Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Brandon A. Dunkleberger, Petitioner v. Illinois

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

______________________________________

BRANDON DUNKLEBERGER, Petitioner,

-vsPEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent.

______________________________________

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Appellate Court Of Illinois

______________________________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

______________________________________

JAMES E. CHADD

State Appellate Defender

SANTIAGO A. DURANGO

Counsel of Record

Deputy Defender

Office of the State Appellate Defender

Third Judicial District

770 E. Etna Road

Ottawa, IL 61350

(815) 434-5531

3rddistrict.eserve@osad.state.il.us

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER

Of Counsel:

Vaidehi Suriyanarayanan

Assistant Appellate Defender

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Is Illinois bound by this Court’s rule that a guilty plea is not valid when the

defendant is not informed of the essential elements of the crime?

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented for Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Opinion Below . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Statement of Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Statement of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Reason for Granting the Petition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE BY IGNORING THIS COURT’S

RULES FOR GUILTY PLEAS, ILLINOIS COURTS HAVE VIOLATED THE

SUPREMACY CLAUSE, HAVE CREATED A SPLIT BETWEEN STATE COURTS,

AND HAVE UNDERCUT THE INCENTIVE FOR USING GUILTY PLEAS.

A.

The Illinois courts are violating the Supremacy Clause. . . . . . . . . . . . 9

B.

The instant case is an ideal vehicle for this Honorable Court to reiterate

the scope of the Supremacy Clause and its importance in maintaining the

rule of law.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Appendix A: Illinois Appellate Court’s decision filed on October 10, 2024, affirming

Defendant’s conviction. People v. Dunkleberger, 2024 IL App (3d) 230674-U.

Appendix B: Illinois Supreme Court’s order filed on January 29, 2025, denying

Defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. People v. Dunkleberger, 251 N.E.3d 399

(Table), 479 Ill. Dec. 777 (2025).

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Page

Federal Cases:

Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 11

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 10

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

James v. City of Boise, Idaho, 577 U.S. 306 (2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Martinez v. Illinois, 572 U.S. 833 (2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

State Cases:

In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Jones v. State, 936 So. 2d 993 (Miss. App. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Miller v. State, 970 A.2d 332 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

People v. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 240 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

People v. White, 2011 IL 109616 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

State v. Alexander, 279 P. 3d 371 (Utah 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Federal Constitutional Provisions:

U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 10

iii

U.S. Const. amend. V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Federal Statutory Provisions:

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

State Statutory Provisions:

720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (2022). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3

720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3

720 ILCS 5/4-4 (2022). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

720 ILCS 5/4-5 (2022). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(A) (eff. March 7, 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

State Supreme Court Rules:

Ill. S. Ct. R. 402(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

iv

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

______________________________________

BRANDON DUNKLEBERGER, Petitioner,

-vsPEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent.

______________________________________

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Appellate Court Of Illinois

______________________________________

The petitioner, Brandon Dunkleberger (hereinafter Defendant), respectfully

prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINION BELOW

The decision of the Illinois Appellate Court (Appendix A) is reported at People

v. Dunkleberger, 2024 IL App (3d) 230674-U, and is not published. The order of the

Supreme Court of Illinois denying leave to appeal (Appendix B) is reported at People

v. Dunkleberger, 251 N.E.3d 399 (Table), 479 Ill. Dec. 777 (2025).

JURISDICTION

On October 10, 2024, the Appellate Court of Illinois issued its decision. No

petition for rehearing was filed. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied a timely filed

petition for leave to appeal on January 29, 2025. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

-1-

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution

“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made

in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the

authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the

judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or

laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges

or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.

amend. XIV, §1.

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution

“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges

or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.

amend. V.

Illinois Aggravated Domestic Battery Statute

“A person who, in committing a domestic battery, strangles another

individual commits aggravated domestic battery. For the purposes of this

subsection (a-5), “strangle” means intentionally impeding the normal breathing

or circulation of the blood of an individual by applying pressure on the throat or

neck of that individual or by blocking the nose or mouth of that individual.” 720

ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (2022).

Illinois Domestic Battery Statute

“A person commits domestic battery if he or she knowingly without legal

justification by any means causes bodily harm to any family or household

member.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (2022).

