Amicus Curiae Brief — Michael Wayne Reynolds, Petitioner v. John Q. Hamm, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections

No. 24-6941

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

MICHAEL WAYNE REYNOLDS,

v.

Petitioner,

JOHN Q. HAMM, COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF FORMER FEDERAL JUDGES AS

AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

RICHARD SNYDER

Counsel of Record

TANNER PEARSON

SPENCER PTACEK

FREDRIKSON & BYRON, P.A.

60 S. 6th St, Suite 1500

Minneapolis, MN 55402

(612) 492-7000

rsnyder@fredlaw.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.................................... 4

ARGUMENT .............................................................. 6

I.

THERE IS AN ENTRENCHED AND

RECURRING CIRCUIT SPLIT THAT

WILL NOT BE RESOLVED WITHOUT

THIS COURT’S INTERVENTION. ................ 6

A.

The Second, Fourth, Ninth, and

Tenth Circuits do not give

AEDPA deference to a state

court’s factual findings if the

state court denied the habeas

petitioner a full and fair

evidentiary hearing. ............................. 7

B.

The First, Third, Fifth, Sixth,

and Eleventh Circuits still give

AEDPA deference to a state

court’s factual findings even if

the state court denied the habeas

petitioner a full and fair

evidentiary hearing. ........................... 12

II.

THE PRESENT CASE ILLUSTRATES

WHY THIS COURT RESOLVING THE

CIRCUIT SPLIT IS SO IMPORTANT. ........ 16

ii

III.

THE PRESENT CASE IS AN

EXCELLENT VEHICLE FOR THIS

COURT TO RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT

SPLIT. ............................................................ 20

IV.

THIS COURT SHOULD RESOLVE

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT BY HOLDING

THAT A STATE COURT’S FACTUAL

FINDINGS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO

AEDPA DEFERENCE IF THE

HABEAS PETITIONER DID NOT

RECEIVE A FULL AND FAIR

EVIDENTIARY HEARING. ......................... 22

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 25

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Brumfield v. Cain,

576 U.S. 305 (2015) ................................................4

Bryan v. Mullin,

335 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2003)............................13

Cowans v. Bagley,

639 F.3d 241 (6th Cir. 2011)................................14

Drake v. Portuondo,

321 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2003) ............................. 9-10

Drake v. Portuondo,

553 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2009) ............................. 9-10

Ford v. Wainwright,

477 U.S. 399 (1986) ................................................7

Garuti v. Roden,

733 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2013) ..................................15

Giglio v. United States,

405 U.S. 150 (1972) .............................. 5, 16, 21-22

Glossip v. Oklahoma,

145 S. Ct. 612 (2025)...................................... 20-21

Gordon v. Braxton,

780 F.3d 196 (4th Cir. 2015)..........................12, 25

iv

Harris v. Nelson,

394 U.S. 286 (1969) ................................................3

Hayes v. Florida Dep’t of Corr.,

10 F.4th 1203 (11th Cir. 2021) ..............................4

Hurles v. Ryan,

752 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2014)................................11

Johnson v. Bell,

605 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2010)................................18

Jones v. Ryan,

52 F.4th 1104 (9th Cir. 2022) ..............................11

Lambert v. Blackwell,

387 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2004) .................................14

Landers v. Warden, Atty. Gen. of Ala.,

776 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2015)............................15

Metheny v. Hamby,

488 U.S. 913 (1988) ..............................................16

Miller v. Champion,

161 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998).......................... 7-8

Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322 (2003) ................................................7

Robidoux v. O’Brien,

643 F.3d 334 (1st Cir. 2011) ............................7, 15

Sandoval Mendoza v. Lumpkin,

81 F.4th 461 (5th Cir. 2023) ................................14

v

Taylor v. Maddox,

366 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2004)................................10

United States v. Thomas,

939 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2019)..............................3

Valdez v. Cockrell,

274 F.3d 941 (5th Circ. 2001) ........................ 12-13

Valdez v. Cockrell,

288 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 2002).............. 13, 20, 23-24

Valentino v. Clarke,

972 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2020)................................12

Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 420 (2000) ................................................2

Wilson v. Workman,

577 F.3d 1284 (10th Cir. 2009)............... 8-9, 23-25

Winston v. Kelly,

592 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2010).......................... 11-12

