Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ronald P. Hargrave, Petitioner v. United States

No. ____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent,

v.

RONALD P. HARGRAVE,

Petitioner.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

FROM THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

__________________________________________________

Elizabeth Franklin-Best

Elizabeth Franklin-Best, P.C.

3710 Landmark Drive, Suite 113

Columbia, South Carolina 29204

(803) 445-1333

elizabeth@franklinbestlaw.com

Counsel for Ronald P. Hargrave

Questions Presented

Can a physician be convicted of a violation of 21 U.S.C. §841, post-Ruan, when that

physician’s conduct in prescribing the controlled substance was both subjectively and

objectively reasonable as evidenced by the fact that the recipient of the prescription

had been prescribed that very same controlled substance by other physicians both

before and after her encounter with this physician?

Is the Fourth Circuit improperly applying its harmless error standard in assessing

Ruan error?

i

Parties to the Proceedings

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

Related Proceedings

There are no proceedings in state or federal trial or appellate courts, or in this

Court, directly related to this case under Supreme Court Rule 14.1(b)(iii).

ii

Table of Contents

Opinion Below ................................................................................................................ 1

Jurisdiction ..................................................................................................................... 1

Statutory Provisions Involved ....................................................................................... 2

Preliminary Statement .................................................................................................. 2

Why the Court Should Grant the Writ.......................................................................... 6

I.

The Fourth Circuit is Misapplying Ruan’s Burden of Proof in

Adjudicating post-Ruan cases .................................................................. 6

II.

The Fourth Circuit’s Harmless Error Analysis Violates Neder v. United

States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). ........................................................................ 8

Conclusion....................................................................................................................... 9

Index to Appendix

Appendix A – Unpublished opinion from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ....... 1a

Judgment from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ......................... 7a

Order from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denying the petition

for rehearing ......................................................................................... 8a

iii

Table of Authorities

Cases:

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) ................................................................ 7, 8

Ruan v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2370 (2022) ...................................................... 4, 6-8

United States v. Brown, 202 F.3d 691 (2000) ............................................................... 7

United States v. Duldulao, 87 F. 4th 1239 (11th Cir. 2023) ........................................... 5

United States v. Ellis, 868 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2017).................................................. 8

United States v. Hargrave, 2024 WL 2953131 (filed June 12, 2024) .......................... 1

United States v. Kahn, 58 F.4th 1308 (10th Cir. 2023) .................................................. 8

United States v. Kim, 71 F. 4th 155 (4th Cir.),

cert denied, 144 S. Ct. 436 (2023) ......................................................................... 4

United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975) ................................................................ 6

United States v. Qureshi, 121 F.4th 1095 (5th Cir. 2024).............................................. 9

United States v. Smithers, 92 F.4th 237 (4th Cir. 2004) ................................................ 7

Federal Statutes:

21 U.S.C. §841 ......................................................................................................... 2, 6-8

21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) .................................................................................................... 2-4

21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(C)................................................................................................... 3

21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(E)(2) .............................................................................................. 3

28 U.S.C. §1254 .............................................................................................................. 1

iv

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari to review the judgment

below.

Opinion Below

Petitioner respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment

of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

The opinion of the court of appeals is unreported and is reprinted in the

Appendix (“App.”) beginning at page 1a.

United States v. Hargrave, 2024 WL

2953131 (filed June 12, 2024). The judgment of the court of appeals is reprinted at

7a. The order denying Petitioner’s timely petition for rehearing en banc is reprinted

at 8a.

Jurisdiction

The Fourth Circuit entered judgment on June 12, 2024. The court of appeals

denied rehearing en banc on September 24, 2024. This Court has jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. §1254.

1

Statutory Provisions Involved

21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) states, in pertinent part:

Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person

knowingly or intentionally—to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with

intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.

