Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Christopher Hadsell, Petitioner v. Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, et al.

No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

o- PL G_2 Ne

IN RE ESTATE OF CHARLES HADSELL,

Deceased,

CHRISTOPHER HADSELL,

Petitioner,

-y-

CATHERINE ISHAM,

Respondent.

¢

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of California

—¢

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

¢

Service on California Attorney General Required by

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.29(c)

¢

Christopher Hadsell

Petitioner In Propria Persona

9000 Crow Canyon Rd., S-399,

Danville, CA 94506

@ (925) 482-6502 @ CjHadsellLaw@gmail.com

I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Is California’s Vexatious Litigant Law (“CA VL

Law’, Cal. Code Civ. Proc.! §§391-391.8)

unconstitutional facially because it is not

narrowly tailored or it does not involve an actual,

compelling state interest?

2. Is CA VL Law unconstitutional as applied?

1 Subsequent references to the Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. will be

designated “CCP”,

i

II. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner is Christopher Hadsell (“Hadsell”). He

was:

Petitioner in the Superior Court of California,

Contra Costa County (“Trial Court’).

Appellant in the Court of Appeal of the State of

California, First Appellate District, Division 4,

(“1DCA”).

Petitioner in the Supreme Court of California

(“Cal. Sup. Ct.”).

Respondent is the Cal. Sup. Ct., Catherine Isham (fka

Porter, Howard, Hadsell, “Isham”), real party in

interest. Isham was:

Respondent in the Trial Court.

Respondent in the 1DCA.

Respondent in the Cal. Sup. Ct.

ii

Ill. TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...........000.000. i

II. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING......... il

III. TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... ce eeeneeeees iii

IV. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... Vii

V. JUDGMENTS BELOW... 1

VI. JURISDICTION o.oo eeeteesenetseeeneeeees 1

VII. CONSTITUTIONAL AND

STATUTORY PROVISIONS... 1

VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE............ 1

A. INTRODUCTION sxsiinnannmnmincisamnnyeu 1

B. THIS COURT HAS IDENTIFIED FOUR

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ESSENTIAL TO THE

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF LIBERTY

AND JUSTICE .o.c..ccccccccccscesccssssessesssesesssseesssseueeees 4

1. The Four Fundamental Rights

Cannot Be Abridged...........ceccceeeeeeeees 5

2. Notwithstanding No Abridgement,

Legislatures Can Prohibit Abuses

That Arise from The Four

Fundamental Rights.......0..0.. cece 6

lv

C. THIS CASE IS THE POSTER CHILD FOR THE

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF CA VL LAW.......... 6

1.

CA VL Law’s History Provides the

Necessary Context for

Constitutionality Analysis .............c 7

a. The False History..........cceceseseeeees 7

b. The Actual History... 9

CA VL Law Is Unconstitutional

Facially .......:csssscscecsecseeecsseseesercssssaneeeeeeeeeens 15

a. CA VL Law Abridges/Curtails

a.

b.

Access to Courts ........ecccccccsccceseseeeeees 15

CA VL Law Is Not Narrowly

Tailored... cassscospegececsestiveisvavertercvereccscases 19

CA VL Law Is Not An Actual,

Compelling, Government Interest.21

Three Undisputed Sets of Facts

Make Clear that CA VL Law Is

Unconstitutional As Applied........... 24

A Rogue Judge, Lacking SMd,

Illegally Placed Hadsell on the CA

VL Lis tiaiseccusiscvnversvsssonvecceserciveneeses. 24

c. The Law of the Case, that Hadsell

Is the Defendant in These Matters,

Makes CA VL Law Inapplicable ....29

d. Denials of Litigation Applications

Demonstrate that Boilerplate

Language is Used as Pretext.......... 32

IX. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE

PETITION wisssisssssssssvusensconsrvvescensssisanssinsesi 34

A. BECAUSE OF THE FEDERAL RULES

DECISION ACT, AND THE ERIE DOCTRINE,

THERE ARE INHERENT CIRCUIT SPLITS

WITHIN EIGHT CIRCUITS; AND SPLITS

AMONG ALL THE CIRCUITS ......ccecccceseseceseeseees 34

B. THE ISSUES ARE IMPORTANT AND

RECURRING ..........ccccssceescesceeseescescescescscesceseesecscees 35

X. CONCLUSION... cccccccccsccesccscesseseeees 36

APPENDICES

Court Opinions:

