Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Terry Dwayne Jones, Petitioner v. United States

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NO. __________________

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

TERRY DWAYNE JONES,

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

APPENDIX A

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Wesley P. Page

Federal Public Defender

Jonathan D. Byrne

Appellate Counsel

Counsel of Record

Rachel E. Zimarowski

Assistant Federal Public Defender

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

Southern District of West Virginia

300 Virginia Street, East, Room 3400

Charleston, West Virginia 25301

304/347-3350

jonathan_byrne@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner

United States v. Jones, Not Reported in Fed. Rptr. (2024)

2024 WL 2012489

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

Terry Dwayne JONES, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 23-4559

Submitted: April 30, 2024

Decided: May 7, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at

Charleston. Irene C. Berger, District Judge. (2:22-cr-00137-1)

Attorneys and Law Firms

ON BRIEF: Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Appellate Counsel,

Rachel E. Zimarowski, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC

DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. William S. Thompson, United States

Attorney, Brian D. Parsons, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Beckley, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WYNN and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

*1 Terry Dwayne Jones pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more

of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Jones expressly conditioned the plea on his

right to appeal the district court's order denying his motion to suppress. The court sentenced

Jones to 57 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Jones challenges the district court's denial of his

motion to suppress arguing that the police officer who stopped Jones for speeding did not have

A-1 1

United States v. Jones, Not Reported in Fed. Rptr. (2024)

probable cause, so the evidence found during the subsequent search of Jones’ car was inadmissible.

(Appellant's Br. (ECF No. 10) at 6). Finding no error, we affirm.

When considering a district court's denial of a suppression motion, we “review legal conclusions de

novo and factual findings for clear error [and] ... consider the evidence in the light most favorable

to the Government.” United States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing factual findings for clear error, we particularly defer to

a district court's credibility determinations, for it is the role of the district court to observe witnesses

and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion to suppress.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). Under the clear error standard, factual findings by the district court may be reversed only

if this Court “is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d 583, 587 (4th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).

Jones argues that the district court erred in finding that the police officer had probable cause to

stop Jones’ vehicle for speeding. Specifically, he contends that the court erred in finding that the

officer's pacing method was a reliable indicator of Jones’ speed. “A traffic stop constitutes a seizure

under the Fourth Amendment and is thus subject to a reasonableness requirement.” United States

v. Perez, 30 F.4th 369, 374 (4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). “As a general matter, the decision to

stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic

violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Probable cause exists

if the officer “had reasonably trustworthy information ... sufficient to warrant a prudent [person]

in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379

U.S. 89, 91 (1964). “When an officer observes a traffic offense—however minor—he has probable

cause to stop the driver of the vehicle.” United States v. Williams, 740 F.3d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2014)

(cleaned up), abrogated on other grounds, Hein v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014).

In Sowards, we determined that an officer's visual estimation that a vehicle is traveling slightly

above the legal speed limit “requires additional indicia of reliability to support probable cause.”

690 F.3d at 592. The reasonableness of the officer's visual estimate may be supported by pacing

methods. Id. Here, the officer observed that Jones’ vehicle appeared to be traveling above the legal

speed limit, and the officer paced the vehicle for several miles. The district court determined that

the officer's speed-gauging methods were reliable. We conclude that this determination was not

clearly erroneous and that the court therefore did not err in denying Jones’ motion to suppress on

the ground that the officer had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop.

*2 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

A-2 2

United States v. Jones, Not Reported in Fed. Rptr. (2024)

All Citations

Not Reported in Fed. Rptr., 2024 WL 2012489

End of Document

A-3 3

NO. __________________

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

TERRY DWAYNE JONES,

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

APPENDIX B

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Wesley P. Page

Federal Public Defender

Jonathan D. Byrne

Appellate Counsel

Counsel of Record

Rachel E. Zimarowski

Assistant Federal Public Defender

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

Southern District of West Virginia

300 Virginia Street, East, Room 3400

Charleston, West Virginia 25301

304/347-3350

jonathan_byrne@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner

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vehicle for a speeding violation.

