Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Colby Dranoel Leonard, Petitioner v. Keith Cooley, Warden, et al.

Supreme Court briefAug 20, 2024

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1.) Whether or not did the Federal Court error when it ordered demonstrative defect in Pro-se litigants

petition that raised constitutional right violations when Pro-se litigants are given more freedom to

correct defects?

2.) When officers state they didnt see the accused committing a crime. Is it Constitutional to seize an

identity and perform a search of evidence to justify an arrest?

3.) Whether or not the Constitution upholds suggestive identification procedures without a emergency

or urgency Constitutional?

4.) Whether or not is the filing of a intiation of a prosecution by Bill Of Information for a Felony

outside the limitations window is Constitutional in any Jurisdiction?

5.) Where does the Constitution charts for State representitives permission to disobey a judges order to

disclose for trial?

6.) Is it Constitutional to administer evidence during a trial who's nature proved nothing in the

committing of the alleged offense?

7.) When a victim/witness indicates confidence in their statement. Is it Constitutional to REFRESH

from previous testimony while on trial in testimony?

8.) When a counsel remains silent with knowledge of Constitutional deprivements more than 6 times.

Do the counsel's silence and failure to object meets the standard of a competent effective counsel?

Cl«

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

RELATED CASES

Louisiana vs. Leonard, 2008-KA-2090,1st Cir. C.O.A. Louisiana order 93-27-09)

Louisiana vs. Leonard, 2009-KO-0908, Louisiana Supreme Court, Judgement rendered(l-8-10)

Leonard : vs. Steven Rader ET AL, 04-07-0409, Louisiana 19th J.D.C., Judgement (5-1-13)

Louisiana vs. Leonard, 2013-KW-0861, Louisiana 1st Cir. C.O.A.,

Judgement (8-27-13)

Louisiana vs. Leonard, 2013-KW-1729, Louisiana 1st Cir. C.O.A.,

Judgement (2-27-14)

Louisiana vs. Leonard, 2014-KH-0682, Louisiana Supreme Court,

Judgement (1-9-15)

Leonard vs. Keith Cooley,ETAL, 15-73-SDD-EWD, U.S.D.C.Midd.D.La. Judgement (3-22-18)

Leonard vs. Keith Deville,ET AL, 18-30374, United States 5th Cir. C.O.A. Judgement (12-17-18)

Leonard vs. Keith Deville,ET AL, 18-30374, United States 5th Cir. C.O.A. Judgement (2-3-20)

Leonard vs. Keith Deville,ET AL, 18-30374, United States 5th Cir. C.O.A. Judgement (5-15-20)

Leonard vs. Keith Cooley,ETAL, 15-73-SDD-EWD, U.S.D.C.Midd.D.La. Judgement (9-27-23)

Leonard vs. Keith Cooley,ET Al, 23-30781, United States 5th Cir. C.O.A. Judgement (1-22-24)

Leonard vs. Keith Cooley,ET AL, 23-30781, United States 5th Cir. C.O.A. Judgement (8-1-24)

Leonard vs. Keith Cooley,ET AL, 23-30781, United States 5th Cir. C.O.A. Judgement (8-26-24)

b«

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY/RULES PROVISONS INVOLVED

•

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

11-34

CONCLUSION

INDEX TO APPENDICES

(8-26-24)

APPENDIX A "Order" of U.S.C.O.A 5th Cir. 23-30781

APPENDIX B "Order" U.S.C.O.A. 5th Cir. 23-30781

APPENDIX C

(8-1-24)

"Unpublished Order" U.S.C.O.A. 5th Cir. 23-30781

(1-22-24)

APPENDIX D "Order" U.S.D.C.Midd.D.La. 15-73-SDD-EWD (1-5-24)

APPENDIX E "Order" U.S.D.C.Midd.D.La. 15-73-SDD-EWD (1-24-24)

APPENDIX F "Order"U.S.D.C.Midd.D.La. 15-73-SDD-EWD (9-27-23)

APPENDIX G

"Recommendation" U.S.D.C.Midd.D.La. 15-73-SDD-EWD (8-29-23)

APPENDIX H "Order"U.S.D.C.Midd.D.La. 15-73-SDD-EWD (10-5-21)

APPENDIX I "Judgement" U.S.C.O.A. 5th Cir. 18-30374

APPENDIX J

(5-15-20)

"Rehearing Petition Opinion" U.S.C.O.A. 5th Cir. 18-30374 (5-15-20)

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX K "Judgement" U.S.C.O.A. 5th Cir. 18-30374 (2-3-20) "never recieved add. change

APPENDIX L "Order" U.S.C.O.A. 5th Cir. 18-30374 (12-17-18)

;

APPENDIX M "Order'U.S.D.C.Midd.D.La. 15-73-SDD-EWD (5-4-18)

APPENDIX N "Order" U.S.D.C.Midd.D.La. 15-73-SDD-EWD (3-22-18)

APPENDIX O "Order" U.S.D.C.Midd.D.La. 15-73-SDD-EWD (3-8-18)

APPENDIX P

"Recommendation" U.S.D.C.Midd.La. 15-73-SDD-EWD (2-14-18)

APPENDIX Q "Order" Louisiana Supreme Court 2014-KH-0682 (l-9-l£)

APPENDIX R "Order" Louisiana 1st Cir. C.O.A. 2013-KW-1729 (2-27-14)

APPENDIX S

"Order" Louisiana 1st Cir. C.O.A. 2013-KW-0861 (8-27-13)

APPENDIX T " Order"Louisiana 19th Judicial District Court 04-07-0409 (5-1-13)

APPENDIX U "Recommendation"Louisiana 19th Judicial distrct Court 04-07-0409 (3-26-13)

APPENDIX V "Order" Louisiana Supreme Court 2009-KO-0908 (1-8-10)

APPENDIX W "Judgement Opinion Unpublished" Louisiana 1st Cir.C.O.A 2008-KA-2090 (327-09)

CASES

BROWN V. TEXAS, 460 U.S. 730,743,103,443 (1983)

13,14

BROWN V. TEXAS, 99 S.CT. 2637 (1979) —

; STATE V.jSNEE, 743 So.2d. 270 (1999)

p^J3;!4

DIBELLA V. UNITED STATES, 369 U.S. 121 1962

ft'4

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HOWARD V. UNITED STATES, 138 F.Supp. 376,380

V. CITY OF GRANDVIEW, 973 F.Supp.2d 1134 (2013)

! ROYER V. FLORIDA, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983) ■—-----

CHIMEL V. CALIFORNIA, 395 U.S. 752,758 (1969)

TRUPIANO V. UNITED STATES, 334 U.S. 699,705 (1948)

PARKS V. COM., 192 S.W. 3d. 318 (2006)

STATE V. POLSTON,360 Ark. 317,201 S.W. 3d. 405 (2005)

pjj i\(o

MENDEZ V. UNITED STATES, 885 F.3d 899 (2018)---------------------MURRAY V. UNITED STATES, 487 U.S. 533,108 S.Ct. 2529 (1969)— ^>\(p

ALDERMAN V. UNITED STATES, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961 (1969)BERKEMER V. McCARTY, 468 U.S. 42 (1984) -------

j^.15

WANG-SUN V. UNITED STATES, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)

HICKS V. ARIZONA, U.S. 107 (1987)

P3'13

0.|3

ra-l'f

SIBRON V. NEW YORK, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)

^ 13

FISHER V. UNITED STATES, 702 F.2d. 372 (1983)

WATSON V. UNITED STATES, 423 U.S. 411, 432 n.

VIDAL V. UNITED STATES, 637 F.Supp. 327 (1986)

TERRY V. OHIO, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

BUMPER V. NORTH CAROLINA, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)

Q^&cqmA V. C-vVj df C,W*^> )HoG?

\\%^ (zow') pj -1 ^

C/VS6S

MATLOCK V. UNITED STATES, 415 U.S. 164,171 (1974)

fcujies .

