Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Reginald L. Hopkins, Petitioner v. United States

APPENDIX A

Case: 23-1836 Document:43 Page:1 Date Filed: 08/02/2024

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 23-1836

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellant

Vv.

REGINALD L. HOPKINS

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

District Court No. 1-21-cr-00177-001

District Judge: The Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson

Argued February 7, 2024

Before: HARDIMAN, SCIRICA, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: July 9, 2024)

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Carlo D. Marchioli [ARGUED]

Office of United States Attorney

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Sylvia H. Rambo United States Courthouse

1501 N. 6" Street, 2"4 Floor

P.O. Box 202

Harrisburg, PA 17102

Counsel for Appellant

John A. Abom [ARGUED]

Abom & Kutulakis

2 W. High Street

Carlisle, PA 17013

Counsel for Appellee

Date Filed: 08/02/2024

OPINION OF THE COURT

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

The Government appeals the District Court’s dismissal

with prejudice of one of two counts set forth in an indictment.

In finding, inter alia, that the Government colluded with state

law enforcement to evade the strictures of the Speedy Trial Act

(“STA” or “the Act”), the District Court invoked a so-called

“ruse exception” to the STA as the basis for granting the

dismissal. The exception is a judicially created carve-out to the

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Act and has not been previously adopted by this Court. Nor

have any of our sister courts of appeals applied a version of the

ruse exception to dismiss a federal charge for violation of a

time limit established by the STA. As the District Court

conceived of the purported exception, a defendant must prove

two elements: first, that state charges were filed for the sole or

primary purpose of preparing a federal criminal prosecution;

and second, that there was collusion between state and federal

authorities. Because we conclude that—at least as it relates to

a prosecution first initiated in a state court—the STA contains

no implied ruse exception, we will reverse the order of the

District Court and reinstate the dismissed count of the

indictment.

I.

A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After Reginald Hopkins was arraigned in the Court of

Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, on, inter

alia, a state firearms offense, and while awaiting his state

preliminary hearing,’ a federal grand jury for the Middle

District of Pennsylvania returned a two-count indictment

against Hopkins. The indictment, which was filed June 23,

2021, charged Hopkins with distributing cocaine base, a

Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1), and for being a felon-in-possession of firearms

and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Hopkins

appeared before a federal magistrate judge for his arraignment

! Hopkins’s state preliminary hearing was continued four

times.

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and entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, the state charges were

withdrawn.

Defense counsel filed numerous unopposed motions to

extend the deadline for filing pretrial motions under Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 and to continue jury selection

and trial. Six motions to continue were filed by two different

defense counsel, each of whom also sought and received leave

to withdraw from the case. Before entry of an appearance by a

third defense counsel, Hopkins filed a pro se motion to dismiss

the indictment for violation of the STA. Because Hopkins was

still represented by counsel, the District Court ordered the

motion to dismiss stricken, without prejudice to refiling with

counsel’s assistance.

Then came a counseled motion to dismiss, arguing that

Hopkins’s rights had been violated under both the STA and the

Sixth Amendment. The District Court scheduled a hearing on

that motion for November 15, 2022. But the day of the hearing,

Hopkins’s attorney—his third—-withdrew. That prompted

another continuance. The District Court appointed counsel

number four, but he was granted leave to withdraw after six

days, which resulted in the appointment of yet a fifth defense

counsel. The District Court conducted an evidentiary hearing

on the motion to dismiss on February 2, 2023.

In a memorandum and order filed the following month,

the District Court concluded that no speedy trial violation had

occurred and therefore denied the motion to dismiss. Hopkins

moved for reconsideration, citing new information disclosed

by the Government. The District Court scheduled a second

evidentiary hearing which was held on March 24, 2023. The

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Court granted the motion to dismiss as to the felon-inpossession count only, denying the motion as to the drug

distribution charge.

The Government filed this timely appeal pursuant to 18

USS.C. § 3731. See United States v. Sanabria, 437 U.S. 54, 69

n.23 (1978) (acknowledging that § 3731 “authorizes appeals

from any order dismissing an indictment in whole or in part”);

United States v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2015).

Simultaneously, it sought to stay Hopkins’s criminal

proceeding pending the resolution of its appeal of the dismissal

of the felon-in-possession count. The District Court denied the

requested stay. Ten days later, at the request of the

Government, the District Court dismissed the § 841(a)(1) drug

distribution charge in Count I of the indictment.

B. BACKGROUND

Against this procedural backdrop, we turn to the

substantive basis of Hopkins’s motion to dismiss and the

District Court’s disposition thereof.

In early 2021, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) received information that

Hopkins “was potentially selling narcotics in Harrisburg” and

“may [have] be[en] in possession of firearms.” App. 4. Based

on this information, Darrin Bates, a police officer with the city

of Harrisburg who was cross designated as an ATF task force

agent (“Bates” or “TFO Bates”), opened a federal investigation

into Hopkins. Pursuant to that investigation, Bates procured a

federal search warrant for an address associated with Hopkins.