Winston v. Pearson,

683 F.3d 489 (4th Cir. 2012).......................... 11-12

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 2254 .......................... 3, 6-12, 14-15, 22-24

vi

Other Authorities

John Blume et al.,

In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A

Response to Hoffman and King,

96 Cornell L. Rev. 435 (2011) ..............................18

Jordan M. Steiker et al.,

The Problem of Rubber-Stamping in

State Capital Habeas Proceedings: A

Harris County Case Study,

55 Hous. L. Rev. 889 (2018).................................19

Justin Marceau,

Deference and Doubt: The

Interaction of AEDPA Section

2254(d)(2) and (e)(1),

82 Tul. L. Rev. 385 (2007) ...................................24

Samuel Wiseman,

Habeas after Pinholster,

53 B.C. L. Rev. 953 (2012) ...................................18

Samuel Wiseman,

What is Federal Habeas Worth?,

67 Fla. L. Rev. 1157 (2015) ..................................18

William J. Clinton,

Statement on Signing the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996, 1 Pub. Papers

630, 631 (Apr. 24, 1996) .......................................24

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1

Amici Curiae are nine former federal judges

who have an interest in this Court granting certiorari

and resolving the circuit split implicated in the present

case:

•

Judge Mark Bennett served on the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of Iowa

from 1994 to 2019, and served on the same

Court as a Magistrate Judge from 1991 to 1994.

•

Judge Robert Cindrich served on the U.S.

District Court for the Western District of

Pennsylvania from 1994 to 2004.

•

Judge Alex Kozinski served on the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from 1985 to

2017, and on the U.S. Claims Court from 1982

to 1985.

•

Judge Timothy Lewis served on the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit from 1992

to 1999, and on the U.S. District Court for the

Western District of Pennsylvania from 1991 to

1992.

1 All parties received notice of Amici’s intent to file this

brief at least 10 days prior to the due date of this brief. Amici

affirm that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole

or in part, and no person or entity other than Amici or their

counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund the

preparation or submission of this brief.

2

•

Judge Beverly Martin served on the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit from

2010 to 2021, and on the U.S. District Court for

the Northern District of Georgia from 2000 to

2010.

•

Judge Stephen Orlofsky served on the U.S.

District Court for the District of New Jersey

from 1995 to 2003, and served on the same

Court as a Magistrate Judge from 1976 to 1980.

•

Judge Kevin Sharp served on the U.S.

District Court for the Middle District of

Tennessee from 2011 to 2017.

•

Judge John Daniel Tinder served on the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit from

2007 to 2015, and on the U.S. District Court for

the Southern District of Indiana from 1987 to

2007.

•

Judge Thomas Vanaskie served on the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit from 2010

to 2019, and on the U.S. District Court for the

Middle District of Pennsylvania from 1994 to

2010.

Amici collectively devoted over 150 years to

serving on the federal bench. As such, Amici had and

continue to have an interest in maintaining the

legitimacy of the federal judiciary. Resolving circuit

splits “furthers the legitimacy of the judiciary and

reduces friction flowing from the application of

3

different rules to similarly situated individuals based

solely on their geographic location.” United States v.

Thomas, 939 F.3d 1121, 1131 (10th Cir. 2019). The

circuit split implicated in the present case over the

proper interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 also touches

upon an area of heightened concern for federal judges

given that “[t]here is no higher duty of a [judge],

under our constitutional system, than the careful

processing and adjudication of petitions for writs of

habeas corpus.” Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290

(1969).

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), federal habeas courts

must give substantial deference to a state court’s

prior factual findings. If AEDPA deference applies,

then a federal court must defer to a state court’s

findings unless the habeas petitioner shows that all

“reasonable minds” would agree that the findings are

incorrect. Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314 (2015).

But if AEDPA does not apply, then a federal court

reviews the state court’s findings de novo.

I. This case presents the question of whether

AEDPA deference applies to a state court’s factual

findings even if the state court denied the habeas

petitioner a full and fair evidentiary hearing. 2 This

question has divided the circuit courts of appeals for

nearly 25 years. Whereas the Second, Fourth, Ninth,

and Tenth Circuits do not apply AEDPA deference if

the state court denied the habeas petitioner a full and

fair evidentiary hearing, the First, Third, Fifth, Sixth,

and Eleventh Circuits do.

II. The question presented is an important one.

Tens of thousands of state prisoners file habeas

2 This case also presents a second cert-worthy question:

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) applies in every case presenting

a challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)? This Court has twice

granted certiorari to address this question, only to bypass it.

Hayes v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 10 F.4th 1203, 1223 (11th Cir.

2021) (Newsom, J., concurring). “In the absence of any

controlling decision, the circuits remain split … over the exact

relationship between subsections (d)(2) and (e)(1).” Id.

5

petitions in federal court every year. Before doing so,

they must first seek relief in state court. In most

cases, the state courts will make adverse factual

findings without allowing for discovery or an

evidentiary hearing.

