Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Bryant Cobb, Petitioner v. Ohio

Supreme Court briefMar 21, 2025

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Filed

MAR 2 1 2025

supreme^ourtS^^

BRYANT COBB — PETITIONER

vs.

STATE OF OHIO — RESPONDENT

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE OHIO SUPREME COURT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Bryant Cobb, #A80O112

501 Thompson Road

P.O. Box 8000

Conneaut, OH 44030

pro se Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Question^ Whether the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth Appellate District’s

affirmation of the denial of Petitioner’s motion to suppress is repugnant to the

“Excessive Bail” Clause of U.S. Constitution, Amendment VIII and to U.S.

Constitution, Amendment IV (as both provisions are applicable to Ohio under the

“Privileges or Immunities” and “Due Process” Clauses of U.S. Constitution,

Amendment XIV, §l).

i

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

RELATED CASES

State of Ohio v. Bryant Cobb, Richland County Common Pleas Court No. 2022 CR

497 R, motion to suppress overruled (entry filed June 8th 2023) and judgment of

conviction (judgment entered August 25, 2023); State of Ohio v. Bryant Cobb, Ohio

Court of Appeals for the Fifth District No. 2023 CA 0051, judgment affirmed

(judgment entered July 8, 2024), reconsideration denied (judgment entered August

5th 2024); State of Ohio v. Bryant Cobb, Ohio Supreme Court No. 2024-1268, appeal

not accepted for review (judgment entered November 26, 2024), reconsideration

denied (judgment entered December 23, 2024).

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page Number

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

IV

OPINIONS BELOW

1

JURISDICTION

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, RULES, AND STATUTES INVOLVED...... 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4-6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

7-11

12

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases

Page Number

Bland v. Holden (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 238

9

Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)

9

Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876)

8

Galen v. County ofLos Angeles, 477 F. 3d 652 (9th Cir. 2007)

10

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)

8

NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)

9

Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951)

9, 10

State v. Benton (1998), 82 Ohio St. 3d 316

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)

5

9, 10

US. v. Scott, 450 F. 3d 863 (9th Cir. 2006)

11

Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177 (i960)

9

Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914)

10

iv

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari is issued, so as to review the

judgment below which affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Richland County Common Pleas Court’s order, overruling Petitioner’s motion to

suppress, is unreported, but is set forth at Appendix V, and such court’s sentencing

entry is set forth at Appendix 2.

The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth District’s decision, affirming Richland County

Common Pleas Court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to suppress and its judgment of

conviction, is reported at 2024-Ohio-2608 and is also set forth at Appendix 3.

The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth District’s decision, denying reconsideration,

is unreported.

The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision, declining to accept jurisdiction of the appeal, is

reported at 2024 Ohio LEXIS 2617 and is also set forth at Appendix 4.

The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision, denying reconsideration, is reported at 2024 Ohio

LEXIS 2854 and is also set forth at Appendix 5.

1

JURISDICTION

The date on which the Richland County Common Pleas Court overruled Petitioner’s

motion to suppress was June 8th 20235 and, on August 25th 2023, such court entered

a judgment of conviction (a copy of each of such decisions appear at Appendix 1 and

2, respectively).

The date on which the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth District affirmed Richland

County Common Pleas Court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to suppress and its

judgment of conviction was July 8th 2024 (a copy of such opinion appears at Appendix

3).

Then, a timely application to reconsider was denied on August 5th 2024.

Thereafter, an application for jurisdictional appeal was declined on November 26th

2024 (a copy of such decision appears at Appendix 4).

Finally, a motion for reconsideration was denied on December 23rd 2024 (a copy of

such decision appears at Appendix 5).

