Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gatewood A. Walden, Petitioner v. The Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar
Supreme Court briefMay 8, 2024
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NO.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES
GATEWOOD A. WALDEN,
Petitioner,
v.
THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE ALABAMA
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, A STATE
REGULATORY AGENCY OF THE STATE OF
ALABAMA
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Alabama
Supreme Court
GATEWOOD A. WALDEN, Pro se
3521 Forest Brook Lane
Montgomery, Alabama 36116
334-590-2544
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether, in Petitioner’s appeal, the Alabama
Supreme Court justices violated his rights under the
equal protection clause of the Eighth Amendment to the
U. S. Constitution by failing to follow the appellate
court’s binding precedent which had previously
reversed a lower court’s ruling that found the
Disciplinary Hearing Officer did not comply with Ride
4.2 (b) (6), Ala. Rides Dis. P. in his Report and Order.
II.
Whether, by affirming a lower court’s decision,
the
Alabama
Supreme
Court
justices
violated
Petitioner’s rights under the Eighth Amendment to the
U. S. Constitution since a state regulatory agency’s
decision revoking his business license was unlawful or
void for the reason that the Disciplinary Hearing Officer
faded to comply with the requirements of Rule 4.2
(b)(6), Ala. Rules Dis. P. and Alabama Supreme Court
precedent in Cooner v. Ala. State Bar Assoc.. (2013)
109044, 1111340, 59 So. 3d 37) by omitting to make
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law?
III.
r
Whether, the Alabama Supreme Court justices
erred and violated Petitioner’s rights under the Eighth
Amendment to the U. S. Constitution when (after
forty-six (46) years of exemplary personal and
professional conduct, a life-long law abiding
citizen, twenty-eight years of honorable military
service, and no prior ethics complaints or
violations) the justices affirmed a state regulatory
agency decision to permanently revoked Petitioner’s
business license for allegedly violating three benign
ethics rules, ethic’s rules not involving immorality,
corruption, dishonesty, or criminality?
IV.
Whether, in Petitioner’s appeal, the Alabama
Supreme Court justices violated his rights under the
Sixth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution by affirming
a state regulatory agency decision revoking his law
license even though the Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s
Report and Order failed to include finding of facts of
specific or clearly defined personal misbehavior or
professional misconduct that he had purportedly
engaged in?
V.
ii
Whether, in Petitioner’s appeal, the Alabama
Supreme Court justices violated his rights under the
Eighth and Sixth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution
by affirming a state regulatory agency decision to
revoke Petitioner’s law license in spite of the fact that it
had lost jurisdiction of the disciplinary proceeding
thirty (30) days after entry of its original final judgment
which prevented it from replacing the prior final
judgment with an out-of-time
second judgment
permanently revoking his business license? See Rule 59
(e), Rules of Civil Procedure.
VI.
Whether, in Petitioner’s appeal, the Alabama
Supreme Court justices violated his due process and
equal protection rights by affirming the state regulatory
agency decision refusing to docket and rule on his duly
submitted Rule 60 (b) (4) motion to vacate the
Disciplinary Board’s unlawful and untimely summary
judgment?
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner, Gatewood A. Walden, a life-long, law
abiding citizen of the City of Montgomery, practiced law
in the State of Alabama for more than forty-six (46)
years during which time he incurred no infractions of
iii
the A. R. Prof. Cond. Concurrently, he served honorably
in the U.S. Navy Reserve as a Judge Advocate General
for twenty-eighth (28) years achieving the rank of Full
Commander.
Respondent, the State Bar Association, a state
regulatory agency, is empowered to oversee lawyers’
personal and professional conduct and to impose
sanctions on those who fail to adhere to high ethical and
moral standards.
SIGNIFICANT RELATED PROCEEDINGS
Cooner v. Ala. State Bar, (2013) 59 So. 3d 37
Cooner II, 145 So.3d 201
Cooner III, 59 So. 3d 2013
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
i,n
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
in
SIGNIFICANT RELATED ROCEEDINGS
,iu
1.
Worley v. Ala. State Bar, 572 So.2d 1239 (Ala. 1990)
2.
Huckaby v. Ala. State Bar, 631 So.2d 855 (1993)
3.
Hayes v. Ala. State Bar, 719 So.2s 787 (1998)
iv
4.
Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. V. Loudermilk, 470 U.S.
532, 105 Sc.D.1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494(1985)
5.
Cooner v. Ala. State Bar, 59 So.3d 37 (Ala.2010)
6.
Cooner v. Ala. State Bar, 145 So. 3d 1, 2 (Ala. 2013)
7.
Cooner Ala. State Bar II, 145 So.3d (2010)
8.
Bennett v. Wilson, (1898) 122 Cal. 509 514, 55 P. 390
9.
Rochin v. Pat Johnson Mfg. Co., 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 719, 67
Cal.App.4th 1228 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1998
10. Tidwell v. State Ethics Comm 'n, 599 So. 2d 12 (Ala.
1992)
11.
