Amicus Curiae Brief — TikTok Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General
Supreme Court briefDec 27, 2024
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Nos. 24-656, 24-657
IN THE
TIKTOK INC., et al., Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent.
BRIAN FIREBAUGH, et al., Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent.
On Writs of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
BRIEF OF ASIAN AMERICANS ADVANCING
JUSTICE | AAJC AND THE FRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW AND EQUALITY AS
AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING NO PARTY
Noah B. Baron
Brendan Benedict
Shalaka Phadnis
Counsel of Record
Alizeh Ahmad
Michael D. Altebrando
ASIAN AMERICANS
BENEDICT LAW GROUP PLLC
ADVANCING JUSTICE 322 G Street NE
| AAJC
Washington, DC 20002
1620 L Street NW
(212) 287-9501
Suite 1050
brendan@
Washington, DC 20036 benedictlawgroup.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................... i
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................. 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 1
ARGUMENT ................................................................ 4
I.
Targeting Speech on the Basis of National
Domicile Is Content-Based and Viewpoint
Discrimination. ...................................................... 4
A. The Act Explicitly Discriminates on the
Basis of National Domicile. ............................ 5
B. The Government’s Proffered Justifications
Echo National-Origin Animus. ...................... 9
C. Strict Scrutiny Applies. ................................ 16
II. The Court’s Application of Strict Scrutiny
Should Be Rigorous. ............................................ 19
A. The Court Should Not Unduly Defer to
“National Security” Claims. ......................... 21
B. Failure
to
Adequately
Interrogate
National Security Justifications Has
Devasting Consequences. ............................. 26
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 30
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Admin. Order 2017-05-17,
394 P.3d 488 (Cal. 2017) ........................................ 12
Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l,
Inc., 591 U.S. 430 (2020) .................................. 16, 17
Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l,
Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013) .................................. 16, 17
Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Def.,
901 F.3d 125 (2d. Cir. 2018) .................................. 23
Anderson v. Laird,
466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam) ........... 23
Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312 (1988) ................................................ 16
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union,
466 U.S. 485 (1984) .................................................. 4
Brown v. INS,
856 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1988) .................................... 7
Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak,
140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020) ............................................ 22
Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455 (1980) .......................................... 18, 19
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). ................... 11
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010) ................... 19
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310 (2010) .................................................. 4
City of Ladue v. Gilleo,
512 U.S. 43 (1994) .................................................. 18
iii
Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 (1901) ................................................ 21
Dr. A. v. Hochul,
142 S. Ct. 552 (2021) .............................................. 20
Ex parte Ah Pong,
19 Cal. 106 (1861) .................................................. 10
Graham v. INS,
998 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1993) ................................. 6, 7
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507 (2004) ................................................ 22
Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943) .................................................. 26
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. 1 (2010) .............................................. 20, 22
Kiiskila v. Nichols,
433 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1970) .................................. 22
Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) .......................... 3, 20, 21, 26, 29
Korematsu v. United States,
584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984). ................ 26, 27
Lin Sing v. Washburn,
20 Cal. 534 (1862) .................................................. 10
Matal v. Tam,
582 U.S. 218 (2017) .................................................. 9
Melian v. INS,
987 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1993) ................................ 6
Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633 (1948) ................................................ 13
Ozawa v. United States,
260 U.S. 178 (1922) ................................................ 12
iv
People v. Hall,
4 Cal. 399 (Cal. 1854) ............................................. 10
Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92 (1972) .................................................... 4
R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377 (1992) .............................................. 4, 8
Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
576 U.S. 155 (2015) ...................................... 4, 18, 20
Roman Cath. Diocese v. Cuomo,
592 U.S. 14 (2020) (per curiam)............................. 22
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) .......................................... 4
Sei Fujii v. State,
242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952) .................................. 12, 13
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
564 U.S. 552 (2011). ................................................. 5
Taylor v. McDonough,
71 F.4th 909 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ................................. 23
Trump v. Hawaii,
585 U.S. 667 (2018) ................................................. 26
Twitter, Inc. v. Garland,
61 F.4th 686 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied sub
nom. X Corp. v. Garland, 144 S. Ct. 556 (Jan.
8, 2024) ................................................................... 23
United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258 (1967) .......................................... 21, 26
Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886) ................................................ 12
Yifan Shen v. Comm’r,
No. 23-12737, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 2346
(11th Cir. Feb. 1, 2024) (per curiam) ..................... 14
v
Ziglar v. Abbasi,
582 U.S. 120 (2017) ................................................ 24
Statutes
10 U.S.C. § 4872(d)(2) .................................................. 5
47 U.S.C. § 151........................................................... 18
47 U.S.C. § 310........................................................... 18
Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477
(repealed 1974) ....................................................... 11
Fla. Stat. § 692.201 (2024)......................................... 13
Fla. Stat. § 692.204 (2024)................................... 13, 14
Ind. Code § 1-1-16-10.2(b) (2024) .............................. 13
Ind. Code § 1-1-16-6(1) (2024) ................................... 13
Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary
Controlled Applications Act, Pub. L. No. 11850 (2024) ....................................................... 1, 2, 5, 6
Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed 1927) ..... 17
Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed
1934) ....................................................................... 18
Other Authorities
Br. for Sen. Mitch McConnell as Am. Curiae
Opposing Emergency Appl. for Inj. Pending
Supreme Ct. Review (No. 24A587) ........................ 15
Aimee Chin, Long-Run Labor Market Effects of
Japanese American Internment During World
War II on Working-Age Male Internees, 23 J.
of Labor Econ. 491 (2005), available at
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.
1086/430285?journalCode=jole. ....................... 27, 28
vi
Commentary by Carol Lam for the Committee of
the 100, https://www.committee100.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/FINAL-CLam-C100Commentary-1.pdf (Sept. 2021)....................... 24, 25
Comm’n on Wartime Relocation & Internment of
Civilians, Personal Justice Denied (1982),
available at
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/japane
se-americans/justice-denied/chapter-4.pdf ...... 27, 28
Nolan Cool, Leaving Home Behind: The Fates of
Japanese American Houses During
Incarceration, Nat’l Museum of Am. History
Behring Cntr. Blog (Aug. 3, 2017),
https://americanhistory.si.edu/explore/stories/l
eaving-home-behind-fates-japanese-americanhouses-during-incarceration .................................. 27
Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National
Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes,
and Judicial Deference, 82 Fordham L. Rev.