If AEDPA deference applies under these

circumstances, which it does in the First, Third, Fifth,

Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, then it will be

effectively impossible for the state prisoner to obtain

relief in federal court. The state court denying

discovery will ensure that there will be little (if any)

evidence in the record contradicting the state court’s

findings. Likewise, the state court denying a live

evidentiary hearing will ensure that the evidence

supporting the state court’s findings will be

unimpeached through cross-examination. With little

evidence in the record contradicting the findings, and

with the evidence supporting the findings being

unimpeached, the state prisoner will be unable to

show that all “reasonable minds” would agree that the

findings are incorrect. Absent such a showing, the

federal court will be required to defer to the findings,

and the state prisoner’s claim will fail.

III. The present case is an excellent vehicle for

this Court to resolve the circuit split. Petitioner

Michael Reynolds sought postconviction relief in state

court based on Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150

(1972). He alleged that the prosecution’s primary

witness at his trial falsely testified that she did not

have a leniency agreement with the prosecution

regarding her own pending criminal charges. After

denying Reynolds discovery and an evidentiary

6

hearing, the state court found that no agreement

existed and denied Reynolds’ claim.

The Eleventh Circuit applied AEDPA

deference to the state court’s finding that no

agreement existed and held that Reynolds had failed

to overcome this deference. However, the court

acknowledged that if AEDPA deference did not apply,

there was enough evidence in the record for it to find

an agreement. Thus, whether the Eleventh Circuit

was correct to give AEDPA deference to the state

court’s finding is outcome determinative.

IV. Finally, this Court should resolve the

circuit split by holding that a state court’s factual

findings are not entitled to AEDPA deference if the

state court denied the habeas petitioner a full and fair

evidentiary hearing. Such a holding is supported by

the text, legislative history, and purpose of AEDPA.

ARGUMENT

I.

THERE IS AN ENTRENCHED AND

RECURRING CIRCUIT SPLIT THAT

WILL NOT BE RESOLVED WITHOUT

THIS COURT’S INTERVENTION.

Section 2254, 28 U.S.C., requires a federal

habeas court to give substantial deference to a state

court’s factual findings. Prior to 1996, the statute

conditioned this deference on the habeas petitioner

receiving a “full and fair hearing” in state court. At a

minimum, this meant a habeas petitioner receiving

an opportunity to present his own evidence as well as

an opportunity to challenge the State’s evidence

7

through cross-examination. Ford v. Wainwright, 477

U.S. 399, 415 (1986).

But in 1996, Congress enacted AEDPA. As a

result, § 2254 no longer explicitly conditions deference

to a state court’s factual findings on the habeas

petitioner receiving a full and fair hearing. Miller-El

v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 358 (2003) (Thomas, J.,

dissenting).

Lower courts are now “divided on whether,

when, and to what extent lack of an evidentiary

hearing in the state court might undercut the

deference to state fact-finding.” Robidoux v. O’Brien,

643 F.3d 334, 340 (1st Cir. 2011). Four courts of

appeals have held that a state court’s factual findings

are not entitled to AEDPA deference if the habeas

petitioner did not receive a full and fair evidentiary

hearing in state court. Five courts of appeals have

held the opposite.

A.

The Second, Fourth, Ninth, and

Tenth Circuits do not give AEDPA

deference to a state court’s factual

findings if the state court denied the

habeas petitioner a full and fair

evidentiary hearing.

The Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits

have all held that a state court’s factual findings are

not entitled to AEDPA deference where the habeas

petitioner did not receive a full and fair evidentiary

hearing in state court.

1. The first circuit to make such a holding was

the Tenth Circuit in Miller v. Champion:

8

[B]ecause the state court did not hold

any evidentiary hearing, we are in the

same position to evaluate the factual

record as it was. Accordingly, to the

extent the state court’s dismissal of [the

habeas petitioner’s claim] was based on

its own factual findings, we need not

afford those findings any deference.

161 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 1998).

The Tenth Circuit would later expand on its

approach in Wilson v. Workman, 577 F.3d 1284 (10th

Cir. 2009). The majority in that case explained that §

2254 requires deference to a state court’s factual

findings only if the state court has adjudicated the

habeas petitioner’s claim on the merits. Id. at 1290.

“A merits adjudication requires the court to consider

the ‘substance’ of the defendant’s claim,” which means

applying “controlling legal principles to the facts

bearing upon [the defendant’s] claim.” Id. at 1292-93.

Without an evidentiary hearing, the state court will

not have the facts bearing upon the defendant’s claim

in front of it and therefore will not be able to apply

controlling legal principles to those facts. Thus, when

a state court “refuses to grant an evidentiary hearing

to consider material, non-record evidence … and then

rules on [a defendant’s] claim without consideration

of this evidence, the [state court’s] denial of the claim

is not an adjudication on the merits to which the

federal courts owe AEDPA deference.” Id. at 1300.

