Amicus Curiae Brief — William Trevor Case, Petitioner v. Montana

Supreme Court briefSep 10, 2025

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NO. 24-624

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

WILLIAM TREVOR CASE,

Petitioner,

MONTANA,

Respondent.

________________

On Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Montana

________________

BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE LOCAL

GOVERNMENT LEGAL CENTER, NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, NATIONAL

LEAGUE OF CITIES, INTERNATIONAL

CITY/COUNTY MANAGEMENT

ASSOCIATION, AND INTERNATIONAL

MUNICIPAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION IN

SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

________________

MILLER BARONDESS, LLP

NADIA A. SARKIS

Counsel of Record

JAMES R. NIKRAFTAR

2121 Avenue of the Stars

Los Angeles, California 90067

(310) 552-4400

nsarkis@millerbarondess.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE................................ 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 2

ARGUMENT............................................................... 4

I. The Fourth Amendment Requires

Reasonableness, Not Uniformity............................ 4

A. The Emergency-Aid Exception Requires A

Bespoke Threshold, Not Probable Cause ........... 5

B. This Court Has Already Articulated The

Appropriate Standard ......................................... 7

C. This Court Has Never Required Probable

Cause For Emergency-Aid Entries ..................... 8

II.

Probable Cause Is Ill-Suited To The

Realities Of Modern Policing................................ 11

A. Police Respond Primarily To Nonviolent

And Noncriminal Matters ................................. 11

B. The Elderly Are Particularly At Risk And

In Need Of Police Intervention ......................... 17

C. Officers Will Not Have Probable Cause For

Most Emergency-Aid Situations ....................... 19

III. Requiring Probable Cause In Emergency-Aid

Situations Would Create Perverse Incentives

And Undermine Public Safety.............................. 22

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Federal Cases

Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of

Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls,

536 U.S. 822 (2002).................................................. 6

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart,

547 U.S. 398 (2006).......................... 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 25

Cady v. Dombrowski,

413 U.S. 433 (1973)...................................... 4, 10, 11

Camara v. Municipal Court,

387 U.S. 523 (1967).................................................. 6

Caniglia v. Strom,

593 U.S. 194 (2021).................................. 7, 9, 10, 11

Colorado v. Bertine,

479 U.S. 367 (1987).......................................... 10, 11

Delaware v. Prouse,

440 U.S. 648 (1979).................................................. 5

Michigan v. Fisher,

558 U.S. 45 (2009)................................ 3, 8, 9, 22, 25

Mincey v. Arizona,

437 U.S. 385 (1978)................................................ 10

Minnesota v. Olson,

495 U.S. 91 (1990).................................................. 10

iii

New York v. Burger,

482 U.S. 691 (1987).................................................. 6

Riley v. California,

573 U.S. 373 (2014)..................................................4

Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n,

489 U.S. 602 (1989).................................................. 6

South Dakota v. Opperman,

428 U.S. 364 (1976).......................................... 10, 11

Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1 (1968).............................................. 4, 5, 8

United States v. Najar,

451 F.3d 710 (10th Cir. 2006) ................................. 7

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,

515 U.S. 646 (1995).................................................. 6

Federal Rules & Constitution

Sup. Ct. R. 37.6 ............................................................ 1

U.S. Const. amend. IV ........... 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 22, 23

Other Authorities

Amos Irwin & Betsy Pearl, The Community

Responder Model, Center for American Progress

(Oct. 28, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/2wnjc65d....... 12

Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Community Violence

Outreach Workers Are More Likely to Experience

Gun Violence Than Police Are, Scientific American

(June 9, 2023), https://tinyurl.com/8d96a5zx .......21

Angie Koehle & Emily Van de Riet, Newborn

found alive, spent several days alone next to

mom’s body after she died in apartment,

KTTV 11 (June 27, 2025, 11:03 AM PDT),

https://tinyurl.com/4t7auaus ............................ 13-14

Ashton Edwards, Domino’s Pizza workers help

save loyal customer’s life, FOX13 (May 10, 2016,

2:30 PM), https://tinyurl.com/4wz56696 ............... 14

Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Older

Adult Fall Prevention (Sept. 2024),

https://tinyurl.com/yc7rpmeh ................................ 17

Esteban L. Hernandez, What’s next for the police

response alternative STAR as it turns 5, AXIOS

Denver (June 9, 2025),

https://tinyurl.com/3w57tkab .......................... 24, 25

Frédéric Bloch, Critical Falls: Why Remaining on

the Ground After a Fall can be Dangerous,

Whatever the Fall, American Geriatrics Soc’y

(July 12, 2012), https://tinyurl.com/wzypuhn4..... 18

Houston Police Dep’t Mental Health Div., Crisis

Intervention Response Team (CIRT),

https://tinyurl.com/mrevcruc .................................25

Hugo Valdez, Several Victorville deputies honored

during the Sheriff’s Life Saving Awards Ceremony,

VICTOR VALLEY NEWS (Jan. 19, 2020, 9:50 PM),

https://tinyurl.com/ywmhdmzu ............................. 15

Jeff Frankel, TX Firefighter Shot Responding to

Welfare Check Call, Journal of Emergency Med.

