Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lenore Albert, Petitioner v. Roxanne Gonzalez, et al.

Case No. ___________

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

In the Matter of LENORE LUANN ALBERT,

A Member of the State Bar and U.S. Supreme Court Bar,

Respondent and Petitioner for Review,

LENORE LUANN ALBERT,

Petitioner

vs.

ROXANNE GONZALEZ,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Lenore L. Albert

1968 S. Coast Hwy #3960

Laguna Beach, CA 92651

Telephone (424) 365-0741

Email: lenalbert@Interactivecounsel.com

Petitioner, pro se

ii

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether a United States District Court can automatically suspend an

attorney’s membership to practice law in that District Court based upon a State

Bar suspension by Local Rule, contrary to this Court’s holding in Theard v.

United States 354 U.S. 278 (1957); if not, whether those Local Rules are

unconstitutional in violation of the Rules Enabling Act.

Whether incorporating state statutes into a federal court’s local rules

violates the Rules Enabling Act.

Whether federal employees are immune in licensure cases or can be sued

for damages under Bivens.

iii

OPINIONS BELOW AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS

The Ninth Circuit court of appeals unpublished Memorandum denying

Ms. Albert relief dated August 20, 2024, appears at Appendix A to the petition

which is the proceeding directly on review in this case. Albert v Gonzalez, Case

No. 23-3322; 24-3496 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2024).

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California

(“Eastern District”) order dated May 24, 2024 issuing reciprocal disbarment,

appears at Appendix B to the petition and is unpublished. In the Matter of

Albert, Case No. 2:24-mc-00117-KJM, 2024 WL 1231293 (E.D. Cal., May 24,

2024) (reciprocal disbarment based on State Bar Opinion).

The United States district court for the central district of California

(“Central District”) order dated October 6, 2023 dismissing the action against

district court operations supervisor, Ms. Gonzalez, appears at Appendix C to the

petition and is unpublished. Albert v Gonzalez Case No. 8:23-cv-00635-FWSJDE (C.D. Cal., Oct. 26, 2023) (civil rights violation by Roxanne Gonzalez who

changed Albert’s membership status from “active” to “inactive” in the federal

court without notice under E.D.C.A. LR 180 and E.D.C.A. LR 184).

Related Cases

Albert v State Bar of California, petition for cert. Case No. 24-5498

docketed on September 10, 2024.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .......................................................................... ii

OPINIONS BELOW AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS............................. iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................... iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................... vi

I. JURISDICTION .................................................................................................. 1

II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED .................................................................................................... 1

III.STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................ 1

IV. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.......................................................... 4

A. The Ninth Circuit Decided an Important Federal

Question in A Way that Conflicts with Theard v United

States ........................................................................................................ 4

1. The Eastern District Has Determined a State Court

Suspension Automatically Suspends an Attorney from

Practicing in Federal Court ................................................................ 4

2. Important Policy Reasons Exist to Keep Membership

in State and Federal Courts Separate ............................................... 6

3. The Eastern District’s Local Rule of “Automatic

Suspension” Violates an Attorney’s Due Process

Rights .................................................................................................. 7

B. Eastern District’s Local Rules Incorporating California’s

State Bar Act into Federal Practice Violates the Rules

Enabling Act ............................................................................................. 8

C. Ms. Albert Should Have the Right to Sue a Federal

Employee Who Wrongfully Took Away Her Right to

Practice Law in Federal Court................................................................. 9

1. Bivens Action ...................................................................................... 9

2. Circuit Split on Immunity ................................................................ 11

V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 12

v

VI. APPENDIX ........................................................................................................ 13

A. Ninth Circuit Memorandum Aug. 20, 2024 .......................................... 14

B. Eastern District Order May 24, 2024 .................................................... 19

C. Central District Order Oct. 6, 2023 ....................................................... 25

D. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions............................................... 44

1. V Amend. U.S. Const. ....................................................................... 44

2. XIV Amend. U.S. Const. § 1.............................................................. 44

3. 28 U.S.C. §2071 ................................................................................. 44

4. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 ................................................................................ 44

5. E.D.C.A. Local Rule 180(b) 2017 ...................................................... 44

6. E.D.C.A. Local Rule 184(c) (2017) ................................................... 45

7. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §6124 ........................................................... 45

8. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §6125 ........................................................... 45

9. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6126 .......................................................... 45

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Bell v. Burson 402 U.S. 535 (1971) .................................................................... 2, 5

Benninghoff v. Superior Court 136 Cal.App.4th 61 (2006) ................................... 9

Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon Frank v. Superior Ct. 17 Cal.4th 119 (1998) ... 9

Brunson v. Murray 843 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2016) .......................................... 11, 12

Conway v. State Bar 47 Cal.3d 1107 (1989) .......................................................... 2

Davis v. Passman 442 U.S. 228 (1979) .......................................................... 10, 11

Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 498 n.3 (2022) ............................................... 10, 11

Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1873) ..................................................... 4

Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-347 (1880) ................................................. 12

In re McCue 211 Cal. 57, 66 (1930) ........................................................................ 9

Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995)............ 12

Mackey v. Montrym (1979) 443 U.S. 1................................................................... 5

Mejia v. Miller, 61 F.4th 663, 669 (9th Cir. 2023) ............................................... 10

Pierson v. Ray 386 U.S. 547, 567, fn. 6 (1967)..................................................... 12

Selling v. Radford 243 U.S. 46 (1917) .................................................................... 6

Theard v. United States 354 U.S. 278 (1957) ................................................ ii, 4, 6

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 133-34 (2017) ..................................................... 11

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ................................................................................................. 1

28 U.S.C. § 1331 ...................................................................................................... 1

28 U.S.C. § 2071 .................................................................................................. v, 1

28 U.S.C. § 2072 ...............................................................................................v, 1, 9

Bus. & Prof. Code § 6000 .................................................................................... 1, 8

Bus. & Prof. Code § 6124 ................................................................................ 1, 3, 8

Bus. & Prof. Code § 6125 .................................................................................... 1, 8

vii

Bus. & Prof. Code § 6126 .................................................................................... v, 1

Other Authorities

Frankel the Alabama Lawyer. 1954-64: Has the Official Organ atrophied? 64

Colum. L. Rev. 1243 (1964) .................................................................................. 6

Note, Judicial Performance in the Fifth Circuit 73 Yale L. J. 90 (1963).............. 6

Pollitt, Counsel for the Unpopular Cause: The "Hazard of Being Undone, " 43 N.

C. L. Rev. 9 (1964) ................................................................................................ 6

Pollitt, Timid Lawyers and Neglected Clients Harper's Magazine, Aug., 1964 at

81-86 ..................................................................................................................... 6

S. Fingerhood The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Southern Justice 214(L.

Friedman, ed. 1965) ............................................................................................. 6

Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration 42

Texas L. Rev. 949 (1964) ...................................................................................... 6

Rules

E.D. Cal. L.R. 180(e) ............................................................................................... 8

E.D.C.A. LR 180 ....................................................................................... iii, 1, 3, 10

E.D.C.A. LR 184 ....................................................................................... iii, 1, 3, 10

Constitutional Provisions

V Amend. U.S. Const. ..................................................................................v, 1, 7, 8

XIV Amend. U.S. Const. ..............................................................................v, 1, 7, 8

1

I. JURISDICTION

Ms. Albert is seeking a writ of certiorari for the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals order filed on August 20, 2024. App. A.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

The U.S. District court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331.

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is filed within 90 days of the Ninth

Circuit’s memorandum making it timely pursuant to Local Rule 13.1.

The notification required by Rule 29.4(a) has been complied with.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The following Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, rules, regulations,

and statutes, or relevant portion thereof that are at issue in this petition are as

follows: V Amend. U.S. Const., XIV Amend. U.S. Const.; the Rules Enabling

Act, 28 U.S.C. §2701, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 U.S. District Court for the Eastern

District of California Local Rules, E.D.C.A. LR 180, and E.D.C.A. LR 184; and

portions of the California State Bar Act (Bus. & Prof. Code §§ “6124,” 6125, and

6126). App D.

III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The State Bar disbarred Ms. Albert for filing papers in federal court

while she was listed as an active member in that federal court but suspended

from the California State Bar at that time. Infractions included filing a motion,

declaration, and Answer. She also put her California State Bar Number (“SBN”)

on the papers and placed “Esq.” or “attorneys for” alongside her name. Ms.

