Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Andrew D. Anderson, Petitioner v. North Carolina, et al.
Supreme Court briefDec 19, 2024
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Case No.
3fn t&Ije Supreme Court of tfje fHmteb States*
ANDREW D. ANDERSON
Petitioner,
v.
THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, ET AL„
Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
APPENDIX TO THE PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Andrew D. Anderson
177 Dills Branch Rd.
Sylva, NC 28779
(706) 307-9493
Petitioner in Pro se
APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDICES
(P.)
Appendix A
Andrew D. Anderson v. The State of North
Carolina et al., 24-1277, U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Judgment entered August 29th, 2024
Appendix B
(la-4a)
Andrew D. Anderson v. The State of North
Carolina et al., l:24_cv-00034-MR-WCM,
U. S. District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina. Judgment
entered March 18th, 2024
Appendix C
(5a-37a)
Andrew D. Anderson v. The State of North
Carolina et al., 24-1277, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. Order denying petition
for rehearing, and rehearing en banc,
entered September 24th, 2024
Appendix D
(38a-41a)
Andrew D. Anderson v. The State of North
Carolina et al., l:24_cv-00034-MR-WCM,
U. S. District Court for the Western District
of North Carolina. Notice of Appeal
entered March 28th, 2024
I a.
(42a-43a)
APPENDIX A
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for The fourth circuit
No. 24-1277
ANDREW D. ANDERSON, an individual, an American, and Disabled Veteran of
Sylva, NC; We the People; All similarly situated free Americans,
Plaintiff- Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA: THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF
NORTH CAROLINA; ROY A. COOPER, III, an individual, and Governor of North
Carolina; THE OFFICE OF THE NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT CHIEF
JUSTICE; CHERI BEASLEY, an individual, and former Chief Justice of the North
Carolina Supreme Court; PAUL NEWBY, an individual, and Chief; Justice of the
North Carolina Supreme Court; NORTH CAROLINA SUPERIOR COURT
•DISTRICT 30; BRADLEY B. LETTS, an individual, and Senior Resident Superior
Court Judge 30B; NORTH CAROLINA DISTRICT COURT; ROY T,
WIJ E WICKRAM A, an individual, and Chief District Court Judge, 30th District;
KRISTINA L. EARWOOD, an individual, and 30th District Court Judge; KALEB
D. WINGATE, an individual, and 30th District Court Judge; DONA F. FORGA* an
individual, and 30th District Court Judge; JOHN J. PAVEY, JR., an individual and
Court-appointed counsel; JARED R. DAVIS, an individual, and Court-appointed
counsel; THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH
CAROLINA; JOSHUA STEIN, an individual, and Attorney General of North
Carolina; THE 43RD PROSECUTORIAL DISTRICT; THE OFFICE OF THE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY; ASHLEY H. WELCH, an individual, and 43rd
Prosecutorial District Attorney; CHRISTINA B.. MATHESON, an individual, and
Assistant District Attorney for the 43rd Prosecutorial District; ANDREW C.
BUCKNER, an individual, and Assistant District Attorney for the 43rdProsecutorial
District; JACOB P. PHELPS, an individual, and Assistant District Attorney for the
43rd Prosecutorial District; JENNACA D. HUGHS, an individual, and Assistant
District Attorney for the 43rd Prosecutorial District; SUMER L. ALLEN, an
individual, and Paralegal for the 43rd Prosecutorial District; JACKSON COUNTY,
NORTH CAROLINA; JACKSON COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; THE
OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF; CHIP L. HALL, an individual, and retired Jackson Co.
Sheriff; CNA SURETY* of Sioux Falls, SD; Small Commercial Service Center;
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HEATHER'BAKER, an individual, and former Jackson Co..Attorney; SHANNON
H. QUEEN, an individual, andformcrtop;rankingofficer -with theJackson Co.
Sheriff’s Dept.; ANN D. MELTON, an indivibuala'ndformerJackson Co. Clerk of
Superior; THE OFFICE OF THE JACKSON COUNTY CLERK OF SUPERIOR
COURT; THE OFFICE OF THE JACKSON COUNTY MAGISTRATE; JEFFERY
W. POWEUL,;an individual, former Jackson Cb. Magistrate and Deputy Magistrate;
SAMUEL K. BOWERS, an individual, and former Jackson Co. Sheriffs Deputy
Courthouse Security; TYLER B. BRYSON, an individual, and current Jackson Co.
Sheriff s Deputy andXourthouse Security; DEREK A. ROBINSON, an individual,
and former Jackson Co. Sheriffs Deputy and Courthouse Security; MEGAN L.
RHINEHART, .an individual and Current Jackson Co. Sheriffs Deputy;
KATHLEEN D. BREEDLOVE, an individual, retired Director.of Human Resources
ifrom Southwestern Community Collegeand currently theOirector of HR for Jackson'
Co.; SOUTHWESTERN' COMMUNITY; COLLEGE; LYNN P. DANN, an
individual, and. former Department Head, iPsycholOgy; Sociology, and' Ethics
Instructor at Southwestern Community College; CHERYL L. CONTINO'CONNER, an individual, and former Dean oT Students:at Southwestern Community
College; BARBARA B. PUTMAN; an individual, and former Dean of Arts &
Sciences at Southwestern Community College; THOMAS R. BROOKS, an
individual, and President of Southwestern Community College; JOHN DOES, 1-99;
JANE DOES, 1-99,
Defendants - Appellees.
: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina; at
Asheville. Martin feReidinger, Chief District Judge. (l:24-cv-00034-MR-WCM)
Decided: August 29, 2024
Submitted: August 27,2024
Before KING arid BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, SeniorCircuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Andrew Douglas Anderson, Appellant Pro Sc.
Unpublished'opinions are nofbiftding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Andrew D. Anderson appeals the district court’s order dismissing, after a review
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2), Anderson’s federal and state civil claims against
Defendants. We have reviewed the record and .find, no reversible error. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s order. Anderson v. State ofN. Carolina, No. 1:24-cv-00034-MRWCM (W.D.N.C. Mar. 18,2024). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would.not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3
4a.
APPENDIX B
5a.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:24-cv-00034-MR-WCM
ANDREW D. ANDERSON,
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, )
THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF )
NORTH CAROLINA, ROY COOPER, )
III, THE OFFICE OF THE NORTH
)
CAROLINA SUPREME COURT CHIEF )
JUSTICE, CHERI BEASLEY, PAUL
)
NEWBY, NORTH CAROLINA *
)
SUPERIOR COURT DISTRICT 30,
)
)
BRADLEY B. LETTS, NORTH
CAROLINA DISTRICT COURT, ROY T.)
WIJEWICKRAMA, KRISTINA L.