Servs. (Mar. 22, 2024),

https://tinyurl.com/mspcfxaz .................................21

Jennifer L. S. Teller et al., Crisis Intervention Team

Training for Police Officers Responding to Mental

Disturbance Calls, Psychiatric Services Vol. 57,

No. 2 (Feb. 2006), https://tinyurl.com/yyb8yj6t .... 15

Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Policing and public health calls for

service in Philadelphia, Crime Sci 10, 5 (2021),

https://tinyurl.com/3m8ehw56 .............................. 13

Kelly Rule, Free phone call service from police leads

to life-saving welfare check in Delaware, FOX 29

Philadelphia (Apr. 16, 2025, 5:54 PM EDT),

https://tinyurl.com/mvx9fpm6 ............................... 18

L.A. Cnty. Dep’t of Mental Health, Law Enforcement

Teams (LET), https://tinyurl.com/mscwfyxp ........25

Laura A. Talbot et al., Falls in young, middle-aged

and older community dwelling adults: perceived

cause, environmental factors and injury, Nat’l

Library of Medicine (BMC Public Health Aug. 18,

2005), https://tinyurl.com/wzypuhn4 .................... 17

Mental Illness Policy Org., Survey: Police needlessly

overburdened by mentally ill abandoned by mental

health system, https://tinyurl.com/5yaxr58a......... 16

Molly M. Simmons et al., SAFE Charlotte:

Alternative Response Models and

Disparities in Policing (Sept. 28,. 2021),

https://tinyurl.com/mr2u56n3 ............................... 16

Nat’l Alliance On Mental Illness, Crisis

Intervention Team (CIT) Programs,

https://tinyurl.com/5djs4rca ..................................24

Paul Hemez, How Many Young and Older Adults

Lived Alone?, U.S. Census Bureau (May 30, 2024),

https://tinyurl.com/4cwpf72m................................ 17

Paula Span, Why Are More Older People Dying

After Falls?, N.Y. TIMES, (Sep. 7, 2025),

https://tinyurl.com/3dvkvt7j ............................. 17-18

Philadelphia Police Dep’t, Behavioral Health Unit

(BHI), https://tinyurl.com/bdz4z6s4......................25

Prince George’s County, Mobile Integrated Health,

https://tinyurl.com/2xautzrj ..................................25

Rebecca T. Brown et al., Good Cop, Better Cop:

Evaluation of a Geriatrics Training Program for

Police, Nat’l Library of Medicine,

https://tinyurl.com/mr2xx8uw............................... 18

vii

Rebecca T. Brown et al., Police on the Front Line of

Community Geriatric Health Care: Challenges and

Opportunities, Journal of the American Geriatrics

Soc’y, Vol. 62, No. 11 (Nov. 2014),

https://tinyurl.com/42223ahc................................. 19

Reimagining Public Safety in the COVID-19 Era:

Hearing Before Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism

and Homeland Security, U.S. House of

Representatives, 117th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 8,

2022), https://tinyurl.com/y3m78x28 .............. 21, 22

Ronnie Roberts, Hugging the Cactus: Police

Supporting Civilian 911 Responders, POLICE

CHIEF ONLINE (Apr. 7, 2021),

https://tinyurl.com/56t9hcbw ................................ 12

Sarah Gillespie et al., Understanding Denver’s

STAR Program, Urban Institute (Aug. 2023),

https://tinyurl.com/4bsa2bzz ........................... 24, 26

Sarah Motter & Zoë Shriner, Patient who fatally

stabbed KCFD paramedic charged with murder,

KCTV 5 (Apr. 28, 2025, 6:31 AM PDT),

https://tinyurl.com/4c7uj7tt............................. 20, 21

Shannon Hicks, Resident Displaced Following Fire

During Health & Welfare Check, THE NEWTOWN

BEE (Jan. 23, 2025, 7:00 AM),

https://tinyurl.com/mwkmhcck.............................. 14

Thomas J. Wieczorek et al., Police Data Analysis

Report: Oakland, CA, Center for Public Safety

Mgmt., LLC, https://tinyurl.com/txu6mb45 ... 13, 16

viii

Thomas Breen, 95.6% Of Cops’ Calls Don’t Involve

Violence, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT (June 19,

2020, 3:56 PM), https://tinyurl.com/5n6tz7zy....... 12

Transform911, Transforming 911 Report: Chapter

Two, https://tinyurl.com/5e2fdbx9 ........................ 15

Vera Institute of Justice, 911 Analysis: Call Data

Shows We Can Rely Less on Police (Apr. 2022),

https://tinyurl.com/36uec794........................... 12, 13

Vera Institute of Justice, Understanding Police

Enforcement: A Multicity 911 Analysis Summary

Brief (Sept. 2020), https://tinyurl.com/4ark4h8p..... 13

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

The Local Government Legal Center (“LGLC”) is

a coalition of government organizations formed in

2023 to provide education to local governments

regarding the Supreme Court and its impact on local

governments and officials and to advocate for local

government positions at the Supreme Court in

appropriate cases.

The National Association of

Counties, the National League of Cities, and the

International Municipal Lawyers Association are the

founding members of the LGLC. The International

City/County Management Association is an associate

member of the LGLC.

The National Association of Counties (“NACo”) is

the only national organization that represents county

governments in the United States. Founded in 1935,

NACo provides essential services to the nation’s 3,069

counties through advocacy, education, and research.

The National League of Cities (“NLC”), founded

in 1924, is the oldest and largest organization

representing U.S. municipal governments.

NLC

works to strengthen local leadership, influence federal

policy, and drive innovative solutions. In partnership

with 49 state municipal leagues, NLC advocates for

over 19,000 cities, towns, and villages where more

than 218 million Americans live.

1 Per this Court’s Rule 37.6, this brief was not authored in whole

or in part by any party, and no one other than amici or their

counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or

submission.

The International City/County Management

Association (“ICMA”) is a nonprofit professional and

educational organization of more than 9,000

appointed chief executives and assistants serving

cities, counties, towns, and regional entities. ICMA's

mission is to create excellence in local governance by

advocating and developing the professional

management of local governments throughout the

world.