In a situation like this where there is no training and

he has no recall and the speed limit that he is saying was

exceeded is only a few miles per hour over, that is not

reasonable suspicion to support a traffic stop.

I'm not even sure what else to say, Your Honor.

just -- the Government, in my opinion, has failed to

establish any kind of necessary basis for, for a pace.

in that situation, I believe that the Court should suppress

the evidence in this case.

THE COURT:

All right.

And

Thank you, Ms. Zimarowski.

Counsel, this Court has reviewed, of course, the

written submissions that the parties filed, the motion to

suppress, as well as the United States's response and the

audio recording.

testimony from Deputy Turley, and I've also had the

opportunity to review the applicable case law.

I have listened here this morning to the

I find, given the evidence in this case, given the

applicable law that the motion to suppress, counsel, should

be denied.

We know as basic tenets of the law of search and

seizure that the stop of a vehicle, as we have here, is, in

fact, a seizure and that that seizure is required to be

reasonable.

The stop of a vehicle is reasonable if an officer has

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probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has

occurred.

law, exists if under the totality of the factual

circumstances presented that officer has reasonably

trustworthy information sufficient to believe that the

driver was committing an offense.

That probable cause, based on the applicable case

Under our facts, the question is whether under all the

circumstances Deputy Turley had reasonable, trustworthy

information sufficient to believe that Mr. Jones was

speeding.

I agree that the statement after the fact,

Ms. Zimarowski, by the defendant that he had his vehicle on

cruise control at a speed in excess of the speed limit is

not relevant to the initial issue of whether or not there

was probable cause at the time the stop was made.

The evidence in the case with respect to the relevant

issue, however, is that Deputy Turley was sitting in his

vehicle and he saw what he described as a white vehicle,

which he didn't know what type of vehicle it was at the

time, but ultimately it was a Chrysler 200 pass.

on his observation, he thought that the vehicle was

traveling in excess of the speed limit.

And based

He then pulled out and followed the vehicle, according

to his testimony, for at least five miles, and after

catching up to it matched its speed and did what he

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considers to be pacing, which he has described here during

the course of his testimony.

was traveling 75 miles per hour, which was five miles over

the posted speed limit.

He determined that the vehicle

He then indicated that he obtained identifying

information from both the driver and the passenger and

ultimately, not relevant to the basis of this particular

motion, but searched that vehicle.

I find that his initial observation or belief that the

vehicle was speeding, together with his action of following

it for at least five miles, catching up with it and matching

its speed, pacing to confirm that it was actually traveling

75 miles an hour supports a finding that he had probable

cause to stop that vehicle.

And although there was slight differential between the

actual speed limit and the speed the car was traveling, I

find that the deputy's actions in following that vehicle for

at least five miles and matching its speed or pacing the

vehicle was sufficient additional indicia of reliability to

support an objectively reasonable basis for probable cause

for the stop.

He has indicated that he had no training in pacing, and

he does not recall the road conditions other than he's

indicated that he was on what I'm going to refer to as a

straight stretch of road.

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He has also indicated that to the best of his

knowledge, his office does not calibrate the speed.

indicated that he got this vehicle in October of '21 which

was, let's say, approximately four months before this stop,

and he indicated that his vehicle was new.

Again, I find that based on the totality of the

circumstances and all of the evidence that's been presented

here today that there was, in fact, probable cause for the

officer to stop the vehicle.

I will preserve an objection and exception for the

defendant to my ruling.

so that you know where you are with respect to the motion to

suppress.

written opinion with respect to the defendant's motion to

suppress.

However, I will on a later date follow up with a

Counsel, is there anything further here that we need to

address here this morning?

I give you all this verbal ruling

MR. HEINRICH:

Not from the United States, Your

Honor.

MS. ZIMAROWSKI:

THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

All right.

