Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jody Lee Miles, Petitioner v. Maryland

Supreme Court briefDec 20, 2024

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QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

Does the doctrine of the separation of powers as derived from the text and structure of the

Constitution of the United States allow for an act of mock clemency in which a member of the

executive branch, on his or her own initiative and against a defendant’s will, interferes with ongoing

court proceedings and commutes that defendant’s illegal sentence to its functional equivalent in

order to prevent its review and significant reduction by the courts?

When a president or governor, on his or her own initiative and against a defendant’s will, interferes

with court proceedings to the sole detriment of that defendant by commuting that defendant’s illegal

sentence to its functional equivalent, do the courts need to place this defendant in the same

favorable position as if the president or governor had never interfered?

LIST OF PARTIES

[Vf All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[ ] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of

all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this

petition is as follows:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW

1

JURISDICTION

2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

16

CONCLUSION

18

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A - Decision of the Appellate Court of Maryland

APPENDIX B - Order of the Appellate Court of Maryland Denying Reconsideration

APPENDIX C - Decision of the Circuit Court of Queen Anne’s County

APPENDIX D - Decision of the Supreme Court of Maryland Denying Review

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES

PAGE NUMBER

Collins v. State, 550 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1977)............

10, 11, 12

Cross v. Huff, 208 Ga. 392, 67 S.E.2d 124 (1951)......

11

Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423 (1997)...........................

6,7

Robinson v. Lee, 317 Md. 371 (1989).........................

11

State v. Ragland, 836 N.W. 2d 107 (Iowa 2013).........

12

Village ofWillowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000)

8

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const, art. I, § 1..........

9

U.S. Const, art. II, § 1.........

9

U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 1.......

9

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1

8

STATUTES AND RULES

Md. Crim. Causes. 4-345(a) (Maryland Rule 4-345(a))

9

Md. Crim. Causes. 4-345(e) (Maryland Rule 4-345(e))

6,7

Md. Code, Corr. Servs. § 7-101(d)...............................

10

OTHER (full citation is provided in the footnotes of the main text)

Constitution Annotated, Intro. 7.2 Separation of Powers Under the Constitution....

8,9

Heather King, Light Upon the Scaffold: The Prison Letters of Jacques Fesch.........

15

Jennifer Lackey, The Irrationality ofNatural Life Sentences...................................

13

Pope Francis, Encyclical Letter Fratelli Tutti (Oct. 3, 2020)....................................

14

Pope John Paul II, Homily at the Papal Mass in St. Louis, Missouri (Jan. 27,1999)...... 14

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix

the petition and is

to

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix

the petition and is

to

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix A__ to the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

f ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[vf is unpublished.

The opinion of the_

appears at Appendix

court

to the petition and is

; or,

[ ] reported at

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

1.

JURISDICTION

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was______________________

[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date: ____________

, and a copy of the

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including______

(date)

(date) on

in Application No. ... , A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

ly^For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix

lb .

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

______________________ , and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including ___

(date)in

(date) on

Application No. __ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

a

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. Const, art. I, § 1

All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall

consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

U.S. Const, art. II, § 1

The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. [...]

U.S. Const, art. Ill, § I

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior

Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. [...]

(Please note: The constitutional issue in this case involves the doctrine of the separation of powers. The Sections of

the foregoing two Articles were abbreviated as the text provided already shows the distinction between the legislative,

the executive and the judicial branches of the government. For reasons of efficiency, Petitioner also omits the

corresponding Articles in the Constitution of Maryland which has, as any constitution in a modem democracy, the

same distinction. Petitioner will, at least at this point, only refer to the Constitution of the United States in his

argumentation.)

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § I

All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are

citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce

any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall

any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Md. Crim. Causes. 4-345(a) (Maryland Rule 4-345(a))

Illegal Sentence.

The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.

3

Md. Crim. Causes. 4-345(e) (Maryland Rule 4-345(e))

Modification Upon Motion.

(1) Generally. Upon a motion filed within 90 days after imposition of a sentence (A) in the District

Court, if an appeal has not been perfected or has been dismissed, and (B) in a circuit court, whether

or not an appeal has been filed, the court has revisory power over the sentence except that it may

not revise the sentence after the expiration of five years from the date the sentence originally was

imposed on the defendant and it may not increase the sentence.

Cross reference: Rule 7-112(b).