Loyd v. Director, Dept, of Public Safety, 480 So.2d
577
12.
Anthony v. Anthony, 128 So. 440, 221 Ala. 221
(Ala. 1930)
13.
Klugh v. U.S., 620 SUPP. 892 (D.S.C. 1985)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
vi
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
IX
INDEX TO APPENDICIES
IX
INTRODUCTION.
1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.
4
v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
5
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
12
COONER V. ALABAMSA STATE BAR
13
INORDINATE PROSECUTORIAL DELAY.
14
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
14
RULE 59(e) RULES OF CIVIL ROCEDURE..
14
BACKGROUND
16
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER
DISCIPLINE...............................................
20
ARGUMENT
.22
ALABAMA SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
25
VOID JUDGMENTS
27
THE REPORT AND ORDER FAILS AS A
MATTER OF LAW......................................
30
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT IMLICATED
32
DISCIPLINARY BOARD IS COMPRISED OF
LAWYERS...........................................................
34
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE
WRIT................................................
35
CONCLUSION.
36
vi
APPENDIX
38
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
38
DATE OF JUDGMENT ON
APPEAL................................
December 8, 2023
DATE OF JUDGMENT AFFIRMING
REARING.............................................. February 9, 2024
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Pages
Cases
Cooner v. Ala. State Bar, (2013) 59 So. 3d 37,
.......................... 1,12,13,14,15,27,28,29,33,37
Cooner II,
12,13,27,28,33,37
145 So. 3d 201
Cooner III,
13,27,28,33,37
59 So. 3d 2013
Alabama Federation of Labor v. McAdory,
245 Ala. 1, 18 So. 2d 810 (1944), cert,
dismissed 325 U.S. 450.....................
1
Worley v. Ala. State Bar,
572 So.2d 1239 (Ala. 1990)
3
Huckaby v. Ala. State Bar,
631 So.2d 855 (1993)
3
Hayes v. Ala. State Bar,
719 So.2s 787 (1998)
3
vii
r
Cleveland Bd. OfEduc. V. Loudermilk,
470 U.S. 532, 105 Sc.D. 1487,84 L.Ed.2d
494 (1985)..................................................
3
Davis v. Alabama State Bar,
676 So.2d 306, 308 (Ala. 1996)
12
Noojin v. Alabama State Bar,
577 So.2d 420. 423 (Ala. 1990), citing
Hunt v. Disciplinary Board of the Alabama
State Bar 381 So.2d 52 (Ala. 1980)..............
12
Bennett v. Wilson, (1898)
122 Cal. 509, 513-514, 55 P. 390
30
Rochin v. Pat Johnson Mfg. Co.,
79 Cal.Rptr.2d 719, 67 Cal.App.4th 1228
(CaLApp. 2 Dist. 1998..............................
30
Tidwell v. State Ethics Comm 'n, 599 So. 2d 12, (Ala.
30
1992),
Ins. Co. of Pa. v. Martinez, 18 S.W.3d 844, 847
(Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.)..............
30
Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Funds Recovery, Inc.,
887 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994,
30
writ denied).
Loyd v. Director, Dept, of Public Safety,
480 So.2d 577..................................
31
Anthony v. Anthony,
128 So. 440, 221 Ala. 221 (Ala. 1930)
31
viii
Cummings v. Bean,
853 A.2d 221, 2004 ME 93 (Me. 2004)
31
Nichia v. Woodruff, 956 S.W.2d 612, 616
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997 pet.
denied)..............................................................
31
Ex parted Citizens Bank,
879 So. 2d 535, 540 (Ala.2003)
31
Klugh v. U.S.,
620 SUPP. 892 (D.S.C.1985)
31
RULES
Rule 4.2 (b)(6), Ala. Rules Dis. P.
..... 1,2,14,15,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,32,33,39
Rule 12(f) Ala. Riles Dis. P.
1
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a)
4
Rule 20, Ala. R. Dis. P
8
Rules 1.7(b), 8.4(a), and 8.4(g), Ala. R. Prof. Cond.......14
Rule 59 (e), Rules of Civil Procedure
12,16
Rule 60(b)(4), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc,
34
28 U.S.C.A. 1257................
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5
4,32
34
Rule 60(b)(4), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.,
ix
32
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5
34
Rule 60(b)(4), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.,
32
28 U.S.C.A., Const. Amend
30
Ala. R. Prof. Con
37
TREATISES
46 Am. Jur.2d 347, Judgements
30
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
First Amendment
Fifth Amendment
Sixth Amendment
Eighth Amendment
Fourteenth Amendment
INDEX TO APPENDICES
Appendix A
Walden v. Ala State Bar, No. SC-2023-0507,
Supreme Court of Alabama. Judgment entered
February 9, 2024. No-opinion judgment denying
Walden’s Application for Rehearing.
Appendix B
Walden v. Alabama State Bar Association, No.
1180203. Application for Rehearing and
Appellant’s Brief. Filed January 19, 2023.
x
Appendix C
Walden u. Ala State Bar, No. SC-2023-0507,
Supreme Court of Alabama. Appeal from the
Judgment of the Montgomery County Circuit
Court. (CV-23-70. Judgment entered December
8, 2023.
