d)(6) aggravating circumstance. Id. at 24, 29. The

stipulation stated that Laird “did remove Anthony Milano a substantial distance

under the circumstances from the place in which he was found . . . [,] the Edgely Inn,

with the intent to inflict bodily injury on him.” Id. at 29.

In mitigation, trial counsel presented an abbreviated version of the evidence

offered by their predecessors ten years earlier, on state postconviction review

following Laird’s initial conviction and death sentence. See Laird, 159 F. Supp. 2d at

109–17 (detailing previous postconviction evidence). Retrial counsel conducted no

independent investigation for the second trial. Among other shortcuts, counsel spent

little time consulting with the mental-health experts who had testified on

postconviction review in 1997; counsel spoke with them a few times on the phone and

met with them just before their testimony. NT 2/8/07, 72, 100–01, 117, 123; NT

5/23/12 at 20–21, 28–30, 153–56.

Counsel failed to develop a professional relationship with their client, limiting

9

their meetings to pre-trial interviews that took place when Laird was brought down

for court appearances in Bucks County (north of Philadelphia) in a non-private

visiting area; counsel refused to travel in order to visit Laird at the prison in Greene

County (south of Pittsburgh), having accepted the court’s appointment to the case on

the condition that such travel would not be required. NT 5/23/12 at 71–76, 125–27;

NT 10/30/06 at 144–49; NT 12/13/06 at 32–36. All the while, retrial counsel knew that

they were getting incomplete information about sexual abuse: Laird “wouldn’t talk to

[counsel] about it,” and Laird’s brother did not want to testify and offered only “vague”

information. NT 5/23/12 at 156–59, 170.

Counsel also recognized that victims of sexual abuse are often reluctant to

disclose the abuse, as they argued at closing: “Victims of abuse want to cover it up.

They don’t want to let it out. They’re ashamed of themselves.” NT 2/13/07 at 149.

Prevailing norms of practice recognized as much: “Topics like childhood sexual abuse

should . . . not be broached in an initial interview [because] [o]btaining such

information typically requires overcoming considerable barriers, such as shame,

denial, and repression, as well as other mental or emotional impairments from which

the client may suffer.” Am. Bar Ass’n, Guidelines for the Appointment and

Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases § 10.7 Commentary (2003).

Counsel complained to the trial judge that they could not meet confidentially with

Laird in the Bucks County jail, where Laird would be sent for court appearances. NT

10/30/06 at 143 (“Two or three people guard him while I’m talking to him out in the

hallway.”) But counsel never remedied that problem by driving to Laird’s prison in

10

western Pennsylvania for a professional and private visit.

During the penalty phase, counsel called psychologist Dr. Henry Dee and

psychiatrist Dr. Robert Fox—the same experts whose testimony was rejected by the

jury during the guilt phase—to testify about Laird’s mitigating life history and

mental impairments. NT 5/23/12 at 192–94. Counsel did not collaborate with these

experts to develop testimony unique to sentencing. Id. at 153–56. Instead, counsel

met with the experts on the eve and morning of trial to prepare them to testify in

support of a guilt-phase defense of diminished capacity. Id. at 18–22, 154–56. Counsel

admitted that they spent almost no time with Drs. Dee and Fox. See NT 2/8/07 at

100–01, 123; NT 5/23/12 at 20, 28–30, 153–55, 168. Not having seen Laird in over a

decade, Dr. Fox spent one hour with him the day before his testimony, and Dr. Dee

saw him for thirty minutes on the day he testified. NT 2/8/07 at 100–01, 123.

Counsel were aware that Laird had likely been sexually abused by his father,

but they made no attempt to develop this information by retaining an expert trained

in male sexual abuse to explain to the jury how such trauma manifests in the adult

male—testimony that would have been critical to understanding Laird’s troubling

conduct. NT 5/23/12 at 156–66. And the recycled witnesses presented only limited

evidence that Laird had been sexually abused in the first instance. Both Drs. Dee and

Fox were aware that Laird had suffered “sexual abuse,” but the trial evidence did not

describe the frequency or details of that abuse. NT 2/13/07 at 16–17, 23, 27, 47, 59–

63.

Dr. Dee testified that Laird’s childhood was “marked by quite severe abuse of

11

all kinds—physical abuse, emotional abuse and sexual abuse.” Id. at 59. Consistent

with the Commonwealth’s theory that the murder was an anti-gay hate crime, Dr.

