Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Carlos Edward Thurman, Jr., Petitioner v. United States

No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CARLOS EDWARD THURMAN, Jr.,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JARROD J. BECK

Counsel for Petitioner

Law Office of Jarrod J. Beck, PLLC

101 West Short Street

Lexington, Kentucky 40507

270.860.2025

jarrod.beck@gmail.com

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I.

Whether the district court clearly erred by applying the USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1)

firearm enhancement?

II.

Whether general application of the USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm

enhancement and BOP policy violate equal protection and Second

Amendment principles?

i

LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner/Appellant/Defendant – Carlos Edward Thurman, Jr.

Respondent/Appellee/Plaintiff – United States of America

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented for Review ................................................................................ i

List of All Parties to the Proceedings ........................................................................ii

Table of Contents .................................................................................................... iii

Index to Appendices ................................................................................................. iv

Table of Authorities .................................................................................................. v

Opinions Below ......................................................................................................... 2

Jurisdiction ................................................................................................................ 2

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ..................................................... 3

Statement of the Case ................................................................................................ 4

Reasons for Granting Writ ........................................................................................ 9

I.

The district court clearly erred by applying the USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1)

firearm enhancement ............................................................................ 9

II.

General application of the USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement

and related BOP policy violate equal protection and Second

Amendment principles ........................................................................ 13

Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 16

Certificate of Service ............................................................................................... 17

iii

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Appendix A

Judgment from the Eastern District of Kentucky in

United States v. Carlos Edward Thurman, Jr., 2:21-CR36-DLB, filed on January 5, 2024.

Appendix B

Unpublished Opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Carlos

Edward Thurman, Jr., No. 24-5020, filed on January 28,

2025.

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

I. Cases

Page No.

District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570 (2008) .......................................................................................... 13, 16

Gall v. United States,

552 U.S. 38 (2007) .................................................................................................. 11

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369 (2024) ................................................................................................ 16

Lopez v. Davis,

531 U.S. 230 (2001) ................................................................................................ 14

McDonald v. Chicago,

561 U.S. 742 (2010) ................................................................................................ 13

New York Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen,

597 U.S. 1 (2022) .................................................................................................... 13

United States v. Allen,

43 F.4th 901 (8th Cir.2022) ............................................................................. 9, 10, 15

United States v. Barron,

940 F.3d 903 (6th Cir.2019) ............................................................................... 10, 12

United States v. Benson,

591 F.3d 491 (6th Cir.2010) ..................................................................................... 12

United States v. Catalan,

499 F.3d 604 (6th Cir.2007) ............................................................................... 10, 12

United States v. Cochran,

14 F.3d 1128 (6th Cir.1994) ............................................................................... 10, 12

United States v. Darwich,

337 F.3d 645 (6th Cir.2003) ..................................................................................... 12

v

United States v. Gilmore,

968 F.3d 883 (8th Cir.2020) ....................................................................................... 9

United States v. Hill,

79 F.3d 1477 (6th Cir.1996) ....................................................................................... 9

United States v. Kurns,

129 F.4th 589 (9th Cir.2025) ..................................................................................... 10

United States v. Missouri,

114 F.4th 980 (8th Cir.2024) ..................................................................................... 14

United States v. Orlando,

363 F.3d 596 (6th Cir.2004) ..................................................................................... 12

United States v. Rahimi,

602 U.S. 680 (2024) .......................................................................................... 13, 14

United States v. Rodriguez,

482 Fed.Appx. 231 (9th Cir.2012) ........................................................................... 11

United States v. Terry,

911 F.2d 272 (8th Cir.1990) ..................................................................................... 10

United States v. West,

962 F.3d 183 (6th Cir.2020) ................................................................................. 9, 12

United States v. White,

875 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.1989) ............................................................................... 10, 12

United States v. Wiltshire,

568 Fed.Appx. 135 (3rd Cir.2014) ....................................................................... 9, 10

United States v. Woods,

604 F.3d 286 (6th Cir.2010) ..................................................................................... 10

vi

Statutes, Rules, and Guidelines

U.S. Const. amend. II ................................................................................................ 3

U.S. Const. amend. V ................................................................................................ 3

18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) ....................................................................................... 14

18 U.S.C. § 3632 ..................................................................................................... 13

18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4) ............................................................................................ 13

18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C) ...................................................................................... 13

18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D) ...................................................................................... 13

28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(ii) ................................................................................ 8, 14

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) .................................................................................................. 2

Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1.410 – 1.485 ........................................................................ 14, 15

Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 ....................................................................... 13

Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(B) ....................................................................................... 11

USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) ................................................................................................. 9

USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), comment. (n.11(A)) ............................................................. 15

vii

CASE NO. ____________________

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CARLOS THURMAN

PETITIONER

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESPONDENT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE UNITED STATES

Carlos Edward Thurman, Jr., by court-appointed counsel, respectfully

requests that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the unpublished opinion of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the case of United States v.