Appendix A

Cal. Sup. Ct.: Judgment (7/23/24).....cccccscccessceesecenees la

al

Constitutional Provisions/Statutes:

Appendix B

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes Involved in

this Case........eeccccsssccccsssccceecesteecesneeesseeeesesseesssnereseeagas 2a

EXHIBITS

Exhibit 1

Newspaper Bibliography..........ccc:cssssssssesssesssesseeeeeees 9a

Exhibit 2

Senate Calendar sssssssssssasnasssvinnssevermessrsasacvasoseasvease 17a

Exhibit 3

Reporter’s Transcript 4/28/16 Excerpt................+ 18a

Exhibit 4

Judge Mockler Reversal Examples............0:cccccceee 19a

Exhibit 5

10/31/18 Humes Denied Appeal Filing .................. 22a

Exhibit 6

11/28/23 Humes Denied Appeal Application.......... 23a

vil

IV.TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB (2002)

586 U.S. 516 ccc cesceccsecseeeeeceeeseecetaueeeaeeenaeerseseneens 16

Bill Johnson's Rests. v. NLEB (1983)

AG1 U.S. 781 woe cecccccccccsecesseseeeesceeeeeaseneeseneeseeneeeees 5,19

Boddie v. Connecticut (1971)

AOL U.S. 871 cocccccccccccsesesssccccssseesteccseeseeeeseeeesenenseaeeenens 21

Bounds v. Smith (1977)

ABO U.S. 817 ........ccccssccssscccecsscsessecceneneess ss nneesunaenexeneesin 20

Christopher v. Harbury (2002)

586 U.S. 408 qu... cccscece soe nteceabtesannaunensecscntnvenmecauietes 5

City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center

(1985)

473 U.S. 482.............. ciamusaumenemmnanmsmamnnenss 17

Cruz v. Beto (1972)

405 U.S. 3199 ...... nosscoosusnvaissabanssesiGassusiusySOEieee-eereneecers 16

De Jonge v. Oregon (1937)

299 U.S. 358 ooo ccccccsesssssseseessesesseeeeseeeeeseneeeeneees 4,5,6

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins (1938)

B04 U.S. 64 woe ceccccsesseceseeeseeeesneseerseesseeeneeseeeeeneeees 35

Goldberg v. Kelly (1970)

BOT US. 254 .....ccsececssesses- csevunnannansccenennnxensenaxents 16, 25

Griffin v. [llinots (1956)

B51 U.S. 12 oo ccccssecenecnescensaeas sdbuansbuabsicenstbbavvaniancnasts 21

Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and

Mun. Employees, Council 31 (2018)

138 S.Ct. 2448... csscssssssseseneensdjeesencilausasve edeeaietenseaen 21

John v. Superior Court (2016)

G3 Cal. 4th 91. -rressraseeenanrasissnysesatssiedswiaveansavnnessiyineeseest 30

vlil

Johnson v. California (2005)

548 U.S. 499 oo cccccscsscesssesescesssssscsecsususassanenss 20

Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009)

175 Cal. App.4th 536.00... ccc escesesceseseeees 32, 33

Los Angeles vy. Morgan (1951)

105 Cal. App.2d 726.........ccccscceccccssecccssessesesseassceses 28

Nelson v. Tucker Ellis LLP (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 827

EE cle Tee Nella anell mrss nnesrces emecenesenmenTeonenieenceeseiueReNCpRCNNSEReCLOrS 29

Peter v. NantKwest, Inc. (2019)

589 U.S. 238 oe cccccscsccessssesceecesssssevacsecsecassersevsens 19

Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke (1978)

A438 U.S. 265 .............00. avassseeavasvasilsetiuisecsatbaiieaaeescamsiss 20

Speiser v. Randall (1958)

357 U.S. 513................osisnasiactnispbenenseecsanmensensepepecersonernrnes 5

Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005)

35 Cal.4th 180.00... .ccccccsccscscsscscsscsseevseseeecseeecsseasseees 28

Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886)

118 U.S. 3856 wo ccccccccsecsssssscsscseecsesecavscsecsesaaeeers 33

Statutes

28 U.S.C. §1257 (8) ..cccccccccssccsesesestsscscsesevecsvsvscsevsvevsesevevavas 1

28 U.S.C. §1 652 wcssssenccsapessuaassseprceciteeeatiiiss 1sscsesccccssccecsaves 35

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§170.4(a)(1) to (6)... 25

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§391(b)(1)-(5) wovcceececscscssseseeees 15