Then-Judge Gorsuch dissented. Id. at 1315

(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). He argued that the

9

majority’s interpretation was “inconsistent with

AEDPA’s plain terms and structure, contradicts the

decisions of several other circuits, and effectively

frustrates AEDPA’s central purpose by getting

[federal courts] back in the business of grading state

court procedures rather than focusing on the

reasonableness of the results they reach.” Id. He

explained that before “AEDPA, § 2254 allowed

[federal courts] to review a state court’s findings de

novo whenever [they] found the state procedures

inadequate.” Id. at 1318. “With AEDPA, Congress

expressly abolished this approach.” Id. The Wilson

majority’s interpretation of § 2254 “is immediately

recognizable as a species of the full and fair hearing

requirement Congress rejected.” Id.

2. The Second Circuit adopted a similar

approach in Drake v. Portuondo, 321 F.3d 338 (2d Cir.

2003) (“Drake I”), and Drake v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d

230 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Drake II”). There, a habeas

petitioner sought postconviction relief in state court,

alleging that the prosecution knowingly used

perjured testimony to obtain his conviction. Drake I,

321 F.3d at 343. But the state court summarily denied

his claim based on its factual finding that the

petitioner “had made no showing that the prosecution

knew or should have known about [the] perjury.” Id.

at 345. The court made this finding without holding a

hearing, thereby preventing the petitioner from

developing the factual record. Id. at 343.

On two separate appeals, the Second Circuit

held that the state court’s finding was not entitled to

AEDPA deference. Id. at 345; Drake II, 553 F.3d at

10

238. The state court had denied the habeas

petitioner’s claim “without a hearing.” Id. “Because

the state court[ ] did not permit the development of

the factual record as to whether the prosecution knew

[the witness’s] testimony to be perjured, … there were

no findings of fact requiring deference.” Id. “[N]o

deference to the state courts’ conclusions is required

[when] the state courts did not permit the

development of the factual record.” Id. at 239.

3. The Ninth Circuit adopted a similar

approach in Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992 (9th Cir.

2004). The court explained that the text of § 2254(d)

does not require a federal habeas court to defer to a

state court’s factual findings if the state court’s

adjudication of the petitioner’s claim “resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2). According to the Taylor court, a habeas

petitioner can satisfy this standard by showing that

the state court’s “fact-finding process itself is

defective.” Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1001. “If, for example,

a state court makes evidentiary findings without

holding a hearing and giving petitioner an

opportunity to present evidence, such findings clearly

result in an ‘unreasonable determination’ of the facts”

and said findings are therefore not entitled to

deference. Id.

Since it decided Taylor, the Ninth Circuit has

“held repeatedly that where a state court makes

factual findings without an evidentiary hearing or

other opportunity for the petitioner to present

11

evidence, the fact-finding process itself is deficient,

and not entitled to deference.” Jones v. Ryan, 52 F.4th

1104, 1120 (9th Cir. 2022); Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d

768, 790 (9th Cir. 2014).

4. The final court of appeals to hold that a state

court’s factual findings are not entitled to AEDPA

deference if the state court denied the habeas

petitioner a full and fair evidentiary hearing was the

Fourth Circuit in Winston v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 535 (4th

Cir. 2010) (“Winston I”) and Winston v. Pearson, 683

F.3d 489 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Winston II”). There, a

habeas petitioner “requested discovery and an

evidentiary hearing from the state court” but the

state court “denied [the] request.” Winston I, 592 F.3d

at 577. As a result, the Fourth Circuit held that the

state court’s factual findings were not entitled to

deference. Id.

The court explained that § 2254 requires

deference to a state court’s factual findings only if the

state court adjudicates the habeas petitioner’s claim

on the merits. This requirement “exists because

comity, finality, and federalism counsel deference to

the judgments of state courts when they are made on

a complete record.” Id. at 555. But “[i]f the record

ultimately proves to be incomplete, deference to the

state court’s judgment would be inappropriate

because judgment on a materially incomplete record

is not an adjudication on the merits for purposes of §

2254(d).” Id. at 555-56. If a “state court failed to

adjudicate a claim on the merits by refusing to

facilitate production of new, material evidence,

meaningful deference to its factual findings is well-

12

nigh impossible.” Winston II, 683 F.3d at 506; see also

Gordon v. Braxton, 780 F.3d 196, 203 (4th Cir. 2015).