Preliminary Statement

Petitioner, previously a licensed physician who practiced at an emergency

healthcare clinic, Doctor’s Care, in Moncks Corner, South Carolina, is convicted of

having violated 21 U.S.C. §841 of the CSA for a patient for whom the following is

true:

•

[The patient] had, at the time she was treated by Petitioner during

normal business hours, been previously treated for post-traumatic

stress disorder, attention deficit activity disorder, panic attacks, and

treatment for chronic pain.

•

On her medical form at the Doctor’s Care on March 10, 2017, she

indicated she had a sore throat. JA 340.

•

She had muscular skeletal complaints. JA 341.

•

She provided Petitioner with her CVS pharmacy prescription history.

JA 344.

•

She attended the physical with her aunt and the two of them met with

Petitioner for 30 minutes during regular business hours. JA 290, 223.

•

Petitioner gave her a strep test and she was prescribed a Z-pack to

address her medical condition. JA 342.

•

[The patient] testified she was disabled and did not work due to a

cheerleading injury. JA 331.

•

She testified she had been receiving oxycodone for the past 10 years on

a regular basis. JA 336.

2

•

At the time of her testimony, she was taking the very same medications

for which Petitioner has been convicted of providing her. JA 271, 328330, 336

•

On her medical chart, and after her examination, Petitioner noted she

suffered from depression, needed assistance controlling her asthma,

and coping with her PTSD. JA 213.

•

On the prescription that he provided to her, he filled her medications,

noted it was a “one-time prescription only” and then referred her to Dr.

Jeffrey Buncher, a pain management specialist. JA 213.

•

A government witness testified that the patient had a legitimate need

for the prescriptions she was provided. JA 163-180.

•

Petitioner’s expert witness also testified she had legitimate need for the

medications Petitioner prescribed to her. Tr. 87, 92.

•

On a prior occasion, the two of them engaged in sexual activity at the

Doctor’s Care facility, after which Petitioner was promptly fired upon

its discovery. JA 290.

None of the facts recited above were contested at trial. The patient had a long

history of being prescribed the same medications that Petitioner prescribed to her

after she presented at the Doctor’s Care complaining of legitimate medical issues.1

While Petitioner assuredly had an inappropriate relationship with Petitioner at that

facility, that fact was irrelevant to the issue of whether the government proved,

Petitioner was convicted of three counts related to this same patient. Count

One alleged that on March 10, 2017, Petitioner did knowingly, intentionally, and

unlawfully distribute oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance in violation of 21

U.S.C. §841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); Count Two alleged that on that same date, he

unlawfully distributed dextroamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance; and

Count Three alleged that on that same date, he unlawfully distributed alprazolam

and clonazepam, both Schedule IV controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(E)(2). She received 30 mg x 90 pills for 2700 mg of oxycodone; 3

mg X 30 pills for 30 doses of Alprazolam; 60 doses of Clonazepam; and 30mg x 60 for

1800 mg of dextroamphetamine.

1

3

consistent with this Court’s recent decision in Ruan v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2370

(2022), Petitioner knowingly or intentionally issued prescriptions outside the bounds

of professional practice when he conducted a standard medical examination during

office hours three days later, prescribed medications that were appropriate to the

conditions, and then referred her to a pain management specialist. At trial, the

government failed to prove to the jury Petitioner subjectively believed the

prescription he wrote for the patient was as “payment” for sexual services rendered

three days earlier, and that the prescriptions were not for legitimate medical

conditions. If the jury had been charged that “the Government must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an

unauthorized manner,” and that this was a subjective inquiry, the jury would have - at a minimum-- hung. United States v. Kim, 71 F. 4th 155, 160 (4th Cir.), cert denied,

144 S. Ct. 436 (2023).

Instead, having conceded the jury instructions in the case

were improper and having reversed his convictions on some counts, the Fourth

Circuit held Petitioner could not show he was harmed with respect to this patient

because his actions were “beyond the pale.” 6a. As to the sexual relations, that is

true. But as to his convictions for violating §841(a)(1) as to this patient, it is most

assuredly not.