-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 11, 2022, Defendant was charged by indictment with one count of

aggravated domestic battery, an Illinois Class 2 felony with a sentencing range of three

to seven years. The charge alleged that,

“defendant in committing a domestic battery . . . intentionally

strangled Katelynn Buchanan, a family or household member” (C. 23)

(emphasis added). 720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (2022).

He was also charged with one count of simple domestic battery, an Illinois Class

4 felony with a sentencing range of one to three years. The charge alleged that,

“defendant, knowingly and without legal justification, caused

bodily harm to Katelynn Buchanan, a family or household member of the

defendant, in that said defendant strangled Katelyn Buchanan, and the

defendant having been previously convicted of the offense of domestic

battery” (C. 24) (emphasis added). 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (2022).

Defense counsel waived a formal reading of the charges (R. 16).

During Defendant’s first appearance, the following exchange occurred between

the court and Defendant:

“THE DEFENDANT: So I have a Class 2 felony? They’re not both

Class 4s?

THE COURT: Pardon me?

THE DEFENDANT: Both of my charges are not Class 4 felonies?

THE COURT: This one’s a Class 2 felony. You have a Class 2

and a Class 4. Okay?” (R. 11).

On December 21, 2022, Defendant entered a partially negotiated plea of guilty

to the aggravated domestic battery charge, which carried a minimum sentence of three

years (C. 54-55; R. 46-54). 720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (2022). Under the terms of the

agreement, the State capped its recommended sentence to four years and dismissed the

charge of simple domestic battery (R. 47).

-3-

The court’s entire admonishment as to the nature of the offense was, “[i]t’s my

understanding you want to plead guilty to aggravated domestic battery. This is a Class

2 felony” (R. 48).

The State’s factual basis set forth the following:

“Katelynn Buchanan would testify that on September 26th of 2022

she was involved in a dating relationship and had a child in common with

an individual she would identify in open court to be the defendant

Brandon Dunkleberger. Ms. Buchanan would also testify that the two

parties resided together, and she awoke that morning to the defendant

striking her. She would testify that the defendant continued to strike her

about the head eventually grabbing her by the throat and holding her

down on the bed against the pillows by her throat. Katelynn would testify

that while she was being choked by the defendant she found it difficult to

breathe, that her face become hot and flushed and that she began to have

difficulty seeing, and her vision was blurry. Ms. Buchanan would further

testify that the defendant was over the age of 18 at the time this

occurred, and she would testify that this occurred here in LaSalle

County” (R. 40-41).

Defense counsel agreed that the evidence at a trial would correspond with the

assertions set forth in the State’s factual basis (R. 41). There is no showing in the

record that any of the elements of the aggravated domestic battery offense were ever

explained to Defendant by the court or defense counsel.

The court accepted Defendant’s plea of guilty, and, on February 23, 2023,

sentenced Defendant to three years’ imprisonment in the Illinois Department of

Corrections (C. 67; R. 76).

On March 10, 2023, Defendant filed a pro se motion to vacate the guilty plea,

claiming that his plea was involuntary because his counsel had promised Defendant

he would receive probation (C. 76-77). On June 27, 2023, new post-plea counsel filed

an amended motion to withdraw the guilty plea, reiterating the arguments raised in

the pro se motion (C. 91-92).

-4-

On November 17, 2023, during the hearing on the motion, Defendant’s original

guilty plea counsel was questioned about Defendant’s claim, and the following

exchange occurred:

“Q. All right. Do you recall what Mr. Dunkleberger had been

charged with?

A. Yes, it was an aggravated domestic battery alleging

strangulation.

Q. Okay. Is there anything that would – the allegation of

strangulation, does that mean anything to you or change any of the

circumstances?

A. Well, I know that strangulation makes the offense a Class 2

felony” (R. 114).

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Defendant’s motion to

withdraw his guilty plea (C. 108; R. 145).

On appeal to the Illinois appellate court, Defendant argued that his plea was

invalid as a matter of plain error because the trial court failed to admonish him of any

of the elements of the offense of aggravated domestic battery and because there was

no showing in the record that defense counsel had explained the essential elements of

the offense to him. Defendant relied on this Court’s opinions in Henderson v. Morgan,

426 U.S. 637 (1976), and Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005), for this argument.

The Illinois appellate court rejected Defendant’s argument and affirmed his

conviction, finding that no plain error occurred because “the court is not required to

apprise a defendant of the elements of the offense prior to accepting a guilty plea,” as

“this obligation is best left to defense counsel.” People v. Dunkleberger, 2024 IL App

(3d) 230674-U ¶ 14.