827 (Nov. 2013) ................................................ 24, 25
Michael German, The ‘China Initiative’ Failed
US Research and National Security. Don’t
Bring it Back, The Hill (Sept 19, 2024),
https://thehill.com/opinion/nationalsecurity/4886821-china-initiative-restartharmful/ .................................................................. 24
Ulysses S. Grant, Seventh Annual Message
(Dec. 7, 1875) .......................................................... 11
H.R. Rep. No. 118-417 (Mar. 11, 2024). .................... 15
vii
John Johnson, Jr., How Los Angeles Covered Up
the Massacre of 17 Chinese, LA Weekly (Mar.
10, 2011), https://www.laweekly.com/how-losangeles-covered-up-the-massacre-of-17chinese/. .................................................................. 10
Knight Foundation and Ipsos, Free Expression
in America Post-2020: A Landmark Survey of
Americans’ Views on Speech Rights (Jan. 6,
2022), available at
https://knightfoundation.org/reports/freeexpression-in-america-post-2020 ........................... 29
Erika Lee, The Making of Asian America:
A History (2015) ..................................................... 28
Legislation to Protect American Data and
National Security from Foreign Adversaries:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Energy and
Commerce, 118th Cong. (Mar. 7, 2024) ................. 15
Mark Mazzetti, Niciole Perlroth & Ronen
Bergman, It Seemed Like a Popular Chat App.
It’s Secretly a Spy Tool, N.Y. Times (Aug. 14,
2020 ed.),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/22/us/politic
s/totok-app-uae.html ................................................ 7
Dudley O. McGovney, The Anti-Japanese Land
Laws of California and Ten Other States, 35
Cal. L. Rev. 7 (1947) ......................................... 12, 13
Jessica Pearce Rotondi, History, Before the
Chinese Exclusion Act, This Anti-Immigrant
Law Targeted Asian Women (Apr. 23, 2024
ed.), https://www.history.com/news/chineseimmigration-page-act-women ................................ 11
viii
Sana Sekkarie, The FBI Has a Racism Problem
and It Hurts Our National Security, Geo. Sec.
Stud. Rev. (Aug. 19, 2020), available at
https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2
020/08/19/the-fbi-has-a-racism-problem-andit-hurts-our-national-security/............................... 25
Terry Tang & Didi Tang, State Alien Land Laws
Drive Some China-Born U.S. Citizens to
Rethink Their Politics, AP News (Oct. 26,
2024), https://apnews.com/article/us-chinaalien-land-lawsa8a832335fbfda53ffa262f1e0f6e264 ........................ 3
Testimony of John C. Yang, President and
Executive Director of Advancing JusticeAAJC, Hearing on Promoting Opportunity:
The Need for Targeted Federal Business
Programs to Address Ongoing Racial
Discrimination Before the Senate Small
Business Committee (May 6, 2024), available
at: https://www.advancingjusticeaajc.org/sites/default/files/202412/SBC%20Written%20Testimony_AAJC_Fin
al%20%281%29.pdf. ............................................... 11
TikTok: How Congress Can Safeguard American
Data Privacy and Protect Children from
Online Harms: Hearing before the H. Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 118th Cong.
(Mar. 23, 2023). ................................................ 15, 16
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Asian Americans Advancing Justice |
AAJC (“Advancing Justice-AAJC”) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that seeks to create an equitable
society for all. Advancing Justice-AAJC works to further civil and human rights and empower Asian American communities through organization, education,
advocacy, and litigation. Advancing Justice-AAJC is a
leading expert on issues of importance to the Asian
American community, including immigrant rights, racial profiling, and national security.
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law
and Equality (“Korematsu Center”) is based at the
University of California, Irvine School of Law (“UC Irvine Law”). Inspired by the legacy of Fred Korematsu,
the Korematsu Center works to advance justice for all
through research, advocacy, and education. The Korematsu Center has a special interest in addressing government action targeting classes of persons based on
race, nationality, or religion and in seeking to ensure
that courts understand the historical—and, at times,
unjust—underpinnings of arguments asserted to support the exercise of such executive power. The Korematsu Center does not, here or otherwise, represent
the official views of UC Irvine Law.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, Pub. L. No. 118-50
1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in any part,
and no person or entity other than amici or amici counsel made
any monetary contribution to fund the brief’s preparation or
submission.
2
(2024) (the “Act”), prohibits entities in the
United States from hosting or publishing certain apps
that have a statutorily defined relationship with four
nations and the people or entities domiciled there. By
choosing to single out content associated with persons
domiciled in some nations but not others, the Act fosters viewpoint discrimination, no different from choosing sides in any controversial debate.
That conclusion follows both from the Act’s text
and structure—which specifically single out, as relevant to TikTok, content associated with China and
Chinese nationals—and from the statements of members of Congress themselves, which focus not on location but on the potential for “communist propaganda”
to be disseminated on TikTok in the United States and
thereby influence public opinion. This is no mere regulation on foreign entities or governments, nor does it
exempt American citizens. Instead, the Act targets
speech that takes place domestically by prohibiting
web hosting and app distribution—expressive activities—but only of content associated with people domiciled in China and three other countries.
Nor does the Act escape viewpoint discrimination
by purportedly limiting its reach to “foreign adversary
control.” By focusing on domicile, the Act necessarily
focuses on nationality, as most Chinese nationals are
domiciled in China, and most of those domiciled in
China are Chinese. That presumption that Chinese
domicile or incorporation is a proxy for control by
China’s government leads to absurd applications that
defy the First Amendment, like barring the distribution or hosting of certain apps or websites created by
Chinese nationals living in the United States on temporary visas.
3
These speech limitations are an alarming parallel
to the restrictions on other rights States have increasingly imposed targeting Chinese, and other, residents.
Two States have adopted, and more than twenty more
have considered, laws restricting non-citizens from
disfavored countries from buying, owning, or even
leasing real property, for example.2 These are unfortunate and potentially dangerous modern analogues to
the long history of racial discrimination against Asian
Americans generally and those of Chinese descent specifically.
