Opposition Brief — Jeffrey G. Hutchinson, Petitioner v. Florida, et al.

No. 24-7087

In The Supreme Court of the United States

JEFFREY GLENN HUTCHINSON

Petitioner,

Vv.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR MAy 1, 2025, AT 6:00 P.M.

JAMES UTHMEIER

Attorney General of Florida

CARLA SUZANNE BECHARD*

Associate Deputy Attorney General

Counsel of Record

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ScoTT BROWNE

3507 E. Frontage Rd., Ste. 200 Chief Assistant Attorney General

Tampa, Florida 33607

Telephone: (813) 287-7900 CHRISTINA Z. PACHECO

Scott.browne@myfloridalegal.com Senior Assistant Attorney General

capapp@myfloridalegal.com

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

Capital Case

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether this Court should review Hutchinson’s fact-intensive claim

based on his unsupported contention that due process demands more

than what he received in state court collateral proceedings once his

death warrant was signed when the claim was properly denied by the

state court and presents no conflict.

2. Whether this Court should accept certiorari to review Hutchinson’s

claim challenging the Governor’s discretion concerning death

warrants and his assertion that he should receive advance notice

prior to the signing of his death warrant when the claim does not

allege a true due process violation or present a conflict.1

3. Whether this Court should grant certiorari review of Hutchinson’s

claim requesting that Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), be

extended, when the state court denied the claim based on

independent procedural grounds and the court’s decision on the

merits correctly refused to extend Atkins to claims beyond intellectual

disability.

1 The first two questions are addressed under Section I. of Respondent’s Reasons for

Denying the Writ.

ul

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ......... ccc eecceeesceeeseeeeneeetececeeeseenecenseesesaeecseeeneasesensesseenseaaees ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS .0.......cccceeccceesceessnecesseereseeeseeeeseeeeseeeseaeseeeseuascaesseneeneuneeseaeeaee iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ...0.0........ccccccccseseeecsaceecenceeceseeeesseneeeeeaceessseeeseaneesesseneeeeeaes lv

OPINION BELOW ............cccccccsscccssseccssseecceceeeceseneessneeseceeeesacesensateessaeeessausasassaeagesaeaeees 1

JURISDICTION ........ccccccccssccceesscecsssnceesseeceesneceseaueeseaaensscessesaenseeseeeeseaseesesneeeseneeseneneees 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED........00. eee 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....00.. eee eeeeeeeee 2

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ....0....eceecceeesceeeeeeseeeeeeeeeaenesneeseeeesseeeesseneseeeeee 6

I. Certiorari Should Be Denied Where There Is No Federal Claim At Issue

And The Florida Supreme Court’s Ruling Is Correct And Conflict Free. ......... 6

A. This Case Does Not Present a Federal Claim Because There

is No Procedural Due Process Violation at Issue..............eesceeeeeseeeeseeeeeeeees 6

B. This Question Presented is Fact Intensive. ..............:::cccsessesseeesneeeees 10

C. The Florida Supreme Court’s Decision Was Correct And It

Does Not Conflict With Any Other Decision. ..............c:ccccccccsecserseeeteereeenees 11

II. Petitioner's Eighth Amendment Claim Does Not Warrant This Court’s

ReVICW. .......ccccccsssscceccccsensccessncesseeeeseeesaesesssaeeeeeeseasenaanaacaacascasseeenenseneeeeesenseeeeseeees 12

A. An Adequate And Independent Basis Supports The Florida

Supreme Court’s Resolution Of This Claim. ...........0...eesseeeeeesseeeeeeeeneeeteees 13

B. This Case Presents No Conflict, And The State’s Practice of

Following This Court’s Eighth Amendment Precedent Is Not A

Cert-Worthy Issue. ............ccccssccccceceeceesssseececececeecescessesceseeeeesesseaaeeseceseeseeeerens 16

CONCLUSION .........ccccccceseesececeesencceceecencececetesesssaeecesensaeacecesaaeeesseseaeeesessseaaeeseeesaeeneesees 18

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Armstrong v. Manzo,

380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) ........cccccccssscccesssseececeesseneeeecesscaceceeessnceeeeseeseaeeesecteaceeeessensnesers 6

Atkins v. Virginia,

586 U.S. 304 (2002)........cccccccesssssseeccseccesssnsneeeeacecceseecesseneananeaeeseeseeesneeaeeeeeseneenees 13, 16

Barwick v. Florida,

143 S. Ct. 2452 (2028) 0... ece ccc ccccecanncenseseneeeseeeeeeceseeeeeeeeeneeaeeneecssesceseenseueesesseeeeeeeoes 18

Barwick v. State,

361 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 2028)...........cccccssccccsssesceceeeseeeeeeseeceeneeseeseeaeeeeseeaeeeeeseesneeeeseeneees 14