Albert currently has three Bar Numbers: California SBN 210876, Michigan

SBN P 85667; and U.S. Supreme Court SBN 264066.

Fourteenth Amendment due process requires both notice and a “fair”

opportunity to be heard. V Amend. U.S. Const.; XIV Amend. U.S. Const.

2

The disbarment was premised on the Eastern District’s local rules that

automatically suspend a member from the practice of law in federal court based

on a state bar suspension without notice or court order.

Background

On December 5, 2000, Ms. Albert became a member of the California

State Bar. She acquired “a property interest in the right to practice [her]

profession that cannot be taken from [her] without due process.” Conway v.

State Bar 47 Cal.3d 1107, 1113 (1989).

Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their continued

possession may become essential in the pursuit of a

livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action

that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases

the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due

process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Bell v. Burson 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).

In 2014, Ms. Albert was admitted to practice in the Eastern District.

On February 14, 2018, the California Supreme Court suspended Ms.

Albert from the practice of law for 30 days. She petitioned for cert. in that case

which this Court denied but did not issue a reciprocal suspension in this Court.

The suspension was lifted on May 5, 2021.

During her suspension, Albert filed several court documents in the

Eastern District that represented she was an attorney while the federal court’s

website represented her membership was active. She also applied for a

certificate of good standing from the Eastern District's clerk's office.

The Eastern District’s operation supervisor, respondent, Roxanne

Gonzalez switched Ms. Albert’s status in the Eastern District after Ms.

Gonzalez checked Ms. Albert’s California State Bar status on its website and

saw she was suspended, purporting to act pursuant to Eastern District Local

3

Rules 180(c) and 184(b), which impose automatic reciprocal suspensions. In

May 2021, the Eastern District reinstated Albert to "active" status after her

California suspension was lifted.

The State Bar then initiated disciplinary proceedings, alleging that Ms.

Albert’s filings in federal court were unauthorized practice of law because her

license in state court was suspended at the time.

Ms. Albert was disbarred on July 16, 2024, and the Eastern District

prematurely issued a reciprocal disbarment order on May 24, 2024.

No judge admonished Ms. Albert for filing the papers in the Eastern

District; and no other district court in California automatically suspends an

attorney without notice and opportunity to be heard based on a state bar

disbarment.

The Eastern District did not adequately review the record. For example,

Ms. Albert was disbarred based on a violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6124 –

a fictitious statute. App. D.

E.D.C.A. LR 180 provides that to be admitted as a member of the U.S.

District Court for the Eastern District of California, the attorney must be

admitted and in good standing with the California State Bar. On the other

hand, E.D.C.A. LR 184 provides that an attorney who is suspended by any court

must promptly notify “the court” of his or her suspension. App. D.

After the State Bar prosecuted Ms. Albert, she filed a civil rights action

against Ms. Gonzalez, but her complaint was dismissed based on Younger

abstention and immunity. She appealed. The ninth circuit affirmed both the

reciprocal disbarment and the dismissal of her action against Ms. Gonzalez.

Albert v Gonzalez, Case No. 23-3322; 24-3496 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2024). App. A.

4

IV. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

A. The Ninth Circuit Decided an Important Federal Question in a Way

that Conflicts with Theard v United States

1. The Eastern District Has Determined a State Court Suspension

Automatically Suspends an Attorney from Practicing in Federal

Court

The Ninth Circuit has made a crucial decision on a federal issue that

contradicts relevant rulings by this Court. The Ninth Circuit unequivocally

affirmed the Eastern District's decision to reciprocally disbar Ms. Albert,

stating that her prior state court suspension automatically suspended her from

practicing law in the Eastern District. Albert v Gonzalez, Case No. 23-3322; 243496 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2024). App. A.

The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, has found that

attorney members in federal court must be afforded due process before that

member can be suspended or disbarred from practicing in that federal court if

the suspension or debarment is based on a State Bar suspension or debarment

order. The United States Supreme Court in Theard v United States, explained:

While a lawyer is admitted into a federal Court by way of a state

Court, he is not automatically sent out of the federal Court by the

same route. The two judicial systems of Courts, the state

judicatures and the federal judiciary, have autonomous control

over the conduct of their officers, among whom, in the present

context, lawyers are included.

