Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Christopher Collings, Petitioner v. David Vandergriff, Warden
Supreme Court briefOct 18, 2024
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**THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE**
**EXECUTION SET FOR DECEMBER 3, 2024, AT 6:00 PM CENTRAL**
No. _______
_________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________________________________
Christopher Collings, Petitioner,
v.
David Vandergriff,
Warden, Potosi Correctional Center, Respondent.
_________________________________________
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of Missouri
_________________________________________
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
_________________________________________
Jeremy S. Weis
Daniel E. Kirsch*
Capital Habeas Unit
Federal Public Defender
Western District of Missouri
1000 Walnut St., Ste. 600
Kansas City, MO 64106
T: 816.675.0923
E: Jeremy_Weis@fd.org
E: Daniel_Kirsch@fd.org
Counsel for Christopher Collings
*Counsel of Record
CAPITAL CASE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The State built its death penalty case against Christopher Collings on the
credibility of its primary law enforcement witness, Wheaton Police Chief Clinton
Clark, regarding incriminating statements Clark obtained from Collings. Clark’s
testimony was the only evidence suggesting—contrary to all other available
evidence—that Collings received a Miranda warning prior to his interrogation by
Clark, and the statements Clark obtained directly contradicted the victim’s
stepfather’s confession admitting to being the only person who committed the fatal
act. However, although Clark had four prior criminal convictions for AWOL, the
State did not disclose Clark’s convictions during Collings’s trial, direct appeal, or
initial state post-conviction proceedings. Instead, the State did not disclose them
until after the conclusion of these proceedings.
The State’s failure to disclose Chief Clark’s prior criminal convictions
prevented Collings’s trial counsel from using the convictions to impeach Clark at
the suppression hearing and trial proceedings, including that the convictions may
have disqualified Clark from serving as a police officer at all. Similarly, the State’s
failure to disclose prevented post-conviction counsel from investigating the
relationship of Clark’s convictions to his service as a police officer as well as any due
process claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), stemming from the
State’s failure to disclose the convictions.
Although prior counsel did not have grounds to present Brady violations to
the Missouri Supreme Court until the State finally disclosed the convictions, the
State nonetheless contended in the court below that Collings could not show cause
for failing to present the Brady violations earlier. The State further contended
Collings could not show prejudice because of the age of the prior convictions. The
Missouri Supreme Court accepted these arguments and ignored both the State’s
duty to disclose and the import of the prior convictions as impeachment evidence.
This case raises the following questions:
Whether the State’s failure to disclose impeachment evidence constitutes
cause sufficient to excuse the petitioner’s prior non-presentation of the due
process violations stemming from the State’s failure to disclose?
Whether a court conducting the Brady prejudice inquiry must consider the
entirety of the suppressed evidence?
i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Christopher Collings, an indigent prisoner in Potosi Correctional Center, is
the petitioner.
David Vandergriff, Warden of the Potosi Correctional Center, is the
respondent.
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
•
State v. Collings, No. SC92720, 450 S.W.3d 741 (Mo. banc 2014). Judgment
entered August 19, 2014.
•
Collings v. Missouri, No. 14-7051, 574 U.S. 1160 (2015) (Mem.).
•
State v. Collings, No. SC 96118, 543 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. banc 2018). Judgment
•
Collings v. Missouri, No. 18-5278, 139 S. Ct. 247 (2018) (Mem.).
•
Collings v. Griffith, No. 4:18-cv-08000-MDH, 2022 WL 4677562 (W.D. Mo.
•
Collings v. Griffith, No. 23-1064, 2023 WL 9231488, at *1 (8th Cir. June 28,
entered March 6, 2018.
Sept. 30, 2022). Judgment entered September 20, 2022.
2023). Judgment entered June 28, 2023.
•
Collings v. Vandergriff, No. 23-6703, 144 S. Ct. 1123 (2024) (Mem.).
•
State v. Collings, No. SC92720, Supreme Court of Missouri. Order setting
•
December 3, 2024 execution date entered August 13, 2024.
State of Missouri ex rel. Collings v. Vandergriff., No. SC100640, Supreme
Court of Missouri. Judgment entered August 15, 2024.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
OPINIONS BELOW ...................................................................................................... 0
JURISDICTION............................................................................................................. 0
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED......................................................... 0
STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................................................................... 0
A.
B.
Factual Background ................................................................................... 4
1.
David Spears confessed to killing R.F. ......................................... 4
2.
Clinton Clark sought a confession from Collings. ........................ 7
3.
The State failed to disclose Chief Clark’s prior convictions......... 9
Procedural Background ............................................................................ 14
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................................................................. 17
A.
This Court’s precedent establishes that a petitioner shows “cause” when
the State’s suppression of the relevant evidence was the reason for the
petitioner’s failure to develop facts in state-court proceedings. ............. 17
B.
A prosecutor’s dishonest or unwarranted concealment of impeachment
information of its witnesses should not warrant judicial approbation. . 19
C.
This Court’s precedent establishes that all impeachment evidence is
relevant to the prejudice analysis and courts must consider all
suppressed evidence in its entirety.......................................................... 21
D.
One can hardly be confident that Collings received a fair trial due to the
State’s suppression of the impeachment evidence of its principal
witness. ..................................................................................................... 24
E.
This Court is presently addressing the same questions this case
presents. .................................................................................................... 27
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 29
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page(s)
Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988) ........................................................................ 19
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) ............................................. 2, 3, 19, 20, 22, 28
Berger v. United States., 295 U.S. 78 (1935) ............................................................ 19
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ............................ 1, 2, 3, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 29
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) ......................................................... 27
Charron v. Gammon, 69 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 1995) .................................................... 16
Collings v. Griffith, No. 4:18-cv-08000-MDH, 2022 WL 4677562 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 30,
2022) ..................................................................................................................... 15, 16
Collings v. Griffith, No. 23-1064, 2023 WL 9231488 (8th Cir. June 28, 2023) ....... 16
Collings v. Vandergriff, 144 S. Ct. 1123 (2024) ........................................................ 16
Farmer v. Ratelle, 131 F.3d 146 (9th Cir. 1997) ...................................................... 27
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) ..................................................... 1-2, 18
Glossip v. Oklahoma, 144 S. Ct. 691 (2024) .......................................................... 4, 28
Glossip v. State, 2023 OK CR 5, 529 P.3d 218, cert. granted, 144 S. Ct. 691 (2024)
............................................................................................................................... 28, 29
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) ............................................. 2, 4, 16, 19, 22, 24
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 536 (1966) ............................................ 2, 10, 12, 25, 26
Mitchell v. Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667 (Mo banc 2010) ....................................... 24-25
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) .................................................................... 19
Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1983) ....................................................... 27
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005) ....................................................................... 15
Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022) ..................................................................... 15
State ex rel. Engel v. Dormire, 304 S.W.3d 120 (Mo. banc 2010) .............................. 3
State ex rel. Jackson County Grand Jury v. Shinn, 835 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. App. W.D.