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§391-391.8.. i, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 17,

18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 30, 34

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1018 o...ccccccccccccccsccsscsesscsrsceceeesees 26

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1088 .....cccccccccccesesscessseseseseseeeees 20

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §128.5 ......cccccccccccscsccecstecereveees 20

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §170.1 o.ccccccccccccssescecscssseeseseeees 25

1x

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §170.3(Q) ..cccccccsscscecssseseseceeessesesens 26

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §891(b)(1).....cccccsccssssseeseeeeeeeeee 15,22

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §391(b)(5).....ccccccsssccssesscececscseseseees 16

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §391(C) ...cccccccccccssccsssesesseeecseeeees 19, 27

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §391.3(8) v..ccccccccssscsssessseseseecsceserees 27

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §391.4 ....cccccccsscccsssssesecscesssseseesees 19

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §391.7(8) ..ccccccccccccscssseeeeees 17, 18, 23

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §891.7(b) ....cccccccsssssscseseecsescseseseees 32

U.S. Const. amend. Tou. ccccceceseeeeeeesees 4,5, 20, 21

U.S. Const. amend. Vu... cccccccscccsssessssseseerscscsescseesessees 5

U.S. Const. amend. XIV oo... ccccescsesseeeeeseeees 5, 16, 17

U.S. Const. ant. EV, §2) Gl 0) pxw-sresensenseeaecmnccenen 5

Other Authorities

A Few Good Men (Castle Rock Entertainment 1992)

ance Ra ta cele pucice vssibova gens exes s suisse vunavenes wsprenexorersseseuxesescavensarer, 28

Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)... cee 7

Born Yesterday (Buena Vista Pictures 1998).............. 7

Final Senate History (1968) oo... .cccccccccsesscsceeceeeeceeeeees 14

Judicial Council of California, 2015-2024 Court

Statistics Reports (2015-2024) ......cecccccccccsesesesesesseees 26

Judicial Council of California, 2022 Court Statistics

Report (2022). szsccsccsvsasssassvsssssmseyiorsespacnerscaanersecnsins 22

Lee W. Rawles, The California Vexatious Litigant

Statute: A Viable Judicial Tool to Deny the Clever

Obstructionists Access? (1998)

72 So.Cal. L.Rev. 275.....ccccccccsccsscsssssssssssssessssseecseseees 8

Oxford English Dictionary 1190 (2d ed., CD-ROM

Ver. 4.0) .sccessusceesavenscvssupisnaesananscastaieassesceaiicnnstina\eeeseecnrnce 22

Staff Writer, Mosk Criticized, Ukiah Daily Journal,

Sep. 25, 1962, Lo. .ccccccccsscesssesesceetecsessenessesesseeeens 13

U.S. Department of Transportation

https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/50intersta

te2.cfm (last visited February 19, 2024)

U.S. Inflation Calculator

https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/ (last visited

February 19, 2024) .sicscsssssinsusavavesessworsexoanverasacoatasness+ 10

V. JUDGMENTS BELOW

The Cal. Sup. Ct.’s judgment is reproduced as

follows:

Judgment (7/23/24) ...cccccccesecsccsccscseccsccsccsscsceseencenas la.

Hadsell v. Court of Appeal(July 23, 2024, No.

$284504)_-_—-Cal.5th___ [2024 Cal. LEXIS 4253].

VI. JURISDICTION

On 7/23/24, the Cal. Sup. Ct. issued its Judgment

(7/23/24) (p. 1a).

This Court’s jurisdiction is timely invoked under 28

U.S.C. §1257(a).

VII. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

Relevant constitutional and statutory provisions that

are not quoted in the text are at 2a et seq.

VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. INTRODUCTION

This Court has identified four fundamental rights that

are essential to the fundamental principles of liberty

and justice that lie at the base of aJZ/ our civil and

political institutions: i) freedom of speech, ii) freedom

of the press, iii) peaceable assembly, and iv) redress of

grievances. This Court recognizes that “redress of

grievances” includes “the right of access to the courts”.

Furthermore, this Court has held that these rights

cannot be abridged by legislatures.

Notwithstanding, because exercising these rights can

result in abuses, the legislatures, can, and should,

prohibit such abuses.

Thus, there is a _ bright line rule between

abridging/curtailing these rights (unconstitutional),

and prohibiting abuses that arise from the exercise of

these rights (constitutional).

The facts of this case make it the poster child for when

a legislature has unconstitutionally (both facially, and

as applied) abridged/curtailed the right of access to

the courts.