The

International

Municipal

Lawyers

Association (“IMLA”) has been an advocate and

resource for local government attorneys since 1935.

Owned solely by its more than 2,500 members, IMLA

serves as an international clearinghouse for legal

information and cooperation on municipal legal

matters. IMLA’s mission is to advance the responsible

development of municipal law through education and

advocacy by providing the collective viewpoint of local

governments around the country on legal issues

before the Supreme Court of the United States, the

United States Courts of Appeals, and state supreme

and appellate courts.

Amici offer their perspective on why the rule

sought by Petitioner would harm local governments

and their residents by undermining modern policing

efforts.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The

Fourth

Amendment

requires

reasonableness, not rigidity. This Court has long

recognized that officers may enter a home without a

warrant when they have an “objectively reasonable

basis” to believe that someone inside is seriously

injured or imminently threatened. Brigham City,

Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403–06 (2006); Michigan

v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (per curiam).

Critically, the Court has never required probable

cause that an emergency is taking place to permit

warrantless entry in such circumstances—despite

numerous opportunities to do so.

Instead, the Court’s Fourth Amendment

standards are customized. The Court has already

endorsed a bespoke standard to fit the unique needs

of the emergency-aid exception, one that has a lower

and context-sensitive reasonableness basis.

See

Michigan, 558 U.S. at 47 (stating that the “‘emergency

aid exception’ . . . requires only an ‘objectively

reasonable basis”’ (citing Brigham City, 547 U.S. at

404–06)). That consistent doctrinal line reflects a

constitutional truth: emergencies demand flexibility,

not the heavy machinery of probable cause.

Imposing a probable cause requirement would

impede public safety and endanger lives. Welfare

checks and crisis calls are a central function of modern

policing. They begin with ordinary human concerns—

such as an unanswered phone, a suicide hotline

report, or a neighbor’s alarm about an unseen elderly

resident. These facts may give officers and coresponders strong cause for concern. But they cannot

satisfy the probable-cause threshold. A rigid rule—

like the one proposed by Petitioner—will thwart

responders from providing vital services to their

communities.

Many police departments have embraced coresponder and crisis-response models.

These

programs succeed precisely because they empower

responders to act when there is an objectively

reasonable basis to believe someone needs help. If

welfare checks were conditioned on probable cause,

such

programs

would

become

unworkable.

Departments would face liability for acting in good

faith and would be perversely incentivized to either

avoid proactive crisis intervention or reframe health

emergencies as criminal investigations. Either path

undermines public safety and erodes community

trust.

The Fourth Amendment does not compel such a

result. The Court’s precedents—spanning more than

four decades—have deliberately avoided probable

cause in the emergency-aid context, recognizing that

the protection of life requires a different balance. A

probable cause standard here would break from this

Court’s precedent. It will stifle innovation and the

departments most committed to safeguarding health.

And it will regress policing toward outdated punitive

models, as well as open them to new forms of liability.

Reasonableness, not probable cause, is the

constitutional touchstone in emergency-aid.

ARGUMENT

The Fourth Amendment Requires

Reasonableness, Not Uniformity

The Fourth Amendment’s protections are

grounded in reasonableness. Riley v. California, 573

U.S. 373, 381 (2014) (the “ultimate touchstone of the

Fourth Amendment is reasonableness”); Cady v.

Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973) (same). The

Constitution only forbids “unreasonable searches and

seizures.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). Thus,

the question in any Fourth Amendment case is

whether the government’s conduct was reasonable

under the totality of the circumstances. See id. (a

Fourth Amendment right “must be shaped by the

context in which it is asserted”). That principle

applies regardless of whether the search serves a

criminal or civil interest. By virtue of that principle,

different standards logically and necessarily apply

when dealing with each.

Here, the work is to determine whether probable

cause is an appropriate standard for emergency-aid

situations. For the following reasons, it is not.

The Emergency-Aid Exception

Requires A Bespoke Threshold, Not

Probable Cause

This Court has never imposed a universal

quantum of suspicion across all categories of

governmental

intrusion

under

the

Fourth

Amendment. In Delaware v. Prouse, for instance, the

Court held that the permissibility of a particular law

enforcement practice is judged “by balancing its

intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment

interests against its promotion of legitimate

governmental interests.” 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).

Similarly, in Terry v. Ohio, the Court adopted a

“reasonable suspicion” standard—less than probable

cause—to allow officers to detain and pat down

individuals because there was a specific need to

prevent imminent criminal activity in a manner

proportionate to the limited intrusion. 392 U.S. 1, 27

(1968).

Likewise, administrative searches, including in

highly regulated industries like railroads and mines,

and school safety inspections operate under tailored

standards. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387

U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (different standard for

administrative inspections); New York v. Burger, 482

U.S. 691, 712 (1987) (custom standard for a junkyard

as a closely regulated industry); Bd. of Educ. of Indep.

Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536

U.S. 822, 838 (2002) (warrantless drug testing

permitted for participants in school extracurricular

activities); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S.

602, 619 (1989) (upheld drug and alcohol testing for

railroad employees following accidents).

Even in one of the most protected

circumstances—the search of children—courts must

still balance the government interest. In Earls, this

Court found that random and suspicionless drug

testing of middle and high school students

participating in extracurricular activities was

constitutional because of the school’s “important

interest in preventing and deterring drug use.” 536

U.S. at 838; accord Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,

515 U.S. 646, 664 (1995) (drug screening of children

participating in sports was constitutional because of,

inter alia, the “severity of the need met by the

search”).