)
EARWOOD, KALEB D. WINGATE,
)
DONA F. FORGA, JOHN J. PAVEY,
)
JR., JARED R. DAVIS, THE OFFICE
)
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
)
NORTH CAROLINA, JOSHUA STEIN, )
)
THE 43RD PROSECUTORIAL
• DISTRICT, T^HE OFFICE OF THE
)
DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ASHLEY H.
)
WELCH, CHRISTINA B. MATHESON, )
ANDREW C. BUCKNER, JACOB P.
)
PHELPS, JENNACA D. HUGHS,
).
)
• SUMER L. ALLEN, JACKSON
COUNTY NORTH CAROLINA,
)
"iS&KSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S
[^DEPARTMENT, THE OFFICE OF THE^) ‘ ^;
^SHERIFF, CHIP L.'HALLv CNAf:.
)*PfesURETY, HEATHER BAKER^
)
ORDER
i
>4
\:
•SGase l:24-cv-00034-MR-WCM Document 5 Filed 03/18/24 Page 1 of 32
6a.
)
SHANNON H. QUEEN, ANN D.
)
MELTON, THE OFFICE OF THE
JACKSON COUNTY CLERK OF
SUPERIOR COURT, THE OFFICE OF )
)
THE JACKSON COUNTY
)
MAGISTRATE, JEFFERY W,
)
POWELL, SAMUEL K. BOWERS,
)
TYLER B. BRYSON, DEREK A.
ROBINSON, MEGAN L. RHINEHART, )
)
KATHLEEN D. BREEDLOVE,
)
SOUTHWESTERN COMMUNITY
COLLEGE, LYNN P. DANN, CHERYL )
L. CONTINO-CONNER, BARBARA B. )
)
PUTMAN, THOMAS R. BROOKS
‘
)
JOHN DOES 1-99, and JANE DOES
)
1-99,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the Plaintiffs
Complaint as Amended [Docs. 1, 4]. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Also
before the Court is the Plaintiff s Motion to Process In Forma.Pauperis [Doc.
-3].
I.
BACKGROUND
a
On February 2, 2024, the pro se Plaintiff Andrew D. Anderson
%
(“Plaintiff’) filed this action against Defendants the State of North Carolina;
the Office of'the Governor Of North Carolina; Roy Cooper, III, an individual,
and Governor of North Carolina; the Office of the North Carolina Supreme
Court Chief Justice; Cheri BOasley, an individual, and former Chief Justice
2
,
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7a.
of the North Carolina Supreme Court; Paul Newby, an individual, and Chief
justice of the North Carolina: Supreme Court; North Carolina Superior Court
District 30; Bradley B. Letts, an individual, and Senior Resident Superior
Court Judge 30B; North Carolina District Court; Roy T. Wijewickrama, an
individual, and Chief District Court Judge, 30th District; Kristina L. Earwood,
an individual, and 30th District Court Judge; Kaleb p. Wingate, an individual,
and 30th Disfrict Court Judge; Dona F.'Forga, an individual, and 30th District
Court Judge; John J. Pavey, Jr., an individual and Court-appointed counsel;
Jared R. Davis, an individual, and Court-appointed counsel; the Office of the
Attorney General Of North Carolina; Joshua Stein, an individual, and Attorney
General of North Carolina; the 43rd Prosecutorial District; the Office of the
District Attorney; Ashley H. Welch, an individual, and 43rd Prosecutorial
District Attorney; Christina B. Matheson, an individual, and Assistant District
Attorney for the 43rd Prosecutorial District; Andrew C. Buckner, an
individual, and Assistant District Attorney for the 43rd Prosecutorial District;
Jacob P. Phelps, an individual, and Assistant District Attorney for the 43rd
Prosecutorial District; Jennaca D. Hughs, an individual, and Assistant District
Attorney for the 43rd Prosecutorial District; Summer L. Allen, an individual,
and Paralegal for the 43rd Prosecutorial District; Jackson County North
Carolina; Jackson County Sheriffs Department; the Office of the Sheriff;
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8a.
Chip L. Hall, an individual, and retired Jackson Co. Sheriff; CNA Surety, of
Sioux Falls, SD, Small Commercial Service Center; Heather Baker, an
individual, and former Jackson Co. Attorney; Shannon H. Queen, an
individual, and former top-ranking officer with the Jackson Co, Sheriffs Dept.;
Ann D. Melton, an individual and former Jackson Co.. Clerk of Superior; the
Office of the Jackson County Clerk, of Superior Court; the Office of the
Jackson County Magistrate; Jeffery W. Powell, an individual, Former
Jackson Go. Magistrate and Deputy Magistrate; Samuel K. Bowers, an
individual, and former Jackson Co. Sheriffs Deputy Courthouse Security;
Tyler B. Bryson, an individual, and current JacksOn Co. Sheriffs Deputy and
Courthouse Security; Derek A. Robinson, an individual, and Former Jackson
Co. Sheriffs Deputy and Courthouse Security; Megan L. Rhinehart, an
individual and Current Jackson Co. Sheriffs Deputy; Kathleen D. Breedlove,
an individual, retired Director of Human Resources from Southwestern
Community College and currently the Director of HR for Jackson Co.;
Southwestern Community Coiiege; Lynn P, Dann, an individual, and former
Department Head, Psychology, Sociology, and Ethics Instructor at
Southwestern Community College; Cheryl L. Contino-Conner, an individual,
and former Dean of Students at Southwestern Community College; Barbara
B. Putman, an individual, and former Dean of Arts & Sciences at
4
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9a.
Southwestern Community College; Thomas R. Brooks, an individual, and
President of Southwestern Community College; John Does 1-99; and Jane
IDoes 1-99. [Doc, 1],
In his 79-page Complaint, With Over 200 pages of exhibits, the Plaintiff
brings numerous federal and state law claims, including federal constitutional
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.G. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 for violations of his
!
First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights; claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C, §§ 1961-1968; "(Ijeveraging malfeasance under colorof-laWto levy administrative terrorism, economieahd psychological warfare,"
State law constitutional claims under Article I, Sections 1,2, 3, 6, 7, 12, 13,
14,18,19, 21,23, 24, 27, 35, 36, and 37 of the North Carolina Constitution;
as well as state law claims for intentional torts, negligence, "breaches of
public trust," and promissory estoppel. [Doc. 1 ].
The Plaintiffs prayer for relief spans more than two full pages of his
Complaint and includes “declaratory statements," damages, injunctive relief,
“ordering the governments to maintain their statutory obligation to Plaintiffs
irights/’ “declaratory relief.that emergency powers do not exist, and that North
.Carblina’s Governor Roy Cooper's abuses Of emergency declarations are
:
not powers vested in him by God nor with the consent of the governed,” an
5
Cass 1 ;?4-r:vmnnS4-MR-WnM nnr.nment S Piled 03/18/24 Pane S rif
10a.