P9 15

ROBINSON V. UNITED STATES, 414 U.S. 218 (1974)

j}^s> is

GUSTAFSON V. FLORIDA, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) —-----

P3 AS

RAKAS V. ILLINOIS, 439 U.S. 128,148-149 (1978)

STOVALL V. DENNO, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) - ---: STOVALL V. DENNO, 388 U.S. 377 (1968) -----

$•.11

i STOVALL V DENNO, 388 U.S. 302 (1967)

j>g47

WOOTEN V. STATE, 325 Ark. 510, 931 S.W. 2d. 408 (1996) -

.)$

SIMS V. STATE, 196 So.3d 180 (2016)

P3 n

CRUME V. BETE, 383 F.2d. 36 (1967)

fa W

FOSTER V. CALIFORNIA, 394 U.S. 440,443,89 S.Ct. 1127 (1969)- pg*

BIGGERS V. TENNESSE, 390 U.S. 404,407, 88 S.Ct. 979

P3* ^

PEOPLE V. CARUSO, 68 Cal.2d. 183,188 (1968)

SIMMONS V. UNITED STATES, 390 U.S. at 83 (1968)

SIMMONS V. UNITED STATES, 390 U.S.. 377, 383 (1968)

CHAPMAN V. CALIFORNIA, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)

$•11

JOHNSON V. LOUISIANA, 406 U.S. 356 (1972)

fa*

WADE V. UNITED STATES, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)

DUNAWAY V. NEW YORK, 442 U.S. 200 (1967)

P9'H

.11

NEIL V. BIGGERS, 409 U.S. 188 (1972)

COLEMAN V. ALABAMA, 399 U.S. 1 (1970)

LAVASCO V. UNITED STATES, 431 U.S. 783,790 (1977)

ROCHIN V. CALIFORNIA, 342 U.S. 165,170-172 (1973)

WALLACE V. SMITH, 414 U.S. 1115 (1973)

BURRELL V. UNITED STATES, 634 F.3d 284,287 (5TH Cir.)

■f

CM&

WESTBROOK V. UNITED STATES, J4 F.3d 1176,1186 (1997) ------

M -

BOFFA V. UNITED STATES, 513 F.Supp. 444 (1980)

P3 ,21

STATE V. COUMER, 888 S.W.2D. 356 (1994)

LOPEZ-VALENZUELA V. UNITED STATES, 511 F.3d 487 (2007)

f3.ZZ

CALIRERA-TERAN V. UNITED STATES, 168 F.3d 141,143 (1999) — fg ZZ

PANARELLA V. UNITED STATES, 277 F.3d 678,684-685

MOLONYV. UNITED STATES, 287 F.3d. 236-239,240 (2002)

GARCIA V. UNITED STATES, 530 F.2d 650 (1976)

P9 sZZ.

P9 'Z7~

pjj#2H

ALVAREZ V. CITY OF BROWNSVILLE, 904 F.3d 382 ( 2018)

STATE V. WILLIAMS, APP. 3 CiR. 1984, 452 So.2D 7244

STATE V. HOOKER, 623 So.2d. 7244, App. 2. Cir. (1993)

P3' 7S

GIGLIO V. UNITED STATES, 405 U.S. 150,154-155 (1972)

AGURS V. UNITED STATES, 427 U.S. 97,106 (1967)

COBB V. STATE, 419 So.2d. 1237,1241(1982)

BRADY V. MARYLAND, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)

KYLES V. WHITLEY, 514 U.S. 419 (1995)

BAGLEY V. UNITED STATES, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)

RAY V. STATE, 423 So.2d 1116,1118 (1982)

ROSIERE V. STATE, 488 So.2d 965 (1986)

CARLSON-V. UNITED STATES, 236 F.Supp.2d. 686 (2002)

BAILEY V. UNITED STATES, 516 U.S. 137,143 (1995)

f>^7

McGUIRE V. STATE, 288 So.2d. 271 (1974)

STATE V. GRAHAM, 422 So.2d 122 (1973)

—-

JACKSON V. VIRGINIA, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)

fl .27

STATE V. DOBY, 540,544 So.2d. 398,1008 (1989)

^,27

STATE V PRIEUR, 277 So.2d 122 (1973)--------

p^-33

BASS V. UNITED STATES, 310 F.3d 321 (2022)

WASHINGTON V. STRICKLAND, 466 U.S. 668,688, 692 (1984) —

,•33

NEW YORK V. KIESER, 56 F.3d 16,18 (1995) —----------- ——-

—W*3

HEARST V. UNITED STATES, 638 F.2d. 1190 (1980) —

MacCOLLOM V. UNITED STATES,426 U.S. at 326-328 (1976)

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HYDE V HOFFMANN-La. ROCHE inc., 511 F.3D 506 (2007)------

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MOORE V. AGENCY for Int'L Dev., 301 U.S. App.D.C. 327 (1993)

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HAINES V. KERNER, 404 U.S. 519, 520, (1972)-----------------------

P0'12-

INDIVIGLO V. UNITED STATES, 612 F.2d. 624 (1971)

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SINCOX V. UNITED STATES, 571 F.2d 876 (1978)

Royer V*Florid HfcD IM. 1>$6

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CONSTITUTION

Lousiana Declaration Of Rights Article 1 & 2

Lousiana Declaration Of Rights Article 1 & 4

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Lousiana Declaration Of Rights Article 1& 5

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Lousiana Declaration Of Rights Article 1& 6

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Lousiana Declaration Of Rights Article 1 & 13

.5,4,7,11,1^2.1;^

Lousiana Declaration Of Rights Article 1 & 15

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......

. ......

21/22,4^48)2*1

Lousiana Declaration Of Rights Article 1 & 16

United States Constitutional Amendments 4th

A6,11,15,(6,20

United States Constitutional Amendments 5th

-4,5,6, )3,, !(p, 10/11; 22,26,1^2^

United States Constitutional Amendments 6th

- 4,5,6,11,16,20,21, ZZjUffiZffl

United States Constitutional Amendments 14th

18 U.S.C.A. ~924

-n21

18 U.S.C.A. -2236

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18 U.S.C.A.-3113

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18 U.S.C.A.-3161

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18 U.S.C.A.-3162

18 D.S.C.A.-3173

18 U.S.C.A.-3500

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25 U.S.C.A. -246

25 U.S.C.A. -251

25 U.S.C.A. -252

,15

28 U.S.C.A. -2254

,33

STATUTES & RULES

Louisiana Code Criminal Procedure Article 215.1

Louisiana Code Criminal Procedure Article 230.2

15 -

Louisiana

Code Criminal Procedure Article 251

Louisiana Code Criminal Procedure Article 252

Louisiana Code Criminal Procedure Article 253

)

Louisiana Code Criminal Procedure Article 386

?3 .21

Louisiana Code Criminal Procedure Article 701

pg.tt ,20^21^22.

Louisiana Code Criminal Procedure Article 729.5

P9 as

Louisiana Code Criminal Procedure Article 821

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Louisiana Code Criminal Procedure Article 841

,33

Louisiana Code Criminal Procedure Article 1421

Louisiana Code Criminal Procedure Article 1425

Louisiana Code Of Evidence Article 103

T8 ,23

P9 ,Z3

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pg‘2.6

Louisiana Code Of Evidence Article 402

Louisiana Code Of Evidence Article 607

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Louisiana Code Of Evidence Article 612

Louisiana Code Of Evidence Article 802

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:279 ---

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Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:283 --

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;

271

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:435

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:438

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:441

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tK- Louisiana

Revised

Statutes 15:442

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'• • ■

• "

Federal Rule 1.3

Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 2

^,21 ^23,2.7,2%

Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 12

I9'1

Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 1^>

Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 26.2

Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 41

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Federal Rules Of Evidence

102

pg.®1p3.'2J)a3)z7/2-),

Federal Rules Of Evidence

103

Federal Rules Of Evidence

401

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Federal Rules Of Evidence

402

Federal Rules Of Evidence

607

Federal Rules Of Evidence

612

Federal Rules Of Evidence

806

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: Federal Rules Of Evidence 1002

OTHER

Code Of Federal Rules Title 1 Chapter 3 pt. 304.4

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: Code Of Federal Rules Title 1 Chapter 3 pt. 304.6

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Code Of Federal Rules Title 1 Chapter 3 pt. 304.28

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: Federal Pr. Forms 20:626

Ii 29 Amercan Jurisprudence 2d. ~ 305 Evidence

29 Amercan Jurisprudence 2d. ~312 Evidence

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29 Amercan Jurisprudence 2d. ~ 622 Evidence

29 Amercan Jurisprudence 2d. ~ 627 Evidence

29 Amercan Jurisprudence 2d. ~ 632 Evidnece

41 Amercan Jurisprudence 2d. ~ 87 Indictment/ Information

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41 Amercan Jurisprudence 2d. ~ 283 Indictment/Information

PS .7}

68 Amercan Jurisprudence 2d. ~ 4 Search/Seizure

Court

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

6 -to

! ; The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix

the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

s been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[M is unpublished.

[ y**

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix

the petition and is

£lfi_to

; or,

[ ] reported at

[ ] d?£s been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[Mis unpublished.