ATF agents, along with Bates and several of his colleagues

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from the Harrisburg Police Department, executed the warrant

and recovered firearms, at least one of which had been reported

stolen. Hopkins was present during the search and was arrested

on state charges. As set forth above, Hopkins was subsequently

indicted federally, and the state charges against him were

dropped.

Hopkins moved to dismiss the federal indictment. As

relevant to this appeal, Hopkins invoked a so-called “ruse

exception” to the STA as the primary basis for dismissal. He

asserted that his rights under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(b) and (c)(1)

had been violated because he had been federally indicted over

four months after his arrest by state authorities and because he

had not been brought to trial within 70 days of that state arrest.”

? Section 3161(b) of the Act requires that the Government file

an information or indictment no more than thirty days after the

defendant is either arrested or served with a summons in

connection with the at-issue charges. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b).

Section 3161(c)(1) requires that the defendant’s trial start no

more than seventy days after the later of either the defendant’s

initial appearance or the date on which the information or

indictment is filed and made public. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).

Section 3161(h) lists various periods of delay that are to be

excluded from both clocks,

Section 3162(a)(1) provides the sanction for violations of §

3161(b)’s thirty-day clock, stating, in relevant part, that “[i]f .

. . no indictment or information is filed within the time limit

required by section 3161(b) .. . such charge . . . shall be

dismissed or otherwise dropped.”

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Though he did not dispute that, ordinarily, the provisions of the

STA do not apply to state arrests, Hopkins specifically argued

that his “arrest on state charges brought by ATF TFO Bates,

based upon a federal search warrant applied for and executed

by ATF TFO Bates, began the federal Speedy Trial clock

because the arrest on state charges was merely a ruse to

facilitate federal prosecution.” Dkt. No. 66 at 6 (emphasis

added) (footnote omitted).3

The District Court held an evidentiary hearing at which

Bates testified. Bates stated that his contact in the U.S.

Attorney’s Office, Johnny Baer (“Baer” or “AUSA Baer”), had

asked him whether he “had enough to charge [Hopkins] in the

state [system]. [Bates] said yes.” App. 104. Bates also

confirmed that Baer “told [him] to go ahead and do the state

charges.” App. 101. And Bates unequivocally denied having

ever “discuss[ed] a charging document” with AUSA Baer.

App. 102.

In a memorandum explaining its order denying the

counseled motion to dismiss, the District Court concluded that

it would “assume, without deciding, that the ‘ruse exception’

Section 3162(a)(2) contains a dismissal sanction for violations

of § 3161(c). It provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f a defendant

is not brought to trial within the time limit required by section

3161(c) . . . the information or indictment shall be dismissed

on motion of the defendant.”

3 Citations preceded by “Dkt.” refer to entries on the District

Court’s docket (1:21-cr-177, M.D. Pa.).

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could apply for purposes of resolving [Hopkins’s] motion.”

App. 162-63. The District Court specifically acknowledged in

the memorandum that “the Third Circuit has not yet decided

whether [to adopt] the ‘ruse exception[,]’” but concluded that

because our Court “has considered and discussed it . . . rather

than rejecting its application,” we “[might] be willing to adopt

it” if “the right circumstances arose.” App. 162 (internal

citations omitted). The Court concluded that the facts of

Hopkins’s case made “the argument in favor of applying the

‘ruse exception’ colorable,” App. 165,4 yet acknowledged that

the case “present[ed] . . . a close call,” App. 168.

Ultimately, the District Court denied the motion

because Hopkins had failed to demonstrate that the exception’s

elements, as the Court understood them, had been satisfied.

The Court first “ffound] that there [was] sufficient evidence”

to “conclude that state authorities intended to prosecute

Hopkins at the state level[,]}” including testimony which

“demonstrate[d] that the state authorities were willing to

pursue the state charges despite the pending federal

indictment” and testimony showing that “Hopkins’[s] case was

4 The Court noted that this was not a circumstance “in which a

purely state or local investigation was later adopted by federal

law enforcement officials for federal prosecution.” App. 165,

The Court also pointed to the testimony which indicated that

when “Bates spoke with AUSA Baer over the phone[,]” “Baer

asked . . . Bates whether there was enough to file state

charges[,]” and “advised... Bates to do so.” App. 166 (internal

citation omitted). And the Court noted the “significant time

period in which Hopkins’[s] case languished at the state court

level[.]” Jd.

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handled normally[.]” App. 166-67 (emphasis in original). “In

light of this evidence, the [CJourt [could not} conclude that

Hopkins was held in state custody for the sole or primary

purpose of preparing a federal criminal prosecution.” App.

167. The Court also concluded that “Hopkins [did] not ma[ke]

a sufficient showing that the requisite level of collusion was

present.” App. 168. Instead, testimony “demonstrate[d]

[no]thing more than coordination between federal and state

authorities.” Jd. Finally, and separate from its analysis of the

ruse exception, the District Court rejected Hopkins’s § 3161(c)

and Sixth Amendment arguments.