“order relieving the. Jackson Go. Sheriff s Dept Of the frivolous duty to guard
the imain entrance and scan ‘every individual enteringi” four years of the
Plaintiffs lost earnings, special damages in the form of "0.1% of North
Carolina's stateand.local direct general expenditures’’of $93,7'miNion, treble
damages, attorneys’ fees and court costs, and post-judgment interest. [Idj.
On February 29, 2024, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint with
an updated request for-relief and submitted additional exhibits via CD Drive.
[Doc. 4], Specifically, the Plaintiff removed his request for pre-judgment
injunctive relief, but the particular requests remain largely the same, fld.1. It
appears that this is a piecemeal amendment, as the Plaintiff references
exhibits filed with the original complaint and includes them in his exhibit index
but did not reattach them to the Amended Complaint.
While at times difficult to follow, the Plaintiffs allegations appear to
arise from several different incidents, Some of which are seemingly
Unrelated. Given the volume of the alleged facts contained in the Complaint
and its accompanying exhibits, the Court will summarize some of the alleged
facts here and will refer to others as necessary throughout its analysis.
• One alleged incident arose out of the Plaintiffs participation in an
ethics course at Southwestern Community College (“SCC”), where his
professor, Defendant Danh, removed a post that the Plaintiff made on the
6
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11a.
-7
class online forum because Dann considered it disrespectful. [Doc. 1-2 at
185]., The Plaintiff complained to multiple other officials at SCC, including
Defendants Contino-Conrtor, Putman, and Brooks. [Id. at 186-87], The
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dann gave him poor grades in his class in
retaliation for him exercising his free speech rights, and that Defendants
Dann, Contino-Cohnor; Putman, and Brooks violated his First Amendment
rights by censoring him. [|d at 187; Doc. 1 at 18-21].
In a separate incident, the Plaintiff was charged with trespass, failure
to appear on misdemeanor, resisting a public officer, and violation of a court
order. [Id at 101, 104, 106]. These charges apparently arose from the
Plaintiff refusing to wear a face mask, and instead wearing a toy football
helmet, when visiting the Jackson County Courthouse. Qd. at 190-91.]. It
appears that the Plaintiff pled guilty to the trespass charge in exchange for
the dismissal of his other charges, but he also alleges that he was found
guilty of trespass at a trial presided over by Defendant Judge ForgaJ [Id. at
124-26, 194].
'The Plaintiff also describes a physical altercation with
Defendants Bryson, and Bowers at the courthouse that apparently resulted
in his arrest, but the Plaintiff also describes being arrested the next day. [id
at 197-98].
I Complete state court records have not been provided by the Plaintiff.
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12a.
The Plaintiff alleges that there was at least one ether incident at the
Jackson County Courthouse where he refused to “don the court-ordered
mandatory face diaper,” and was refused access to the clerk’s office by
Defendant Robinson. [Id. at 195]. The Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant
Bryson harassed him on multiple occasions “about wearing a face mask
Which is unlawful, to begin with." [Id. at 196],
From the exhibits attached to the Plaintiffs Complaint, it appears that
the Plaintiff filed a previous Civil case in state court against Defendants Dann,
Breedlove, Contino-Connor, Brooks, Putman, Southwestern Community
College, and several Jane Does and John Does. [Doc. 1-2 at 82-84, 91],
Although the Plaintiff does not specify what the claims in this previous case
were, from the records provided, it appears that the case was dismissed by
Judge Pope and the Plaintiffs appeal was dismissed by Defendant Judge
Letts, fld.1. Although Judge Pope is not named as a Defendant in this case,
the Plaintiff claims that because of Judge Pope’s order for Rule 11 sanctions
for frivolously filing a second civil suit, he was “reduced to liquidating private
property, 260 ounces of .999 fine silver bullion to raise funds to cover” his
sanctions." []d. at 195].
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13a.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, seeks to proceed in
forma pauperis, the Court must examine the pleadings to determine whether
this Court has jurisdiction and to ensure that the action is not frivolous or
malicious and states a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28
lil.SiC; § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii): see also Michau v. Charleston Cntv.. 434
F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that § 1915(e) "governs IFP filings in
addition to complaints filed by prisoners”). A complaint iS‘ deemed frivolous
“where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams.
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Fourth Circuit has offered the following
guidance to a court tasked with determining whether a complaint is frivolous
under § 1915(e):
The district court need not look beyond the
complaint's allegations in making such a
determination. It must, however, hold the pro se
complaint to less stringent standards than pleadings
drafted by attorneys arid must read the complaint
liberally. Trial courts, however, are granted broad
discretion in determining whether a suit is frivolous or
malicious.
White v. White. 886 F.2d 721, 722-23 (4th .Cir, 1989). While the complaint
.....................................
'•
■*
must be construed liberally, the Court may “pierce the veil of the complaint’s
factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
(9a)
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14a.
dearly baseless," including such claims that describe “fantastic or delusional
Scenarios," Neitzke. 490 U.S. at 327, 328.
Rule 8 of the; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a]
pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain
statement:of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction....[and] (2) a short and
plain- statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2). A complaint fails to state a claim where it offers
merely “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation .of the elements of a
cause of action," or “naked assertion^]” devoid of "further factual
enhancement." See Ashcroft v. iabal. 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atf. Corp; v. Twomblv; 550 U.S. 544. 555, 557 (2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
III.
DISCUSSION
A;
Sovereign Immunity
The Plaintiff purports to name the State of North Carolina as a
Defendant.
The Eleventh Amendment deprives, federal courts of any
jurisdiction to hear state law claims by private parties against states. See
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hoso. v: Halderman. 465 U.S. 89, 104-106 (1984).
The Eleventh Amendment applies with its full sweep to bar any relief,
whether legal or equitable. ]d at 106. The bar includes pendent state law
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15a.
claims as well as all federal claims, except in those cases Where Congress
has expressly abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment rights;
See
'Huang V: Board of Governors of Univ. of N.C., 902 F,2d 1134,1138 (4th Cir.
1990). A state may waive the protection of the Eleventh Amendment by State
statute or state constitutional provision. Edeirnan v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
673-74 (1974).
Any such waiver, however, must be clearly and
unequivocally expressed.
Because Congress has not abrogated the states’ immunity in any of
the types of claims brought by the Plaintiff, and the State has not waived its
immUrfity, the Plaintiffs CiaiiiTi against the*0fate of North Carolina is dismissed
with prejudice.
Furthermore, sovereign immunity also extends to state
agencies and departments. Halderman. 465 U.S. at 101-02. As such, the
Plaintiff may not proceed with any of his claims; against Defendants “Office
of the Governor of North Carolina,” Roy Cooper, III, “North Carolina Superior
Court District 30,” "North Carolina. District Court,’’ "Office of the Attorney
General of North Carolina,” Joshua Stein, or “Office of the Sheriff.”