Regarding a facial challenge, CA VL Law: i)

abridges/curtails the right to access courts, ii) is not

narrowly tailored, and ili) there is no actual,

compelling state interest. Thus, CA VL Law cannot

survive the strict scrutiny standard applicable to

statutes that infringe fundamental rights.

Regarding an as-applied challenge: i) it is undisputed

that Hadsell has never violated any CA VL Law, 11) yet,

it is undisputed that a judge, without subject matter

jurisdiction (therefore, her actions were ultra vires,

and any results are legal nullities), illegally placed

him on the California Vexatious List, 111) the Law of

the Case is that Hadsell is the “defendant” in these

proceedings, and CA VL Law doesn’t apply to

defendants, and iv) upon pain of dismissal, Hadsell

was forced to apply for leave to file pleadings; denials

of those applications demonstrate that the application

of CA VL Law was pursuant to pretext. Thus, CA VL

Law cannot survive an as-applied constitutional

challenge because: i) there was no required court order

that made Hadsell subject to CA VL Law, ii) he is a

“defendant”; thus, CA VL Law is inapplicable, and iii)

CA VL Law was applied pursuant to pretext.

Therefore, because CA VL Law was applied when

there was no legal basis for its application, it cannot

survive an as-applied challenge.

The Federal Rules of Decision Act, and the Erie

Doctrine require the application of state law in federal

courts for civil actions so that there is uniformity in

the application of the law, and no forum shopping.

Here, given the geography of the 13 states, nine

circuits have an inherent split because they include

states both with, and without, VL Law, causing a split

within each circuit. Likewise, there are combinations

of the circuits such that there are inherent splits

among all the circuits when applying VL Law.

Only this Court can resolve these splits to ensure

uniformity of law and the avoidance of forum

shopping.

There are about 135 million Americans who have the

Sword of Damocles hanging over their heads

regarding their access to the courts due to VL Laws. If

California can be extrapolated to the other 12 states,

then about 8,000 Americans have the Sword pressing

on their necks, and likely every court day, somewhere

in our nation, the fundamental right to access the

courts is being unconstitutionally violated for one or

more Americans.

This Court should find that situation intolerable—

especially when it occurs, as in this case, without due

process of law because throughout these proceedings,

not a single hearing has been held on any application

to file a pleading, yet Hadsell has been denied a

fundamental right, when it is undisputed, that he has

not violated any law.

For these reasons, this case is certworthy and Hadsell

prays that the Court grants certiorari.

B. THIS COURT HAS IDENTIFIED FOUR

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ESSENTIAL TO

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF

LIBERTY AND JUSTICE

Listed in the U.S. Const. amend. I (“1st Amend.”) are

four fundamental rights (“Four Fundamental

Rights”) essential to the fundamental principles of

liberty and justice that lie at the base of all civil and

political institutions: i) freedom of speech, ii) freedom

of the press, iii) peaceable assembly, and iv) redress of

grievances. This Court stated (De Jonge ¥,

Oregon (1937) 299 U.S. 353, 364, emphasis added):

Freedom of speech and of the press are

fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the

due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

of the Federal Constitution. [Citations.] The right of

peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of

free speech and free press and is equally

fundamental. As this Court said in United States v.

Cruikshank... “The very idea of a government,

republican in form, implies a right on the part of its

citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in

respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress

of grievances.”

This Court recognizes that “redress of grievances”

includes “the right of access to the courts”, Sil]

Johnson's Rests. v. NLRB (1983) 461 U.S. 731, 7412;

and that the 1st Amend., is applicable to the states,

[see Speiser v. Randall(1958) 357 U.S. 518, 530

(concurring) where Justice Black collects 15 of this

Court’s cases where the 14th Amend. makes the ist

Amend., “applicable in all its particulars to the

States.”]

1. THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

CANNOT BE ABRIDGED

Immediately following the first De Jonge quote supra,

this Court states (De Jonge, 364, emphasis added):

there does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For

—principles which the Fourteenth

Amendment embodies in the general terms of its

due process clause. [Citations.]

2 As stated in Christopher v. Harbury (2002) 536 U.S. 403, 415,

fn. 12, besides the 1st Amend., this Court has grounded “the right

of access to courts” in the ByMilepes and Immunities Clause (U.S.

Const. art. lV, §2, cl. 1), the Sth Amend., and the 14th Amend,

Thus, no legislature may abridge/curtail the Four

Fundamental Rights.