Hopkins then filed a motion for reconsideration based

on newly disclosed information. That information included a

bail recommendation which Bates had made to the state

magisterial district justice before Hopkins had been arraigned

on state charges. In its entirety, the recommendation stated:

Affiant requests high bail on defendant due to the

nature of the charges and the defendant is being

federally indicted. If convicted would be looking

at a 15[-]year mandatory sentence. The

5 Bates’ recommendation had not been mentioned during the

first hearing on Hopkins’s motion to dismiss. Bates apparently

“located [it] .. . 20 days after the first evidentiary hearing[,]”

and it “was produced to defense counsel on . . . the same day

the [District C]ourt filed the original memorandum and order

denying Hopkins’{s] motion.” App. 7 (internal citation

omitted).

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defendant does have knowledge of this and does

put him at a flight risk.®

Dkt. No. 106, at 9 (emphasis added). The District Court reopened the record to consider the additional evidence in

support of Hopkins’s renewed motion to dismiss the.

indictment.

The District Court held a second evidentiary hearing, at

which Bates again testified. Although, during the first hearing,

Bates had denied having had “any communication” with

“anybody” from the US Attorney’s office “about indicting

[Hopkins,]” App. 102, he now testified that he had spoken with

the U.S. Attorney’s office about a federal indictment before

making the state bail recommendation. Bates specifically

testified that he “wouldn’t tell a judge that [Hopkins was] being

federally indicted on [his] own without talking to the

[Assistant] United States Attorney.” App. 223-24. He also

confirmed that “it was only after [he] had the conversation with

the Assistant United States Attorney that [he] then related to

[the state judge] . . . that [Hopkins] would be federally

indicted.” App. 224.

The District Court granted in part and denied in part

Hopkins’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The Court first

addressed Hopkins’s argument as to section 3161(b). The

Court reiterated its awareness that “[t]he Third Circuit ha[d]

6 Testimony at the subsequent evidentiary hearing

demonstrated that Bates was mistaken in his belief that, at the

time of the bail recommendation, Hopkins would, if convicted,

face a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence.

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not yet decided whether to adopt the ‘ruse exception.’” App.

10. But because “[the Third Circuit had] considered and

discussed it repeatedly rather than rejecting its application,” the

Court “believe[d] that the Third Circuit [would] likely...

adopt [it] if the factual circumstances of a case compel|[led]

such a determination.” App. 10-11 (internal citations omitted).

The Court then went on to predict that “it is reasonably clear

that the Third Circuit would adopt this exception under the

right circumstances[.]” App. 11 (emphasis added). Because the

Court “perceive[d] that the right circumstances exist[ed]

here[,]” it decided to “apply the ‘ruse exception’ [to Hopkins’s]

case.” Id. The Court conceded that “[i]t is unclear whether

there are two elements that both need to be proved” for the ruse

exception to apply, or “whether a defendant can succeed by

proving . . . only one element.” App. 12 (internal citations

omitted). But it decided to “treat the ‘ruse exception’ as having

two separate elements, both of which need to be proven in

order for Hopkins to succeed.” App. 13.

In highlighting the differences in testimony between the

two evidentiary hearings,’ the District Court concluded that

7 In particular, the Court pointed out that “Bates’

contemporaneous bail recommendation and testimony during

the second hearing starkly contradicted his prior testimony[,]”

App. 21, such that “[t]he court [was] unable to reconcile the

conflicting testimony TFO Bates provided during the two

evidentiary hearings[,]” App. 23. The contradictions, in the

Court’s eyes, constituted “diametrically-opposed answers”

which “fatally undermin[ed] [Bates’] credibility[.]” Jd. Since

Bates’ “attempt to reconcile the conflicting testimony upon

questioning by the court was not convincing,” id., “the court

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“the state charges were filed for the primary or sole purpose of

preparing a federal criminal prosecution against Hopkins[.]”

App. 24. Then, considering the evidence and testimony from

both evidentiary hearings, and “having received no evidence to

the contrary,” the Court “fLound] collusion between TFO Bates

and AUSA Baer.” App. 26. Finally, as a “result of applying the

‘ruse exception’ and finding a violation of § 3161(b),” the

Court dismissed the firearms charge in Hopkins’s indictment.

App. 28.

The Court also addressed Hopkins’s argument as to

section 3161(c). Again applying the ruse exception, the Court

concluded that the STA’s seventy-day clock began to run on

the day Hopkins was arraigned in state court. The Court

examined various continuances at the state court level, totaling

sixty-six days, and determined that they were not excludable.

And the Court noted that the Government conceded that

another period of twenty days was not excludable. Considering

all these factors, the Court concluded that “it [was] apparent

when applying the ‘ruse exception’ that more than seventy

days elapsed between Hopkins being charged [on firearms

offenses] and seen by a judicial officer in state court and his

trial.” App. 32. Hopkins had thus “demonstrated that

§ 3161(c)(1) was violated” and that “dismissal of Count 2 [was

similarly] required[.]” Jd.