Bosse v. Oklahoma,

1387 S. Ct. 1 (2016) oo ccccccccesssseccecssceeceecsscenseeseesecsueecescesceseeseesaaeeeseessaneesseseeereeees 17

Braxton v. United States,

500 U.S. 344, 847 (1991) oo... ccecsscceesseeeeeeesscececeesessneeeesesseecercssenseeeceeeuieeeeessnaeeeess 16

Coleman v. Thompson,

BOL U.S. 722 (1991) cocccseccseccsscsssecsseecsucsssecssecesuseseesseessesessssesssuversesssucsseeesevessversucerseen 15

Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne,

B57 U.S. 52, 67 (2009).........ccccccceeeesecceeesesccecceeesecceaeeseeeceneeeeeeceseeeceseeauareessasaaneaeecesoeseeees 6

Florida v. Powell,

559 U.S. 50 (2010) oo... cccccccesecesseeceseceesseneecescucenseseneceseceeesenneeseaaeeseeeeessseeeennsestees 14

Ford v. Florida,

145 GS. Ct. 1161 (2025) oo... cececccccesessceccessenceeecesseeseeeesseseeacescesenaeeceeessaaaeeesteeeeteanes 18

Foster v. Chatman,

B78 U.S. 488 (2016) 0... ccccesccecessssceeeeseeeeeeeeeseaaeeeeeeensaeecereceeeeeseeaeeeeeesessaeeseareeetees 13

Fox Film Corp. v. Muller,

296 U.S. 207 (1985) 2... eccccccceseeecceccsessescecececeecceeceeseaaereecceneaeseteasesenseeasaeeaseaueceeanaees 15

Herb v. Pitcairn,

B24 U.S. 117 (1945) oon cece ccsceneceeeaeseecceceeeeeesceaeeecsneeerecenaceseecereeneseseeeeeteeteess 13, 14

Hohn v. United States,

B24 U.S. 236 (1998) .....ccceeccccccccccecesssnneeceeeeseseesncnensnnaaeaeeseseeseseeaaanaeceeeeassesaquenenseaaanes 17

Hutchinson v. Florida,

677 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 2012) 0.0.0... ccccccccccceccecceeceeeeeeeeseeeeeeeseseseeseteeeseeeeeeeseceeeeeess 4

Hutchinson v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.,

2021 WL 6340256 (11th Cir. Mar. 24, 2021) (No. 21-10508-P) ........ cece eeeeeees 4

Hutchinson. v. State,

133 So. 3d 526 (Fla. 2014)...ccccccccecceccssecssecsuessecsuessessecssucssesssessuesseessessuessesssesssesssavecseee 4

iv

Hutchinson v. State,

17 So. 3d 696 (Fla. 2009) .........cccccccceesecceeecesceaeetesseneeeeseaneeeseeseececeeeeeeeseneeseeseeeeereeteas 3,4

Hutchinson v. State,

243 So. 3d 880 (Fla. 2018)............cccccssccccceceecesessseeeeecessseeesseneanaaceseeteeseseseuaaaeeseeeeeeeeeees 4

Hutchinson v. State,

348 So. 3d 50 (Fla. 2022)...........cccccssscceceseseeceeeeseeneeeeseaneeeeeeseaaeceeeesseeeersesseageeseessneeeeees 4

Hutchinson v. State,

882 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 2004)...cccccccesccescsesscecsesesesssesssuesssessessessasessesseesseessessesssseees 2, 3, 4, 8

Hutchinson v. State,

No. SC2025-0517, 2025 WL 1198037, (Fla. Apr. 25, 2025) .......... eee passim

Hutto v. Davis,

454 U.S. 370 (1982) oo. cccccsenscccccessececesecseneesesaeeeeeceaeeeceeeseaaeeeeeeeseceneeesesseeeeeesneaneeees 17

Illinois v. Gates,

AG2 U.S. 213 (1983) ccccccccceccseccsecsesssecssessucssessseeseccsuverecssecsuessecsusssessstesessessessevessessesen 11

Johnson v. Lee,

578 U.S. G05, GOO (QOIG) «0.00... cccccccsessccccceeeeeeseesceneeceeeeseessesennconceeeceseeseneeeeseeeeeeeeeeees 15

Michigan v. Long,

AG3 U.S. 1082 (1988) ...... cece ceecceccecsssseeesessseeeecesseneecesseeeeeceesuceseeecescsnusesecstceeeesessnteneess 15