You all have a good day.

(Proceedings concluded at 9:37 a.m.)

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NO. __________________

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

TERRY DWAYNE JONES,

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

APPENDIX C

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Wesley P. Page

Federal Public Defender

Jonathan D. Byrne

Appellate Counsel

Counsel of Record

Rachel E. Zimarowski

Assistant Federal Public Defender

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

Southern District of West Virginia

300 Virginia Street, East, Room 3400

Charleston, West Virginia 25301

304/347-3350

jonathan_byrne@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 2:22-cr-00137

TERRY DWAYNE JONES,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Court has reviewed the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Document 21) and the

Response of the United States of America to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Document 25).

During a suppression hearing held on March 16, 2023, the Court heard testimony from Deputy

Michael Turley of the Jackson County Sheriff’s Office. The Court issued an oral ruling denying

the motion to suppress, to be followed by this written order.

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

During the suppression hearing, the Defendant objected to the witness wearing a mask,

citing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Court permitted those in the

courtroom to wear or remove masks at their discretion based on the CDC’s report that community

levels of COVID-19 are currently low in Kanawha County, West Virginia. The Confrontation

Clause contained in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “In all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses

against him.” It “guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before

the trier of fact.” Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988). “We have never held, however, that

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the Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face

meeting with witnesses against them at trial.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990)

(emphasis in original). “[A] defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied

absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is

necessary to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is

otherwise assured.” Id. at 850. Like other Sixth Amendment rights, the Confrontation Clause

must “be interpreted in the context of the necessities of trial and the adversary process.” Id. The

“central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a

criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding

before the trier of fact,” accomplished through “physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and

observation of demeanor by the trier of fact.” Id. at 845–46.

The Court is unconvinced that a mask covering a witness’s nose and mouth implicates the

Confrontation Clause. The witness appeared in person, under oath, subject to cross examination,

with the ability for the Court, acting as fact-finder for purposes of the suppression hearing, the

Defendant, and observers to evaluate his demeanor. Despite being unable to see his nose and

mouth, everyone present remained able to assess tone, unusual pauses, shifting or squirming, eye

contact, and body language. The less tangible benefits of face-to-face confrontation, including

the idea that a person is less likely to lie while testifying in person, in the presence of a defendant,

and the symbolic benefit of requiring testimony in the presence of the accused, are likewise not

implicated by the wearing of masks. See id. at 846–47 (discussing purposes of confrontation).

To the extent that a mask covering a witness’s nose and mouth can be said to infringe on the

Defendant’s Confrontation Clause right to see a witness’s full facial expression, the Court finds

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that permitting witnesses to wear masks during a pandemic is necessary to further the important

state interest of protecting vulnerable people from contagious illnesses. 1

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In an Indictment (Document 1) returned on July 12, 2022, the Defendant, Terry Dwayne

Jones, is charged with possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of a substance

containing a detectable amount of fentanyl. Deputy Turley pulled Mr. Jones over on February

15, 2022, and discovered the alleged controlled substance during a warrantless search of his

vehicle. The Defendant challenges the basis of the traffic stop.

Deputy Turley testified that he was parked along I-77 around mile marker 144, not far from

Ripley, West Virginia, during the afternoon of February 15, 2022. He observed a white car that

he believed was exceeding the speed limit based on his visual observation. Deputy Turley pulled

out to match the speed. He does not recall how long it took him to catch up to the car or precisely

how long he followed it to match the speed, though he testified that he typically would pace a car

for 1/8 to 1/4 mile. He matched the speed at 75 miles per hour, based on the speedometer in his

cruiser. The speed limit is 70 miles per hour. He pulled the car over at the 138-mile marker. 2

Deputy Turley explained that this location is an ideal place to stop a vehicle because there is a long

straight stretch that ensures visibility, and it is close to the Ripley exit so backup can arrive quickly

if needed.

