Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Christopher Michael Williams, Petitioner v. Pavan Parikh, Clerk, Hamilton County, Ohio, et al.

Se^-<fgc

No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Christopher-Michael: Williams,

PETITIONER,

vs.

PAVAN PARIKH, HAMILTON COUNTY CLERK,

RESPONDENT.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

Christopher-Michael: Williams

Ohio prisoner, (#723739) in Propria Persona

Chillicothe Correctional Institution

15802 State Route 104 North, FI, 364, Bottom

Chillicothe, Ohio 45601

Phone Number to Prison where I can be reached (740) 774-7080

RECEIVED

i

JAN 2 1 2025

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.Sl

I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Is a State Court Clerk entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity regardless of their conduct

due to their administrative duties being closely intertwined with the judicial machinery?

2. Regarding quasi-judicial immunity, may this Court’s decision in Antoine v. Byers &

Anderson, 508 U.S. 429 be abridged through the 6th Circuits jurisprudence of Bush v. Rauch, 38

F.3d 842, in order to shield state-actors from liability if their personal involvement produces a

violation of civil rights upon a U.S. citizen?

3. Does a State court clerk violate a citizen’s 1st amendment right to petition the government for

redress of grievances, when they file the citizen’s initial complaint into the trash, even though the

suit is properly filed?

4. Do state court clerks’ duties include discretionary judgment of whether or not to file citizens’

complaints that are properly filed?

2

LIST OF PARTIES IN COURT BELOW

The caption set out above contains the names of all the parties.

LIST OF CASES DIRECTLY RELATED TO THIS CASE

No cases are related to this case.

II. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

I. Questions Presented for Review

2

II. List of Parties in Court Below

3

III. Table of Authorities Cited

4

IV. Petition For Writ of Certiorari,

,5

V. Opinions Below,

5

VI. Jurisdictional Statement

,5

VII. Constitutional Provisions Involved

5

VIII. Statement of the Case

6

IX. Argument for Allowance of Writ

7

X. CONCLUSION

14

1G

XI. APPENDIX

INDEX TO APPENDICITIS

1C*

Appendix A _

Appendix B _

SC5

Appendix C

3

III. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Page No.

Cases

(in alphabetical order)

Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, 508 U.S. 429 (1993) ..................................... ...2,6,9,10,11,12,14

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979)..

7

Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 500,111 S. Ct. 1934, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1991)

9,11

Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880)......................................................

13

Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219.......................................... ...........................

13

Green v. Garrington, 16 Ohio St. 549, (1866)............. ....................................

9

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20, 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976)

9

Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118...................................... ............................... ..........

,4

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131, 123 S. Ct. 2162,156 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2003).

7

Parnell v. Fitz, 640 F. Supp. 3d 819........................................................... ...............

7

Stem, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23793, 2007 WL 1023948 ................................. .......

9,10,11

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120...................................................................................

12

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const., Amendment 1.

5

U.S. Const., Amendment 14

5

Statutes

5

42 U.S.C. § 1983

Texts. Treatises, and Law Reviews

OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL STATEMENT:

Office of the Attorney General of the State

of Ohio, OH Attorney General Opinions, Reporter, 1970 Ohio AG LEXIS 65 *, Opinion No. 70077, July 3, 1970

8

4

IV. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

I am an Incarcerated Person detained at Chillicothe Correctional Institution in Chillicothe, Ohio

petitioning in Propria Persona, respectfully petitions this court for a writ of certiorari to review

the judgment of the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals.

V. OPINIONS BELOW

The decision by the United States District Court denying Mr. Williams the ability to

proceed with his law suit is reported as Williams v. Parikh. 708 F. Supp. 3d 1345 (United States

District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division December 21, 2023). The 6th

Circuit Court of Appeals denied Mr. Williams his appeal on September 4, 2024. That order is

attached at Appendix page^ . Mr. Williams timely filed an application for rehearing En Banc

that was denied October 25, 2024. That order is attached at Appendix page<2ot •

VL JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit was entered on Sept. 4,

2024. Rehearing was sought and denied October 25, 2024. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

VII. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES INVOLVED

1.

The First Amendment, United States Constitution, provides:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free

exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people

peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

2. The statute under which Petitioner brought the original action was 42 U.S.C.S. §1983 which

states in relevant part:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured

in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...”

3. The 9th Amendment, United States Constitution, Provides:

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage

others retained by the people.