Committee note: The court at any time may commit a defendant who is found to have a drug or

alcohol dependency to a treatment program in the Maryland Department of Health if the defendant

voluntarily agrees to participate in the treatment, even if the defendant did not timely file a motion

for modification or timely filed a motion for modification that was denied. See Code, HealthGeneral Article, § 8-507.

(2) Notice to Victims. The State's Attorney shall give notice to each victim and victim's

representative who has filed a Crime Victim Notification Request form pursuant to Code, Criminal

Procedure Article, § 11-104 or who has submitted a written request to the State's Attorney to be

notified of subsequent proceedings as provided under Code, Criminal Procedure Article, § 11503 that states (A) that a motion to modify or reduce a sentence has been filed; (B) that the motion

has been denied without a hearing or the date, time, and location of the hearing; and (C) if a hearing

is to be held, that each victim or victim's representative may attend and testify.

(3) Inquiry by Court. Before considering a motion under this Rule, the court shall inquire if a victim

or victim's representative is present. If one is present, the court shall allow the victim or victim's

representative to be heard as allowed by law. If a victim or victim's representative is not present

and the case is one in which there was a victim, the court shall inquire of the State's Attorney on

the record regarding any justification for the victim or victim's representative not being present, as

set forth in Code, Criminal Procedure Article, § 11 -403(e). If no justification is asserted or the court

is not satisfied by an asserted justification, the court may postpone the hearing.

Md. Code, Corr. Servs. § 7-101(d)

"Commutation of sentence" means an act of clemency in which the Governor, by order, substitutes

a lesser penalty for the grantee's offense for the penalty imposed by the court in which the grantee

was convicted.”

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.

A president’s or governor’s right to grant clemency cannot be valued highly enough. Mercy,

not mere justice, makes a human system truly humane and who can claim to never be in need

of forgiveness?

2.

It is therefore utterly concerning when a governor implores this right to take the initiative to

actively hurt a defendant.

3.

In Petitioner’s case, the Governor of Maryland, against Petitioner’s outspoken will,

commuted Petitioner’s death sentence to life without parole on January 15th, 2015. At this

time, the Attorney Generatl of Maryland had already conceded that Petitioner’s death sentence

became illegal due to a change in law.

4.

The Governor acted without necessity: Petitioner was in no need of clemency since his illegal

sentence would have been changed by the courts and the worst possible outcome of these

court proceedings would have been life without parole. An illegal death sentence, i.e., a death

sentence that cannot be carried out anymore, is de facto a natural life sentence.

5.

Moreover, the Governor acted to the sole detriment of Petitioner and was fully made aware

of this fact in advance by Petitioner’s then-Counsel: After the Governor’s commutation of

sentence, court proceedings that could have led to a lesser sentence than life without parole

were discontinued.

6.

The Governor’s unrequested commutation of sentence was challenged in the courts by thenCounsel for Petitioner. While the courts came to the conclusion that the commutation of

sentence was legal, a judge in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County made the decision

5

to not change the court records. Petitioner is, in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County,

still under an illegal death sentence.

7.

In August 2023, Petitioner filed pro se a Motion for Modification of Sentence under Maryland

Rule 4-345(e) and following Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423 (1997). Maryland Rule 4-345(e)

partially reads as follows:

\

8.

[...] Upon a motion filed within 90 days after imposition of a sentence [...] in

a circuit court, whether or not an appeal has been filed, the court has revisory

power over the sentence except that it may not revise the sentence after the

expiration of five years from the date the sentence originally was imposed on

the defendant and it may not increase the sentence. [...]

In its Response dated September 11th, 2023, the State argued that Petitioner’s time to file a

motion for modification under Maryland Rule 4-345(e) had elapsed as the sentence was

imposed on Petitioner on January 15th, 2015. In a footnote, the State conceded that the court

could come to another conclusion with regard to the date of the imposition of the sentence,

namely that the sentence was imposed at the trial, on March 19th, 1998.

9.

Petitioner’s Motion for Modification of Sentence was denied on September 11th, 2023.

10.

On appeal, Petitioner argued inter alia that it was not clear whether the sentence of life

without the possibility of parole was ever imposed on him. The State had previously argued

that governors did not impose sentences.

11.

In this context, the State then claimed that no imposition of sentence was needed with a

commutation. Consequently, in the State’s opinion, Petitioner never had the right to file a

motion for modification of sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(e) after his change of

sentence.

6

12.