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1257(a).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, RULES, AND STATUTES INVOLVED

Ohio Crim. R. 46 (2022), in pertinent part, provides:

irkit

(B) Pretrial release. Unless the court orders the defendant detained under

division (A) of this rule, the court shall release the defendant on the least

restrictive conditions that, in the discretion of the court, will reasonably assure

the defendant's appearance in court, the protection or safety of any person or

the community, and that the defendant will not obstruct the criminal justice

process. kkk

***

(2) Non-financial conditions of release. The court may impose any of the

following conditions of release:

***

0 Any other constitutional condition considered reasonably necessary to

reasonably assure appearance or public safety.

(C) Factors. Subject to subsection (G)(2) of this rule, in determining the kkk

conditions of bail, the court shall consider all relevant information kkk

Ohio Constitution, Article I, §9, in pertinent part, provides:

All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties “k'k'k except for a person who

is charged with a felony where the proof is evident or the presumption great and

where the person poses a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or

to the community. Where a person is charged with any offense for which the person

may be incarcerated, the court may determine at any time the kkk conditions of bail.

Excessive bail shall not be required kkk

U.S. Constitution, Amendment VIII, in pertinent part, provides:

Excessive bail shall not be required kkk

U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, §1, in pertinent part, provides:

kkk

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges

or immunities of citizens of the United States! nor shall any State deprive any person

of *** liberty *** without due process of law kkk

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This instant proceeding arises out of the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth

District’s affirmation of the Richland County Common Pleas Court’s judgment

overruling Petitioner’s motion to suppress and such lower court’s judgment of

conviction, and out of such appellate court’s denial of reconsideration! and out of the

Supreme Court of Ohio’s declination of review thereof and its denial of

reconsideration.

As pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was released on bond in an

unrelated case, Richland County Common Pleas Court Case No. 2022 CR 147. Such

bond was conditioned on Petitioner’s granting of consent to a search without warrant

(leaving only the option of either granting consent or staying in jail) which Petitioner

granted on April 5th 2022. While on pretrial supervision and electronic monitoring

(another condition of his bail), probation officers, on June 6th 2022, went to

Petitioner’s home in order to conduct a surprise home search and ultimately found

drugs on his person. Afterwards, on July 21st 2022, Petitioner was indicted with five

felony counts in Richland County Common Pleas Court Case No. 2022 CR 497 R.

Later, on January 24th 2023, Petitioner moved to suppress the relevant evidence as

being fruit of an unconstitutional search, and, by an entry filed June 8th 2023, the

Richland County Common Pleas Court overruled such motion. As a result of the

overruling of his motion to suppress, Petitioner, on August 21st 2023, pled no contest

to two of the five felony counts and the court, by entry filed August 25th 2023,

sentenced him to 6-9 years. (Appendix 1-2! Appendix 7, pp. 4-5! Appendix 9, pp. 3-5.)

4

Seeking to vindicate his right/ privilege under U.S. Constitution, Amendments

VIII and XIV, §1, Petitioner, in appellate proceedings, sought relief from the trial

court’s overruling of his motion to suppress and sought a reversal of the conviction.

Particularly, counsel for Petitioner argued that the consent given was not voluntary

and that the evidence recovered was the fruit of an unconstitutional search.

(Appendix 7, p. 6-7.) Afterwards, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth District

affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Petitioner voluntarily consented to

warrantless searches. (Appendix 3, p. 4 at ff 6-8.)

Next, on July 9th 2024, Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the Ohio Court

of Appeals

for the

Fifth

District’s

affirmation.

In

such Application for

Reconsideration, Petitioner alleged that State v. Benton (1998), 82 Ohio St. 3d 316 is

inapposite and that “warrantless searches have no connection to assuring the

defendant’s appearance or public safety.” (Appendix 8, p. 1.) Subsequently, on August

5th 2024, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth District denied reconsideration.

Ever eager to uphold his right(s)/ privilege(s) under U.S. Constitution,

Amendments IV and VIII (applicable to Ohio courts pursuant to U.S. Constitution,

Amendment XIV, §l), Petitioner continued on by invoking the Ohio Supreme Court

to accept jurisdiction of a jurisdictional appeal, aimed at reviewing the Ohio Court of

Appeals for the Fifth District’s judgment. Particularly, Petitioner asserted that “Ohio

law forbids a court from imposing consent to warrantless searches as a condition of

pretrial bond[;]” that Ohio law does not allow the compulsory suspension of U.S.