Carlos Edward Thurman, Jr., No. 24-5020, filed on January 28, 2025 and attached

to this Petition as Appendix B.

1

OPINIONS BELOW

Mr. Thurman’s appeal to the Sixth Circuit was taken from the Judgment

entered following his conviction for involvement in a narcotics conspiracy. See

Appendix A. On January 28, 2025, the Sixth Circuit issued an unpublished

opinion affirming Mr. Thurman’s conviction and sentence. See Appendix B. This

petition for a writ of certiorari now follows.

JURISDICTION

The Sixth Circuit issued an unpublished opinion affirming Mr. Thurman’s

conviction and sentence on January 28, 2025. See Appendix B. Mr. Thurman

invokes this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. Const. amend. II: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the

security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be

infringed.”

U.S. Const. amend. V: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,

except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual

service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the

same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in

any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public

use, without just compensation.”

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On January 9, 2023, Mr. Thurman pleaded guilty to participating in a

narcotics conspiracy. See [R. 169: Minute Entry for Rearraignment, Page ID #

591]; [R. 51: Superseding Indictment, Page ID # 218-35]. This case is about the

district court’s erroneous application of a firearm enhancement pursuant to USSG

§ 2D1.1(b)(1) and its impact on Mr. Thurman as he serves his sentence.

Following his guilty plea, the United States Probation Office (USPO)

prepared Mr. Thurman’s Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSR) and applied the

firearm enhancement because: (1) “several individuals provided statements” that

Mr. Thurman’s “co-defendant Mario Baker frequently carried a firearm while

distributing narcotics”; (2) law enforcement “seized two handguns” while

searching co-defendant Romeo Richardson’s residence; and (3) police recovered

two additional firearms at residences in Cincinnati, Ohio “associated with” Mr.

Thurman. [R.254: Sealed PSR, Page ID # 884, Paragraph 32]; id. at Page ID #

908. More specifically, a .380 Lorcin pistol was seized at a residence on Glen Este

Place and a Rohm RG14 .22 caliber revolver was discovered at a residence on

Bettman Drive in Cincinnati. Id.

At sentencing, co-defendant Mario Baker acknowledged that he possessed

firearms during the conspiracy period. However, Mr. Baker did not testify that Mr.

Thurman ever saw him with or knew he was in possession of a firearm. [R. 288:

4

Transcript, Sentencing, Page ID # 1110-11]; id. at Page ID # 1176, Lines 16-17.

Mr. Baker said the Glen Este Place residence belonged to Mr. Thurman’s

grandparents, and he never went inside. Id. at Page ID # 1112. The location on

Bettman Drive belonged to “a girl” Mr. Thurman “knew.” Id. at Page ID # 1113,

Line 17. Mr. Baker occasionally went into that residence to obtain drugs from Mr.

Thurman. Id. at Page ID # 1114-15.

FBI Task Force Officer (TFO) Mark Stidham testified about the execution of

search warrants at Bettman and Glen Este. Id. at Page ID # 1119. TFO Stidham

recalled a female at the Bettman Drive residence confirming Mr. Thurman stayed

there overnight, but he did not live there. Id. at Page ID # 1124. Officers found a

firearm in a sock in a bedroom at that location. Id. at Page ID # 1126, Lines 13-15.

Law enforcement found “multiple firearms” at the home on Glen Este, but only

one was seized—the Lorcin pistol. Id. at Page ID # 1128. The “other firearms

were claimed by someone else and left there[.]” Id. at Page ID # 1129, Lines 6-8.

Stidaham said another agent asked the occupants of the residence about the Lorcin,

and “they did not recognize” it. Id. at Lines 11-18.

On cross-examination, TFO Stidham agreed Mr. Thurman was not the

owner or legal occupant of either residence. Id. at Page ID # 1142. Stidham also

confirmed law enforcement never observed Mr. Thurman in possession of firearms

throughout the course of their months-long investigation. Id. at Page ID # 1143,

5

Lines 22-24. Stidham knew Mr. Thurman’s grandparents lived at the Glen Este

Place residence and recalled locating an old rifle during the search, but he said he

was unaware Mr. Thurman’s grandfather collected similar old items like the Lorcin

pistol discovered by police. Id. at Page ID # 1144-45; id. at Page ID # 1147.

