Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Christian Genao, Petitioner v. United States

No. 24-_____

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

_____________________________________________

Christian Genao,

-v-

Petitioner,

United States of America,

Respondent.

_____________________________________________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

The United States Court of Appeals

For the Second Circuit

__________________________________________________________________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

__________________________________________________________________

Allegra Glashausser

Counsel of Record

Federal Defenders of New York, Inc.

Appeals Bureau

52 Duane Street, 10th Floor

New York, New York 10007

(212) 417-8739

Allegra_Glashausser@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner

Question Presented

Federal criminal defendants have a right to be present at sentencing,

grounded in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and codified in

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a)(3). Circuits, however, are split

as to whether this right requires sentencing courts to orally pronounce

non-mandatory conditions of supervised release at sentencing or if these

conditions can be added later to the written judgment. Seven circuits

require all non-mandatory conditions to be orally pronounced, while two

do not.

Must sentencing courts orally pronounce non-mandatory conditions of

supervised release to protect defendants’ right to be present and to put

them on notice of the conditions they must follow to avoid

reincarceration?

i

Table of Contents

Question Presented......................................................................................................... i

Table of Contents ........................................................................................................... ii

Table of Authorities ...................................................................................................... iii

Opinions and Orders Below........................................................................................... 1

Jurisdiction .................................................................................................................... 1

Relevant Constitutional and Statutory Provisions ...................................................... 1

Statement of the Case ................................................................................................... 3

A.

Introduction and Summary of Grounds for Certiorari ...................................... 3

B.

Facts .................................................................................................................... 4

1.

Guilty Plea and Sentencing ............................................................................ 4

2.

The Second Circuit’s Decision ......................................................................... 6

Reasons for Granting the Writ ...................................................................................... 7

I.

The Second Circuit’s holding that non-mandatory conditions of

supervised release need not be pronounced orally conflicts with

the precedents of seven other circuits. ........................................................ 7

ii

A.

The Circuits are split. ........................................................................... 8

B.

The question presented is important ................................................ 11

C.

This case presents a suitable vehicle for resolving the question

presented.

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 15

iii

Table of Authorities

Cases

Kentucky v. Stincer,

482 U.S. 730 (1987) .................................................................................................. 11

Mont v. United States,

587 U.S. 514 (2019) .................................................................................................... 3

United States v. Anstice,

930 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2019) ...................................................................................... 8

United States v. Asuncion-Pimental,

290 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2002) .................................................................................... 7, 10

United States v. Diggles,

957 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2020) ...................................................................................... 8

United States v. Geddes,

71 F.4th 1206 (10th Cir. 2023) ................................................................................... 8

United States v. Handakas,

329 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2003) ........................................................................................ 6

United States v. Leavens,

No. 23-7993, 2025 WL 387810 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2025).............................................. 13

United States v. Lewis,

125 F.4th 69 (2d Cir. 2025) ...................................................................................... 14

United States v. MacMillen,

544 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008) .......................................................................................... 5

United States v. Matthews,

54 F.4th 1 (D.C. Cir. 2022) ......................................................................................... 8

United States v. Meadows,

No. 22-3155, 2025 WL 786380 (2d Cir. Mar. 12, 2025) ..................................... 10, 13

United States v. Montoya,

82 F.4th 640 (9th Cir. 2023) ................................................................................... 8, 9

iv

United States v. Pasley,

No. 23-5230, 2024 WL 2862562 (6th Cir. June 6, 2024) ........................................... 9

United States v. Rascoll,

No. 23-7425, 2025 WL 367029 (2d Cir. Feb. 3, 2025).............................................. 14

United States v. Roberson,

No. 24-31, 2007 WL 10131753 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 2025).............................................. 13

United States v. Rodriguez,

75 F.4th 1231 (11th Cir. 2023) ................................................................................... 8

United States v. Rogers,

961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020) .................................................................................. 8, 9

United States v. Rosario,

386 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2004) ........................................................................................ 5