Theard v. United States 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957).

Over one century ago, this Court explained, “[w]ithout its observance no

one would be safe from oppression wherever power may be lodged.” Ex Parte

Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1873).

The Eastern District affirmed its Local Rule automatically suspends an

attorney without notice. The decision improperly shifted the responsibility to an

5

attorney to file a new case without an Order to Show Cause and request an

Order to Show Cause to Issue from the court. This is a clear violation of due

process and impractical because there is no such option in PACER ECF case

opening. Nevertheless, the order provided, “the State Bar court specifically

discussed the automatic suspension provision and noted the procedure in this

court's Local Rules to challenge automatic suspensions.” In the Matter of

Albert, Case No. 2:24-mc-00117-KJM, 2024 WL 1231293 p. 4 (E.D. Cal., May

24, 2024). App. B.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed

Here, Albert has not made that concession, but she also has not

made any showing to meet her burden to demonstrate a due

process violation by clear and convincing evidence. See In re

Kramer, 282 F.3d at 724. At best, she has offered bare, conclusory

allegations. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not

have to independently review the state court record because the

local rules provided Albert with notice of the automatic suspension

and an opportunity to challenge it. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 184(b).

Albert v Gonzalez, Case No. 23-3322; 24-3496 p. 8 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2024).

App. A.

However, since Ms. Albert was suspended automatically from the

Eastern District without notice, she did not have the opportunity to show that a

reciprocal suspension was unwarranted before she was suspended.

In affirming, the Ninth Circuit erroneously dismissed the importance of a

temporary suspension. “When a deprivation is irreversible — as is the case with

a license suspension that can at best be shortened but cannot be undone — the

requirement of some kind of hearing before a final deprivation takes effect is all

the more important.” Mackey v. Montrym (1979) 443 U.S. 1, 21 (See, Bell v.

Burson (1971) 402 U.S. 535 (1971) , 539, “Once licenses are issued, as in

petitioner's case, their continued possession may become essential in the

6

pursuit of a livelihood.”). See also, Wooten v. Roach (E.D. Tex. 2019) 431 F.

Supp. 3d 875, 899, (“Privileges, licenses, certificates, and franchises ... qualify

as property interests for purposes of procedural due process.”).

The disbarment by pronouncing the Eastern District Local Rules

automatically suspended Ms. Albert’s license to practice law as soon as the state

court suspended her in 2018 was a legal conclusion that was incorrect as a

matter of constitutional law. A reciprocal suspension or disbarment based on a

State Court Bar or Court Order cannot be automatic or “forthwith.” Theard v.

United States 354 U.S. 278, 282 (1957). (See also, Selling v. Radford 243 U.S. 46

(1917).).

As such, Ms. Albert was deprived of her due process rights, justifying this

Court to review the Eastern District Local Rules.

2. Important Policy Reasons Exist to Keep Membership in State

and Federal Courts Separate

It is of utmost importance in society to keep bar membership between

state and federal courts separate for trial lawyers. For example, it took out-ofstate lawyers to advocate for civil rights in federal courts in the South due to

the hostility (or fear of losing their license to practice law). See Pollitt, Counsel

for the Unpopular Cause: The "Hazard of Being Undone, " 43 N. C. L. Rev. 9

(1964); Pollitt, Timid Lawyers and Neglected Clients Harper's Magazine, Aug.,

1964 at 81-86; Frankel The Alabama Lawyer. 1954-64: Has the Official Organ

atrophied? 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1243 (1964).

The out-of-state lawyers had to push through in the federal courts. See

Note, Judicial Performance in the Fifth Circuit 73 Yale L. J. 90 (1963); Wright,

The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration 42 Texas L.

Rev. 949 (1964); S. Fingerhood The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Southern

Justice 214(L. Friedman, ed. 1965).

7

Here, Ms. Albert was representing approximately 191,000 members of

the California State Bar when it disbarred her as more fully explained in the

related petition, Albert v State Bar of California, petition for cert. Case No. 245498.

Limiting federal practice based on local state bar membership infringes

on the federal court’s ability to regulate the practice of law in its Courts in

violation of Ms. Albert’s Fifth Amendment rights, Fourteenth Amendment

rights, and the concept of federalism. V Amend. U.S. Const., XIV Amend. U.S.

