Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Cyrus Mark Sanai, Petitioner v. Melanie J. Lawrence, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 16, 2024

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TABLE OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Memorandum Decision of the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals.

APPENDIX B

Dismissal Order in Sanai v. Lawrence.

APPENDIX C

Order Denying Ex Parte Application for

Temporary Restraining Order in Sanai

v. Cardona.

APPENDIX D

Order Denying Motion for Injunction

Pending Appeal in Sanai v. Cardona.

APPENDIX E

Amended Order Dismissing Case in

Sanai v. Kruger.

APPENDIX F

Letter from the California Supreme

Court.

APPENDIX G

Order Denying Petition for Panel

Rehearing.

APPENDIX H

Order denying Motion to Recall Mandate

APPENDIX I

Relevant Statutes and Constitutional

Provisions

A-l

APPENDIX A

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FILED

JAN 30 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER,

CLERK

U.S. COURT OF

APPEALS

PEYMAN ROSHAN, an No. 21-15771

individual on behalf of

himself and others

D.C. No. 3:20-cv-04770AGT

similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

MEMORANDUM*

MELANIE J

LAWRENCE, in her

official capacity as

Chief Trial Counsel,

and in her personal

This disposition is not appropriate for publication

and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth

Circuit Rule 36-3.

A-2

capacity; OFFICE OF

CHIEF TRIAL

COUNSEL,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Alex G. Tse, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

CYRUS MARK SANA!,

Plaintiff-App ellant,

PlaintiffAppellant,

MELANIE J LAWRENCE,

sued in her individual and

official capacities;

CYNTHIA VALENZUELA,

sued in her individual and

official capacities; GEORGE

CARDONA, sued in his

individual and official

capacities; RICHARD A.

HONN, sued in his official

capacity; W. KEARSE

MCGILL, an individual

sued in his official capacity;

No. 22-56215

D.C. No. 2:21-cv07745-JFW-KES

A-3

DOES, 1 through 10,

inclusive,

DefendantsAppellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding

CYRUS MARK SANAI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Plaintiff-

No. 23-15618

D.C. No. 4:22-cv-01818JST

Appellant,

GEORGE CARDONA;

LEAH WILSON,

Defendants-Appellees.

Case: 21-15771, 01/30/2024, ID: 12854157, DktEntry:

123-1, Page 3 of 7

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding

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CYRUS MARK SANAI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Plaintiff-

No. 23-16104

D.C. No. 3:23-cv-01057AMO

Appellant,

LEONDRA KRUGER,

Judge; JOSHUA P.

GROBAN; MARTIN J.

JENKINS; KELLI M.

EVANS; CAROL A.

CORRIGAN; GOODWIN

H. LIU; PATRICIA

GUERRERO,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Araceli Martinez-Olguin, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted January 8, 2024

San Francisco, California

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Before: SILER,** TASHIMA, and BRESS, Circuit

Judges.

.'A

•3

Appellants Cyrus Sanai and Peyman Roshan

are California attorneys who, at relevant times, were

subject to California State Bar disciplinary

proceedings.1 They filed these four lawsuits under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against officials of the California State

Bar and the Justices of the California Supreme

Court, alleging that the California State Bar

disciplinary process is constitutionally defective. In

each case, appellants asked the district court to

enjoin State Bar proceedings. The district courts

concluded that Younger abstention applied. See

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). We review

dismissals on the basis of Younger abstention de

novo. Canatella u. California, 304 F.3d 843, 850 (9th

Cir. 2002). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§

1291 and 1292, and we affirm.

Younger and its progeny direct that

“[ajbsent ‘extraordinary circumstances,’ abstention in

favor of state judicial proceedings is required if the

state proceedings (1) are ongoing, (2) implicate

The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

The four above-captioned cases (three filed by the same plaintiff)

present nearly identical questions about the applicability of Younger

abstention to California State Bar proceedings. Having previously

consolidated these matters for oral argument, we now consolidate them

for all purposes.

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important state interests, and (3) provide the

plaintiff an adequate opportunity to litigate federal

claims.” Hirsh v. Justices of Supreme Ct. of Cal., 67

F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (citing

Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar

Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)); see generally

Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.

2004) (noting that the ‘Middlesex factors . . . guide

consideration of whether Younger extends to

noncriminal proceedings”). In addition, “[t]he

requested relief must seek to enjoin or have the

practical effect of enjoining—ongoing state

proceedings.” ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. u. State

Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citing AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d

1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)). If each of these

conditions is met, Younger abstention is appropriate

unless “there is a ‘showing of bad faith, harassment,

or some other extraordinary circumstance that would

make abstention inappropriate.”’ Arevalo v.

Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765-66 (9th Cir. 2018)

(quoting Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435).

As an initial matter, we reject appellants’

contention that our prior decision in Hirsh should not

apply to these cases. “[W]e are bound by circuit

precedent except ‘where the reasoning or theory of

our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable

with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher

authority.’” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1274

(9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d

889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). Appellants have

not identified intervening authority that is “clearly

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irreconcilable” with Hirsh, and so Hirsh still governs

here.

Applying Hirsh, we conclude that the district

courts properly abstained under Younger in each of

the four cases. Under Hirsh, for purposes of Younger

abstention, California State Bar proceedings are

judicial in nature and implicate important state

interests. Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 712, 713. In addition, like

the plaintiffs in Hirsh, Appellants asked federal

courts to enjoin their ongoing State Bar disciplinary

proceedings.2 Id. at 712.

-fr

On the third Middlesex factor, our precedents

indicate that attorneys subject to California State

Bar disciplinary matters have an adequate

opportunity to raise their federal constitutional

claims in the State Bar proceedings. Id. at 713; see

also Rosenthal u. Justices of the Supreme Ct. of Cal.,

910 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1990). Appellants raise several

2 In Sanai v. Cardona, No. 23-15618, Sanai filed his lawsuit before the

State Bar initiated the relevant disciplinary proceedings. Nevertheless, the

district court properly concluded that Younger abstention applied because

the state proceedings were “initiated ‘before any proceedings of substance

on the merits ha[d] taken place in federal court.’” Polykoff v. Collins, 816

F.2d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Hawaii Housing Auth. v.

Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238 (1984)); cf. Credit One Bank, N.A.v. Hestrin,

60 F.4th 1220, 1226 (9th Cir. 2023) (concluding that state proceedings

were ongoing for Younger purposes when “the only significant

proceeding that had occurred in the federal action” at the time the state

action was filed “was the denial of [a] motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction”).

A-8

arguments about the alleged insufficiency of the

State Bar process, each of which fails. Contrary to

appellants’ arguments, the California Supreme Court

follows In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968). See, e.g.,

Van Sloten u. State Bar, 771 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Cal.

1989). And even assuming that appellants are correct

that the State Bar owed some duty to provide

attorneys in disciplinary proceedings with

exculpatory material, appellants have not identified

any plausible violation of that obligation.

Appellants relatedly argue that the State Bar

proceedings provide an inadequate opportunity to

litigate because appellants are precluded from

raising claims of judicial bias or obtaining discovery

related to suspected bias, as allegedly allowed under

Bracy u. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1994) and Gacho v.

Wills, 986 F.3d 1067 (7th Cir. 2021). But in alleging

bias by State Bar officials and state judges in favor of

Thomas Girardi, appellants have not plausibly

explained the relationship between Girardi and their

State Bar proceedings. Appellants’ wholly conjectural

bias claims fail to “overcome [the] presumption of

honesty and integrity in those serving as

adjudicators.” Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 713 (quoting

Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir.

1992)).

Nor have appellants demonstrated that the

“extraordinary circumstances” exception for Younger

abstention should apply. See Arevalo, 882 F.3d at

765-66. Appellants have not demonstrated judicial

. bias in the State Bar proceedings. See Hirsch, 67

A-9

F.3d at 713—14. Nor have they demonstrated any

other “extraordinary circumstances” justifying an

exception to Younger.

In three of these cases, appellants argue

that the district courts erred by denying their post

judgment motions under Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 59 and 60(b). We review the district courts’

denial of these motions for abuse of discretion. See

Kaufmann v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 843, 847 (9th Cir.

2022) (Rule 59 motion standard of review); Flores u.

Rosen, 984 F.3d 720, 731 (9th Cir. 2020) (Rule 60(b)

motion standard oftreview).

.. v;

• ■ s.

Appellants’ arguments are based on their

mistaken view that the Supreme Court’s decisions in

Banister u. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698 (2020) and Kemp v.

United States, 142 S. Ct. 1856 (2022) abrogated our

precedent governing post-judgment motions under

Rules 59 and 60(b). That is not correct. The district

court applied the proper legal standards in denying

these motions, and appellants do not identify any

other basis for concluding that the district courts

abused their discretion in denying the motions.