As in those cases, the job of the Court here is to

find a balance by adopting a standard that balances

the government’s responsibility to render emergencyaid in diverse scenarios with the need to preserve the

sanctity of the home. The emergency-aid exception

applies where officials confront a severe need—“to

assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened

with such injury.” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403; see

also Pet. Br. at 24. The governmental interest is

saving lives. In this scenario, officers are not pursuing

evidence or enforcing criminal law but responding to

a civil emergency—acting as a first responder, not an

investigator.

The governmental interest is not

prosecution, but protection. And the risk is not flight

or destruction of evidence, but the loss of life.

This distinction matters because, as one court

described, these cases are “unattended by the typical

concern of buffering investigatory zeal with judicial

oversight.” United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 714

(10th Cir. 2006). And this Court’s precedents, as

detailed above, allow the standard to vary according

to the nature of the intrusion and the urgency of the

governmental objective. As Justice Alito explained in

Caniglia v. Strom, while there is “no overarching

‘community caretaking’ doctrine,” that does not mean

“all searches and seizures conducted for non-lawenforcement purposes must be analyzed under

precisely the same Fourth Amendment rules

developed in criminal cases.” 593 U.S. 194, 201 (2021)

(Alito, J., concurring).

Requiring probable cause—a standard designed

for criminal investigations—misaligns the legal test

with the civil, life-saving purpose undergirding the

emergency-aid exception.

This Court Has Already Articulated

The Appropriate Standard

This Court has already articulated that the

proper inquiry for the emergency-aid exception is

whether an officer had an objectively reasonable basis

to believe immediate entry was necessary to render

aid. Michigan, 558 U.S. at 49 (warrantless entry is

permitted under the Fourth Amendment so long as

“there [is] ‘an objectively reasonable basis for

believing’ that medical assistance [is] needed, or

persons [are] in danger” (citation omitted)); Brigham

City, 547 U.S. at 400 (same).

The key question under the Fourth Amendment

is whether the facts and circumstances confronting an

officer create an objectively reasonable basis to believe

that someone is in danger or needs aid. See id. at 402.

This position is entirely consistent with the Court’s

earlier insistence that the Fourth Amendment right

“must be shaped by the context in which it is

asserted.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 9. In this context,

probable cause is not a useful standard.2

This Court Has Never Required

Probable Cause For Emergency-Aid

Entries

It is equally clear that the reasonableness

standard for emergency-aid entries is not and should

not be the same as probable cause. This Court has

never equated the two, despite many opportunities to

do so. In Brigham City, the Court held that “police

Also notable, in Terry, a Fourth Amendment intrusion for

purposes of investigating a crime applied a less-than-probablecause standard. Logically in a circumstance where criminal

investigation is not the aim, there must be daylight between the

standards. The condition at question here is at least of equal

importance—rendering emergency-aid—and the risks are much

greater.

may enter a home without a warrant when they have

an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an

occupant is seriously injured or imminently

threatened with such injury.” 547 U.S. at 400. The

Court did not require probable cause—nor did it

equate “objectively reasonable basis” with that more

exacting standard.

In Michigan, the Court reaffirmed that

warrantless entry is permitted so long as “there [is]

‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that

medical assistance [is] needed, or persons [are] in

danger.” 558 U.S. at 49 (citation omitted). The Court

described Brigham City as controlling and made no

suggestion that probable cause was constitutionally

required.

Nothing in Caniglia disturbs this framework. In

Caniglia, police conducted a welfare check on the

petitioner, whose wife claimed he was suicidal and

had brandished a firearm the night before. 593 U.S.

at 196. But when police entered his home, the

petitioner was already in custody. Id. at 198. There

was no ongoing emergency—a meaningful distinction

which led the Court to reject the use of “community

caretaking” as a stand-alone doctrine for warrantless

home entry. But that case turned on the absence of

exigency, not the quantum of suspicion. As Chief

Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer emphasized,

Caniglia and Brigham City/Michigan are not in

conflict. Id. at 200-01 (“[n]othing in today’s opinion is

. . . contrary” to the Court’s holding in Brigham City,

547 U.S. at 406; also citing Michigan, 558 U.S. at 49).

Caniglia likewise does not change that the

police’s community caretaking function provides a

relevant contextual framework that informs the entry

standard applied.

See, e.g., South Dakota v.

Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976) (describing

inventory procedures as “caretaking procedures” to

protect property); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367,

372–73 (1987) (same); Caniglia, 593 U.S. at 198-99

(analyzing the context of police caretaking functions

regarding vehicles on public highways in Cady, 413

U.S. at 441). And none of these cases limit the

application of that framework to circumstances only

outside the home, to wit, vehicle searches.

Petitioner asserts that the emergency-aid

exception is simply an exigency “that sounds in

probable cause.” Pet. Br. 15. For several reasons, that

is incorrect. This Court has never framed the

emergency-aid doctrine in terms of probable cause;

the question is whether officers had an objectively

reasonable basis to believe someone needed

immediate assistance—a standard Petitioner does not

address.

Petitioner’s brief cites only criminalinvestigation cases, such as Minnesota v. Olson, 495

U.S. 91 (1990)— which involved a first-degree

murder—rather than an emergency-aid scenario.

Petitioner’s argument is also irreconcilable with the

Court’s consistent instruction that police may enter

without a warrant because “[t]he need to protect or

preserve life or avoid serious injury” itself justifies

entry. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978)

(citation omitted).

II.

Probable Cause Is Ill-Suited To The

Realities Of Modern Policing

There is no getting around the vital role of police

departments in community caretaking. This Court

has repeatedly recognized this essential function.