[could] no longer rely on . . . Bates’ testimony from the first

hearing about the conversation with AUSA Baer or his

description of his intention in filing the state charges,” App.

24,

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To determine whether to dismiss Count 2 with or

without prejudice, the Court went on to balance the factors set

forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1)-(2), including the “seriousness

of the offense[,]” “facts and circumstances of the case which

led to the dismissal[,]” and “the impact of a reprosecution on

the administration . . . of justice.” App. 32 (citing these

subsections). The Court ultimately concluded that the majority

of the factors weighed in favor of Hopkins and thus dismissed

Count 2 of the indictment with prejudice.

Il.

The Government appeals the District Court’s dismissal

of Hopkins’s § 922(g)(1) charge. First, it argues flatly that no

Tuse exception to the STA exists. Alternatively, the

Government contends that even assuming such an exception

exists, the District Court erred by applying it in this case.

Hopkins disagrees. He argues that the ruse exception is a

“necessary corollary” to the STA and that the District Court

correctly applied it to Hopkins’s case. Hopkins’s Br. 10, 12.

We agree with the Government that the STA contains no ruse

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exception premised on a state arrest.2 We will therefore

reverse.”

A. THE STA AND THE LIMITED USE OF THE RUSE

EXCEPTION

The STA serves twin purposes. It “reduc[es] crime and

the danger of recidivism by requiring speedy trials[.]”?° It also

“give[s] effect” to a defendant’s “[S]ixth [A]mendment right

to a speedy trial.” United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7

n.7 (1982) (quoting S. Rep. No. 93-1021, at 1 (1974)).!! To

8 Given the facts of the case before us, it is unnecessary to

consider whether a ruse exception exists in circumstances

wherein an individual has first been subject to civil arrest by

federal immigration officials. Cf United States v. Guevara-

Umana, 538 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 2008) (“recogniz[ing the]

exception” in the “civil detention” context as “appropriate” but

concluding that an application of the exception was “not

necessary to decide th[e] case”).

° The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

3231. The Government timely appealed. We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3731. Our review

of the District Court’s interpretation of the STA is plenary.

United States v. Dyer, 325 F.3d 464, 467 (3d Cir. 2003). We

review the District Court’s findings of fact for clear error. Id.

10 Public Law 93-619 (Jan. 3, 1975), 88 Stat. 2676.

1! See also Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 211 (2010)

(“[T]he Act serves not only to protect defendants, but also to

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effectuate those purposes, the STA requires that the

government adhere to several time limits in connection with

criminal prosecutions,

Section 3161(b) provides that “[a]ny information or

indictment charging an individual with the commission of an

offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which

such individual was arrested or served with a summons in

connection with such charges.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). “If the

government fails to comply with this time limit, the [STA]

requires the dismissal of charges in the complaint, with or

without prejudice.” Dyer, 325 F.3d at 467 (citing 18 U.S.C. §

3162(a)(1)).

Section 3161(c)(1) provides, in relevant part, that “[iJn

any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a

defendant charged in an information or indictment with the

commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days

from” either “the filing date (and making public) of the

information or indictment,” or “the date the defendant has

appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such

charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” 18 U.S.C. §

3161(c)(1).4

vindicate the public interest in the swift administration of

justice.”).

!2 Section 3161(h) sets forth several categories of delay that are

to be excluded from the calculation of the thirty- and seventy-

day time frames. These include—as relevant here—when a

delay results from a continuance granted upon a judge’s

finding “that the ends of justice served by taking such action

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Ordinarily, the time limits of the STA have not been

triggered by an event other than the commencement of a

federal prosecution. However, beginning with the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in United States v. Cepeda-Luna, 989 F.2d

353 (9th Cir. 1993), some courts have recognized that the

STA’s time limits can be triggered by civil detention or a state

arrest under a “ruse” exception to the STA, id. at 357. And

different courts have articulated elements of a so-called ruse

exception with slight variations. Courts that have recognized a

tuse exception have generally understood it to require

collusion between federal law enforcement authorities and

state or civil officials for the sole or primary purpose of

detaining a defendant for later federal criminal prosecution.

Yet no such exception is found anywhere in the text of the Act.

Since Cepeda-Luna, courts of appeals which have

considered the exception have usually done so in the

immigration context, ie., where an individual has first been

subject to civil arrest by federal immigration officials and is

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a

speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).

13 See, e.g., United States v. Pasillas-Castanon, 525 F.3d 994,

997 (10th Cir. 2008) (“While civil arrests and detentions do not

ordinarily trigger the Speedy Trial Act, they may activate it

when law enforcement authorities collude with state or civil

officials to detain a defendant as a mere ruse for later

prosecution.”) (internal citation omitted).