The Fourth Circuit has recognized that its

interpretation of § 2254 is “consistent with holdings

reached in similar cases in the Second and Tenth

Circuits,” Winston I, 592 F.3d at 556, but “two of [its]

sister circuits [the First and Sixth Circuits] have

suggested that [its] interpretation creates a

considerable tension with § 2254(d)’s structural

limitation on relief.” Valentino v. Clarke, 972 F.3d

560, 577 n.15 (4th Cir. 2020).

B.

The First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and

Eleventh Circuits still give AEDPA

deference to a state court’s factual

findings even if the state court

denied the habeas petitioner a full

and fair evidentiary hearing.

In contrast, the First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and

Eleventh Circuits have held that a state court’s

factual findings are still entitled to AEDPA deference

even if the state court denied the habeas petitioner a

full and fair evidentiary hearing.

1. The first court of appeals to make such a

holding was the Fifth Circuit in Valdez v. Cockrell,

274 F.3d 941 (5th Circ. 2001). The majority in that

case explicitly “decline[d] to adopt [the Tenth

Circuit’s] approach,” id. at 953, and held that “a full

and fair hearing is not a prerequisite to the operation

of AEDPA’s deferential scheme,” id. at 946. The

majority explained that AEDPA “jettisoned all

references to a full and fair hearing.” Id. at 949.

AEDPA’s “mandatory and all-encompassing language

13

… leaves no room for judicial imposition of a full and

fair hearing prerequisite.” Id. at 950.

Judge Dennis dissented and also dissented

from the denial of rehearing en banc. Id. at 959–73

(Dennis, J., dissenting); see also Valdez v. Cockrell,

288 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 2002) (Dennis, J., dissenting

from the denial of rehearing en banc). He believed

that the majority’s interpretation “insulate[d] a state

habeas court’s decision … from meaningful review in

a federal habeas court.” Id. at 703. 3 Under the

majority’s interpretation, “state courts are free to (1)

rubber-stamp the prosecuting body’s proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law, (2) deny the

petitioner relief without affording him a hearing, and

(3) effectively prevent a federal court from later

granting the requested relief.” Id.

Judges Wiener and Parker also dissented from

the denial of rehearing en banc to express their belief

that under the panel majority’s interpretation,

“federal habeas review has been reduced to nothing

more than a search for the state judge’s signature—a

classic example of exalting form over substance.” Id.

at 706 (Wiener & Parker, JJ., dissenting from denial

of rehearing en banc).

3 In Bryan v. Mullin, the Tenth Circuit noted Judge

Dennis’s dissent and agreed with him that “the rule adopted by

the Fifth Circuit mandated the perverse result of deferring to

legal and factual determinations made by state courts, even

though a habeas petitioner had never been afforded a full and

fair opportunity to develop the factual basis of his claim in state

court.” 335 F.3d 1207, 1216 n.8 (10th Cir. 2003).

14

Since it decided Valdez, the Fifth Circuit has

“consistently held that a full and fair hearing is not a

precondition … to applying § 2254(d)’s standards of

review.” Sandoval Mendoza v. Lumpkin, 81 F.4th

461, 472 (5th Cir. 2023). In doing so, it has rejected

the Fourth Circuit’s approach. Id.

2. The Third Circuit adopted a similar view in

Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2004).

Like the Valdez court, the Lambert court noted that §

2254 “no longer explicitly conditions federal deference

to state court factual findings on whether the state

court held a hearing.” Id. at 238. But the court

declined to conclude “that state court … procedures

are entirely irrelevant.” Id. “The extent to which a

state court afforded a defendant adequate procedural

means to develop a factual record–whether the

defendant was afforded a ‘full and fair hearing,’ to put

it in the parlance of the pre-AEDPA statute–may well

affect whether a state court’s factual determination

was reasonable.” Id. at 239. “In other words, the

extent to which a state court provides a full and fair

hearing is no longer a threshold requirement before

deference applies; but it might be a consideration

while applying deference under § 2254(d)(2) …” Id.

3. The next court of appeals to address the

issue was the Sixth Circuit in Cowans v. Bagley, 639

F.3d 241 (6th Cir. 2011). In that case, a state

postconviction court found that the habeas petitioner

was competent. Id. at 247. In federal court, the

petitioner argued that this finding was not entitled to

AEDPA deference because the state court did not hold

an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 248. But the Sixth

15

Circuit rejected the argument, explaining that

“[n]othing in § 2254(d)(2) … suggests we defer to a

state court’s factual findings only if the state court

held a hearing on the issue.” Id. “”[W]e have never

suggested that § 2254(d)(2) does not apply to

competency determinations issued without a

hearing.” Id.

4. Like the Sixth Circuit, the First Circuit has

also rejected the argument “that a state court finding

gets no deference absent an evidentiary hearing.”