We have reviewed appellants’ other

assignments of error and find them without merit.

Costs are taxed to appellants. The judgments of the

district courts are

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AFFIRMED in Case Nos. 21-15771, 2315619, and 23-16104, and AFFIRMED IN PART

AND DISMISED IN PART in Case No. 22-56215.3

In Sanai v. Lawrence, No. 22-56215, Sanai did not timely

appeal the district court’s dismissal of the case because he

filed his notice of appeal more than 30 days after the district

court entered judgment on that order. See Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(1)(A). The timely filing of a notice of appeal is

jurisdictional. Sanai’s motion for reconsideration under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) did not extend the time

for appeal of that order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l)(A)(vi),

because it was a successive motion for reconsideration and

the district court did not alter its judgment in response. See

. Wages v. IRS, 915 F.2d 1230, 1233 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990). In

Case No. 22-56215, we therefore dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction Sanai’s appeal of the district court’s orders

entered more than 30 days before Sanai filed his notice of

appeal on December 21, 2022. See Evans v. Synopsys, Inc.,

34 F.4th 762, 768 (9th Cir. 2022) (noting that the deadline for

filing an appeal is jurisdictional). This partial dismissal of the

appeal did not affect our ability to reach the underlying issues

because the Younger issues are also presented in Sanai’s

timely appeal of the district court’s denial of an injunction

pending appeal. As to the district court orders that Sanai has

timely appealed—those entered on November 28, 2022;

December 20, 2022; June 20, 2023; and August 21, 2023—

we affirm.

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'•

K-

B-l

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

CV 21-7745-JFW(KESx)

Case No.

Date: March 21, 2022

Title:

al.

Cyrus Sanai -v- Melanie Lawrence, et

PRESENT:

HONORABLE JOHN F. WALTER,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Shannon Reilly

Courtroom Deputy

None

Present

Court

Reporter

ATTORNEYS

PRESENT FOR

PLAINTIFFS:

None

ATTORNEYS

PRESENT FOR

DEFENDANTS:

None

PROCEEDINGS

ORDER DENYING AS

B-2

(IN

CHAMBERS):

MOOT PLAINTIFFS

MOTION FOR A

PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION [filed

2/7/22; Docket No. 38];

and

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS

MELANIE

LAWRENCE, JUDGE

CYNTHIA

VALENZUELA,

GEORGE CARDONA,

JUDGE W. KEARSE

McGILL, AND JUDGE

RICHARD HONN’S

NOTICE OF MOTION

AND MOTION TO

DISMISS FIRST

AMENDED

COMPLAINT [filed

2/22/22; Docket No. 47

On February 7, 2022, Plaintiff Cyrus Sanai

(“Plaintiff’) filed a Motion for Preliminary

Injunction.1 On February 14, 2022, Defendants

1 Plaintiff s Ex Parte Application to Serve Application

and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and

Preliminary Injunction by Email (Docket No. 21) is

DENIED as moot.

B-3

Melanie Lawrence (“Lawrence”), Judge Cynthia

Valenzuela (“Judge Valenzuela”), George Cardona

(“Cardona”), Judge W. Kearse McGill (“Judge

McGill”), and Judge Richard Honn (“Judge Honn”)

(collectively, “Defendants”) filed their Opposition. On

February 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Reply.2 On

February 22, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion to

Dismiss First Amended Complaint (“Motion to

Dismiss”). On March 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed his

Opposition.3 On March 14, 2022, Defendants filed a

Reply. Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7-15, the Court finds

that these matters are appropriate for decision

without oral argument. The hearing calendared for

March 28, 2022 is hereby vacated and the matters

taken off calendar. After considering the moving,

opposing, and reply papers, and the arguments

therein, the Court rules as follows:

Factual and Procedural Background

2 On March 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Amended

Reply.

3 On February 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte

Application to Strike and Deny on the Merits Motion

to Dismiss for Violation of Standing Order (Docket

No. 49), which is DENIED. Plaintiff also filed a

Preliminary Objection and Opposition on Procedural

Grounds Only to Motion to Dismiss on March 3,

2022.

B-4

Plaintiff is a licensed California attorney

defending charges brought against him in ongoing

disciplinary proceedings in the California State Bar

Court.

«-v

The State Bar of California (“State Bar”) is the

California state government agency responsible for

admission, regulation, and discipline of attorneys in

this state. The State Bar is a state constitutional

entity that serves as the administrative arm of the

California Supreme Court. Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 9;

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6000 et seq; see also In re

Rose, 22 Cal. 4th 430, 438 (Cal. 2000) (“The State Bar

is a constitutional entity, placed within the judicial

article of the California Constitution, and thus

expressly acknowledged as an integral part of the

judicial function”). Cardona is the Chief Trial

Counsel of the State Bar and, as a result, is the lead

official responsible for

the prosecution of attorneys within the State Bar

Court. In the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”),

Plaintiff does not plead any specific facts or any

specific allegations regarding Cardona. Lawrence

formerly served as Interim Chief Trial Counsel and

held that position during a portion of the time that

Plaintiffs disciplinary trial was proceeding. In the

FAC, Plaintiff alleges that Lawrence denied him

access to confidential disciplinary files. Judge

Valenzuela is the California State Bar Court Judge

presiding over Plaintiffs attorney disciplinary

B-5

proceedings. In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that Judge

Valenzuela was prejudiced against Plaintiff, based on

the fact that she recused herself in another matter

unrelated to Plaintiff, denied his requests for

discovery, and denied his motion for disclosure.

Judge McGill and Judge Honn are judges of the State

Bar Court Review Department. In the FAC, Plaintiff

alleges that Judge McGill and Judge Honn

“validated” Judge Valenzuela’s allegedly biased

conduct in Plaintiffs attorney disciplinary trial.

System

California’s Attorney Disciplinary

The State Bar Court hears attorney

disciplinary cases and makes recommendations of

discipline to the California Supreme Court. Cal. Bus.

& Prof. Code § 6070. The structure and process of

California’s attorney disciplinary system is described

by the California Supreme Court in case law as

follows:

The State Bar Court Hearing Department

(Hearing Department) conducts evidentiary

hearings on the merits in disciplinary matters.

An attorney charged with misconduct is

entitled to receive reasonable notice, to

conduct discovery, to have a reasonable

opportunity to defend against the charge by

the introduction of evidence, to be represented

by counsel, and to examine and cross-examine

witnesses. The Hearing

B-6

Department renders a written decision

recommending whether the attorney should be

disciplined.

Any disciplinary decision of the Hearing

Department is reviewable by the State Bar

Court Review Department (Review

Department) at the request of the attorney or

the State Bar. In such a review proceeding, the

matter is fully briefed, and the parties are

given an opportunity for oral argument. The

Review Department independently reviews the

record, files a written opinion, and may adopt

findings, conclusions, and a decision or

recommendation at variance with those of the

Hearing Department.

A recommendation of suspension or

disbarment, and the accompanying record, is

transmitted to [the California Supreme Court]

court after the State Bar Court's decision

becomes final.

In re Rose, 22 Cal. 4th at 439 (internal citations

omitted).

The State Bar Court Proceedings

Against Plaintiff

On January 7, 2014, the State Bar Office of

Chief Trial Counsel filed a Notice of Disciplinary

Charges in State Bar Court, charging Plaintiff with

nine counts of professional misconduct. See Notice of

Disciplinary Charges (Exh. 1 to Defendants’ Request

for Judicial Notice (“RJN”)) and State Bar Court

B-7

Docket (Exh. 2 to Defendants’ RJN).4 On August 13,

2021, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Disclose,” seeking

discovery from Judge Valenzuela relating to her

alleged bias. See Motion to Disclose (Exh. 3 to

Defendants’ RJN). On September 20, 2021, Judge

Valenzuela denied the Motion to Disclose. See State

Bar Court Order (Exh. 4 to Defendants’ RJN). On

September 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed a petition for

review of the denial of the Motion to Disclose in the

California Supreme Court, which was promptly

denied on September 29, 2021. See California

Supreme Court Order (Exh. 5 to Defendants’ RJN).

Plaintiffs State Bar Court proceedings are

ongoing, and are currently in the post-trial briefing

stage. See State Bar Court Docket. Plaintiff continues

to file papers with the State Bar Court, and the State

Bar Court has not yet made a final decision as to

whether to recommend to the California Supreme

Court that Plaintiff be disciplined in the underlying

matter. Id. If the State Bar Court issues a final

4 Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support

of Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint

(Docket No. 48), which is unopposed, is GRANTED.