In his Reply Brief, Petitioner referred to the constitutional doctrine of the separation of

powers that aims to protect individuals from arbitrary and oppressive actions by those in

power. Petitioner had already been deprived of his right to fight for a sentence that allowed

for parole after his death sentence became illegal. As the natural life sentence was never

imposed on him, he was then also deprived of his right to file a motion for modification under

Maryland Rule 4-345(e) which he definitely would have had, following Greco v. State, 347

Md. 423 (1997), had the courts - and not the Governor - changed his sentence.

13.

On May 29th, 2024, the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the decision of the Circuit

Court of Queen Anne’s County. The Court gave the following reasons for its decision:

Mr. Miles does not cite any authority that required the court to hold a hearing

on the motion “in the interest of justice.” Mr. Miles also does not cite any

authority that required the circuit court to somehow “implement” the

Governor’s commutation of the sentence of death in order for the resulting

sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole to be legal.

14.

Petitioner, who is not a lawyer and who lost his right to counsel after the commutation of his

sentence, then timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration, citing statutes and case law in

support of his position. This Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Appellate Court

of Maryland on July 10th, 2024.

15.

Petitioner’s timely filed Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Maryland

asked review of the following two issues:

When a governor, on his own initiative, interferes with court proceedings to the

sole detriment of a defendant by commuting an illegal sentence to its functional

equivalent, do the courts need to place that defendant in the same favorable

position as if the governor had never interfered?

Is the Circuit Court required to implement the Governor’s change of sentence?

7

As reasons for granting the review Petitioner stated:

An individual’s constitutional right to be protected from arbitrary and

oppressive actions by those in power is a matter of great public concern, in

particular when the most fundamental rights - life and freedom - are affected.

It is essential for any democracy that a governor’s right to commute a sentence

remains bound to clemency and is not distorted into a means of oppression that

could target political opponents or personal enemies.

An individual’s right to know what sentence he or she is serving and when it

was imposed is a matter of great public concern as it directly affects this

individual’s right to know and exercise his or her rights.

On September 26th, 2024, the Supreme Court of Maryland denied discretionary review.

16.

The courts clearly erred in their decisions as they allow a governor, by commuting a

defendant’s illegal sentence to its functional equivalent, to arbitrarily deprive a defendant of

rights.

17.

This is unconstitutional on two grounds. Firstly, under the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, Petitioner has the right to be treated in the same way as any other

defendant with an illegal sentence. He cannot be treated differently where there is “no rational

basis for the difference in treatment.” (Village ofWillowbrookv. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000))

18.

Secondly, the doctrine of the separation of powers, as derived from the text and structure of

the Constitution of the United States, seeks to protect individuals from arbitrariness and

oppression.

The Framers’ experience with the British monarchy informed their belief that

concentrating distinct governmental powers in a single entity would subject the

nation’s people to arbitrary and oppressive government action, (underlining

added)1

Constitution Annotated, Intro. 7.2 Separation of Powers Under the Constitution, CONGRESS.GOV,

https://constitution.congress.gOv/browse/essay/intro-2-2-2/ALDE_00000031/ (last accessed on Oct. 27,2024).

8

This is why there are three different branches of the government (U.S. Const, art. I, § 1, U.S.

Const, art. II, § 1, U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 1). The sentencing of defendants in criminal cases is

a core function of the judicial branch.

19.

While “the design of the Constitution contemplates some overlap in the branches’

performance of government functions,”2 it is clear that this overlap cannot contradict the

intention of the doctrine of separation of powers, namely the protection against arbitrary and

oppressive government action. This means that a governor can only reduce a defendant’s

sentence with the intention to do that defendant a favor. By commuting an illegal sentence,

the Governor in the present case actually sentenced Petitioner and thus infringed upon the

core functions of the judicial branch.

20.

Illegal sentences are changed by the courts. For this purpose, the Maryland Code foresees the

possibility to file motions to correct illegal sentences (Maryland Rule 4-345(a)). The change

of an illegal sentence is a matter of right.

21.

Clemency, however, is not a matter of right. Nobody has a right to clemency. It is a free gift

by the grantor and always involves some kind of benefit to the grantee. Therefore, a governor

can grant clemency to one person and not to another one. One could argue that a governor

has the right to act arbitrarily when denying someone clemency (which would still be against

reason and the honorability of the office). However, it is clear that a governor has no right to

act in an arbitrary and oppressive way when granting clemency, because this is a contradiction

in itself.

Ibid.

9

22.

The Maryland Code defines “commutation of sentence” as an “act of clemency” (Md. Code,

Corn Servs. § 7-101 (d)). Therefore, a governor who uses the right to commute a sentence to

actively and intentionally harm a defendant abuses his or her power in doing so.