Const.

3. The Eastern District’s Local Rule of “Automatic Suspension” Violates

an Attorney’s Due Process Rights

The Eastern District first became aware of Ms. Albert’s state bar

suspension on April 24, 2018. Ms. Albert also informed the Court of her

suspension when she filed the motion to vacate on August 18, 2019. Yet, no one

in the Eastern District told Ms. Albert she was automatically suspended based

on their Local Rules before or immediately after she filed a motion to vacate for

Ms. Noble and an answer for Mr. Grewal.

Without notice of the purported “automatic” suspension, setting aside the

procedural due process issue, Ms. Albert’s due process rights were violated

based on lack of fair notice as to her current status in federal court alone.

Ms. Gonzalez’s unilateral act of changing Ms. Albert’s status to “inactive”

on or after March 1, 2021, was made retroactive to February 14, 2018, without a

Court Order.

Whether the Court characterizes the act as suspending Ms. Albert

without notice in 2018 or making the suspension issued by Ms. Gonzalez

retroactive, it was a serious due process violation resulting in lack of notice or

opportunity for Ms. Albert to be heard before a reciprocal suspension took place.

8

The want of due process that resulted in this discipline should suffice to bar a

reciprocal disbarment by this Court and granting review. V Amend. U.S. Const.,

XIV Amend. U.S. Const.

B. Eastern District’s Local Rules Incorporating California’s State Bar

Act into Federal Practice Violates the Rules Enabling Act

California Bus. & Prof. Code § 6125 provides, “[n]o person shall practice

law in California unless the person is an active licensee of the State Bar.” Id.

App. D. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 6124 does not exist.).

The Eastern District purports that it incorporated this statute from the

State Bar Act into its Local Rules and found that, as such, Ms. Albert’s practice

while she was listed as an active member in federal court but suspended in

state court was the unlawful practice of law “in California.”

Moreover, Ms. Albert argues she did not have notice the State Bar

would find she committed unauthorized practice of law in federal

court because the State Bar Act is meant to be limited to state

court practice. See First Resp. at 17-19. This argument is wholly

without merit. Compliance with the State Bar Act is required by

this court's local rules, which require attorneys practicing here to

“comply with the standards of professional conduct required of

members of the State Bar of California and contained in the State

Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of

California, and court decisions applicable thereto[.]” E.D. Cal. L.R.

180(e)

In the Matter of Albert, Case No. 2:24-mc-00117-KJM, 2024 WL 1231293

p. 6 (E.D. Cal., May 24, 2024).

Consequently, Bus. & Prof. Code § 6125 was unconstitutionally

broadened to reach into the regulation of federal court practice through use of

its Local Rules.

The California State Bar was created by state legislation known as the

State Bar Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6000, et seq.). Shortly after the State

9

Bar’s inception in 1927, the California Supreme Court held that the State Bar

Act applies only to state court. “[t]he State Bar Act and other statutes enacted

for the purpose of regulating the practice of law in this state are applicable to

our state Courts only.” In re McCue 211 Cal. 57, 66 (1930).

This holding was maintained in Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon Frank v.

Superior Ct. 17 Cal.4th 119 (1998) (“[f]or example, section 6125 does not

prohibit the practice of law before federal Courts.);” and Benninghoff v.

Superior Court 136 Cal.App.4th 61, 74 (2006).

Thus, one could deduce the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of

California has decided that the California Legislature can govern the practice of

law in its courts.

Petitioner is not aware of any case where a state legislature is allowed to

govern a federal court and be in conformity with the Rules Enabling Act, 28

U.S.C. § 2072(b) which provides “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or

modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no

further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.” Id.

Federal courts incorporating state law into local rules abridges federal

rules. This is an issue of importance that this Court should review.

C. Ms. Albert Should Have the Right to Sue a Federal Employee Who

Wrongfully Took Away Her Right to Practice Law in Federal Court

Finally, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court’s order

dismissing Ms. Albert’s case against Ms. Gonzalez on the grounds that (1) she

was immune from suit and (2) there was no Bivens action. Albert v Gonzalez,

Case No. 23-3322; 24-3496 p. 5 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2024). App. A.