U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v.

Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992)

(holding that courts “may take notice of proceedings

in other courts, both within and without the federal

judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct

relation to matters at issue”).

B-8

recommendation of discipline, Plaintiff will be able to

seek review of that recommendation in the California

Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 9.13 of the

California Rules of Court.

D. Procedural History

On September 29, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint

against Lawrence, Judge Valenzuela, and Cardona.

On February 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed his FAC, which

added Judge McGill and Judge Honn as defendants,

and which alleges causes of action for: (1) violation of

Plaintiffs rights to an impartial tribunal and

discovery based on alleged judicial bias pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) a constitutional violation under

Ex Parte ■

Young; and (3) declaratory judgment. In his FAC,

Plaintiff seeks to have this Court enjoin the ongoing

California State Bar Court proceedings against him

because Plaintiff has allegedly been denied due

process, based on his belief that Judge Valenzuela is

biased against him and that the California Supreme

Court has denied Plaintiffs appeal of Judge

Valenzuela’s order denying Plaintiffs request to

obtain discovery from Judge Valenzuela.

II.

Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(1)

The party mounting a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge

to the Court’s jurisdiction may do so either on the

face of the pleadings or by presenting extrinsic

B-9

evidence for the Court’s consideration. See White v.

Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Rule

12(b)(1) jurisdictional attacks can be either facial or

factual”). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts

that the allegations contained in a complaint are

insufficient on their face to invoke federal

jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d

1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In ruling on a.Rule .

12(b)(1) motion attacking the complaint on its face,

the Court accepts the allegations of the complaint as

true. See, e'.g., Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362

(9th Cir. 2004). “By contrast, in a factual attack, the

challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that,

by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal

jurisdiction.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. “With a

factual Rule 12(b)(1) attack . . . a court may look

beyond the complaint to matters of public record

without having to convert the motion into one for

summary judgment. It also need not presume the

truthfulness of the plaintiff[‘s] allegations.” White,

227 F.3d at 1242 (internal citation omitted); see also

Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. General Tel & Electronics

Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Where the

jurisdictional issue is separable from the merits of

the case, the judge may consider the evidence

presented with respect to the jurisdictional issue and

rule on that issue, resolving factual disputes if

necessary. . . ‘[N]o presumptive truthfulness attaches

to plaintiffs allegations, and the existence of

disputed material facts will not preclude the trial

court from evaluating for itself the merits of

jurisdictional claims.’”) (quoting Mortensen v. First

Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (9th Cir.

B-10

1977)). “However, where the jurisdictional issue and

substantive issues are so intertwined that the

question of jurisdiction is dependent on the

resolution of factual issues going to the merits, the

jurisdictional determination should await a

determination of the relevant facts on either a motion

going to the merits or at trial.” Augustine v. U.S., 704

F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983). It is the plaintiff who

bears the burden of demonstrating that the Court

has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the action. See

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375,

377 (1994); Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes,

873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).

Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the

legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the

complaint. “A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only

where there is either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal

theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged

under a cognizable legal theory.’” Summit

Technology, Inc. v. High-Line Medical Instruments

Co., nc., 922 F. Supp. 299, 304 (C.D. Cal. 1996)

(quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). However, “[wjhile a

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a

plaintiff s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his

‘entitlement to relief requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(internal citations and alterations omitted).

“[F] actual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must

accept as true the allegations of the complaint and

must construe those allegations in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Wyler

Summit Partnership v. Turner Broadcasting System,

Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998). “However, a

court need not accept as true unreasonable

inferences, unwarranted deductions of fact, or

conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of

factual allegations.” Summit Technology, 922 F.

Supp. at 304 (citing Western Mining Council u. Watt,

643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981) cert, denied, 454

U.S. 1031 (1981)).

“Generally, a district court may not consider

any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. u.

Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th

Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). However, a court may

consider material which is properly submitted as

part of the complaint and matters which may be

judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of

Evidence 201 without converting the motion to

dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See,

e.g., id.; Branch v. Tunnel, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.

1994).

B-12

Where a motion to dismiss is granted, a

district court must decide whether to grant leave to

amend. Generally, the Ninth Circuit has a liberal

policy favoring amendments and, thus, leave to

amend should be freely granted. See, e.g., DeSoto u.

Yellow Freight System, Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th

Cir. 1992). However, a Court does not need to grant

leave to amend in cases where the Court determines

that permitting a plaintiff to amend would be an

exercise in futility. See, e.g., Rutman Wine Co. v. E. &

J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987)

(“Denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of

discretion where the pleadings before the court

demonstrate that further amendment would be

futile.”).

7 ■ •

III.

&■

A ;

Discussion

In their Motion, Defendants argue that

Plaintiff s FAC should be dismissed on the grounds

that: (1) the FAC is barred by the Younger abstention

doctrine; and (2) the FAC fails to allege sufficient

facts to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. In his Opposition, Plaintiff argues that

Younger abstention does not apply because: (1) he is

barred from litigating his federal constitutional

issues in the State Bar Court proceedings; (2) he

cannot present the evidence he wants in the State

Bar Court proceedings; (3) he is alleging actual bias

against Judge Valenzuela, which is an “exceptional

circumstances” exception to Younger, and (4) the

disparate treatment of respondents in State Bar

B-13

Court disciplinary proceedings constitutes bad faith

harassment.

Legal Standard Governing Abstention

Under Younger

Under the doctrine first articulated in Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal courts must

abstain from hearing cases that would interfere with

pending state court proceedings that implicate

important state interests. The doctrine is justified by

considerations of comity. As the Supreme Court held

in Younger, comity requires “a proper respect for

state functions, a recognition of the fact that the

entire country is made up of a Union of separate

state governments, and a continuance of the belief

that the National Government will fare best if the

States and their institutions are left free to perform

their separate functions in their separate ways.” Id.

at 44. As a result, federal courts must abstain from

exercising jurisdiction where four requirements are

met: (1) the state-initiated proceeding is ongoing; (2)

the proceeding implicates important state interests;

(3) the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating

federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding;

and (4) the federal court action would enjoin the

proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so. Id.

In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held “that Younger

principles apply to actions at law as well as for

injunctive or declaratory relief.” Gilbertson u.

Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 968 (9^ Cir. 2004) (holding

that “a determination that the federal plaintiffs

constitutional rights have been violated would have

B-14

the same practical effect as a declaration or

injunction on pending state proceedings”).

{

-:-

:*<

The Supreme Court has held that Younger applies

specifically to state attorney disciplinary proceedings.

Middlesex County Ethics Comm. u. Garden State Bar

Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (“The State ... has

an extremely important interest in maintaining and

assuring the professional conduct of the attorneys it

licenses”). In addition, the Ninth Circuit held that

the Younger abstention doctrine applies to California

State Bar attorney disciplinary proceedings. See

Hirsch v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 67 F.3d 708,

712-13 (9^ Cir. 1995) (holding that each of the four

Younger factors are met in California State Bar

proceedings); see also Canatella v. State of Cal., 404

F.3d 1106, 1109-12 (9^ Cir. 2005) (holding that the

attorney’s “claim that the state bar statutes are

patently unconstitutional also does not, by itself,

support an extraordinary circumstances exception to

Younger abstention”).

Application of Younger to the Facts

of this Case

First Threshold Requirement

In this case, the Court concludes that the first

threshold requirement to Younger abstention - an

ongoing state court proceeding - is easily satisfied

because it is undisputed that the State Bar Court

proceedings against Plaintiff are ongoing. Beltran v.

B-15

State of Cal., 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1988)

(holding that State Bar Court proceedings are .

“ongoing” if the proceedings are pending at the time

the federal action was filed).

Second Threshold Requirement

With respect to the second threshold requirement,

the Court must consider if the state court

proceedings implicate important state interests. As

the Ninth Circuit has held, this requirement

measures “[t]he importance of the [state’s] interest. .

. by considering its significance broadly, rather than

by focusing on the state’s interest in the resolution of

an individual case.” AmerisourceBergen, 495 F.3d at

1150 (“The goal of Younger abstention is to avoid

federal court interference with uniquely state

interests such as preservation of these states'

peculiar statutes, schemes, and procedures. [The

defendant] cites no case, nor could he, holding that

federal courts should abstain in favor of state courts

when a universal judicial interest - such as the

prompt resolution of cases - is at stake”). In this

case, the Court concludes that the second threshold

requirement is easily satisfied because the Supreme

Court has expressly held that states have “an

extremely important interest in maintaining and

assuring the professional conduct of the attorneys it

licenses.” Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 434; see also Hirsch,

67 F.3d at 712 (“California’s attorney disciplinary

proceedings.implicate important state interests”).