Robidoux, 643 F.3d at 340–41. Moreover, it has

rejected the “the rationale of the Fourth Circuit …

and the Tenth Circuit … that there can be no decision

on the merits if there has been no evidentiary hearing

on disputed facts.” Garuti v. Roden, 733 F.3d 18, 23

(1st Cir. 2013).

5. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a

similar approach in Landers v. Warden, Atty. Gen. of

Ala., 776 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2015). The habeas

petitioner in that case argued that a “state habeas

court’s fact-finding procedure—resolving a credibility

dispute on the basis of dueling affidavits, without an

evidentiary hearing—was so inadequate as to render

its factual determinations ‘unreasonable’ under §

2254(d)(2), stripping them of AEDPA deference.” Id.

at 1297. But the Eleventh Circuit rejected this

argument, “conclud[ing] that an evidentiary hearing

in state court cannot be a requirement for § 2254(d)(2)

deference for all disputed factual issues in a state

court proceeding.” Id. In doing so, the court noted the

“disagreement among [its] sister circuits on the extent

to which § 2254(d)’s deference is conditioned, if at all,

16

on the state court's fact-finding procedures.” Id. at

1298.

***

“[W]here cases present issues over which the

[lower] courts have divided, this Court has a special

obligation to intercede and provide some definitive

resolution of the issues.” Metheny v. Hamby, 488 U.S.

913, 915 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from denial of

certiorari). As the foregoing makes clear, this case

presents such an issue. There is a well-recognized and

entrenched circuit split on the issue of whether a state

court’s factual findings are still entitled to AEDPA

deference when the habeas petitioner did not receive

a full and fair evidentiary hearing. This Court has a

special obligation to intercede and provide some

definitive resolution of the issue.

II.

THE PRESENT CASE ILLUSTRATES

WHY THIS COURT RESOLVING THE

CIRCUIT SPLIT IS SO IMPORTANT.

The question on which the circuits are split is

an important one as is illustrated by the facts of this

case. At Petitioner Michael Reynolds’ trial, the

prosecution’s key witness (Adrian West) testified

twice that she did not have a leniency agreement with

the prosecution regarding her own pending criminal

charges. Reynolds alleges that this testimony was

false and violated Giglio. He first sought

postconviction relief in Alabama state court where he

was denied a meaningful opportunity to conduct

discovery on his claim and then denied an evidentiary

17

hearing where he could challenge the State’s evidence

through cross-examination.

Despite these limitations, there was still ample

evidence in the record of an agreement between West

and the prosecution. Specifically, there was memo

drafted by West’s attorney in which he acknowledged

an “[a]greement with D.A.” Pet. App. 677a. There was

also an affidavit from a district attorney in which he

stated that West’s attorney sent this memo to his

office “in an effort to substantiate his recollection of

an agreement for a sentence recommendation from

the State.” Id. at 668a. In addition to this direct

evidence, there was what Judge Jordan of the

Eleventh Circuit described as “strong circumstantial

evidence” of an agreement. Id. at 57a.

Despite all of this evidence, the state court

remarkably found there was “nothing in the record

that indicates there was an agreement between the

prosecution and West.” Id. at 461a. The court then

found that “no such agreement ever existed” largely

based on three affidavits submitted by West, her

attorney, and a district attorney in which they all

denied the existence of an agreement. Id. at 463a.

Reynolds never received an opportunity to test these

affidavits in an adversarial setting. Id. at 32a.

Reynolds then sought relief in federal court.

Because the Eleventh Circuit held that AEDPA

deference applied, the burden was on him to show

that all “reasonable minds” would agree that the state

court’s finding that there was no agreement was

incorrect. But the previous actions of the state court

18

made it impossible for him to make this showing. See

Johnson v. Bell, 605 F.3d 333, 344-45 (6th Cir. 2010)

(Clay, J., dissenting) (explaining why it is

“impossible” to prove the existence of a deal between

a prosecutor and a witness without having an

opportunity to question the prosecutor and witness

through cross-examination). The state court denying

him discovery prevented him from discovering and

introducing evidence that would have contradicted

the state court’s finding. Likewise, the state court

denying him a live evidentiary hearing ensured that

the evidence supporting the state court’s finding went

unimpeached.

Reynolds’ case is not an outlier. Tens of

thousands of state prisoners file habeas petitions in

federal court every year. Before doing so, they are

required to seek postconviction relief in state court. In

a typical case, the state court will deny the state

prisoner an opportunity to conduct discovery, thereby

preventing him from obtaining the evidence he needs

to prove the facts that are material to his claim. 4 The

state court will then hold a “paper hearing” rather

than a live evidentiary hearing, thereby denying the

prisoner an opportunity to impeach through crossexamination any evidence submitted by the State. 5

After it has denied the state prisoner any meaningful

John Blume, In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A

Response to Hoffman and King, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 435, 447

(2011); Samuel Wiseman, Habeas after Pinholster, 53 B.C. L.