Dee testified on cross-examination that that Laird “hated homosexuals” and had a

“long smoldering antagonism towards persons identified as homosexuals” that might

explain why Laird “fastened upon Anthony Milano.” Id. at 98, 122. The prosecution

elicited these insights by refreshing Dr. Dee’s recollection of a 1994 report from

psychiatrist Dr. David Silverman, who had examined Laird during the initial

postconviction proceeding after Laird’s first trial. Id. at 98–99. The Commonwealth

did not elicit any other evidence about Dr. Silverman, declining to complete the

picture depicted by Dr. Silverstein by declining to elicit his 1994 insight that Laird’s

homophobia “may have been caused by the fact that at about age 9 he had been

required to perform fellatio on an adult male [relative] on a few separate occasions.”

Laird, 159 F. Supp. 2d at 114 n.30 (district court ruling on first habeas petition).

Drs. Dee and Fox testified that Laird had been forced to perform fellatio on his

father but without linking that fact to Laird’s anti-gay animus. NT 2/13/07 at 17, 59–

61. Laird’s younger brother Mark described an early childhood memory of seeing his

father and Laird naked together in the bedroom. NT 2/12/07 at 78, 97–98. Mark

described this experience as “the norm” of his relationship with his parents and

brother, observing that “eventually, the beatings and shit got so bad that my mother

got the balls to leave him.” Id. at 90–91.

The Commonwealth argued that child abuse did not explain Laird’s crime or

make it any “less terrible.” NT 2/13/07 at 124–25. “I submit to you that a lot of people

12

in this world go through difficult things as young children,” the prosecutor observed.

Id. at 120. “They go through difficult things and those people don’t do the type of thing

that Mr. Laird did to Anthony Milano.” Id. The jury returned a verdict of death,

finding that the single aggravating circumstance (kidnapping) found by all jurors

outweighed the mitigating circumstances found by one or more jurors: physical abuse,

sexual abuse, emotional abuse, witnessing the abuse of others, the “psychological

consequences of the abuse,” substance abuse, alcohol abuse, and Laird’s favorable

conduct in prison. NT 2/13/07 at 194–95. No jurors found that Laird acted under an

“extreme mental or emotional disturbance” or that he was “substantially impaired”

in his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform with the law.

Id. at 194; see also Trial Ex. CP-4 (Third Circuit App. at 235–37). The jury declined

to find the proposed aggravating circumstance that the murder involved torture. Trial

Ex. CP-4 (Third Circuit App. at 235–37).

C.

The Postconviction Evidence

The postconviction evidence detailed the sexual abuse suffered by Laird, as

well as the effects of that abuse. From the age of five until the age of eleven, Laird

was routinely and repeatedly raped orally and anally by his own father. NT 5/24/12

at 76–77, 112–13; A261. Laird’s father would often arrive at home “staggering drunk,”

which is when the abuse occurred. Id. at 76; A261. “The sick fuck would rub his dick

between my cheeks,” Laird reported. A260; NT 5/24/12 at 93. “Every time he came

home drunk,” he explained, “I knew I would either have to suck his dick or get

beaten.” A261.

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Psychologist Dr. David Lisak stated that Laird suffers flashbacks to the “tactile

experiences” of sexual assault. NT 5/24/12 at 199–200; A262. To the present day,

Laird experiences “involuntary gag reflexes,” which Dr. Lisak described as “literally

the tactile experience of his father’s ejaculate in his throat.” NT 5/24/12 at 199; A262.

Laird also suffers from “sudden sensory memories of the feel of his father’s naked

body, or a sudden pang of rectal pain.” A262. The experience of male-on-male sexual

abuse is “utterly humiliating for most men,” and it brings “helplessness,

powerlessness and terror that are the essence of the trauma” and that “violate the

core norms of masculinity.” A259. Dr. Lisak explained that “the psychological harm

is enormously magnified” in children who experience trauma at the hands of those

who are supposed to protect them. NT 5/24/12 at 121–22.

Laird felt “worthless” and “intensely ashamed of himself” as a result of the

sexual abuse. Id. at 115–16. He developed a “persona of hyper-masculinity to counter

what he really felt about himself.” Id. at 115; A267. As Dr. Lisak explained, “[i]f you’re

male and you feel worthless and you feel like you were weak and vulnerable, . . . [y]ou

create this mask of essentially pseudo-invulnerability.” NT 5/24/12 at 115; A267. “As

I got older, I started to feel I could be the baddest motherfucker,” Laird said during

the evaluation. A267. Laird harbored “intense negative feelings about male-to-male

touch,” and he reportedly “hated homosexuals” as Dr. Silverman had observed

eighteen years earlier. A271. The crime itself may be attributed to a “long, pent-up

rage [Laird] was capable of feeling towards any male whom he perceived as wanting

to touch him against his will.” A272; NT 5/24/12 at 207–08.