1 In addition, the proceeding at issue was a suppression hearing, wherein the Court was the sole finder of fact.

Indeed, the Defendant did not contest the accuracy of Deputy Turley’s testimony, but instead argued that the facts

described were legally insufficient to establish probable cause.

2 The Court noted orally that Deputy Turley had followed the vehicle for five miles. Deputy Turley did not recall

precisely how long he followed directly behind Mr. Jones’ vehicle, though he pulled the vehicle over approximately

six miles from the point where he first observed the car.

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Deputy Turley testified that he smelled marijuana as he approached. He spoke with Mr.

Jones, who was driving the vehicle, and a female passenger. He returned to his vehicle with their

identification, then asked them to exit the vehicle so that he could perform a search. He found

marijuana, Ecstasy, and fentanyl pills in the vehicle. Although he had a canine partner in his car,

he did not remove it because the odor of marijuana was sufficient to justify the search. He did

not turn on his body camera and testified that he was unaware that department policy required use

of body cams during traffic stops. In a recorded, Mirandized interview after his arrest, Mr. Jones

admitted that he had the cruise control set at around 74 mph, above the posted speed limit, that the

car smelled of marijuana, and that the drugs found in the vehicle were his.

Deputy Turley testified that he typically either responded to calls or did traffic patrol along

I-77 during his shifts. He began working for the Jackson County Sheriff’s Office in 2020, and

began working as a police officer in 2018, attending the police academy in 2019. He did not

receive training on pacing but did describe his method. He would “match their speed with my

cruiser.” (Turley Tr. at 7:5.) 3 More specifically, he would “travel the same speed as they are.

They’re not gaining from you. You’re not losing from them. And you travel long enough to

determine that you are not going varying speeds,” then check the speedometer to determine the

speed of both vehicles. (Tr. at 8::1-3.) Deputy Turley did not recall the specifics of any training

related to traffic enforcement. He also did not recall traffic or weather conditions on the date of

Mr. Jones’ stop. He testified that he was unaware of factors, such as speed or tire inflation or

wear, that could impact the accuracy of pacing. He had a new police cruiser that was delivered

in September or October of 2021 with a certified speedometer. He searched online prior to the

3 The Court has utilized a rough transcript of the hearing. Precise citations may differ slightly from the final version.

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hearing to learn that being certified meant it was accurate within two miles per hour. The Jackson

County Sheriff’s Office does not use radar guns, and it does not calibrate the speedometers.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When deciding a motion to suppress, the district court may make findings of fact and

conclusions of law. United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 541 (4th Cir. 2005). On a motion

to suppress, the burden of proof is on the party who seeks to suppress the evidence. United States

v. Dickerson, 655 F.2d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 1981). However, once the defendant establishes a

proper basis for his motion to suppress, the burden shifts to the government to prove the

admissibility of the challenged evidence by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v.

Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974).

DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects people against

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Brief detention pursuant to a traffic

stop constitutes a “seizure” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and must therefore be

“reasonable.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996). “As a general matter, the

decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that

a traffic violation has occurred.” Id. at 810. “[T]he actual motivations of the individual officers

involved” and their “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth

Amendment analysis.” Id. at 813 (finding pretextual stops permissible). “Observing a traffic

violation provides sufficient justification for a police officer to detain the offending vehicle for as

long as it takes to perform the traditional incidents of a routine traffic stop,” including checking

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ID, licenses, registration, and running a computer check. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328,

335–36 (4th Cir. 2008).

The Fourth Circuit has addressed stops for speeding, explaining that the “inquiry here is

whether, given the totality of the circumstances, [the officer] had reasonably trustworthy

information sufficient to support a prudent person’s belief that [the defendant] was speeding.”