Rev. 953, 972-77 (2012).

4

5 Samuel Wiseman, What Is Federal Habeas Worth, 67

Fla. L. Rev. 1157, 1198 (2015).

19

opportunity to prove the facts material to his claim,

the state court will then unsurprisingly make a

finding that the prisoner failed to prove the facts

material to his claim. This finding will likely be

contained within a proposed order submitted by the

prosecution that the state court “rubberstamps”

without reviewing. 6

The prisoner then has the option to seek

habeas relief in federal court. But if AEDPA deference

is applied to the state court’s factual findings, then it

is a foregone conclusion that he will not obtain relief.

He has already been prevented from introducing

evidence that would have contradicted the state

court’s findings and from impeaching any evidence

supporting the findings. As a result, he will not be

able to overcome the findings by showing that all

reasonable minds would agree that they are incorrect,

and his claim will fail.

The foregoing is the current practice in the

First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits. In

these circuits, if a state court finds that a state

prisoner has failed to prove a fact material to his

claim, a federal court will give that finding AEDPA

deference no matter what. It does not matter if the

reason that the state prisoner failed to prove a fact

material to his claim was the state court denying him

a full and fair hearing. Likewise, it does not matter

whether the state court denying the state prisoner a

6 Jordan M. Steiker et al., The Problem of RubberStamping in State Capital Habeas Proceedings: A Harris County

Case Study, 55 Hous. L. Rev. 889 (2018).

20

full and fair hearing makes it impossible for him to

make the showing necessary to overcome AEDPA

deference. The courts in these circuits will still apply

AEDPA deference under these circumstances. In

these circuits, “federal habeas review has been

reduced to nothing more than a search for the state

judge’s signature.” Valdez, 288 F.3d at 706 (Wiener &

Parker, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en

banc).

III.

THE PRESENT CASE IS AN EXCELLENT

VEHICLE FOR THIS COURT TO

RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT.

The present case is an excellent vehicle for this

Court to resolve the circuit split given that the answer

to the question presented is likely outcome

determinative.

To be entitled to relief on his Giglio claim,

Reynolds must make two showings: (1) there was a

leniency agreement and so West’s testimony was

false; and (2) the false testimony was material.

Glossip v. Oklahoma, 145 S. Ct. 612, 626 (2025).

Assuming that there was an agreement, then

West’s false testimony would clearly be material.

West was the prosecution’s “key witness” 7 and

whether she had a leniency agreement with the

prosecution affected her credibility. This Court has

7 In the prosecution’s own words, West “was obviously a

key part of [Reynolds’] prosecution and probably the key

witness.” Pet. App. 699a. She “provided critical information that

[the prosecution] wouldn’t have - - may not have gotten

otherwise.” Id.

21

repeatedly held that false testimony bearing on the

testimony of the prosecution’s key witness is material,

especially when the false testimony relates to a

leniency agreement. See, e.g., Giglio, 405 U.S. at 155

(1972)Had the prosecution corrected West’s false

testimony on the stand, it “would have revealed to the

jury not just that [West] was untrustworthy … but

also that [she] was willing to lie to them under oath.”

Glossip, 145 S. Ct. at 628. “Such a revelation would

be significant in any case …” Id. (emphasis added).

Accordingly, whether Reynolds is entitled to

habeas relief hinges entirely on whether he can prove

an agreement between West and the prosecution

existed. And whether he can make such a showing

depends on whether the state court’s finding to the

contrary is entitled to AEDPA deference.

The Eleventh Circuit held that the state court’s

finding was entitled to AEDPA deference, and that

Reynolds had failed to overcome that deference.

However, the court acknowledged that if AEDPA

deference did not apply, there was enough evidence in

the record from which a fact finder could find an

agreement:

Although factual inferences can be

drawn in the way Mr. Reynolds suggests,

the record can also be read differently. …

We are not the original triers of fact and

our review of the state court factual

findings is deferential under AEDPA.

Our limited review means that we may

not issue a writ of habeas corpus simply

22

because we conclude, in our independent

judgment, that the Rule 32 court and the

ACCA were incorrect. The decision must

be objectively unreasonable.

Pet. App. 23a-24a (emphasis added). The quote above

is an acknowledgement by the Eleventh Circuit that

if AEDPA deference did not apply and they were “the

original triers of fact” exercising their “independent

judgment,” then the record was sufficient for them to

draw “factual inferences” that there was an

agreement between West and the prosecution “in the

way Mr. Reynolds suggests.”