Cady, 413 U.S. at 441 (recognizing caretaking

functions, including responding to disabled vehicles

and investigating accidents); Brigham City, 547 U.S.

at 406 (“The role of a peace officer includes preventing

violence and restoring order, not simply rendering

first aid to casualties . . .”); Caniglia, 593 U.S. at 199201 (“Police officers perform many civic tasks in

modern society . . . While there is no overarching

‘community caretaking’ doctrine, it does not follow

that all searches and seizures conducted for non-lawenforcement purposes must be analyzed under

precisely the same Fourth Amendment rules

developed in criminal cases.” (Alito, J., concurring));

South Dakota, 428 U.S. at 369-71, 370 n.5 (upholding

inventory procedures as “caretaking procedures”

designed to protect property, guard against danger

and shield police from false claims, functions

unrelated “to criminal investigations”); Colorado, 479

U.S. at 372–73 (same).

In a modern context, these

caretaking functions often predominate.

community

Police Respond Primarily To

Nonviolent And Noncriminal

Matters

The majority of 911 calls do not involve serious

or violent crimes. A 2022 study from the Vera

Institute of Justice analyzed 15.6 million 911 calls

from across nine major U.S. cities. In six of those

cities—including major metro areas like New York,

Baltimore, and New Orleans—no more than 3% of all

911 calls involved violent crime.3 Other studies are in

accord. For instance, one study showed violent-crime

calls make up only about 1–2% of all incidents in a

survey of several major U.S. cities,4 and police data

from eight cities confirm that low-priority or nonurgent calls comprise roughly one-third to nearly onehalf of all calls for service.5

City-specific data confirms these trends. For

example, from 2018-2020 in New Haven, Connecticut,

only 4.4% of police dispatches were for violent crimes,

while nearly twice that number were related to

physical and mental health (8.02%).6 Similarly, in

Camden, New Jersey, in 2017, less than 30% of calls

were related to any type of crime, and only 1.4% were

related to violent crime.7 These studies evidence that

3 Vera Institute of Justice, 911 Analysis: Call Data Shows We Can

Rely Less on Police (Apr. 2022) [hereinafter, Call Data],

https://tinyurl.com/36uec794.

This study utilized the FBI

definition of violent crimes, which includes homicide, rape,

robbery, and aggravated assault. See id. at 1 n.4.

4 Ronnie Roberts, Hugging the Cactus: Police Supporting Civilian

911 Responders, POLICE CHIEF ONLINE

https://tinyurl.com/56t9hcbw.

(Apr.

2021),

5 Id.

Thomas Breen, 95.6% Of Cops’ Calls Don’t Involve Violence,

NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT (June 19, 2020, 3:56 PM),

https://tinyurl.com/5n6tz7zy.

7 Amos Irwin & Betsy Pearl, The Community Responder Model,

Center

for

American

Progress

https://tinyurl.com/2wnjc65d.

(Oct.

28,

2020),

violent crime occupies only a small percentage of

police time.

By contrast, welfare checks and aid to those in

medical, mental health, and substance abuse crises

occupy a significant portion of police departments’

remaining service hours and are a central, essential

police work.

Welfare Checks. Welfare checks comprise a

significant portion of police responses in all surveys.

One 2020 study found that in four of five cities

studied, welfare checks were the most frequent

incident type.8 In Tucson, Arizona, for instance,

“check welfare” calls comprised roughly 8% of all 911

calls.9

Oakland, California10 and Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania11 showed similar numbers.

These welfare checks serve a life-saving

function. By way of example, in May 2025, police in

Phoenix, Arizona performing a welfare check rescued

a 6-day-old newborn baby who had been alone for

several days next to her deceased mother.12 Police

8 Vera Institute of Justice, Understanding Police Enforcement: A

Multicity 911 Analysis Summary

https://tinyurl.com/4ark4h8p.

Brief

(Sept.

2020),

9 Call Data, supra note 3.

Thomas J. Wieczorek et al., Police Data Analysis Report:

Oakland,

CA,

Center

for

Public

Safety

Mgmt.,

LLC, https://tinyurl.com/txu6mb45.

11 Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Policing and public health calls for service

Philadelphia,

Crime

https://tinyurl.com/3m8ehw56.

Sci

10,

(2021),

12 Angie Koehle & Emily Van de Riet, Newborn found alive, spent

several days alone next to mom’s body after she died in apartment,

were called when neighbors noticed packages piled up

by the door. The Phoenix Police attributed the baby’s

rescue to the “smart, immediate actions of the officers

as well as the neighbors seeing something unusual

and calling in for help.”13

In Salem, Oregon in May 2016, police performed

a welfare check on and saved a 48-year-old man in the

midst of a health emergency after a Domino’s Pizza

employee grew concerned that the man—a daily

customer for years—had not ordered a pizza in several

days.14

In Newton, Connecticut, in January 2025, police

conducted a welfare check on an elderly man with a

hoarding problem.15 As he spoke to officers, police

noticed flames and smoke erupting behind the kitchen

stove. Police evacuated the man and controlled the

flames until the fire department arrived, saving the

man and the home.

In Victorville, California, in December 2018, San

Bernadino County Sherriff’s Deputies conducted a

welfare check on a U.S. Army veteran when her

boyfriend reported that she did not show up for

KTTV

(June

27,

https://tinyurl.com/4t7auaus.

2025,

11:03

PDT),

13 Id.

Ashton Edwards, Domino’s Pizza workers help save loyal

customer’s life, FOX13 (May 10, 2016, 2:30 PM),

https://tinyurl.com/4wz56696.