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D.

The Rulings Below

The district court denied Laird’s ineffective-assistance claim. A105–18.

Consistent with the parties’ briefing, the district court identified the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court’s opinion as the relevant merits ruling under AEDPA. A116–17; Dist.

Dkt. #39 (Pet’r Mem. of Law) at 48–50; Dist. Dkt. #42 (Answer) at 42–52; Dist. Dkt.

#51 (Reply) at 2–9. The state supreme court, in turn, reasoned that Laird was not

prejudiced by the claimed error, because the evidence relating to Dr. Lisak would

have been “largely cumulative” of testimony from Mark Laird as well as Drs. Dee and

Fox that Laird had suffered “sexual abuse” as a child. A201. The district court

accepted that summary as a “fair characterization of Dr. Lisak’s testimony in light of

the record.” A116. Even though “some of Dr. Lisak’s testimony at the 2012 PCRA

hearing was not cumulative of the testimony presented at the 2007 trial,” the district

court upheld as “reasonable” the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s conclusion that

Laird suffered no prejudice “because at least one juror found a mitigating factor” that

Laird “was, in fact, sexually abused.” A27, 116–17.

Next the district court reviewed trial counsel’s performance de novo, observing

that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not reached the issue. A118 n. 15. The

district court observed that counsel relied on Drs. Dee and Fox to describe Laird’s

sexual abuse, that Drs. Dee and Fox relied on the limited information provided by

Laird and his brother, and that attorneys are entitled to rely on expert mental-health

opinions “as sufficiently complete explorations of all potential areas of mitigation that

those experts are qualified to diagnose.” Id. The court therefore concluded that trial

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counsel “did not act unreasonably.” Id.

As in the district court, the parties on appeal applied AEDPA solely to the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion, and without addressing the lower-court

ruling that preceded it. See Appellant’s Am. Br. (Aug. 28, 2020) at 18–19, 40–48;

Appellee’s Br. (Sept. 21, 2020) at 44–52; Reply Br. (Nov. 11, 2020) at 1. The parties

disputed, then, whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was reasonable in finding

a lack of prejudice, as well as whether the district court was correct in its de novo

ruling upholding trial counsel’s performance. See Appellant’s Am. Br. at 29–32, 40–

48; Appellee’s Br. at 32–52; Reply Br. at 1–14.

The Third Circuit charted its own course, adhering to its practice of

“review[ing] different state courts’ analyses of Strickland’s prongs as the ‘last

reasoned’ decision[]” on each prong. A29. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

had resolved only the question of Strickland prejudice, the Third Circuit identified

the lower PCRA court’s ruling as the state courts’ “last reasoned decision” on the

question of counsel’s performance. A28–29. The court justified acting sua sponte,

reasoning that “a State’s lawyers cannot waive or forfeit § 2254(d)’s standard.” A29

(quotation omitted).

The Third Circuit upheld the PCRA’s court’s performance ruling as a

“reasonable” and “faithful” application of Strickland and other precedents. A29–36.

In the Third Circuit’s view, the PCRA court reasonably determined that “[t]rial

counsel were not ineffective for failing to present additional details that would have

been insignificant considering the evidence as a whole.” A31–32. The court below

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declined to decide the question of prejudice despite the adverse prejudice ruling from

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. A29, A36–37. Petitioner moved for rehearing,

which the Third Circuit denied. A251.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Third Circuit’s decision deepens a circuit split on how to apply AEDPA

when different layers of state courts have addressed different aspects of a multi-factor

federal claim. This split will continue to grow if not curtailed by this Court. Habeas

petitioners, after all, routinely seek relief on claims requiring the prisoner to satisfy

multiple elements. An ineffective-assistance claim requires the defendant to show

that counsel performed deficiently and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. A claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963), requires the defendant to show that the prosecution suppressed evidence, that

the evidence was exculpatory, and that the suppressed evidence was material to the

defendant’s conviction or sentence. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82

(1999). A Batson claim requires the defendant to make a prima facie showing that

the prosecution has excluded potential jurors on the basis of race, after which the

prosecution may overcome the presumption by articulating a race-neutral

explanation for its strikes, which then requires the defendant to prove racial

discrimination under all the circumstances. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93–

98 (1986).