The erroneous, pre-Ruan, instructions the Court charged the jury, state, in

relevant part:

For you to find the defendant guilty of the charges in Counts 1 through

7, the Government must prove the following three essential elements

beyond a reasonable doubt: The Government has to first prove that the

defendant distributed the controlled substance alleged in the

4

Indictment; second, that the defendant knew the substance distributed

was a controlled substance under the time of the distribution; and third,

that the defendant distributed the controlled substance outside the

usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical

purpose.…

A physician’s own methods do not themselves establish what

constitutes professional practice. In determining whether defendant’s

conduct was within the bounds of professional practice, you should

subject—subject to the instructions I give you concerning the credibility

of experts and other witnesses, consider the testimony you have heard

regarding or heard relating to what has been characterized during the

trial as the norms of professional practice. You should also consider the

extent to which, if any at all, any violations of professional norms you

find that have been committed by the defendant interfered with his

treatment of his patients and contributed to an excessive distribution of

controlled substance.

JA 822-824.

The district court also instructed the jury regarding “good faith”— “If a doctor

distributes a drug in good faith in medically treating a patient, then the doctor has

distributed that drug for a legitimate medical purpose in the usual course of

professional practice; that is, he has distributed the drug lawfully.

Good faith in this context means good intentions and the honest exercise

of professional judgment as to the patient’s needs. It means that the

defendant acted in accordance with what he reasonably believed to be

proper medical practice. If you find that the defendant acted in good

faith in distributing the drugs charged in the indictment, then you must

find that the defendant is not guilty.”

JA 822-23.

The court of appeals properly held these jury instructions were improper and

that “the instructional error undermines [its] confidence in the outcome of the trial”

as to the other convictions in this case. App. 5a (quoting United States v. Duldulao,

87 F. 4th 1239, 1261 (11th Cir. 2023). The court’s decision not to grant the same relief

5

as to this patient, however, lacks logical consistency. The government’s argument,

which the court of appeals appears to have adopted, was that Petitioner’s prescribing

these medications was not legitimate because he had sex with the patient for money

three days earlier but, while that conduct may have been unethical, and subjected

him to termination from Doctor’s Care as violative of its policies, it was not a federal

crime.

The patient presented at Doctor’s Care on March 10, 2017, as someone who

had extensive and well-documented legitimate medical needs, had received these

medications in the past, and it was within Petitioner’s discretion to prescribe them

for her on this occasion. He gave her a single prescription for a 30-day supply of

oxycodone and noted that it would be last he would prescribe to her. He referred her

to a pain management specialist. These actions are not consistent with being a “drugpusher.” See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 138 (1975) (noting that

prosecution under §841 is for the “significantly greater offense of acting as a drug

pusher”). Petitioner prescribed the patient with reasonable prescriptions for the other

medications which she had received before, and for the same medical conditions she

complained of when she met with Petitioner and earlier doctors.

WHY THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE WRIT

I.

The Fourth Circuit is Misapplying Ruan’s Burden of Proof in

Adjudicating post-Ruan cases

The Court should grant the writ because the Fourth Circuit is improperly

applying this Court’s recent opinion in Ruan. Before more cases come before this

Court, the Court should signal to the Fourth Circuit that it meant what it said in the

6

opinion—that the Government has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt

that a in a §841 prosecution under which a defendant meets his burden of production,

the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly

or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner. Ruan, 597 U.S. at 468.

Instead

of requiring the Government to meet this burden, the Fourth Circuit instead has

substituted its own standard which appears to be that it will uphold a conviction if

the conduct is sufficiently offensive.2

For the Fourth Circuit’s decision to be correct, the jury would have had to

conclude that Petitioner did not really believe the patient had a sore throat on March

10, 2017, or a history of PTSD, or a long-standing cheerleading injury that left her

disabled, but prescribed these substances because he had sexual relations with her

anyway.