On January 29, 2025, the Supreme Court of Illinois entered an order denying

Defendant’s timely filed petition for leave to appeal. People v. Dunkleberger, 131211,

2025 WL 379922 (Ill. January 29, 2025).

-5-

REASON FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI

CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE BY IGNORING THIS

COURT’S RULES FOR GUILTY PLEAS, ILLINOIS COURTS HAVE VIOLATED

THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, HAVE CREATED A SPLIT BETWEEN STATE

COURTS, AND HAVE UNDERCUT THE INCENTIVE FOR USING GUILTY

PLEAS.

Because Defendant may have pled guilty to a crime that he did not commit by

not being informed of any of the elements of the crime before entering his plea, the

outcome of this case was clearly controlled by this Court’s opinions in Henderson v.

Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), and Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005). These

opinions make it clear that a guilty plea is not valid when the defendant is not

informed of the essential elements of the offense before entering his plea. Yet, the

Illinois appellate court affirmed Defendant’s guilty plea conviction although he was not

informed of any of the elements of the offense before entering his plea. The decision in

this case violates the Supremacy Clause, departs from rulings on the question in other

states, and discourages the use of guilty pleas. This decision also reflects a pattern by

Illinois courts of ignoring this Court’s opinions on fundamental issues, a pattern that

needs to be addressed.

Here, Defendant pled guilty to aggravated domestic battery. Thus, this Court’s

jurisprudence controls whether his guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily made.

See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (the federal constitutional standards

governing guilty pleas apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment).

Specifically, this Court has made it clear that because guilty pleas waive fundamental

rights guaranteed by the constitution, it is critical that criminal defendants be

adequately informed of the circumstances and consequences of their guilty pleas. Brady

-6-

v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). In Henderson, this Court unambiguously

explained that a guilty plea cannot constitute an intelligent admission that the

defendant committed the offense unless he received “ ‘real notice of the true nature of

the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due

process’ “ Henderson, 426 U.S. at 644-45 (quoting Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334

(1941)). Henderson is particularly relevant due to its similarity to this case.

In Henderson, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder but

eventually pled guilty to the lesser uncharged offense of murder in the second-degree.

Henderson, 426 U.S. at 642. However, the defendant had an unusually low mental

capacity so it was therefore unclear whether he had even possessed the intent to

commit second-degree murder and had instead possessed only the intent for

manslaughter based on heat of passion. Id. at 659 n.16. In short, it was possible the

defendant may have unknowingly pled guilty to an offense he did not commit. Id at

645. Hence, the question for this Court was “whether a defendant may enter a

voluntary plea of guilty to a charge of second-degree murder without being informed

that intent to cause the death of his victim was an element of the offense.” Id. at 638.

This Court concluded that the defendant’s guilty plea was not voluntarily made

and had to be set aside because he was not advised by the court or defense counsel of

the essential mental state element of the offense. Id. at 645-47. This Court reasoned

that, “it is impossible to conclude that his plea to the unexplained charge of

second-degree murder was voluntary” because there “is nothing in this record that can

serve as a substitute for either a finding . . . or . . . admission, that respondent had the

requisite intent.” Id. at 646. This Court underscored that “[d]efense counsel did not

purport to stipulate to that fact; they did not explain to [the defendant] *** that his

plea would be an admission of that fact; and he made no factual statement or

-7-

admission necessarily implying that he had such intent.” Id. In sum, this Court’s

opinion in Henderson requires that for a guilty plea to be knowingly and intelligently

made, the defendant must be informed of the essential elements of the charged offense,

especially the mental state requirement, so that he does not inadvertently plead guilty

to an offense he did not commit.

Later in Stumpf, this Court clarified that it cannot be presumed that defense

counsel has explained the essential elements of the offense to the guilty plea

defendant. Stumpf, 545 U.S. at 183. Specifically, this Court noted that “[w]here a

defendant pleads guilty to a crime without having been informed of the crime’s

elements, [the voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently] . . . standard is not met and

the plea is invalid.” Id. This means that there needs to be a showing in the record that

the guilty plea defendant was affirmatively informed by the court or defense counsel

of the essential elements of the offense, including the mental state requirement. Id.

Accordingly, if the record fails to make this showing, the guilty plea is invalid because

it cannot be presumed from a silent record that the defendant was informed of the

essential elements of the offense.