Third Threshold Requirement

B-16

With respect to the third threshold

requirement, the Court must consider whether the

State Bar Court proceedings provide Plaintiff with an

adequate opportunity to litigate his federal claims.

However, as the Supreme Court has held, to satisfy

the third requirement of Younger abstention, a party

“need be accorded only an opportunity to pursue their

constitutional claims in the ongoing state

proceedings . . . and their failure to avail themselves

of such opportunities does not mean that the state

procedures were inadequate.” Moore v. Sims, 442

U.S. 415, 431 n. 12 (1979).

Thus, for purposes of Younger abstention, federal

courts “must assume that state procedures afford an

adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous

authority to the contrary.” Baffert v. Cal. Horse

Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 619 (9th Cir. 2003); see

also Hirsh, 67 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1995)

(“Refusing to abstain would require presuming that

the California Supreme Court will not adequately

safeguard federal constitutional rights, a

presumption the U.S. Supreme Court squarely

rejected in Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431").

In addition, Plaintiff has the opportunity to

raise his purported constitutional challenges when

the outcome of his State Bar Court proceedings is

reviewed by the California Supreme Court, and the

Ninth Circuit has held that this opportunity satisfies

the third threshold requirement of Younger

abstention. Hirsch, 67 F.3d at 713. Specifically, the

Ninth Circuit in Hirsch held that:

B-17

The California Constitution precludes the Bar

Court from considering federal constitutional claims.

See Calif. Const. Art. Ill, § 3.5. However, such claims

may be raised in judicial review of the Bar Court’s

decision. This opportunity satisfies the third

requirement of Younger. Id.; see also Kay v. State Bar

of California, 2009 WL 1456433 (N.D. Cal. May 21,

2009) (holding that federal constitutional claims

“may be raised in judicial review of the Bar Court’s

decision. Thus, the State Bar’s procedures are fully

consistent with federal due process”); Dickstein u.

State Bar of California, 2012 WL 6553973 (N.D. Cal.

Dec. 14, 2012) (holding that “as explained in Hirsch,

Dickstein may raise his federal claims by seeking

from the California Supreme Court judicial review of

any adverse decision by the Bar Court”).

Moreover, despite Plaintiffs argument to the

contrary, California case law, including People u.

Guerra, 37 Cal. 4^ 1067 (2006), does not prohibit a

party from entering “a trial court’s rulings or in-court

statements as evidence to prove bias.” FAC, 1j 19.

Although the California Supreme Court in Guerra

held that “a trial court’s numerous rulings against a

party — even when erroneous - do not establish a

charge of judicial bias, especially when they are

subject to review,” it did not hold that a party is

prohibited from presenting such evidence. Guerra, 37

Cal. 4^ at 1112. Indeed, in Guerra, the defendant

introduced, and the court considered, the trial judge’s

statements and prior rulings. Id.

B-18

VV'i

In this case, as Plaintiff acknowledges in his

Opposition, he “sought to force disclosure [of Judge

Valenzuela’s alleged bias against him] by motion all

the way up to the California Supreme Court”

(Opposition, 21:25-26), and Plaintiff will have

another opportunity to raise these claims in the

California Supreme Court if the State Bar Court

recommends discipline in the underlying

proceedings. Although the California Supreme Court

concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to the

discovery that he sought in his disciplinary

proceedings, the mere fact that Plaintiff disagrees

with the California Supreme Court’s decision does

not overcome the presumption that “California’s

attorney disciplinary proceedings provide [attorneys]

with an adequate opportunity to litigate [their]

federal constitutional rights. Canatella, 404 F.3d at

1111; see also Dubinka v. Judges of Sup. Ct. Of State

of Cal. For County of Los Angeles, 23 F.3d 218, 22425 (9^ Cir. 1994) (holding that “when federal

plaintiffs are permitted to raise their challenge in the

state proceedings, the fact that the state supreme

court has previously rejected an identical argument

does not make Younger abstention inappropriate”).

Therefore, the Court concludes that the third

threshold requirement is easily satisfied.

Fourth Threshold Requirement

Finally, the Court concludes that the fourth

requirement - that this action would enjoin the State

Bar Court proceedings or have the practical effect of

B-19

doing so — is easily satisfied because Plaintiff is

seeking injunctive relief “against conducting the

remainder of his state bar court proceedings until the

facts necessary to determine the nature and scope of

bias that applies to him” are discovered. FAC, f 47.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that all of the

threshold requirements for Younger abstention are

easily met in this case.

Plaintiffs Purported Exceptions to

Younger Do Not Apply

The Court also concludes that Plaintiff has

failed to plead facts demonstrating that an exception

to Younger abstention applies in this case. For

example, in his FAC, Plaintiff alleges, relying on

Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), that

Younger does not apply because he has raised an

issue “that relates to [the] question of whether the

State Bar is biased in the constitutional sense.” FAC,

H 43. In Gibson, the Supreme Court found that

where, due to pervasive bias-in-fact, an

administrative board is incompetent to adjudicate a

matter, a district court does not need to abstain from

fashioning appropriate judicial relief. Id. at 577.

Specifically, in Gibson, optometrists sought to enjoin

hearings before the Board of Optometry involving

charges based on their employment by a corporation.

Id. The district court concluded it was not required to

abstain under Younger because the district court had

made factual findings that the Board’s bias rendered

it incompetent to adjudicate the issues. Id. The

B-20

iy ' ■ ■

!' •

district court’s findings included: (1) that the board

acted as prosecutor and judge and had previously

brought charges against the plaintiffs, indicating

that the board may have preconceived opinions; (2)

that the board, comprised of private practitioners,

had a pecuniary interest in the suspension of the

corporation for which the charged optometrists

worked; and (3) that optometrists such as the

plaintiffs were excluded from membership on the

Board. Id. at 571. As a result, the district court

concluded that “the administrative process was so

defective and inadequate as to deprive the plaintiffs

of due process of law.” Id. at 570. The Supreme Court

agreed that the administrative process was an

“exceptional circumstance that established an

exception to Younger.” Flangas u. State Bar of

Nevada, 655 F.2d 946, 949-950 (9th Cir. 1981)

(finding district court had abused its discretion in

enjoining disciplinary proceedings where there was

no showing of exceptional circumstances warranting

exception to Younger).

In this case, Plaintiff fails to plead any facts

that even suggest that the State Bar Court

proceedings are so defective and inadequate that

there is the slightest possibility that Plaintiff would

be deprived of his due process rights. Instead,

Plaintiff merely pleads conclusory allegations. For

example, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Valenzuela had

“some sort of relationship” with a disciplinary

respondent unrelated to Plaintiffs underlying

disciplinary proceedings and that the relationship is

“such that she is hostile against any respondent who

B-21

claims that improper judge and lawyer relationships

are valid defenses in state bar disciplinary cases. See,

e.g., FAC,

27 and 38. Plaintiff also alleges in

conclusory fashion that Defendants have denied him

access to “his file and the files of’ other respondents,

which he alleges contain unidentified information

relevant to the issue of his right to an impartial

tribunal. FAC, 43. Therefore, the Court concludes

that the “exceptional circumstance” exception does

not save Plaintiff s claims.'.

Plaintiff has also alleged that Younger

abstention does not apply in this case because of the

“bad faith harassment” exception based on the

purported disparate treatment of respondents in

State Bar disciplinary proceedings. In the Younger

abstention context, bad faith “generally means that a

prosecution has been brought without a reasonable

expectation of obtaining a valid conviction” (Kugler v.

Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 126 n. 6 (1975)), and requires

“evidence of bad faith, such as bias against Plaintiff,

or of a harassing motive.” Baffert v. California Horse

Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 621 (9th Cir. 2003). In this

case, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that the

State Bar pursued disciplinary charges against

Plaintiff without reasonable expectation of success,

or solely to harass him. In the absence of any such

facts, “no exception to the application of Younger

abstention is warranted.” Beffert, 332.F.3d at 621.

Therefore, this exception does not save Plaintiffs

claims.

B-22

Accordingly, because the threshold

requirements for Younger abstention have been met

and there is no exception to Younger abstention that

can save Plaintiffs claims, the Court concludes that

Younger abstention is appropriate in this case and

that Younger abstention “requires dismissal of the

federal action.” Beltran, 871 F.2d at 782; see also

Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 981 (holding that “[w]hen an

injunction is sought, and Younger applies, it makes

sense to abstain, that is, to refrain from exercising

jurisdiction, permanently by dismissing the federal

action because the federal court is only being asked

to stop the state proceeding”).

ft'

Leave to Amend Would Be Futile

The Ninth Circuit has instructed that “a

district court should grant leave to amend even if no

request to amend the pleading was made, unless it

determines that the pleading could not possibly be

cured by the allegation of other facts.” See, e.g., Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497

(9th Cir. 1995)). However, “[a] district court may

dismiss a complaint without leave to amend if

amendment would be futile.” Airs Aromatics, LLC v.