Appendix D
Walden v. The Disciplinary Board of the Alabama
State Bar. ASB No. 09-1040 (A). Report and
Order of the Disciplinary Board. Judgment
entered June 14, 2012.
xi
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner respectfully requests this court to
issue a writ of certiorari to review the Alabama
Supreme
Court’s
February
9,
2024,
no-opinion
affirmance judgment of its December 8,
2023,
judgment affirming a lower court’s unlawful decision,
and to resolve whether the Alabama Supreme Court
justices violated his due process and equal protection
rights when they revoked his very valuable and
irreplaceable business license without just cause and
contrary to well-settled, binding, appellate court
precedent?
“One’s employment, trade, or calling is a
property right, and any wrongful
interference therewith is actionable,
Alabama Federation of Labor v. McAdory,
245 Ala. 1, 18 So. 2d 810 (1944), cert,
dismissed 325 U.S. 450. Indeed, the
right to work is an inherent
constitutional right that the State
may not interfere with unjustly.”
(emphasis added)
Petitioner also respectfully requests this court
to issue a writ of certiorari to adjudicate whether a
state regulatory agency’s decision to revoke his
business license is void as a matter of law since the
agency’s Disciplinary Hearing Officer failed in his
1
Report and Order (final judgment) to make written
FINDINGS OF FACTS and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
as mandated by Rule 4.2 (b)(6), Ala. R. Dis. P. or as
instructed in Cooner v. Ala. State Bar. 59 So. 3d 37, et
al.
In addition, Petitioner respectfully requests the
issuance of a writ of certiorari because the state
regulatory agency’s decision to revoke his business
license was unquestionably unlawful because the
agency’s Disciplinary Hearing Officer failed in his
Report and Order to demonstrate or articulate findings
of facts showing that Petitioner had engaged in
explicit personal or professional
misconduct or
misbehavior, and because he also failed to identify or
articulate specific conclusions of law applicable to each
allegation of professional misconduct as Rule 4.2 (b)(6),
Ala. R. Dis. P. mandates
Petitioner respectfully request the issuance of a
writ of certiorari because the right to practice law in
the State of Alabama is constitutionally protected as a
valuable property right, and no lawyer can be deprived
of that right except by due process of law and upon the
presentation of clear and convincing evidence of
professional misconduct or unfitness to practice law
2
due to an infirmity, none of which was shown at the
disciplinary hearing.1
Finally, Petitioner respectfully requests the
issuance of a writ of certiorari because the state
regulatory agency that revoked his business license
has never refuted or denied the truth and applicability
of the relevant, uncontested facts and the existence of
binding precedential law in this matter.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s Report and
Order (final judgment) dated June 14, 2012, revoking
Petitioner’s business license.
The decision of the Montgomery Circuit Court
affirming the Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s Report
and Order dated June 14, 2012, revoking Petitioner’s
business license.
The decision of the Ala. Sup. Ct. dated
December 8,
2023,
SC-2023-0507
affirming the
Montgomery Circuit Court’s decision affirming the
state
regulatory
agency’s
decision
to
revoke
Petitioner’s business license.
1 Worley v. Ala. State Bar, 572 So.2d 1239 (Ala. 190);
Huckaby v. Ala. State Bar, 631 So.2d 855 (1993); Hayes v. Ala.
State Bar, 719 So.2s 787 (1998). Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. V.
Loudermilk, 470 U.S. 532, 105 Sc.D. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985).
3
The no-opinion decision of the Ala. Sup. Ct.
dated February 9, 2024, denying a Petition for
Rehearing of its December 8, 2023, decision affirming
the state regulatory agency’s decision to revoke
Petitioner’s business license.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
(I)
Date of judgment reviewed: Decenter 8,
2023.
(II)
Date of rehearing: Petition for Rehearing
denied February 8, 2023.
an) The Court’s jurisdiction is based on 28
U.S.C. §1257(a) and Constitutional grounds.
av) This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1257 (a) to review the egregiously
erroneous judgment of the state’s highest
appellate court when it is alleged that the
justices knowingly and willfully violated a
citizen’s due process and equal protection
rights under the U.S. Constitution.
(V)
This court has jurisdiction to exercise its
supervisory power when a state’s highest
appellate court justices have entered a
decision that has departed so far from the
accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings or sanctioned such a departure
4
by a lower court as to call for granting a
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
(VI)
This court has jurisdiction when it is
irrefutable that the state’s highest appellate
court has egregiously and in bad faith (the
settled law and the undisputed facts being
uncontested)
violated
citizen’s
U.S.
a
inalienable, constitutional rights to due
process of law, equal protection of the law,
and protection from cruel and unusual
punishment,
in
which
case
the
U.S.
Supreme Court has jurisdiction, the power,
and the duty to vacate that state court’s
unlawful and unconstitutional decision.