United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d 583, 587–88 (4th Cir. 2012). The Fourth Circuit found that

the stop in Sowards was not supported by probable cause where the officer stopped a vehicle based

only on his visual estimate that the vehicle was going 75 mph where the speed limit was 70 mph,

and the officer’s testimony revealed significant difficulty with measurements, as well as a lack of

training or articulable technique for estimating speed. Id. at 593–94. The court explained that a

visual estimate might be sufficient if the “vehicle’s speed is estimated to be in significant

excess…of the legal speed limit.” Id. at 591. However, if the differential between the vehicle

speed and the speed limit is slight “additional indicia of reliability are necessary to support the

reasonableness of the officer’s visual estimate.” Id. “The reasonableness of an officer's visual

estimate that a vehicle is traveling in slight excess of the legal speed limit may be supported by

radar, pacing methods, or other indicia of reliability that establish, in the totality of the

circumstances, the reasonableness of the officer's visual speed estimate.” Id. at 592.

The Defendant relies on a recent opinion in which Judge Goodwin found that “[w]ithout

further indicia of reliability, such as information on Detective Seth Johnson's training in visual

estimates of speed, I cannot find that his estimate of 37 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone

based on pacing alone supports a finding of reasonable suspicion justifying a traffic stop.” United

States v. Morris, No. 2:20-CR-00167, 2021 WL 141799, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 14, 2021). In

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Morris, Judge Goodwin found that expired registration tags provided an independent basis

justifying the stop and ultimately denied the motion to suppress without a hearing. Id. Here,

because speeding was Deputy Turley’s sole basis for stopping the Defendant’s vehicle, the Court

held a hearing to determine whether sufficient indicia of reliability exist to support the

reasonableness of the officer’s determination that the Defendant was speeding.

The speed differential is slight in this case, raising the bar for the type of confirmatory

evidence necessary to establish probable cause. Deputy Turley confirmed his visual impression

that the Defendant was speeding through pacing, a method explicitly condoned in Sowards. He

explained his method of matching his cruiser’s speed to the speed of a vehicle: he would follow

the vehicle, ensuring that he was not gaining or losing on it, over a distance of at least 1/8 mile,

and check his speedometer. Although he had no specific training, the method is straightforward.

The Jackson County Sheriff’s Office does not use radar guns or calibrate the speedometers in

cruisers. However, Deputy Turley’s cruiser was only about four months old and was equipped

with a certified speedometer from the factory. It had both digital and analog speedometers.

While not relevant to the question of whether probable cause existed at the time of the stop, Mr.

Jones’ later statement that he had his cruise control set at about 74 mph further verifies that Deputy

Turley’s method and equipment were sufficient to accurately determine a vehicle’s speed. Thus,

the Court finds that Deputy Turley had reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to believe

that Mr. Jones was speeding.

The stop was supported by probable cause.

Therefore, the

Defendant’s motion to suppress must be denied.

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CONCLUSION

Wherefore, after thorough review and careful consideration, the Court ORDERS that the

Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Document 21) be DENIED.

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to the Defendant and counsel,

to the United States Attorney, to the United States Probation Office, and to the Office of the United

States Marshal.

ENTER:

March 20, 2023

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NO. __________________

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

TERRY DWAYNE JONES,

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

APPENDIX D

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Wesley P. Page

Federal Public Defender

Jonathan D. Byrne

Appellate Counsel

Counsel of Record

Rachel E. Zimarowski

Assistant Federal Public Defender

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

Southern District of West Virginia

300 Virginia Street, East, Room 3400

Charleston, West Virginia 25301

304/347-3350

jonathan_byrne@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner

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AO 245B (Rev. 09/19)

Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Southern District

of West

Virginia

__________

District

of __________

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TERRY DWAYNE JONES

THE DEFENDANT:

✔ pleaded guilty to count(s)

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

Case Number: 2:22-cr-00137-01

USM Number: 36734-510

Rachel E. Zimarowski

Defendant’s Attorney

One of single-count Indictment

G pleaded nolo contendere to count(s)

which was accepted by the court.

G was found guilty on count(s)

after a plea of not guilty.

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

Title & Section

Nature of Offense

Offense Ended

Count

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)

possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of

2/15/2022

One

fentanyl

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through

the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to

G The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s)

G Count(s)

G is

G are dismissed on the motion of the United States.