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix_____ to the petition and is

; or,

[ ] reported at

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the_

appears at Appendix

court

to the petition and is

; or,

[ ] reported at____

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

•i-

JURISDICTION

; [Vi For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the,. United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was

[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

; ;

[vT A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date: ___ 8 "__

, and a copy of the

. . order denying rehearing appears at Appendix_A

'. [ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

; to and including _

(date) on

(date)

in Application No.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix_______

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

______________________ , and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension , of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

(date)in

to and including__:__

(date) on

Application No. __ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The core of every procedure attempt was surrounded around issues that Leonard was wrongfully

convicted for 35 years for Armed Robbery for $3.00 dollars (three-dollars). The Rights of Mr.Leonard

was violated in the approach of arresting officers in the said offense while he was being seated in a

vehicle.During trial the officers stated that he seen the accuse not doing anything that he could see, see

Demonstrative Exhibit trial transcript pgs. 197-199. The suspect that officersw was pursuing the

officer did not see get in the vehicle with Leonard and the other occupant. Officers upon approaching

the vehicle ordered Leonard and the accused out of the vehicle with weapons drawn forcing them to

comply with their procedures Frisk,Seizure of Identity and Search. That approach itself violated the

rights constitutionally when the bases of their approach had no probable cause leading to an illegal

arrest and seizure of identity, there was no consent of a vehicle mobile search in its nature to find

evidence that Leonard and the occupant of the vehicle was breaking Law. Neither did the state prove a

valid ,knowing and intelligent consent was given.In the process of prosecuting procedure the counsel

remained silent in the defense of Leonard falling below a level of a reasonable objective depriving

Leonard of Fair Trial, Fairness, Due Process, Equal Protection of the Laws and Right to a Effective

Counsel and to be Free in his Person and Privacy.

Leonard was apprehended by Louisiana's East Baton Rouge City Police

Department and transported from place "x" to place "y" for a suggestive identification alternative

where the state's victim/witness and arresting officer/witness became testifying witness to the illegal

procedure see, Demonstrative Exhibits trial transcripts pgs.149, pg.163, pg.189-190, pg. 203-204.

In discovery of finding procedures like this that violates the constitutional rights of the accused raising

the issues with in appeals court is the accused only right. Controling case law provides jurisprudence

establishing to the courts of the land in the United States that suggestive procedure like the one done in

that particular case provides law for mirror reflecting cases like Leonard's in line-ups with just the

accused Leonard single, handcuffed, exiting a police unit, fitting a description violates the

constitution and identification from procedure done out-of-court like the one done here taints the in

court identification and excludes them both not accepting them when they are based on alternatives like

the one done in Leonard's case mirror reflecting the controling cases provided.During trial the counsel

for Leonard remained silent on the constitutional violation depring him of his right to Fairness, Fair

Trial, Due Process, Equal Protection of the Laws, and his right to an effective counsel throught out

trial.

Another issue is that the court lost its jurisdiction on the opportunity to initiate the prosecution

which points to the immediate release of Leonard according to the Speedy Trial rights. Leonard pointed

to the sentencing court that the limitation on the prosecution for filing by Bill of Information had

expired on the prosecution of a felony. See, Demonstrative Exhibits trial transcripts pg.ll which

provides the arresting date and the actual date that the Bill of Information was filed exceeding its

limitation. Mr.Leonard was still prosecuted and the counsel for Leonard still remained silent on

constitutional issues that violates the rights of the accused depriving him of Fairness, Fair Trial, Due

Process, Equal Protection of the Laws, his Speedy Trial Right and the right to an Effective counsel.

Inside the State's magistrate recommendation the magistrate stated the only remedy for its error and the

courts failed to apply it see Appendix U.

At the preliminary examination the state's victim/witness stated that she gave a written

statement for officers. See,Demonstrative exhibits trial transcript pgs.105-106, pg.159, pg.160

The attorney at the preliminary examination staged raised to the Judge attention that the defense had

not been provided a copy of that statement after a Motion for Discovery was filed the Judge ordered the

state to disclose for the exculpatory purpose. The accused went through trial without the statement

being disclosed and the counsel for the accused remained silent on the matter falling below a

reasonable objective of an effective counsel that deprives Leonard of Fairness, Fair Trial, Due process,

Equal protection of the laws, and his right to an effective counsel.

During Trial the State introduced evidence that was illegally seized and

proved nothing in the committing of the said offense . It did not at all exclude the hypothesis of

innocence and was insufficient in the finding of something. The state tendered evidence that was never

proved to be used in the offense neither was it taken during the alleged offense. Nor did anything in the

possession of Leoanrd that was put into evidence prove that leonard had committed the said offense or

v :

did anything jeoprodize the safety of the arresting officers. How was this evidence admissible? what

i- / •

wasiit admissible for? What was relevant about it nature and what part of the offense? See,

•

Demonstrative exhibits trial transcripts pages 184-188. Leonard had advised the courts that his

constitutional rights had been violated and for his counsel remaining silent on the matter again falling

below a reasonable objective standard counsel’s actions deprived Leonard of his right to Fairness, Fair

Trial, Due process, Equal protection of The laws and his right to an effective counsel.

Again in trial, the victim/witness stated that she could give a independent

statement. Once that was indicated the courts still allowed the State to let the victim/witness

REFRESH while on trial testifying under oath forfeiting the defense's cross-examination under

impeachment to attack the the victim/witness credibility see, Demonstrative Exhibits trial transcripts

pages 151-157. At this point in trial here again the counsel for the defense remained silent continuing

to fall below a reasonable objective depring the accused of his right to Fairness, Fair Trial, Due

Process, Equal Protection of the laws and a effective counsel.

The counsel's repetitive actions of silence on matters of great importancefor the defense was clear

actions of incompetence. The counsel was not at all effective on behalf of Leonard's defense through

the trial on constitutional matters which forfeited and deprived Leonard of his rights to Fairness, Fair

Trial, Due Process, Equal Protection of the Laws, Speedy Trial and effective counsel.

REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

FEDERAL COURTS CONFLICTING

United States 5 th Circuit Court of Appeals had an Order that ruled that Leonard a Pro-se litigant did

not demonstrate. Upon a Motion to Retain Documents leonard was DENIED the opportunity to access

the files that the State District attorney had submitted to the courts from the United States District

Court Middle District Of Louisiana stating that" Leonard has no constitutional right to the documents

}; :

that the,state had submitted to the United States District Court Middle District of Louisiana.

The United States 5th Circuit Court of Appeals ordered a ruling stating that there existed no

conflict of the courts or no debatable issues between the procedure of the courts and that there was no

demonstration over all the constitutional right violations that was deprived Leonard.

On 1-5-24 the United States District Court Middle District of Louisiana in a order stated that the

indigent defendant has no constitutional right to aquire a copy of his transcript or court records for use

in a collateral proceeding see, Appendix D.

The United States 5th Circuit Court of Appeals ordered that Pro-se indigent litigant Leonard did

not demonstrate 8-1-24 see,Appendix B.

Upon the Motion to Retain Documents request to obatin court records was exactly to use as

demonstrative exhibits. The United Sates District Court Middle District of Louisiana denied Leonard

records of supporting material preventing him from using the documents as collateral material

proceeding see, Appendix D. That exact action from the court its deprived Leonard of his right to

Fairness, Fair Trial, Due Process, Equal Protection of the Laws, as long as Leonard could have shown a

relevant reason for the request of records, The petitioner must show a need for and relevancy of the

requested records see, (United States v. MacCoIlom, 426 U.S. at 326-328(1976). The United States

District Court Middle District of Louisiana also requested that Leonard be denied the right to proceed

II*

in Forma Pauper knowing that Leonard was a indigent petitioner pursuing his appeal right Pro-se see 9127-23 Appendix D and Appendix F. Also, the United States District Court Middle District of

Louisiana ordered that Leonard Pro-se litigation in his State Post-Conviction application was not

;presented and based on Federal law grounds stating that the claims was not subject to Federal Habeas

: Corpus review. At the State District Court level Leonard provided the definition of the United States

; Constitutional Amendments 6th Speedy Trial. Leonard even within the states Louisiana Code of

i Criminal Procedure Article 701 Speedy Trial qouted and covered State and Federal bases there just

; under the SPEEDY TRIAL Statement is enough being that it qoutes the constitution in part..

The Magistrate for the State District Court gave a Recommendation see, Appendix U, stating the

Article 701 in FAVOR of Leonard that defines SPEEDY TRIAL remedy for violation of the State and

Federal constitution indicating to apply the State's forum in In Article 701 SPEEDY TRIAL.

All Mr. Leonard asked the higher court to do was apply, In diversity cases, a Federal court

must apply Federal procedure rules and the substantiveLaw of the Forum state see, (Hyde v.

Hoffmann- La Roche inc, 511 F.3d 506,2007 WL 4441065(2007).