II. With that context in mind, it is essential that
this Court not unduly defer to invocations of national
security—particularly when those putative national
security concerns arise as a repetition of anti-Asian
bias and amid a growing trend of xenophobia and racism. While amici express no view on the merits of the
specific national security concerns at issue here, amici
write to emphasize that “it is essential that there be
definite limits to” the deference accorded to claims of
national security, for “[i]ndividuals must not be left
impoverished of their constitutional rights on a plea of
military necessity that has neither substance nor support.” Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233
(1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Strict scrutiny must
be strict, if not fatal, in fact and not solely in theory.
2 Terry Tang & Didi Tang, State Alien Land Laws Drive
Some China-Born U.S. Citizens to Rethink Their Politics, AP
News (Oct. 26, 2024), https://apnews.com/article/us-china-alienland-laws-a8a832335fbfda53ffa262f1e0f6e264.
4
ARGUMENT
I. Targeting Speech on the Basis of National
Domicile Is Content-Based and Viewpoint
Discrimination.
Underlying “the First Amendment itself” is the
“principle of viewpoint neutrality”. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984). “Other principles follow from this precept. In the realm of private
speech or expression, government regulation may not
favor one speaker over another.” Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995);
see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558
U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Prohibited, too, are restrictions
distinguishing among different speakers, allowing
speech by some but not others.”); Police Dep’t of Chi. v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (explaining that the
Court has “frequently condemned . . . discrimination
among different users of the same medium for expression”). That is because “speech restrictions based on
the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a
means to control content”. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576
U.S. 155, 170 (2015) (cleaned up).
Taken together, these principles mean that the
government cannot ban people in the United States
from publishing or hosting certain apps or websites in
the United States owned by Chinese residents but
permit them to publish German-owned apps or websites any more than it can ban a “sign saying, for example, that all ‘anti-Catholic bigots’ are misbegotten;
but not that all ‘papists’ are”. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 391-92 (1992). But the Act does just that by
discriminating between apps and websites associated
with people from “foreign adversary” nations and all
other apps and websites. It regulates “based on the
5
content of speech and the identity of the speaker” both
“on its face” and in its “purpose and practical effect”.
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565, 567
(2011). We address each in turn.
A. The Act Explicitly Discriminates on
the Basis of National Domicile.
1. On its face, the Act discriminates on the basis of
an app’s connection to people from certain nations
(their “domicile”)—a form of viewpoint discrimination.
The Act’s text discriminates on the basis of national
domicile by specifically targeting for disfavored treatment any “foreign adversary controlled application”.
This term is broadly defined to include, “with respect
to a covered company or other entity,” any “website,
desktop application, mobile application, or augmented
or immersive technology application” operated either
“directly or indirectly” by TikTok, ByteDance, or any
individual or company that is either domiciled in the
Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, or the
Islamic Republic of Iran, or is at least 20 percent
owned, directly or indirectly, by individuals or entities
that are. Act §§ 2(g)(1); 2(g)(4) (adopting the “foreign
adversary country” definition in 10 U.S.C.
§ 4872(d)(2)).3
3 Entities other than ByteDance and TikTok are subject
to § 2(a) if the President determines they “present a significant
threat to the national security of the United States” following a
notice period. Act § 2(g)(3). A “covered company” creates an app
that allows users to create an account, share content with others,
6
The sum of the Act’s provisions prohibits any “entity”—domestic or foreign—from distributing, updating, or hosting foreign adversary-controlled apps (including websites) “within the land or maritime borders
of the United States.” Act § 2(a)(1). The Act thus
places restrictions on what people in the United States
can say here based on a content characteristic—the
identity of who controls the app or website they host
or distribute. That control could be as little as having
a China-based relative as a 20 percent minority investor. By contrast, any app or website content developed
by a German company—even one controlled by the
German government—may be distributed or hosted in
the United States without triggering the Act, even if
the President were to conclude that the app, or Germany itself, threatened national security.
The Act may also apply domestically for another
reason: an owner can be considered “domiciled” in a
foreign country while residing in the United States,
even for extended periods of time. The “domicile” is
“generally understood to mean the place where an individual establishes both physical presence and an intent to remain indefinitely.” Melian v. INS, 987 F.2d
1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1993). Nonimmigrants such as
those on temporary worker, tourist, or student visas
are not domiciled in the United States because they do
not intend to remain here indefinitely. See Graham v.
INS, 998 F.2d 194, 196 (3d Cir. 1993) (temporary
and view content others share, if the app “has more than
1,000,000 monthly active users” during two of the three months
preceding a Presidential national security determination—but
apps “whose primary purpose is to allow users to post” product,
business, or travel reviews or travel information are exempted.
Act § 2(g)(2). “Other entity” is undefined.
7
worker visa-holder); Melian, 987 F.2d at 1525 (tourist
visa-holder); Brown v. INS, 856 F.2d 728, 731 (5th Cir.
1988) (student visa-holder). Thus, an app may be
within the Act’s scope if it is controlled by a Chinese
resident on a student visa at Harvard University.
2. To see how the government chooses sides of
speech through the Act, consider the example of
ToTok. With just two letters to distinguish it from the
petitioner in Case No. 24-656, ToTok is an app for
smartphones that is a spying tool “used by the government of the United Arab Emirates to try to track every
conversation, movement, relationship, appointment,
sound and image of those who install it on their
phones.”4 U.S. intelligence linked ToTok to DarkMatter, an Abu Dhabi-based hacking group under FBI investigation, and warned “some allies” about the app’s
dangers, while declining to warn the American public.
See id. Launched in October 2019, ToTok was downloaded millions of times in just two months and placed
among the most installed social apps in the
United States for one week that December, see id., conceivably enough that the app would, if its domestic distribution continued, satisfy the Act’s million monthly
user threshold.
ToTok thus appears in practice to raise the same
hypothetical national security concerns that Congress
invoked to justify the Act’s regulation of TikTok and
other apps associated with enumerated nationalities.