2. NOTWITHSTANDING NO

ABRIDGEMENT, LEGISLATURES CAN

PROHIBIT ABUSES THAT ARISE FROM THE

FOUR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Despite an absolute prohibition against

abridging/curtailing the Four Fundamental Rights,

any abuse from exercising the rights can, and should

be, prohibited.

Immediately following the second De Jonge quote

supra, this Court states (De Jonge, 364-365, emphasis

added):

These rights may be abused... to incite to violence

and crime. The people through their legislatures

may protect themselves against that abuse. But

Thus, there is a bright line rule between

abridging/curtailing the Four Fundamental Rights

(unconstitutional) and prohibiting abuses that arise

from the exercise of the rights (constitutional).

C. THIS CASE IS THE POSTER CHILD

FOR THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF

CA VL LAW

Regarding a facial challenge, CA VL Law: 1)

abridges/curtails the right to access courts, ii) is not

narrowly tailored, and iii) there is no actual,

compelling state interest.

Regarding an as-applied challenge, the undisputed

facts are: 1) the law of the case is that Hadsell is the

defendant in these matters—thus, CA VL Law is

inapplicable, ii) Hadsell has never violated any CA VL

Law, and iii) a rogue trial judge, with no subject

matter jurisdiction (““SMJ”), illegally placed Hadsell

on the California Vexatious Litigant List, “CA VL

List”. Other than the one 1DCA instance holding

Hadsell is the defendant in these matters, not a single

California court judgment has acknowledged any of

these facts. Instead, it has ignored the facts and used

boilerplate as pretext to deny Hadsell access to the

courts.

1. CAVL LAW’S HISTORY PROVIDES THE

NECESSARY CONTEXT FOR

CONSTITUTIONALITY ANALYSIS

a. The False History

Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) defines

common knowledge as, “A fact that is so widely known

that a court may accept it as true without proof.”

There is no time to fully research everything. So,

common knowledge is a wonderful thing—except

when it’s wrong, as it is here.

An entertaining film, Born Yesterday (Bu is

Pictures 1993) (link is to IMDb.com and 2.5-minute

trailer) starred Melanie Griffith as Billie Dawn, John

Goodman as Harry Brock, and Don Johnson as Paul

Verrall.

Harry is a wealthy businessman who takes beautiful

Billie on an extended business trip to Washington D.C.

where she promptly embarrasses Harry socially

because she’s uneducated. Harry hires Paul? to

“smarten her up”. And boy does he. Billie proceeds to

charmingly skewer the wealthy, well-educated, elite of

Washington D.C. when the newly educated Billie

enlightens the Washington elites that the common

knowledge (that they take for granted) is wrong.

That is exactly the situation here.

Read any California court opinion, treatise, or article,

they all say the same wrong thing: CA VL Law was

enacted to stop the “clogging” of courts with VLs. Not

only is that light years away from the actual, sordid

truth, but, as discussed infra (p. 21), it is

mathematically impossible to be true. Additionally,

discussed infra (p. 14), no factual support has been

found in any history, legislative or otherwise. The only

case-law reference is to Lee W. Rawles, The California

Vexatious Litigant Statute: A Viable Judicial Tool to

the Clever Obstructioni: ccess? (1998) 72

So.Cal. L.Rev. 275. Yet, the article itself states that

there is a, “[T]otal absence of studies specifically

tracking vexatious behavior...”, jd., 310, fn 20.

3 His last name, Verrall being a play on the Latin veritas (truth)

meaning his character is all truth.

b. The Actual History

CA VL Law was enacted on 7/13/63. This was right in

the midst of what the U.S. Department of

Transportation calls, “The Greatest Decade 1956-

1966” for building the Interstate Highways, U.S.

Department of Transportation,

https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/50interstate

2.cfm (last visited February 19, 2024).

Unfortunately, with massive funding, comes massive

corruption (id., emphasis added):

[T]he press regularly repeated tales of alleged

corruption and bungling that the former President

[Eisenhower] considered “almost hair-raising.” A

sympathetic article in The Cincinnati Enquirer for

July 3, 1960, summarized the criticism:

Now critics are proclaiming it “our great big

highway bungle,” a “nightmare,” a “rat hole” of

waste and extravagance, and a scandal of such

potential that Teapot Dome [an influence

peddling scandal during the early 1920s] will be

peanuts by comparison.