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later criminally charged.'* Some, though, have done so in the

state context, i.e., where an individual has first been subject to

4 See United States v. Saucedo, 956 F.3d 549, 553 (8th Cir.

2020) (“[W]e decline to reach” whether we “recognize[] the

Tuse exception” because, even “assuming, without deciding,

that there is a ruse exception to the [STA], it would not apply

in this case.”); Guevara-Umana, 538 F.3d at 142

(“recogniz[ing the] exception” in the “civil detention” context

as “appropriate” but concluding that an application of the

exception was “not necessary to decide th[e] case”); United

States v. Rodriguez-Amaya, 521 F.3d 437, 442 (4th Cir. 2008)

(holding that the STA “includes a ruse exception in the context

of civil detention,” but concluding “that the . .. exception [did]

not apply” to the “case at bar”); Pasillas-Castanon, 525 F.3d

at 997-98 (noting that “civil arrests and detentions . . . may

activate [the STA] when law enforcement authorities collude

with state or civil officials to detain a defendant as a mere ruse

for later prosecution[,]” agreeing that the STA “cannot be

evaded through sham civil proceedings[,]” but warning that

“[t]he ruse exception is not easily triggered” and concluding

that the exception did not apply here); United States v. Garcia-

Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440, 451-52, 452 (6th Cir. 2004)

(“assum[ing] that [the ruse exception] applies to persons held

in detention and awaiting removal, when there is evidence of

collusion between deportation and prosecution authorities[,]”

“Tajssuming without deciding that [the underlying] events

demonstrate[d] collusion,” but affirming the denial of

defendant’s motion to dismiss because he failed to show that

“his detention . .. was a criminal arrest”); United States v.

Tejada, 255 F.3d 1, 4 (Ist Cir. 2001) (addressing the

immigration context, acknowledging in passing that the ruse

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exception may be applicable in certain circumstances, but

finding “no evidence” of detention “for any reason other than

routine inquiry into . .. suspicious immigration status”); United

States v. De La Pena-Juarez, 214 F.3d 594, 598 (Sth Cir. 2000)

(“agree[ing] . . . that civil detention should not be used as a

delay tactic . . . view[ing] the ‘ruse exception’ as an effective

way of protecting against the possibility of collusion between

federal criminal authorities and civil or state officials,”

emphasizing that it would “only apply this exception where the

defendant demonstrates that the primary or exclusive purpose

of the civil detention was to hold him for future criminal

prosecution[,]” but concluding that “[t]here is insufficient

evidence in the record to” apply the exception to this case)

(internal citations omitted); United States v. Noel, 231 F.3d

833, 836-37 (llth Cir. 2000) (though the STA may be

triggered “when detentions are used by the government, not to

effectuate deportation, but rather as ‘mere ruses to detain a

defendant for later criminal prosecution[,]’” defendant

“presented no evidence that his detention was a ruse”) (internal

citations omitted); United States v. Grajales-Montoya, 117

F.3d 356, 366, 367 (8th Cir. 1997) (seeming to acknowledge

the existence of the ruse exception, but concluding that the

initial detention here “was for reasons other than” preparing a

federal prosecution, that there was no “evidence that [detention

was] a ruse to evade the” STA, and that the “requisite

collusion” was not present).

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criminal arrest by state officials and is later federally charged.5

The D.C. Circuit appears to have rejected the exception

outright.!6

13 See United States v. Mearis, 36 F.4th 649, 653 (5th Cir.

2022) (recognizing the exception and defining the appropriate

standard, and holding that the Court “appllies] the same

standard to a state criminal arrest”); United States v. Faison,

555 F. App’x 60, 63 (2d Cir. 2014) (“collusion between state

and federal authorities can create [such] an exception”); United

States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590, 595-96 (4th Cir. 2005) (in the

state context, and only “in limited circumstances,” “an

individual being held by state authorities” could be considered

“under ‘federal arrest’ or in ‘federal custody’ if “the

Government has knowledge that an individual is held by state

authorities only to answer to federal charges”; remanding for

consideration by the District Court); United States v. Benitez,

34 F.3d 1489, 1494-95 (9th Cir. 1994) (Though STA “time

periods may be triggered by state detentions that are merely a

tuse to detain the defendant solely for the purpose of bypassing

the requirements of the Act[,]” and though the case presented

a “very close” call, the Court did not “conclude that the district

court’s finding that the state prosecution was brought in good

faith was clearly erroneous.”) (internal citations omitted).

At least one court, albeit not precedentially, has apparently

limited the ruse exception to the immigration context. See

United States v. Alvarado-Linares, 698 F. App’x 969, 974

(11th Cir. 2017) (“limit[ing]” the ruse exception “to a situation

in which federal immigration officials detain an immigrant

ostensibly to remove him from the country, while in reality

they actually hold him solely for the purpose of bringing

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No court of appeals has ever applied the ruse exception

to conclude that an STA violation had occurred and that

dismissal of federal charges was therefore warranted.

Since our 2003 decision in Dyer, this Court has left open

the question of whether to adopt a ruse exception to the STA.