4 Mark Mazzetti, Niciole Perlroth & Ronen Bergman, It
Seemed Like a Popular Chat App. It’s Secretly a Spy Tool, N.Y.
Times (Aug. 14, 2020 ed.),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/22/us/politics/totok-appuae.html.
8
But because the Act limits its censorship to content
with a nexus to persons in China (or to persons in Iran,
North Korea, or Russia), ToTok falls outside its reach.
Thus, American companies like Google and Apple are
free under the Act to host or distribute ToTok or any
other website or app created or operated by foreigners,
so long as they are not Chinese, Iranian, Russian, or
North Korean. But our government has “no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle,
while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392.
While a regulation prohibiting or regulating speech
by Chinese nationals or other foreigners abroad might
be “facially valid if it met the requirements of the
Equal Protection Clause” because it is “directed at certain persons or groups,” id. (emphasis in original), the
Act instead regulates what American web and app
hosts and distributors may publish within the
United States based on that content’s relationship to
four specific nations and those domiciled there.
And if the Court finds that the Act passes constitutional muster, it’s easy to see how Congress might be
emboldened to start choosing sides on other contested
topics by, for example, banning Americans from hosting websites developed by companies with 20 percent
Palestinian ownership but permitting Americans to
host websites 20 percent owned by Israelis, or vice
versa. Such a ban could be based on assumptions that
a company whose ownership is 20 percent Palestinian
would espouse different views than would a company
whose ownership is 20 percent Israeli. In the same
way, as explained below, Congress assumes that TikTok, post-divestiture, would make available different
9
content than it does now. That is functionally viewpoint discrimination, no different from distinguishing
between “capitalists and socialists, and those arrayed
on both sides of every possible issue.” Matal v. Tam,
582 U.S. 218, 243 (2017). Perhaps Congress could regulate all distribution of foreign-owned or operated
apps that pose a national security threat. But what it
may not do is choose sides among nations in proscribing what people may say in the United States.
B. The Government’s Proffered Justifications Echo National-Origin Animus.
If any doubt remained that the Act discriminates
on the basis of nationality, history and context would
remove it.
First, the Act’s text is similar to the recently-enacted—and constitutionally suspect—“alien land
laws” primarily targeting Chinese nationals. Those
laws, themselves, echo an ugly past of similar laws
previously struck down as discriminatory.
Second, statements from members of Congress further support this conclusion. Time and again, Congress identified Chinese nationals as a threat to U.S.
national security and objected specifically to the Chinese “communist propaganda” that TikTok purportedly makes available.
1. The Act follows the long and unfortunate history
of anti-Asian prejudice in American law. This discrimination has been rooted in stereotypes of Asian Americans as “outsiders,” “aliens,” and “perpetual foreigners.”
The differential legal treatment of those of Chinese
origin predates the Civil War. By 1854, a California
10
court barred testimony from Chinese witnesses, describing them as “a race of people whom nature has
marked as inferior” and who bring “with them their
prejudices and national feuds,” among other things.
People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 405 (Cal. 1854). In 1858,
California adopted its own exclusion act barring persons of “the Chinese or Mongolian races” from entering
the State, which its Supreme Court struck down in an
unreported decision. Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal.
534, 564 (1862) (statement of counsel). California’s
Revenue Act of 1861 taxed all “foreigners not eligible
to become citizens of the United States” living in “any
mining district” in the State. Ex parte Ah Pong, 19 Cal.
106, 108 (1861). Because “a Chinaman” was “not eligible to become a citizen of the United States,” id., that
(since-invalidated) law effectively targeted California’s growing Chinese population. California was even
more explicit in an 1862 law titled, “An Act to protect
free white labor against competition with Chinese
coolie labor, and discourage the immigration of the
Chinese into the State of California,” which was similarly struck down. Lin Sing, 20 Cal. at 564. And when
17 Chinese men and boys were lynched in Los Angeles
in 1871, few legal consequences for the perpetrators
followed.5
At the federal level, the Page Act came next in
1875. It applied to immigrants from “China, Japan, or
any Oriental country” and purported to bar “importation” of “women for the purposes of prostitution,”
5 See John Johnson, Jr., How Los Angeles Covered Up the
Massacre of 17 Chinese, LA Weekly (Mar. 10, 2011),
https://www.laweekly.com/how-los-angeles-covered-up-themassacre-of-17-chinese/.
11
among other persons. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141,
§§ 1, 3, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974). President Grant
told Congress that “importation of Chinese women,
but few of whom are brought to our shores to pursue
honorable or useful occupations” was an “evil.” Seventh Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1875). In practice, this
false stereotype that presumed Chinese women to be
prostitutes disproportionately prevented their immigration to the United States.6 Congress extended this
discriminatory treatment to bar immigration by all
Chinese laborers (with few exceptions) in the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1872, which, as extended, effectively
banned Chinese immigrants for nearly 60 years.7 The
Court at the time upheld the Chinese Exclusion Act,
deferring to the “government of the United States” in
considering “foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous
to its peace and security”. Chae Chan Ping v. United
States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606
(1889).
6 See Jessica Pearce Rotondi, History, Before the Chinese
Exclusion Act, This Anti-Immigrant Law Targeted Asian Women
(Apr. 23, 2024 ed.), https://www.history.com/news/chineseimmigration-page-act-women.
7 Testimony of John C. Yang, President and Executive
Director of Advancing Justice-AAJC, at 5, Hearing on Promoting
Opportunity: The Need for Targeted Federal Business Programs
to Address Ongoing Racial Discrimination Before the Senate
Small Business Committee (May 6, 2024), available at:
https://www.advancingjustice-aajc.org/sites/default/files/202412/SBC%20Written%20Testimony_AAJC_Final%20%281%29.pd
f.
12
With immigration from China restricted federally,
the States renewed their discrimination against Chinese (and other Asian) immigrants and their businesses. San Francisco, for its part, targeted Chinese
immigrants with regulations that overwhelmingly denied them permits to operate laundries. See Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). States also blocked
Asian immigrants from owning land under so-called
“alien land laws.” Although these statutes did not, on
their face, “single out any particular ethnic group,”
they did prohibit property ownership by those “ineligible for citizenship”—a coded reference to Asians specifically, who were ineligible for citizenship. See Admin. Order 2017-05-17, 394 P.3d 488, 488 (Cal. 2017);
see also, e.g., Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178,
189, 198 (1922) (Japanese immigrant residing in the
United States for over twenty years was “clearly ineligible for citizenship” because he “is clearly of a race
which is not Caucasian”).