Opinion Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc.,

744 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and

quotation marks omitted); Gardner u. Martino, 563

F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of

discretion in denying leave to amend when

amendment would be futile); Rutman Wine Co. v. E.

& J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987)

B-23

("Denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of

discretion where the pleadings before the court

demonstrate that further amendment would be

futile").

The Court concludes that this is a case where

it would be futile and, thus, unnecessary to provide

Plaintiff yet another opportunity to amend. See, e.g.,

Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int'l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1087-88

(9th Cir. 2002) (“The basic underlying facts have

been alleged by plaintiffs and have been analyzed by

the district court and us. We conclude that the

plaintiffs cannot cure the basic flaw in their pleading.

Because any amendment would be futile, there is no

need to prolong the litigation by permitting further

amendment”); Lipton u. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d

1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Because any amendment

would be futile, there was no need to prolong the

litigation by permitting further amendment”);

Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass 'n u. Klamath

Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir.

1983) (holding that “futile amendments should not be

permitted”). The Court has concluded that Younger

abstention clearly applies to this case, and Plaintiff

has had two opportunities to allege an exception to

Younger abstention and has failed to do so.

IV.

Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs FAC is

DISMISSED without leave to amend, and this

action is DISMISSED without prejudice.

B-24

Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction is

DENIED as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

’■

'i .

■ fy

C-l

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CYRUS SANAI,

Plaintiff,

GEORGE CARDONA,

et al.,

Case No. 22-cv-01818-JST

ORDER DENYING EX

PARTE APPLICATION

FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER

Re: ECF No. 52

Defendants.

Before the Court is Plaintiff Cyrus Sanai’s

application for a temporary restraining order against

Defendants George Cardona and Leah Wilson. ECF

No. 52. The Court will deny the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, an attorney admitted to practice in

California, initiated this action for declaratory and

Ai'A

C-2

injunctive relief in March 2022. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff

generally alleges various constitutional deficiencies

in California’s rules and procedures for attorney

discipline. Defendant Cardona is the State Bar Chief

Trial Counsel, while Defendant Wilson is the State

Bar Executive Director. Defendants moved to dismiss

the original complaint, ECF No. 14, and Plaintiff

subsequently filed the operative First Amended

Complaint, ECF No. 28. Defendants then filed

another motion to dismiss, ECF No. 30, now pending

before the Court.

{

Plaintiff is the subject of a pending State Bar

disciplinary proceeding. ECF No. 52-1 ]f 6 (“I was the

subject of one of these out-of-control prosecutions, in

which eight of the ninth [sic] charges were dismissed

when the Defendants rested; he [sic] is still fighting

the other charge in state and federal court.”); accord

ECF No. 30 at 8-9. On March 22, 2022, Plaintiff

received a letter from the State Bar notifying him

that it planned to file a new Notice of Disciplinary

Charges (“NDC”). ECF No. 28 t 30. The filing of an

NDC initiates an attorney disciplinary action in

California. See Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of

California, Rule 41(A) (“A notice of disciplinary

charges is the initial pleading in a disciplinary

proceeding.”); Canatella v. State of California, 304

F.3d 843, 851-52 (finding that a state bar disciplinary

action is not “ongoing” for the purposes of abstention

under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), until an

NDC has been issued).

On January 3, 2023, the State Bar notified

Plaintiff of his right to an Early Neutral Evaluation

C-3

Conference, which was scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on

February 21, 2023. ECF No. 52-1 ^ 6. On February

14, Plaintiff received a copy of the draft NDC the

State intended to file. Id. t 7. On February 17,

Plaintiff filed the instant application for a temporary

restraining order to issue by noon on February 21,

2023.1 ECF No. 52. Plaintiff asks this Court to enjoin

Defendants from “taking any action to advance the

disciplinary matter or matters docketed as 17-0-0572

and 20-0- 14956 or any other disciplinary action

based on the same or similar facts,”, including filing

an NDC. Id. at 2. Plaintiff thus asks this Court to

enjoin the State Bar from pursuing disciplinary

action against him.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy

that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that

the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat.

Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2009). A plaintiff

seeking a temporary restraining order or preliminary

injunction “must establish that he is likely to succeed

on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable

harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the

1 Plaintiffs amended reply requests relief by 8 a.m. “tomorrow,

February 2, 2023, as that is the date that the State Bar has

stated it will file the Notice of Disciplinary charges.” ECF No.

56 at 3. Because the amended reply was filed on February 21,

2023, the Court presumes that Plaintiff intended to refer to

February 22 as the NDC filing date. Plaintiffs amended reply,

id., otherwise appears identical to his first reply, ECF No. 54.

C-4

S’

1•¥

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an

injunction is in the public interest.” Am. Trucking

Ass’ns, Inc. u. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046,

1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20).

To grant preliminary injunctive relief, a court must

find that “a certain threshold showing [has been]

made on each factor.” Leiva-Perez u. Holder, 640 F.3d

962, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). The plaintiff

must demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely,

not merely possible, in the absence of injunctive

relief. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. Assuming that this

threshold has been met, ‘“serious questions going to

the merits’ and a balance of hardships that tips

sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of

[preliminary injunctive relief], so long as the plaintiff

also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable

injury and that the injunction is in the public

interest.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632

F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).

III. DISCUSSION

Having reviewed Plaintiffs motion and

complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to

make the necessary threshold showing on three of

the four factors, such that the Court cannot grant

injunctive relief.

Plaintiff argues that, absent injunctive relief,

he will be subjected to unconstitutional attorney

disciplinary procedures. The Ninth Circuit has

recognized that “[a]n alleged constitutional

infringement will often alone constitute irreparable

harm.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v.

C-5

Coal, for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1412 (9th Cir.

1991). The complaint raises facial challenges to the

State Bar’s rules, policies, and practices, many of

which Plaintiff alleges violate attorneys’ rights under

the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment.2 The vast majority of

Plaintiffs complaint is devoted to procedural due

process claims, including lack of notice. In his

application for injunctive relief, Plaintiff does not

suggest the filing of an NDC - the immediate action

he seeks to enjoin - would amount to a constitutional

injury. Assuming for the sake of argument that the

State Bar rules, as written, permit pleadings which

fall short of the constitutional standard, Plaintiff

2 While the complaint cites the First Amendment,

Plaintiff does not explain how any of the rules he

challenges violate the First Amendment. The sole

allegation that directly addresses the First

Amendment seeks “[a] declaratory judgment that all

State Court proceedings and all appellate

proceedings arising out of State Bar Court

proceedings are violations of the First Amendment. .

. and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process

protections because a party may not utilize the

statements and actions of a State Bar Court

[H]earing [Djepartment judge or Review Department

judge or Justice of the California Supreme Court to

obtain disqualification of such judge or justice.” ECF

No. 28 at 21. Plaintiff does not further articulate how

the described rule violates the First Amendment

rights of individuals subject to such proceedings.

C-6

does not suggest he is likely to be subject to a

constitutionally deficient pleading. In short,

Plaintiff has failed to show that, absent this Court’s

intervention, irreparable harm is likely, rather than

merely possible. Plaintiff also does not show that the

balance of equities “tips sharply” in his favor. All. for

the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135. In determining

whether plaintiff has met this burden, courts must

consider “the interests of all parties and weigh the

damage to each.” L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v.

Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th

Cir.1980). Plaintiff asserts that he “will suffer

irreparable injury from violation of constitutional

rights [] and the expenditure of time and resources to

defend himself.” ECF No. 52 at 20. However, as

discussed above, Plaintiff does not show that he is

likely to suffer any constitutional injury absent

injunctive relief, and the Court is not persuaded that

Plaintiff s time and costs outweigh Defendants’

interest in this matter. As the Supreme Court has

observed, “[t]he State . . . has an extremely important

interest in maintaining and assuring the professional

conduct of the attorneys it licenses.” Middlesex Cnty.

Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S.

423, 434 (1982). The Court does not find that the

balance of equities tips sharply in Plaintiffs favor.