Shannon Hicks, Resident Displaced Following Fire During

Health & Welfare Check, THE NEWTOWN BEE (Jan. 23, 2025, 7:00

AM), https://tinyurl.com/mwkmhcck.

school.16 Deputies found her door open and a suicide

note inside. Acting quickly, deputies located her

vehicle where they found her amidst a suicide

attempt. Thanks to the deputies’ efforts, she survived

and received treatment.

Medical, Mental Health, And Substance

Abuse Crises. Police also spend a significant portion

of their time serving as first responders for

individuals who are experiencing a mental health

crisis.17 Peer-reviewed studies and local government

data consistently show responding to mental health

and substance abuse crises forms a meaningful share

of police work.

Some analyses have found that north of 6.5% of

dispatched calls involve mental health issues.18 And

it is sometimes even higher. In Charlotte, North

Carolina, for instance, 7% of all calls to CharlotteMecklenburg police over a five-year period were

related to mental health, substance abuse, or

16 Hugo Valdez, Several Victorville deputies honored during the

Sheriff’s Life Saving Awards Ceremony, VICTOR VALLEY NEWS

(Jan. 19, 2020, 9:50 PM), https://tinyurl.com/ywmhdmzu.

17 Jennifer L. S. Teller et al., Crisis Intervention Team Training

for Police Officers Responding to Mental Disturbance

Calls, Psychiatric Services

Vol. 57, No. 2 (Feb. 2006),

https://tinyurl.com/yyb8yj6t (collecting sources).

Transform911, Transforming 911 Report: Chapter Two,

https://tinyurl.com/5e2fdbx9.

homelessness.19 Of these, nearly 74% were welfare

checks on individuals in crisis.20

Responding to mental health crises not only

represents a significant proportion of all calls for

service, but also a disproportionate amount of officer

time. For instance, officers in Oakland, California

spent an average of 50.2 minutes on communitygenerated mental health-related calls and 66 minutes

on police-initiated calls of the same type.21 These

cases are also more likely to require backup.22

Police responsibility in this arena is also

expanding, not contracting. In one nationwide survey

of more than 2,400 senior law enforcement officials,

more than 84% stated that there was an increase in

the mentally ill population over the course of their

career.23 And more than 70% of respondents indicated

that their departments had increased or substantially

increased the time spent on service involving

individuals with mental illness over the same

period.24

19 Molly M. Simmons et al., SAFE Charlotte: Alternative Response

Models and Disparities in

https://tinyurl.com/mr2u56n3.

Policing

(Sept.

28,.

2021),

20 Id.

21 Thomas

J. Wieczorek et al., supra note 10, at 13.

22 Id. at 15 (an average of 2.3 units were deployed for community-

initiated and police-initiated mental health calls, compared with

averages of 1.9 and 1.5 respectively).

Mental Illness Policy Org., Survey: Police needlessly

overburdened by mentally ill abandoned by mental health system,

https://tinyurl.com/5yaxr58a.

24 Id.

The Elderly Are Particularly At

Risk And In Need Of Police

Intervention

Elderly Americans rely heavily on the ability of

police to ensure their safety and welfare. The elderly

live alone in disproportionate numbers and are at a

significantly higher risk of at-home injury. Nearly

30% of adults ages 65 and above live alone, and that

proportion grows the older the individual.25 Among

senior women in particular, rates of solo living are

very high. About 43% of women aged 75 or older live

alone.26

Falls among this population are incredibly

common. More than 36 million falls are reported

among older adults annually.27 This leads to

approximately 41,000 deaths each year, making falls

the leading cause of injury-related death for seniors.28

The fall rate in adults over 65 is twice that of those

aged 20-45.29 And the death rates from such falls has

more than tripled in the last 30 years.30

25 Paul Hemez, How Many Young and Older Adults Lived Alone?,

U.S.

Census

Bureau

https://tinyurl.com/4cwpf72m.

(May

30,

2024),

26 Id.

27 Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Older Adult Fall

Prevention (Sept. 2024), https://tinyurl.com/yc7rpmeh.

28 Id.

29 Laura A. Talbot et al., Falls in young, middle-aged and older

community dwelling adults: perceived cause, environmental

factors and injury, Nat’l Library of Medicine (BMC Public Health

Aug. 18, 2005), https://tinyurl.com/wzypuhn4.

30 Paula Span, Why Are More Older People Dying After Falls?,

These enhanced risks are not limited to falls; any

acute emergency presents far more risk for the

elderly. Prolonged lie time after falls—when an

elderly person remains on the floor for hours or days—

dramatically increases the risks of “pressure ulcers,

dehydration, hypothermia, rhabdomyolysis, or renal

failure” which, in the aggregate, “doubles the risk of

death.”31

Police welfare checks on the elderly are often the

last chance for these vulnerable individuals. For

instance, in April 2025, an 87-year-old woman in New

Castle County, Delaware was rescued by police who

conducted a welfare check after repeated calls to her

home went unanswered. Police found the woman on

her back porch where she had fallen, stuck overnight

in the cold without access to food or water.32

Such stories are common enough that many

police departments have implemented trainings on

aiding seniors and even instituted formal “senior

watch” or check-in programs.33

Although precise statistics on the number of

fallen or medically incapacitated seniors found by

N.Y. TIMES, (Sep. 7, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/3dvkvt7j.

31 Frédéric Bloch, Critical Falls: Why Remaining on the Ground

After a Fall can be Dangerous, Whatever the Fall, American

Geriatrics Soc’y (July 12, 2012), https://tinyurl.com/wzypuhn4.