United States District Court Middle District of Louisiana had order ruling that Leonard did not provide

the litigation of SPEEDY TRIAL error at the State level conflicts with the State's Magistrate

Recommendation that qouted the "ONLY REMEDY" that could be legally applied see, Appendix U

SPEEDT TRIAL. As to any defect Leonard should ahve been given more freedom from litigants

represented by counsel to CORRECT defects in service of processand pleadings, see (Moore v.

Agency for Int'I Dev., 301 U.S. App. D.C. 327, 994 F.2d. 874,876 (D.C.Cir.1993), (Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 30 L.Ed.2d 652, 92 S.ct.594(1972) and U.S. Supreme Court Digest,

Lawyer's edition 130 Pro-Se litigants complaint.

ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Testimony was given by a competent witness under oath that was recorded and also transcribed

: making the testimony evidence establishing the existence of an intrusion and seizure in violationof the

Louisiana Declaration of Rights Article 1&2, art. 1&4, art. 1&5, art.l&16 and the United States

Constitutional Amendments 4th, 5th and the 14th.This cause of action for grounds for relief was

; relief inside the Habeas Corpus application alphabets* (c),(d),(i). The State of Louisiana police

. exceeded the limits of an investigative stop after they lost a suspect on foot pursuit.Officers at gunpoint

v in lost of thier suspect ordered two individuals out of a vehicle at gunpoint to cooperate with a brief

investigation procedure asking the individuals to identify themselves which was unnecessary. The

officers then in cooperation conducted a frisk of the personal pockets of the individuals for the purpose

obtaining incriminating evidence. Nothing in violation of the law was collected from the personal

possession of the accused that would even jeopradize the life of officers or justify the frisk. Officers

still indicated that the accused mr.Leonard was not free to go. The arresting officer in this case did

testify that Leonard and the other occupant of the vehicle were not at all involved in criminal activity

stating "NOT THAT HE COULD SEE", see trial transcript pg. 201 Nor, did he see the suspect that

he was in pursuit of get into the vehicle with Leonard, see trial transcript 199. (197-199) There was

no way that officers could point to facts supporting his conclusion that Leonard in any. way

"LOOKED SUSPICIOUS", the officers lacked Terry grounds to suspect or believe Leonard was

engaged in criminal conduct see,(Brown v Texas, 99 S.ct. 2637(6-25-79),(State v. Snee, 743 So.2d

270(9-l-99)There was no actions illegal enough at the time to establish probable cause these aren't

sufficient enough:

D£/non$Vf&ViTe, gxKiW -\r!al fffl/iStfipf p<jj< H7" 2-dl

*probable cause:(Sibron v. New York,392 U.S. 40, 73, 88 S.Ct.1889 L.Ed.2d. 917(1968)

mere flight: (Wang-sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,83 S.ct. 407,9 L.Ed.2d. 441(1963)

vague description: (Fisher v. United States, 702 f.2d. 372 (3rd Cir.1983)

*Inarticulable hunches:(Brown v. Texas, 460 U.S. 730,743,103,443 S.Ct. 1535, L.Ed.2d.507 (1983)

13.

^suspicion,hunches or guess work:(Hicks v. Arizona, U.S. 107 S.Ct.1149,1152,1153 L.Ed.2d(1987)

*warrantless arrest: (Watson v. United States,423,U.S.411,432n.6,46 S.Ct.820,46 L.Ed.2d 598(1976

"EXCLUSIONARY RULE". Under the "Fruit of the Poisonus Tree" doctrine.

LSA -C.CR.P.Art.215.1(A)(B)(C)(D)/1997 La.Sess.Serv.Act.759(H.B.351)(identifying INSIGNIA) :

Temporary questioning of persons in public places;frisk and search for weapons also,Fed.R.Cr.P.12

Pleadings and pretrial motions (3) motions must be made before trial (c) Supression of evidence

;■

see, Dibella v United States, 369 U.S 121 (1962)/United States v. Howard,138 F.Supp 376,380 also,

see Fed.R,Cr.P.41 search and seizure also see, 18 U.S.C.A.-3113/25 U.S.C.A-246 & 251 & 252 this

mentions introduction or about to introduce/probable cause and 18 U.S.C.A-2236 searches with

out warrant (b)committing or about to commit an offense in the presence of an officer.

Knowing that the police officer seen NOTHING. There existed nothing for weight and

reliability that could lead officers to conclude that the law had been violated. At that point the question

remains, What constituted probable cause? The officer had no trustworthy information under the

circumstances to believe that two men just sitting in a vehicle has committed or is committing or about

to committ an offense see,(Corona v. City of Clovis, 406 F.supp.3d 1187 2019 W.L. 3797050(8-12-19

(Sinclair v. City of Grandview, 973 F.supp.2d 1234, 2013 W.L. 5406211(9-26-13),(Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1,21-22 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d.889(1968).(Vidal v. United States, 637 F.supp. 327

(S.D.N.Y.1986). With knowing at that present moment that coming into contact with Mr.Leonard that

NO law was being broken. When did probable cause for an arrest and search or seizure exist?

The two occupants of the vehicle gave the officers no reason to believe that there was fair probability

that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found on the individuals or in the vehicle. Officers can

not in no way point to facts in support of his conclusion that Leonard LOOKED SUSPICIOUS. The

officer lacked Terry grounds and grounds to suspect and believe Leonard was engaged in any type of

criminal conduct (Brown v. Texas, 99 S.Ct. 2637(6-25-79), (State v. Snee, 743 So.2d 2709( 9-1-99)

"EXCLUSIONARY RULE'The Supreme Court has held that a stop of a automobile and brief detent-

ion of it's occupants which significantly curtails the freedom of action of the driver and passenger is in

violation of the constitution, see (Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S, 42,104 S.Ct. 2924,82 L.Ed.2d.36

(1984). Further, when validity of a search rest upon consent the state has burden of proving that

a necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily which is not satisfied by show

of mere submission to claim lawful authority. Investigating a person who's no more than suspected of

criminal activity the police may not even perform a full search of a person to seize personal info or

search the vehicle or other effects.Nor, may the police verify thier suspicion by means that approach

theiconditions of arrest.- The Constitutional Amendment 4th protection is not diluted in situations

where it has been determined that legitimate law enforcement interests justify warrantless searching.

The searches are limited to police when it is out of thier control. With this we should know that the

police officers may not carry out a full search of a person or automobile especially if its not in the

immediate control of the accused and he CAN NOT give consent see,(Florida v. Royer, 103 S.ct. 1319

(3-23-83),(Bumper v. California, 391 U.S. 543,88 S.ct. 1788,20 L.Ed.2d.797(1968),(Matlock v.

United States, 415 U.S. 164,171,94 S.Ct. 988,39 L.Ed.2d. 242(1974),(Robinson v. United States,

414 U.S. 218,94 S.Ct. 467,38 L.ed.2d. 427(1973),(Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 94 S.Ct. 488

38 L.Ed.2d. 456(1973), (Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.128,148-149,99 S.Ct. 421,58 L.Ed.2d 387(1978).

Things like this RESTS upon desirability of having magistrates rather than police determine

when searches and seizures are permissible and what limitations should be placed see,(Trupiano v.

United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705(1948) see,(ChimeI v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 758(1969).

When did police officers meet the burden of proving that consent was given from any one of the people

in the vehicle? See,LSA-C.Cr.P.Art.215.1 (A)(B)(C)(D) questioning of persons in public places/

frisk and search for weapons see, 18 U.S.C.A.-2236 searches without warrant,(b) commitiing or

about to commit an offense in the presence of a officer see, (c)making a search at the request or

invitation with consent of the owner see, 25 U.S.C.A.-252 to introduce or about to introduce see,

68 Am.Jur.2d serach and seizures~4 (I) serach and seizures in general (A.)search and seizures

general considerations (3) Requirement od Individualized suspicion for search and seizure:

A search generally must be based on some level od individualized suspicion or wrongdoingsee, -1 •

(Polston v. State, 360 Ark. 317,201 S.W.3d 406 (2005). Also, a degree of individualized suspicions

is required for serach determining sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct is occuring to

make intrusion of privacy reasonable see,(Parks v. Com., 192 S.W. 3d 318(Ky.2006). see more, ....

29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence~627 suppression of tainted evidence (V.)Admissibility, generally

(E)AdmiSsibilty of illegally obtained evidence, (3) Evidence derived from illegally obtained

evidence,(a.): "Fruit of the poisonus Tree" doctrine, see(Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533

108 SCt.2529,101 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). In situations like this evidence is inadmissible in a criminal

prosecution see,(Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,89 S.ct. 961 22 L.Ed.2d 176(1969).