California passed the first alien land law in 1913,
and at least ten more States adopted similar laws between 1917 and 1943.8 After its 1913 alien land law
was struck down, California adopted another in 1920.
A voters’ pamphlet for the 1920 election “stated that
the statute’s ‘primary purpose is to prohibit Orientals
who cannot become American citizens from controlling
our rich agricultural lands,’” and a former state attorney general saw it as “prevent[ing] ruinous competition by the Oriental farmer against the American
farmer.” Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 628 (Cal.
See Dudley O. McGovney, The Anti-Japanese Land
Laws of California and Ten Other States, 35 Cal. L. Rev. 7, 7-8
(1947).
8
13
1952); see also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 651
(1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“The California Alien
Land Law was spawned of the great anti-Oriental virus”.). Other States soon followed. See McGovney, supra n.8, at 7-9 (identifying similar laws in Arizona
(1917), Louisiana (1921), New Mexico (1922), Idaho
(1923), Montana (1923), Oregon (1923), Kansas (1925),
Utah (1943), Wyoming (1943), and Arkansas (1925
and 1943)).
Although these laws and their logic were eventually repudiated, in recent years, States have considered, and even adopted, laws again restricting Chinese
(and other) residents from owning property, often invoking a “foreign adversary” concept like the Act at issue here does. Indiana, for example, adopted a statute
banning citizens of “China, Iran, North Korea, Russia,
or a country designated as a threat to critical infrastructure by the governor” from acquiring or leasing
real property within ten miles of a military installation. Ind. Code §§ 1-1-16-6(1), 1-1-16-10.2(b) (2024). A
Florida law similarly focuses on those countries (plus
“the Venezuelan regime of Nicolas Maduro,” “the Republic of Cuba,” and “the Syrian Arab Republic”), covering any persons “domiciled” in those countries who
are not a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.
Fla. Stat. §§ 692.201(3), (4)(d). It also provides that
any person domiciled in China who is not a U.S. citizen
or lawful permanent resident, as well as any corporation organized under the laws of the People’s Republic
of China or with its principal place of business in
China, may not own more than a “de minim[i]s indirect interest” in real property generally, Fla. Stat. §
692.204(1)(a) (2024). Although it exempts “one residential real property that is up to 2 acres in size” (sub-
14
ject to other conditions) and property interests acquired before July 1, 2024, id. §§ (2), (3), in practice,
the law restricts purchases in the overwhelming majority of residential areas in the state.
By relying on the “domicile” of Chinese nationals—
and those of other covered nations—the Florida law,
like the Act here, singles out particular nationalities
for restrictions while not imposing similar restrictions
on other similarly-situated immigrants, quintessential national origin discrimination. That is because
those “domiciled” in China are overwhelmingly persons of Chinese national origin, while neither the Florida law nor the Act imposes any similar restrictions on
persons “domiciled” in any non-“foreign adversary”
countries.
The Eleventh Circuit has enjoined Florida’s restrictions on property ownership as to two Chinese citizens challenging the law pending appeal. Yifan Shen
v. Comm’r, No. 23-12737, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 2346
(11th Cir. Feb. 1, 2024) (per curiam). Judge Abudu’s
concurrence concluded that the Florida law’s “language, the anti-Chinese statements from Florida’s
public officials, and SB 264’s impact establish that the
law is a blanket ban against Chinese non-citizens from
purchasing land within the state”, which “blatantly violates” the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at *9.
2. Statements by members of Congress in hearings
about TikTok and the Act recall this history of suspicion of China and discriminatory rhetoric of “control”
by Chinese people, showing the Act’s purpose in regulating content by people from, or associated with, disfavored nations and points of view:
15
Representative Cathy McMorris Rodgers (RWA): TikTok is “a valuable propaganda tool
for the CCP” that “will never embrace
American values, virtues of our society,
and culture”. Legislation to Protect American Data and National Security from Foreign Adversaries: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 118th
Cong. 3 (Mar. 7, 2024);
House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce: Foreign adversaries
like China “push misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda on the American
public.” H.R. Rep. No. 118-417 at 2 (Mar. 11,
2024);
Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY): “The goal
of the Foreign Adversaries Act is to further
the highly compelling state interest of preventing . . . deployment of subversive enemy
propaganda through algorithmic curation.”
Br. for Sen. Mitch McConnell as Am. Curiae
Opposing Emergency Appl. for Inj. Pending
Supreme Ct. Review at 4 (No. 24A587);
Representative Frank Pallone, Jr. (D-NJ):
The Chinese Communist Party “has the ability, with TikTok, to . . . promote pro-Communist propaganda”. Hearing Before the
H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 118th
Cong. 10;
Representative Robert E. Latta (R-OH):
“Based on the established relationship between your company and the Chinese Communist Party, it is impossible for me to conclude that the video is anything different
16
than the type of propaganda the CCP requires Chinese companies to push on its citizens.” TikTok: How Congress Can Safeguard American Data Privacy and Protect
Children from Online Harms: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
118th Cong. 33 (Mar. 23, 2023);
Representative Marc A. Veasey (D-TX): “I
also worry that TikTok is the world’s most
powerful and extensive propaganda machine, allowing the Chinese Communist
Party to use TikTok’s platform to influence
public opinion”. Id. at 69;
Representative Randall K. Weber (R-TX):
“And let’s be honest, TikTok is indoctrinating our children with divisive, woke, and
pro-CCP propaganda”. Id. at 97; and
Representative Morgan Griffith (R-VA):
“[L]ogic would tell us that there are a fair
number of your employees who are members
of the Chinese Communist Party”. Id. at 115.
C. Strict Scrutiny Applies.
Because the Act is both facially and purposively
content-based, strict scrutiny applies—and it applies
even if the Act were viewpoint neutral (which it is not).
See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). Three justifications offered below for applying something less
than strict scrutiny are unpersuasive.