Constitution, Amendment IV protections of a person presumed innocent; and that the

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conditioning of bond release upon the granting of consent to general searches renders

any search thereunder unconstitutional. (Appendix 9, pp. 3, 6-7.) Upon the

submission of each parties’ stance, the Ohio Supreme Court, on November 26th 2024,

declined to accept jurisdiction. (Appendix 4.) Later, Petitioner sought reconsideration

(Appendix 10), but to no avail as the Ohio Supreme Court, on December 23rd 2024,

declined to reconsider its judgment (Appendix 5).

Having exhausted all possible avenues for relief in the Ohio courts, Petitioner

respectfully urges that the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth District’s judgment is

repugnant to U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV, to the Excessive Bail Clause of U.S.

Constitution, Amendment VIII (both applicable to Ohio courts pursuant to U.S.

Constitution, Amendment XIV, §l), and is at variance with this Court’s decisions (and

those of other federal courts) as explained in the argument below.

6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

Decision affirming the denial of Petitioner’s motion to suppress is repugnant

to U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV and to the Excessive Bail Clause of U.S.

Constitution, Amendment VIII (applicable to Ohio courts pursuant to U.S.

Constitution, Amendment XIV, §l).

In light of its affirmation of the Richland County Common Pleas Court’s

overruling of Petitioner’s motion to suppress evidence, alleged to have been the fruit

of an unconstitutional search, its failure to reconsider such affirmation, and its

audacity to ignore this Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, the Ohio

Court of Appeals for the Fifth District (and the Supreme Court of Ohio) appears to

hold itself out to be “Supreme” over, and suggests that its interpretations of federal

law are paramount to those of, this Court. That being so, Petitioner implores this

Court to strike down such delusions, by granting his petition; not only as a benefit

to his interest in this particular case, but so as to remind that excess bail shall not

be required and as to clarify that the threat of withholding release on bail for a

refusal to consent to general searches renders involuntary any subsequent consentto-search.

As a threshold matter, this Court has jurisdiction to review the aforesaid

judgment (that of the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth District) because of its

repugnancy to U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV, to Amendment VIII’s Excessive

7

Bail Clause,1 and to the interpretations thereof. More particularly, the decision is so

repugnant as it permits Ohio courts to place arrestees in the precarious position of

having to make a Hobson’s choice of constitutional dimension—consenting to the

abridgement of an arrestee’s Amendment IV right to privacy in his/ her residence

and the effects therein, under the coercive threat of the government’s withholding of

the Amendment VIII right to bail. On certiorari, this Court will not have much

problem in ascertaining that a consent-to-search was involuntarily given where

release on bail was conditioned on the grant of such consent; and that, under such

circumstances, bail was excessive. Of course this Court has an interest in the

uniform application of federal law,2 even when such law is applied in a state court of

last resort. See Sup. Ct. R. 10(b) or (c). In fact, this Court’s precedent, in its various

factual contexts, highlights that it is a duty of this Court to ascertain, in order that

federal guaranties may appropriately be enforced, whether a nonfederal ground

1 The Excessive Bail Clause is applicable to Ohio via U.S. Constitution, Amendment

XIV, §1. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 501 n.5 (1987) (“The prohibitions of

the Eighth Amendment apply to the States through the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.”); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764 n. 12

(2010) (Excessive Bail Clause incorporated into Due Process Clause).

2 See generally, Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130,136 (1876) (“The laws of the United

States are laws in the several States, and just as much binding on the citizens and

courts thereof as the State laws.”).