B.
Judicial and Prosecutorial Immunity
The Plaintiff names as Defendants several judges, including Justices
Of the North Carolina Supreme Court and Superior Court and District Court
*
Judges of Jackson County. [Doc... 1]. Judges are immune from suit under
11
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16a.
the doctrine of judicial immunity: See Stump V. Sparkman, 435 U S. 349,
359 (1996) (“A judge is. absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts
even if his exercise .of authority is flawed by the commission of grave
procedural errors.”); imbler v. Pachtman. 424 U.S. 409, 419 (1976) (stating
that judicial “immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting
maliciously and corruptly, and it is not for the protection or benefit of a
malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it
is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with
independence and without fear of consequences") (internal quotations
omitted).
Accordingly, the Plaintiff's claims against former Chief Justice Beasley,
Chief Justice Newby, and Judges Letts, Wijewickrama, Earwood, Wingate,
Forga, and Powell are barred by judicial immunity and are therefore
dismissed with prejudice. See, e.q.. Galloway v. Davis. No. 23-1386, 2023
WL 4105708 (4th Cir. June 21,2023) (affirming dismissal With prejudice of a
Bivens action under § 1915(e)(2) as barred by judicial immunity); Mills v.
Marchant. No. 8:19-cv-1512-TMC-JQA, 2019 WL 2647600, at *2-3 (D.S.C.
June 4, 2019), adopted. 2019 WL 2644216 (D.S.C. June 27, 2019) (noting
that dismissal with prejudice is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 where claims
against a judge are barred-by the doctrine of judicial immunity and therefore
12
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17a.
frivolous).. The same goes for Defendants “Office of the North Carolina
Supreme, Court Chief Justice" and “Office of the Jackson County Magistrate."
Judicial immunity also extends to persons other than a judge where
performance of judicial acts or activity as an official aide of the. judge is
involved. Wilev V. Buncombe County. 846 F.Supp.2d 480, 485 (W.D.N.C.
Mar. 2,2012) (citations omitted). Clerks of court, therefore, have been ruled
immune from suit Under § 1983 when performing “quasi-judicial" duties, Jd.
“The doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity has been adopted and
made applicable to court support personnel because of the ‘danger that
disappointed litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from
suing the: judge directly, will vent their wrath oh clerks, court reporters, and
other judicial adjuncts.’" Id. (quoting Kincaid v, Vai'U 969 F.2d 594. 601 (7th
Cir. 1992)), As such, the Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Melton and
“Office of the Jackson County Clerk of Superior Court" are barred by judicial
immunity as well.
Prosecutors are also immune from suit under the doctrine of
prosecutorial immunity, jmbler, 424 U.S. at 419. Therefore, the Plaintiffs
Claims against Defendants Welch, Matheson, Buckner, Phelps, Hughs, “43rd
Prosecutorial District,” and “Office of the District Attorney” must be dismissed
on this basis alone.
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18a.
C.
Section 1983 Claims
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was
“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law."
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co, v, Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,49-50 (1999).
1.
Claims Challenging State Court Convictions
To the extent he aims to do so, the Plaintiff may not bring a § 1983
claim challenging the validity of his state court convictions.
Heck v,
Humphrey. 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). “Heck v. Humphrey bars a § 1983
action if it is clear from the record that its successful prosecution would
necessarily imply that the plaintiffs earlierconviction was invalid. The Heck
analysis requires a close factual examination of the underlying conviction."
Riddick v. Lott. 202 F. App’x 615,616 (4th Cir. 2006). Again, it is not entirely
clear what the Plaintiff is alleging in regard to his state court criminal
proceedings, but he does appear in part to be seeking expungement of his
convictions. [DOC. 1 at 76]. Any such claim is barred under Heck and must
be dismissed.
2.
Claims Against Private Party Defendants
The Court next turns to the private parties that the Plaintiff names as
defendants.
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19a.
[T]he Fourth Circuit has recognized four exclusive
circumstances under which a private party can be
deemed to be a state actor [under § 1983], These
are: (i) when the state has coerced the private actor
to commit an act that would be unconstitutional if.
done by the state; (2) when the state has sought to
evade a clear constitutional duty through delegation
to a private actor; (3) when the state has delegated a
traditionally and exclusively public function to a
private actor; or (4) when the state has committed an
unconstitutional act in the course of enforcing a right
of a private citizen. If the conduct does not fall into
one of these four categories, then the private conduct
is not an action of the state.
Davison v. Facebook, Inc.. 370 F. Supp. 3d 621, 628 (E.D. Va.), affd, 774
F. App’x 162 (4th :Cir. 2019) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
With regard to the private parties named as Defendants in this case,
the Plaintiff has not alleged any of the circumstances that would compel the
Court to treat those Defendants as state actors. Therefore, all § 1983 claims
against Defendants C'KlA Surety, Heather Baker, John J. Pavey, Jr., and
Jared R. Davis cannot go forward.
3,
Claims Pursuant to Monel!
The Court next turns to the remaining Defendants: Jackson County,
Jackson County Sheriffs Department, multiple current and former Sherriffs
Deputies, Summer Allen, ,SCC, and several employees of SCC.2 Suits
2 For purposes of initial review, the Court will assume that SCC and its employees are
state actors subject to suit under § 1983. See Tann v. ludwikoski, 393 F. App’x 51, 53
15
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20a.
against ran officer in his official capacity “generally represent only another
way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”
Kentucky v. Graham. 473 U.S. 159; 165 (1935) (1985) (quoting Monell v
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York. 436 U.S, 658, 690 n.55 (1978)).
The Jackson County Sheriffs Department, for example, is.not liable under
§ 1983 for an employee's acts “unless action pursuant to official municipal
policy of some nature caused [the] constitutional tort.” Collins v. City Of
Harker Heights. 503 U.S. i 15, 120-21 (1992) (quoting Monell. 436 U.S. at
691). That is, "[f]or a governmental entity to be liable under section 1983,
the official policy must be the moving force of the constitutional violation.”
MOore v. City of Creedmoor. 345 N.C. 356, 366, 481 S.E.2d 14, 21 (1997)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Thus, the entity's ‘policy or
custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” ]d. (quoting
Monell. 436 U.S. 658, 694).
The Plaintiff has not alleged any policy or custom, as Monell requires,
that plausibly states a constitutional violation against any of the Defendants
in their official capacities. On the contrary, the Plaintiff relies on broad legal
conclusions that his fights were violated without providing adequate factual
(4th Cir. 2010) (“We conclude that [defendants], as employees of a state public
educational institution created by state law;.are state actors.”).