(VII) This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1651(a) which relates that the
Supreme Court and all courts established by
Act of Congress may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principals of law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An employee of a state regulatory agency, i.e.
the
State Bar Association, instituted a formal
complaint
alleging
Petitioner
5
committed
three
infractions of the Alabama Rules of Professional
Conduct: (1) engaging in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice (2) inducing another lawyer
to violate an ethics rule, and (3) instituting a civil
lawsuit merely to maliciously injure the defendant in
the case.
According to disciplinary procedure, every ethics
complaint
must
be
supported
by
an
affidavit
demonstrating facts of lawyer misconduct personally
known to affiant. In this regard the regulatory agency
lawyer’s affidavit failed categorically. It contained only
amorphous
accusations of rules infractions but
identified no particular facts of explicit professional
misconduct in support of the alleged rules infractions,
and certainly none personally known to the state
regulatory agency lawyer. Therefore, because the
affidavit failed in its purpose and was legally
insufficient the regulatory agency never obtained
subject matter jurisdiction of the disciplinary matter.
Noteworthy is the fact that not one of the
alleged infractions, even if proved to be true, involved
moral turpitude, corruptness, depravity, or any other
type of misconduct that would shock the moral
conscience. Furthermore, neither of the infractions,
even if proved to be true, offends the high moral
6
standards required of Alabama lawyers rather they
are mere technical infractions. And, neither, even if
proved to be true, suggests that Petitioner was
unprincipled, unethical, dishonest, or of low moral
character.
Indeed,
had
the
alleged
infractions
occurred, which neither did, they would have been
comparable to a misdemeanor or a traffic offence such
as running a stop sign or illegal parking and would not
have been so serious or grave as to have warranted
revocation of Petitioner’s business license.
It is important to point out that the aforesaid
alleged infractions are only those Petitioner has ever
been accused of in more than forty-six (46) years in the
practice of law. Indeed, his lifelong personal and
professional conduct and behavior has always been
that of an honorable, principled, and upright lawyer.
Notwithstanding Petitioner’s exemplary, life
long, professional, and personal history, a state
regulatory agency employee instituted an ethic’s
complaint against him which led to the summary
suspension of his business license on the spurious
grounds that he “posed an imminent danger of serious
injury to the public or to his client.” This allegation
was proved
revocation
to
be
complete
of Petitioner’s
7
nonsense
business
because
license
was
unsupported by any expression of specific or precise
personal misbehavior, or professional misconduct, and
certainly none that could have been construed as
“conduct that posed an imminent threat to either the
public or to a client. And since the affidavit failed to
demonstrate any such specific or explicit misbehavior
the regulatory agency lacked subject matter jurisdiction
right from the start.
Furthermore, the affidavit indicates clearly that
the state employee had no personal knowledge of
any alleged misconduct or misbehavior on Petitioner’s
part. To be precise, he did not demonstrate facts
personally known to him showing that Petitioner was
likely to cause immediate and serious injury to his
client or to the public. In short, his affidavit failed in
its purpose. Rule 20, Ala. R. Dis. P. (a) states in part:
“Grounds for Suspension. A lawyer’s law
license may be suspended] on petition
supported by affidavit demonstrating
facts personally known to affiant.
showing that his conduct is likely to
cause immediate and serious injury to a
client or to the public, (paraphrased)
The truth is the state employee’s affidavit
contained no allegations of facts personally known to
him from which a rational person could have
concluded
that
Petitioner
8
engaged
in
conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice, or that he
induced another lawyer to violate an ethics rule, or
that
that
his
conduct
was
likely
to
cause
immediate and serious injury to a client or to the
public.
Indeed,
whatever
knowledge
of alleged
misconduct the state employee possessed was based on
rank hearsay or his own imagination.
Furthermore, the nature, character, or type of
personal or professional misconduct that might have
been prejudicial, or might have posed imminent
danger to a client, or to the public was neither
specified, identified, nor explained. Consequently, the
state regulatory agency lacked the authority or power
to interimly suspend Petitioner’s business license. In
short, the state employee’s affidavit was at best
ineffectual and at worst perjurious, but clearly formed
no basis for the summary suspension of Petitioner’s
business license.
Even so, based on vague, indeterminate, and
amorphous accusations of rides infractions rather than
actual concrete incriminating facts or evidence, the
state employee summarily suspended Petitioner’s
business
license.
Consequently,
Petitioner
was
abruptly put out of business with no income to support
himself and his family. Additionally, he and his family
9
were embarrassed, humiliated, and publicly disgraced,
and his personal reputation was forever ruined. And
none of that should ever have occurred, not ever. Not
only that, but Petitioner was also left in limbo and outof-business for almost a year before he was afforded a
hearing on the bogus charges against him.
Eleven months later, the state regulatory
agency’s Disciplinary Board belatedly conducted an
evidentiary hearing during which not a single witness
testified to having observed Petitioner engaging in any
unethical, wrongful, or criminal conduct whatsoever.
The Board relied, not on witness testimony, but solely
on the unsubstantiated accusations and argument of
the regulatory agency’s lawyer.