1992) ........................................................................................................................... 22
iv
State v. Callahan, 573 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. App. 1978) ................................................ 23
State v. Collings, 450 S.W.3d 741 (Mo. banc 2014) .................... 5, 8, 9, 14, 16, 17, 24
State v. Collings, 543 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. banc 2018) ........................................................ 5
State v. Himmelman, 399 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1966) ...................................................... 23
State v. Mitchell, 659 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. App. 1983) ...................................................... 23
State v. Zinn, 562 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. App. 1978) ........................................................ 23
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ................................................... 15-16
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) ................................. 1, 2, 3, 4, 18, 19, 22, 24
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) ................................................. 1, 15, 18
United States v. Brenizer, 20 M.J. 78 (C.M.A. 1985) ............................................... 23
Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S. 385 (2016) ............................................................... 4, 25, 27
Statutes and Rules
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ...................................................................................................... 1
R.S.Mo. § 590.080.1 ................................................................................................... 24
R.S.Mo. § 590.080.2(2) .............................................................................................. 24
R.S.Mo. § 590.100.1 ................................................................................................... 24
Rule 13.1 ...................................................................................................................... 1
Other
Licensing Information, Missouri Department of Public Safety,
https://dps.mo.gov/dir/programs/post/licensing.php. ................................................ 24
Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt Is
Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is No Excuse, 66
Brook. L. Rev. 1011 (2001) ................................................................................... 27-28
U.S. Department of Justice, National Crime Information Systems,
https://www.justice.gov/tribal/national-crime-information-systems ....................... 21
v
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Christopher Collings respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the
final order of the Supreme Court of Missouri.
OPINIONS BELOW
The judgment and mandate of the Supreme Court of Missouri is unreported
and reproduced in the appendix at 1a-3a.
JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Missouri entered judgment on August 15, 2024. App.
1a. This petition is timely under Rule 13.1, and this Court has jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1257(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United Stated Constitution states in
relevant part, “nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Under Brady v Maryland, prosecutors must disclose evidence that a
defendant may use to impeach a government witness. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) (finding that the prosecution’s duty to disclose
encompasses impeachment evidence); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676
(1985) (“Impeachment evidence . . . falls within the Brady rule.”); Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972) (clarifying that Brady applies to evidence
0
undermining witness credibility). Brady provides that “the individual prosecutor,”
not the defendant, has the “duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the
others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.” Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). A rule “declaring ‘prosecutor may hide, defendant
must seek,’ is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendants
due process.” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004); see also Strickler, 527 U.S.
at 280.
In this capital case, the State built its case on the credibility of its primary
law enforcement witness, Wheaton Police Chief Clinton Clark. Clark’s testimony
was the only evidence suggesting that Collings received a Miranda warning prior to
Clark’s interrogation of Collings, and the statements Clark obtained directly
contradicted the victim’s stepfather’s confession to being the only person who
committed the fatal act. However, although Clark had at least four criminal
convictions for AWOL, the State never provided Clark’s four convictions (nor any of
Clark’s other relevant impeachment material requested in Collings’s motion for
discovery in the court below) to Collings’s trial, direct appeal, or post-conviction
counsel. In addition to their inherent impeachment value, Clark’s convictions—had
he disclosed them on his law enforcement application—may have disqualified Clark
from serving as a police officer at all.
The only reason Collings now knows that Clark’s convictions exist is that
after the conclusion of Collings’s trial, direct appeal, and post-conviction
proceedings, the State finally disclosed the convictions in Collings’s federal habeas
1
proceedings. Only the State possessed or had access to Clark’s convictions, and
Collings did not have any other way of obtaining this impeachment information but
for the State’s disclosure of it.
After the State disclosed Clark’s impeachment evidence, Collings pursued
state-court habeas relief. This action required Collings to establish “cause and
prejudice.” State ex rel. Engel v. Dormire, 304 S.W.3d 120, 125 (Mo. banc 2010).
“Cause is established where there is a factor at issue external to the defense or
beyond its responsibilities.” Engel, 304 S.W.3d at 125-26 (citing Strickler, 527 U.S.
at 283 n.24). “[P]rejudice is identical to” that necessary to warrant relief under
Brady. Id. at 126. Accordingly, “[c]ause and prejudice parallel two of the three
components of the alleged Brady violation itself.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282. 1
“Corresponding to the second Brady component (evidence suppressed by the State),
a petitioner shows ‘cause’ when the reason for his failure to develop facts in statecourt proceedings was the State's suppression of the relevant evidence; coincident
with the third Brady component (prejudice), prejudice within the compass of the
‘cause and prejudice’ requirement exists when the suppressed evidence is ‘material’
for Brady purposes.” Banks, 540 U.S. at 691.
As to cause, there is no dispute that the State did not provide the
impeachment evidence to Collings’s prior counsel. And although the State contends
1 A defendant seeking relief due to the prosecution’s abdication of its duty to
disclose must satisfy three components: “The evidence at issue must be favorable to
the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that
evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently;
and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82.
2
that Collings should and could have obtained the impeachment information on his
own, neither the law nor the evidence supports this conclusion. Nonetheless, despite
Kyles, Strickler, and Banks, the lower court did not find that Collings established
cause.
Nor did the lower court find prejudice. A petitioner “must show only that the
new evidence is sufficient to ‘undermine confidence’ in the verdict.” Wearry v. Cain,
577 U.S. 385, 392 (2016). The State urged that Clark’s four convictions were
irrelevant to the prejudice analysis because they occurred decades before Clark had
anything to do with Collings’s case. Sugg in Opp. at 5. But a reviewing court must
consider all suppressed impeachment evidence; older convictions are not
meaningless for impeachment purposes. See Kyles, 514 at 441; Strickler, 527 U.S.
at 281-82. And without question, the State’s case—particularly at the suppression
hearing and the sentencing phase of the trial—hinged on the factfinders’ crediting
Clark’s account over the defense account, which is the precise situation in which
impeachment evidence discrediting a prosecution witness is most meaningful. See
Wearry, 577 U.S. at 392-93.