Mungin v. State,

320 So. 3d 624 (Fla. 2020)... ceccssccccccscccecesssssnncecesseseensennaeeeeeeeeeeceeesauseeseeseeesesenanes 14

Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard,

523 U.S. 272, 288-89 (1998) .............:ccsscessssesssssssseneessesseseeueuseeeeeasessesseseeseeesesecesneenes 6,7

Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue,

ABD U.S. 182 (1987) ccccccccsecceecsesssecsecsseseesucersessecssesssessutssessusssuesaveseesaeessessaesaversueeneeen 16

Sochor v. Florida,

504 U.S. 527, 534 (1992) oo. eecceceseesececceneeceeccecceeeeeeseeceseecceeceecceueeeeseausaneetacesensees 14

Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Lid.

460 US. 538 (1988) oo... ccc cc secccsscccssccceceaeecneeceseecsaeeseueceesecsseeecceseceseseesceseeenseescaeees 17

United States v. Johnston,

268 U.S. 220 (1925) .ocsccecceccsessesssessucsseessucsecssuscsecsssessecsacsscsucssecsucssecsaeeseeesetsaeessseesseee 10

Wainwright v. Sykes,

A433 U.S. 72 (1977) .....ccccecccccsccccccccccesseneeeeeeceeeecesceanneeeeeeeseeedeesuessceaneesesseseseeeeeteeeesees 15

Walker v. Martin,

GZ U.S. 307, 316-17 (ZOD) .eeccececcscsseccsessecsecssecsuessessecsecsusssesseserscneceessessucsaceaecessessees 14

Other Authorities

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.8510) ..............cccccccsecseesssssnssnssnnseaeceeeceeeeeesenaesgessssssssesssesssesesenssceseess 14

Sup. Ct. R. 10... cece ee sseesseccsacceeeeeeeessssesnneeseeseseeseaaeeceeeeeeeeeseeseseeneneneeeeeseeeeesees 10, 11

Sup. Ct. R. 10(b).............

U.S. Const. amend. VIII

vi

OPINION BELOW

The Florida Supreme Court’s opinion is published at Hutchinson v. State, No.

SC2025-0517, 2025 WL 1198037, (Fla. Apr. 25, 2025).

JURISDICTION

On April 21, 2025, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the state

postconviction court’s summary denial of fourth successive postconviction motion. The

Florida Supreme Court also denied a stay and issued the mandate immediately, due

to the active warrant.

Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court based upon 28 U.S.C. §

1257(a). Respondent agrees that this statutory provision sets out the scope of this

Court’s certiorari jurisdiction but submits that this case is inappropriate for the

exercise of this Court’s discretionary jurisdiction.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, states: All

persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction

thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No

State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities

of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction

the equal protection of the laws.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “Excessive

bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual

punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Hutchinson murdered his live-in girlfriend, Renee Flaherty, and her three

young children: Logan, Amanda, and Geoffrey on September 11, 1998. See Hutchinson

v. State, 882 So. 2d 948, 948-49 (Fla. 2004). Hutchinson shot the four victims with

his pistol-grip Mossberg shotgun, which was found inside the home on the kitchen

counter. Id. at 948.

Hutchinson had been living with Renee and her three children prior to the

murders, and she and Hutchinson had a fight. Hutchinson, 882 So. 2d at 948.

Hutchinson, who had been drinking, loaded his clothes and guns into his truck and

drove to a local bar. He told the bartender that Renee was “pissed off’ at him, while

drinking more beer. Jd. at 948. Renee called a friend after Hutchinson left and

she told her friend that Hutchinson had left for good. Hutchinson, 882 So. 2d at 948.

But Hutchinson returned to the house after leaving the bar and broke down the front

door, which had been locked with a dead bolt. Id. at 949. In a drunken rage at Renee,

he shot her and her three small children. Renee was on the bed in the master

bedroom with her two youngest children.

Hutchinson shot her once in the head. Jd. at 948. Hutchinson also shot

Amanda once in the head. The deputies found the seven-year-old girl’s body on the

floor near the bed. Hutchinson shot Logan once in the head as well. The deputies

found the four-year-old boy’s body at the foot of the bed. Hutchinson shot Geoffrey

twice—once in the head and once in the chest. The deputies found the nine-year-old

boy’s body in the living room between the couch and the coffee table.