First, the Act does more than merely regulate “foreign organizations operating abroad” that lack protection under the First Amendment. Agency for Int’l Dev.
v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 591 U.S. 430, 436
(2020) (Alliance II). The Act prohibits any “entity”—
17
domestic or foreign—from distributing, updating, or
hosting a foreign adversary-controlled application or
website in the United States. Act § 2(a)(1). And, as explained above, the Act could apply to Chinese residents living temporarily in the United States. Those
facts make this case more like Agency for International
Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 208 (2013) (Alliance I). The
Court distinguished the two fact-patterns in 2020, explaining that the “prior decision recognized the
First Amendment rights of American organizations
and held that American organizations do not have to
comply with” a funding requirement to oppose prostitution or sex trafficking, All. II, 591 U.S. at 439—a requirement, in effect, to “pledge allegiance” to that policy, All. I, 570 U.S. at 220. The court below correctly
found that the Act here does “not directly proscribe
conduct by an entity that owns a foreign adversarycontrolled application” but rather “bar[s] others from
providing critical support in the United States for such
an application” by hosting or distributing it. Pet.
App. 18a. That is just the same domestic application
that involved the First Amendment in Alliance I.
Although Chief Judge Srinivasan’s concurrence below highlighted the history of regulation of the airwaves to prevent foreign control, Pet. App. 68a-71a,
this Act is materially different because it proscribes
domestic speech associated with particular foreign
countries and by particular people domiciled there, rather than control by foreign actors generally. None of
the statutes, past or present, offered by the concurrence singles out specific nations in defining foreign
control. See Pub. L. No. 62-264, § 2, 37 Stat. 302, 303
(repealed 1927) (Radio Act of 1912 providing that
every radio license “shall be issued only to citizens
18
. . . or to a company incorporated” domestically); Pub.
L. No. 69-632, § 12, 44 Stat. 1162, 1167 (repealed 1934)
(prohibiting grant of station licenses to “any alien”,
“any foreign government,” and any company “organized under the laws of any foreign government” or
that has “an alien” as a director or officer or more than
20 percent owner); 47 U.S.C. § 310(a)-(b) (similar); 47
U.S.C. § 151 (no mention of particular countries for
FCC’s consideration of “national defense”).
Second, the Act’s focus on particular nationalities
does not transform it into a content-neutral “time,
place, or manner regulation,” as the majority and concurrence below suggested. Contra Pet. App. 25a, 81a.
Just the opposite. “Precisely because of their location”
of origin, covered apps and websites “provide information about the identity of the ‘speaker.’” City of
Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994). The concurrence admits that the Act “amounts to a speaker-based
regulation,” but claims there is no “content preference
underpinning it”. Pet. App. 82a. But “the fact that a
distinction is speaker based does not, as the [concurrence] seemed to believe, automatically render the distinction content neutral.” Reed, 576 U.S. at 170. As the
above statements from members of Congress illustrate, the content of purported Chinese “communist
propaganda” was a significant driving force behind the
Act’s passage.
The Court rejected a similar “location-based” justification in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). There,
an Illinois statute barred picketing in front of residences but exempted “the peaceful picketing of a place
of employment involved in a labor dispute.” Id. at 457.
To be sure, that statute by its terms purported to reg-
19
ulate by “place,” but it could not “be seriously disputed” that the labor exemption gave “preferential
treatment to the expression of views on one particular
subject”. Id. at 460-61. The same is true here. The Act
regulates speech by those in the United States based
on an app’s association with persons from a subset of
nations, which necessarily gives preferential treatment to expression—the hosting and distribution of
covered apps and websites—associated with all other
countries.
Third, the option of divestiture does not save the
Act, as the court below implied. See Pet. App. at 30a
(“[C]ontent on the platform could in principle remain
unchanged after divestiture”.). Rather, the divestiture
requirement, read together with Congress’s concern
about Chinese “communist propaganda,” is more evidence that Congress is discriminating based on viewpoint. Congress implicitly assumed that a change in
the national domicile of the owner would change the
content on TikTok, and on that basis, refuses to allow
U.S.-based web and app distributers to host TikTok
without its divestment. That viewpoint-biased purpose
is what triggers strict scrutiny, not whether “in principle” that purpose will succeed. After all, even a facially neutral law adopted “for the purpose of suppressing the expression of a particular viewpoint is
viewpoint discrimination.” Christian Legal Soc’y
Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661,
736 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
II. The Court’s Application of Strict Scrutiny
Should Be Rigorous.
No interest is so pressing that it justifies diluting
constitutional muster. This is particularly salient
20
where, as here, strict scrutiny applies. A straightforward application of First Amendment precedent “requires the Government to prove that the restriction
furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored
to achieve that interest”. Reed, 576 U.S. at 171
(cleaned up). The Court should hold the government to
that standard. Here, the government contends that it
seeks to address a potential threat to national security. But even if the government successfully demonstrates its compelling interest in national security, it
must also show that the Act is narrowly tailored to
achieving that interest.
If this Court defers to asserted national security interests as the court below did in its application of strict
scrutiny, it would leave prone the very same rights it
is bound to protect. The Court’s “precedents, old and
new, make clear that concerns of national security and
foreign relations do not warrant abdication of the judicial role” and “do not automatically trump the Court’s
own obligation to secure the protection that the Constitution grants to individuals.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010) (cleaned up).
The judiciary has failed to uphold the guarantees
of the Constitution against claims of national security
and emergency before, leading “to this Court’s greatest
regrets.” Dr. A. v. Hochul, 142 S. Ct. 552, 559 (2021)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of application for
injunctive relief). Some of the most prominent instances bore directly, and devastatingly, on Asian
Americans. See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214. These
hard-learned lessons should inform the Court’s approach today as America again faces a tide of rising
anti-Asian sentiment, accompanied by laws restricting
the rights of Asian nationals.
21
A. The Court Should Not Unduly Defer to
“National Security” Claims.