23.

Unrequested commutations of illegal sentences that actively and intentionally harmed

defendants occurred in multiple U.S. states and at different times. The real constitutional

problem is, however, not the governors’ commutations. After all, a governor could act with

the best intentions and simply not be informed of the disastrous consequences his or her

actions would have on the individual. The real constitutional problem is the courts’ reactions

to the governors’ actions. No harm or injustice would occur if the courts considered the

sentences that resulted from the unrequested commutations as a mere “safety net” under

which a defendant cannot fall. However, in most — but not all — cases, the courts allowed

these unrequested commutations to unfold their detrimental effects.

24.

In 1977, for example, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, after death sentences for two

defendants became illegal following a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, decided as

follows:

In similar cases in the past, this Court has held that the proper procedure to be

followed, where the death penalty cannot validly be carried out, is for the cause

to be remanded for a new sentencing hearing before a jury. [...] Accordingly

these cases are remanded to the respective trial courts from which they

originated for a resentencing hearing, with punishment to be fixed in each case

from twenty years to life imprisonment. (Collins v. State, 550 S.W.2d 643, 647

(Tenn. 1977))

25.

Seven days after the issuance of this opinion, the Governor of Tennessee commuted the

corresponding illegal death sentences to life imprisonment and the State filed a petition for

rehearing.

10

26.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee then reversed its decision. “Life imprisonment is a less

severe penalty than death, and an accused has no basis for complaint.” {Collins v. State, 550

S.W.2d 643, 647 (Term. 1977)) This argument is clearly wrong in this context. Not the

comparison between life imprisonment and death is indicated here, but the comparison

between a life sentence that is final and an illegal death sentence that cannot be carried out

anymore. The illegal death sentence would have been reviewed and would have been changed

to life imprisonment at the worst and only twenty years of incarceration at best.

27.

This decision is therefore in conflict with the general rule, as referred to, for example, in

Cross v. Hujf, 208 Ga. 392, 67 S.E.2d 124 (1951) and Robinson v. Lee, 317 Md. 371 (1989),

that the benefit of the doubt in favor of a defendant applies where there is ambiguity as to the

defendant’s sentence.

28.

Also, in no other area would anyone say that someone should be thankful to still be alive after

having been intentionally hurt. If a patient, for example, has a life-threatening wound on the

leg, the doctor may contemplate its amputation in order to save the patient’s life. However,

as soon as the patient’s life is not at stake anymore, the doctor is not allowed to amputate.

29.

Without medical necessity, in particular under the protest of the patient, an amputation

becomes a criminal act. The doctor cannot argue that the patient should be thankful to still be

alive because, at one point, death was an option.

30.

Just as a doctor cannot interfere with the healing process of a patient’s body by taking

debilitating measures until they become necessary, a governor cannot interfere with the

judicial process by commuting a sentence until this action becomes necessary (in the interest

of the defendant).

11

31.

The decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee was far from being unanimous. Justice

Brock and Justice Cooper dissented, correctly referring to the prematurity of the Governor’s

actions:

[...] the Governor's actions were premature and unauthorized by law, and

constitute an unwarranted interference with the judicial process. [...] The

Governor has no power to impose sentence; he has power only to diminish the

punishment provided by a sentence imposed by the courts. The power to

commute a sentence can never properly be exercised until after the judgment

of the courts has become final; until that time there is no sentence to be

commuted. Any "commutation" before that time necessarily is an

impermissible interference with the judicial process. {Collins v. State, 550

S.W.2d 643, 654-655 (Tenn. 1977))

32.

A more recent decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa {State v. Ragland, 836 N.W. 2d 107

(Iowa 2013)) also contradicts the above-mentioned decision of the Supreme Court of

Tennessee and the decisions of the state courts in Petitioner’s case. The Governor of Iowa,

claiming to fear the release of violent criminals into society, commuted Mr. Ragland’s illegal

sentence of life without parole to life with no possibility of parole for 60 years with no credit

for earned time. Nevertheless, a resentencing hearing was held in which Mr. Ragland attacked

both the sentence he received at trial and the sentence that resulted from the commutation.

The evidence presented at that hearing showed that Mr. Ragland was no threat to society. He

was resentenced to life with the possibility of parole after 25 years of incarceration.

33.