In Dyer, the defendant was detained by agents of the

Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) for illegally

reentering the United States after he was deported. 325 F.3d at

465. There, the Special Agent handling the case contacted the

United States Attorney’s Office, and Dyer was criminally

indicted approximately forty days following his initial

detention by INS. Jd. Dyer moved to dismiss, alleging a

violation of the STA and invoking a ruse exception. Jd. at 465-

66. The District Court denied the motion and Dyer entered a

conditional guilty plea. Jd. at 466. On appeal, Dyer argued that

“the [STA]’s time limit began to run when the INS took him

into custody under the ‘ruse exception’ recognized by some

federal criminal charges” and emphasizing that “[jJoint state

and federal investigations are the norm” and that “state

authorities . . . h{ojld sovereign discretion”) (emphasis in

original). Another has assumed without deciding that the

exception could apply to state arrests. See United States v.

Asfour, 717 F. App’x 822, 825-26 (10th Cir. 2017)

(unpublished).

'6 United States v. Knight, 824 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (D.C. Cir.

2016) (Kavanaugh, J.) (noting that “the Court ha[d] previously

declined to create such an exception to the” STA) (citing

United States v. Mills, 964 F.2d 1186, 1188, 1192 (D.C. Cir,

1992) (en banc)).

20

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[courts].” Jd. at 468 (internal citations omitted). Yet we

declined “to decide whether to recognize the ruse exception.”

Id. Further, “[e]ven if we [had] conclude[d] that the exception

[was] a valid one,” we determined that “Dyer ha[d] not shown

that he would be entitled to invoke it[.]” Jd. (internal citation

omitted). Since Dyer, we have treated attempts to invoke the

ruse exception in the same manner—and, even then, in only

non-precedential decisions.'7

B. WE REJECT A RUSE EXCEPTION PREMISED ON

A STATE ARREST

The Government argues that there is no ruse exception

to the STA because such an exception “conflicts with the

unambiguous text of the [STA]” and that an examination of the

“text should end the inquiry.” Govt Br. 18, 19 (internal citation

omitted). The Government also asserts that “[c]lase law

[similarly] does not support” an exception because statements

17 See United States v. Costello, 720 F. App’x 120, 123 (3d Cir.

2018) (“We again need not decide whether there exists a ‘ruse’

exception to the... [STA]. . . because there simply is no

evidence of collusion... or... det[ention] . . . for the purpose

of preparing a federal prosecution.”); United States v. Crews,

494 F. App’x 240, 243 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting the recognition

of the ruse exception among other courts of appeals, but

deciding “not [to] consider [it] here since there is no evidence

to support the application of such an exception”) (internal

citations omitted); United States v. Brown, 445 F. App’x 474,

479-80 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Our Circuit has yet to recognize [the]

‘ruse exception’ . . . [but] even if such an exception exists, we

will [not] apply it” here.).

21

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by those “circuits [which] have [concluded] that the ruse

exception exists... all amount to dicta.” Jd. at 23, 24. Hopkins

counters that the’ruse exception is a “necessary corollary” to

the Act. Hopkins’s Br. 10, 12. We agree with the Government

and conclude that a ruse exception is inconsistent with the text

of the STA and that there are sound policy rationales for

declining to adopt a ruse exception.

i The exception is inconsistent with the text of the

STA.

When “interpreting a statute[,] a court should always

turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others[:] . . . that

courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it

means[,] and means in a statute what it says there.” Conn. Nat'l

Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (internal

citations omitted). And “[wJhen the words of a statute are

unambiguous... this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry

is complete.” /d. at 254 (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted).

The STA contains no explicit provision establishing a

Tuse exception. As a starting point, the STA defines the term

“offense” as “a[] Federal criminal offense.” 18 U.S.C. §

3172(2) (emphasis added). Such offenses include only those

which “violat[e] . . . any Act of Congress and [which are]

triable by any court established by Act of Congress.” Jd. State

courts, by definition, do not fall into that category. Further, it

is only after an individual is “arrested or served with a

summons in connection with such charges”—i.e., federal

charges—that the STA’s protections come into play. Id. §

3161(b) (emphasis added). The statute requires that these

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charges be contained within one of two documents: either an

“information” or “indictment.” Jd. § 3161(b), (c). These terms

refer to charging documents that must be filed in the federal

criminal system in order for the government to proceed to trial

on felony charges. Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 7.!8 Finally, the STA

defines “judge” and “judicial officer” as “any United States

magistrate” or “Federal district judge[.]” Jd. § 3172(1)

(emphasis added). Plainly, state judicial officers do not fall into

this category.