Moreover, explicit professional misconduct or
the type or nature of the professional misconduct was
neither identified nor explained, and not a single
witness testified at the disciplinary hearing that
Petitioner
had
engaged
in
any
explicit
or
particularized misbehavior or specific professional
misconduct. Consequently, there was no concrete
evidence before the Disciplinary Board from which it
could have or might have made findings of facts and
conclusions of law. Therefore, it is not at all surprising
that the Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s Report and
10
Order contained no concrete evidence demonstrating
professional misconduct. None was proven.
At that point, the proceedings should have been
dismissed for lack of standing or subject matter
jurisdiction, but regrettably they were not.
Following the conclusion of the shamefully
belated disciplinary hearing, the Disciplinary Hearing
Officer announced that the Disciplinary Board had
decided
that
Petitioner
had
committed
three
infractions of the ethics rules, and that his business
license would be suspendedi for a period of six (6)
months.
Notwithstanding
the
constraints
of
civil
procedure, i.e. Rule 59 (e), however, more than sixty
(60) days later the Board, without considering any
other evidence, abruptly vacated its initial judgment.
and
unlawfully
entered
a
second
judgment
permanently revoking Petitioner’s business license.
Petitioner contends that the judgment permanently
revoking his business license was untimely and
unlawful since it was summarily entered more than
sixty (60) days after the initial judgment suspending
his
business
license.
The
procedural
rule
is
unambiguous and well known. Rule 59 (e), Rules of
Civil Procedure states:
11
“A motion to alter, amend, or vacate the
judgment shall be filed not later than
thirty (30) days after entry of the
judgment.”
In addition, the court is respectfully reminded
that the standard of proof required in lawyer
disciplinary proceedings in the State of Alabama is
clear and convincing evidence of attorney misconduct.
Petitioner avers that no evidence whatsoever, let alone
clear and convincing evidence of attorney misconduct,
was presented at the hearing that would have justified
the revocation of his business license.
‘The standard of review applicable to an appeal
from an order of the Disciplinary Board is “that the
order will be affirmed unless it is not supported by
clear and convincing evidence or misapplies the
law to the facts.” Noojin v. Alabama State Bar, 577
So.2d 420. 423 (Ala. 1990). citing Hunt v. Disciplinary
Board
of
the
Alabama
State
Bar, 381
So.2d
52 (Ala. 1980) see also Davis v. Alabama State Bar, 676
So. 2d 306. 308 (Ala. 1996), Cooner I, 59 So. 3d at 37.
and Cooner v. Ala. State Bar, 145 So. 3d 1, 2 (Ala.
2013).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Cooner v. Ala. State Bar, 59 So.3d 37 (Ala.2010).
Cooner v. Ala. State Bar, 145 So. 3d 1, 2 (Ala. 2013),
12
and Cooner Ala. State Bar, 145 So.3d (2010) are
landmark Alabama Supreme Court cases and are
binding precedent. For no good or discernable reason
or any explanation whatsoever, however, the court
refused to follow precedent in Petitioner’s disciplinary
case, and therefore violated his constitutional right to
due process and equal protection of the law.
Judicial precedent (‘stare decisis’) is the legal
principle whereby courts follow the rulings in previous
cases
with
similar facts
and
issues,
ensuring
consistency and predictability in the law. This doctrine
ensures consistency, predictability, and stability in the
law by obliging courts to apply the same reasoning or
legal principles as earlier courts have when deciding
cases with similar circumstances.
Precedent refers to a court decision that is
considered an authority for deciding subsequent cases
involving identical or similar facts, or similar legal
issues. Precedent is incorporated into the doctrine
of stare decisis and requires courts to apply the law in
the same manner to cases with the same facts.
Precedent
ensures
that
individuals
in
similar
situations are treated alike instead of based on a
particular judge’s personal views or biases, and it is
important in promoting stability and evenhandedness.
13
Generally, precedent is established by a series
of decisions although sometimes a single decision can
create precedent. Precedent was due to be followed in
this matter.
COONER V ALABAMA STATE BAR
In three Cooner cases the Alabama Supreme
Court held that the Disciplinary Board's order
disbarring Cooner did not satisfy the requirements of
Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Disc. P., because it did not include
findings of fact as to each allegation of misconduct
adequate for the Court to conduct a meaningful review
to determine whether or not the Board's conclusion
that Cooner had violated Rules 1.7(b), 8.4(a), 8.4(c),
and 8.4(g), Ala. R. Prof. Cond., was supported by clear
and convincing evidence.
INORDINATE PROSECUTORIAL DELAY
Petitioner
further
contends
that
the
Disciplinary Board’s failure to comply with Rule 4.2,
Ala. R. Disc. P., in its December 8, 2023, and its
February 8, 2023, orders frustrated his right to
appellate review pursuant to Rule 12 (f), Ala. R. Disc.
P., that the Board's “inordinate, and unexplained delay
frustrated, Petitioner’s right to appellate review of the
Board's conclusions of infractions of the ethic’s rules.