The opinion below is directly contrary to relevant decisions of this Court. Like
Glossip v. Oklahoma, 144 S. Ct. 691, 692 (2024) (Mem.), this case thus presents a
clear opportunity for this Court to address important due process concerns arising
out of the prosecution’s suppression of impeachment evidence until after the
conclusion of the defendant’s trial, direct appeal, and initial-review post-conviction
proceedings.
3
A.
Factual Background
1.
David Spears confessed to killing R.F.
Nine-year-old R.F. lived with her mother, Colleen Munson, and stepfather,
David Spears, in Stella, Missouri. State v. Collings, 450 S.W.3d 741, 747 (Mo. banc
2014). On November 2, 2007, Spears, Christopher Collings, and Nathan Mahurin
were drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana together at Spears’s house. Collings
v. State, 543 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. banc 2018). Later in the evening, the three men went
to Collings’s trailer and left R.F. home alone. Id. On the way, they stopped at a
convenience store and purchased more alcohol. Id. They continued drinking and
smoking at Collings’s trailer for about an hour, and then Mahurin and Spears left.
Id. Mahurin took back roads to take Spears home and then Mahurin returned to his
home. Id.
The next morning, Munson returned from her overnight work shift and could
not find R.F. Id. Munson woke Spears and asked him where R.F. was. Id. Spears
said R.F. was staying with a friend, but he could not identify the friend; his
insistence that R.F. was with a friend caused Munson to delay calling the police.
Collings, 450 S.W.3d at 747. Later that afternoon, Munson contacted the local
sheriff's department to report R.F. missing. Id. Law enforcement began to
investigate R.F.’s disappearance. Id.
Spears met with investigators on several occasions in the following days. He
told an officer he recalled R.F. waking him and asking permission to go to a friend’s
house. App. 53a-54a. This information was not true.
4
On November 3, 2007, the day after R.F.’s disappearance, Spears called
Mahurin and left a voicemail. App. 57a. Spears told Mahurin to confirm to law
enforcement that Spears left his home with Mahurin to assist Collings with gassing
up his vehicle. App. 57a. This information was not true.
Spears then tried to convince investigators that he only left his residence on
the night his stepdaughter disappeared for a few minutes. App. 58a-59a. He said he
and Mahurin departed the residence to take gas to Collings as Collings had run out
on his drive home. App. 58a-59a. However, Munson informed law enforcement that
Collings did not have a vehicle at the house that night, and Mahurin provided
Spears’s voicemail to law enforcement. App. 58a-59a. When law enforcement
confronted Spears about the lies, he then admitted Collings did not have a vehicle
at his home that night. App. 58a-59a. Spears acknowledged he left R.F. at home
alone when the three men traveled to Collings’s home. App. 58a-59a.
After hearing about R.F.’s disappearance, Amber Walters, who was a
childhood friend of Spears, went to see Spears and check on how he was doing. App.
60a. Spears was focused on his relationship with Munson and lamented that the
disappearance negatively impacted his marriage. App. 60a. Spears did not express
any concern for R.F. App. 60a. Spears offered that he didn’t know where R.F. was
located, but if he were going to dispose of a body, he would do it in the Fox Sinkhole.
App. 60a.
On November 7, 2007, Spears agreed to ride with Mark Bridges, Newton
County Coroner, to search for R.F. Bridges was friendly with Spears and had
5
employed Spears at his car dealership in Neosho, Missouri. App. 130a. Investigators
believed Spears would be willing to speak openly with Bridges during the ridealong, so they had Bridges wear a recording device. App. 136a.
Spears directed Bridges to the Fox Sinkhole despite its remote location. App.
68a, 69a, 70a. Spears was familiar with the sinkhole and believed it would be an
ideal location to hide a body. App. 70a. Once there, Spears located the opening, and
both Bridges and Spears peered into the cave. App. 75a. Bridges mentioned that he
thought he could see something at the bottom of the hole. App. 75a-77a.
On November 9, 2007, law enforcement returned to the Fox Sinkhole and
discovered R.F.’s body. Later that day, Spears confessed to having raped and
murdered R.F. App. 109a. He said he drove to the Collings property and found R.F.
and Collings together. App. 109a. Spears admitted he had intercourse with R.F. and
then used a string or cord to strangle her to death. App. 109a. He did so after
Collings purportedly stated, “It’s gotta be done.” App. 109a-110a. Spears loaded R.F.
into the back of his mother’s Chevrolet Suburban and drove her to the Fox Sinkhole
to dispose of her body. App. 110a. Spears claimed that Collings was with him at the
sinkhole. App. 110a.
Spears’s confession matched the investigative timeline. Mahurin dropped
Spears off at his residence near midnight on November 2, 2007. Trial Tr. Vol. 10,
pp. 3734-35. Spears then called his mother to borrow her Suburban and left his
residence shortly after she arrived. Trial Tr. Vol. 19, pp. 5887-88. After Spears left
6
his home in his mother’s Suburban, his whereabouts were unknown, and he did not
return home until just before 7:00 AM on November 3, 2007. Id. at 5888-89.
Spears’s confession also matched with the cadaver dog evidence. Spears
stated R.F.’s body was in the Suburban Spears drove that night. App. 109a-110a..
Investigators used a cadaver dog to search various locations thought to be
associated with the murder. Trial Tr. Vol. 19, pp. 5906-23. Only the Suburban had
positive identifications. Id. The trained cadaver dog positively identified locations at
the driver’s side door as well as in the cargo area of the vehicle. Id. at 5915, 5918. 2
2.
Clinton Clark sought a confession from Collings.
While law enforcement naturally focused the bulk of their attention on
Spears, law enforcement also repeatedly questioned Collings about his potential
involvement because Collings was one of the last people to see R.F. alive. Wheaton
Police Chief Clinton Clark viewed Collings as a suspect and affirmatively contacted
law enforcement handling the investigation seeking to be investigate and pursue a
confession from Collings. Supp. Trial Tr. Vol 6, p. 1219. After speaking with
Collings, “Chief Clark contacted the FBI and told them about his talk with Collings.