Plaintiff additionally does not show that an

injunction would be in the public interest. Plaintiffs

argument regarding this factor consists entirely of

discussion of the State Bar’s failure to investigate

Tom Girardi, an issue of no relevance to Plaintiffs

application to enjoin the State Bar from disciplining

Plaintiff. Plaintiff particularly seeks to enjoin

C-7

Defendants from filing an NDC, which will reveal to

the public the nature of the allegations against

Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not address how enjoining his

own disciplinary proceeding would further the public

interest. To the contrary, the Court finds that, in this'

instance, denying injunctive relief would further the

public’s recognized interest in regulating attorney

conduct. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 434 (“The

judiciary as well as the public is dependent upon

professionally ethical conduct of attorneys and thus

has a significant interest in assuring and

maintaining high standards of conduct of attorneys

engaged in practice.”).

Absent a threshold showing on each factor, the

Court cannot grant the extraordinary remedy of

injunctive relief. Accordingly, Plaintiffs application

for injunctive relief is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2023

JON S. TIGAR

United States

District Judge

D-l

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CYRUS SANAI,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 22-cv-01818-JST

ORDER DENYING

MOTION FOR

INJUNCTION

PENDING APPEAL

GEORGE CARDONA, et

al.,

Re: ECF No. 81

. Defendants.

Before the Court is Plaintiff Cyrus Sanai’s

motion seeking the entry of a temporary restraining

order and issuance of an order to show cause why an

injunction pending appeal should not issue. ECF No.

81. The Court will deny the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

D-2

Sanai, a California lawyer, initiated this action

for declaratory and injunctive relief against

Defendants George Cardona, the State Bar Chief

Trial Counsel, and Leah Wilson, the State Bar

Executive Director, in March 2022, shortly after

receiving a letter notifying him that the State Bar

would initiate disciplinary proceedings against him.

ECF No. 1; ECF No. 28 \ 30; ECF No. 77 U 30. Sanai

is now the subject of a pending State Bar disciplinary

proceeding; the Notice of Disciplinary Charges

(“NDC”), which initiates the proceeding, was filed on

February 23, 2023. See ECF No. 81-7 at 4; Rules of

Procedure of the State Bar of California, Rule

5.351(A) (“A proceeding begins when a notice of

disciplinary charges is filed and served on the

attorney.”).

Before the NDC was filed—but after he had

received a copy of the draft NDC—Sanai filed an

application for a temporary restraining order and

request for an order to show cause why a preliminary

injunction should not issue to prevent Defendants

from “taking any action to advance the disciplinary

matter or matters docketed as 17-0-0572 and 20-014956 or any other disciplinary action based on the

same or similar facts,” including by filing the NDC.

ECF No. 52. On February 22, 2023, the Court denied

the application. ECF No. 58.

Sanai filed a notice of appeal of the Court’s

February 22 order and a motion for leave to file a

motion for reconsideration. ECF Nos. 68, 69. The

Court denied leave to file a motion for

reconsideration, concluding that the notice of appeal

D-3

divested it of jurisdiction to reconsider its February

22 order. ECF No. 75.

Sanai now requests that the Court issue a

temporary restraining order and an order to show

cause why Defendants should not be enjoined from

“taking any action to advance the disciplinary matter

or matters docketed as 17-0-0572 and 20-0-14956 or

any other disciplinary action based on the same or

similar facts pending appeal of the Court’s denial of a

motion for preliminary injunction.” ECF No. 81 at 2.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“The standard for evaluating an injunction

pending appeal is similar to that employed by district

courts in deciding whether to grant a preliminary

injunction.” Feldman v. Ariz. Secy of State’s Off., 843

F.3d 366, 367 (9th Cir. 2016). “[Pjlaintiffs must make

a ‘threshold showing’ of four factors.” E. Bay

Sanctuary Covenant v. Garland, 994 F.3d 962, 975

(9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640

F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)). They

must “demonstrate!] that they are likely to succeed

on the merits, that they are likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,

that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and

that an injunction is in the public interest.” S. Bay

United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 959 F.3d 938,

939 (9th Cir. 2020). The Ninth Circuit also permits

an alternative balancing test, under which ‘“serious

questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance

that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support

issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two

D-4

elements are also met.” All. for the Wild Rockies v.

Cottrell, 532 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir; 2011).

III. DISCUSSION

Reviewing the motion and the Court’s

February 22 order, the Court concludes that Sanai is

unlikely to succeed on appeal because Younger

abstention applies to this action.

The abstention doctrine first articulated in

Younger u. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), reflects the

“strong federal policy against federal-court

interference with pending state judicial proceedings

absent extraordinary circumstances.” Middlesex

Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457

U.S. 423, 431 (1982). “Younger abstention may be

raised sua sponte at any point in the appellate

process.” H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610,

613 (9th Cir. 2000). “Absent ‘extraordinary

circumstances,’ abstention in favor of state judicial

proceedings is required if the state proceedings (1)

are ongoing, (2) implicate important state interests,

and (3) provide the plaintiff an adequate opportunity

to litigate federal claims.” Hirsh u. Justs, of Sup. Ct.

of State of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1995).

Sanai’s attorney discipline proceeding is an

ongoing state judicial proceeding. “California’s

attorney discipline proceedings are ‘judicial in

character’ for purposes of Younger abstention.”

Canatella u. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir.

2005) (quoting Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 712). “Younger

abstention is required . . . when state court

D-5

V ,

proceedings are initiated ‘before any proceedings of

substance on the merits have taken place in federal

court.’” Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,

238 (1984) (quoting Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,

349 (1975)). While “[a] federal proceeding may be

deemed to have passed beyond the ‘embryonic stage’

if the federal court has conducted extensive hearings

on a motion for a preliminary injunction or granted

such a motion,” the “denial of a temporary

restraining order is not considered a proceeding of

substance on the merits.” Polykoffv. Collins, 816

F.2d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal citations

omitted). Though this case was filed a year ago, no

proceedings of substance on the merits have yet

taken place. Other than its February 22 order

denying a temporary restraining order, the Court has

not issued any substantive orders in this case.1

Because the NDC was filed prior to proceedings of

substance on the merits in this case, the attorney

discipline proceeding is an ongoing state judicial

proceeding under Younger.

Attorney discipline proceedings implicate

important state interests. Canatella, 404 F.3d at

1110-11 (“[The Ninth Circuit] ha[s] clearly stated

that ‘California’s attorney discipline proceedings

implicate important state interests.’” (quoting Hirsh,

67 F.3d at 712)); Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 434 (holding

that the state “has an extremely important interest

1 The Court has not even had the opportunity to evaluate the

sufficiency of the pleadings; though Defendants have filed two

motions to dismiss, each was mooted by the filing of or notice of

intent to file an amended complaint.

D-6

in maintaining and assuring the professional conduct

of the attorneys it licenses”).

The California attorney discipline process

provides an adequate opportunity for Sanai to

litigate his federal constitutional claims. “Federal

constitutional rights may be asserted in [California

attorney] discipline proceedings, and on judicial

review of such proceedings.” Canatella, 404 F.3d at

1111 (internal citation omitted). “Although judicial

review is wholly discretionary, its mere availability

provides the requisite opportunity to litigate.” Id.; see

also Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 713 (“The fact that review is

discretionary does not bar presentation of appellants’

federal claims—appellants can raise the claims in a

petition for review.”). Because Sanai can raise his

federal constitutional claims in the attorney

discipline proceeding, Younger abstention is

appropriate. That his claims concern the

constitutionality of the attorney discipline

proceedings themselves does not affect this outcome.

See Hirsh, 67 F. 3d at 713 (“Refusing to abstain would

require presuming that the California Supreme

Court will not adequately safeguard federal

constitutional rights, a presumption the U.S.

Supreme Court square rejected in Middlesex, 457

U.S. at 431.”); Baffert u. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 332

F.3d 613, 619 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The Supreme Court

has ‘repeatedly rejected the argument that a

constitutional attack on state procedures themselves

automatically vitiates the adequacy of those

procedures for purposes of the Younger-Huffman line

of cases.’” (quoting Ohio C.R. Comm’n v. Dayton

Christian Schs, Inc., All U.S. 619, 628 (1986))).