14
Hence, the Board violated his due-process and equalprotection rights thus punishing him without having
to prove his guilt by clear and convincing evidence.
Rule 14, Ala. R. Disc. P. For this reason alone, the
charges against Petitioner were due to be dismissed,
and the judgment permanently revoking his business
license was due to be vacated.
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
As is shown herein, the Alabama Supreme Cout
violated Petitioner’s due process and equal protections
rights under the Constitution, and the court also
violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment.
“The Constitution and the laws of the
United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof . . . shall be the
supreme law of the land, and the judges
in every state of the land shall be bound
thereby, anything in the Constitution or
the laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.”
RULE 59(e) RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The official court record of the Disciplinary
Board is undisputed, unchallenged, and clearly shows
that the Board violated Petitioner’s due process and
equal protection rights by foiling to comply with the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.
15
After more than sixty (60) days the Board
abruptly vacated its final judgment suspending
Petitioner’s business license for six months, and
unlawfully entered a second judgment permanently
revoking his business license. The point is that the
Board’s second judgment was untimely and unlawful.
The procedural rule is unambiguous and well known.
Rule 59 (e), Rules of Civil Procedure mandates:
“A motion to alter, amend, or vacate the
judgment shall be filed not later than
thirty (30) days after entry of the
judgment.”
Clearly the second judgment violated Rule 59 (e)
and was void.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner obtained a business license from the
State of Alabama and opened a law office in the city of
Montgomery in September 1966. He practiced law full
time in Montgomery for more than forty-six (46) years
during which time
his personal
and business
reputation was blemish free, no complaints, no
incidents of personal or professional misconduct or
misbehavior whatsoever, not even a traffic ticket.
Concurrently, Petitioner served in the U. S.
Navy Reserve as a Judge Advocate General for twentyeight (28) years retiring as a Full Commander. At one
16
point in his military career, Petitioner held a TopSecret clearance and worked in the Pentagon. As a
retired veteran, he receives a government pension.
In 2012, an employee of a state regulatory
agency, the State Bar Association, summarily and
without notice or an opportunity for Petitioner to be
heard or object, suspended Petitioner’s business
license and ordered him to immediately discontinue
his law practice on the spurious grounds that he posed
an imminent and serious threat of injury or harm to
the public or to his client. That accusation was
categorically false, and unsupported by any direct or
circumstantial evidence whatsoever.
The false and baseless accusation of extremely
serious professional misconduct was nothing more
than a groundless expression of one misguided state
employee’s speculative imagination. Before that time
Petitioner had never in more than forty-six (46) years
in the private practice of law even once been accused of
any type of personal or professional misconduct or
misbehavior whatsoever. His reputation was excellent.
After that, the misguided and ill-informed state
employee filed a formal ethics complaint along with
an, albeit flawed, verified affidavit alleging that
Petitioner had violated three ethics rules. Without a
17
smidgen of factual evidence personally known to him.
he nevertheless accused Petitioner of (1) conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice (2) inducing
another lawyer to violate an ethics rule, and (3)
instituting a civil lawsuit for the sole purpose of
harassing or injuring the defendant in the case.
The state employee’s perfidious affidavit was
legally deficient, however, because it contained no
allegations of specific facts of professional misconduct
personally known to him or when and where that
misconduct allegedly occurred. Moreover, it contained
no facts or evidence from which a reasonable person
could have concluded that Petitioner had engaged in
clearly
identifiable
misbehavior.
professional
misconduct
or
Indeed, the affidavit contained no
expression from which a reasonable person could have
concluded with a reasonable degree of certainty that
Petitioner had engaged in any identifiable personal or
professional misconduct or unethical behavior or when
or where it allegedly occurred.
Additionally, the class or type of alleged
professional misconduct that could have or might have
been prejudicial to the administration of justice was
neither identified nor explained in the affidavit. Also,
no particularized language demonstrated, clearly and
18
convincingly the actual occurrence of any type of
inappropriate,
criminal,
unlawful,
dishonest,
or
unprofessional behavior, or demonstrated how or why
such behavior constituted a violation of a particular
ethics rule. And no specific language explained how, by
what method, or in what manner Petitioner prejudiced
or adversely impacted the administration of justice, or
to what degree he prejudiced the administration of
justice, if any at all.
Furthermore, the Rules of Professional Conduct
contain no such rule of which Petitioner is aware
prohibiting one lawyer from inducing another lawyer
to violate an ethics rule. This was simply an ethics
rule invented in the mind of a misguided state
employee.
The infirmity of the state employee’s affidavit
will
continue
to
be
shown
throughout
these
proceedings.
Just the same, Petitioner found himself out of
business and in limbo for almost a year before he was
afforded a hearing on the charges against him. At the
disciplinary hearing not one witness testified to having
observed Petitioner engaging in any, definitive,
unethical, wrongful, or criminal behavior conduct. The
truth of this assertion is confirmed by what does not
19
appear in the Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s Report
and Order. The Report and Order contained no
findings of facts or any concrete evidence, but simply
opined that Petitioner had violated three ethics rules.