A 911 call from the victims' home, was received at 8:41p.m. (T. XXII 728,750).

The 911 caller stated: “I just shot my family.” (T. XXII 701). Deputies arrived at the

home within ten minutes of the 911 call and found Hutchinson on the ground in the

garage with the cordless phone nearby. Hutchinson, 882 So. 2d at 948. The caller

2

identified one of the victims as his girlfriend. (T. XXII 706).

One of the child victim's tissue, caused from the blowback of shooting the child

with a shotgun, was on Hutchinson's pants. Hutchinson, 17 So. 3d at 698. Hutchinson

also had gunshot residue on his hands. (T. XXV 1250). Hutchinson's shotgun was

positively identified as the murder weapon. The murder weapon was located on the

kitchen counter in the house. (T. XXII 621; XXVI 1547, 1552, 1557; XXVII 1710);

Hutchinson, 882 So. 2d at 948. All eight expended shells—the five involved in the

murders and the three located in the closet of the house—were from this shotgun.

(T. XXVI 1557).

On January 18, 2001, the jury convicted Hutchinson of four counts of firstdegree murder with a firearm. Hutchinson v. State, 882 So.2d 943, 948 (Fla. 2004).

Hutchinson waived his right to a penalty phase jury, but he presented mitigation

to the trial judge at a bench penalty phase. Id. The court found two aggravating

factors for the murders of Logan and Amanda: (1) previously convicted of another

capital felony for the murders of the other children; and (2) the victim was less than

12 years of age. Hutchinson, 882 So. 2d at 959.

The trial court found three aggravating factors for the murder of Geoffrey:

(1) previously convicted of another capital felony for the murders of the other

children; (2) the victim was less than 12 years of age; and (3) the murder was

heinous, atrocious, and cruel (HAC). Jd. at 959. The court found one statutory

mitigator: no significant history of prior criminal activity and gave it significant

weight, and 20 non-statutory mitigators. Hutchinson, 882 So. 2d at 959-60. On

February 6, 2001, the trial court imposed three death sentences for the murders of

each of the three children. Hutchinson, 882 So. 2d at 949. The trial court also

sentenced Hutchinson to life imprisonment for the murder of the children’s mother.

Hutchinson’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal.

Hutchinson, 882 So. 2d at 961. Hutchinson’s collateral challenges have been

universally rejected. Hutchinson v. State, 17 So. 3d 696 (Fla. 2009); Hutchinson v.

State, 133 So. 3d 526 (Fla. 2014); Hutchinson v. State, 248 So. 3d 880 (Fla. 2018);

Hutchinson v. State, 343 So. 3d 50, 54 (Fla. 2022); see also Hutchinson v. Florida,

677 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 2012); Hutchinson v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 2021 WL

6340256 (11th Cir. Mar. 24, 2021) (No. 21-10508-P).

On January 15, 2025, Hutchinson, filed a third successive postconviction

motion raising two claims: (1) a claim of newly discovered evidence of a mild

neurocognitive disorder due to traumatic brain injury (TBI) resulting from his

military service during the Gulf War; and (2) a claim of newly discovered evidence

of Gulf War Illness.

The State filed an answer to the third successive postconviction motion,

arguing that both claims of newly discovered evidence were untimely; the second

claim was procedurally barred because the matter of Hutchinson suffering from

Gulf War Illness was presented as mitigation at trial; and that neither diagnosis

would result in an acquittal of any of the four first-degree murder convictions at a

new trial or life sentences at a new penalty phase. The State asserted the third

successive postconviction motion should be summarily denied. On March 6, 2025,

the postconviction court held a case management conference.

On March 31, 2025, the Governor signed a warrant scheduling the execution

on May 1, 2025. The next day, April 1, 2025, a new judge was assigned to preside

over both the pending third successive postconviction motion and the warrant

litigation. On April 4, 2025, the postconviction court summarily denied the third

successive postconviction motion finding the claims to be untimely. And on April 8,

2025, the postconviction court denied the motion for rehearing, again determining

the successive claims to be untimely. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the

denial of relief. Hutchinson v. State, No. SC2025-0497, 2025 WL 1155717 (Fla. Apr.

21, 2025). Hutchinson’s petition for writ of certiorari is currently pending before

this Court. (24-7079).

On April 7, 2025, Hutchinson filed a fourth successive postconviction motion

raising four claims. On April 11, 2025, the postconviction court summarily denied

the fourth successive postconviction motion and denied a stay of execution. The

Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief. Hutchinson v. State, No.