16
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21a.
allegations in support of his claims. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims
against Defendants Jackson County North Carolina, the Jackson County
Sheriffs Department and SCC will be dismissed in their entirety. The
Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Allen, Hall, Queen, Bowers, Bryson,
Robinson, Rhinehart, Breedlove, Dann, Contino-Conner, Putman, and
Brooks in their official capacities are also accordingly dismissed.
4.
Claims Against Individual Defendants
The Court next looks to the Plaintiff s constitutional claims against the
remaining Defendants in their individual capacities,
a.
Defendant Allen
Beginning with Defendant Allen, the Plaintiff appears to state no claim
against her and instead has only submitted an email communication on
which 'she was copied. [Doc. 1-2 at 92]. Therefore, Defendant Allen will be
dismissed as a Defendant.
b.
Defendant Hall
The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hall refused to comply with the
Plaintiffs request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA") and
“conspired to obstruct justice and tampered with evidence to produce the
discovery that withheld the exculpatory or Brady material,” but provides no
17
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22a.
further allegations of fact that state a plausible constitutional claim.
Therefore, any § 1983 claims against Defendant Hall will be dismissed,
c.
Defendants Bowers and Bryson
The Plaintiff additionally alleges claims of excessive force against
Defendants Bowers and Bryson. “Whether an officer has used excessive
force is judged by a standard of objective reasonableness.” Stanton v. Elliott,
25 F.4th 227, 233 (2022) (quoting Clem v. Corbeau. 284 F.3d 543, 550 (4th
Cir. 2002)). Moreover, “recognizing that police officers are often forced to
make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving—we take care to consider the facts from the perspective
of a reasonable officer on the scene and avoid judging the officer’s conduct
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”
Id; Stanton. 25 F.4th at 233 (“In
questioning the split-second decisions of police officers, we must avoid
hindsight bias and try to place ourselves in the heat of the moment.”).
The Plaintiff alleges the following with regard to his excessive force
claim against Defendants Bowers and Bryson:
Under color of state law, [Defendant] Bryson then
grabbed the [Pjlaintiff by one arm and put it behind
his back in a bent arm bar maneuver, and with
[Defendant] Bryson’s other hand, grabbed the
[Pjlaintiff by the opposing side of his jacket and
forced the [P]laintiff out of the courtroom where the
[Pjlaintiff, was summoned to appear absent of all
jurisdictions in Superior Court. Plaintiff Anderson
18
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23a.
alleges the deputies never stated or even surmised
that the [P]laintiff was under arrest at any point,
Where the [Pjiaintiff alleges he would have readily
surrendered. Plaintiff Anderson alleges Defendants
then proceeded to exit the court to the right and not
to the [left]3 (which was the direction of the jail).
Thus, Plaintiff Anderson alleges he [feared for his
life]4 and that they were about to throw him down the
stairs and simply claim the [Pjiaintiff was resisting
arrest, it was an accident; whoops, he should not
have resisted arrest, so before they-all ([Pjiaintiff and
three5 deputies) could make it to the stairs, with the
[Plaintiffs [sic] one free hand grabbed the center
frame door pole of a double-door walkway to the
staircase and would not let go. The deputies tried to
get Plaintiff Anderson's hand loose for several
seconds but were unsuccessful. In Deputy Bryson’s
frustration, he shouted at the [Pjiaintiff, “DO YOU
WANT TO GO TO JAIL?!" Plaintiff Anderson alleges
he answered, “YES!!!” Plaintiff Anderson further
alleges Defendant Deputy Bryson immediately
attempted multiple times to suplex or body slam
Plaintiff Anderson over the [Defendant's left
shoulder simultaneously; Deputy Bowers attempted
to break loose the [Pjiaintiff s one-handed death grip
on the center pole of the double door. If Defendants,
Deputy Bowers and Deputy Bryson, had succeeded
in their attempts to suplex Plaintiff Anderson, alleges
[sic] the [DJefendants attempted murder and
intended to slam Plaintiff Anderson’s head hard on
the hard marble/concrete floor, resulting in his
potential death or severe maiming by the deputies;
Plaintiff alleges rather than allowing the [DJefendants
3 Alteration in original.
4 Alteration in original.
5 It is unclear from the Plaintiff s Complaint as to who he alleges the third deputy to be;
only Defendants Bowers and Bryson are named in this part of the Plaintiffs allegations.
19
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24a.
to have their way, Plaintiff Anderson planned his fall
to mitigate serious injuries.
[Doc. 1 at 45-46]. The Plaintiff-admits, he had already failed to appear as
summoned and then fled from the Defendants once he saw them.
The
Plaintiff further admits that he resisted arrest when the Defendants tried to
handcuff him.
Judging the allegations by a. standard of objective
reasonableness, the Plaintiff fails to plausibly assert any claim, but merely
alleges that the Defendants used only as much force as was necessary,
which force was reasonably calculated to detain and arrest the Plaintiff, who
was resisting arrest:6 Therefore, even accepting these allegations as true
and taking them in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, he has not alleged
a plausible excessive force claim against Defendants Bowers and Bryson.
d.
Defendant Robinson
The Plaintiff additionally alleges that Defendant Robinson asked him
to leave the Jackspn County courthouse because the Plaintiff refused to
wear a face mask and arrested the Plaintiff for trespass. [Doc. 1-2 at 192].
These allegations fail to state any claim of a violation of the Plaintiffs
constitutional rights; it appears instead that the Defendant lawfully arrested
6 Even if the Plaintiff had stated a viable claim for excessive force, such a claim would
almost certainly be barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity, as the Plaintiff has not
alleged the violation Of a clearly established right. See .Pearson v, Callahan, 555 U.S,
•223, 232 (2009).
20
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25a.
the Plajntiff for failing to comply with a lawful command to leave the premises'
This claim will accordingly be dismissed.
e.
Defendants Rhinehart and Breedlove
In his claims against Defendants Rhinehart and Breedlove, the Plaintiff
alleges that both Defendants Coerced him into not filing complaints with the
court. What can best be surmised from the Plaintiffs allegations is that these
Defendants went to the Plaintiffs residence to serve him with a civil
restraining order and summonses for his felony charges.. [Doc. 1-2 at 188].
On these .facts, the Plaintiff has not stated any viable claim that his
• constitutional rights were violated.
f.
Defendants Dann, Contino-Connor, Putman, and
Brooks
The Plaintiff also claims that Defendants Dann, Contino-Cohnor,
Putman, and Brooks violated his First Amendment rights by censoring his
free speech and retaliating against him for exercising his free speech rights
in the context of his participation in a community college course. "It can
hardly be argued that either students of teachers shed .their constitutional
rights to freedom of Speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker
v. Des Moines indeo. Cmtv. Sch. Dist.. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). “But
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—whether
it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork
21
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26a.