The FBI believed if Collings were going to confess or reveal any information, it
would be to Chief Clark. Hence, the FBI encouraged Chief Clark to help in the
2 Given Spears’s confession and its consistency with the physical evidence, law
enforcement charged Spears with R.F.’s murder. After Collings’s trial, the State
struck a deal with Spears in which he pleaded guilty to endangering the welfare of a
child and hindering a felony prosecution and received consecutive four- and sevenyear sentences. State of Missouri v. David Wesley Spears, Pulaski County Circuit
Court No. 08PU-CR00681-01.
7
investigation, to which Chief Clark agreed.” Collings, 450 S.W.3d at 749. Afterward,
Clark actively pursued questioning of Collings expressly to extract a confession.
Supp. Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 586, 604; Supp. Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 662-63.
Clark obtained authorization to make additional approaches to Collings, and
Clark did so on several occasions in the week following R.F.’s disappearance.
Collings, 450 S.W.3d at 749-50. Clark then reported back his findings to the FBI. Id.
On November 9, 2007, Collings made several statements to Clark. The first was an
unrecorded statement made at the Muncie Bridge outside of Wheaton, Missouri. Id.
at 50-51. According to Clark, while at the Muncie Bridge, Collings confessed to
raping and killing R.F. Id. After returning to the Wheaton Police Department,
Collings gave another statement that was unrecorded. Id. at 751. Collings later
gave two more statements that were videorecorded. Id. at 751-52.
The State charged Collings with R.F’.’s murder. Afterward, even though
Clark knew—from attending Collings’s arraignment and from Collings himself—
that Collings was represented by counsel who had advised Collings not to talk about
his case, Clark continued “to pose questions and interject personal comments about
their relationship in an effort to get Collings to speak.” Collings, 450 S.W.3d at 757.
This questioning, which Clark knew was being recorded, went on for approximately
40 minutes, even though “Collings stated unequivocally, at least nine times, that he
could not answer any questions regarding the case on the advice of counsel.” Id. The
Missouri Supreme Court determined Clark’s conduct was an “egregious and blatant
violation of Collings’ constitutional rights[.]” Id. at 758.
8
3.
The State failed to disclose Chief Clark’s prior convictions.
The State’s case against Collings heavily depended on the statements Clark
obtained from Collings on November 9, 2007. Unlike Spears, the cadaver dog
evidence did not implicate Collings. The physical evidence collected from Collings’s
property and offered against him—a random piece of string and ashes from a burn
barrel—was not collected until after the statements, and without the statements,
this evidence would have lacked relevance for admission. The only other physical
evidence included a tenuous hair comparison and a partial DNA profile.
On January 22, 2008, Collings requested impeachment information under
Brady regarding the State’s witnesses, including Clark. Trial L.F. Vol. 1, p. 12; App.
167a. Defense counsel subsequently made additional discovery requests for
impeachment information. Trial L.F. Vol. 2, pp. 261-62.
The State knew that a principal issue at the suppression hearing was
whether Clark provided Miranda warnings prior to the Muncie Bridge
interrogation. The only evidence suggesting that Clark did so was Clark’s testimony
itself; all the other available evidence regarding the timing of the Miranda warnings
contradicted Clark’s testimony. The State also knew that Spears had confessed to
being the sole person who killed R.F., which contradicted the statements Clark
obtained from Collings, and that the State intended to use Clark’s testimony to
convict Collings and secure a death sentence. Nonetheless, throughout the 1,002
days (or two years, eight months, and 28 days) that elapsed between Collings’s
request for impeachment material and the start of the suppression hearing on
9
October 20, 2010, the State failed to disclose any information about Clark’s criminal
history.
Approximately five months later, on or about April 1, 2011, after the
suppression hearing but before the trial, the State made the following disclosure
regarding Clark’s criminal history:
Chief Clint Clark, Wheaton Police Department, had one reported
incident being arrested in Barry County on January 6, 1968 for
Desertion from the U.S. Army with the charge amended to AWOL and
an investigative arrest in Rogers, Arkansas on November 5, 1968 for
investigation of forgery with no disposition shown on either charge.
App. 114a. The State asserted that it was providing all impeachment information
concerning Clark. App. 112a-114a. The State later confirmed that it had disclosed
all relevant Brady information. Trial Supp. L.F. Vol. 2, p. 235.
However, the State’s disclosure regarding Clark’s criminal history was both
incorrect and incomplete. Clark’s desertion arrest did have a disposition: a
conviction for AWOL. Supp. App. 1sa. Clark also had three additional convictions
and sentences for AWOL. 3 Supp. App. 3sa-6sa, 9sa-10sa. Although voir dire did not
begin until February 27, 2012, the State never disclosed Clark’s AWOL convictions
during the trial proceedings nor the direct appeal or initial-review post-conviction
proceedings.
3 Collings does not know whether Clark also was convicted of forgery. The State has
never disclosed this information to Collings, and the lower court—despite the newly
disclosed evidence of Clark’s AWOL convictions—overruled Collings’s motion for
discovery requesting such records.
10
After all these proceedings concluded, the State finally disclosed Clark’s prior
convictions in response to Collings’s petition for federal habeas relief. The State’s
records acknowledged that Clark’s arrest on January 6, 1968, in fact led to an
AWOL conviction and sentence. Supp. App. 1sa. The records also revealed three
additional convictions for the same offense. Supp. App. 3sa-6sa, 9sa-10sa. Clark was
ordered to serve a sentence of six months of hard labor in the Post Stockade at Fort
Leonard Wood, Missouri. Clark was then released in January 1969, and within
three weeks of his release, he deserted his post again until he was apprehended on
or about May 9, 1969. Supp. App. 13sa-14sa, 16sa. Clark was again sentenced to six
months imprisonment in the Post Stockade at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri until
his discharge “under conditions other than honorable” on October 23, 1969. Supp.
App. 16sa. Clark was absent or in-custody for 726 of the 890 days of his service in
the military. Supp. App. 16sa.
The State’s withholding of Clark’s convictions prevented trial counsel from
inquiring about the circumstances of Clark’s convictions during his deposition and
from using the convictions to impeach Clark at the suppression hearing and at trial.