Stidham noted that no witnesses ever mentioned Mr. Thurman being in possession

of guns. Nor did any photographs or other evidence collected during the

investigation establish Mr. Thurman had ever been in possession of the Lorcin or

any other firearm. Id. at Page ID # 1145-46.

The final witness at sentencing was Mr. Thurman’s father. Id. at Page ID #

1154. He grew up at the Glen Este Place address and discussed his father’s

deteriorating mental acuity. Id. He said Mr. Thurman stayed with his

grandparents at Glen Este on occasion, but he did not live there. Id. at Page ID #

1156. He also testified that he observed an old pistol in a dining room drawer

years prior to the search of the residence. Id. at Page ID # 1158; id. at Page ID #

1161.

In discussing the USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, the district court noted

that a weapon must be either actually or constructively possessed. Id. at Page ID #

1171, Lines 6-16. The Court said there had been no testimony that anyone had

ever seen Mr. Thurman in actual possession of firearms. Id. at Lines 11-18.

6

The government argued the enhancement could still apply because it was

“reasonable” for Mr. Thurman to infer that Mr. Baker possessed firearms during

the conspiracy. Id. at Page ID # 1172, Lines 18-21. Despite Mr. Thurman’s

father’s testimony, the government also said the enhancement was appropriate

because Mr. Thurman lived at Glen Este Place, and firearms were located there.

Id. at Page ID # 1173. The government conceded that “nobody saw” Mr. Thurman

“with those guns[,]” but insisted it did not matter because they were kept in a

residence where investigators believed drugs and drug proceeds were stored. Id. at

Lines 24-25.

The defense emphasized that Mr. Baker testified and said nothing about

seeing Mr. Thurman with a firearm despite their frequent dealings throughout the

conspiracy period. Id. at Page ID # 1177. Nor did any other witness claim to have

seen Mr. Thurman in possession of guns. Id. at Lines 19-21. The defense also

argued Mr. Thurman has no history of being a felon in possession of firearms and

that witness testimony suggested the firearm found at Glen Este Place had been

there for years. Id. at Page ID # 1177-79.

The district court ultimately applied the enhancement. The court noted that

Mr. Baker admitted he was in possession of firearms during the conspiracy period,

but there was no evidence that he “possessed…and showed a firearm to Mr.

Thurman during their mutual drug transactions over this four – or five-month

7

period.” Id. at Page ID # 1180, Lines 7-9. Despite those circumstances, the court

still found it was reasonably foreseeable to Mr. Thurman that Mr. Baker possessed

firearms within the scope of their jointly undertaken criminal activity. Id. at Page

ID # 1183.

More confusing, the district court also said the enhancement would apply

based on the firearms found at Bettman Drive and Glen Este Place. Id. at Page ID

# 1181-82. Despite making no specific finding that Mr. Thurman even knew the

firearms were present at those locations, the court said USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) was

triggered because it could not “conclude it was clearly improbable that [Mr.

Thurman’s] constructive possession of either of those firearms was connected with

his” drug trafficking. Id. at Page ID # 1182, Lines 12-15. Mr. Thurman was

sentenced to 210 months of incarceration. Id. at Page ID # 1183, Lines 22-25; id.

at Page ID # 1186, Lines 19-21; id. at Page ID # 1201, Lines 21-24. BOP policy

prohibits Mr. Thurman from earning time credits under the First Step Act because

the court applied the firearm enhancement. See 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(ii)

The Sixth Circuit denied Mr. Thurman’s direct appeal, concluding he had

constructive possession of the weapons found at Bettman Drive and Glen Este

Place because he exercised “dominion over” each residence. Appendix B, Pages

6-7. Like the district court, the Sixth Circuit said the firearm enhancement applied

because Mr. Thurman failed to show it was “clearly improbable” the guns “were

8

connected to his drug dealing.” Appendix B, Pages 6-7. It did not mention Mr.

Baker’s possession of firearms during the conspiracy period.

On January 17, 2025, former President Joseph R. Biden Jr. signed an

executive order commuting Mr. Thurman’s 210-month sentence to a term of 140

months. See [R. 301: Executive Grant of Clemency, Page ID # 1264].

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

The district court clearly erred by applying the USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1)

firearm enhancement.

When a defendant is convicted of a drug-related offense, USSG §

2D1.1(b)(1) authorizes district courts to apply a two-level enhancement “[i]f a

dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” For the enhancement to

be included at sentencing, “the government must establish that (1) the defendant

actually or constructively possessed the weapon, and (2) such possession was

during the commission of the offense.” United States v. West, 962 F.3d 183, 187

(6th Cir.2020) (citing United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1485 (6th Cir.1996)).