Even courts of appeals which have read a ruse exception

into the STA concede that the STA’s plain language does not

expressly apply to civil or state detentions. See Cepeda-Luna,

989 F.2d at 355 (“The language of the [STA] compels the

conclusion that its provisions do not apply to civil

detentions[,]” and offense means “any Federal criminal

offense.”) (cleaned up); Woolfolk, 399 F.3d at 595 (“[Flor the

[STA] to apply, the defendant must be under federal arrest or

be in federal custody.”) (cleaned up). Those in search of

Statutory text within the STA that might support even the

18 While a federal felony may initially be charged by

complaint, Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 3, an indictment or information

must be filed within 30 days of the arrest on such complaint in

order for the felony charges to proceed, even when a

preliminary hearing is held. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b); Fed. R. Crim.

Proc. 5.1 and 7. States, by contrast, often charge and proceed

on felony offenses only by filing a criminal complaint and

proceeding to a preliminary hearing. See, e.g., Pennsylvania’s

Rule of Criminal Procedure 503; 234 Pa. Code § 503 (2001).

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implication of a ruse exception inevitably come up emptyhanded.!°

Congress knows how to create exceptions within

statutes, and routinely does so. See, ¢.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)

(providing that a “court may not modify a term of

imprisonment once it has been imposed” unless one of several

exceptions applies); 52 U.S.C. § 20507(b)(2) (providing that a

state may not remove a voter from its registration list for failure

to vote unless specified exceptions apply); 12 U.S.C. §

5552(a)(1), (2) (delegating to state attorneys general the

authority to bring federal civil enforcement actions, but

generally excepting actions against certain entities from such

authority unless certain conditions are met). But it did not do

so when it enacted the STA, nor at any time since.

It is not the role of the courts to make policy choices

which are traditionally within the realm of legislative decisionmaking. See, e.g., Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793, 1802-03

(2022) (“evaluat[ing] a range of policy considerations” is truly

a “legislative endeavor” and an “unenviable task[,]” “Congress

is far more competent than the Judiciary to weigh such policy

considerations,” and “the Judiciary’s authority to do so at all

is, at best, uncertain”) (internal citations omitted) (cleaned up).

Courts which have recognized a ruse exception have, in

essence, implied substantive rights from a statutory text that is

silent on the subject. The Supreme Court has, in recent years,

19 See also Mills, 964 F.2d at 1189 (“Under the most natural

reading .. . an arrest starts the [STA’s] clock only if it is in

connection with federal charges.”) (emphasis in original)

(cleaned up).

24

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cautioned against such judicial overreach and emphasized the

importance of respect for the separation of powers. Consider,

for example, the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to, on

Congress’s behalf, expand liability of both law enforcement

officers and those who work in prisons. See, e.g., id. at 1802

(“Now long past the heady days in which [courts] assumed

common-law powers to create causes of action... we have

come to appreciate more fully the tension between judicially

created causes of action and the Constitution’s separation of

legislative and judicial power”; “creating a cause of action is a

legislative endeavor.”) (internal citations omitted) (cleaned

up); fd. at 1809 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Our

Constitution’s separation of powers prohibits federal courts

from assuming legislative authority.”); see also Ziglar v.

Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 133, 135 (2017) (“It is a significant step

under separation-of-powers principles for a court to determine

that it has the authority, under the judicial power, to create and

enforce a cause of action” because creating a new cause of

action “is ...a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.’’) (internal citation

omitted). In our view, creating exceptions to a statutory scheme

is similarly “a legislative endeavor.” Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1802.

A judge’s role is to apply statutes and to interpret them. We do

not enact them, nor do we amend them. Congress could have

included a ruse exception in the STA but did not do so. Because

it is not our role to search for ways to ostensibly improve an

Act of Congress, we decline to engraft a ruse exception onto

the plain text of the STA.

We further agree with the Government’s assertion that

statements by those “circuits [which] have [concluded] that the

ruse exception exists .. . all amount to dicta.” Govt Br. 24. As

the Government persuasively explains, “[t]he [District [C]ourt

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did not identify .. . a precedential appellate decision approving

the dismissal of charges based on the exception.” Jd. Nor have

we been able to do so. Hopkins’s counsel conceded as much at

oral argument. See ECF No. 36 at 17 (Though various “circuits

have discussed it[,]” none have “applied it” and it has “never

been used .. . to actually grant dismissal of charges.”). So we

are not persuaded by the out-of-circuit authority on which

Hopkins relies in support of his contention that a ruse

exception is “a necessary corollary” to the Act. Hopkins’s Br.

12.70

ii, Policy rationales for declining to adopt a ruse

exception.

There are also sound policy reasons supporting our

refusal to recognize a ruse exception. First, doing so would be

inconsistent with principles of federalism and dual

sovereignty. Recognizing a ruse exception risks binding the

federal government to the actions taken by state authorities in

criminal investigations and prosecutions. As the Government

persuasively argues, “Cepeda-Luna .. . did not grapple with

significant federalism concerns created by the ruse exception

when state officials are involved.” Govt Br. 27. States “are

20 The Government also notes that Hopkins “does [not] identify

any support for [a ruse] exception in the Act’s legislative

history.” Reply Br. 3. See also Govt Br. 26 n.6. Whether or not

one agrees that such a cross-check is useful, the legislative

history of the STA is devoid of references to support the

implication of a ruse exception. See A. Partridge, Legislative

History of Title I of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (Fed. Judicial

Center 1980).