The counsel for Leonard prior to trial and during trial remained silent on matters of great

importance which deprived Leonard of his rights.The counsel should not have been silent on matters on

matter that the officers lacked probable cause, that officers had no valid reason for intrusion, nor did the

officers at that time seek a consent and even in the approach asking him to identify himself at gunpoint.

The counsel's approach in defense failed below the valid standard level of a effective counsel and the

performance deprived Leonard of constitutional rights as well as the officers procedure see,

Louisiana Declaration of Rights 1&2;1&4;1&5;1&13;1&16 and United States Constitutional

Amendments 4; Amend. 5; Amend. 6; Amend. 14.

SUGGESTIVE IDENTIFICATION

> • Under oath the victim/witness and police/ witness gave testimony that was recorded and

, transcribed establishing the existence of Leonard's Constitutional Rights being violated by East Baton

: Rouge a parish in the State of Louisiana city police department in thier alternative performing a

: suggestive idetification procedure that was testified to by the state witness/victim and the arresting'

: ..

;

officer/witness founding a cause of action which happens to be a ground foro relief inside the Habeas

, Corpus application alphabets (c),(d),(i).

Mr.Leonard was unlawfully apprehended and illegally seized searched/frisked and

then placed in the back of a police unit and transported from place"x to place "y" just to be viewed

as a culprit of a said offense while no emergency or urgency existed in a crime that had been committed

with no life threatening injuries without an attorney counsel privledge see trial transcript pgs.163

203-204. The arresting officer testified to the arrest and transfer of the accused. Mr.Leonard was

SINGLE, HANDCUFFED, EXITING THE BACK OF POLICE UNIT,SURROUNDED BY THE

OFFICERS. In the line-up no other men in a line-up where shown as culprits except the accused and

courts have ruled that single suspects for review have been widely condemned see,(Stovall v. Denno,

388 U.S. 302, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. (1967). There was a victim in this offense that suffered

noinjury so there was no urgency for the alternative that the officers used suggestively. Influential

police as well as performing coercive procedures like that one the officers performed by the possibility

fraud indication of conscientious police work only enhances probative force and slovenly police work

diminishes it determining the sloppiness of police investigation during identification procedure when

fairer alternatives are available. At the performance of these type of suggestive identification procedure

the human perception and memory is inherently UNRELIABLE and the accused Mr.Leonard had no

scientific means of EXONERATING himself .These type of suggestive procedures violates the funda

mental concept of justice when its so EXTREMELY UNFAIR, and UNTRUSTWORTHY when its

gathered in a suggestive way it should be excluded. Mr.Leonard is asking the court to apply the law and

constitution to the procedures that violated his rights see,LSA-C.Cr.P.Art.252 (6) fillers, (8.) live line

up, (9.) photo line-up/LSA C.Cr.P.Art. 253 eye witness identification procedures (a)(ii)(b)(c)(e)(3)

(f)(h)(l)(2)/LSA-251(B) to convict the guilty and protect the innocent/Fed.R.O.E.102 purpose/

FED.R.O.E.402/28 U.S.C.A. obtaining identification evidence in violation of the constitution is

not admissibIe/FED.R.Cr.P.12 (b)(3) unnecessarily suggestive line-up;Due Process violation/

[

Fed.Pr.forms~20:626 evidence of pretrial identification or tainted potential courtroom identificat

ion/ also see, 29 Am. Jur.2d Evidence~622-Suggestive line-up, V. Admissibility, general, E. Admiss

ibility of illegally obtained evidence, 2. grounds for suppressing evidence, C. Improper identifica

tion evidence. Pretial identification violates Due Process when there are suggestive elements in the

identification procedure that make it all but inevitable that the victim will identify only one person as a

culprit see,(Wooten v. State ,325 Ark. 510, 931 S.W.2d 408 (1996), (Sims v. State, 196 So.3d 180

(miss.ct.app.2016). Line-ups are unduly suggestive when its virtually inevitable that the witness will

select the indivdual who police have singled out,see (Crume v. Bete 383 F.2d. 36, 39 (CA5 1967),

(Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440,443 89 S.Ct. 1127,22 L.Ed.2d 402,407(1967 Reversed).

Suggestive identification procedures undermines the reliability of the victim these type of procedures

violates Due Process, (Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404, 407 88 S.Ct. 979, 980,19 L.Ed.2d 1267,

(People V. Caruso, 68 Cal.2d 183,188,65 Rpter. 336, 340,436 P.2d 336,340(1968). Conduct of

identification procedure may become so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistake

identity that suggestive procedures are done not to prevent mistaken identification they are at the same

19*

time depriving the accused of Due Process and Equal Protection of the Law (Simmons V. United State

390 U.S; 377,383, 88 S.Ct. 967,970,19 L.Ed.2d 1247(1968).Police procedures that are suggestive and

unnecessary (Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 377 ,19 L.Ed.2d. 1247 ,88 S.Ct. 964(1968), (Neil v Diggers,

409 U.S. 188,34 L.Ed.2d 401, 93 S.Ct. 375(1972). Consequently, the state courts committed

constitutional error in eliciting of identifications made by suggestive tainted procedure and since it has

- made no attempt to show that its error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the teachngs of

(Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.ct. 824 17 L.Ed.2d 705(1967). 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence-

632 line-up identification following illegal arrest. V. Admissibility,generally, E.Admissibility of

illegally obtained evidence, 3. Evidence derived from illlegally obtained evidence, b. particular

evidence. Line-ups,photograph line-up and etc.accused have rights see, (Dunaway v. New York,

442 U.S. 200,99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d. 824(1967), (Wade v. United States, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct.

1926,18 L.Ed.2d 1149(1967),(Stovall V. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967,18 L.Ed.2d 1199(1967)

(Royer v. Florida, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229(1983),(Johnson v.

Louisiana,406 U.S. 356, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152(1972). Even a description of clothing gave no

assurance that the victim/witness could identify from a number of persons of similarity and things were

heightened when the police work was coercive and suggestive, (Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.

at 83 ,88 S.Ct. 967,19 L.Ed.2d 229(1968). When Fair assurance is what Leonard deserves required by

Due Process see,(Lovasco v. United States, 431 U.S. 783,790 52 L.Ed.2d 752, 97 S.Ct 2044(1977),

(Wallace v. Smith, 414 U.S. 1115, 38 L.Ed.2d 743, 94 S.Ct. 848(1973),(Rochin v. California, 342

U.S. 165 170-172, 96 L.Ed.2d 183,72 S.Ct. 205, 25 ALR2d 1396(1952). The Due Process protects

against admission of evidence derived from suggestive identification procedures see,(Simmons v.

United States ,390 U.S. 377,19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 88 S.Ct. 967(1968),(Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1

26 L.Ed.2d 387, 90 S.Ct. 1999(1970),(Foster v. California 399 U.S 440,22 L.Ed.2d 402, 89 S.Ct.

1127(1969). The counsel for Mr. Leonard should not have remained silent at no point on any

constitutional issues that deprived Mr.Leonard of his rights.Remaining silent on the matters was

‘

unprofessional becoming a error that prejudice Leonard which is a probability sufficient enough to

undermine the condfidence in the outcome. The counsel's challenge of the suggestive identification

: procedure would have had it excluded due to the illegalality of it and its unconstitutional performance

; of obtaining the evidence which deprived leonard of the Louisiana Declaration Of Rights Articles

; 1&2; Art.l&4; Art.l&5; Art.l&6; Art.l&16 and the United States Constitution Amendments 4th

rAmend.5th;Amend.6th; Amend.l4th

BILL OF INFORMATION

initiation of prosecution

Louisiana's 19th Judicial District Court for the parish of East Baton Rouge had lost its jurisdiction

when the time limit for initiating the prosecution on a felony had expired for felony offense.The Bill

initiating the arrest was filed outside the 60 day to initiate the prosecution. Trial transcripts provide the

fact and also briefs from the state district attorney and the magistrate's judge recommendation also

admits that the state was outside the 60 day time limit to initiate the prosecution. This is what

established the existence of a cause of action which is a ground for relief inside the hapeas Corpus

application alphabets (d),(i). see trial transcrit page 11.