SC2025-0517, 2025 WL 1198037, (Fla. Apr. 25, 2025). Hutchinson again seeks this

Court’s certiorari review as well as a stay of his execution.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. Certiorari Should Be Denied Where There Is No Federal Claim

At Issue And The Florida Supreme Court’s Ruling Is Correct And

Conflict Free.

A. This Case Does Not Present a Federal Claim Because

There is No Procedural Due Process Violation at Issue

Hutchinson loosely frames this issue as one involving due process; however,

Hutchinson makes no specific allegation amounting to a due process violation. The

fundamental requirement of due process is that a person be given “the opportunity to

be heard” at “meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380

U.S. 545, 552 (1965). This does not mean that a defendant must be given advanced

notice or limitless opportunities to be heard. See, e.g., Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v.

Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 288-89 (1998).

Due process applies to a person’s “protected entitlements” or “liberty interests,”

and the Due Process Clause imposes procedural limitations on a State’s power to take

away such interests. Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S.

52, 67 (2009). In cases in which a defendant has no such liberty interest, this Court has

found that he could not challenge the constitutionality of any procedures available to

him. See, e.g., id. at 67-68.

A defendant's due process rights during postconviction procedures are not equal

to a defendant's due process rights during trial, and they “must be analyzed in light of

the fact that he was already been found guilty at a fair trial and has only a limited

interest in postconviction relief.” Jd. at 69. Indeed, “the demands of due process are

reduced accordingly” after a defendant has been convicted of a crime.” Ohio Adult

Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 288 (1998). For example, only “some minimal

procedural safeguards apply to clemency proceedings.” Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289.

Here, Hutchinson challenges the Governor's discretion? in signing a warrant,

and he claims that he received delayed notice of his death warrant once signed (by

approximately three hours), and he had a “truncated warrant period” that forced his

defense team to work “around the clock to cobble together some pleadings.” Petition at

14-15. Hutchinson concludes that having to work under such time constraints during

the warrant period was fundamentally unfair and did “not equate to due process.”

Petition at 15.

Hutchinson further argues that because his third successive postconviction

motion was pending when the warrant was signed, the signing of his death warrant

resulted in the prompt resolution of his pending case that “suffocated” the court’s

deliberation. Petition at 16. And the “breakneck speed” of the warrant proceedings

made it difficult for his counsel to secure visits with his two mental health experts in

preparation of his fourth successive motion.’ Petition at 18-19.

In sum, Hutchinson complaints boil down to wanting more notice prior to the

warrant being signed and wanting more time to litigate his claims once the warrant

2 Hutchinson also generally complains about the Governor's “unfettered” discretion

regarding warrants, but “the Governor's executive discretion need not be fettered by

the types of procedural protections sought by [petitioner].” Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v.

Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 282 (1998).

3 As Hutchinson admits, he was evaluated by his two mental health experts. Petition

at 18. In addition, Hutchinson was provided competency evaluations and a hearing

on his (in)competency claim. Hutchinson was found competent and he has appealed

that finding to the Florida Supreme Court (2025-0590).

7

was signed. Hutchinson, however, fails to identify how the Due Process Clause was

violated in any way. Hutchinson was tried and convicted in 2001, and he appealed his

convictions and sentences to the Florida Supreme Court. Hutchinson v. State, 882 So.

2d 943 (Fla. 2004). For more than twenty years, Hutchinson has been raising

postconviction claims in the postconviction court and appealing the denial of those

claims. See Hutchinson v. State, No. SC2025-0517, 2025 WL 1198037, at *2 (Fla. Apr.

25, 2025). In total, he raised four separate postconviction challenges in state court prior

to the signing of his death warrant. And he also challenged his convictions and death

sentences in federal court.

Hutchinson received both notice and the opportunity to be heard. His attorneys

received notice of the death warrant within hours of it being filed. Hutchinson fails to

cite to any authority showing that due process requires advance notification of a death

warrant or express notice within a specified timeframe.

The warrant was signed on March 31, 2025, and the warrant listed Hutchinson's

scheduled execution for May 1, 2025. Hutchinson’s counsel received notice of the

warrant the same day that it was signed. On April 1, 2025, in response to the Governor

signing Hutchinson’s warrant, the Florida Supreme Court issued a scheduling order

outlining when the parties’ pleadings should be filed in the state trial and appellate

courts. Hutchinson’s counsel was served with this order. Hutchinson had notice of all

of the hearings and deadlines in state court, and Hutchinson was heard at every stage.

Hutchinson filed his fifth postconviction motion and he litigated and appealed his

postconviction claims. Due process is not at issue here.