Petitioner would have had to believe she was lying about having any

condition that required medical attention on that date. There is no evidence to

support this far-fetched conclusion. Ruan, 597 U.S. at 467 (“And for purposes of a

This analysis also conflicts with another panel decision addressing Ruan error

in United States v. Smithers, 92 F.4th 237 (4th Cir. 2004): There the Court declared

that to determine whether jury-instruction errors were harmless, the Court asks

whether the “record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding

with respect to that omitted element.” U.S. v. Brown, 202 F.3d 691, 701 (2000)

(quoting Neder, supra). If “there is any evidence upon which a jury could have reached

a contrary finding, the error is not harmless… because…we cannot determine beyond

a reasonable doubt that the ‘jury verdict would have been the same absent the error.’”

Id. The Court then undertook to assess the additional evidence that was presented

below—that Smithers offered evidence as to the medical records, their complaints,

and the incidents that led to their pain. The Court found “[t]he defense provided

evidence that could rationally have led to a contrary finding on each of the unlawfuldistribution counts.” Smithers, 92 F. 4th at 251.

2

7

criminal conviction under §841, this requires proving that a defendant knew or

intended that his or her conduct was unauthorized.”)

II.

The Fourth Circuit’s Harmless Error Analysis Violates Neder v.

United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999).

The Fourth Circuit, in its opinion denying Petitioner relief on three counts,

cherry-picked facts to support its opinion while disregarding a trove of evidence

tending to prove Petitioner subjectively believed he was providing prescription

medications in the usual course of medical treatment. In holding the error here

harmless, the Fourth Circuit completely ignored that Petitioner offered a defense to

his mental state, the core issue in his case and in Ruan.

For example, the

government’s own witness testified to the legitimate medical need for the medications

prescribed to the patient. JA 164. Then, Petitioner’s own expert witness also testified

to those legitimate needs. JA 623, 628. Focusing solely on the sexual component of

Petitioner’s conduct while overlooking the multiple bases upon which a properly

instructed jury could have found in Petitioner’s favor, the Fourth Circuit has

rendered Neder a dead letter. See United States v. Kahn, 58 F.4th 1308 (10th Cir.

2023) (“This is not a case in which the element of the crime that was impacted by the

invalid jury instruction was “uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence,”

and where “the defendant ‘did not contest the element… at trial, and did not ‘suggest

he would introduce any evidence bearing upon the issue… if so allowed.” (United

States v. Ellis, 868 F.3d 1155, 1172 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 15,

17)).

This Court should not allow a circuit court of appeals to simply disregard a

recent opinion because it believes the facts of the case surrounding the dispensing of

8

the controlled substance (but not the dispensing of the controlled substance itself) to

be particularly egregious. See also United States v. Qureshi, 121 F.4th 1095 (5th Cir.

2024) (finding government did not carry its burden to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same without the error where the

defendant put forth evidence of defendant’s knowledge at trial).

Conclusion

This Court should grant the petition for writ of certiorari and summarily

reverse the court of appeals’ affirmance of Counts 1-3.

Respectfully submitted,

Elizabeth Franklin-Best

Elizabeth Franklin-Best, P.C.

3710 Landmark Drive, Suite 113

Columbia, South Carolina 29204

(803) 445-1333

elizabeth@franklinbestlaw.com

Counsel for Ronald P. Hargrave

December 19, 2024.

9

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4711

Doc: 46

Filed: 06/12/2024

Pg: 1 of 6

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4711

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RONALD P. HARGRAVE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at

Charleston. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (2:18-cr-00425-BHH-1)

Submitted: April 4, 2024

Decided: June 12, 2024

Before WYNN, HARRIS, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Elizabeth A. Franklin-Best, ELIZABETH FRANKLIN-BEST, P.C.,

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Adair F. Boroughs, United States Attorney,

Winston D. Holliday, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

`1a

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4711

Doc: 46

Filed: 06/12/2024

Pg: 2 of 6

PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Ronald P. Hargrave, a former physician, of seven counts of

unlawfully distributing a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(C).

On appeal, Hargrave challenges the district court’s jury instructions, the

sufficiency of the evidence, and the exclusion of one of his proposed witness’ testimony.