United States v. Rosado,

109 F.4th 120 (2d Cir. 2024) .................................................................................... 14

United States v. Ross,

No. 23-7210, 2025 WL 45287 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 2025).......................................... 11, 14

United States v. Sepulveda-Contreras,

466 F.3d 166 (1st Cir. 2006) ....................................................................................... 9

United States v. Sims,

92 F.4th 115 (2d Cir. 2024) ...................................................................................... 10

United States v. Oliveras,

96 F.4th 298 (2d Cir. 2024) ..................................................................................... 14

United States v. Thomas,

299 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................... 10

United States v. Truscello,

168 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1999) .......................................................................................... 7

v

United States v. Walker,

80 F.4th 880 (8th Cir. 2023) ....................................................................................... 8

United States v. Whitaker,

No. 21-1543, 2023 WL 5499363 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2023) ......................................... 11

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 3231 ............................................................................................................. 1

18 U.S.C. § 3583 ......................................................................................................... 3, 8

18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) ........................................................................................................ 1

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ........................................................................................................ 1

28 U.S.C. § 1291 ............................................................................................................. 1

U.S. Const. Amend V ..................................................................................................... 1

Rules

Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(3) .............................................................................. 1, 2, 6, 8, 14

Fed. R. Crim. P. 36......................................................................................................... 6

United States Sentencing Guidelines U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3 & 5D1.3(d)(4) ................... 1, 4

Other Authorities

“Federal Probation and Supervised Release Violations,”

July 2020, available at https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and

publications/research-publications/2020/20200728_Violations.pdf ........................ 12

“Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release,”

July 2010, available at https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-publications/2010/20100722_Supervised_Release.pdf ......... 12

vi

Opinions and Orders Below

The Second Circuit’s opinion is reproduced in the appendix at Pet. App. pp. 13. The transcript of the district court’s sentencing, post-sentencing hearing, the

judgment, and the amended judgment is reproduced at Pet. App. 4-64.

Jurisdiction

The court of appeals had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C.

§ 3742(a), entered judgment on October 4, 2024, and denied rehearing on December

19, 2024. The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, entered

judgment on June 15, 2023, and entered an amended judgment on June 30, 2023.

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

Relevant Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

I.

Fifth Amendment Due Process

No person shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law.

U.S. Const. Amend V.

II.

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 43(a)(3):

Defendant’s Presence

a) When Required. Unless this rule, Rule 5, or Rule 10 provides

otherwise, the defendant must be present at:

…

(3) sentencing.

1

III.

Revocation of Supervised Release

The court may…

(3) revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant

to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release …

if the court, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

applicable to revocation of probation or supervised release, finds

by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a

condition of supervised release…

18 U.S.C. § 3583 (e)(3).

IV.

“Special” Conditions

The following “special” conditions of supervised release are

recommended in the circumstances described and, in addition, may

otherwise be appropriate in particular cases:

…

(4) Substance Abuse

If the court has reason to believe that the defendant is an abuser of

narcotics, other controlled substances or alcohol — (A) a condition

requiring the defendant to participate in a program approved by the

United States Probation Office for substance abuse, which program may

include testing to determine whether the defendant has reverted to the

use of drugs or alcohol; and (B) a condition specifying that the defendant

shall not use or possess alcohol.

U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(4).

2

Statement of the Case

A.

Introduction and Summary of Grounds for Certiorari

Hundreds of thousands of people are serving terms of federal supervised

release, a kind of “conditional liberty” imposed after completion of a prison

sentence. Mont v. United States, 587 U.S. 514, 523 (2019). While on supervised

release, people are subject to certain statutorily mandated conditions. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d). Sentencing courts “may” also impose additional, non-mandatory

supervised release conditions, if those conditions are “reasonably related” to certain

enumerated sentencing factors, involve no greater deprivation of liberty than

reasonably necessary, and are consistent with any pertinent Sentencing

Commission policy statements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)-(3).

The sentencing guidelines list 36 possible conditions of supervised release,

dividing them into categories of “mandatory” and “discretionary” conditions.

U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3. The guidelines divide those discretionary conditions into

categories called “standard,” “special,” and “additional” conditions. Id. Violating any

of the conditions of supervised release can result in years of incarceration, separate

from any incarceration on the original offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (e)(3). Thus, to

succeed on supervision and avoid reincarceration, people need to know what

conditions apply to them.

This case presents an issue that divides courts across the country: must the

sentencing court orally pronounce all non-mandatory conditions of supervised

release, so that defendants are present to hear them, know what conditions they

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need to follow to avoid reincarceration, and have an opportunity to object to

conditions imposed? Seven circuits say yes, that all non-mandatory conditions of

supervised release must be pronounced orally, in the defendant’s presence. Two,

including the Second Circuit, say no, and that discretionary “standard” conditions of

supervised release need not be orally pronounced.

The Second Circuit has stubbornly maintained its minority position in this

long-standing circuit split, refusing to require oral pronouncement of an array of

discretionary supervision conditions. Because the Second Circuit includes two

districts that supervise a large number of people compared to other districts across

the country, this outlier position – if it remains the law – will have outsized

importance.

A uniform approach is critical to providing sentencing courts, counsel, and

defendants clarity. This Court should grant certiorari.

B.

Facts

1. Guilty Plea and Sentencing

On October 21, 2021, Christian Genao flew to New York from the Dominican

Republic. PSR 3. He was stopped at the airport, where authorities found drugs

hidden under his clothes. PSR 3. He immediately confessed, explaining that, when

he agreed to carry these drugs, he owed a debt he could not repay after a car crash.

PSR 3, Dkt. 25. Mr. Genao pleaded guilty to importing cocaine.

The district court sentenced Mr. Genao to one year and one day of

incarceration, followed by two years of supervised release. Pet. App. p. 18. At the

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sentencing, the court imposed two conditions of supervised release: first, that

probation could search Mr. Genao’s property if there was reasonable suspicion that

he violated a condition of supervision, and, second, that Mr. Genao had to

participate in outpatient drug treatment. Pet. App. pp. 18-19.

Three days after sentencing, a written judgment was filed, which added a

condition that Mr. Genao “shall not consume any alcohol or other intoxicants during

and after [drug] treatment.” Pet. App. p. 56. The written judgment also required

Mr. Genao “submit to testing during and after treatment to ensure abstinence from

drugs and alcohol.” Pet. App. p. 56.

Mr. Genao’s counsel objected by letter and asked the court to correct the

judgment under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 36, by striking the alcohol

prohibition so that the drug treatment condition in the judgment matched what the

court ordered at sentencing. Dkt. 33. Counsel noted that the “oral pronouncement of

sentence” controls when there is a conflict between the oral pronouncement and the

written judgment, citing United States v. Rosario, 386 F.3d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 2004),

United States v. MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71, 74 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008), and Fed. R. Crim. P.

43(a)(3).

In response, the district court issued a written order stating that it

“underst[oo]d that the Probation Department has determined that alcohol usage

does have a nexus to drug treatment, because use of alcohol tends to loosen a

person’s defenses and thus increase the likelihood of that person’s return to drug

usage.” Dkt. 34. Two weeks after the sentencing, the district court summoned the

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parties and Mr. Genao back to court to attempt to add the condition, a procedure to

which Mr. Genao objected. Pet. App. p. 37-40. After this proceeding, the court filed

an amended judgment with the same supervision conditions. Pet. App. p. 63.

Mr. Genao concluded his term of custody on July 15, 2024; he has served only

about eight months of supervised release.

2. The Second Circuit’s Decision

On appeal, Mr. Genao argued that the supervised release condition

prohibiting the use of alcohol should be removed from the written judgment because

the court did not mention it during the oral sentencing and it was not reasonably

related to the sentencing factors for Mr. Genao.

The Second Circuit rejected this argument, citing its prior decisions declining

to require oral pronouncement of various non-mandatory conditions of supervised

release. It explained that “we have not rigidly disregarded all conditions of

supervised release later included in a judgment but omitted from the oral

pronouncement of sentence.” Pet. App. p. 1, citing United States v. Handakas, 329

F.3d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 2003). The circuit explained that sentencing courts were not

required to orally pronounce the “standard” conditions of supervision “set forth in §

5D1.3(c) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.” Pet. App. p. 1, citing United

States v. Truscello, 168 F.3d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1999).

The circuit then held that certain “special” conditions in § 5D1.3(d) of the

guidelines also did not need to be orally pronounced. Pet. App. p. 1. The court

explained that for people in drug treatment, “the Guidelines generally recommend

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that the district court prohibit the defendant from using or possessing alcohol as a

condition of supervised release.” Pet. App. p. 2. It then concluded that “[i]t is

therefore ‘irrelevant’ that the Guidelines label the condition ‘special’; in this case,

the condition is ‘no different in practical terms’ from the standard conditions in §

5D1.3(c), which the district court need not orally pronounce.” Pet. App. p. 2, citing

United States v. Asuncion-Pimental, 290 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2002).

Put differently, the summary order stated that, “Because the Guidelines

generally recommended that the district court prohibit [Mr.] Genao from using or

possessing alcohol while on supervised release, it was permissible for the district

court to impose the alcohol prohibition as a condition in its written judgment

without pronouncing it orally at sentencing.” Pet. App. p. 2.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

I.

The Second Circuit’s holding that non-mandatory conditions of supervised

release need not be pronounced orally conflicts with the precedents of seven

other circuits.

Both the Due Process Clause and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a)(3)

guarantee criminal defendants the right to be physically present at sentencing. This

right means that a court must orally pronounce its sentence in the defendant’s

presence. This oral sentence constitutes the judgment of the court and if a later

written judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncement, it is the oral sentence that

controls. Based on these well-established rules of criminal procedure, most circuits

hold that a sentencing court must orally pronounce any conditions of supervised

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release that it intends to impose in addition to those mandated by statute. This is

the law in the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.

The law in the Second Circuit is different. Rather than requiring oral

pronouncement of all non-mandatory conditions, the Second Circuit follows an

increasingly untenable, ad hoc approach. Because Second Circuit law conflicts with

other “United States court[s] of appeals on the same important matter,” Sup. Ct. R.

10(a)—and the Second Circuit is wrong—this Court should grant certiorari.

A.

The Circuits are split.

Seven circuits require that all non-mandatory conditions of supervised

release be orally pronounced at sentencing. United States v. Montoya, 82 F.4th 640,

645 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc); United States v. Geddes, 71 F.4th 1206, 1215 (10th

Cir. 2023); United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 2023);

United States v. Matthews, 54 F.4th 1 (D.C. Cir. 2022); United States v. Rogers, 961

F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir.

2020); United States v. Anstice, 930 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2019).

These seven circuits follow a clear, straightforward approach, grounded in 18

U.S.C. § 3583(d)’s statutory text—which distinguishes between a limited number of

mandatory supervised release conditions and all other conditions, which are

discretionary. 1 This oral pronouncement requirement gives defendants an

1 The Sixth and Eighth Circuits also largely agree with the majority position. See

United States v. Pasley, No. 23-5230, 2024 WL 2862562, at *3 (6th Cir. June 6,

2024) (explaining that the sentencing court “must alert defendants orally at

sentencing that it is imposing” “standard discretionary conditions”); United States

v. Walker, 80 F.4th 880, 882 (8th Cir. 2023) (explaining that “the failure to

8

opportunity to object to and “defend against” discretionary conditions at sentencing,

and to “dispute whether” a particular condition is “necessary or what form it should

take.” Montoya, 82 F.4th at 650 (cleaned up). As the Fourth Circuit reasoned, a

sentencing court “cannot assume that any set of discretionary conditions – even

those categorized as ‘standard’ by the Guidelines – will be applied to every

defendant placed on supervised release, regardless of conduct or circumstances.”

Rogers, 961 F.3d at 297-98. Requiring all non-mandatory conditions to be orally

pronounced preserves defendants’ “best chance to oppose supervised-release

conditions that may cause them unique harms.” Id. at 298.

The First and Second Circuits take a different approach. In the First Circuit,

sentencing courts are not required to provide a full oral pronouncement of standard

discretionary conditions. Instead, defendants are “deemed to be on constructive

notice” for “ standard conditions announced for the first time in a written

judgment.” United States v. Sepulveda-Contreras, 466 F.3d 166, 169 (1st Cir. 2006).

The First Circuit has not, however, extended this rule to any special conditions.

The Second Circuit’s position is an outlier. This circuit does not require oral

pronouncement of a wide swath of discretionary conditions, including any conditions

that the sentencing guidelines label “standard,” U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c), along with

other “special” conditions that the circuit deems similar to standard conditions. For

example, if the “special condition” is a “clarification of [a] mandatory condition,”

specifically address the standard conditions of supervised release [orally]… was

[likely] a matter of mere oversight,” but vacating those conditions and remanding to

the sentencing court to give the defense the opportunity to object).

9

then it need not be orally pronounced. United States v. Asuncion-Pimental, 290

F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2002). And, if the “special condition” is a “basic administrative

requirement,” that is “routinely-imposed,” it need not be orally pronounced. United

States v. Thomas, 299 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2002).

Indeed the Second Circuit has adopted its own definition of “special

conditions,” calling some conditions that are designated as “special” in the

sentencing guidelines, “recommended.” As the Second Circuit recently explained,

While the Guidelines technically describe a category of

“recommended” conditions as “special” because their

appropriateness is contingent on whether certain circumstances

are present, we consider those recommended conditions to be “as

necessary to the administration of supervised release as the

standard conditions,” which “are presumed suitable in all cases.”

United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th 115, 119, n.1 (2d Cir. 2024).

This ad hoc approach means that, in the Second Circuit, a judge does not

have to announce at sentencing – or give the defense any opportunity to object to –

such restrictive conditions as (i) a total ban on consuming alcohol (Mr. Genao’s

case); (ii) allowing probation to search a “person,” “property, residence, [and]

vehicle,” United States v. Meadows, No. 22-3155, 2025 WL 786380, at *5 (2d Cir.

Mar. 12, 2025), (iii) monitoring of the person’s computer and internet use, see

United States v. Whitaker, No. 21-1543, 2023 WL 5499363, at *2 & n.1 (2d Cir. Aug.

25, 2023); (iv) or an obligation to obtain permission from a probation officer before

opening any new financial accounts, see United States v. Ross, No. 23-7210, 2025

WL 45287, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 2025).

10

The Second Circuit thus requires fewer conditions of supervised release be

imposed orally than any other Circuit, although its rule about which conditions

need to be orally imposed is imprecise. Mr. Genao’s case presents a prime example

of the Second Circuit’s confused oral pronouncement law. Alcohol bans are “special

conditions” under the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(4)(b).

Nonetheless, the Second Circuit held that a ban on alcohol did not need to be orally

imposed. Pet. App. 1-2.

No further time is needed for percolation. Eleven circuits have already

addressed this question. This entrenched circuit split will not be obviated if the

Third Circuit were to issue a decision on this matter. This Court should resolve this

conflict.

B.

The question presented is important.

Whether sentencing courts must tell defendants the non-mandatory

conditions of supervised release that apply in their case implicates core

constitutional due process rights and liberty interests. This is because criminal

defendants have a statutory and due process right to be present at sentencing. Fed.

R. Crim. P. 43(a); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987) (“defendant is

guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is

critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the

procedure.”).