8

adequately and independently supports the Ohio Supreme Court’s judgment below.3

Frankly, permitting the judgment below to stand, unchecked by this Court (who, in

the context of federal law, rightfully holds the title of “Supreme”), enables the seeds

of rebellion against our Federal Constitution to mature into an outright revolution

whereby state courts may condition release on bail upon an arrestee’s waiver of 4th

Amendment rights.

That bail is generally available to allow an accused person to be released

before trial is fundamental to the American system of justice. Pretrial release not

only makes it easier for an accused person to prepare a defense, it also upholds the

presumption of innocence by ensuring that a person is not punished before being

convicted. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). Although a court may impose bail

conditions to protect an individual or the public, the primary function of bail is to

allow for pretrial release, while also assuring that the accused person will appear in

court when required. Id. at 4-5; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752*754

(1987); Bland v. Holden (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 238, 239. To be even more frank,

there is nothing in either of the state courts’ record which suggest that Petitioner is

a danger to any one individual or to the community, nor has there been any

legitimate state interest claimed below which would justify the bond condition of an

3 See NAACPv. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177

(1960).

9

arrestee consenting to warrantless, general searches4—surely, the Excessive Bail

Clause applies to conditions of release,5 and the Fourth Amendment “protection

reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not ***.” Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383,

392 (1914).

Evenmore, the fact that Petitioner was permitted bail evinces the trial court’s

belief that Petitioner is not the type of person who “poses a substantial risk of

serious physical harm to any person or to the community[;]”6 thus, the court, by

grant of bail, disposed of any assertion that consent-to-search, as a condition of

release, is “reasonably necessary to reasonably assure •kick public safety.”7 What is

more, consent-to-search was never even sanctioned by the trial court as a condition

4 See Crim. R. 46(C) (court to consider relevant information when fashioning bail

conditions).

5 Salerno at 754.

6 Ohio Constitution, Article I, §9. Also note that one may prevail on an Eighth

Amendment challenge to release conditions by showing that the release conditions

are so excessive in relation to the asserted government interest. See Salerno at 754

(proposed conditions of release or detention must not be excessive in light of

legitimate state interests); Stack at 55 Galen v. County ofLos Angeles, All F. 3d 652,

659-660 (9th Cir. 2007) (bail may not be set to achieve invalid interests or m an

amount that is excessive in relation to the interest sought to be achieved).

7 Crim. R. 46(B)(2)(i).

10

of bail—the court, in exercising its discretion, instead, found electronic monitoring

to be the least restrictive condition which would reasonably assure the Petitioner's

appearance in court, the protection or safety of any person or the community, and

that he would not obstruct the criminal justice process. (Appendix 6).8 Without a

determination by the court that consent-to-search, as a bond condition, is so

reasonably necessary (and is the least restrictive in assuring the government

interests outlined in Crim. R. 46), Petitioner has suffered an egregious loss,

occasioned by executive officers. Petitioner’s dilemma is very similar to what the

defendant in U.S. v. Scott, 450 F. 3d 863 (9th Cir. 2006) experienced—the executive

officers here have “short-circuit[ed] the process by claiming that the arrest itself is

sufficient to establish that the conditions [here, condition of random, general

searches] are required.” Scott at 874. It is inescapable that Petitioner, by virtue of

the presumption of innocence, had privacy and liberty interests far greater than any

probationer or parolee.9

8 Note that the plain language of Crim. R. 46(B) and of Ohio Constitution, Article I,

§9 places within the discretion of the court, as opposed to state executive officers, the

determination of what conditions a release shall be subjected to.

9 See Scott at 873 (holding that a defendant “out on his own recognizance before trial

has greater privacy and liberty interests than a probationer) and at 874 (“That an

individual is charged with a crime cannot, as a constitutional matter, give rise to any

11

II.

Conclusion

The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted so as to preserve the

presumption of innocence, to safeguard against the erosion of a court’s discretion in

setting bail conditions, and to protect arrestees from excessive bail and coercion to

waive Fourth Amendment rights.

inference that he is more likely than any other citizen to commit a crime if he is

released from custody).

12

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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