32 Kelly Rule, Free phone call service from police leads to life-

saving welfare check in Delaware, FOX 29 Philadelphia (Apr. 16,

2025, 5:54 PM EDT), https://tinyurl.com/mvx9fpm6.

33 Rebecca T. Brown et al., Good Cop, Better Cop: Evaluation of a

Geriatrics Training Program for Police, Nat’l Library of

Medicine, https://tinyurl.com/mr2xx8uw.

police are not available, it is clear that “police

increasingly serve as first responders to incidents

involving older adults in which aging-related health

plays a critical role.”34

The evidence from peer-reviewed geriatrics

research and government data alike confirms that as

America’s population ages, the role of law

enforcement in safeguarding isolated seniors’ health

and safety has grown indispensable.35

Officers Will Not Have Probable

Cause For Most Emergency-Aid

Situations

Applying a probable cause threshold for

emergency-aid would make it much harder to provide

this aid and open new forms of municipal liability that

will powerfully disincentivize police departments

from intervening. Petitioner’s suggestion that a

probable cause standard will not serve as a barrier to

police intervention and rescue presumes too much.

Pet. Br. at 46. Probable cause is not likely to exist in

most emergency-aid situations, including those

“heartland” cases. Id.

To the contrary, for many welfare checks, officers

arrive with only the knowledge that a neighbor has

not been seen, packages have piled up, a phone has

gone unanswered, or a pizza has not been ordered. By

34 Rebecca T. Brown et al., Police on the Front Line of Community

Geriatric Health Care: Challenges and Opportunities, Journal of

the American Geriatrics Soc’y, Vol. 62, No. 11 (Nov. 2014),

https://tinyurl.com/42223ahc.

35 Id.

definition, these facts rarely—if ever—amount to

probable cause of an imminent danger to permit

warrantless entry into a home. Yet these are exactly

the circumstances where timely intervention can

mean the difference between life and death, especially

for vulnerable populations.

Petitioner suggests that civilian crisis response

teams or other alternatives are the answer for

rendering aid where the probable cause standard

would bar police entry. Pet. Br. at 49. The argument

fails for two key reasons.

First, civilian crisis response teams are the

exception rather than the rule.

Most local

governments do not have them. They only exist in a

few cities and counties. So, Petitioner’s fig leaf is just

that. It does not actually solve the constant need for

police to perform vital caretaking functions.

Second, even if civilian response teams were

available and theoretically could provide emergencyaid, Petitioner ignores that these interventions often

do turn dangerous. Civilian response teams are illequipped to handle such volatile situations. And in

some instances, tragedy has resulted. A sobering

example occurred in Kansas City, Missouri in April

2025, when paramedics were transporting a woman

who had been found walking on a highway in

distress.36 She was not under arrest—responders

were trying to help her and get her safely to a

36 Sarah Motter & Zoë Shriner, Patient who fatally stabbed KCFD

paramedic charged with murder, KCTV 5 (Apr. 28, 2025, 6:31 AM

PDT), https://tinyurl.com/4c7uj7tt.

hospital.37 Without warning, the woman produced a

knife and stabbed a firefighter-paramedic, Graham

Hoffman, through the heart, killing him.38 Similarly,

in March 2024, an Arlington, Texas firefighter was

helping police conduct a welfare check at an

apartment where neighbors reported a child crying

and an unresponsive mother inside.39

As the

firefighter pried the door open to ensure the mother

and child were safe, the occupant shot him.40 One

study found that 20% of outreach workers reported

being “shot at” while on duty, and 2% were actually

shot.41

Welfare checks can rapidly escalate in

unexpected ways, and police officers are generally

best equipped and trained to respond under these

circumstances.

As a former police chief testified to Congress,

“[i]n a country of 400 million guns, predicting danger

in advance is a real challenge.”42

Dispatch

37 Id.

38 Id.

39 Jeff Frankel, TX Firefighter Shot Responding to Welfare Check

Call, Journal of Emergency Med. Servs. (Mar. 22, 2024),

https://tinyurl.com/mspcfxaz.

40 Id.

41 Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Community Violence Outreach

Workers Are More Likely to Experience Gun Violence Than Police

Are,

Scientific

American

(June

2023),

https://tinyurl.com/8d96a5zx.

Reimagining Public Safety in the COVID-19 Era: Hearing

Before Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland

Security, U.S. House of Representatives, 117th Cong., 2d Sess.

(Mar. 8, 2022), https://tinyurl.com/y3m78x28.

information is not always reliable—a call labeled

“mental health issue” could hide a lethal threat and

vice versa.43 Relying on civilian response, or as

Petitioner suggests, “family or friends,” to fill the

massive gaps left by a probable cause standard is

simply untenable.

III.

Requiring Probable Cause In EmergencyAid Situations Would Create Perverse

Incentives And Undermine Public Safety

A probable cause requirement will also

inevitably lead to delays in providing emergency-aid,

will discourage the kind of community policing and

soft welfare checks that save lives, and will make

departments that prioritize mental health response

over arrest open to new avenues of local government

liability.

Inevitable Delays. A probable cause standard

will delay emergency-aid. Officers responding to

welfare calls will face pressure to wait until they can

develop facts meeting a criminal-investigatory

standard, even where delay could cost lives.

In Michigan, the Court noted that “[i]t does not

meet the needs of law enforcement or the demands of

public safety to require officers to walk away from a

situation” like the violent home disturbance

experienced there. 558 U.S. at 49. In other words,

recognizing the duality of police responsibility for law

enforcement and community caretaking, the Fourth

Amendment should not be construed to undermine

those responsibilities. A rule which would require

43 Id.

officers to do so does not comport with the Fourth

Amendment or this Court’s precedents.