App. 39a-42a, 45a-47a. The only evidence suggesting that Clark provided Miranda
warnings to Collings prior to the Muncie Bridge interrogation was Clark’s
testimony itself. Contrary to Clark’s testimony, the case records showed that the
Miranda form was signed at 3:00 PM, after the initial interrogation at the Muncie
Bridge. App. 166a. Similarly, corroborating testimony from two law enforcement
officers observed Collings sign the form after he returned from the initial
11
interrogation at the Muncie Bridge. Supp. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 258, 321, 326-27.
Furthermore, this timing was consistent with Chief Clark’s own call log indicating
that he and Collings arrived back at the station following the Muncie Bridge
interrogation at approximately 3:00 PM. Supp. Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 667-70. But due to the
State’s suppression of Clark’s convictions and other impeaching information,
Collings was unable to use this evidence to discredit Clark’s testimony.
The State continued to withhold the impeaching information throughout
Collings’s pre-trial and trial proceedings, which likewise prevented Collings from
using it at trial. For example, when Clark added details furthering the State’s
narrative that he had not shared in the various times he previously testified under
oath, Trial Tr. Vol. 13, pp. 4578-4601, the State’s failure to disclose prevented
counsel from using Clark’s convictions to impeach him. The State’s suppression also
prevented Collings from investigating whether Clark’s convictions disqualified him
from servicing as a police officer or whether he disclosed the convictions as part of
his application to be a police officer. App. 41a-42a, 46a.
The suppression of Clark’s convictions also prevented Collings from relying
on them to establish residual doubt, which was one of the principal arguments for a
sentence other than death. PCR Tr. Vol. 2, p. 390. Defense counsel presented
evidence establishing that Spears was one of the last people to see R.F. alive, that
he acted suspiciously the day she disappeared, and that dogs alerted to the scent of
human remains in the Suburban that he was driving on the night of the offense.
Trial Tr. Vol. 10, pp. 3647, 3650, 3652-53, 3695; Vol. 19, pp. 5905, 5913. Although
12
counsel did not present Spears’s confession to raping and killing R.F., counsel did
present the statements of law enforcement officers providing evidence of Spears’s
involvement to Collings. Trial Tr. Vol. 14, pp. 4847-64; PCR Ex. 29.
If Spears’s confession that he was the sole person who committed the fatal act
was true, then Collings’s confession—obtained by Clark—could not also have been
true. App. 42a; Trial Tr. Vol. 20, p. 6489. The jury thus would have had reason to
question whether the police tactics and investigation implicating Collings were
reliable. Id. But due to the State’s suppression of Clark’s prior convictions, the jury
could not consider Clark’s convictions when assessing residual doubt. Id.
The State continued to withhold Clark’s convictions throughout Collings’s
initial-review post-conviction proceedings. App. 50a. As with trial counsel, this
failure to disclose prevented post-conviction counsel from investigating whether
Clark’s convictions should have disqualified him from servicing as a police officer
and whether he disclosed his convictions as part of his law enforcement application.
App. 50a-51a. The State’s failure also prevented post-conviction counsel from
including Clark’s convictions in their claims regarding the reliability of Collings’s
confession. App. 51a. Furthermore, the State’s withholding prevented postconviction counsel from raising any due process claims under Brady stemming from
the State’s failure to disclose the convictions to trial counsel as well as any other
potential claims related to the relationship of Clark’s convictions and his service as
a police officer. App. 51a.
13
B.
Procedural Background
After the conclusion of Collings’s state post-conviction proceedings, Collings
petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief. That petition included a Brady claim
regarding the culpability phase of the trial. In response to that claim, the State
finally disclosed Clark’s convictions. Supp. App. 1sa-20sa.
During the pendency of the habeas petition, this Court issued its decision in
Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022). Collings sought a stay of the habeas
proceedings in the federal district court under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005),
so he could return to state court to comply with the new obligations of Ramirez. The
State opposed the motion and further contended that, although the State had never
previously disclosed Clark’s convictions, because the withheld evidence was not a
part of the prior state court record, the district court could not consider it. App.
123a.
The district court denied the Rhines motion and entered a separate order
denying habeas relief. Collings v. Griffith, No. 18-CV-08000-MDH, 2022 WL
4677562, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2022). The district court found that Collings
(who was limited to the prior state court record that did not include Clark’s
convictions) had not shown that a failure to disclose occurred. Id. at *11. The court
ruled that even if it could consider Clark’s convictions, Collings could not show
prejudice. Id. In this ruling, the court applied a higher prejudice standard than this
Court applies to Brady claims. Contrast Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (equating the
Brady materiality standard with the reasonable probability standard of Strickland
14
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)) with Collings, 2022 WL 4677562 at *8 (finding
that “the standard of prejudice is higher than that required to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland.”) (citing Charron v. Gammon, 69 F.3d 851,
858 (8th Cir. 1995)). The Eighth Circuit denied Collings’s application for appellate
review. Collings v. Griffith, No. 23-1064, 2023 WL 9231488, at *1 (8th Cir. June 28,
2023).
Collings subsequently requested review in this Court. On April 2, 2024, this
Court declined to grant review. Collings v. Vandergriff, 144 S. Ct. 1123 (2024).
The next day, the State moved the Missouri Supreme Court to set Collings’s
execution date. State v. Collings, No. SC92720. On June 27, 2024, Collings timely
initiated a state habeas action asserting Brady violations that invalidated Collings’s
conviction and sentence. App. 4a. The petition asserted that under Strickler and
Banks, Collings established “cause” for not presenting the claim earlier due to
events or circumstances external to the defense: the State’s suppression of the
impeachment information. App. 6a, 29a-30a, 35a-36a. The petition further asserted
that, under Brady’s materiality test, the State’s suppression of the impeachment
information prejudiced Collings. App. 6a, 25a-29a, 31a, 33a-35a, 36a. Collings
requested that the court deny or stay the State’s motion to set an execution date so
that the Brady claims could be fully and properly adjudicated. App. 36a-37a.
On July 1, 2024, Collings moved for discovery. App. 175a. In support of this
motion, Collings relied on Amendments 5, 6, 8 and 14 to the United States
Constitution; Brady, Kyles, and their progeny; and his rights to due process and a
15
full and fair hearing in state post-conviction and habeas corpus proceedings. App.