This is not a technical right, but has a real-life impact on a huge swath of

criminally-justice involved people. Millions of people are or have been on supervised

11

release. See United States Sentencing Commission, “Federal Offenders Sentenced

to Supervised Release,” July 2010, available at

https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2010/20100722_Supervised_Release.pdf (from the late 1980s until

2009, nearly one million people were sentenced to terms of supervised release). And,

hundreds of thousands of people are charged with violating their conditions of

supervised release. United States Sentencing Commission, “Federal Probation and

Supervised Release Violations,” July 2020, available at

https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2020/20200728_Violations.pdf (between study period of 2013-2017,

over 100,000 violation hearings were held across the country).

If defendants and their lawyers do not know what conditions are being

imposed, they cannot object, which can result in inappropriate and unnecessary

conditions being imposed. If defendants do not know what conditions they must

follow, they will be less likely to succeed on supervision. Violating any condition of

release – even seemingly technical conditions, such as, in Mr. Genao’s case, not

having a beer while watching a football game – can result in reincarceration.

Indeed, according to the Sentencing Commission’s most recent data, more than half

of alleged violations were of the least serious type. Id. at 4.

Moreover, the outlier rule in the Second Circuit has an outsize impact

because, of the districts around the country with the most people on supervised

release, two of the top 10 are located in the Second Circuit. Id. at 16 (noting that the

12

Eastern District of New York and the Southern District of New York were both in

the top 10 districts in the country based on the number of people on supervised

release during study period, 2013-17, which is the most recent published data from

the Commission).

Unsurprisingly, given the lack of clarity in the rule and the vast number of

people on supervised release, the Second Circuit currently spends considerable time

and judicial resources parsing conditions of supervised release and deciding

whether a particular condition should have been orally imposed or not. The circuit

has issued six summary orders related to this question already in the first three

months of this year. Meadows, 2025 WL 786380 (vacating part of a search condition

not announced orally, while upholding other part of the same condition); United

States v. Roberson, No. 24-31, 2007 WL 10131753, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 2025)

(rejecting argument that court’s comment that it would “read out loud the

conditions of supervised release” “suggested that it had orally pronounced all of the

conditions that it intended to impose”); United States v. Leavens, No. 23-7993, 2025

WL 387810, at *2 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2025) (rejecting argument that the oral

pronouncement was too “general and vague,” but striking portion of a condition

from the written judgment because it was not orally imposed); United States v.

Rascoll, No. 23-7425, 2025 WL 367029, at *3 (2d Cir. Feb. 3, 2025) (holding that the

reference at sentencing that the prior conditions were being reimposed was

sufficient, but amending the written judgment so that conditions were indeed the

same as previously imposed); Ross, 2025 WL 45287, at *2 (upholding financial

13

condition in written judgment that “clarified” the oral pronouncement); United

States v. Lewis, 125 F.4th 69, 74 (2d Cir. 2025) (finding that lawyer’s waiver of the

reading of four special conditions also waived the argument on appeal that those

conditions were not properly imposed). Last year, the Second Circuit also issued

three published decisions about the pronouncement of supervised release

conditions. United States v. Rosado, 109 F.4th 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2024); Sims, 92

F.4th 115; United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298 (2d Cir. 2024).

Confusion abounds—both within and among circuits—about which conditions

a judge must pronounce orally and which it can skip. This Court should resolve this

split.

C.

This case presents a suitable vehicle for resolving the question

presented.

This case also provides an appropriate certiorari vehicle. Petitioner objected

below as soon as the written judgment was filed, and raised the same issue to the

Second Circuit Court of Appeals, specifically urging the court of appeals to strike

the special condition prohibiting the consumption of alcohol because it was not

orally imposed. See Petitioners Second Circuit Brief, pp. 15-18. The facts are

undisputed. The Second Circuit cleanly decided the question of oral pronouncement

and declined to reach alternative issues. Pet. App. pp. 1-2.

14

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant this petition for a writ of

certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Allegra Glashausser

Allegra Glashausser

Federal Defenders of New York, Inc.

52 Duane Street, 10th Floor

New York, New York 10007

Allegra_Glashausser@fd.org

Tel.: (212) 417-8739

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