A arrest is a public act that seriously interfered with Leonard's liberty whether he is free or on bail or 110-07 arrest date and the filing date of the felony Bill 4-16-07 displayig 96 days existed before a bill of

information was filed for a felony offense elapping the 60 day window limitation for a felony and for

the error depriving Leonard of his rights he ask the court to apply, see LSA-C.Cr.P.Art.230.2 (A.)(B(1)

(2) determination of probable cause within 48 hours/ LSA-C.CR.P.Art.701(l)(a) Limitation for

initiation of prosecution/ 18 U.S.C.A.~3161(b)(c)(l) Time limits and exclusions / 6th Amendment

wrt.The arrest disrupts his employment,drain his financial resources,curtail his associations,subject him

to public obloquy and creates anxiety in him, his family and his friends. It's either a formal indictment

or information or the actual restraints imposed by the arrest and holding to answer on criminal charges

that engages the prosecution of the Speedy trial. Mr.Leonard can not incur the lost of liberty for an

offense without notice and meaningful opportunity to defend himself or to lose his defense see trial.,

transcripts .11 which establishes the existence of the initiation of prosecution by the bill of information

U.S.C.A.Const.Amend.VI-jury trials-18 U.S.C.A. part ll ch.208 U.S.C.A.~3173/ Fed.R.Cr.P.Rule

2 Interpretation/ Fed.R.O.Ev. 102 Purpose. Let the court clarify the event in Leonard's Speedy Trial

clock upon the initial arrest which took place 1-10-07 the day of his intial appearance before officer

and the filing date of the felony bill of information 4-16-07 outside the window see LSAC.Cr.P.Art.701(l)(a) and 18 U.S.C.A.~3161(c)(l) also see,(United States v. Burrell, 634 F.3d 284,

287(5th Cir.),(United States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176,1186(5th Cir.1997). More over this issue,

whether, the Bill of Information complies with the requirements of the State of Louisiana and Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure measured by practical considerations that do not prejudice Leonard.The

court is determined soley that constitutional notice requirements imposed by the Louisiana

Declaration of Rights Article 1&2; Art. l&13;Art.l&15; Art.l&16 and the United States

Constitutional Amendments 5th; Amend. 6th; Amend.l4th see also,(United States v. Boffa,513

F.supp.

444,

Fed.R.Evid.Serv.l734(D.Del.l980),

Am.Jur.2d

Indictments

and

Informations~87, VII. Charging Offense, A. General, 1. Overview/ 41 am.Jur.2d Indictments and

Informations~283 XVI. Cure of defects in charge or charging process~283. Indictments or

Information shall be held invalid when the violation prejudice the substantial rights of the accused see,

(Coumer v. State, 888 S.W.2d 356(Mo.Ct.App.S.D.1994). The State of Louisiana had lost its

jurisdiction on the initiation of the prosecution for filing a Bill of Information for a felony offense

being outside the set 60 day time limitation. The legal principle to be applied had been provided to the

courts when the State failed to initiate the offense timely by these Legal statues; LSA~C.Cr.P.Art.386

2-1

failure of grand jury to indict/ LSA~C.Cr.P.Art.701 (b.) failure to initiate information timely

constitutes release/ 18 U.S.C.A.~3162 sanctions (a)(1),(2)/ (Lopez-Valenzuela v. United States, 511

F.3d 487 (12-19-07)Reversed/ LSA-C.O.E.Art. 612(D) Failure to comply / Fed.Rule 1.3 Failure to

comply.'. With theses types of issues being challenged here in Leonard appeal this type of jurisdictional

issue'the court should being considered in light of the fact that jurisdictional issues like these can be

raised at anytime see, (Molony v.United States ,287 F.3d 236, 239-240(2cnd Cir.2002), (Panarella v.

United States, 277 F.3d 678, 684-685(3rd Cir.2002),(Calirera-Teran v. United States, 168 F.3d

141,143(5th Cir.1999).

For the court and counsel not assuring that legal priciples be applied violates the rights of

Mr.Leonard and deprives him of his Speedy Trial rights his Due Process and Equal Protection of the

Laws. An effective counsel would nopt have remained silent at all on the matter. A effective counsel

would have not have been silent at all on the matter taking a strategic approach through proper Motion

to dismiss the late intiation of the prosecution which would have resulted to the immediate release of

Mr.leonard from custody of being wrongfully accused, with the accused Leonard counsel

unprofessional error with performance falling below that standard level of effective counsel. The

counsel deficiency prejudiced the defense which is also sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome. The conviction of Mr. Leonard have been obatined through unconstitutional procedure in

violation of the Louisiana Declaration Of Rights Article 1&2: Art.l&13;Art.l&15; Art. 1&16 and

the United States Constitutional Amendments 5th; Amend.6th;Amerid.l4th.

BRADY

The victim in this case independently stated that she wrote a written statement and had

it submitted to the arresting officers.During preliminary examination it had been established that the

22.

statement had not been disclosed as the it was raised to the courts attention and the Judge ordered the

state to disclose the the statement for the purpose that it needed to be inspected to see if it-had held

exculpatory evidence even as to a mislikihood of misidentification especially a suggestive one. During

•trial the state district attorney did not furnish the statement for trial after a judge's order. Fairness and

Due Process as well Equal protection of the laws was deprived Mr.Leonard forfieting him a fair trial

which-is a: ground for relief inside the Habeas Corpus alphbets letters, (d),(i).

On trial transcript pages 105-106 Attorney for the defense at the time

:Mr.Cunningham discussed with the court at that point the existence of the statement, evidence that

impeaches a testimony (Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,154-155, 92 S.Ct. 763,766,31 L.Ed.2d

104(1972); LSA-C.E.Art.l03(A)(B) Rulings on Evidence, LSA-C.O.E.Art.802 production and

inspection; LSA-C.Cr.P.Art.1421 Discovery methods; LSA-C.Cr.P.Art.l425(B.)(C.)

Expert;Pretrial disclosures; Scope of discovery; LSA-R.S.15:283(B) testimony taken outside the

courtroom; F.R.O.Cr.P. Rule 2 interpretation; Fed.R.O.E. 102 Purpose; Fed.R.O.Ev.R. 1002

Requirement of original; Fed.R.O.Cr.P. Rule 16 Discovery & Inspection ,(c.) continuing duty to

disclose(l.)(2.)/(d.) regulating discovery ; C.O.F.R. Title 1,Chapter 3,part 304.4, Disclose of

records and Information; C.O.F.R. Title 1, chapter 3, part 304.6,reponses to request; C.O.F.R.

Title 1,chapter 3, part 304.28, Notice of record ordered and emergency disclosures; Fed.R.O.Ev.

rule 103/ 28 U.S.C.A. (a.)(b.) also see case laws Disclosing or furnishing evidence information to

the Judge for exculpatory purposes see, (Agurs v United States, 427 U.s. 97,106, 96 S.Ct. 2392,

2399, 49 L.ed.2d 342 (1967); ( Bagley v. United States, 473 U.s. 667,105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d.

481(1985); (Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.s. 83,10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194(1963); (Kyles v.

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,131 L.Ed.2d 490,115 S.Ct 1555(1995);(Cobb v. State, 419 So.2d

1237,1241(La.l982);(Ray v State, 423 So.2d 1116,1118 (La.l982);(Rosiere v. State, 488 So.2d 965,

970(La.l986).

23.

The missing statement In Mr.Leonard's trial case that was called to the Judges's attention

alerting him so that proper course of action may take place to enable the counsel to take proper

corrective measures that would have made a different result the counsel didnt advise the court during

trial depriving the accused of his rights that Mr.leonard now asks the court to apply the JENCKS

STATUTE 18 U.S.C.~3500(a.)(b.)(c.)(d.)(e.(l)(2)(3)/ incorperated into F.R.Cr.P.26.2. The

Statement in its form are admissible in court all for the purposeof production and inspection with the

view to cross-examination after inspection for impeachment from a trial judge that determines

admissibility, ,eyidentaty questions of inconsistency, materiality and relevancy of the contents see,

LSA-C.E.Art. 607 attacking and supporting credibility (A)(B)(C)(D(2); LSA-C.E.Art. 612 writing

used to refresh memory (D.); Fed.R.O.E. 607 who may impeach witness/ 28 U.S.C.A.;

Fed.R.O.Ev. 612 writing used to refresh memory(b.)(c.) and Fed.R.O.Ev.806/ 29 Am.Jur.2d

Evidence~312, V. admissibility,generally, A. Relevant, competent and Material evidence(Rule

401,401), 3. Specific types of Evidence, b. Evidence admissible for limited purpose.

Impeachment is not admitted a sevidence in favor to establish the truth of the subject

matter, but merely to destroy the credibility of a witness,may be plain error when the impeaching

evidence is extremely damaging,the failure to give it is so PREJUDICIAL as to affect substantial

rights of the accused Mr.Leonard see, (Garcia v. United States, 530 F.2d 650,2 fed.R.Evid.serv

564(5th Cir.1976)/ also Impeachment evidence is considered exculpatory for BRADY purposes

see,(Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382(9-18-18 5th cir.) Reversed...