175a. Collings requested the entirety of the information in Clark’s criminal history
records, including any additional impeachment information regarding Clark’s
AWOL convictions and as well as the disposition of Clark’s arrest for forgery, and
Clark’s law enforcement application and other relevant law enforcement
employment or licensing records. App. 176a-177a, 184a-186a.
The Missouri Supreme Court issued an order requesting that the State
respond, and on July 3, 3034, the State responded to the petition. App. 188a. The
State acknowledged that it never provided Clark’s convictions to Collings prior
counsel but posited that it did not have any duty to provide this impeachment
information to Collings’s counsel. App. 188a-189a, 191a. The State argued trial
counsel should have known about Clark’s multiple AWOL convictions, and because
trial counsel did not obtain Clark’s convictions on their own, Collings could not
establish cause for failing to present his Brady claims earlier. App. 192a. In in
response to Collings’s prejudice showing, the State only offered one conclusory
statement: that Clark’s four convictions occurred “in the 1960s decades before he
had anything to do with Petitioner’s case.” App. 192a. Collings timely replied on
July 17, 2024. App. 194a.
On August 13, 2024, the Missouri Supreme Court ordered Collings to be
executed on December 3, 2024. State v. Collings, No. SC92720. Two days later, on
August 15, 2024, the court overruled the motion for discovery and denied the
habeas petition. App. 1a-3a.
16
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
A. This Court’s precedent establishes that a petitioner shows “cause” when the
State’s suppression of the relevant evidence was the reason for the
petitioner’s failure to develop facts in state-court proceedings.
The decision below is contrary to controlling precedent of this Court. It is
beyond question that the State had a duty to disclose Clark’s convictions and any
other impeachment evidence. See, e.g., Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280; Bagley, 473 U.S.
at 676; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-54.
The State does not dispute that although Clark has at least four convictions
for AWOL, the State never provided Clark’s convictions (nor any of Clark’s other
relevant impeachment material requested in Collings’s motion for discovery in the
court below) to Collings’s trial, direct appeal, or post-conviction counsel. App. 188a189a. However, in response Collings’s contention that this failure to disclose was a
circumstance external to the defense that prevented Collings’s prior counsel from
developing and presenting the grounds for the due process violations, the State
contends that it did not have any duty to provide the impeachment information.
App. 188a-189a, 191a. Rather, the State posits, trial counsel should have known
about Clark’s multiple AWOL convictions, and because trial counsel did not obtain
Clark’s convictions on their own, Collings could not establish cause for failing to
present his Brady claims earlier. App. 192a.
This Court has resoundingly rejected this argument. It is “the individual
prosecutor,” not the defendant, who has the “duty to learn of any favorable evidence
known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the
17
police.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. When the State has not disclosed impeachment
information, “defense counsel has no ‘procedural obligation to assert constitutional
error on the basis of mere suspicion that some prosecutorial misstep may have
occurred.’” Banks, 540 U.S. at 696 (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 286-87). Instead,
the “cause” inquiry “turns on events or circumstances ‘external to the defense.’” Id.
(citing Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222 (1988) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 488 (1986))). These circumstances include the State’s suppression of
relevant evidence. Id. at 691.
In Banks, the prosecutor argued that the “‘the prosecution can lie and conceal
and the prisoner still has the burden to ... discover the evidence[.]’” Id. at 696
(quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 35). This Court found that its prior “decisions lend no
support to the notion that defendants must scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady
material when the prosecution represents that all such material has been
disclosed.” Id. at 695. This Court further explained that given the “‘special role
played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials[,]’” id. at
696 (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281), “[c]ourts, litigants, and juries properly
anticipate that ‘obligations [to refrain from improper methods to secure a
conviction] ... plainly rest[ing] upon the prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully
observed.’” Id. (quoting Berger v. United States., 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
Accordingly, this Court rejected a rule “declaring ‘prosecutor may hide, defendant
must seek,’ [because it] is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord
defendants due process.” Id.
18
Here, as in Banks, the prosecution withheld impeachment information from
the defense, (Supp. App. 1sa-20sa), asserted that it had provided all impeachment
information concerning Clark (App. 112a-114a), and later confirmed that it had
disclosed all relevant Brady information, (Trial Supp. L.F. Vol. 2, p. 235). Under
Banks, a defendant is entitled to rely on the prosecutor’s duty to be truthful, not to
“stoop to improper litigation conduct to advance prospects for gaining a conviction,”
and properly discharge prosecutorial duties regarding discovery. 540 U.S. at 694.
When it later comes to light that the prosecutor did not fulfill this duty, the
defendant has established cause for not presenting the Brady material earlier. Id.
The decision below conflicts with this Court’s long-established precedent.
B.
A prosecutor’s dishonest or unwarranted concealment of impeachment
information of its witnesses should not warrant judicial approbation.
Despite this Court’s rulings in Banks and Strickler, prosecutors continue to
argue—as in this case—that their failure to disclose impeachment information does
not constitute cause for a defendant’s failure to bring a Brady claim. A state court’s
explicit or implicit acceptance of this argument effectively greenlights the State’s
withholding of all impeachment evidence in future cases. So long as the State
withholds the information throughout the defendant’s direct appeal and postconviction proceedings, if the State’s suppression cannot constitute cause, the
defendant will never have any opportunity for a reviewing court to redress the
constitutional violation arising from the State’s abdication of its duty. This
approach is antithetical to the prosecution’s constitutional duties and the
defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.
19
Permitting prosecutors to conceal impeachment information discrediting
their own witnesses is not consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
guarantees. Often, the State is the only party who has access to the impeachment
information. This case provides a perfect illustration of that reality. Collings’s
current counsel attempted to follow up on the State’s limited trial disclosure
regarding Clark by requesting a complete copy of his military records, but counsel
did not have the access to obtain the relevant impeachment information.
Accordingly, the response Collings received did not provide any evidence of Clark’s
prior convictions. App. 171a-174a. However, the State did not face any barriers to
Clark’s information, including all his convictions, sentencing details, and additional
military records relevant to his credibility. Contrast Supp. App. 1sa-20sa with App.
171a-174a. Only the State possessed or had had access to Clark’s prior convictions,
and Collings did not have any way of obtaining this information on his own.