1. Bivens Action

First, with respect to Bivens, although this Court limited Bivens’ actions,

it did not completely eliminate them.

10

Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit found that:

Congress is in a better position to assess the social costs of

litigation that would potentially inhibit public officials from

performing their duties, see id. at 499, and that Albert had

alternative ways to challenge the decision to change her admission

status from active to inactive, see id. at 497-98; Mejia v. Miller, 61

F.4th 663, 669 (9th Cir. 2023) (noting that the plaintiff had

"alternative administrative remedies"), including by "written

motion to the Chief Judge" of the Eastern District of California.

E.D. Cal. L.R. 184(b). Thus, the district court did not err in

dismissing her Bivens claim.

Albert v Gonzalez, Case No. 23-3322; 24-3496 p. 5-6 (9th Cir. Aug.

20, 2024). App. A.

Petitioner’s position is that a court is better positioned to determine the

costs to the integrity of its operations compared to the legislature when an

operations supervisor wrongfully suspends an attorney’s membership in that

court without due process. Therefore, the case for damages against Ms.

Gonzalez was wrongfully dismissed.

The court, as opposed to Congress is better suited to weigh the costs and

benefits of allowing the damages action to proceed because this concerns court

operations. Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 498 n.3 (2022).

The harm was caused by an operations supervisor within a federal court

using her ECF case management system privileges.

Furthermore, the alternative remedial structure the Ninth Circuit

suggested is inadequate because the process pointed to is not an alternative

where Ms. Albert is able to seek money damages against Ms. Gonzalez for

violating her due process rights. Davis v. Passman 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979).

Like Passman, “[r]elief in damages would be judicially manageable, for

the case presents a focused remedial issue without difficult questions of

valuation or causation.” Davis v. Passman 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979).

11

“Litigation under [Theard and Selling] has given federal courts great

experience evaluating claims for” due process violations when a district court

automatically suspends an attorney without due process. Davis v. Passman 442

U.S. 228, 245 (1979) .

Like Passman, “deference to state-court adjudication in a case such as

this would in any event not serve the purposes of federalism, since it involves

the application of the Fifth Amendment to a federal officer in the course of his

federal duties. It is therefore particularly appropriate that a federal court be the

forum in which a damages remedy be awarded.” Davis v. Passman 442 U.S.

228, 246 (1979) , fn. 23.

Finally, the policy reason for limiting Bivens actions does not exist here

because no separation of powers issue is at play. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S.

120, 133-34 (2017); Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 498 n.3 (2022).

The Court has yet to clarify when the second step would apply in federal

matters concerning events or transactions that occurred in court. Therefore, the

Court should grant the petition for review.

2. Circuit Split on Immunity

There is a circuit split on absolute immunity when it comes to licensure.

The Seventh circuit finds the actors take on a political role stripping

them of immunity. Brunson v. Murray 843 F.3d 698, 712 (7th Cir. 2016)

The Ninth circuit, on the other hand, found Ms. Gonzalez was immune

because she “was performing a ministerial action integral to the judicial

function when she followed the district’s local rules and changed Albert’s status

to inactive.” Albert v Gonzalez, Case No. 23-3322; 24-3496 p. 6 (9th Cir. Aug. 20,

2024). App. A.

12

U.S. Supreme Court precedent has generically held that ministerial acts

create liability, not immunity. (See, Pierson v. Ray 386 U.S. 547, 567, fn. 6

(1967), “A judge is liable for injury caused by a ministerial act; to

have immunity the judge must be performing a judicial function,” citing, Ex

parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-347 (1880)).

The U.S. Supreme Court has also taken a broader view on accountability,

finding “[t]he Constitution constrains governmental action "by whatever

instruments or in whatever modes that action may be taken.” Lebron v.

National Railroad Passenger Corp. 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995) citing Ex parte

Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-347 (1880)

However, this Court has never decided the scope of immunity when it

comes to the licensure of attorneys.

This Court should grant review and find that the Seventh circuit view is

the better position. Brunson v. Murray 843 F.3d 698, 712(7th Cir. 2016)

V. CONCLUSION

Ms. Albert respectfully requests this Court grant her petition for a writ

of certiorari.

Dated: September 26, 2024

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Lenore Albert___________

LENORE L. ALBERT

Petitioner, pro per