Constructive possession of a firearm “requires both knowledge of” the

weapon “and the intent to control it.” United States v. Allen, 43 F.4th 901, 910 (8th

Cir.2022) (citing United States v. Gilmore, 968 F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir.2020)). See

also, e.g., United States v. Wiltshire, 568 Fed.Appx. 135, 140 (3rd Cir.2014)

(constructive possession requires proof defendant “knew of the existence and his

9

possession” of the firearm); United States v. Kurns, 129 F.4th 589, 596-97 (9th

Cir.2025) (citing United States v. Terry, 911 F.2d 272, 278 (9th Cir.1990)).

To show that possession of a firearm by one co-conspirator is attributable to

another through relevant conduct, the government must prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that his coconspirator would possess a firearm. United States v. Woods, 604 F.3d 286, 290

(6th Cir.2010). Various circuits have “explicitly rejected the fiction that a firearm’s

presence always will be foreseeable to persons participating in illegal drug”

activity. United States v. Barron, 940 F.3d 903, 912 (6th Cir.2019) (citing United

States v. Catalan, 499 F.3d 604, 607 (6th Cir.2007) (citing United States v.

Cochran, 14 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir.1994) (citing United States v. White, 875

F.2d 427, 429-33 (4th Cir.1989)))).

The district court clearly erred in this case. The record contains no evidence

confirming that Mr. Thurman knew firearms were present at the Bettman Drive

and Glen Este Place residences. A defendant cannot constructively possess a

firearm without knowing of its existence and presence. See Allen, 43 F.4th at 910;

Wiltshire, 568 Fed.Appx. at 140; Kurns, 129 F.4th at 596-97. The government

offered no testimony or other proof establishing that Mr. Thurman was even aware

of the firearms found at Bettman and Glen Este, much less than he intended to

10

exercise control over them. Constructive possession cannot be established without

such evidence.

Making matters worse, the district court failed to make any factual findings

about whether Mr. Thurman knew firearms were at those locations. This error

violates Rule 32(i)(3)(B) and confirms the court could not have properly applied

the firearm enhancement based on Mr. Thurman’s supposed constructive

possession of the guns at issue. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)

(district court must “adequately explain chosen sentence to allow for meaningful

appellate review”); United States v. Rodriguez, 482 Fed.Appx. 231, 237-38 (9th

Cir.2012) (district court’s failure to make requisite factual findings before

imposing enhancement required remand). It also undermines the Sixth Circuit’s

conclusion that the enhancement was properly applied because Mr. Baker

exercised “dominion and control” over the Bettman and Glen Este residences.

Appendix B, Pages 6-7. Without proof that he was aware firearms were present in

those locations, Mr. Thurman’s alleged control over the premises is irrelevant.

Co-defendant Mario Baker’s testimony about his own possession of firearms

was also insufficient to apply the enhancement. As the district court and the

government each acknowledged, Mr. Baker said nothing about Mr. Thurman

having any awareness of his possession of firearms during the conspiracy. See [R.

288: Transcript, Sentencing, Page ID # 1180, Lines 7-9]; id. at Page ID # 1173,

11

Lines 24-25. As a result, the district court’s finding that Mr. Baker’s possession

was reasonably foreseeable to Mr. Thurman is unsupported by the record. Instead,

the court apparently presumed Mr. Thurman must have been aware that Mr. Baker

possessed a gun in furtherance of the conspiracy simply because they had engaged

in drug transactions together. See id. at 1183. Such an assumption was

impermissible. See Barron, 940 F.3d at 912 (citing Catalan, 499 F.3d at 607

(citing Cochran, 14 F.3d at 1132 (citing White, 875 F.2d at 429-33 (4th

Cir.1989)))). This likely explains why the Sixth Circuit made no mention of Mr.

Baker’s gun possession in its opinion. See Appendix B, Pages 6-7.

Mr. Thurman understands a “district court’s finding that a defendant

possessed a firearm during a drug crime is a factual finding subject to the clearly

erroneous standard of review.” United States v. Benson, 591 F.3d 491, 504 (6th

Cir.2010) (citing United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir.2003)). The

record in this case meets that standard. Mr. Thurman believes full consideration of

the “entire evidence” will leave this Court “with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed[.]” West, 962 F.3d at 187 (citing United States

v. Orlando, 363 F.3d 596, 603 (6th Cir.2004)). For those reasons, he asks the Court

to grant his petition in order to vacate application of the USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1)

firearm enhancement in his case.

12

II.

General application of the USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement

and related BOP policy violate equal protection and Second

Amendment principles.