Similarly, Collings would not have been able to obtain on his own the other
impeachment information requested in his motion for discovery. Only the State has
access to the NCIC databases containing the disposition of Clark’s forgery charge.
U.S. Department of Justice, National Crime Information Systems,
https://www.justice.gov/tribal/national-crime-information-systems (explaining that
NCIC is “[a] criminal records database allowing criminal justice agencies . . . to get
criminal histories) (emphasis added). Likewise, only the State has access to Clark’s
law enforcement application (on which he should have disclosed his convictions) or
any other law enforcement employment or licensing records containing (or not
20
containing) information about his convictions. State ex rel. Jackson County Grand
Jury v. Shinn, 835 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992) (concluding that the public
policy of Missouri is that personnel records of police officers are closed to the
public). 4 The State also had unique access to Chief Clark as he was an integral part
of the State’s case-in-chief against Collings.
Unlike a prosecutor, a criminal defendant does not have access to
impeachment information pertaining to the State’s law enforcement witnesses.
“Prosecutors’ dishonest conduct or unwarranted concealment [of this information]
should attract no judicial approbation.” Banks, 540 U.S. at 696.
C.
This Court’s precedent establishes that all impeachment evidence is
relevant to the prejudice analysis and courts must consider all
suppressed evidence in its entirety.
The decision below also conflicts with this Court’s controlling precedent
regarding the prejudice inquiry. In the proceedings below, the State responded to
Collings’s prejudice showing with only one conclusory statement: that Clark’s four
convictions occurred “in the 1960s decades before he had anything to do with
Petitioner’s case.” App. 192a. However, this Court has repeatedly held that the
Brady prejudice inquiry must include the entirety of the suppressed evidence, which
necessarily includes all suppressed impeachment evidence. Kyles, 514 at 441;
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82. Thus, the fact that a witness’ multiple convictions
4 Due to the State’s failure to disclose Clark’s convictions, Collings’s prior counsel
did not know that there was a particular need to examine Clark’s law enforcement
application or other employment records. App. 41a, 46a, 50a-51a.
21
occurred prior to the witness’ conduct in the case does not render the convictions
irrelevant to the witness’ credibility.
For example, courts have specifically recognized the impeaching value of a
prior conviction like AWOL. As one court explained, “a servicemember who thinks
so little of his service commitment as to depart without authority may also take
lightly his obligation to testify truthfully, especially when his own neck is on the
block.” United States v. Brenizer, 20 M.J. 78, 81 (C.M.A. 1985); see also State v.
Mitchell, 659 S.W.2d 4, 5-6 (Mo. App. 1983) (“We do not question the validity of
courts martial for the purposes of military order and discipline. Further, we find
nothing objectionable in the use of courts-martial for the purpose of impeaching a
witnesses’ credibility.”). In fact, the State of Missouri itself has used AWOL
convictions for the precise purpose of impeaching a testifying witness. See, e.g.,
State v. Callahan, 573 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Mo. App. 1978) (noting that the State
interrogated the appellant about being AWOL while a member of the Armed Forces
of the United States under the guise of impeaching the appellant’s credibility); see
also State v. Himmelman, 399 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1966) (evidence of defendant’s courtmartial conviction was properly received for purposes of impeachment); State v.
Zinn, 562 S.W.2d 784, 788 (Mo. App. 1978) (same).
Here, Clark’s convictions were particularly relevant because, like Clark’s
demonstrated disregard for his service commitment, Clark’s conduct in this case
unquestionably showed he took lightly his obligation to respect Collings’s rights. It
is uncontroverted that not long after obtaining Collings’s initial statements and “in
22
an effort to get Collings to speak[,]” Clark engaged in conduct that was an
“egregious and blatant violation of Collings’ constitutional rights[.]” Collings, 450
S.W.3d at 757-58. Given Clark’s egregious and blatant disregard for Collings’ rights,
Clark’s similar blatant disregard for his service commitment—as reflected in his
four prior convictions—would have been relevant to his conduct in this case.
The lower court’s refusal to consider Clark’s law enforcement application
records also is inconsistent with Kyles and Strickler. The lower court knew that
these records were relevant to Clark’s credibility and may even show that Clark
was ineligible to be a police officer. The Missouri Department of Public Safety
licenses peace officers, and under its provisions, “[a] person may be eligible for
licensing as a peace officer if the individual . . . has no criminal history as outlined
in Section 590.080.1 and Section 590.100.1, R.S.Mo.” Licensing Information,
Missouri Department of Public Safety, https://dps.mo.gov/dir/programs/post
/licensing.php. Such history includes convictions resulting from a criminal
prosecution under the laws of the United States, including the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. See R.S.Mo. § 590.080.2(2).
Because Clark’s convictions should have rendered him ineligible to be a police
officer in the first place, Clark may have failed to disclose his convictions on his law
enforcement application. 5 That act would have been a specific act of dishonesty
relevant to his credibility. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667, 670 (Mo
5 Collings does not know whether Clark disclosed these convictions or any others on
his application because the State has never disclosed this information to Collings.
23
banc 2010). But even if Clark did disclose them on his law enforcement application,
because they should have rendered him ineligible to serve, then special
accommodations likely were made due to his prior criminal history.
Either way, Clark’s law enforcement application records—which the State
has continued to suppress—were relevant to the court’s prejudice determination.
The court’s failure to consider them and the prior convictions conflicts with this
Court’s precedent.
D.
One can hardly be confident that Collings received a fair trial due to
the State’s suppression of the impeachment evidence of its principal
witness.
This Court has recognized the reasonable probability of prejudice due to the
State’s suppression of impeaching evidence when the State’s case was “built on the
jury crediting [the State’s witness’s] account rather than [the defense account.]”
Wearry, 577 U.S. at 392-93. Here, the statements Clark obtained and Clark’s
testimony about them were critical to the State’s case at both phases of Collings’s
trial. The State’s suppression of Clark’s impeachment information renders the
outcome of this case unworthy of confidence.
For example, the only evidence the State offered at the suppression hearing
to support Clark’s timing of the Miranda warnings was Clark’s testimony itself. All
the other available evidence regarding the timing of the Miranda warnings
contradicted Clark’s testimony.