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independent actors[,] . . . do not answer to the federal

government in their enforcement of state criminal law[, a]nd .

. . have their own procedures to protect defendants from

unlawful or overlong state incarceration.” /d. (internal citation

omitted). A ruse exception “undermines state sovereignty” and

would “invite[] burdensome federal discovery into the minds

of state investigators and prosecutors[.]” Jd. at 29. See also

Reply Br. 3-4.

As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “an arrest or

indictment by one sovereign [does] not cause the speedy trial

guarantees to become engaged as to possible subsequent

indictments by another sovereign.” MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 10

n.11. Indeed, it is precisely because “the states and the federal

government are distinct sovereigns . . . [that] the speedy trial

protections of the [STA] apply only to arrests made for federal

charges.” United States v. Clark, 754 F.3d 401, 405 (7th Cir.

2014). Accordingly, courts have relied on similar reasoning to

reject the argument that the Sixth Amendment speedy trial

right attaches at the time of an earlier state charge. See, e.g.,

United States v. Lara, 970 F.3d 68, 81-82 (1st Cir. 2020).?!

Second, recognizing a ruse exception premised on a

state arrest would severely hinder prosecutorial discretion. The

Government argues that “[t]he exception also presents negative

21 See also United States v. Rose, 365 F. App’x 384, 389 (3d

Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (“The state arrest and state

prosecution do not control the speedy trial analysis because the

state and federal governments are separate sovereign entities,

and the actions of one cannot typically bind the other.”) (citing

MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 10 n.11),

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incentives for prosecutors, potentially inducing _ state

prosecutors to continue to press state charges even after federal

charges are brought,” or alternatively “to shield the likelihood

of federal charges from state courts making bail determinations

even though that likelihood would undoubtedly provide

motivation for a defendant to abscond.” Govt Br. 27. And the

Government warns of an additional incentive that could

disadvantage both the prosecution and the accused: “federal

prosecutors may be encouraged to hastily file federal charges

after a state arrest, short-circuiting needed additional

investigation.” Jd. We do not take that point lightly. As one

District Judge observed in rejecting a defendant’s assertion that

the STA clock was triggered by his state arrest, “[i]f the Speedy

Trial Act ‘clock’ were to start ticking at the time of the initial

state arrest,” federal authorities “would be forced to indict

within thirty days . . . in order to preclude the possibility of a

dismissal with prejudice . . . [and would be] compelled to

arraign and try the defendant within seventy days of [the]

indictment.” United States v. Ferrs, 503 F. Supp. 187, 189

(E.D. Pa. 1980) (internal citations omitted), aff’d, 676 F.2d 688

(3d Cir. 1982). Thus, federal authorities would be “forced to

try the defendant even though [they] initially preferred to wait

for the state to prosecute.” Id.; see also United States v. Mejias,

417 F. Supp. 585, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 552 F.2d 435

(2d Cir. 1977), cert denied sub nom. Padilla-Martinez v.

United States, 434 U.S. 847 (1977) (Triggering the STA’s

protections as of the date of the state indictment would “require

that the [federal] government rush headlong into a...

prosecution whenever a defendant had been arrested on state

charges as the result of federal participation in an ongoing

investigation.”).

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Finally, the Government warns that “[t]he exception . .

. penalizes much-needed and expected coordination between

state and federal law enforcement.” Govt Br. 26 (internal

citation omitted). See also Reply Br. 3 (“Hopkins does not...

address countervailing policy considerations [like] the ruse

exception’s effect of disincentivizing essential coordination

between state and federal law enforcement[.J”). We agree.

Such coordination—often achieved using joint task forces—

can be a valuable way to “avoid duplication of effort and

resources.” Mearis, 36 F.4th at 654.2? The work of just such a

task force is at the heart of the instant appeal. Indeed, both

counsel acknowledged at oral argument the importance of such

coordination. See ECF No. 36 at 8 (counsel for the

Government) (“Even just the idea that the exception might

exist can chill desired coordination between federal and state

actors.”); id. at 26 (Hopkins’s counsel) (Federal and state

authorities “should work together and cooperate and

coordinate”). Taken together, the aforementioned policy

“considerations dictate . . . that should a ruse exception exist,

it should be a creation of Congress.” Govt Br, 29. As we have

emphasized, ‘“judge-made equitable rules cannot claim

supremacy over statutory text.” Williams v. Superintendent

Mahanoy SCI, 45 F 4th 713, 723 Gd Cir. 2022).

22 See also Bartkus vy. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123 (1959)

(federal-state “cooperation . . . is the conventional practice ...

throughout the country”); Alvarado-Linares, 698 F. App’x at

974 (“[jJoint state and federal investigations are the norm, and

extensive discussion back and forth between state and federal

authorities is not uncommon”).

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