D-7

-ft

'!<

Even where Younger applies, federal courts

may exercise jurisdiction where “state

proceedings are conducted in bad faith or to harass

the litigant, or other extraordinary

circumstances exist.” Baffert, 332 F.3d at 621; see

also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577-79 (1973)

(rejecting abstention where state administrative

board had a pecuniary interest in the

outcome of the proceedings); Younger, 401 U.S. at 5354 (explaining that extraordinary

circumstances could exist where a statute is

“flagrantly and patently violative of express

constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence

and paragraph, and in whatever manner and

against whomever an effort might be made to apply

it” (emphasis added) (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313

U.S. 387, 402 (1941))). Sanai alleges widespread

corruption throughout the State Bar, generally

relating to Tom Girardi, and argues that various

aspects of California’s attorney discipline system are

unconstitutional. These are not extraordinary

circumstances that justify rejecting abstention. See

Canatella, 404 F.3d at 1112 (extraordinary

circumstances exception did not apply where plaintiff

argued that “the California Supreme Court has an

inherent conflict of interest in considering

constitutional challenges to state bar disciplinary

proceedings” and “the state bar statutes are patently

unconstitutional”); Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 713

(extraordinary circumstances exception did not apply

where plaintiff argued that California Supreme

Court justices and Bar Court judges are biased and

the attorney discipline system is unconstitutional);

Pavone v. Cardona, No. 3:21-cv-1743-BTM-BLM,

D-8

2022 WL 1060440, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2022)

(extraordinary circumstances exception did not apply

where plaintiff argued California State Bar is

corrupt, “primarily referencing the example of

Thomas Girardi”); Kinney u. State Bar of Cal., No. C13-1396 MMC, 2013 WL 1331971, at *2 (N.D. Cal.

Mar. 29, 2013) (extraordinary circumstances

exception did not apply where plaintiff argued his

federal rights would be violated during attorney

discipline proceedings because, “if plaintiff is

subjected to an adverse decision by the State Bar in

violation of his constitutional rights, ‘such claims

may be raised in judicial review of the Bar Court’s

decision’” (quoting Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 712)).

Because Younger abstention applies, Sanai is

unlikely to succeed on the merits of his appeal.

Where a party fails to “establishQ serious questions

going to the merits . . ., [courts] need not consider the

remaining factors for” injunctive relief. Doe u. San

Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 19 F.4th 1173, 1181 (9th

Cir. 2021). Absent the necessary “threshold showing”

of a likelihood of success on the merits, this Court

cannot grant an injunction pending appeal. E. Bay

Sanctuary, 994 F.3d at 975 (quoting Leiua-Perez, 640

F.3d at 966).

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that Sanai has failed to

make a sufficient showing to justify the entry of a

temporary restraining order or to demonstrate a

basis for an order to show cause regarding the

D-9

issuance of an injunction pending appeal. Sanai’s

motion is therefore denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 8, 2023

JON S. TIGAR

United States District

'Vi

Judge

E-l

APPENDIX E

.UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CYRUS SANAI,

Case No. 23-cv-010.57AMO

Plaintiff,

AMENDED ORDER

DISMISSING CASE

WITHOUT

LEONDRA KRUGER, et PREJUDICE;

al.,

DENYING PENDING

MOTIONS AS MOOT

Defendants.

Dkt. Nos. 32, 33, 34

Currently before the Court are Plaintiff Cyrus

Sanai’s (1) amended ex parte motion for entry of

default judgment, ECF No. 32, (2) ex parte motion for

leave to file an overlength motion for default

judgment, ECF No. 33, and (3) emergency ex parte

motion for temporary restraining order, declaratory

judgment, and preliminary injunction, ECF No. 34.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court

DISMISSES the action WITHOUT PREJUDICE. In

light of the dismissal, the Court DENIES all pending

motions AS MOOT.

I. BACKGROUND

E-2

On March 9, 2023, Mr. Sanai commenced this

action for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

declaratory and injunctive relief against the Justices

of the California Supreme Court. ECF No. 1 at 2-3.

Following the Clerk’s entry of default, ECF No. 20,

on July 10, 2023, Mr. Sanai filed an amended ex

parte motion for entry of default judgment and an ex

parte motion for leave to file an overlength motion for

default judgment. ECF Nos. 32, 33. On July 11, 2023,

Mr. Sanai filed an emergency ex parte motion for

temporary restraining order, declaratory judgment,

and preliminary injunction. ECF No. 34.

Mr. Sanai seeks a declaratory judgment that:

a. under BracyW Sanai and anyone

similarly situated to him has the

right to obtain documentary evidence

and conduct depositions and have

testify at trial members of the

judicial branch regarding bias;

b. the California Supreme Court’s

holding in Guerra, W G is

unconstitutional and that the rulings

and actions of a state court tribunal

on their own may be used to prove

actual bias or bias under the federal

standard;

W Bracy v. Gramely, 520 U.S. 899 (1997).

PI People v. Guerra, 37 Cal. 4th 1067 (2006).

E-3

c. the State Bar Court Rules of

Procedure are unconstitutional in that

they do not provide for

constitutionally adequate discovery

and rights to call witnesses;

d. the California Supreme Court’s

authority barring discovery against

appellate justices and filing recusal

motions is unconstitutional and no

further proceedings may be conducted

at the appellate level until such rights

are acknowledged and codified by rule;

and

e. the prosecution of Sanai [by the Office of

Chief Trial Counsel] was unconstitutional

under Bracy.

ECF No. 1 at 22-23, 24, 26-28.

Mr. Sanai also seeks a temporary restraining

order, preliminary injunction, and permanent

injunction ordering that:

a. all disciplinary proceedings against

Sanai are enjoined;!3!

I3) Specifically, Mr. Sanai seeks to enjoin further disciplinary

proceedings against him “until the facts necessary to determine

the nature and scope of bias under Bracy that applies to him

and persons not related to Thomas Girardi, his firm, and his

colleagues in other firms who continue to enjoy the fruits of his

corruption of the State Bar and California Supreme Court.”

ECF No. 1 at 25.

E-4

b. the trial may only be re-opened in

front of a new State Bar Court judge

with Sanai entitled to have full

discovery and witnesses that would

be available in a civil trial, criminal

trial, or both;

c. that the California Supreme Court’s

Guerra decision is unconstitutional

and that a state court jurist[’]s

statements and rulings may be

entered as proof of bias; and

d. that the California Supreme Court’s

authority barring discovery against

appellate justices and filing recusal

motions is unconstitutional and no

further proceedings may be

conducted at the appellate level until

such rights are acknowledged and

codified by rule.

Id. at 23, 25-26.

II. DISCUSSION

Younger abstention mandates dismissal of Mr.

Sanai’s claims, which challenge ongoing state bar

disciplinary proceedings as unconstitutional. See

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1971). “Absent

‘extraordinary circumstances’, abstention in favor of

state judicial proceedings is required if the state

proceedings (1) are ongoing, (2) implicate important ‘

state interests, and (3) provide the plaintiff an

adequate opportunity to litigate federal claims.”

Hirsh v. Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of

E-5

Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing

Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar

Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).

Each element is met here. The state bar

disciplinary proceedings pending at the time Mr.

Sanai commenced this action, see ECF No. 1 at 17,

satisfy the first element. See Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 712

(applying Younger abstention where appellants faced

ongoing disciplinary proceedings at the time of filing

suit in federal court). The second element is satisfied

because “California’s attorney disciplinary

proceedings implicate important state interests.” See

id. at 712-13 (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 434). The

third element is likewise met: “the California

Supreme Court’s rules relating to Bar Court

decisions provide for an adequate opportunity for a

plaintiff to present federal constitutional claims.” See

Robertson v. Honn, No. 17-CV-01724-JD, 2018 WL

2010988, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2018), aff’d, 781 F.

App’x 640 (9th Cir. 2019), cert, denied, 141 S. Ct. 948

(2020). “Refusing to abstain would require presuming

that the California Supreme Court will not

adequately safeguard federal constitutional rights, a

presumption the U.S. Supreme Court rejected in

Middlesex.” Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 713 (citing Middlesex,

457 U.S. at 431).

Though there are exceptions to Younger

abstention, they do not compel a different result here.

“If state proceedings are conducted in bad faith or to

harass the litigant, or other extraordinary

circumstances exist, the district court may exercise

E-6

jurisdiction even when the criteria for Younger

abstention are met.” Baffert u. Cal. Horse Racing Bd.,

332 F.3d 613, 621 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

In an unsuccessful attempt to invoke the bias

exception, Mr. Sanai alleges:

Sanai has a due process right to

an impartial tribunal in the

actual constitutional sense, and,

under Bracy, the right to obtain

information relevant to that

issue. The State Bar Court and

the California Supreme Court

have denied Sanai the right to

obtain such information as to

both the State Bar Court and the

California Supreme Court. This

denial violates Sanai’s right to

due process. Because this is an

issue that relates to question of

whether the California Supreme

Court is biased in the

constitutional sense, Younger

abstention does not apply. Gibson

v. Berryhill (1973) 411 U.S. 564.

Perhaps more important, there is

no Younger abstention because

the defendants have explicitly

contended, and the state courts

have ruled, that Sanai has no

right to obtain evidence necessary

to show constitutional bias under

Bracy. See Middlesex County

Ethics Comm. u. Garden State

E-7

Bar Assn (1982) 457 U.S. 423, 432

(1982) [sic]. There are no state

court procedures available to

Sanai to vindicate his

constitutional arguments,

because he is not allowed the :

evidence in his file or to obtain

discovery against the judicial

branch.