The State appealed that decision and argued that Mr. Ragland should not have been

resentenced as, in the State’s view, after the commutation, Mr. Ragland’s sentence was no

longer illegal. The Supreme Court of Iowa, however, ruled in Mr. Ragland’s favor.

34.

The Supreme Court of Iowa did not allow an act of mock clemency to hurt a defendant. Mr.

Ragland was placed in the same favorable position as if the governor had never interfered

12

with the court proceedings. This should always be the case where a member of the executive

branch commutes a sentence without a request by the defendant.

35.

This rule would protect both defendants as well as those governors or presidents who do not

want to abuse their power. At the time of writing, President Biden, for example, is asked to

commute all death sentences of those on federal and military death row.3 This request comes

from people such as Rev. Sharon Risher who have high moral values. Their intention is to

save lives. President Biden should be able to fulfill their request without risking to hurt

anyone.

36.

In this context, Petitioner would also like to address the fear, as expressed by the Governor

of Iowa when he commuted Mr. Ragland’s sentence, that court review of sentences would

lead to the release of violent and dangerous criminals into society.

37.

As the Supreme Court of Iowa noted in its decision, the court that resentenced Mr. Ragland

to life with the possibility of parole after 25 years thoroughly reviewed the evidence and

concluded that Mr. Ragland’s rehabilitation was successful. The Governor, however, made a

decision about Mr. Ragland without considering any evidence. This is not a rational

approach.4

38.

Also, when the Governor bases his decision solely on a previous court decision to prevent a

future court decision (and thus expresses suspicion with regard to court decisions), how does

he know that the first court made the right decision?

Khaleda Rahman, Joe Biden Urged to Prevent Death Row Execution Spree under Trump (updated Nov. 7,2024,

9:36 AM EST), NEWSWEEK.COM, https://www.newsweek.com/joe-biden-urged-prevent-trump-death-rowexecution-spree-1981920.

See, in this context, Jennifer Lackey, The Irrationality of Natural Life Sentences, NEWS.NORTHWESTERN.EDU

(Feb. 1,2016), https://news.northwestem.edu/stories/2016/02/opinion-nytimes-life-sentences/.

13

39.

Courts definitely make mistakes. Exonerations show that innocent people get convicted, too,

but not all innocent prisoners will be exonerated. Petitioner knows first-hand how difficult it

is to successfully fight a wrongful conviction. Sometimes, the only option for wrongfully

convicted prisoners to get a little bit of justice in this world is to fight their sentences. This

right should not be taken away from them.

40.

Moreover, even those prisoners who are actually guilty still have human dignity. They have

a free will and can change. In his call for an end of the death penalty, which he characterizes

as both cruel and unnecessary, Pope John Paul II points out that

the dignity of human life must never be taken away, even in the case of someone

who has done great evil. Modem society has the means of protecting itself,

without definitively denying criminals the chance to reform.5

41.

It is this chance to reform that is denied by a natural life sentence as well. This sentence

conflicts with human dignity in a similar way since it takes away all hope and nobody can

live without hope. It is not surprising that Pope Francis calls this sentence a “secret death

penalty.”6

42.

There is no doubt that there are people who need to remain in prison for the rest of their lives

because they are unwilling or unable to change and remain a threat to society. But how can a

governor know who is a threat and who is not?

43.

People can change so much in prison that their current selves are unrecognizable from their

earlier selves. One of the most poignant examples is probably Jacques Fesch, convicted of

Pope John Paul II, Homily at the Papal Mass in St. Louis, Missouri (Jan. 27, 1999), para. 5,

https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/travels/1999/documents/hfjp-ii_hom_27011999_stlouis.htnil

(last accessed on Nov. 23,2024).

Pope Francis, Encyclical Letter Fratelli Tutti of the Holy Father Francis on Fraternity and Social Friendship

(Oct. 3, 2020), para. 268, https://www.vatican.va/content/ffancesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papaffancesco_20201003_enciclica-ffatelli-tutti.pdf (last accessed on Nov. 23,2024).

14

robbery murder and executed in France in 1957. After his conversion in prison, he changed

so much that he became an inspiration for many Catholics and his cause for beatification has

been opened.

Jacques Fesch reminds us that behind every state-sanctioned murder is a human

being with hopes, fears, longings and, however, deeply buried, the fundamental

idea of God. He reminds us of the central Catholic tenet that every soul is

redeemable. He reminds us that our Lord was himself the victim of capital

punishment - and that one of his last acts was to turn to the repentant thief

beside him and say, “This day you shall be with me in paradise. »7

Heather King, Light Upon the Scaffold: The Prison Letters ofJacques Fesch, WORDONFlRE.ORG (July 10,

2017), https://www.wordonfire.org/articles/light-upon-the-scafFold-the-prison-letters-of-jacques-fesch/.