5

VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The facts necessary to place in their setting the questions now raised can be briefly stated:

I. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE SECTION 42 USC 81983 ORIGINAL

ACTION CASE NOW BEFORE THIS COURT.

In September 2022 and January 2023 Petitioner within his constitutional rights

commenced to file an action against Ohio Job and Family Services in the Hamilton County Court

of Common Pleas. The Clerk Parikh’s Deputies under his supervision lost or discarded the

action. On December 21, 2023 the District Court Judge DOUGLAS R. COLE dismissed the

action according to established law, without prejudice, asserting that there was a conflict

between this court’s judgment in Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, 508 U.S. 429, and the 6th

Circuits judgment in Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842.

On September 4, 2024, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals entered a judgment completely

avoiding the constitutional question and conflict of jurisprudence asserted by District Court

Judge DOUGLAS R. COLE, and forwarded by me. The court ignored my constitutional question

and reassertion of District Court Judge DOUGLAS R. COLE’s conundrum of conflicting

authorities cited in his judgment. Whereby, a petition to this Court for a Writ of Certiorari is

timely filed for this court to create clarity for the American people in regards to their rights to

petition the government for redress of grievances as so enumerated in the constitution.

II. THE 6th CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A FEDERAL

QUESTION IN A WAY THAT EGREGIOUSLY CONFLICTS WITH THE

APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE COURT.

This is an access to the courts case. The 6th circuit’s legitimate desire to protect court

officials from frivolous or malicious claims that are entitled to absolute qualified immunity is

being accomplished in a way that violates the constitution, and this courts jurisprudence

regarding the standard set forth in the reasonable common law immunity doctrine of judges to be

applied to officers of his court acting as his arm of execution. The stance taken by the 6th circuit

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creates an unauthorized blanket of immunity for all court officers to be clothed with the status

and constitutional protections of a judge simply because they are a part of the judicial branch or

its functions. It creates a nullification of the constitution’s 1st and 14th Amendment under the

guise of supported jurisprudence for the purpose of capricious justice through personal opinion

to the injury of U.S. citizens, making the constitution and civil rights irrelevant to holders of

office. This slight encroachment produces tyranny and prejudice to victims of officers who act

under color of law through neglect to their duties and oath. "Convicted prisoners do not forfeit all

constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison." Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 99 S. Ct. 1861,60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979). “However, convicted

prisoners do not retain constitutional rights that are inconsistent with incarceration” Overton v.

Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131,123 S. Ct. 2162,156 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2003). In our country, even

convicted prisoners have constitutional rights. “When state officials tasked with securing these

rights violate them, the law provides a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” Parnell v. Fitz, 640 F.

Supp. 3d 819. If not addressed, other circuits could follow, and the simple pure liberties

guaranteed by the constitution could slowly erode away through similar, slight, invisible

abrogation’s of constitutional law.

ARGUMENT FOR ALLOWANCE OF WRIT

I. The Court of Appeals Erred in Affirming on the Basis That the Court clerk was entitled

to absolute immunity regardless of the acts taken against the plaintiff, and decided a

federal question in conflict with the applicable decisions of this Court.

Williams v. Parikh, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 22602 United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, September 4, 2024, Filed, No. 24-3059 the 6th Cir. Court stated:

“If that were not enough to dismiss Williams's § 1983 claims against Parikh in his individual

capacity, Parikh is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity, which applies to non-judicial

officials "performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons

are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune." Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847

(6th Cir. 1994). Because Williams's allegations are based on actions that Parikh took while

performing his quasi-judicial duties, Parikh is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. See

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Wojnicz v. Davis, 80 F. App'x 382, 383-84 (6th Cir. 2003); Mwonyonyi v. Gieszl, No. 89-5495,

1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 2048, 1990 WL 10713, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 9, 1990) (acknowledging

clerk's absolute quasi-judicial immunity for alleged refusal to file a document).”

Being “Entitled” to immunity, and whether or not it is applicable for the actions an officer takes

under color of law that produces injury to constitutional rights are not under the same test of

liability and application due to the wording of 42 USCS §1983, and the 14th and 1st

Amendments. Without the aligning of the conflict between this court and the 6th Circuits

opposing legal perspectives, defendants in the 6th Circuit and other Circuits across the country

will be able to erroneously utilize the standard set in my action against the Clerk and further

prevent me from bringing any claim for future injuries that will result as I proceed in the civil

venue as a U.S. Citizen, and other similar situated U.S. Citizens. Clerks could just discard valid

complaints with no repercussions absent the proper authority of the court constitutionally

endowed with Judicial Discretion.

To further address the flawed interpretation there was an opinion issued by the Ohio

Attorney General speaking to the rights of citizens to hold court clerks liable to injury which is

contrary to the 6th circuit’s jurisprudence and is in line with this court’s unanimous holding stated

in his opinion in 1970 with no other opinion of Ohio jurists or leading law enforcer to contradict.

The opinion is found at 1970 Ohio AG LEXIS 65, Opinion No. 70-077 issued July 3, 1970

Request by: E. Raymond Morehart, Fairfield County Pros. Atty., Lancaster, Ohio, Opinion By:

Paul W. Brown, Attorney General stating in relevant part:

County recorders and common pleas court clerks and their deputies are liable, both

personally and on their bonds, to the persons who may have been injured through their

negligent errors and omissions, including those arising from indexing and filing of

papers within their respective offices. The principle of sovereign immunity does not

apply to protect public officers and their deputies from personal liability in the

performance of ministerial duties.

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Ohio Attorney General speaking to the rights of citizens generated his jurisprudence

from Green v. Garrington, 16 Ohio St. 549, (1866). The state itself has admitted to the absence of

immunity of court officers who fall under the designation proffered by this court in Antoine v.

Bvers & Anderson. Inc.. 508 U.S, 429.113 S. Ct. 2167.124 L. Ed. 2d 391 (19931 further

pointing to the disconnect of jurisprudence the 6th circuit has executed upon its section of the

country and it will produce injury again if not rectified by the supervisory power of this

honorable Supreme Court.

II. The Court of Appeals Erred bv Determining Not to Give This Court’s Decisions

Dominance over its own jurisprudence.

In my Appeal, and application for En Banc reconsideration, I consistently utilized the

statement of District Court Judge DOUGLAS R. COLE when he stated:

And the Sixth Circuit has expounded on this point by holding that this immunity extends

even to non-discretionary decisions. lOLink to the text of the note Huffer v. Bogen, 503

F. App'x 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2012). (at Foot note 10 he stated:

In laying out the standard that applies, the Court recognizes that there is perhaps reason

to doubt its propriety in light of the Supreme Court's analysis in Antoine v. Bvers &

Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429.113 S. Ct. 2167.124 L. Ed. 2d 391 (19931. See Stern v.

Felmet, No. 2:05-cv-907,2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23793, 2007 WL 1023948, at *6 (S.D.

Ohio Mar. 30,2007) (finding that Antoine "casts doubt on [the Sixth Circuit's] broad,

arm-of-the-absolutely-immune-court analysis where clerks of court are concerned"). In

Antoine, the Supreme Court held that court reporters, who lack discretion in the

performance of their duties, merit only qualified immunity. Id. at 435-37. In reaching this

conclusion, the Supreme Court rejected a theory that absolute immunity extends to a non­

judicial official simply because their function is intimately tied to the judicial process. Id.

As the Supreme Court explained, the "'touchstone' for [the application of absolute

immunity] ... has been 'performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties,

or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights," and the extension of this doctrine to

"officials other than judges ... [is proper] because their judgments are 'functionally

comparable' to those of judges." Id. at 435-36 (first quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S.

478, 500, 111 S. Ct. 1934,114 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment

in part and dissenting in part), and then quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,423

n.20,96 S. Ct. 984,47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976Y). This is in tension with the Sixth Circuit’s

standard—set forth in published judicial decisions even after the Supreme Court's

decision in Antoine—which extends the immunity to those whose actions are

"intrinsically associated with a judicial proceeding.." Bush, 38 F.3d 847. Were this Court

writing on a blank slate, it would find the test in Antoine governs. But it is not. The

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Court is bound by the Sixth Circuit's test despite this conflict, and it may not depart from

that rule of law. In re Higgins, 159 B.R. 212, 215 (S.D. Ohio 1993). But see Stem, 2007

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23793, 2007 WL 1023948, at *7 (applying the standard in Antoine

despite the binding subsequent contrary Sixth Circuit authority).

The district court spoke clearly saying that it was “bound” by the rule of law in the 6th

Circuits judgment in Bush, 38 F.3d 847. and that I could not assert my claims under the

authority of this court because of their disagreement with this court. That alone would have

allowed me to bring a claim in honor with the statute of 42 USCS §1983 for violation of the 1st

and 14th Amendments by the proper parties. Whereby, the supremacy of the constitution is

robbed, my rights are abridged, and our countries long standing authority is not afforded its due

in the 6th Circuits definition of absolute quasi-judicial immunity in Bush, 38 F.3d 847. which

was coincidentally passed one year after Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 113

S. Ct. 2167,124 L. Ed. 2d 391 (19931

III.

The Questions Raised in This Case Are Important and Unresolved

Rule 10 (c) governs the soul of this courts compelling interest to hear issues of this matter

where an Appeals court enters a decision on an important federal question in a way that conflicts

with relevant decisions of this court when it stated:

Where a court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decision of another

court of appeals on the same matter; or has decided an important state or territorial

question in a way in conflict with applicable state or territorial law; or has decided an

important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this court;

or has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with applicable decisions of this

court; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course ofjudicial proceedings,

or so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this

. court's power of supervision, (c) a United States court of appeals has decided an

important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court,

or has decided an important federal question in a wav that conflicts with relevant

decisions of this Court. FERGUSON v. MOORE-McCORMACK, 352 U.S. 521 at *532.

That is exactly what happened in Bush, 38 F.3d 847. one year after Antoine v. Byers &

Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429,113 S. Ct. 2167,124 L. Ed. 2d 391 (19931. Normally when this

court issues its decision on the application of constitutional elements and the Supreme Court's

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current construction of Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS 1983); appeals courts don’t issue

opinions that remove the courts supervisory arm of jurisprudence, but the 6th Circuit has in this

case. The prejudice produced by this deviation was felt by the District court justice who asserted

the matter with his own judgment, by giving notice to the conflict between the 6th Circuit and

this honorable court. The 6th circuit Court of Appeals erred in its jurisprudence in Bush, 38 F.3d

847 by finding that even if a petitioner under a 42 USCS §1983 claim proved; that the personal.

acts of a clerk violated his 1st Amendment Rights to the United States Constitution were proven

with evidence that they acted under color of law doing so, the clerk would be absolutely immune

due to its entitlement to judicial immunity.

In Stem v. Felmet, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23793 6th circuit District Judge of the

Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. stepped beyond the arm of

the 6th circuit to this courts jurisprudence when he ruled stating:

As has been recognized elsewhere, however, the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in

Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429,113 S. Ct. 2167, 124 L. Ed. 2d 391

(1993) (holding court reporters entitled only to qualified immunity, not absolute

immunity), casts doubt on such broad, arm-of-the-absolutely-immune-court analysis

where clerks of court are concerned. See Woodard v. Mennella, 861 F.Supp. 192,196

(E.D.N.Y. 1994); Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 286-89 (7th Cir. 2004); In reaching

its Antoine decision, the Supreme Court explained:

We are also unpersuaded by the contention that our "functional approach" to immunity,

see Burns V. Reed, 500 U.S. at 486, 111 S. Ct. at 1939, requires that absolute immunity

be extended to court reporters because they are "part of the judicial function," see 950

F.2d at 1476. The doctrine ofjudicial immunity is supported by a long-settled

understanding that the independent and impartial exercise of judgment vital to the

judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential damages liability. Accordingly, the

"touchstone" for the doctrine's applicability has been "performance of the function

of resolving disputes [*20] between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating

private rights." 500 U.S. at 500, 111 S. Ct. at 1946 (SCALIA, J., concurring in

judgment in part and dissenting in part). When judicial immunity is extended to officials

other than judges, it is because their judgments are "fimctional[ly] comparable]" to those

of judges — that is, because they, too, "exercise a discretionary judgment" as a part of

their function. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 423, n. 20, 96 S. Ct. at 991, n. 20. Cf.

Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 297-298,108 S. Ct. 580, 584, 98 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1988)

11

(absolute immunity from state-law tort actions available to executive officials only when

their conduct is discretionary). 508 U.S. 435-36 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).

Upon consideration of Ohio Revised Code §§ 2939.12 and 2937.19 (referred to in

footnote 8, above) together with § 2945.45 (providing for the clerk to issue criminal

subpoenas to any county) and also Ohio Criminal Rule 17 providing further detailed

procedures for issuance, service, and return of "[e]very subpoena issued by the clerk,

[*21] " the Court concludes it is simply premature, in absence of developed facts, to

finally determine whether these acts were "ministerial" rather than judicial. Snyder at

288. Having them performed may well be essential to the judicial process; however, as

the Court further noted in rejecting that rationale for absolute immunity in Antoine, "As

we explained in Forrester, some of the tasks performed by judges themselves, 'even

though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not ... been

regarded as judicial acts.' 484 U.S. at 228." 508 U.S., 437. Thus, although language in

certain, particularly older, cases might suggest otherwise, it appears that quasi-judicial

immunity does not operate to bar the claim against Defendant Corrigan based on his

issuance of the subpoena as alleged in this case. That is so because such action required

by statute in certain circumstances cannot reasonably be characterized as comparable to

performing the (judicial) function "of resolving disputes between parties or of

authoritatively adjudicating private rights," even though such action might be considered

performance of a task integral to the judicial [*22] process as provided by Ohio law. Id.

437-38.

This court stated in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120 that:

The qualified immunity rule seeks a proper balance between two competing interests. On

one hand, damages suits may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of

constitutional guarantees. On the other hand, permitting damages suits against

government officials can entail substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of

personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the

discharge of their duties. As one means to accommodate these two objectives, judicial

precedent holds that government officials are entitled to qualified immunity with respect

to discretionary functions performed in their official capacities. The doctrine of qualified

immunity gives officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments

about open legal questions. (Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Thomas and

Alito, JJ.; 6 participating Justices)

Yet Bush, 38 F.3d 847, the 6th circuit effectively created confusion and violated the 9th

Amendment to the united states constitution when they removed the dichotomy of administrative

actions purely ministerial and judicial actions. This court said that there is no clear list of what

actions are judicial. This Court has never undertaken to articulate a precise and general definition

of the class of acts entitled to immunity. The decided cases, however, suggest an intelligible

distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that

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judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform. Administrative decisions, even though

they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not similarly been regarded as

judicial acts. In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). for example, this Court declined to

extend immunity to a county judge who had been charged in a criminal indictment with

discriminating on the basis of race in selecting trial jurors for the county's courts. The Court

reasoned:

HN4 "Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined by its

character, and not by the character of the agent. Whether he was a county judge or not is

of no importance. The duty of selecting jurors might as well have been committed to a

private person as to one holding the office of a judge. ... That the jurors are selected for

a court makes no difference. So are court-criers, tipstaves, sheriffs, &c. Is their election

or their appointment a judicial act?" Id., at 348.

Truly judicial acts, however, must be distinguished from the administrative, legislative,

or executive functions that judges may occasionally be assigned by law to perform. It is the

nature of the function performed adjudication rather than the identity of the actor who performed

it a judge that determines whether absolute immunity attaches to the act. Forrester v. White,

484 U.S. 219 and Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 this honorable court stood firm in its same

jurisprudence it did above in Antione 508 U.S. 429 and this court got it right in 1993 with its

decision in Antione, and it should be restored to the 6th Circuit by removing the extrajudicial

deviation in the saying “Quasi-judicial immunity extends to those persons performing tasks so

integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the

judicial officer who is immune.” At HN3 of Bush, 38 F.3d 847.

The crux of the issue is; state agents acting under color of law as “clerk deputies”

refusing to file law suits in violation of the 1st Amendment being granted immunity for those acts

creates a problem for the country and grants clerks power in violation of the 9th Amendment

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“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or

disparage others retained by the people” which protects the nullification of constitutional rights

The clerks who unconstitutionally denied the filing of my law suit where acting in an

administrative capacity when they discarded my lawsuit, and the decisions at issue, however,

were not themselves judicial or adjudicative thusly not warranting absolute judicial immunity.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of Bush, 38 F.3d 847 in the 6th circuit below is a unique departure from

sound relevant and clear decisions of this Court that require judicial immunity extended to agents

of judicial operations be applied according to the common law standard and perspective

unanimously decided in Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429,113 S. Ct. 2167,

124 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1993). This breach occurred specifically when the 6th circuit court stated

“Quasi-judicial immunity extends to those persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined

with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is

immune.” As such, it represents a breach in the wall erected by the First Amendment to the

Constitution, and the decisions of this Court that were designed to protect a citizen from being

injured without remedy via jurisprudence contrary to the established interpretations of immunity

erected by this court unanimously.

This petition for a writ of certiorari should, therefore, be granted.

Dated:

Respectfully submitted

Christopher-Michael: Williams Ohio prisoner, (#723739) in Propria Persona

15802 State Route 104 North, FI, 364,

Chillicothe, Ohio 45601

Phone Number where I can be reached through prison staff and request (740) 774-7080

14