State courts frequently terminate their analysis after concluding that one

element or another lacks the requisite proof—an efficient and desirable practice that

this Court has encouraged. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“no reason” for a court

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“to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient

showing on one”). It is inevitable, then, that separate state courts may resolve

different requirements or prongs of the same defendant’s claim. This Court should

instruct the lower courts how to apply AEDPA in such cases.

I.

THE DECISION BELOW WORSENS A CIRCUIT SPLIT ON A

RECURRING ISSUE CONCERNING FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW

OF STATE-COURT DECISIONS UNDER AEDPA.

Certiorari review is crucial when courts of appeals disagree about an important

federal issue. See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a). Such is the case here.

A.

The Seventh, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits

The opinion below directly conflicts with the law of multiple circuits. The

Seventh Circuit applies § 2254(d) when the highest state-court merits ruling resolves

a single component of a defendant’s claim, but it reviews any remaining component

de novo even when a lower state court has decided it. See Dunn v. Jess, 981 F.3d 582,

591 (7th Cir. 2020); Thomas v. Clements, 789 F.3d 760, 766–67 (7th Cir. 2015). In

Dunn, for example, the state trial court reached Strickland prejudice but not

performance, and the state appellate court reached performance but not prejudice.

The Seventh Circuit applied § 2254(d) only to the performance prong because

“AEDPA deference only applies to issues that the last reasoned state court decision

reached on the merits.” 981 F.3d at 591 (quoting Lentz v. Kennedy, 967 F.3d 675, 688

(7th Cir. 2020) (itself quoting Wilson, 584 U.S. at 125)).

The Eleventh Circuit follows the same approach. See Knight v. Fla. Dep’t of

Corr., 958 F.3d 1035, 1045–46, 1046 n.3 (11th Cir. 2020). Similar to what happened

in Dunn, the Florida Supreme Court upheld trial counsel’s performance without

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reaching the issue of prejudice. The trial court had decided the prejudice prong

adversely to Knight, but the Eleventh Circuit decided it de novo. Id. at 1044–46. The

Eleventh Circuit explained that it had no occasion to “look through” the Florida

Supreme Court’s decision and defer to the state trial court’s prejudice determination.

Id. at 1045–46, 1046 n.3 (quoting Wilson, 584 U.S. at 125).

The Ninth Circuit likewise applies AEDPA deference claim-by-claim rather

than issue-by-issue. “[E]ven when one state court adhered to federal law,” the court

remarked, “if the last court to review the claim erred, the federal court should review

the last decision in isolation and not in combination with decisions by other state

courts.” Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005). Barker involved a

Brady claim in which the last state-court decision was “contrary to” the rule of Kyles

v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). Kyles requires a court to measure materiality by the

cumulative effect of all suppressed evidence, which the Washington Supreme Court

failed to do. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436; Barker, 423 F.3d at 1094. Having concluded

that the highest state-court merits ruling was “contrary to” Kyles under § 2254(d)(1),

the Ninth Circuit refused to consider the Washington Court of Appeals’ decision on

the same claim. Barker, 423 F.3d at 1093–94; see also Castellanos v. Small, 766 F.3d

1137, 1145–50 (9th Cir. 2014) (similar approach to Batson claim). The Ninth Circuit

went on to deny relief to Barker under a de novo review of his Brady claim. See

Barker, 423 F.3d at 1095–1101.

B.

The Third and Fifth Circuits

Despite a reasoned merits ruling from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the

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Third Circuit in Laird’s case sua sponte applied § 2254(d) to the PCRA court’s ruling.

A28–36. In support, the court cited its earlier decisions in Saranchak v. Sec’y Pa.

Dep’t of Corr., 802 F.3d 579, 597 (3d Cir. 2015), and Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 289

(3d Cir. 2008)); A29. In both of those cases, the court “reviewed the PCRA courts’

prejudice-prong analyses as the last reasoned decisions because the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court only addressed the performance prong.” A29. The Third Circuit

discerned “no compelling reason” to distinguish those precedents from Laird’s case,

in which the Commonwealth’s highest court reached only the prejudice prong. Id.

The Fifth Circuit ruled similarly in Loden v. McCarty, 778 F.3d 484 (5th Cir.