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence,

or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution,

the defendant must notify the court and United States attorney of material changes in economic circumstances.

8/17/2023

Date of Imposition of Judgment

Q-Le-~

Signature of Judge

IRENE C. BERGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

Name and Title of Judge

8/17/2023

Date

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AO 245B (Rev. 09/19) Judgment in Criminal Case

Sheet 2 — Imprisonment

Judgment — Page

DEFENDANT: TERRY DWAYNE JONES

CASE NUMBER: 2:22-cr-00137-01

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a

total term of:

FIFTY-SEVEN (57) MONTHS. The defendant shall be given credit for all time served to which he is legally entitled.

✔ The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:

The Court recommends that the defendant: 1) be evaluated for and placed in any and all appropriate substance and/or

alcohol abuse treatment programs for which he is eligible; and 2) be placed in a facility as near to his home in Detroit,

Michigan, as possible.

✔ The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

G The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

G at

G a.m.

G p.m.

G as notified by the United States Marshal.

G The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

G before 2 p.m. on

G as notified by the United States Marshal.

G as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on

, with a certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

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AO 245B (Rev. 09/19)

Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 3 — Supervised Release

Judgment—Page

DEFENDANT: TERRY DWAYNE JONES

CASE NUMBER: 2:22-cr-00137-01

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, you will be on supervised release for a term of:

FOUR (4) YEARS.

MANDATORY CONDITIONS

You must not commit another federal, state or local crime.

You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.

You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from

imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.

G The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that you

pose a low risk of future substance abuse. (check if applicable)

You

must

make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A or any other statute authorizing a sentence of

restitution. (check if applicable)

✔ You must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. (check if applicable)

G You must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (34 U.S.C. § 20901, et seq.) as

directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in the location where you

reside, work, are a student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense. (check if applicable)

G You must participate in an approved program for domestic violence. (check if applicable)

You must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any other conditions on the attached

page.

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Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 3A — Supervised Release

Judgment—Page

DEFENDANT: TERRY DWAYNE JONES

CASE NUMBER: 2:22-cr-00137-01

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are imposed

because they establish the basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed by probation

officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in your conduct and condition.

10.

11.

12.

13.

You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours of your

release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs you to report to a different probation office or within a different time

frame.

After initially reporting to the probation office, you will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and

when you must report to the probation officer, and you must report to the probation officer as instructed.

You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission from the

court or the probation officer.

You must answer truthfully the questions asked by your probation officer.

You must live at a place approved by the probation officer. If you plan to change where you live or anything about your living

arrangements (such as the people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying

the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72

hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation officer to

take any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or she observes in plain view.

You must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from

doing so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses

you from doing so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or your job

responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10

days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of

becoming aware of a change or expected change.

You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you know someone has been

convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the

probation officer.

If you are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.

You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was

designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or tasers).

You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant without

first getting the permission of the court.

If the probation officer determines that you pose a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may

require you to notify the person about the risk and you must comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the

person and confirm that you have notified the person about the risk.

You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

U.S. Probation Office Use Only

A U.S. probation officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by the court and has provided me with a written copy of this

judgment containing these conditions. For further information regarding these conditions, see Overview of Probation and Supervised

Release Conditions, available at: www.uscourts.gov.