15

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

44.

The constitutional protection of individuals from arbitrary and oppressive actions by those in

power is a matter of great public concern and national importance.

45.

Many statements and debates during and following the most recent presidential campaigns

are directly related to this issue. To cite but a few:

(a) Former Trump advisor Steve Bannon claimed that Vice President Harris prevented his

early release. 8

(b) President Biden raised public concern when he stated that his former rival Donald Trump

needed to be locked up politically. Donald Trump made similar remarks with regard to

Hillary Clinton during his presidential campaign in 2016.9

(c) When recently asked if he would consider pardoning Hunter Biden if he was elected,

Donald Trump stated that he did not want to hurt people.10

(d) After Donald Trump was elected as the new President of the United States, Senator Ron

Johnson expressed his opposition to a presidential pardon for Hunter Biden, warning

against a “dual system of justice where the powerful, or the sons and daughters of the

powerful, get off scot-free.”11 However, Senator Johnson is not opposed to a commutation

8

9

10

11

Kari Donovan, Steve Bannon Unleased: ‘Kamala Harris is Illegally Holding Me Prisoner to Sabotage the

Election!’, WARROOM.ORG (Oct. 18,2024), https://warroom.org/steve-bannon-unleased-kamala-harris-isillegally-holding-me-prisoner-to-sabotage-the-election/.

Louis Casiano, Paul Steinhauser: Biden calls for Trump to be 'politically' locked up at New Hampshire event.

Trump previously called for Hillary Clinton to be imprisoned during his 2016 presidential campaign,

FOXNEWS.COM (Oct. 22, 2024, 06:46 pm EDT), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/biden-calls-trumppolitically-locked-new-hampshire-event.

Trump addresses whether he would consider pardoning Hunter Biden, FOXNEWS.COM (Oct. 24, 2024, 02:05),

https://www.foxnews.com/video/6363716053112.

Chris Pandolfo, Republican senator says Trump should not pardon Hunter Biden. Ron Johnson said a pardon

for Hunter Biden would create a 'dual system ofjustice', FOXNEWS.COM (Nov. 8, 2024, 02:02 pm EST),

https://www.foxnews.com/politics/republican-senator-says-trump-should-not-pardon-hunter-biden.

16

or reduction of Hunter Biden’s sentence “as a show of good will and effort to unify the

country.”12

46.

These examples show the relevance of the issue at hand and the urgency that it be addressed.

There is at least a concern that people are being favored or disadvantaged with regard to

their sentences for mere political reasons.

47.

When a president or governor does not grant clemency, he or she passively hurts a person

by not giving that person a free gift. It is not compatible with the office of president or

governor if such decision is taken for political gain. It should be based on evidence and

reason. The issue at hand, however, is mock clemency, i.e., a governor’s or president’s abuse

of his or her right to grant clemency to actively hurt an individual.

48.

If mock clemency was allowed, President Trump could minimally reduce Hunter Biden’s

sentence to prevent its review and significant reduction by the courts. The same could happen

to President Trump if, at one point, he had to fight sentences himself. Petitioner does in no

way suggest that President Trump or any future president would act like that. This would be

malicious and unjust. However, it happened in multiple cases throughout the country,

including the case at hand.

49.

As shown above, the courts reacted differently to the governors’ actions. This disparity in

decisions of U.S. state courts on one and the same issue makes a review of the U.S. Supreme

Court necessary, even more so as this issue touches the doctrine of the separation of powers

which is at the heart of any modem constitution.

12

Ibid.

17

50.

The punishment of defendants in criminal cases should be reserved to the judicial branch

alone. The only overlap from the executive branch that should be allowed and even welcomed

is true clemency. If an act that is formally based on the right to grant clemency is not favorable

to a defendant, in particular if it was not requested and even opposed by the defendant, the

courts should put the defendant in the same favorable position as if the governor or president

had never acted, as it was correctly done in State v. Ragland.

51.

In State v. Ragland, the Supreme Court of Iowa took a decision that is based on reason and

human dignity and the protections it provides to the individual reflect the true meaning of

both federal and state constitutions and make the legal system more just and humane. These

protections should therefore be expanded from Iowa to the entire country.

CONCLUSION

52.

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

C\*A.

Date:

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18

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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