2015). There, the Mississippi Supreme Court declined to decide the prejudice

component of the petitioner’s ineffective-assistance claim. Because the trial court had

ruled on both components, the Fifth Circuit applied § 2254(d) to the inferior ruling on

the prejudice prong: “Where a lower state court ruled on an element that a higher

state court did not, the lower state court’s decision is entitled to AEDPA deference.”

Id. at 494–95. That approach directly contradicts the law of the Seventh, Ninth, and

Eleventh Circuits as described above.

II.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S APPROACH CONFLICTS WITH THIS

COURT’S PRECEDENTS AND AEDPA’S PLAIN LANGUAGE.

The ruling below is in tension with this Court’s precedents. The Court in

Wilson explained the “straightforward inquiry” that governs cases in which the last

state-court decision is a reasoned merits ruling. 584 U.S. at 125. The federal court

“simply reviews the specific reasons given by the state court and defers to those

reasons if they are reasonable.” Id.

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The question at issue in Wilson was whether a federal habeas court should

“look through” a state appellate court’s summary merits ruling and apply AEDPA

deference to a lower court’s reasoned merits ruling, rather than applying the “no

reasonable basis” standard of Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011), to the higher

ruling. The Court answered that question affirmatively, prescribing the same method

that ought to govern Laird’s case: the federal habeas court must “train its attention

on the particular reasons—both legal and factual—why state courts rejected a state

prisoner’s federal claims” and must “give appropriate deference to that decision.” Id.

at 125 (emphasis added). The dissenters in Wilson agreed: “[A] federal habeas court

must focus its review on the final state court decision on the merits, not any preceding

decision by an inferior state court.” Id. at 135–36 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Habeas

review applies “to a single state court decision, not to some amalgamation of multiple

state court decisions.” Barker, 423 F.3d at 1093 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 395, 397–99, 405 (2000)).

Richter itself explained that “§ 2254(d) applies when a ‘claim,’ not a component

of one, has been adjudicated.” 562 U.S. 98. The Court has elsewhere defined a habeas

“claim” as “an asserted federal basis for relief from a state court’s judgment of

conviction.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530 (2005). A state court necessarily

rejects a “claim” when it concludes that the defendant has failed to prove a required

element—whether or not some lower court found additional deficiencies. AEDPA

deference therefore extends “straightforward[ly]” to the state courts’ last reasoned

decision addressing the merits of the petitioner’s “claim,” Wilson, 584 U.S. at 125, and

21

not to multiple decisions resolving different elements of a single claim.

AEDPA’s plain language further undermines the Third and Fifth Circuits’

approach. The statute forbids habeas relief on “any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in

a decision that was” either (1) contrary to or an unreasonable application of this

Court’s precedents or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphases added). As explained by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits,

the statute speaks of “the adjudication” rather than multiple ones: “Had Congress

intended us to give deference to an amalgamation of adjudications, it could have used

different language.” Thomas, 789 F.3d at 767. Likewise, “[t]he reference to a single

decision underscores that Congress meant federal courts to review only one final state

court decision.” Barker, 423 F.3d at 1093 (emphasis added); see also Thomas, 789 F.3d

at 767 (“[T]he statute refers to a single decision, rather than multiple decisions.”).

The ruling below illustrates the unsoundness of applying AEDPA deference to

multiple state-court decisions on the same claim. The Third Circuit latched on to the

PCRA court’s ruling as the state courts’ “last reasoned decision” on the issue of trial

counsel’s performance. A28–29. The Third Circuit thus upheld as “reasonable” the

lower court’s rationale that “[t]rial counsel were not ineffective for failing to present

additional details that would have been insignificant considering the evidence as a

whole.” A21, 31, 33, 201, 240. That approach to AEDPA is particularly inapt in Laird’s

case. The Third Circuit acknowledged that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “did not

agree” that Dr. Lisak’s opinions would have been “insignificant” as compared to the

22

trial mitigation. A21 (ruling below); see also A201 (Pennsylvania Supreme Court

observing that “we do not necessarily endorse the concept that Dr. Lisak’s testimony

would have been insignificant”). AEDPA does not require federal courts to defer to a

lower state court’s opinion that the higher court did not accept. Because the

Commonwealth’s highest court did not accept the key rationale employed by the

PCRA court, that same rationale cannot constitute the state-court “adjudication” of

Laird’s claim. The higher court’s rejection of the lower court’s finding precludes a

federal court’s deference. See, e.g., Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1132–33 (9th

Cir. 2014) (refusing to defer to lower court’s finding that Brady evidence was

immaterial, because the state appellate court disagreed with that finding and

rejected the claim on other grounds).