Mendocino County was so rife with government

corruption that it had a standing, annual, grand jury

for government corruption. (See Exhibit 1,

“Newspaper Bibliography’, p. 9 for newspaper

articles listing regarding the history.)

10

The political weaponizing of the grand jury into the

“Warrant War” ostensibly began‘ with Deputy Robert

Morton (“Morton”). However, given Morton’s

involvement with County Supervisor Oscar Klee

(“Klee”) and Judges Glenn Evans (“Evans”) and

Maurice Tindall (“Tindall”) within the Volunteers for

Good Government organization (“VGG’), this history

properly begins with Klee.

Prior to becoming County Supervisor, Klee was a

judge. He requested law books for his office totaling

$720 [about $7,200 today, U.S. Inflation Calulator,

https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/ (last visited

February 19, 2024)]. His books arrived, but his pay

was docked the $720 to pay for them (from his $2,277

annual salary). This began political bickering that

escalated into Klee being indicted twice by the grand

jury—the most serious being for six counts of

misappropriation of funds totaling $50.85. While

that’s about $500 today, it’s nonetheless a fairly trivial

amount.

Thus, the issue wasn’ becoming wealthy at the

government’s trough, it was the penalty of legal

defense fees and potential imprisonment.

Fortunately for Klee, he was acquitted both times, and

a legal defense fund was created to cover his legal fees.

4 There is nothing new under the sun. Weaponizing government

is as old as Ancient Rome with Cicero v. Cataline, and as current

as Former-President Trump, and President Biden, and his son,

Hunter Biden.

11

But, he also fought back. At the 1/17/62 Annual Grand

Jury meeting with the Board of Supervisors, Klee

introduced a letter accusing DA Frank Petersen

(“Petersen”) of “aiding and abetting the board of

supervisors and the county road department in

wasting a million dollars of the taxpayers' money.”5

These and other Klee travails were certainly impetus

for his involvement in VGG.

This is where Morton and VGG intersect.

1962 was an election year. Sherriff-Coroner Reno

Bartolomie (“Bartolomie”) was up for re-election.

Morton found a hand-written list with his name, along

with four other deputies’ names. Morton confronted

Bartolomie stating that the deputies on the list were

to be fired if Bartolomie won re-election.

Morton’s suspicion about being fired was because he

had been making noises that Bartolomie was not

running a good ship by, inter alia: i) failing to serve an

arrest warrant on a suspected wife-beater, 11) failing

to report embezzlement in his office by an employee,

and ii) failing to arrest teenagers drinking alcohol.

Morton’s concerns ended up being well founded for at

least the first two concerns since: i) the suspected

5 Nothing much came of the charges—especially after Road

Commissioner, Walter Severance, after 34 years of service, had

his three-sentence resignation letter (viz., Mr. Severance’s

severance letter) read to the Board of Supervisors by the clerk in

his absence while he was on vacation.

12

wife-beater was later convicted and his marriage

annulled, and 11) Bartolomie’s employee indeed

admitted to embezzling about $300, or $3,000 today.

In a public display, during an election year, Morton

and the four other sheriffs on the list resigned en

masse at a public County Supervisor’s meeting at

which Bartolomie was speaking.

Morton then unsuccessfully approached Petersen to

indict Bartolomie.

Unsuccessful with Petersen, and likely spurred on by

his friends at VGG, Morton utilized an obscure law

where a judge can issue a warrant based upon a

complaint from a private citizen.

Morton was unsuccessful with two judges, but with

Judges Evans and Tindall (members of VGG) he was

successful in obtaining about 50 arrest warrants for

Bartolomie, Bartolomie’s Captain Gino Stefani,

Petersen, and a few others.

Most significantly here is Petersen. Amongst this

flurry of warrants, Petersen, as the sitting DA, was

humiliated by being arrested, and booked, on four

separate occasions.

Notwithstanding, obtaining the warrants resulted in

a debacle.

Based upon Attorney General Stanley Mosk’s (“Mosk’,

later, Cal. Sup. Ct., Associate Justice) public

statements about the warrants, and an affidavit from

Klee, Tindall issued a summons for an order to show

13

cause why Mosk shouldn’t be held in contempt of

court.®

This was a bridge too far. Mosk not only put aside his

state duties to insert himself into Mendocino county

affairs to win a successful motion to have Tindall

disqualified from his case, but he continued beyond his

case to have all charges stemming from any of the

warrants dropped, and then Ae convened a special

session of the Mendocino grand jury that indicted

Evans, Morton, Ms. Shon Salisbury’, and Tindall®.