Accordingly, the question presented is outcome

determinative. If Reynolds prevails on the question

presented in this Court, then the record is sufficient

for the Eleventh Circuit to find an agreement and

grant him relief on remand.

IV.

THIS COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE

CIRCUIT SPLIT BY HOLDING THAT A

STATE COURT’S FACTUAL FINDINGS

ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AEDPA

DEFERENCE

IF

THE

HABEAS

PETITIONER DID NOT RECEIVE A FULL

AND FAIR EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

This Court should resolve the circuit split by

interpreting § 2254 as not requiring deference to a

state court’s factual determinations when the state

court denied the habeas petitioner a full and fair

evidentiary hearing. This full-and-fair-hearing

interpretation is supported by the text, legislative

history, and purpose of AEDPA.

23

A. The text of § 2254 only requires deference to

a state court’s factual determinations if two things are

true. First, the habeas petitioner’s claim must have

been “adjudicated on the merits.” Second, that

adjudication must not have “resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts.” Id. Neither of these things is true when the

habeas petitioner does not receive a full and fair

evidentiary hearing.

First, a state court that disposes of a claim

without providing the habeas petitioner a full and fair

hearing does not adjudicate that claim on the merits.

“A merits adjudication requires the court to consider

the ‘substance’ of the defendant’s claim,” which means

applying “controlling legal principles to the facts

bearing upon [the defendant’s] claim.” Wilson, 577

F.3d at 1292-93. When a state court refuses to provide

the defendant a full and fair hearing, the state court

prevents the petitioner from putting the facts bearing

upon his claim in front of that court. As a result, the

state court will not be able to apply controlling legal

principles to those facts. Thus, when a state court

“refuses to grant an evidentiary hearing to consider

material, non-record evidence … and then rules on

the [defendant’s] claim without consideration of this

evidence,” the state court’s “denial of the claim is not

an adjudication on the merits to which the federal

courts owe AEDPA deference.” Id. at 1300.

Second, “the denial of a full and fair hearing in

state court produces per se an unreasonable

determination of the facts.” Valdez, 288 F.3d at 705

24

(Dennis, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en

banc).

B. The full-and-fair-hearing interpretation is

also supported by the legislative history of AEDPA.

See Justin Marceau, Deference and Doubt: The

Interaction of AEDPA Section 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1), 82

Tul. L. Rev. 385, 427 (2007) (summarizing “four pieces

of legislative history that … support the conclusion

that procedural fairness in state court is a

prerequisite for deference to factual findings”).

As just one example, when signing AEDPA into

law, President Clinton stated: “If [AEDPA] were read

to deny litigants a meaningful opportunity to prove

the facts necessary to vindicate Federal rights, it

would raise serious constitutional questions. I do not

read it that way.” William J. Clinton, Statement on

Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996, 1 Pub. Papers 630, 631 (Apr. 24,

1996).

A reading of § 2254 that requires deference to

state court’s factual findings made in the absence of a

full and fair hearing would clearly deny a litigant a

meaningful opportunity to prove the facts necessary

to vindicate his federal rights. “[I]f a full and fair

hearing is not a prerequisite … to deference in federal

court under the AEDPA, then state courts are free to

(1) rubber-stamp the prosecuting body’s proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law, (2) deny the

petitioner relief without affording him a hearing, and

(3) effectively prevent a federal court from later

granting the requested relief.” Valdez, 288 F.3d at 703

25

(Dennis, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en

banc);

C.

Finally,

the

full-and-fair-hearing

interpretation also comports with the general purpose

of AEDPA, which is “to further the principles of

comity, finality, and federalism.” Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000). This purpose is “not served

when the state court has never considered the

substance of the claim in the first place.” Wilson, 577

F.3d at 1293. “No court will have yet evaluated the

evidence … and thus there is no prior evaluation of

the claim that would deserve the kind of deference

AEDPA provides.” Id. As the federal court would be

the first court to apply controlling legal principles to

the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim, “its

ruling would show no disrespect to any contrary

dispensation from the state court.” Id. When a state

court denies a habeas petitioner a full and fair

evidentiary hearing, federal habeas courts “do not

offend the principles of comity, finality, and

federalism that animate AEDPA deference because

the state court has passed on the opportunity to

adjudicate the claim on a complete record.” Gordon,

780 F.3d at 202.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a

writ of certiorari should be granted.

26

May 8, 2025

Respectfully Submitted,

RICHARD SNYDER

Counsel of Record

TANNER PEARSON

SPENCER PTACEK

FREDRIKSON & BYRON, P.A.

60 S. 6th St, Suite 1500

Minneapolis, MN 55402

(612) 492-7000

rsnyder@fredlaw.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae