Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Bryant Cobb, Petitioner v. Ohio
Supreme Court briefMar 21, 2025
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Filed
MAR 2 1 2025
supreme^ourtS^^
BRYANT COBB — PETITIONER
vs.
STATE OF OHIO — RESPONDENT
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE OHIO SUPREME COURT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Bryant Cobb, #A80O112
501 Thompson Road
P.O. Box 8000
Conneaut, OH 44030
pro se Petitioner
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Question^ Whether the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth Appellate District’s
affirmation of the denial of Petitioner’s motion to suppress is repugnant to the
“Excessive Bail” Clause of U.S. Constitution, Amendment VIII and to U.S.
Constitution, Amendment IV (as both provisions are applicable to Ohio under the
“Privileges or Immunities” and “Due Process” Clauses of U.S. Constitution,
Amendment XIV, §l).
i
LIST OF PARTIES
All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.
RELATED CASES
State of Ohio v. Bryant Cobb, Richland County Common Pleas Court No. 2022 CR
497 R, motion to suppress overruled (entry filed June 8th 2023) and judgment of
conviction (judgment entered August 25, 2023); State of Ohio v. Bryant Cobb, Ohio
Court of Appeals for the Fifth District No. 2023 CA 0051, judgment affirmed
(judgment entered July 8, 2024), reconsideration denied (judgment entered August
5th 2024); State of Ohio v. Bryant Cobb, Ohio Supreme Court No. 2024-1268, appeal
not accepted for review (judgment entered November 26, 2024), reconsideration
denied (judgment entered December 23, 2024).
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page Number
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
IV
OPINIONS BELOW
1
JURISDICTION
2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, RULES, AND STATUTES INVOLVED...... 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
4-6
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
7-11
12
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases
Page Number
Bland v. Holden (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 238
9
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)
9
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876)
8
Galen v. County ofLos Angeles, 477 F. 3d 652 (9th Cir. 2007)
10
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)
8
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
9
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951)
9, 10
State v. Benton (1998), 82 Ohio St. 3d 316
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)
5
9, 10
US. v. Scott, 450 F. 3d 863 (9th Cir. 2006)
11
Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177 (i960)
9
Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
10
iv
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari is issued, so as to review the
judgment below which affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Richland County Common Pleas Court’s order, overruling Petitioner’s motion to
suppress, is unreported, but is set forth at Appendix V, and such court’s sentencing
entry is set forth at Appendix 2.
The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth District’s decision, affirming Richland County
Common Pleas Court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to suppress and its judgment of
conviction, is reported at 2024-Ohio-2608 and is also set forth at Appendix 3.
The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth District’s decision, denying reconsideration,
is unreported.
The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision, declining to accept jurisdiction of the appeal, is
reported at 2024 Ohio LEXIS 2617 and is also set forth at Appendix 4.
The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision, denying reconsideration, is reported at 2024 Ohio
LEXIS 2854 and is also set forth at Appendix 5.
1
JURISDICTION
The date on which the Richland County Common Pleas Court overruled Petitioner’s
motion to suppress was June 8th 20235 and, on August 25th 2023, such court entered
a judgment of conviction (a copy of each of such decisions appear at Appendix 1 and
2, respectively).
The date on which the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth District affirmed Richland
County Common Pleas Court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to suppress and its
judgment of conviction was July 8th 2024 (a copy of such opinion appears at Appendix
3).
Then, a timely application to reconsider was denied on August 5th 2024.
Thereafter, an application for jurisdictional appeal was declined on November 26th
2024 (a copy of such decision appears at Appendix 4).
Finally, a motion for reconsideration was denied on December 23rd 2024 (a copy of
such decision appears at Appendix 5).
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1257(a).
2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, RULES, AND STATUTES INVOLVED
Ohio Crim. R. 46 (2022), in pertinent part, provides:
irkit
(B) Pretrial release. Unless the court orders the defendant detained under
division (A) of this rule, the court shall release the defendant on the least
restrictive conditions that, in the discretion of the court, will reasonably assure
the defendant's appearance in court, the protection or safety of any person or
the community, and that the defendant will not obstruct the criminal justice
process. kkk
***
(2) Non-financial conditions of release. The court may impose any of the
following conditions of release:
***
0 Any other constitutional condition considered reasonably necessary to
reasonably assure appearance or public safety.
(C) Factors. Subject to subsection (G)(2) of this rule, in determining the kkk
conditions of bail, the court shall consider all relevant information kkk
Ohio Constitution, Article I, §9, in pertinent part, provides:
All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties “k'k'k except for a person who
is charged with a felony where the proof is evident or the presumption great and
where the person poses a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or
to the community. Where a person is charged with any offense for which the person
may be incarcerated, the court may determine at any time the kkk conditions of bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required kkk
U.S. Constitution, Amendment VIII, in pertinent part, provides:
Excessive bail shall not be required kkk
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, §1, in pertinent part, provides:
kkk
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States! nor shall any State deprive any person
of *** liberty *** without due process of law kkk
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This instant proceeding arises out of the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth
District’s affirmation of the Richland County Common Pleas Court’s judgment
overruling Petitioner’s motion to suppress and such lower court’s judgment of
conviction, and out of such appellate court’s denial of reconsideration! and out of the
Supreme Court of Ohio’s declination of review thereof and its denial of
reconsideration.
As pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was released on bond in an
unrelated case, Richland County Common Pleas Court Case No. 2022 CR 147. Such
bond was conditioned on Petitioner’s granting of consent to a search without warrant
(leaving only the option of either granting consent or staying in jail) which Petitioner
granted on April 5th 2022. While on pretrial supervision and electronic monitoring
(another condition of his bail), probation officers, on June 6th 2022, went to
Petitioner’s home in order to conduct a surprise home search and ultimately found
drugs on his person. Afterwards, on July 21st 2022, Petitioner was indicted with five
felony counts in Richland County Common Pleas Court Case No. 2022 CR 497 R.
Later, on January 24th 2023, Petitioner moved to suppress the relevant evidence as
being fruit of an unconstitutional search, and, by an entry filed June 8th 2023, the
Richland County Common Pleas Court overruled such motion. As a result of the
overruling of his motion to suppress, Petitioner, on August 21st 2023, pled no contest
to two of the five felony counts and the court, by entry filed August 25th 2023,
sentenced him to 6-9 years. (Appendix 1-2! Appendix 7, pp. 4-5! Appendix 9, pp. 3-5.)
4
Seeking to vindicate his right/ privilege under U.S. Constitution, Amendments
VIII and XIV, §1, Petitioner, in appellate proceedings, sought relief from the trial
court’s overruling of his motion to suppress and sought a reversal of the conviction.
Particularly, counsel for Petitioner argued that the consent given was not voluntary
and that the evidence recovered was the fruit of an unconstitutional search.
(Appendix 7, p. 6-7.) Afterwards, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth District
affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Petitioner voluntarily consented to
warrantless searches. (Appendix 3, p. 4 at ff 6-8.)
Next, on July 9th 2024, Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the Ohio Court
of Appeals
for the
Fifth
District’s
affirmation.
In
such Application for
Reconsideration, Petitioner alleged that State v. Benton (1998), 82 Ohio St. 3d 316 is
inapposite and that “warrantless searches have no connection to assuring the
defendant’s appearance or public safety.” (Appendix 8, p. 1.) Subsequently, on August
5th 2024, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth District denied reconsideration.
Ever eager to uphold his right(s)/ privilege(s) under U.S. Constitution,
Amendments IV and VIII (applicable to Ohio courts pursuant to U.S. Constitution,
Amendment XIV, §l), Petitioner continued on by invoking the Ohio Supreme Court
to accept jurisdiction of a jurisdictional appeal, aimed at reviewing the Ohio Court of
Appeals for the Fifth District’s judgment. Particularly, Petitioner asserted that “Ohio
law forbids a court from imposing consent to warrantless searches as a condition of
pretrial bond[;]” that Ohio law does not allow the compulsory suspension of U.S.
Constitution, Amendment IV protections of a person presumed innocent; and that the
5
conditioning of bond release upon the granting of consent to general searches renders
any search thereunder unconstitutional. (Appendix 9, pp. 3, 6-7.) Upon the
submission of each parties’ stance, the Ohio Supreme Court, on November 26th 2024,
declined to accept jurisdiction. (Appendix 4.) Later, Petitioner sought reconsideration
(Appendix 10), but to no avail as the Ohio Supreme Court, on December 23rd 2024,
declined to reconsider its judgment (Appendix 5).
Having exhausted all possible avenues for relief in the Ohio courts, Petitioner
respectfully urges that the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth District’s judgment is
repugnant to U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV, to the Excessive Bail Clause of U.S.
Constitution, Amendment VIII (both applicable to Ohio courts pursuant to U.S.
Constitution, Amendment XIV, §l), and is at variance with this Court’s decisions (and
those of other federal courts) as explained in the argument below.
6
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I.
Decision affirming the denial of Petitioner’s motion to suppress is repugnant
to U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV and to the Excessive Bail Clause of U.S.
Constitution, Amendment VIII (applicable to Ohio courts pursuant to U.S.
Constitution, Amendment XIV, §l).
In light of its affirmation of the Richland County Common Pleas Court’s
overruling of Petitioner’s motion to suppress evidence, alleged to have been the fruit
of an unconstitutional search, its failure to reconsider such affirmation, and its
audacity to ignore this Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, the Ohio
Court of Appeals for the Fifth District (and the Supreme Court of Ohio) appears to
hold itself out to be “Supreme” over, and suggests that its interpretations of federal
law are paramount to those of, this Court. That being so, Petitioner implores this
Court to strike down such delusions, by granting his petition; not only as a benefit
to his interest in this particular case, but so as to remind that excess bail shall not
be required and as to clarify that the threat of withholding release on bail for a
refusal to consent to general searches renders involuntary any subsequent consentto-search.
As a threshold matter, this Court has jurisdiction to review the aforesaid
judgment (that of the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth District) because of its
repugnancy to U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV, to Amendment VIII’s Excessive
7
Bail Clause,1 and to the interpretations thereof. More particularly, the decision is so
repugnant as it permits Ohio courts to place arrestees in the precarious position of
having to make a Hobson’s choice of constitutional dimension—consenting to the
abridgement of an arrestee’s Amendment IV right to privacy in his/ her residence
and the effects therein, under the coercive threat of the government’s withholding of
the Amendment VIII right to bail. On certiorari, this Court will not have much
problem in ascertaining that a consent-to-search was involuntarily given where
release on bail was conditioned on the grant of such consent; and that, under such
circumstances, bail was excessive. Of course this Court has an interest in the
uniform application of federal law,2 even when such law is applied in a state court of
last resort. See Sup. Ct. R. 10(b) or (c). In fact, this Court’s precedent, in its various
factual contexts, highlights that it is a duty of this Court to ascertain, in order that
federal guaranties may appropriately be enforced, whether a nonfederal ground
1 The Excessive Bail Clause is applicable to Ohio via U.S. Constitution, Amendment
XIV, §1. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 501 n.5 (1987) (“The prohibitions of
the Eighth Amendment apply to the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764 n. 12
(2010) (Excessive Bail Clause incorporated into Due Process Clause).
2 See generally, Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130,136 (1876) (“The laws of the United
States are laws in the several States, and just as much binding on the citizens and
courts thereof as the State laws.”).
8
adequately and independently supports the Ohio Supreme Court’s judgment below.3
Frankly, permitting the judgment below to stand, unchecked by this Court (who, in
the context of federal law, rightfully holds the title of “Supreme”), enables the seeds
of rebellion against our Federal Constitution to mature into an outright revolution
whereby state courts may condition release on bail upon an arrestee’s waiver of 4th
Amendment rights.
That bail is generally available to allow an accused person to be released
before trial is fundamental to the American system of justice. Pretrial release not
only makes it easier for an accused person to prepare a defense, it also upholds the
presumption of innocence by ensuring that a person is not punished before being
convicted. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). Although a court may impose bail
conditions to protect an individual or the public, the primary function of bail is to
allow for pretrial release, while also assuring that the accused person will appear in
court when required. Id. at 4-5; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752*754
(1987); Bland v. Holden (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 238, 239. To be even more frank,
there is nothing in either of the state courts’ record which suggest that Petitioner is
a danger to any one individual or to the community, nor has there been any
legitimate state interest claimed below which would justify the bond condition of an
3 See NAACPv. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177
(1960).
9
arrestee consenting to warrantless, general searches4—surely, the Excessive Bail
Clause applies to conditions of release,5 and the Fourth Amendment “protection
reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not ***.” Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383,
392 (1914).
Evenmore, the fact that Petitioner was permitted bail evinces the trial court’s
belief that Petitioner is not the type of person who “poses a substantial risk of
serious physical harm to any person or to the community[;]”6 thus, the court, by
grant of bail, disposed of any assertion that consent-to-search, as a condition of
release, is “reasonably necessary to reasonably assure •kick public safety.”7 What is
more, consent-to-search was never even sanctioned by the trial court as a condition
4 See Crim. R. 46(C) (court to consider relevant information when fashioning bail
conditions).
5 Salerno at 754.
6 Ohio Constitution, Article I, §9. Also note that one may prevail on an Eighth
Amendment challenge to release conditions by showing that the release conditions
are so excessive in relation to the asserted government interest. See Salerno at 754
(proposed conditions of release or detention must not be excessive in light of
legitimate state interests); Stack at 55 Galen v. County ofLos Angeles, All F. 3d 652,
659-660 (9th Cir. 2007) (bail may not be set to achieve invalid interests or m an
amount that is excessive in relation to the interest sought to be achieved).
7 Crim. R. 46(B)(2)(i).
10
of bail—the court, in exercising its discretion, instead, found electronic monitoring
to be the least restrictive condition which would reasonably assure the Petitioner's
appearance in court, the protection or safety of any person or the community, and
that he would not obstruct the criminal justice process. (Appendix 6).8 Without a
determination by the court that consent-to-search, as a bond condition, is so
reasonably necessary (and is the least restrictive in assuring the government
interests outlined in Crim. R. 46), Petitioner has suffered an egregious loss,
occasioned by executive officers. Petitioner’s dilemma is very similar to what the
defendant in U.S. v. Scott, 450 F. 3d 863 (9th Cir. 2006) experienced—the executive
officers here have “short-circuit[ed] the process by claiming that the arrest itself is
sufficient to establish that the conditions [here, condition of random, general
searches] are required.” Scott at 874. It is inescapable that Petitioner, by virtue of
the presumption of innocence, had privacy and liberty interests far greater than any
probationer or parolee.9
8 Note that the plain language of Crim. R. 46(B) and of Ohio Constitution, Article I,
§9 places within the discretion of the court, as opposed to state executive officers, the
determination of what conditions a release shall be subjected to.
9 See Scott at 873 (holding that a defendant “out on his own recognizance before trial
has greater privacy and liberty interests than a probationer) and at 874 (“That an
individual is charged with a crime cannot, as a constitutional matter, give rise to any
11
II.
Conclusion
The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted so as to preserve the
presumption of innocence, to safeguard against the erosion of a court’s discretion in
setting bail conditions, and to protect arrestees from excessive bail and coercion to
waive Fourth Amendment rights.
inference that he is more likely than any other citizen to commit a crime if he is
released from custody).
12
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