All four were found guilty. The sentences were: i) Ms.

Salisbury received 30 days in jail; 11) Evans and

Tindall both received 5-years’ probation and fined

$2,000 and $4,000, respectively ($20,000 and $40,000

today), both lost their judgeships; and iii) Morton

received 5-years’ prison probation and one year in

county jail.

6 Judge Comstock dismissed the contempt charge, however, he

admonished Mosk stating, “ ‘If Mosk’s remarks had been made in

court he would have been liable for contempt.’ ”, Staff Writer,

Mosk Criticized, Ukiah Daily Journal, Sep. 25, 1962, 1.

7 Strangely enough, the former wife of the convicted wife-beater,

the homeowner where the teenage drinking occurred, and

girl-Friday for VGG; the last item being the offense for her

indictment.

8 On 7/30/63, the Anderson Valley Advertiser ran a cartoon that

seemed to capture the moment of Mosk’s involvement in local

county affairs. It depicted a California Penal Code book wearing

a pirate’s eye patch with the line, “Must it be hidden behind a

Mosk?”

14

But this sordid, political mess doesn’t end here. As an

election year, Petersen became the newly elected,

first-time, and single-term, State Senator.

Having endured all the indignities and humiliations

during the Warrant War, he came to Sacramento with

a vengeance.

He arrived on 1/17/63, and by 4/9/63, he had

introduced the CA VL Law. [See Final Senate History

(1963), 348, S.B. 1179 Exhibit 2, “Senate Calendar”,

p. 17 (yellow highlight added).]

As Exhibit 2 shows, no legislative or committee

hearing was held, nor any fact finding occurred, in the

brief 82 days between Petersen’s arrival and his bill’s

introduction. Likewise for the next 95 days until

signed into law.

The record shows Petersen’s VL-Law bill had nothing

to do with “clogging” the court system with frivolous,

pro-se litigants’ pleadings to the detriment of other

litigants’ legitimate proceedings.

No. This was aimed squarely at the Evanses, Klees,

Mortons, and Tindalls of the world (viz., judges,

politicians, and law enforcement), who dared to use

the courts and law enforcement in a tit-for-tat,

banana-republic-style political retaliation in response

to the same tactics used against them by the

Bartolomies, Mosks, and Petersens of the world. Both

political enemies abused their governmental powers

against each other with grand-jury indictments and

investigations, arrests, bookings, and trials against

their political opponents.

15

For our purposes, there is not a scintilla of evidence,

or even discussion, regarding any “clogging” of courts.

2. CA VL LAW IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

FACLIALLY

a. CA VL Law Abridges/Curtails Access to

Courts

While the California Legislature can prohibit abuses

resulting from the right to access the courts, here, CA

VL Law unconstitutionally abridges/curtails the right

to access the courts. Before that analysis, a brief

discussion is required noting that the California

Legislature commits constitutional error right out of

the gate with its Vexatious Litigant (“VL”) definition.

i. Vexatious Litigant Definition is

Absurd.

CCP §§391(b)(1)-(5) provide five separate definitions

to brand a litigant “vexatious”.

CCP §391(b)(1) (p. 5a) states anyone, in pro se, within

the prior seven years, who has “five litigations...

determined adversely” is a VL. Such a person, who has

violated no law, is a VL.

Every case will produce one “successful” and one

“unsuccessful” litigant. Indeed, a person who has a

95% successful record with 95 successful cases in a

row in 10 years, followed by 5 unsuccessful cases in

the following year, is a VL. Absurd. Especially

16

considering this Court’s favorable view of at least four

values that “unsuccessful” suits provide.?

CCP §391(b)(5) (p. 6a) is even worse. This Court has

held that convicted prisoners have a right to access

the courts, Cruz y. Beto (1972) 405 U.S. 319, 321:

[P]ersons in prison, like other individuals, have the

right to petition the Government for redress of

grievances which... includes “access of prisoners to

the courts for the purpose of presenting their

complaints.” [Citations.]

Yet CCP §391(b)(5) defines a VL as a person who has

i) never been convicted of crime; but 11) who is now

subjected to a restraining order; iii) resulting from an

ex-parte, unnoticed, hearing, held in absentia (in

violation of due process, 14th Amend., Goldberg v. Kelly

(1970) 397 US. 254, 267); iv) that could be supported

only by testimony of the person seeking the order that

the person to be restrained sent a (constitutionally

vague) “annoying” text message through a third party.