We affirm Hargrave’s convictions on Counts 1 through 3, vacate his convictions on Counts

4 through 7, and remand for further proceedings.

Hargrave relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S.

450 (2022), to argue that the district court’s jury instructions were erroneous because they

applied an objective, rather than subjective, standard to the requirement that Hargrave’s

actions were outside the scope of a professional medical practice. The Government argues

that Hargrave invited any error by proposing some of the language in the jury’s

instructions. Alternatively, the Government contends that plain-error review applies. We

disagree with the Government on invited error but agree on plain error.

Under the invited error doctrine, “a court can not be asked by counsel to take a step

in a case and later be convicted of error, because it has complied with such request.” United

States v. Herrera, 23 F.3d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). We

have applied the doctrine in the context of jury instructions. Id. at 76. However,

Hargrave’s “requested instructions ‘relied on settled law that changed while the case was

on appeal.’” United States v. Kumar, No. 20-4478, 2024 WL 1134035, at *2 (4th Cir. Mar.

15, 2024) (quoting United States v. Duldulao, 87 F.4th 1239, 1255 (11th Cir. 2023)). Thus,

2a

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4711

Doc: 46

Filed: 06/12/2024

Pg: 3 of 6

we will consider Hargrave’s challenge on the merits, employing plain-error review. See

Duldulao, 87 F.4th at 1257.

To succeed on plain-error review, Hargrave “has the burden to show that: (1) there

was error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial rights.” United

States v. Cowden, 882 F.3d 464, 475 (4th Cir. 2018). If Hargrave makes this showing, “we

may exercise our discretion to correct the error only if the error seriously affects the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (cleaned up). The

Government does not dispute the first two prongs of plain-error review are satisfied, and

in light of Ruan and our subsequent decision in United States v. Smithers, 92 F.4th 237 (4th

Cir. 2024), we agree they are. See United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 215

(4th Cir. 2014) (recognizing error is plain when it is “clear or obvious at the time of

appellate consideration” (cleaned up)); see also Duldulao, 87 F.4th at 1258 (“[A] district

court errs by instructing a jury to apply an objective standard to the usual course of

professional practice requirement, or failing to convey that a subjective analysis is

required.” (cleaned up)).

To establish the error affected his substantial rights, Hargrave has the “burden of

showing that the error actually affected the outcome of the proceedings.” United States v.

Nicolaou, 180 F.3d 565, 570 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other

words, Hargrave must “show that the proper instruction, on the same evidence, would have

resulted in acquittal, or at the very least a hung jury.” Id.

It is illegal to distribute or dispense a controlled substance “[e]xcept as authorized”

by law. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). In Ruan, the Supreme Court held that § 841’s “knowingly

3a

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4711

Doc: 46

Filed: 06/12/2024

Pg: 4 of 6

or intentionally” mens rea applies to the “[e]xcept as authorized” clause of the statute. 597

U.S. at 454, 468. Thus, when a defendant shows that he is authorized to issue prescriptions

for controlled substances, “the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.” Id. This is a

subjective, rather than objective, inquiry. United States v. Kim, 71 F.4th 155, 160, 164 (4th

Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 436 (2023). The Government cannot meet its burden by

proving that the physician lacked objective good faith in issuing the prescriptions. Ruan,

597 U.S. at 465.

On Counts 1 through 3, we do not believe the instructional error affected Hargrave’s

substantial rights. These counts related to his conduct with C.K., who testified that

Hargrave wrote her prescriptions for controlled substances and gave her cash in exchange

for sex. While Hargrave attacked C.K.’s credibility, two employees testified that they

observed the beginning of Hargrave’s encounter with C.K., confirming C.K.’s account. In

the face of substantial evidence of this quid-pro-quo relationship with C.K., Hargrave

cannot satisfy his burden to show that the jury would have acquitted him, or at least hung,

if it had been properly instructed. See Nicolaou, 180 F.3d at 570.