Discourages “soft entry” welfare checks. A

probable cause threshold would all but eliminate soft

entry welfare checks.

Probable cause requires

articulable facts suggesting a fair probability of

criminal activity. By definition, however, welfare

checks arise precisely when there is no evidence of

crime—only silence, an unanswered phone, or a report

of unusual absence. If probable cause were required,

officers would face an untenable choice: either refrain

from entry, leaving potentially incapacitated

individuals unaided, or attempt to reframe benign

circumstances as evidence of criminal activity,

distorting the doctrine and inviting pretextual

policing.

This would leave individuals like the newborn in

Phoenix, Arizona or the pizza-lover in Salem, Oregon

to risk death without aid. Imposing a probable cause

requirement would discourage officers from

performing these checks, undermining their

preventive function. Faced with legal uncertainty,

departments may direct officers not to enter absent a

warrant, even when a neighbor credibly reports that

an elderly resident has not been seen in days. Such

hesitation increases the risk of “long lies” and

preventable deaths. Moreover, officers who do enter

may feel compelled to justify their actions under the

rubric of criminal suspicion, creating a perverse

incentive to treat health emergencies as potential

crimes.

Neither outcome serves the Fourth

Amendment’s ultimate aim of reasonableness.

Liability for departments with proactive

mental health response protocols. As noted

above, most localities do not have the resources to

fund dedicated mental health response teams. But

even for those that do, the issue of probable cause

creates disincentives to act. Applying a probable

cause standard would subject police departments that

proactively seek to prioritize mental health treatment

over arrest to liability for failing to act, including

those departments that adopt co-responder models

which incorporate clinicians in their response teams.

While most localities do not have the resources

to create dedicated civilian response teams for

mental health crises, many police departments have

committed

resources

toward

health-focused

interventions.

Several localities even embed clinicians directly

in the 911 response system. For instance, in Denver,

Colorado, the Support Team Assisted Response or

STAR program deploys a medic and mental health

clinician, instead of police, to “low-risk” welfare and

behavioral health calls.45

STAR is dispatched

primarily by Denver 911, whose operators have been

trained to identify STAR-eligible incidents.46 These

professionals can then render aid and connect

Nat’l Alliance On Mental Illness, Crisis Intervention Team

(CIT) Programs, https://tinyurl.com/5djs4rca.

Esteban L. Hernandez, What’s next for the police response

alternative STAR as it turns 5, AXIOS Denver (June 9, 2025),

https://tinyurl.com/3w57tkab.

46 Sarah Gillespie et al., Understanding Denver’s STAR Program,

Urban Institute (Aug. 2023), https://tinyurl.com/4bsa2bzz.

individuals

with

additional

services,

even

transporting them to behavioral health centers.47

Though the program is limited to 6am to 10pm, as of

mid-2025, STAR has resolved more than 25,000

incidents, assisting thousands of residents.48 There

are similar programs in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,49

Los Angeles, California,50 Houston, Texas,51 Prince

George’s County, Maryland,52 and others.53

The success of co-responder and crisis-response

models depends on officers’ ability to enter promptly

and intervene when there is an objectively reasonable

basis to believe aid is needed. See Brigham City, 547

U.S. at 403–06 (2006); Michigan, 558 U.S. at 49

(stating police “do not need ironclad proof” of a lifethreatening injury to act).

47 Hernandez, supra note 45.

48 Id.

Philadelphia Police Dep’t, Behavioral Health Unit (BHI),

https://tinyurl.com/bdz4z6s4.

50 L.A. Cnty. Dep’t of Mental Health, Law Enforcement Teams

(LET), https://tinyurl.com/mscwfyxp.

51 Houston Police Dep’t Mental Health Div., Crisis Intervention

Response Team (CIRT), https://tinyurl.com/mrevcruc.

52 Prince George’s County, Mobile Integrated Health,

https://tinyurl.com/2xautzrj.

53 Notably however, reliance on such programs is challenging as

their funding is not secure in the same way as police funding. In

Eugene, Oregon for instance, their 30-year long CAHOOTS

(Crisis Assistance Helping Out On The Streets) program ended

in April 2025 because of funding issues. Denver STAR’s service

hours are restricted for the same reason.

Imposing a probable cause requirement in these

settings would be fatal to such programs.

definition, welfare checks and crisis calls rarely

involve evidence of criminality. See Section II.A,

supra. A probable cause standard would force officers

and clinicians to remain outside while individuals

suffer overdoses and newborns or the elderly lay

unattended—turning proactive crisis response into a

legal liability rather than a public safety asset.

In addition, a probable cause standard would

punish agencies at the vanguard of police

modernization by ensuring that their interventions

are second-guessed, evidence is excluded, and liability

risks are heightened.

For instance, the STAR

program depends on the discretion of 911 dispatchers

to determine if a case is STAR eligible, rather than

needing a police response.54 Rational agencies would

respond by retreating from welfare checks and crisis

interventions altogether, or by reframing them as

criminal investigations to satisfy a probable cause

threshold. Either outcome would distort policing

priorities and erode public trust.

A probable cause standard in the emergency-aid

context would undermine those protocols, penalize

departments that innovate, and incentivize regression

to outdated, punitive models of policing.

54 Gillespie, supra note 46.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the

Montana Supreme Court should be upheld.

Respectfully submitted,

MILLER BARONDESS, LLP

NADIA A. SARKIS

Counsel of Record

JAMES R. NIKRAFTAR

2121 AVENUE OF THE STARS

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

90067

(310) 552-4400

nsarkis@millerbarondess.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

September 10, 2025

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.