Hutchinson’s complaint that the signing of his death warrant improperly sped

up the resolution of his pending postconviction claim fares no better. Hutchinson does

not contend that he was denied notice or an opportunity to be heard on his pending

motion. Instead, he speculates that the lower court did not have enough time to resolve

his claims. And he further assumes that the Florida Supreme Court did not have

adequate time to review the appeal of his fourth successive postconviction claims,

despite the majority opinion’s assurance that it did. See Hutchinson v. State, No.

SC2025-0517, 2025 WL 1198037, at n.7 (Fla. Apr. 25, 2025).

Hutchinson has identified no true due process violation here. What is more, the

warrant schedule issued by the Governor and the discretion afforded to the Governor

in selecting and issuing death warrants is a matter of state law. Hutchinson did not

have a right under the United States Constitution to even raise this challenge.

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10

(1989) (holding that, in the capital context, “[s]tate collateral proceedings are not

constitutionally required as an adjunct to the state criminal proceedings and serve a

different and more limited purpose than either the trial or appeal”). Thus, it cannot

even be said that due process extends to these circumstances surrounding the state’s

warrant procedures, but even if it does, Hutchinson has not shown an actual due

process violation.

Hutchinson’s federal due process claim violation based upon the warrant

schedule in his successive state collateral proceedings rests upon a very thin

constitutional premise. Hutchinson’s case has long been final on state and federal

review. He can hardly complain about the setting and timing of a warrant—all of

which are matters of state law.

Hutchinson’s contention that he should have been given more time to litigate

his fifth postconviction motion after his death warrant was signed does not equate to a

due process challenge. Because no federal claim is truly at issue here, this case is not

worthy of this Court’s attention.

B. This Question Presented is Fact Intensive.

In order to squarely rule on the due process question presented by Hutchinson,

this Court would have to engage in intensive factual analysis and determination, and

this Court generally does not like to engage in its own fact finding. “We do not grant a

certiorari to review evidence and discuss specific facts.” United States v. Johnston,

268 U.S. 220, 227 (1925).

In addition, resolution of Hutchinson’s question would require this Court to

put itself in the position of the state courts to determine whether the state courts had

sufficient time to resolve the expedited proceedings. This Court rarely grants a

petition for writ of certiorari “when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual

findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.” Sup. Ct. R. 10. But

Hutchinson’s argument does not even meet that meager threshold. He asks this Court

to second-guess the judgment of the state courts and to find that the state courts had

inadequate time to promptly resolve the proceedings, despite having any indication

to the contrary. Hutchinson has not set forth any compelling reason for this Court to

exercise its discretionary review in granting the petition for writ of certiorari. Sup.

10

Ct. R. 10.

C. The Florida Supreme Court’s Decision Was Correct And

It Does Not Conflict With Any Other Decision.

In light of there being no due process violation, the Florida Supreme correctly

affirmed the denial of Hutchinson’s “due process claim” based on the truncated

warranted period. “[A]lthough the warrant period in this case was admittedly short

and the record lengthy, Hutchinson has been able to raise numerous postconviction

claims and advance arguments to support them.” Hutchinson v. State, No. SC2025-

0517, 2025 WL 1198037, at *4 (Fla. Apr. 25, 2025). The court noted that the order

challenged offered both record and rules based reasons for rejecting Hutchinson's

claims. Id. The Florida Supreme Court’s decision comports with this Court’s

jurisprudence that due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard—and

Hutchinson received both. While Hutchinson asserts that due process demands more,

he has cited no controlling authority requiring that it do so.

Significantly, Hutchinson alleges no conflict between the lower court’s decision

and the decision from any other court. Hutchinson fails to allege a conflict, because

there is none. Indeed, there the Florida Supreme Court’s decision does not conflict with

the decision of another state court of last resort or a United States court of appeals, nor

did the lower court decide an important question of federal law that conflicts with a

decision from this Court. Sup. Ct. R. 10. As this Court has acknowledged, “there are

strong reasons to adhere scrupulously to the customary limitations of [the Court’s]

discretion.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). Certiorari review is improper

here.

11

Il. Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment Claim Does Not Warrant This

Court’s Review.

At the outset, Hutchinson argues that the Florida Supreme Court “opt[ed] out” of

reviewing his Eighth Amendment challenge. Petition at i, 19-21. That is not so. The

Florida Supreme Court addressed Hutchinson’s claim and found it contrary to this

Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as well as Florida Supreme Court precedent.