9 [E]ven unsuccessful but reasonably based suits advance some

First Amendment interests. Like successful suits, unsuccessful

f dispu' sig ee and

may nee gain acceptance the first time around. [E.g., Justice

Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead leading to Katz.] Moreover, the

ability to lawfully prosecute even unsuccessful suits

. See [Citation] (noting the potential for avoiding violence by

the filing of unsuccessful claims). BH&K Constr Co. _v.

NERB (2002) 536 U.S. 516, 532.

17

The other three definitions suffer similar fatal flaws.

Notwithstanding, assuming arguendo the definitions

weren't fatally flawed, as detailed infra, CA VL Law

applies only to plaintiffs. Thus, defendants can engage

in exactly the same conduct as plaintiffs, yet

defendants are entirely immune to CA VL Law. Thus,

the entire scheme suffers from a fatal equal-protection

issue because infringing the fundamental right of

access to the courts for one party, when the opposing

party can engage in exactly the same conduct with

impunity, cannot possibly pass the strict scrutiny

standard (detailed infra, p. 20), that is required for

state infringement of fundamental rights, 14th

Amend., City of Cleburn VL.

xX,

Center (1985) 473 U.S. 432, 439.

ii. CA VL Law Abridges Access to

Courts by Requiring Court Approval Before a

Pleading Can Be Filed

CCP §391.7(a) (emphasis added, p. 7a) states, “the

court may... enter a prefiling order which prohibits a

vexatious litigant from “ling any new Litigation in

the courts of this state in propria persona without

first obtaining leave of the presiding justice or

presiding judge of the court...”.

Here, unlike for any other litigant, CA VL Law

abridges the right to access the courts rather than

prohibits the abuse of the right. Therefore, it is

unconstitutional because it abridges the right.

18

Moreover, the Cal. Sup. Ct. has a “Chief Justice” and

“Associate Justices”, not a “presiding justice” or a

“presiding judge”.

It appears there’s no case law, statute, or regulation

equating Chief Justice Guerrero to a presiding justice

or presiding judge. These terms are all terms of art,

that in all circumstances {e.g., setting salaries (Cal.

Gov. Code §§68200-68202); election laws [Cal. Election

Code §13109(i)]}, are used distinctively, never as

synonyms, or interchangeably.

It also appears to be why the Judicial Council of

California (that creates mandatory and optional court

forms) Form VL-110 (form for VLs to apply for court

leave to file a pleading) has checkboxes for its use only

in appellate, or superior courts.

Therefore, it appears the California Legislature’s

intent is (and the Judicial Council of California

agrees) that CCP §391.7(a) does not apply to the Cal.

Sup. Ct.

Notwithstanding, searching for “application of

petitioner for leave to file a petition” resulted in 164

results for the Cal. Sup. Ct. between 2013 and today—

all but one were denied. For the one instance found

where a writ of mandate was allowed to be filed, the

writ was denied 44 days later without comment.

Indeed, the Cal. Sup. Ct. has benighted itself

regarding the constitutionality of CA VL Law because

not a single case has been granted certiorari regarding

the laws’ constitutionality.

19

ili. Upon Pain of Dismissal, CA VL Law

Abridges Access to Courts by Requiring “Security”

Be Posted for Speculative Opposing-Party Expenses

(Including Attorneys’ Fees) Before a Pleading Can

Be Heard

CCP §391(c) (p. 6a) defines “security” as, “an

undertaking to assure payment... of the party’s

reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees...”. If

the VL fails to provide the “security”, then the court

“shall” dismiss the pleading, CCP §391.4, p. 7a.

This law also violates the “American Rule” that unless

a specific statute or contract provides for fee shifting,

each party bears its own litigation costs (Peter vy,

NantKwest, Inc. (2019) 589 U.S. 23, 30).

Here, unlike for any other litigant, CA VL Law

abridges the right to access the courts by requiring a

VL to post security for the speculative opposing

party’s litigation costs, before a hearing can be held,

or else the matter “shall be dismissed”, CCP §391.4, p.

7a.

Thus, CA VL Law abridges the right to access the

courts rather than prohibits the abuse of the right.

Therefore, it is unconstitutional because it abridges

the right.

b. CA VL Law Is Not Narrowly Tailored

“[T]he right of access to the courts is an aspect of the

First Amendment right to petition the Government for

redress of grievances.”, Bil] Johnson's Rests., 741.

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