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of
course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech.” Id. at 513.
The facts alleged by the Plaintiff show that he posted a disruptive and
disrespectful comment making a series of jokes about Confucius, [Doc. 1 -2
at 18], Defendant Dann, the instructor for the course, removed the Plaintiffs
post and explained to the Plaintiff that he did so “because of the offense it
would cause to followers [of Confucius], and disrespect to their personal
beliefs." [jdj. Dann also explained that he would not permit such comments
to be made about other religious figures, like Jesus or Muhammed, and he
“can’t treat Confucius any differently." [Id.]. It appears from these facts that
Defendant Dann, and subsequently Defendants Contino-Connor, Putman,
and Brooks, acted precisely in accord with Tinker by prohibiting a particular
expression of opinion because of its potential “substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities.” Tinker. 393 U.S. at 514. Indeed,
Dann explained that he was concerned precisely with the “invasion of rights
of others,” in this case, followers of Confucius. []d, at 513],
The Court turns next to the Plaintiffs claim of retaliation under the First
Amendment. “In order to state a colorable retaliation claim under Section
1983, a plaintiff 'must allege that (1) he engaged in protected First
22
Casel:24-cv-00034-MR-WCM Documents Filed03/18/24 Page22of32
27a.
Amendment activity, (2) the defendant took some action that adversely
affected his First Amendment rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship
between his protectedactivity and the defendant’s conduct."’ Martin v. Duffy,
858 F.3d 239,249 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors
of George Mason Univ.. 411 F.3d 474, 499 (4th Cir, 2005)) (alterations
omitted).
The Plaintiff alleges that the SCC employees named as
Defendants retaliated against him by giving him a zero on his final paper.
[Doc. 1 at 77]. However, records provided by the Plaintiff himself do not
support this allegation.
Defendant Dann’s comments in response to
Plaintiffs final paper instead indicate that the Plaintiff did not answer any of
the questions asked in the assignment using ethical theories, as instructed.
[Doc. 1-2 at 23]. There is no indication that the Defendant's decision to give
the Plaintiff a low grade was in any way related to the content of his speech
but was instead genuinely based on his deficient performance On the
assignment. Therefore, the Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible retaliation
claim against Defendants Dann, Contino-Connor, Putman, or Brooks.
The COUrt further notes that documents provided by the Plaintiff
indicate that the Plaintiff has already brought civil claims against these
Defendants in state court, and that those claims were dismissed, further
23
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28a.
suggesting their lack of viability.7 [Doc. 1-2 at 82-84, 91]. For all of the
foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs have not alleged a plausible First
Amendment claim against these Defendants, and these claims will be
dismissed.
g-
Doe Defendants
Finally, the Plaintiff names as Defendants John Does 1-99 and Jane
Does 1-9, but provides no further information about who these Defendants
are or what claims the Plaintiff is bringing against them. As such, these
Defendants wilI be dismissed.
D.
Section 1981 Claims
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction Of
the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts,. .. and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings . .. as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
The statute also guarantees equal treatment in “the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." ]d.
§ 1981(b). To establish a Section 1981 claim, the plaintiff must show that
(1) he is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant had an intent to
7 While the full details of such claims were not provided to the Court, any claims that were
dismissed in state court with prejudice that the Plaintiff attempts to relitigate in this Court
are barred by res judicata.
24
Case l:24-cv-00034-MR-WCM Document 5 Filed 03/18/24 Page 24 of 32
29a.
discriminate based on. race; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or
’
f
more of the activities enumerated in the statute, Bobbitt by Bobbitt v. Rage
!
.Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 512, 517 (W.D.N.C. 1998) (quoting Bellows v. Amoco
'
‘....................................................................... ‘
■"
'
..................................................................................
'
'!
Oil Go.. 118 F.3d 268,*274 (7th Cir. 1997)).
The Plaintiff has not alleged that he is a racial minority, nor that any of
!
the Defendant’s had any racially discriminatory intent.
Therefore, the
Plaintiff’s § 1981 claims will be dismissed in their entirety.
E.
Section 1985 Claims
The Fourth Circuit has explained that “to establish a sufficient cause of
action for “conspiracy to deny equal protection of the laws” under § 1985(3),
a plaintiff must prove: (1) a conspiracy of two or more persons, (2) who are
motivated .by a specific class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus to
(3) deprive the plaintiff of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law
to all, (4) and which results :in injury to the plaintiff as (5) a consequence of
an overt act committed by the defendants in connection with the conspiracy.”
Simmons v. Poe. 47 F.3d 1370,1376 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Buschi v. Kirven.
775 F.2d 1240, 1257 (4th Cir. 1985); Griffin v. Breckenridae. 403 U.S. 88,
102-03 (197111: see also Bhattacharva w Murray. 515 F. Supp. 3d 436, 463
(W.D. Va. 2021).
Courts “have specifically .rejected section 1985 claims
whenever the purported conspiracy is alleged in a merely conclusory
25
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30a.
manner, in the absence of concrete supporting facts.” A Soc'v Without A
Name v, Virginia. 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Simmons. 47
F.3d at 1376); see also Womack v. Paragon Systems. No. 3:17-cv-00667;
FDW, 2018 WL 2418557, at *4 (W.D.N.C. May 29, 2016) (“Allegations of
‘parallel conduct and a bare assertion of a conspiracy’ are not enough for a
claim to proceed."):
Here, Plaintiff has made only cOnclusory allegations regarding a
purported conspiracy and has not made any allegation regarding
discriminatory animus. - Therefore, all of his § 1985 claims will be dismissed,
F.
RICO Claims
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act "creates civil
liability for those who engage in a pattern of racketeering activity." GE
Investment Private Placement Partners II v. Parker. 247 F.3d 543, 548 (4th
Cir. 2011). Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), “RICO contains a private right of
action for '[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this Chapter.’” Chubirko v. Better Bus. Bureau of
S. Piedmont. Inc.. 763 F. Supp. 2d 759, 766 (W.D.N.C. 2011). RICO “does
not cover all instances of wrongdoing, Rather, it is a unique cause of action
that is concerned with eradicating organized, long-term, habitual criminal
26
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31a.
activity.’' U.S. Airline Pilots Ass’n v. AWAPPA. LLC. 615 F.3d 312, 317 (4th
Cir. 2010).
The elements of a RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) are: (1) the
conducting; (2) of an enterprise; (3) through a pattern; (4) of racketeering
activity. See Whitney, Bradley. & Brown. Inc. V. Kammermann. 436 F. App’x
257, 258 (4th Gir. 2011V(citing Sedima. S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.. Inc.. 473 U.S.
479, 496 (1985)). A “pattern of racketeering activity” is defined as at least
two acts Of racketeering, typically referred to as predicate acts. See 18
U.S.C. § 1961(5). To plead a conspiracy violation under § 1962(d), a plaintiff
must allege that “each defendant agreed that anothercoconspirator would
commit two or more acts of racketeering.” Walters v. McMahen. 795 F.
Supp. 2d 350, 355 (D. Md! 2011), affd in relevant part. 684 F.3d 435 (4th
Cir. 2012). “[T]he person committing the racketeering acts must be separate
from the ‘enterprise’ that the person participates in or conducts” and the
plaintiff must show “that the defendants conducted or participated in the
conduct of the enterprise’s affairs, not just their own affairs.”
Carter v.
Rogers, Townsend & Thomas. P C,. No. 1:12cv495, 2014 (U.S. Dist, LEXIS
25622, at *14-15 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 28, 2014).
*>
Here, the Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations as to who any
Of the Defendants conspired' with, when this alleged agreement Occurred,
27
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32a.
where it occurred, how it occurred, or even the nature of the agreement. The
Plaintiff instead appears to allege, as already described, a wide-ranging
series of unrelated incidents, none of which indicate a violation of federal law
on the part of any of the Defendants. Moreover, the Plaintiffs claims of
conspiracy read as mere legal conclusions rather than factual allegations
that support a plausible finding of any actual conspiracy.
in sum, the Plaintiff has failed to allege any violation of federal law, let
alone any agreement or conspiracy on behalf of any of the Defendants to
commit racketeering. The Plaintiffs allegations therefore fail to state a viable
claim for relief under RICO.
G.
Remaining State Law Claims
*■■■
Federal district courts may entertain claims not otherwise within their
adjudicatory authority when those claims "are so related to claims ... within
[federal-court competence] that they form part of the same case or
controversy." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). To exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a
court must find that “[tjhe state and federal claims ... derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact” where a plaintiff “would ordinarily be expected to
try them all in one judicial proceeding.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs.
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). When a district court dismisses all claims
independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it "ordinarily
28
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33a.
dismisses] all related state claims." Artis v. Dist. Of Columbia. 583 U S. 71,
71 (2018); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). A district court may also dismiss the
related state claims if (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state
law; (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which; the district court has original jurisdiction; or (3) in exceptional
circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), (2), (4).
To the extent that the Plaintiff seeks relief under North Carolina law,
the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, as no federal claim
has passed initial review. See Artis. 583 U S. at 71; 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.
H.
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
The Plaintiff seeks to proceed with this civil action without having to
prepay the costs associated with prosecuting the matter. [Doc. 3]. Upon
review of the Plaintiffs Application, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has
sufficient resources from which to pay the filing fee required for this action.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the application should be denied.
29
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34a.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs
Complaint fails initial review and will dismiss his Complaint without prejudice.
The Court will allow the Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend his Complaint, if
he so chooses, to properly state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Any amended complaint will be subject to all timeliness and procedural
requirements and will supersede the Complaint. Piecemeal amendment will
not be permitted. The Plaintiff is further cautioned against combining multiple
causes of action against multiple defendants in one Complaint and should
instead separate his unrelated causes of actions where appropriate. Should
the Plaintiff fail to timely amend his Complaint in accordance with this Order,
the Court will dismiss and terminate this action.
Furthermore, litigants do not have an absolute and unconditional right
of access to the courts in order to prosecute frivolous, successive, abusive,
or vexatious actions. See Demos v. Keating. 33 F. App’x 918,920 (10th Cir.
2002); Tinker v. Hanks. 255 F.3d 444,445 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Vincent. 105
F.3d 943, 945 (4th Cir. 1997). District courts have inherent power to control
the judicial process and to redress conduct which abuses that process.
Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corn.. 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001).
30
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35a.
The Plaintiff is hereby informed that future frivolous filings will result in
the imposition of a pre-filing review system. Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am.,
]na, 390 F.3d 812, 818 (4th Cir. 2004); Vestal v. Clinton. 106 F.3d 553,555
(4th Cir. 1997). If such a system is placed in effect, pleadings presented to
the Court which are not made in good faith and which do not contain
substance, will be summarily dismissed as frivolous. See Foley v, Fix. 106
F.3d 556, 558 (4th Cir. 1997). Thereafter, if such writings persist, the pre
filing system may be modified to include an injunction from filings. In re
Martin-Triaona. 737 F.2d 1254,1262 (2d Cir. 1984).
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Complaint as
Amended [Docs. 1,4] fails initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for
failure to state a claim for relief and shall be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE in accordance with the terms of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days
in which to amend his Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order.
If Plaintiff fails to so amend his Complaint, the matter will be dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis [Doc. 3] is DENIED.
31
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36a.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff shall pay the required
filing, fee within thirty (30) days of entry of this Order. Failure to pay the
required filing fee within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Order will
result in the dismissal of this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: March 18,2024
6-*
jr
MartiffReidinger
Jg||.
Chief United States District Judge
32
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37a.
APPENDIX C
38a.
:USCA4 Appeal: 24-1277
DocHY
Filed: 09/24/2024'
Rg:1;of3
FILED: September 24,2024
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No..24-1277
(l:24-cv-00034-MR-WCM)
ANDREW D. ANDERSON, an individual, an American, and Disabled Veteran of
Sylva, NC; We the People; All similarly situated free Americans
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
OF NORTH CAROLINA; ROY A. COOPER, III, an individual, and Governor of
North Carolina; THE OFFICE OF THE NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME
COURT CHIEF JUSTICE; CHERI BEASLEY, an individual, and former Chief
Justice of the North CarolinaSupreme Court; PAUL NEWBY, an individual, and
Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court; NORTH CAROLINA
SUPERIOR COURT DISTRICT 30; BRADLEY B. LETTS, an individual, and
Senior Resident Superior Court Judge 30B; NORTH CAROLINA DISTRICT
COURT; ROY T. WIJEWICKRAMA, an individual, and Chief District Court
Judge, 30th District; KRISTINA L. EARWOOD, an individual, and 30th District
Court Judge; KALEB D. WINGATE,.an individual, arid 30th District Court
Judge; DONA F. FORGA, an individual, and 30th District Court Judge; JOHN J.
PAVEY, JR., an individual and Court-appointed counsel; JARED R. DAVIS, an
individual, andOouft-appoInted counsel; THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA; JOSHUA STEIN, an individual, and
Attorney General ofNorth Carolina; THE 43RD PROSECUTORIAL DISTRICT;
THE OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY; ASHLEY H. WELCH, an
individual, and 43rd Prosecutorial District Attorney; CHRISTINA B.
MATHESON, an individual, arid Assistant District Attorney for the 43rd
Prosecutorial District; ANDREW C. BUCKNER, an individual, and Assistant
District Attorney for the 43rd Prosecutorial District; JACOB P. PHELPS, an
individual, and Assistant District Attorney for the 43rd Prosecutorial District;
JENNACA D. HUGHS, an individual, and Assistant District Attorney for the
39a.
USCA4 Appeal: 24-1277
Doc: 11
Filed: 09/24/2024
Pg: 2of 3
43rd Prosecutorial District; SUMER L. ALLEN, an individual, and Paralegal for
the 43rd Prosecutorial District; JACKSON COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA;
JACKSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; THE OFFICE OF THE
SHERIFF; CHIP L. HALL, an individual, and retired Jackson Co. Sheriff; CNA
SURETY, of Sioux Falls, SD; Small Commercial ■Service Center; HEATHER
BAKER, an individual, and former Jackson Co. Attorney; SHANNON H.
QUEEN, an individual, and former top-ranking officer with the Jackson Co.
Sheriffs Dept.; ANN D. MELTON, an individual and former Jackson Co. Clerk
of Superior;THE OFFICE OF THE JACKSON COUNTY CLERK OF
SUPERIOR COURT; THE OFFICE OF THE JACKSON COUNTY
MAGISTRATE; JEFFERY W. POWELL, an individual, former Jackson Co.
Magistrate and Deputy Magistrate; SAMUEL K. BOWERS, an individual, and
former Jackson Co. Sheriffs Deputy Courthouse Security; TYLER B. BRYSON,
an individual, and current Jackson Co. Sheriffs Deputy and Courthouse Security;
DEREK A. ROBIN SON, an individual, and former Jackson Co. Sheriffs Deputy
-and Courthouse Security; MEGAN L, RHINEHART, an individual and Current
Jackson Co. Sheriffs Deputy; KATHLEEN D. BREEDLOVE, an individualretired Director of Human Resources from Southwestern Community College and
currently the Director of HR for Jackson Co.; SOUTHWESTERN COMMUNITY
COLLEGE; LYNN P. DANN, an individual, and former Department Head,
Psychology, Sociology, and Ethics Instructor at Southwestern Community
College; CHERYL L. CONTINO-CONNER, an individual, and former Dean of
Students at Southwestern Community College; BARBARA B. PUTMAN, an
individual, and former Dean of Arts & Sciences at Southwestern Community
College; THOMAS R. BROOKS, an individual, and President^ Southwestern
Community College; JOHN DOES, 1-99; JANE DOES, 1-99
Defendants - Appellees
ORDER
The court denies the petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. No judge
40a.
.USCA4 AppealfM-1277
Doe: 11
Filed: 09/24/2024
Pg:3,of3
Entered at the direction of the panel; Judge King, Judge Benjamin, and
Senior Judge Keenan.
For the Court
/s/ Nwamaka Anowi, Clerk
41a.
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11
Additional material
from this filing is
available in the
Clerk's Office.
i.
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Case No.
3fn
Supreme Court of tfje ®mte& &tate*
ANDREW D. ANDERSON
Petitioner,
v.
THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, ET AL.,
Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Andrew D. Anderson
177 Dills Branch Rd.
Sylva, NC 28779
(706) 307-9493
Petitioner in Pro se
•si
CERTIFICATE of SERVICE
day of
I Andrew D. Anderson, do swear and declare that on this the
April 2025, as required by Supreme Court rule 29 I have served the enclosed
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS and PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI on each party to the above proceeding or that
party’s counsel and on every other person required to be served by depositing an
envelope containing the above documents in the United states mail properly
addressed to each of them and with first class postage prepaid or by delivery to a
third party commercial carrier for delivery within three calendar days the names
and addresses of those served are as follows:
John J. Pavey Jr.
33 Dillsboro Rd.
Sylva, NC 28779
(828) 586-8987
Derek A. Robinson
P.O. Box 511
Cherokee, NC 28719
(828) 507-1770
Cheri Beasley
305 Meeting House Cir.
Raleigh, NC 27615
(919) 889-2989
DA Ashley H. Welch
5 W. Main St.
Franklin, NC 28734
(828) 349-7210
Jacob P. Phelps
461 E Main Street
Sylva, NC 28779
(828) 354-4300
Jared R. Davis
P.O. Box 347
Waynesville, NC 28786
(706) 540-9449
Heather Baker
546 Ridgeway St.
Sylva, NC 28779
(828) 507-0440
Shannon H. Queen
383 Hillcrest St.
Sylva, NC 28779
(828) 269-9867
Tyler B. Bryson
243 Mint Rd.
Sylva, NC 28779
(828) 226-7149
CNA Surety
S. Reid St. Ste 300
Sioux Falls, SD 57103
(800) 331-6053
Deputy Samuel K. Bowers
Swain Co. Sheriffs Dept
95 Brendle St.
Bryson City, NC 28713
(828) 399-1453
(1)
~s
ATTN: AG Jeff Jackson
attorney on record for
Respondents: The State of
North Carolina, The Office
of the Governor of N.C.,
CSC Kim Poteet, The
Office of the Magistrate,
Summer Allen, Cheri
Beasley, Jacob Phelps,
Roy Cooper, Jennaca
Hughs, Ann Melton,
Andy Buckner, Christina
Matheson, Roy Wijewickrama,
Kristina Earwood, Kaleb
Wingate, Paul Newbie, The
Office of the Sheriff,
Josh Stein,
The Office of the District
Attorney, 43rd Prosecutorial
District, 30th District, District
Court of N.C.,
114 West Edenton St.
Raleigh, NC 27603
(919) 716-6400
Attorney Bill Davis
attorney on record for
Respondents: Jackson
Co. NC,
Albert Reagan, Megan
Rhinehart,
399 Grindstaff Cove Rd.
Attorney Wyatt S. Stevens Sylva, NC 28779
(828) 631-2210
Roberts & Stevens P.A.
attorneys on record for
Attorney John Spainhour
Respondents: Kathleen
Breedlove and Philip Dann MGC Law attorney on
record for Respondents:
aka “Bucky Dann”
SCC, Thomas Brook
301 College St. Ste. 400
Bucky
Dann, Cheryl
Asheville, NC 28801
Contino-Connor, and
(828) 252-6600
Barbara Putman,
10 Brook St. Ste. 200
E.B.C.I. Chief Justice
Asheville, NC 28803
Bradley B. Letts
(828) 575-1902
137 Seven Clans Lane
Cherokee, NC 28719
(828) 586-5286
Attorney Jake Stewart
attorney on Record for
Respondent: Chip Hall
2907 Providence Rd. # 200
Charlotte, NC 28211
(704) 940-3441
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
i'h
Executed on this the
day of April 2025.
wilfr o nr
■‘cfth.Ajh/m
By: Petitioner, Andrew D. Anderson
(2)
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