Hutchinson, No. SC2025-0517, 2025 WL 1198037, at *5—6. The lower court’s opinion

specifically recognized this Court’s “Eighth Amendment jurisprudence forbids statutes

that allow imposition of arbitrary death sentences.” Jd. at 5. And the court

acknowledged that “that aspect of the Eighth Amendment is satisfied when the

challenged statute sufficiently narrows the class of persons eligible for the death

penalty...We have repeatedly held that Florida's death-penalty statute accomplishes

this.” Id.

The lower court further recognized that the Eighth Amendment “requires

individualized sentencing, which gives the capital defendant the right to present

mitigating evidence to his sentencer.” Jd. It concluded that “Hutchinson vindicated this

right by presenting mitigating evidence at his penalty phase. And despite his

invocation of vague constitutional principles, Hutchinson has not cited any authority

holding that the Eighth Amendment provides an absolute right to present mitigating

evidence at any time, regardless of its availability, regardless of the defendant's

diligence in locating and presenting it, and regardless of its strength or force.” Id. The

court concluded that “Hutchinson seeks an unjustified extension of the U.S. Supreme

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Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and his claim is inconsistent with our

precedent.” Id. at *6.

To the extent that Hutchinson claimed that his combat-related issues exempted

him from execution, the court disagreed and found precedent undermined his

arguments. Id. The court also addressed the claim raised in Hutchinson’s habeas

petition that Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), should extend to individuals, like

Hutchinson, with certain neurocognitive disorders. The court found the claim

procedurally barred and meritless, as it has “repeatedly refused to extend Aékins

beyond the intellectual-disability context. Id.

Hutchinson’s characterization of the lower court “opting out” of Eighth Amendment

review is simply incorrect. Hutchinson’s disagreement with the resolution of his claims

is not a valid reason to warrant this Court’s review.

A. An Adequate And Independent Basis Supports The

Florida Supreme Court’s Resolution Of This Claim.

The Florida Supreme Court denied Hutchinson’s Atkins-extension claim based on

state procedural law. When both state and federal questions are involved in a state

court proceeding, this Court has no jurisdiction to review the case if the state court

judgment rests on a state law ground that is both independent of the merits of the

federal claim and an adequate basis for the court’s decision. Foster v. Chatman, 578

U.S. 488, 497 (2016). This “independent and adequate state ground” rule stems from

the fundamental principle that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review matters of state

law. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125—26 (1945). This Court has explained that

“folur only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they

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incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not

to revise opinions” or enter advisory opinions. Jd. “[I]f the same judgment would be

rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review

could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.” Id. Ifa state court’s decision

is based on separate state law, this Court “of course, will not undertake to review the

decision.” Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 57 (2010).

Florida law generally prohibits a death row inmate from raising a claim in a

successive postconviction proceeding that could have been raised previously. Fla. R.

Crim. P. 3.851(d); see also Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785, 795 (Fla. 2023) (finding

Atkins-extension claim untimely and reiterating that procedural bars apply to

exemption-from-execution claims). “It is incumbent upon the defendant to establish

the timeliness of a successive postconviction claim.” Mungin v. State, 320 So. 3d 624

(Fla. 2020). Hutchinson failed to establish that his Atkins-extension claim was timely,

and instead, he incorrectly asserted that the state’s procedural bars did not apply.

This Court should not review the Florida Supreme Court’s decision when

Hutchinson’s claim was deemed untimely and procedurally barred under state law.

The Florida Supreme Court’s determination that the claim was untimely and

procedurally barred is based on independent and adequate state grounds that is

independent of any federal question. See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316—

17 (2011) (finding California’s time bar qualified as an adequate state procedural

ground); Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 534 (1992) (holding this Court lacked

jurisdiction to decide a federal claim that the Florida Supreme Court decided both on

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the merits and on preservation grounds); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87

(1977) (concluding that Florida procedure regarding preservation amounted to an

independent and adequate state procedural ground which prevented review); see also

Johnson v. Lee, 578 U.S. 605, 609 (2016) (acknowledging that state postconviction

court is generally not used to litigate claims that were or could have been raised at

trial or direct appeal, and finding that the procedural bar “qualifies as adequate to

bar federal habeas review”). Federal courts must not lightly “disregard state

procedural rules that are substantially similar to those to which we give full force in

our own courts.” Lee, 578 U.S. at 609.