For this reason, the Disciplinary Hearing
Officer’s Report and Order is the Achilles heel of this
litigation. Why? Because it does not even remotely
comply with Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Disc. P. and Cooner,
supra. In a word, the Report and Order is legally
defective. Thus, the charges against Petitioner are
invalid and unenforceable.
Obviously,
a
bald-faced,
unsubstantiated
statement that Petitioner violated three ethic’s rules is
not a legally sufficient substitute for a clear and plain
expression of the specific wrongful conduct that
Petitioner engaged in as required by Rule 4.2 of the
Rides of Disciplinary Procedure. Rule 4.2 (b) (6)
requires
that
the
Disciplinary
Hearing
Officer
articulate in his Report and Order specific findings of
facts and identifiable conclusions of law as to each
allegation of professional misconduct. Consequently,
the Report and Order must contain language such as
“the board makes a finding of the following fact” or
“the board finds this fact to be true....” Otherwise, the
Report and Order is invalid or void.
20
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER
DISCIPLINE
Lastly but by no means of less importance, Rule
4.2 requires that the Report and Order reference the
Alabama Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline.
Section I: These standards adopt a model that
requires the Disciplinary Board to answer each of the
following questions: (emphasis added)
What ethical duty did the lawyer violate? (A
duty to a client, the public, the legal system, or the
profession?)
What was the lawyer’s mental state? Did the
lawyer act intentionally, knowingly, or negligently?
What was the extent of the actual or potential injury
caused by the lawyer’s misconduct? And are there any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances?
Rule 4.2, Section C of the standards requires:
"(iii) A finding as to the discipline to be
imposed, with reference, where appropriate, to
the Alabama Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Discipline...."
“In imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer
misconduct the Board should consider the
following factors:
The duty violated:
21
The lawyer’s mental state:
The actual or potential injury caused by the
lawyer’s conduct, and
The existence of aggravating or mitigating
factors.
The Alabama Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Discipline are complex and sometimes obscure or
subject to interpretation. For example, the sanction to
be imposed upon a lawyer for professional misconduct
can range from slight, moderate, or severe, and
requires careful analysis. Yet this type of analysis
required by the standards is completely lacking
anywhere in Petitioner’s disciplinary proceedings.
Section II A, 1.3 (3) advises that the standards
are
designed to promote,
among other things,
consistency in the imposition of discipline for the same
or similar circumstances.
The point is because the Report and Order
failed to comply with any of these requirements it was
void and unenforceable.
ARGUMENT
Petitioner has shown explicitly and hopefully
with clarity the procedural requirements of Rule 4.2,
Ala. R. Disc. P. in lawyer disciplinary proceedings.
Now he will now show how and why the Disciplinary
22
Hearing Officer’s Report & Order failed to comply with
those procedural requirements.
Firstly, Rule 4.2. requires that the Disciplinary
Hearing
Officer
make
a
Report
and
Order
demonstrating actual facts and conclusions of law,
secondly, that the report be captioned Report and
Order, and thirdly that the Report and Order contain
certain specific information and language. These
requirements are not discretionary; rather they are
imperative. Consequently, the failure of a Report and
Order to contain the required information and
language is fatal to the prosecution’s case.
As to the charge that Petitioner engaged in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, the
Report & Order failed to show or demonstrate
precisely what particularized professional misconduct
Petitioner allegedly engaged in that was or might have
been prejudicial or harmful to the administration of
justice. Or when it occurred. Or who observed it. Or
where it occurred.
Other questions were not answered either. Over
what period of time did the alleged prejudicial or
harmful misconduct occur? Was it oral or was it in
writing? Did it occur once, or did it occur multiple
times? Was it coercive, or merely strongly suggestive,
23
physical, or verbal, illegal, or prohibitive, slightly
harmful, or impactful, or minimally harmful and
impactful, or extremely harmful and prejudicial? Who
observed the prejudicial and harmful misconduct? The
Report and Order did not answer these questions.
Furthermore, it did not contain any specific findings of
facts
relating
to
these
questions.
Thus,
the
Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s Report and Order failed
to comply with the requirements of Rule 4.2.
Turning now to the charge of inducing another
lawyer to violate the ethics rules, the Report and
Order does not even bother to identify the alleged
induced lawyer. Who was he or she? Was he or she,
young or old, black, or white, or some other ethnicity?
What was the method of inducement? Was it
accomplished by threats, bribery, or by other nefarious
means? Who witnessed the inducement? Did one or
more than one individual witness the inducement?
Who corroborated the fact that the inducement
actually occurred. When did it occur? Where did it
occur? Was it oral or was it in writing? And is inducing
a lawyer to engage in unprofessional conduct an actual
infraction of the ethics rules?
Still, the fundamental question is whether a
lawyer who induces another lawyer to engage in
24
unprofessional conduct is
guilty of professional
misconduct? The question is: which ethics rule was
implicated? Petitioner is unaware of any such rule,
and the Report and Order referenced no such rule. If
no such ethics rule exists, and it does not, then no
basis exists for finding Petitioner had violated the
rule.