ECF No. 1 at 20-21.

To make a showing of bias, Mr. Sanai “must

overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in

those serving as adjudicators,” with “evidence.”

Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 713-14 (citations and internal

quotations omitted). Mr. Sanai has proffered only

mere conjecture, not evidence, of alleged bias. This

falls short of the required showing. See Robertson,

2018 WL 2010988, at *2. Mr. Sanai’s complaint that

there is no procedural mechanism to seek recusal of

presiding justices, see ECF No. 1 at 21, does not

relieve him of his burden of proof. “The absence of a

mandatory statutory recusal mechanism applicable

to justices of the California Supreme Court does not

make a showing of bias unnecessary.” See Hirsh, 67

F.3d at 714.

Mr. Sanai’s allegations that Younger

abstention doesn’t apply because “these proceedings

follow a pattern of bad faith harassment,” see ECF

No. 1 at 21, fare no better. “In the Younger

abstention context, bad faith ‘generally means that a

prosecution has been brought without a reasonable

E-8

expectation of obtaining a valid conviction.”’ Baffert,

332 F.3d at 621 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S.

117, 126 n.6 (1975)). Mr. Sanai’s state bar attorney

profile shows that he is ineligible to practice law. The

docket from the review of that disciplinary action by

the California Supreme Court, Sanai on Discipline,

No. S276140, shows that the matter has culminated

in revocation of Mr. Sanai’s eligibility to practice law

in California.4 Those proceedings “provided attorneys

subject to discipline with more than constitutionally

sufficient

' i1'-: .

-Y.

V’

■V

Finding no exception to Younger abstention,

the Court must dismiss this action. See

Everett v. Justices of Cal. Supreme Court, No. 20-cv03504-EMC, 2021 WL 6424652 (9th Cir. 2021), cert,

denied Cal. July 7, 2020), appeal dismissed as

frivolous, 142 S. Ct. 1238 (2022).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court

DISMISSES this case WITHOUT PREJUDICE. All

pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk

shall enter Judgment against Plaintiff and close the

file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 24, 2023

4 Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(1), the Court takes judicial notice of

Mr. Sanai’s state bar online attorney profile and the docket in S276140.

E-9

ARACELI MARTlNEZ-OLGUlN

United States District Judge

F-l

APPENDIX F

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

JORGE E. NAVARRETE

CLERK AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

OF THE SUPREME COURT

EARL WARREN BUILDING

350 MCALLISTER STREET

SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102

(415) 865-7000

June 16, 2023

SENT VIA USPS AND EMAIL

ly.

Cyrus Sanai

9440 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 301

Beverly Hills, California 90210

-.4

Re: S276140 — In re Cyrus Mark Sanai

on Discipline

Dear Mr. Sanai:

This will acknowledge receipt of your “second

petition for rehearing”, which we received

electronically on June 15, 2023. The court is unable

to file your submission as there is no provision in the

Rules of Court to file a rehearing of the denial of a

rehearing. This case is now closed and cannot be

F-2

reconsidered or reinstated. Thereby, we return,

unfiled, your submission.

Very truly yours,

JORGE E. NAVARRETE

Clerk and

Executive Officer of the Supreme Court

By: F. Jimenez,, Assistant Deputy Clerk

cc: Rec.

Enclosure

G-l

APPENDIX G

UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH

CIRCUIT

PEYMAN ROSHAN, an

individual on behalf of

himself and others

similarly situated,

FILED

APRIL 17 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER,

CLERK

U.S. COURT OF

APPEALS

No. 21-15771

D.C. No. 3:20-cv-04770AGT

PlaintiffAppellant,

ORDER

MELANIE J LAWRENCE,

in her official capacity as

Chief Trial Counsel, and in

her personal capacity;

OFFICE OF CHIEF

TRIAL COUNSEL,

Defendants-Appellees.

G-2

CYRUS MARK SANAI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Plaintiff-

No. 22-56215

D.C. No. 2:21-cv07745-JFW-KES

Appellant,

MELANIE J LAWRENCE,

sued in her individual and

official capacities;

CYNTHIA VALENZUELA,

sued in her individual and

official capacities; GEORGE

CARDONA, sued in his

individual and official

capacities; RICHARD A.

HONN, sued in his official

capacity; W. KEARSE

MCGILL, an individual

sued in his official capacity;

DOES, 1 through 10,

inclusive,

DefendantsAppellees.

CYRUS MARK SANAI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

PlaintiffAppellant,

No. 23-15618

D.C. No. 4:22-cv-01818JST

GEORGE CARDONA;

LEAH WILSON,

Defendants-Appellees.

CYRUS MARK SANAI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Plaintiff-

No. 23-16104

D.C. No. 3:23-cv-01057AMO

Appellant,

■A-iUG ,

't'-V

■ ;,v.

.v-

LEONDRA KRUGER,

Judge; JOSHUA P.

GROBAN; MARTIN J.

JENKINS; KELLI M.

EVANS; CAROL A.

CORRIGAN; GOODWIN

H. LIU; PATRICIA

GUERRERO,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: SILER, TASHIMA, and BRESS, Circuit

Judges.

The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

G-4

The panel unanimously voted to deny Appellants’

petitions for panel rehearing.. No. 21-15771, Dkts.

145, 146, 147, 148. Judge Bress voted to deny the

petitions for rehearing en banc and Judges Siler and

Tashima so recommended. The full court has been

advised of the petitions for rehearing en banc and no

judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the

matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35. Appellants’

petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc

are DENIED.

H-l

APPENDIX H

UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH

CIRCUIT

PEYMAN ROSHAN, an

individual on behalf of

himself and others

similarly situated,

n-V:

FILED

SEP 4 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER,

CLERK

U.S. COURT OF

APPEALS

No. 21-15771

D.C. No. 3:20-cv-04770AGT

PlaintiffAppellant,

ORDER

MELANIE J LAWRENCE,

in her official capacity as

Chief Trial Counsel, and in

her personal capacity;

OFFICE OF CHIEF

TRIAL COUNSEL,

Defendants-Appellees.

H-2

CYRUS MARK SANAI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Plaintiff-

No. 22-56215

D.C. No. 2:21-cv07745-JFW-KES

Appellant,

MELANIE J LAWRENCE,

sued in her individual and

official capacities;

CYNTHIA VALENZUELA,

sued in her individual and

official capacities; GEORGE

CARDONA, sued in his

individual and official

capacities; RICHARD A.

HONN, sued in his official

capacity; W. KEARSE

MCGILL, an individual

sued in his official capacity;

DOES, 1 through 10,

inclusive,

DefendantsAppellees.

CYRUS MARK SANAI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

PlaintiffAppellant,

No. 23-15618

D.C. No. 4:22-cv-01818JST

GEORGE CARDONA;

LEAH WILSON,

Defendants-Appellees.

CYRUS MARK SANAI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Plaintiff-

No. 23-16104

D.C. No. 3:23-cv-01057AMO

Appellant,

LEONDRA KRUGER,

Judge; JOSHUA P.

GROBAN; MARTIN J.

JENKINS; KELLI M.

EVANS; CAROL A.

CORRIGAN; GOODWIN

H. LIU; PATRICIA

GUERRERO,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: SILER, TASHIMA, and BRESS, Circuit

Judges.

The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

H-4

Appellants’ motion to recall the mandate, No.

21-15771, Dkt. 165, is denied.

1-1

APPENDIX I

Relevant Statutes and Constitutional Provisions

■i

!-%

4 ’

Every person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution

and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress, except that in any action

brought against a judicial officer for an

act or omission taken in such officer’s

judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall

not be granted unless a declaratory

decree was violated or declaratory relief

was unavailable. For the purposes of

this section, any Act of Congress

applicable exclusively to the District of

Columbia shall be considered to be a

statute of the District of Columbia.

42 U.S.C. §1983.

1-2

It is the duty of an attorney to do all of

the following:

(g) Not to encourage either the

commencement or the continuance of an

action or proceeding from any corrupt

motive of passion or interest.

Bus. & Prof. Code §6068(g)

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment

or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising

in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in

actual service in time of War or public danger; nor

shall any person be subject for the same offence to be

twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor shall

private property be taken for public use, without just

compensation.

U.S. Const, amend. V

1-3

;

All persons born or naturalized in the

United States, and subject to the

jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the

United States and of the State

wherein they reside. No State shall

make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of

citizens of the United States; nor shall

any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, §1

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.