Defendant's Signature

Date

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Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 3B — Supervised Release

Judgment—Page

DEFENDANT: TERRY DWAYNE JONES

CASE NUMBER: 2:22-cr-00137-01

ADDITIONAL SUPERVISED RELEASE TERMS

While on supervised release, the defendant must not commit another federal, state, or local crime, must not possess a firearm or other dangerous

device, and must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance. The defendant must also comply with the standard terms and conditions of supervised

release as recommended by the United States Sentencing Commission and as adopted by the United States District Court for the Southern District of

West Virginia, including the condition that the defendant shall participate in a program of testing, counseling, and treatment for drug and alcohol

abuse as directed by the probation officer, until such time as the defendant is released from the program by the probation officer. In addition, the

defendant shall comply with the following Standard Conditions of Supervision adopted by the Southern District of West Virginia in Local Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32.3:

1) If the defendant is unemployed, the probation officer may direct the defendant to register and remain active with Workforce West Virginia;

2) The defendant shall submit to random urinalysis or any drug screening method whenever the same is deemed appropriate by the probation officer

and shall participate in a substance abuse program as directed by the probation officer. The defendant shall not use any method or device to evade a

drug screen;

3) As directed by the probation officer, the defendant will make co-payments for drug testing and drug treatment services at rates determined by the

probation officer in accordance with a court-approved schedule based on ability to pay and availability of third-party payments;

4) A term of community service is imposed on every defendant on supervised release or probation. Fifty hours of community service is imposed on

every defendant for each year the defendant is on supervised release or probation. The obligation for community service is waived if the defendant

remains fully employed or actively seeks such employment throughout the year;

5) The defendant shall not possess a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or any other dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed, or was

modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or tasers), and shall reside in a residence free

from such items; and

6) The defendant shall not purchase, possess, or consume any organic or synthetic intoxicants, including bath salts, synthetic cannabinoids, or other

designer stimulants.

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Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 3D — Supervised Release

Judgment—Page

DEFENDANT: TERRY DWAYNE JONES

CASE NUMBER: 2:22-cr-00137-01

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

In addition, the Defendant shall comply with the following Special Condition of supervision:

The Defendant is not a resident of this district; therefore, the period of supervised release is to be administered by the district where the Defendant is a

legal resident and/or the district where a suitable release plan is developed.

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Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 5 — Criminal Monetary Penalties

Judgment — Page

DEFENDANT: TERRY DWAYNE JONES

CASE NUMBER: 2:22-cr-00137-01

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

TOTALS

5HVWLWXWLRQ

$ 0.00

Assessment

$ 100.00

)LQH

$ 0.00

G The determination of restitution is deferred until

$9$$$VVHVVPHQW

$ 0.00

-97$$VVHVVPHQW

$ 0.00

. An Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case (AO 245C) will be

entered after such determination.

G The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise in

the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid

before the United States is paid.

Name of Payee

TOTALS

Total Loss***

0.00

Restitution Ordered

Priority or Percentage

0.00

Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement $

The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than $2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before the

fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be subject

to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:

G the interest requirement is waived for the

G the interest requirement for the

G fine

G restitution.

G restitution is modified as follows:

* Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-299.

** Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22.

*** Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on

or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

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Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 6 — Schedule of Payments

Judgment — Page

DEFENDANT: TERRY DWAYNE JONES

CASE NUMBER: 2:22-cr-00137-01

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant’s ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

✔ Lump sum payment of $ 100.00

✔

not later than

in accordance with G C,

due immediately, balance due

, or

G D,

G E, or

G Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with

G Payment in equal

✔ F below; or

G C,

G D, or

G F below); or

(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $

over a period of

(e.g., months or years), to commence

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or

(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $

over a period of

(e.g., months or years), to commence

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a

term of supervision; or

G Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from

imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant’s ability to pay at that time; or

✔ Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

If not paid immediately, the defendant shall pay the $100 special assessment while incarcerated through participation in the Inmate Financial

Responsibility Program by paying quarterly installments of $25 each.

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during

the period of imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate

Financial Responsibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

G Joint and Several

Case Number

Defendant and Co-Defendant Names

(including defendant number)

Total Amount

Joint and Several

Amount

Corresponding Payee,

if appropriate

G The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

G The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):

G The defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s interest in the following property to the United States:

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) AVAA assessment,

(5) fine principal, (6) fine interest, (7) community restitution, (8) JVTA assessment, (9) penalties, and (10) costs, including cost of

prosecution and court costs.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.