As for counts 4 through 7, which corresponded with prescriptions Hargrave issued

J.L., D.W., and M.F., those three individuals did not testify at trial. The Government

introduced an expert who testified that these prescriptions were not justified by Hargrave’s

written notes, but Hargrave called his own expert to testify that they were. While C.K.

testified that J.L. was a drug dealer and referred her to Hargrave, she was unsure if J.L.

called Hargrave on her behalf or if he simply provided Hargrave’s contact information, and

4a

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4711

Doc: 46

Filed: 06/12/2024

Pg: 5 of 6

there was no other evidence linking them to a conspiracy. And although a pharmacist

testified that she observed some questionable behavior between Hargrave and M.F. that

signified there may have been a sexual relationship between the two, Hargrave only treated

C.K. one time, three days after their sexual encounter, while Hargrave had an extended

physician-patient relationship with M.F., and he ordered an MRI that confirmed M.F. had

a nerve condition that caused pain.

Thus, on this record, we believe that a properly instructed jury could have at least

hung, Nicolaou, 180 F.3d at 570, and the “instructional error undermines our confidence

in the outcome of the trial,” Duldulao, 87 F.4th at 1261 (cleaned up). Accordingly, we

believe it prudent to exercise our discretion to correct the plain error and vacate Hargrave’s

convictions on Counts 4 through 7. In light of our decision to vacate, we need not address

Hargrave’s sufficiency challenge to those counts. See Smithers, 92 F.4th at 240. And for

the reasons stated above, we reject Hargrave’s sufficiency challenge on Counts 1 through

3.

Finally, Hargrave challenges the district court’s decision to exclude the testimony

of a pharmacist. We review the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. * See

United States v. Parker, 262 F.3d 415, 420 (4th Cir. 2001). “An error [in an evidentiary

In his brief, Hargrave conceded that this argument is reviewed for plain error.

However, “parties cannot waive the proper standard of review by failing to argue it or by

consenting to an incorrect standard.” United States v. Venable, 943 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir.

2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court excluded the testimony upon

motion of the Government, and Hargrave argued for allowing the witness to testify. Thus,

Hargrave preserved his argument below.

*

5a

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4711

Doc: 46

Filed: 06/12/2024

Pg: 6 of 6

ruling] is harmless if it’s highly probable that it did not affect the judgment.” United States

v. Caldwell, 7 F.4th 191, 204 (4th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). We conclude that any error was

harmless.

Hargrave presented testimony from a physician who opined that his

prescriptions were written for legitimate purposes. Moreover, Hargrave’s conduct with

C.K. was so beyond the pale that the pharmacist’s proposed testimony that others have

received similar prescriptions would not have swayed the jury.

Accordingly, we affirm Hargrave’s convictions on Counts 1 through 3, vacate his

remaining convictions, and remand for further proceedings.

We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED

6a

USCA4 Appeal:

22-4711

Doc: 47-2

06/12/2024

Pg: 1 of

1

2:18-cr-00425-BHH

Date FiledFiled:

10/02/24

Entry Number

165-1

Page Total

1 of 1Pages:(1 of 1)

FILED: June 12, 2024

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

___________________

No. 22-4711

(2:18-cr-00425-BHH-1)

___________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

RONALD P. HARGRAVE

Defendant - Appellant

___________________

JUDGMENT

___________________

In accordance with the decision of this court, the judgment of the district

court is affirmed in part and vacated in part. This case is remanded to the district

court for further proceedings consistent with the court's decision.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this court's mandate in

accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 41.

/s/ NWAMAKA ANOWI, CLERK

7a

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4711

Doc: 58

Filed: 09/24/2024

Pg: 1 of 1

FILED: September 24, 2024

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

___________________

No. 22-4711

(2:18-cr-00425-BHH-1)

___________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

RONALD P. HARGRAVE

Defendant - Appellant

___________________

ORDER

___________________

The court denies the petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. No judge

requested a poll under Fed. R. App. P. 35 on the petition for rehearing en banc.

Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge Wynn, Judge Harris, and Judge

Quattlebaum.

For the Court

/s/ Nwamaka Anowi, Clerk

8a