This Court has long recognized that where a state court judgment rests on nonfederal grounds, where the non-federal grounds are an adequate basis for the ruling

independent of the federal grounds, “our jurisdiction fails.” Fox Film Corp. v. Muller,

296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991); Michigan

v. Long, 463 U.S. 1082, 1038, 1041-42 (1983). Moreover, this Court has denied

certiorari review in other active death warrant cases in which the Florida Supreme

Court has found similarly raised claims procedurally barred. See, eg.,

Ford v. Florida, 145 S. Ct. 1161 (2025) (Roper-extension claim), Barwick v. Florida,

143 S. Ct. 2452 (2023) (Atkins-extension claim). Given that the Florida Supreme

Court’s denial of this claim rests on an adequate and independent state law ground,

this Court lacks jurisdiction, and the petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

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B. This Case Presents No Conflict, And The State’s

Practice of Following This Court’s Eighth Amendment

Precedent Is Not A Cert-Worthy Issue.

There is no conflict between this Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and

the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in this case. Nor is there any conflict between the

Florida Supreme Court’s decision and the decision of another state supreme court or a

United States appellate court.

As this Court has observed, a principal purpose for certiorari jurisdiction “is to

resolve conflicts among the United States courts of appeals and state courts concerning

the meaning of provisions of federal law.” Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347

(1991); see also Sup. Ct. R. 10(b) (listing conflict among federal appellate courts and

state supreme courts as a consideration in the decision to grant review). Issues that

have not divided the courts or are not important questions of federal law do not merit

this Court’s attention. Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 482 U.S. 182, 184

n.3 (1987). In the absence of such conflict, certiorari is rarely warranted. Hutchinson

cites no case showing a conflict between his Eighth Amendment claim.

Likewise, Hutchinson fails to show how he was required to have this Court’s

decision in Atkins extended to him based on his mental health issues related to his

military service. He cites to no case from this Court or any other court in which a court

has held that the Eighth Amendment demands such application.

In addition, Hutchinson’s challenge to Florida’s conformity clause does not

involve a conflict, nor does it render this case worthy of this Court’s attention. While

acknowledging that this Court does not require states to offer more Eighth Amendment

protection than this Court’s jurisprudence affords, Hutchinson suggests that Florida

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“obstructs” aspects of this Court’s jurisprudence and refuses to engage in Eighth

Amendment determinations. But Hutchinson fails to show how the Florida Supreme

Court’s reliance on the state’s conformity clause violates his federal constitutional

rights.

Nothing in the Eighth Amendment forces state courts to expand this Court’s

Eighth Amendment jurisprudence into areas where this Court has not. Hutchinson

does not establish how the state court’s adoption of this Court’s Eighth Amendment

jurisprudence violates his rights in any way.

What is more, lower courts are required to follow this Court’s precedents. The

United States Constitution mandates that the “the Laws of the United State ... shall

be the supreme Law of the Land” that judges in every state are bound by. See U.S.

Const. art. 6. Likewise, this Court has long acknowledged that lower courts are bound

to adhere to its precedent. See, e.g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252-53

(1998) (“Our decisions remain binding precedent until we see fit to reconsider them,

regardless of whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing

vitality.”); Bosse v. Oklahoma, 580 U.S. 1, 3 (2016) (“[I]t is this Court’s prerogative

alone to overrule one of its precedents.”); Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K.

Rand, Lid., 460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983) (“Needless to say, only this Court may overrule

one of its precedents.”); see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (“[U]nless we

wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must

be followed by the lower federal courts.”). As the Florida Supreme Court recognized,

“Hutchinson seeks an unjustified extension of the U.S. Supreme Court's Eighth

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Amendment jurisprudence and his claim is inconsistent with our precedent.”

Hutchinson v. State, No. SC2025-0517, 2025 WL 1198037, at *6 (Fla. Apr. 25, 2025).

Hutchinson’s complaint about Florida’s conformity clause is baseless. Just like

this Court has denied certiorari review in other cases challenging Florida’s conformity

clause, this Court should deny review here. See, e.g.,

Ford v. Florida, 145 S. Ct. 1161 (2025), Barwick v. Florida, 143 S. Ct. 2452 (2028).

No compelling reasons exist in this case to warrant this Court’s exercise of review.

CONCLUSION

Hutchinson has not provided any compelling reason for this Court to grant

certiorari review. Accordingly, the petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES UTHMEIER

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA

can iain BECHARD

Associate Deputy Attorney General

Counsel of Record

ScoTT BROWNE

Chief Assistant Attorney General

CHRISTINA Z. PACHECO

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

3507 East Frontage Road, Suite 200

Tampa, Florida 33607

CarlaSuzanne.Bechard@myfloridalegal.com

(813) 287-7900

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