Moreover, a failure to make such a showing in the record cannot be harmless,

because without this information, the unacceptable possibility arises that the

defendant pled guilty to an offense that he did not commit. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 64647. In short, Henderson and Stumpf clearly require that a guilty plea defendant be

informed of the essential elements of the offense for the plea to be knowing and

voluntary. Put differently, someone, whether it be the court or defense counsel, must

inform a guilty plea defendant of the essential elements of the offense before he enters

his plea.

-8-

These controlling principles were ignored in this case by the Illinois appellate

court, in violation of the Supremacy Clause, because it affirmed Defendant’s plea of

guilty to aggravated domestic battery based on strangulation although he was not

informed of the elements of the crime before pleading guilty. Specifically, Defendant

was never informed that the strangulation had to be intentional. 1 Moreover, the record

indicates that defense counsel himself did not understand the mens rea for the

aggravated domestic battery offense, and could therefore not have explained it to

Defendant, who had expressed confusion about the crime he was charged with

committing (R. 11, 114).

In sum, from Defendant’s point of view, both crimes involved strangulation but

it was not clear to him what made one offense more serious than the other because he

did not understand that the offense of aggravated domestic battery required that he

“intentionally” strangle the victim, whereas the lesser charge only required

knowledge.2 Therefore, as in Henderson, there is a possibility that Defendant

unknowingly pled guilty to a more serious crime that he did not commit. Henderson,

426 U.S. at 645.

A.

The Illinois courts are violating the Supremacy Clause.

On direct appeal to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Defendant emphasized that

the trial court and defense counsel’s failure to inform him of the essential elements of

aggravated domestic battery was not in compliance with Henderson and Stumpf.

1

In Illinois, a defendant acts intentionally when his “conscious objective or

purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct.” 720 ILCS 5/4-4 (2022).

2

In Illinois, a defendant acts knowingly when he is consciously aware that: (1)

his conduct is of the nature or attendant circumstances described by the statute

defining the offense; or (2) that the result, as proscribed by the statute, is practically

certain to be caused by his conduct. 720 ILCS 5/4-5 (2022).

-9-

However, the appellate court determined that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(1),

which was adopted to ensure “substantial compliance” with the requirements of

Boykin, did not require that the trial court explain the elements of the offense to the

defendant. People v. Dunkleberger, 2024 IL App (3d) 230674-U, ¶ 14; People v. Davis,

145 Ill. 2d 240, 249 (1991); Ill. S. Ct. R. 402(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2012). This was an error.

The constitutionally based ruling of Henderson applies to all state courts under the

Supremacy Clause because state and federal courts are “bound by this Court’s

interpretation of federal law.” James v. City of Boise, Idaho, 577 U.S. 306, 307 (2016);

U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; see Henderson, 426 U.S. at 653-659 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting)

(Henderson constitutionalized the requirement that the elements of the offense be

explained to the defendant). In short, the Illinois appellate court’s interpretation of the

rule violated the Supremacy Clause, as it is not in compliance with the protections

provided by the federal constitution. See In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 41 (Illinois

courts “are under a mandatory obligation to adhere” to the federal constitutional

commands).

The implication of the appellate court’s decision is that a guilty plea defendant

in Illinois has less constitutional protections than those provided by the United States

Constitution. However, the federal constitution sets a “floor” for protections that the

states cannot disregard. Cf. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 491 n.12 (1984).

Accordingly, the failure of Illinois to adhere to clear federal constitutional precedents

undermines the protections afforded to criminal defendants by the federal constitution.

In addition, by not following the federal precedent articulated in Henderson and

Stumpf, Illinois has created a split in authority with other jurisdictions. For example,

unlike in Illinois, in Utah, a trial court “may not accept [a guilty] plea until the court

has found that the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to

-10-

which the plea is entered” Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(A) (eff. March 7, 2025) (emphasis

added); see also State v. Alexander, 279 P. 3d 371, 382-383 (Utah 2012) (plea was not

knowingly and voluntarily made because the defendant was not informed of elements

of charge); Miller v. State, 970 A.2d 332, 346 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (although the

defendant was represented by counsel, guilty plea was involuntary because the

defendant was not adequately informed of nature and elements of crime; Jones v. State,

936 So. 2d 993, 998 (Miss. App. 2006) (“Stumpf requires a reliable indication that the

defendant has had the elements of his offense explained”). Thus, Illinois’ disregard of

the Supremacy Clause has unnecessarily created a split in authority between the state

courts.

Unfortunately, Illinois courts have a recent history of ignoring the federal

constitutional requirements that this Court has clearly enunciated in its decisions. For

example, this Court has explained that “a guilty plea to a felony charge entered

without counsel and without waiver of counsel is invalid” Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 n.6.

Yet in People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, the Supreme Court of Illinois ignored Brady

and gave effect to a guilty plea that was invalid because it had been entered without

the assistance of counsel. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶ 30;United States v. Broce, 488 U.S.

563, 569 (1970).

And in Martinez v. Illinois, 572 U.S. 833 (2014), this Court took the

extraordinary step of reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois based

only on the petition for certiorari because the court had ignored clearly established

precedent from this Court which established that double jeopardy attaches when the

jury is empaneled and sworn. Id. at 834.

Furthermore, this indifference to this Court’s precedents is senselessly

discouraging reliance on guilty pleas. The reality is that 97% of federal convictions and

-11-

94% of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134,

143 (2013); see People v. White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶ 35 (in 2009, more than 85% of

Illinois convictions resulted from guilty pleas). Because the criminal process “is for the

most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,” there is a critical need for

assurance that defendants are adequately informed of the circumstances and

consequences of their guilty pleas, especially since plea bargains involve the waiver of

fundamental constitutional rights. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012). If guilty

plea procedures are not fair, then criminal defendants will opt out of pleading guilty,

leading to an increased burden on judicial resources. Frye, 566 U.S. at 144.

Accordingly, this Court should grant review in order to reassert the Supremacy

Clause and redress the split in authority unnecessarily created by Illinois in the state

courts. Moreover, this Court’s direction is necessary to encourage the use of guilty pleas

in criminal cases because the erosion of due process protections for criminal defendants

who opt to plead guilty will have dire consequences on judicial resources.

B.

The instant case is an ideal vehicle for this Honorable Court to

reiterate the scope of the Supremacy Clause and its importance in

maintaining the rule of law.

While Defendant’s claim was not raised in the trial court, the issue may be

considered by this Court. In Henderson, this Court found that the failure to inform the

guilty plea defendant of the essential element of the charge was not a harmless error.

Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647. The error here was likewise not harmless because

Defendant was indeed prejudiced by the fact that he was allowed to plead guilty

despite having no knowledge as to the mental state requirement of aggravated

domestic battery. Specifically, the essential element of whether Defendant acted

“intentionally” in strangling the complainant was never addressed throughout the

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proceedings, including in the factual basis, which failed to mention the mens rea for the

offense.

Had Defendant been apprised of the essential elements of aggravated domestic

battery, he may have sought to plead to the lesser charge of knowing strangulation or

proceed with a jury trial, believing that the State could not prove the requisite

intentional mental state of aggravated domestic battery. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 64546. While it may have been inferred from the evidence that Defendant indeed

intentionally strangled the complainant, the jury “would not have been required to

draw that inference” and may have accepted an argument from Defendant that he only

possessed the knowledge mens rea for simple domestic battery. Id. However, because

Defendant was not provided adequate notice of the offense, any options he had were

foreclosed before he could even explore them.

In sum, this case presents an excellent vehicle to reaffirm the clearly established

federal precedent in Henderson and Stumpf. Defendant has fully exhausted his claims.

The relevant facts were established in the trial court and the record supports only one

finding–that the Illinois courts violated the Supremacy Clause in finding that

Defendant’s plea of guilty was knowingly and voluntarily made although he was not

informed of the mental state requirement for the offense of aggravated domestic

battery. Moreover, the systematic consequences of inaction would be significant,

considering Illinois’ pattern of disregarding or willfully misapplying binding federal

precedent. Accordingly, Defendant respectfully requests this Honorable Court to issue

a writ of certiorari to grant review.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari

issue to review the judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois.

Respectfully submitted,

SANTIAGO A. DURANGO

Counsel of Record

Deputy Defender

Office of the State Appellate Defender

Third Judicial District

770 E. Etna Road

Ottawa, IL 61350

(815) 434-5531

3rdDistrict@osad.state.il.us

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER

Of Counsel:

Vaidehi Suriyanarayanan

Assistant Appellate Defender

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