1. The assertion of a government interest in national security does not dispense with the need for vigorous application of strict scrutiny. Cf. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 384 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(“The Constitution is not to be obeyed or disobeyed as
the circumstances of a particular crisis in our history
may suggest the one or the other course to be pursued.”). Accepting government justifications at face
value creates a dangerous precedent that “then lies
about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of
an urgent need.” Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
This Court’s precedents today make clear that the
Court “do[es] not defer to the Government’s reading of
the First Amendment, even when [national security]
interests are at stake.” Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. at 34. This Court and lower courts have repeatedly evaluated putative national security claims
and found them wanting before, even in more sensitive
defense contexts.
For example, as the Vietnam War raged, the Court
held unconstitutional a law prohibiting any member of
a “Communist-action organization” that is under order
to register with the government from “employment in
any defense facility.” United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258, 260 (1967). The Court specifically rejected the notion that the law should be saved simply because the
judiciary “has given broad deference to the exercise of
[the war] power by the national legislature,” for “even
the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties.” Id. at 263-64
22
(cleaned up). It has since reaffirmed this view. See,
e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004) (“It
is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that . . . we must preserve our commitment at
home to the principles for which we fight abroad.”).
The same was true during other emergencies, including the recent COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g., Roman Cath. Diocese v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14, 19 (2020)
(per curiam) (“[E]ven in a pandemic, the Constitution
cannot be put away and forgotten.”); id. at 21 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Government is not free to disregard the First Amendment in times of crisis.”); Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603,
2604 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of application for injunctive relief) (“We have a duty to defend
the Constitution, and even a public health emergency
does not absolve us of that responsibility.”). The constitutional standard should be no lower when assessing putative national security interests in postpandemic peacetime.
2. Lower courts also often closely interrogate proffered national security interests rather than defer to
them wholesale. See, e.g., Kiiskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d
745, 750 (7th Cir. 1970) (“[P]laintiff’s rights may not
be threatened or curtailed by the defendants’ own unsupported assessment of the requirements of national
defense.”). Departing from this norm would both erode
civil liberties and create confusion in the lower courts.
For example, lower courts, applying the Court’s instruction that national security does not require abdication of the judicial role, have scrutinized the factual
bases for the government’s proffered justifications, affirming that “[d]eference to the executive’s national security and military judgments is appropriate only
23
where [courts] have sufficient information to evaluate
whether those judgments were logical and plausible.”
Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 901
F.3d 125, 134 (2d. Cir. 2018).
As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, where national security justifications implicate First Amendment rights in particular, strict scrutiny requires
courts to undertake a “careful review” to satisfy themselves that “the government made a sufficiently particularized inquiry that substantiates the need for” the
limitation on speech “in the specific context of [the
plaintiff’s] operations.” Twitter, Inc. v. Garland, 61
F.4th 686, 699 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied sub nom.
X Corp. v. Garland, 144 S. Ct. 556 (Jan. 8, 2024). In
Twitter, the district court had before it “three rounds
of classified and unclassified declarations” from the
government with “granular details regarding the
threat landscape and national security concerns that”
justified the claimed danger there. Id. at 699-700.
The D.C. Circuit has ruled similarly. In Anderson
v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam),
the court reversed denial of injunctive relief against a
rule mandating chapel attendance at federal military
academies. Chief Judge Bazelon’s concurrence explained that “[w]hile some weight must be accorded
. . . [to] military judgment . . . it is for this court to assess that decision in constitutional terms.” Id. at 296.
He found that the rule involved nothing “vital to our
immediate national security, or even to military operational or disciplinary procedures.” Id. Other examples abound. See, e.g., Taylor v. McDonough, 71 F.4th
909, 940 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (rejecting the government’s
“generalizations about military secrecy” as insufficient
24
to bar plaintiff from pursuing a compensation claim
where less restrictive alternatives were available).
To be sure, the Court has sometimes afforded
greater deference to the government’s national security concerns in exceptional circumstances—namely,
when faced with an ongoing war or in the context of
the specific conduct of foreign affairs or military decision-making. No such circumstance exists here in considering the Act’s application to peacetime speech
within the United States. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582
U.S. 120, 143 (2017) (“This danger of abuse is even
more heightened given the difficulty of defining the security interest in domestic cases.” (cleaned up)).
3. Even if the Court affirms, the process by which
it arrives at its conclusion influences both the public
and the government itself.9 In particular, vigorous judicial review of government action creates the proper
incentives for state actors to comply with the Constitution, providing essential counterbalances to various
“perverse incentives.”10 For example, government officials, including law enforcement such as FBI agents,
See generally Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect:
National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and
Judicial Deference, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 827 (Nov. 2013).
9
10 Commentary by Carol Lam for the Committee of the
100, https://www.committee100.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/FINAL-CLam-C100-Commentary-1.pdf
(Sept. 2021); see also Michael German, The ‘China Initiative’
Failed US Research and National Security. Don’t Bring it Back,
The Hill (Sept. 19, 2024), https://thehill.com/opinion/nationalsecurity/4886821-china-initiative-restart-harmful/ (describing
how structure of recent “China Iniative” incentivized
investigators to search for crimes with which to charge those of
Chinese descent, including U.S. citizens).
25
may be encouraged by promotions and rewards to dig
up more negative information on communities presumed to be national security threats, even if those assumptions lack merit.11
Careful judicial scrutiny provides an important
counterweight to these incentives, influencing the government to either create new national security policies, make amendments to existing ones, or publicize
more information about how it reaches decisions, increasing public confidence and potentially leading to
better security policy overall. See Deeks, supra n.9, at
841. For instance, the government disclosed details
about its detainee transfer process at Guantanamo in
litigation after its previous “lack of transparency hurt
the government’s ability to defend its policies in court.”
Id.
While the vigorous application of strict scrutiny in
the face of claims of national security is always appropriate in cases involving fundamental rights, it is essential here, where the challenged government action
echoes racial animus. Though amici express no view
on the legitimacy of the asserted national security interests in this case, amici urge the Court to consider
the Congressional record and the growing anti-Asian
animus reflected in various state legislation. See supra
Section I.B.
11 See Lam, supra n.10; see also Sana Sekkarie, The FBI
Has a Racism Problem and It Hurts Our National Security, Geo.
Sec. Stud. Rev. (Aug. 19, 2020), available at
https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2020/08/19/the-fbihas-a-racism-problem-and-it-hurts-our-national-security/
(“Information that exonerates people from suspicion is not
similarly rewarded. Suspicious activity is created that otherwise
would not have existed.”).
26
Respondents’ proffered national security interests
demand close interrogation—not because they are
rare, but because they are common. Cf. Robel, 389 U.S.
at 263 (“[T]he phrase ‘war power’ cannot be invoked as
a talismanic incantation to support any exercise of
congressional power which can be brought within its
ambit.”).
B. Failure to Adequately Interrogate National Security Justifications Has
Devasting Consequences.
Historically, excessive judicial deference to putative national security concerns has resulted in the
egregious violations of the rights of Asian Americans
and others and chilled Asian Americans’ meaningful
participation in civic life. Perhaps the most infamous
example of this Court’s deference to national security
was its approval of the incarceration of roughly
110,000 Japanese Americans living on the west coast
of the United States during World War II. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214; Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81, 63 (1943). These decisions robbed individuals of liberty and sundered families and communities. History has not judged those opinions kindly. See,
e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 710 (2018) (recognizing that Korematsu “has been overruled in the
court of history”). When a federal court vacated
Fred Korematsu’s conviction underlying the 1944 Korematsu case 40 years later, it said the prior opinion
“remains on the pages of our legal and political history,” serving “as a caution that in times of distress the
shield of military necessity and national security must
not be used to protect governmental actions from close
scrutiny and accountability.” Korematsu v. United
27
States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984). That
lesson, so hard learned, must not be forgotten now.
Japanese Americans detained in incarceration
camps suffered “very substantial economic losses” that
lasted for years, if not the rest of their lives.12 Some of
those losses were immediate, as they were forced to
sell “their income-producing assets under distress-sale
circumstances on very short notice”, “accept low prices
or abandon property or . . . place the property in insecure storage”, leave their homes “without the personal
attention that owners would devote to them,” or close
up their businesses.13
Other losses accrued over the years spent imprisoned. Individuals who did not, or could not, sell their
property returned to find most of what they left behind
“ransacked, stolen, or sold.”14 Meanwhile, those de-
12 Comm’n on Wartime Relocation & Internment of
Civilians, Personal Justice Denied 117-118 (1982), available at
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/japaneseamericans/justice-denied/chapter-4.pdf; see also Aimee Chin,
Long-Run Labor Market Effects of Japanese American
Internment During World War II on Working-Age Male
Internees, 23 J. of Labor Econ. 491, 512-515 (2005), available at
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/430285?journ
alCode=jole.
13 Personal Justice Denied, supra n.12 at 117, 127-128.
14 Nolan Cool, Leaving Home Behind: The Fates of Japa-
nese American Houses During Incarceration, Nat’l Museum of
Am. History Behring Cntr. Blog (Aug. 3, 2017), https://americanhistory.si.edu/explore/stories/leaving-home-behind-fates-japanese-american-houses-during-incarceration (noting that an estimated “80% of goods and property stored with private, non-government entities” faced such losses).
28
prived of their freedom had an earning capacity “reduced to almost nothing”, and, without a source of income, soon fell behind on “tax, mortgage, and insurance payments.”15 As a result, even when finally released, they had to start life “anew on meager resources.”16 The time spent incarcerated had lifelong effects on earning capacity too, reducing “the annual
earnings of males by as much as 9%-13% 25 years afterward.”17 The experience of incarceration had lasting effects in other ways, including stripping Japanese
Americans of their sense of security and expectation of
equal treatment, and chilling their speech, for generations.18
Unfortunately, the end of Japanese incarceration
was not the end of discrimination against Asian Americans in the United States. Asian Americans faced a
more recent wave of prejudice following the COVID-19
pandemic. And since then, Asian Americans are increasingly self-censoring. Of all racial groups polled in
one 2021 survey, Asian American respondents viewed
themselves as being the second-most-marginalized in
exercising their speech, especially on politics and race,
15 Personal Justice Denied, supra n.12, at 117.
16 Id.
17 Chin, supra n.12, at 491.
18 Erika Lee, The Making of Asian America: A History 247
(2015) (noting that after incarceration, Japanese Americans
“tried to follow the instructions they had been given to
‘assimilate,’ ‘blend in,’ and not ‘make waves’”).
29
after Black Americans.19 On a scale from 1-7, with 1
being “very hard” and 7 being “very easy,” Asian Americans’ average response on how easy it is for them to
use their free speech rights without consequence was
a mere 3.8, demonstrating dishearteningly low confidence in their First Amendment rights.20 This fear of
participation in the public sphere chills public discourse and erodes the critical role of civil society by
suppressing the voices of already-marginalized communities. There’s little security in that.
Today, it is more than clear that purported national security justifications, if not adequately scrutinized, have devastating consequences for all Americans, and for the Asian American community in particular. When courts “acquiesce” to these discriminatory policies by adopting weakened standards of review, they both effectively endorse the government’s
discriminatory targeting of Asian communities and
distort constitutional doctrine. As Justice Jackson
warned in dissent in Korematsu: “A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality,
and it is an incident. But if we review and approve,
that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own,
and all that it creates will be in its own image.” 323
U.S. at 246. The Court can send a clear message here
19 Knight Foundation and Ipsos, Free Expression in
America Post-2020: A Landmark Survey of Americans’ Views on
Speech Rights 6-7 (Jan. 6, 2022), available at
https://knightfoundation.org/reports/free-expression-in-americapost-2020/
20 Id. at 7.
30
that invoking the idea of national security does not
and will not exempt discrimination from scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
The Court should address viewpoint discrimination
and scrutinize purported national security justifications.
Respectfully submitted,
Noah B. Baron
Shalaka Phadnis
Alizeh Ahmad
ASIAN AMERICANS
ADVANCING JUSTICE
| AAJC
1620 L Street NW
Suite 1050
Washington, DC
20036
Brendan Benedict
Counsel of Record
Michael D. Altebrando
BENEDICT LAW GROUP PLLC
322 G Street NE
Washington, DC 20002
(212) 287-9501
brendan@
benedictlawgroup.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
December 27, 2024
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.