Criminal action should have been dismissed when the State or government on the grounds

of priviledge elects not to comply with a order to produce for the accused written statement for

inspection and for admission in evidence relevant statements or reports. Leonard had a full trial without

exculpatory statment that could have been used for impeachment not at all being disclosed from the

state for inspection.The culmulative effect of all suppressed evidence is considered rather than each

21/

item of evidence individually. The court needed the statement to determine whether it was in violation .

Any the. State fails to disclose to the accused evidence of innocence that would have produced a different result violates.The state is not free of the obligation to disclose the evidence even if it's not

requested. Failing to produce falls under all three situations that a Brady claim may arrive.The State

prosecution have duty to learn of any evidence known-to others acting on governments behalf in cases

including police officers to avoid these types Brady violations. If the State succeeds or fail in meeting

the obligation to disclose material or exculpatory.evidence we know its inescapable. The prosecution

remains the one responsible for the duty of disclosing evidence regardless of whether police or

investigators failed to inform the prosecution because prosecution can establish any procedures and

regulations to insure communication of all relevant informationn with all individuals in each

department dealing with it.Discounting any material or exculpatory evidence in light of undisclosed

evidence there would not be enough to convict with the strong possibility of aquittal on criminal

charges understanding that the statement could have put the case in a different light undermining the

confidence.The question is not whether absence of the evidence/statement for impeachment did

Mr.Leonard recieve a fair trial. Question is, Whether or not did Leonard recieve a fair trial resulting in a

verdict worthy of confidence with the state failing to disclose evidence that should have been

collected ,collectively,as a whole? These type of errors or issues that Mr.Leonard DO NOT have to

demonstarate to the court. Under BRADY, it does not require demonstration by preponderance that the

disclosed evidence would have resulted to aquittal see, LSA-C.O.E.Art.612 failure to comply (D.);

LSA-C.Cr.P.Art. 729.5 failure to comply; Federal rule 1.3 failure to comply ; Fed.R.Cr.P.Rule 16

Discovery and Inspection (2) Failure to comply (A.)(D.)/ (State v. Williams, App.3.Cir 1984,452

So.2d 7244),(State V. Hooker,app 2.Cir 1993 623 so.2d 178)

" STATE DIDN'T DISCLOSE IN A RECKLESS DISREGARD OF TRUTH".

Mr. Leonard's Due Process was violated and a effective counsel should not have been silent

on matters of great importance when one possess the knowledge of the fact that in cross-examination

the defense could have used the statement for impeachment.Being silent on the matters of great

constitution importance was a unprofessional error making the counsel perfomance continuosly

deficient prejudicing the defense from the Louisiana Declaration of Rights Articles 1&2; Art. 1&13;

Art. 1&16 and the United States Constitutional Amendments 5th; Amend.6th and Amend.14th.

INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

Officers illegally seized evidence that did not exclude the hypothesis of

innocence in the alleged offense. Evidence did not prove the accused committed the alleged offense

and was insufficient in the supporting the finding of the offense. The evidence was admitted without

the court applying the relevancy test. The counsel for Leonard remained silent on the issue which

which deprived Leonard of his right to a fair trial and effective assistance from counsel being grounds

for relief inside the Habeas Corpus application alphabets (c.)(d.)(i.).

Evidence seized illegally by Baton Rouge's city police department collected

and admitted into evidence without suppression in compliance with court procedures see, ( Carlson v.

United States , 236 F.supp 2d 686 (6-28-02). The court admitted into evidence in trial evidence

without any challenge see trial transcripts pages 184-188. All evidence used at trial was with intent to

prove that every piece points to the guilt of Leonard and his involvement of every element of the

crime.Evidence that officers seized illegally had nothing to do with the said alleged offense.All

evidence at trial in trial transcripts pages 184-188 should have been in compliance with LSAC.Cr.P.Art 821 (c.) and Fed.Rule 103; LSA-C.Ev.Art. 103 Rulings on evidence (1.) Ruling

admitting evidence (A.)(B.), (2.) Ruling excluding evidence (b.) (c.) (d.); LSA-C.E.Art.402

Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible/Fed.R.O.Ev.402, 28

U.S.C.A.;/ Relevancy see LSA-R.S. 15:435/ LSA-R.S.15:441/ LSA-R.S.442 also see the LSA>■ C.O.E. 607 Relevancy Test (D)(2)/Fed.R.O.Ev. 401/28 U.S.C.A.; see, Fed.R.O.Ev.102 Purpose and

Fed.R.Cr.P.rule 2 interpretation.

• ■

The items found was in discovered in a vehicle not in control or owned by

f the accused and was irrelevant to the said offense nor did anything of the evidence belong to the victim

of the'alleged offense.If the relevancy test was applied in what nature of the offense was the evidence

admissble for? Court held that every element of the evidence that the state, had intended to use at trial

I HAVE to prove the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt excluding the hypothesis of innocence

LSA-R.S. 15:438. Evidence was insufficient that was used at trial the state never proved a valid

waiver to search,nor did the evidence prove Leonard used,held or carried or even possessed the seized

items and how they were used in the said offense this is why and how the evidence was insufficient see,

(Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137,143 (1995) vacated and reversed- 18 U.S.C.A. 924 (c.)(l)(A)

29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence~305 ,(V.) Admissibility,generally, (A.) Relevant,competent,and material

evidence Rules 401,402, (3.) Specific types of evidence, (a.) circumstantial evidence

Evidence of an intent to committ a crime ,if circumstantial, must exclude every reasonable

hypothesis except guilt, (McGuire v. State, 288 So.2d 271(Fla.4th DCA 1974), (Graham v. State

422 So.2d 123(La.l982), (Jackson V. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 995 S.Ct. 2781, L.Ed.2d 560(1979),

(Doby v State,540,544 So.2d 398, 1008(La.App2d.cirl989). Due Process, requires that no person be

made to suffer onus of a criminal conviction by sufficient proof. The critical inquiry on a review of the

sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must not be simply to determine whether

the jury was properly instructed but to determine whether record evidence could support reasonably a

finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt that every element of every piece of evidence the state

prosecution used at trial proved that Mr.Leonard possessed,carried and used or took and obtained

during the time of committing the alleged offense. A relevant question exists, Did every piece of

; evidence seized and admitted into evidence prove that Leonard used or obatin it from the said offense?

j Why was the evidence admitted? what nature was it apart of?: See, (Prieur v. State, 277 So.2d

■! 122(La.l973). What rule excludes or supresses evidence obtained in violation of a person's rights?

j Once the state meet the burden that they can shoe a knowing and intelligent voluntary waiver of rights

j see,(Bumper v. North Carolina 391 U.S. 543,88 S.ct. 1788,20 L.ed.2d 797(1968). Why did Leonard's

i counsel continue to remain silent on the matter of the relevancy test?Remaining silent om matters of

j depriving the accused of constitutional rights is unprofessional error that deprives rights, these type of

1 errors that continued throughout trial was deficient performance that continued to prejudice Leonard

being probability sufficient enough to undermind the confidence in the outcome when it deprives

Leonard of The Louisiana Declaration Of Rights Articles 1&2; Art.l&13; Art. 1&16 and the

United States Constitutional Amendments 5th; Amend.6th ; Amend.l4th.

IMPROPER COURT PROCEDURE

Here was established the exsitence of a improper court procedure, the victim

during trial had stated that she could independently testify and remember what she gave a previous

statement to the court. The court during trial still allowed the victim to read while on stand under oath a

previous statement that she gave in an attempt to REFRESH which was improper and depriving

Leonard of a fair trial,due process and equal protection of the laws. The counsel of the accused failed to

object remaining silent on the matter depriving theh accused of his rights. Which is a cause of action

that is ground for relief inside the Habeas Corpus application alphabet (i).

Inside the trial transcript pages 152-157 the procedure took place that violated the

rights of the accused depriving him Due process and right to Fair trial and the Equal protection of the

laws. Mr.Leonard asks the court are those type of procedure violating? When they are outside the

1S,

compliance

of LSA-R.S. 15:279 trial procedure; LSA-C.E.Art.612 writing used to refresh

rnemory (B.); Fed.R.O.Ev. 102 Purpose; Fed.R.O.Cr.P.Rule 2 Interpretation; Fed.R.Ev. 612 (a.)

Scope(l.)(2.)(b.). With that procedure and the "law to apply, Did the procedure violate? Are the Courts

state and federal against the type on trial REFRESHING once the victim/witness indicate

independence. Procedures like the one administered during Leonard's trial is under the impression that

the courts has, ruled those type of procedures deprive the accused and prejudice the accused of

constitutional rights. .During trial the counsel continued to remain silent on the violation of the Due

..;

f .