The State contended that Clark issued a written Miranda warning to
Collings prior to Collings’s initial interrogation on the Muncie Bridge. However,
24
case records reflected the Miranda form was signed at 3:00 PM, after the initial
interrogation. Supp. Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 657, 666-70. This timing was consistent with the
signed Miranda form, Clark’s Daily Log listing the timing of the warning coming
after the Muncie Bridge confession, as well as the testimony from the two law
enforcement officers who observed Collings sign the form after returning from the
Muncie Bridge. Supp. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 258, 321, 326-27; Supp. Tr. Vol. 6, pp. 1247-48;
App. 128a-129a. Furthermore, the timing was consistent with Clark’s call log
indicating that he and Collings arrived back at the station following the Muncie
Bridge interrogation at approximately 3:00 PM. Supp. Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 667-70.
The State’s case unquestionably relied on crediting Clark’s account rather
than the defense account. Yet due to the State’s suppression, defense counsel was
unable to impeach Clark’s credibility with his prior convictions, not to mention the
other undisclosed impeachment information requested in the Motion for Discovery.
Had defense counsel successfully suppressed the November 9, 2007, statements, the
remaining evidence would have been insufficient to support a conviction for firstdegree murder. 6
Clark’s credibility was again at issue at trial. During his trial testimony,
Clark added details furthering the State’s narrative that he had not shared in the
6 Without the statements, the physical evidence collected from Collings’s property
after the statements and then offered against Collings—a random piece of string
and ashes from a burn barrel—would have lacked relevance for admission. The only
other physical evidence included a tenuous hair comparison and a partial DNA
profile.
25
various times he previously testified under oath. 7 Trial Tr. Vol. 13, pp. 4578-4601.
But again, due to the State’s suppression, the jury was not able to consider Clark’s
convictions in assessing Clark’s credibility.
At sentencing, given that Spears—R.F.’s own stepfather—confessed to raping
and killing R.F., the jury had even more reason to question whether the police
tactics and investigation implicating Collings were reliable. App. 42a; Trial Tr. Vol.
20, p. 6489. If Spears’s confession admitting that he was the sole person who
committed the fatal act was true, then Collings’s confession to being the sole person
committing the fatal act could not also have been true. Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d
1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1983) (concluding that “third party confessions, if believed,
would necessarily exonerate the defendant of the primary offense.”); see also
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (finding that a third-party
confession was “critical evidence” on the question of reasonable doubt). Even if
Spears’s confession was “not completely accepted by the jury, evidence of a thirdparty confession casts a dark cloud of reasonable doubt over the guilt of the
defendant.” Farmer v. Ratelle, 131 F.3d 146, *2 (9th Cir. 1997).
“[L]lingering doubt about the defendant’s guilt . . . is the factor that makes
jurors most likely to reject a death sentence.” Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers,
7 For example, Clark testified that Collings told him that he burned a foam
mattress. Trial Tr. Vol. 13, pp. 4697, 4702. Clark, though, never noted that in his
reports nor did he offer that detail in his sworn deposition. Id. The physical evidence
is inconsistent with Clark’s testimony. App. 125a-127a. Clark also denied Collings
signed a Miranda form while at the police station following his unrecorded
confession at the Muncie Bridge. Trial Tr. Vol. 13, pp. 4672-4676.
26
How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt Is Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death;
and Mitigation Is No Excuse, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 1011, 1058 (2001). However, due to
the State’s suppression, defense counsel was unable to use Clark’s convictions to
question the reliability of Clark’s account, especially considering Spears’s
confession.
Given the trial court and the jury’s ignorance of Clark’s prior convictions,
“one can hardly be confident that [Collings] received a fair trial[.]” Banks, 540 U.S.
at 702.
E.
This Court is presently addressing the same questions this case
presents.
Glossip, 144 S. Ct. at 692, is currently pending before this Court. The
questions presented in Glossip are the same as those presented in this case.
In Glossip, the State did not disclose impeachment evidence of the State’s
“star witness”— information regarding the witness’ psychiatric treatment—until
after the conclusion of Glossip’s initial state-court trial, direct appeal, and postconviction proceedings. Pet. Brief at 8, Glossip v. Oklahoma, No. 22-7466. The state
court found that the petitioner could not establish cause because the defendant
could have obtained the impeachment evidence through the exercise of reasonable
diligence. Glossip v. State, 2023 OK CR 5, ¶ 26, 529 P.3d 218, 226, cert. granted,
144 S. Ct. 691 (2024). The court reasoned that because a pretrial competency report
and the witness’ trial testimony indicated that the witness had taken lithium, the
petitioner’s counsel “knew or should have known about [the witness’] mental health
27
issues[.]” Id. at ¶ 27, 529 P.3d at 226. Thus, the court concluded, “this issue could
have been and should have been raised” in earlier proceedings. Id.
The State makes the same argument here. The State contends that because it
disclosed to trial counsel that Collings had been charged with one count of AWOL,
trial counsel should have known, despite the State’s assertions to the contrary,
about Clark’s multiple AWOL convictions the State did not disclose. App. 189a,
192a. Because Collings’s prior counsel did not obtain these convictions on their own,
the State posits, Collings cannot now establish cause for failing to present his Brady
claims earlier. App. 192a.
The prejudice question in Glossip also is like the question presented here. In
Glossip, the prosecution’s case hinged on the credibility of its star witness, but the
state court made its prejudice finding in isolation without holding any kind of
evidentiary hearing or considering the entirety of the suppressed evidence. Pet.
Brief at 36-38, Glossip v. Oklahoma, No. 22-7466. Here, the State’s case likewise
was built on the jury crediting the star witness’ account rather than the defense
account, and as in Glossip, the court below failed to conduct any kind of factdevelopment procedure and dismissed the claims without considering the entirety of
the suppressed evidence.
Glossip shows that the questions presented in this case similarly warrant
this Court’s review. At a minimum, this Court should stay the resolution of this
petition until this Court decides Glossip.
28
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant the petition for writ of
certiorari or, in the alternative, stay this case until this Court’s resolution of the
questions presented in Glossip.
Respectfully submitted,
_______________________________
Jeremy S. Weis
Daniel E. Kirsch*
Capital Habeas Unit
Federal Public Defender
Western District of Missouri
1000 Walnut St., Ste. 600
Kansas City, MO 64106
T: 816.675.0923
E: Jeremy_Weis@fd.org
E: Daniel_Kirsch@fd.org
Counsel for Christopher Collings
*Counsel of Record
29
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.