This Court recently has reiterated that “the right to keep and bear arms is

among the fundamental rights necessary to our system or ordered liberty.” United

States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 690 (2024) (citing McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S.

742, 778 (2010)). See also, e.g., New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v.

Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626

(2008). “[T]he enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain

policy choices off the table.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.

In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act (FSA), Pub. L. No. 115-391,

132 Stat. 5194. Among other reforms, the FSA includes a provision directing the

Attorney General to provide incentives and rewards for prisoners to participate in

“evidence-based recidivism reduction” programming. 18 U.S.C. § 3632. The FSA

allows inmates to earn time credits by successfully participating in certain antirecidivism programs or productive activities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4). The

time credits are applied toward pre-release custody or supervised release. Id. at §

3632(d)(4)(C). However, prisoners who are “serving a sentence for a conviction”

for certain enumerated offenses are ineligible to earn FSA time credits. Id. at §

3632(d)(4)(D).

13

Mr. Thurman’s conspiracy conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846 is not an

excluded offense. Id. Yet the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has concluded that a 2016

provision in the Code of Federal Regulations categorically prohibits all defendants

who receive a firearm enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) from earning time

credits under the FSA. See 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(ii). Compare Lopez v. Davis,

531 U.S. 230, 244 (2001) (BOP may categorically exclude incarcerated individuals

from RDAP eligibility based on their ”prior involvement with firearms, in

connection with the commission of a felony”); 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) (“The

period a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense remains in custody after

successfully completing a treatment program may be reduced by the Bureau of

Prisons[.]”).

Mr. Thurman is currently in BOP custody completing his 140-month

sentence. He is eager to take advantage of the rewards and incentives mandated by

Congress in the FSA. But contrary to important constitutional principles, the BOP

will not allow Mr. Thurman to do so because his grandfather stored a firearm in a

drawer in the dining room of his home. This result improperly prevents Mr.

Thurman from receiving equal treatment under the law and unconstitutionally

discourages citizens like Mr. Thurman’s grandfather from exercising their

fundamental “right to keep and bear arms.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 690. See also

United States v. Missouri, 114 F.4th 980, 983 (8th Cir.2024) (citing Second

14

Amendment Preservation Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1.410-1.485 (2021)) (discussing

Missouri law prohibiting government action “that might be reasonably expected to

create a chilling effect on the purchase or ownership of [firearms] by law-abiding

citizens”) (certiorari petition No. 24-796 docketed January 27, 2025).

The time has come for this Court to intervene. This case offers the Court a

unique opportunity to address an important policy issue that clearly implicates the

Second Amendment and due process rights of numerous citizens, incarcerated or

otherwise. The United States Sentencing Commission has directed district courts

to presume the firearm enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) should apply

based merely on the presence of a firearm. See USSG § 2D1.1, comment.

(n.11(A)) (“The enhancement should be applied if the weapon was present, unless

it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.”). We

know possession as a matter of law “requires both knowledge of” the weapon “and

the intent to control it[,]” yet the BOP categorically excludes inmates like Mr.

Thurman from earning time credits based solely on application of this

enhancement. Allen, 43 F.4th at 910. Mr. Thurman’s injury is not theoretical or

qualified—BOP policy guarantees it.

Congress mentioned nothing about the firearm enhancement in the FSA, yet

the BOP’s policy choice categorically undermines the liberty interests of

individuals like Mr. Thurman every day. As this Court has noted, the days of

15

agency deference are over, see Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S.

369 (2024), and “the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain

policy choices off the table.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. The Court should grant

certiorari to vindicate Mr. Thurman’s rights. The Court also should grant certiorari

to protect the Second Amendment interests of law-abiding citizens like Mr.

Thurman’s grandfather.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Thurman respectfully requests this Court

grant his petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari for the purpose of vacating

the two-level firearm enhancement applied by the district court at sentencing.

Respectfully submitted,

____________________________

JARROD J. BECK

LAW OFFICE OF JARROD J. BECK, PLLC

101 WEST SHORT STREET

LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY 40507

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER

16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Jarrod J. Beck, counsel for Petitioner Carlos Edward Thurman, Jr., do

hereby certify that the original and ten copies of this Petition for Writ of Certiorari

were mailed to the Office of the Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States,

Washington, DC 20543. I also certify that a true copy of the Petition was served

by mail with first-class postage prepaid upon Anthony Bracke, Assistant United

States Attorney, 207 Grandview Drive, Suite 400, Fort Mitchell, Kentucky 41017.

This 28th day of April, 2025.

____________________________

JARROD J. BECK

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER

17