■

process, Fair trial and Equal Protection of the Laws at the cross-examination point in defense of

Leonard thats was so unoprofessional and points to the deprivement of an effective counsel during

times of his constitutional rights violation that deprived him of Louisiana Declaration of Rights

Article 1&2; Art. 1&13; Art.l&13; Art. 1&16 and the United States Constitutional Amendments

5th; Amend. 6th; Amend. 14th.

INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL

During the procedure of the state's prosecution multiple rights continued to be

violated of the accused Mr.Leonard left unchallenged due to the unprofessional silence of his counsel.

There existed multiple issues that a effective counsel learned in law would not have failed to raise in

defense of Leonard .The matters of great importance that the counsel failed to take strategic approach

on and in the defense of the accused Mr.Leonard. Proper motion would have changed the result of the

outcome.The counsels actions fell below a reasonable standard of a effective counsel which prejudiced

the accused depriving him of a competent counsel and constituional rights od Due Process, Fair trial

and Equal protection of the Laws becoming grounds on the Habeas Corpus application grounds for

it .

The counsel's unprofessional errors failing to raise matters of great importance,failing

the defense and unprotecting rights constitutionally in no way protecting or preserving them, being one

knowing and intelligent in the practice of Law strategically taking proper motion would have been

effective,professional. Leonard's counsel was inadequate for the purpose of defending his rights.

Mr.Leonard, attempted to demonstrate:

1) This first instance,counsel should not have been silent on the matter that the police had no probable

cause to apprehend Leonard and seize his person and property:

ja.) Had'the counsel challenge the arrest and seizure taking the correct strategic approach in proper

motion of suppression of the evidence.

b.) The suppression of the evidence in the defense of Leonard's rights would not have even been

challenged due to Fairness, Due Process and Equal Protection of the Laws.

c.)The result of that process would have been favorable to the defense preserving the rights of

Leonard favorable by the constitution excluding all unlawfully obatined information leading to an

illegal arrest and seizure.

2) Again for the second time,counsel should not have been silent on the matter that identification

evidence was obtained in an illegal suggestive procedure.

a.) Counsel of the defense could have, challenged the admission of the suggestive identification

procedure in the defense of Leonard's rights constitutionally which was deprived of him that could of

been best in his interest.

b.) Suppressing that suggestive identification procedure and the identification admission into

evidence would have had the identification procedure and any identification admission to the court

excluded in the interest ofo Leonard's constitutional rights that would not have been challenged or

canceled due to the right of the defense's Fair Trial, Due process and Equal Protection of the law.

e.) The ending result of its process would have been favorable to the defense excluding any

admission of evidence to the identification procedure dueu to it's tainted suggestive out-of-court

alternative that taints the in-court identification as well which excludes it.

3) For the third time,counsel remained silent on the matter that the state lost it's jurisdiction to initiate

the prosecution on a untimely Bill of Information to chaege a felony offense.

a.) Effective counsel would have motioned to dismissed upon a untimely Bill of Information

initiating an untimely offense for a felony to protect and preserve the rights of the accused Mr. Leonard

I;'."'

Speedy Trial right.

b.) Filing that proper motion moving the court under Speedy trial procedure on the fact that court

lost it's jurisdiction or any legal procedure on the matter.Defense of Leonard's rights could have been

motioned in defense of his rights before losing its defense under Speedy Trial exercising his Fair Trial,

Due process and Equal Protection of the Laws without and challenge or cancel from the state.

c.)Result of that process would have immediate released Leonard from prison in favor of the

defense by reason of the State and Federal Constitutional Rights leading to the dismissal of the charges

and immediate release.

4) For the fourth time,counsel should not have remained silent on the fact that the state still had not

disclose an exculpatory statement that could have been used for impeachment after the Judge had

ordered that it be disclosed.

a.) The counsel should have challenged the state failure to disclose the written statement that the

state's victim had established the fact that it was written and turned over to officers that the judge

ordered to be disclosed.

b.) The request for the production of the statement was proper court procedure and requested by

counsel that was removed from the case in interest of Fairness,Due Pocess and Equal Protection of the

Laws for impeachment purpose that the state could not have challenged or canceled.

c.) Result of that process would have ended in a cross-examination impeachment that would have

undermined the confidence in the outcome when it comes to the fact about what actually happened in

the offense and the description given to officers about the culprit in the offense.

5.) For the fifth time,counsel remained silent on the matter that the evidence adduced at trial did not

exclude the, hypothesis of innocence and that the evidence was insufficient and inadequate in proving or

finding ;the fact that it was invovled in the actual offense and in what nature of the offense did it prove

:■■

beyond reasonable doubt.

a.) Counsel should have filed motion to suppress strategically taking a great defensive approach in

defending the right to a Fair Trial, Due process and Equal Protection of the Laws. To have irrelevant

evidence admitted during trial deprived Loenard of those rights and a effective counsel would have

protected and preserved those rights having irrelevant evidence excluded being that it did not exclude

the hypothesis of innocence.

b.) The insufficient evidence being excluded that was inadequate in proving any facts in the said

offense would have the trial court exclude the evidence that had nothing to do with the offense or found

in the possession of Leonard or the vehicle he had no control over or gave consent or could give

consent to search as a passenger.

c.) The end result of that suppression would have favored that defense having the court to exclude

irrelevent evidence that didn't prove anything as to the elements of the crime. In what nature was the

evidence admissble depriving Leonard of a Fair Trial, Due Process and Equal Protection of the Laws.

6) During the prosecution of Mr.Leonard for the sixth time, counsel remained silent as the State district

attorney and the court violated Leonard's right to Fairness, Due Process and Equal Protection of the

Laws when it allowed the State's victim/witness to REFRESH from a previuos statement she made

after she laid foundation that she could testify independently.

a.) Had'the counsel object to the court procedure at the time according to proper manner and

procedure of the court in defense of Leonard's right to Fairness ,Due Process and Equal Protection of

the Laws challenging the REFRESHING approach after the victim/witness testified that she could

testify, independently.

b.) Challenging that REFRESH approach that deprived Leonard of several rights of the constitution

Fairness, Due Process and Equal Protection of the Laws would have went unchallenged and could not

, :

;

. .

have been cnaceled by the state.

c.) The end result of that process would have allowed the court to exempt the approach of the State

in Leonard's defense in attempt to cross-exam attacking the victim/witness crediblity during impeachm

ent that would have been excluded awarding the accused his right to Fair Trial, Due Process and Equal

Protection of the laws. Abesent exceptional circumstances a defendant is bound by the tactical decisions

of a competent counsel who is reponsible for strategical approaches even when making oblection see

La.C.Cr.Pr.Art.841 (A) objection from counsel necessary and Fed.R.12 (b)(6), Fed.R.12 (h)(2)&(b)

Failure by counsel not objecting .When the counsel falls below the objective standard of reasonablnes

and the defendant was prejudice as result of such conduct see,( Washington v. Strickland,466 U.S.668

688„ 692,104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-2065, 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984), (New York v Kieser, 56 F.3d 16,

18 (2d.Cir 1995). The counsel's ineffectiveness is procedure forfeiture see, (Hearst v. United States,

638 F.2d. 1190(7th Cir.1980), (Indiviglo v. United States, 612 F.2d. 624 (2cnd Cir.1971), (Sincox v.

United States,571 F.2d 876 (5th Cir.1978), Leonard's counsel remained silent through the trial...

See, 28 U.S.C.A. ~ 2254 (d.) unreasonable performance ,( Bass v. United States, 310 F.3d 321 (5th

cir. 10-16-22) Vacated and Reversed. Leonard's in his writ of certiorari intends to demonstrate six

times how the counsel's unprofessional error deprived him of Louisiana declaration of Rights Article

1&2; Art. 1&13; Art. 1&16 and the United States Constitutional Amendments 5th; Amend. 6th;

Amend. 14 th.

CONCLUSION/PRAYER

In this,Leonard concludes that the court finds that the United states

District Court Middle District of Louisiana errored in denying Leonard documents that could

have been submitted as demonstrative exhibits to the United states 5th Circuit court of Appeals as

supporting materials. Let the court find that the denial of the United states 5th Circuit Court of

Appeals and the United States District Court Middle District of Louisiana could be debatable

upon on the feat that the United Stated District Court Middle District of Louisiana refused to

provide Pro-Se litigant documents to demonstrate.The court errored by not advising the State of

Louisiana district attorney to serve all parties on the matter in compliance with the court rules

upon recieving the documents that the state submitted by mailing them to the indigent Pro-Se

litigant.

Further,Let the court conclude that each constitutional violation should have been

addressed with jurisprudence within opinion from the courts published for the public interest of

how the judicial system upholds the Law for reason that Higher courts can monitor how the lower

courts address constitutional violation issues with controlling cases governing how law is applied

to overturn'wrongful convictions.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.