Moreover, Laird would likely prevail under AEDPA review if the Third Circuit

were to address the correct question. That question is the one briefed below: whether

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which issued the last reasoned decision on the

merits of Laird’s claim, unreasonably determined that the mitigating evidence from

his postconviction proceedings would have been “largely cumulative” of the trial

mitigation, so that Laird suffered no prejudice. That question went unanswered

below. A37.

The postconviction evidence showed that Laird was repeatedly raped by his

father, both orally and anally, from the age of five until the age of eleven. NT 5/24/12

at 76–77, 112–13. In addition to the fact that the trial mitigation did not capture the

severity and frequency of the sexual abuse, there was no trial evidence connecting

23

that abuse to the murder of a victim whom Laird singled out for his perceived sexual

orientation and whose community he believed was “trying to infiltrate us.” NT 2/5/07

at 216. The missing evidence here was that Laird felt “worthless” and “intensively

ashamed of himself” as a result of his father’s sexual abuse, that he developed “a kind

of hyper-masculinity to counter what he really felt about himself,” and that he

consequently harbored a “long smoldering antagonism toward persons identified as

homosexual.” NT 5/24/12 at 115–16; A271–72.

On the trial record’s scant evidence of Laird’s sexual abuse, by comparison, (1)

the prosecutor was able to suggest that Laird was never sexually abused and that

any such abuse did not make his crime any “less terrible,” NT 2/13/2007 at 124, and

(2) the district court described the trial mitigation as capturing only a “single incident

of potential sexual abuse.” A116. Yes, the Third Circuit disagreed with the latter

assessment. A32. But the retrial record did not capture that Laird was “profoundly

scarred” by his father’s sexual abuse, let alone that the abuse bore a nexus to his

crime. A270–72.

As argued to the Third Circuit, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision

“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A

state court’s ruling that new mitigating evidence is “cumulative” of the trial evidence

is a factual determination. See, e.g., Abdul-Salaam v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 895

F.3d 254, 266 (3d Cir. 2018). “‘Cumulative evidence’ is defined as evidence ‘which goes

to prove what has already been established by other evidence.’” Smith v. Sec’y N.M.

Dep’t of Corr., 50 F.3d 801, 829 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 343

24

(5th ed. 1979)); cf. Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 22–23 (2009) (death of defendant’s

ten-month-old sister, grandmother’s alcoholism and drug addiction, and family’s

ongoing “strife” were all described to sentencing jury). For the reasons explained

above, the state court’s finding of “cumulative” evidence is “objectively unreasonable

in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

To the extent that a ruling of “cumulativeness” is a legal conclusion that the

defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of additional mitigating evidence at

trial, see Abdul-Salaam, 895 F.3d at 266 n.5, the state court failed in its duty to

consider the totality of evidence from both the trial and the postconviction proceeding.

See Williams, 529 U.S. at 397–98. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling

therefore contradicts and unreasonably applies Williams, which requires a reviewing

court “to evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both that adduced

at trial, and the evidence adduced in the [postconviction] proceeding in reweighing it

against the evidence in aggravation.” Id.

The testimony at issue here would have been critical to the jury’s choice of

sentence: “[E]vidence about the defendant’s background and character is relevant

because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal

acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental

problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.” Penry v.

Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545

(1987)). Mitigating evidence is necessarily more compelling when it is “causally

25

connected to the murder[].” Thornell v. Jones, 602 U.S. 154, 166–69 (2024). The

sentencer in this case was materially ill-informed.

CONCLUSION

The ruling below worsens an unnecessary circuit split, and it misapplies this

Court’s precedents as well as the statutorily required analysis of Laird’s claim. The

Court should grant certiorari and thereafter reverse the judgment of the Third

Circuit and remand for further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Joseph W. Luby

Joseph W. Luby*

Cristi A. Charpentier

Assistant Federal Defenders

Federal Community Defender Office

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

601 Walnut Street, Suite 545 West

Philadelphia, PA 19106

(215) 928-0520

Joseph_Luby@fd.org

Cristi_Charpentier@fd.org

*Counsel of record for Petitioner

Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court

Dated: May 16, 2025

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