Petitioner now turns to the third ethics charge:
instituting a civil lawsuit merely to harass or
maliciously injure the defendant in the case. The
Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s Report and Order did
not demonstrate who the defendant was, or whether
the defendant was injured, or which lawsuit was
implicated, or what conduct constituted harassment or
an what conduct constituted an intent to maliciously
injure. Nor did it identify what particularized conduct
constituted malice, or what conduct demonstrated an
intent to harass or injure. Lastly, the Report and
Order did not explain the reason the alleged unlawful
conduct constituted an infraction of an ethics rule, nor
which rule, nor did it contain conclusions of law as to
each allegation of such conduct.
Given the fact that it was self-evident that the
Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s Report and Order
failed to comply with Rule 4.2 and was void, the
25
appellate court’s “no opinion affirmance” was clear and
inexcusable error, and flagrantly violated Petitioner’s
constitutional right
to
due
process
and
equal
protection of the law. It was therefore clearly due to be
vacated.
Lastly,
although
specifically
required
by
procedural law the Report and Order did not include a
summary of the specific conduct the Board allegedly
found to be an infraction of the ethics rules.
Furthermore, it failed to include conclusions of law as
to each allegation of professional misconduct. In
addition, it failed to include any explanation or reason
as to why such alleged misconduct constituted a
violation of a particular ethics rule. Hence, the Report
and Order failed completely in its purpose.
ALABAMA SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
The precepts contained in Cooner v. Ala. State
Bar Assoc. 59 So. 3d 29, (Ala.2010) and Cooner v. AlaState Bar Assoc. 59 So. 3d 37, (Ala.2013) are
consistent and compelling:
“On October 8, 2010, the Alabama Supreme
Court held that the Disciplinary Board's order
disbarring Cooner and revoking his law license did not
satisfy the requirements of Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Disc. P.,
because it did not include findings of fact as to each
26
allegation of misconduct adequate for this Court to
conduct a meaningful review to determine whether the
Disciplinary Board's conclusion that Cooner had
violated Rules 1.7(b), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(g), Ala. R.
Prof. Cond., was supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Cooner v. Alabama State Bar. 59 So.3d 29
(Ala. 2010)
(“Cooner
I”). 1 Accordingly,
this
Court
reversed the Disciplinary Board's judgment as to those
infractions.
“In the conclusions of law, the Board did not
include a summary of the specific conduct it
found that constituted a violation of each Rule
of Professional Conduct Cooner was charged
with violating, and it did not include any
explanation as to why such conduct constituted
a violation of any particular rule. Rather, the
Board merely cited a laundry list of various
paragraphs included in the “Findings of Fact.”
“But references to paragraph numbers alone do
not constitute findings of fact as to each
allegation of misconduct.” (emphasis added)
“However, this Court has previously held that
that general recitation of facts alone was not
sufficient to comply with Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Disc.
P. See Cooner I, 59 So.3d at 39; Cooner II,
supra. There have been two problems all along
with the purported findings of fact in this case.
First, as explained in both Cooner I and Cooner
II. there have not been actual findings of fact bv
the Board as opposed to general recitations of
27
evidence heard bv the Board. The main opinion
in the present case states that “this Court has
previously held that that general recitation of
facts alone was not sufficient to comply with
So. 3d at
Rule 4 .2. Ala. R. Disc. P.”
(emphasis added).”
“In point of fact, what we said in our previous
opinions in this case is that a general recitation
of “evidence” is not sufficient to constitute the
requisite findings of “facts.” As we said in
Cooner I: The second problem all along has
been the failure of the Board to align different
factual findings with different conclusions of
misconduct.” (emphasis added).
A general recitation of “evidence” is exactly
what the Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s Report and
Order contains and nothing more and certainly no
requisite findings of “facts.”
VOID JUDGMENTS
Petitioner asserts that he has firmly established
by any measure that the Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s
Report and Order fails as a matter of law. Because the
Report and Order is void it would be a judicial travesty
and breach of duty for this court to refuse to grant the
issuance of a writ of certiorari and vacate the unjust
and legally insufficient judgment of the Disciplinary
Board of the State Bar Association. Indeed, recent case
law dictates that a court has a clear duty to vacate a
28
void judgment whenever it is brought to the court’s
attention.
“A void judgment is not entitled to the respect
accorded to, and is attended by none of the
consequences of, a valid adjudication. Indeed, a
void judgment need not be recognized by anyone
but may be entirely disregarded or declared
inoperative bv any tribunal in which effect is
sought to be given to it.” 46 Am. Jur.2d 347,
Judgements.
“A ‘final’ but void judgment [order] is, in legal
effect, no judgment. By it, no rights are
divested. From it no rights can be obtained.
Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it
are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars
anyone. Bennett v. Wilson. (1898) 122 Cal. 509,
513-514, 55 P. 390.” Rochin v. Pat Johnson Mfg.
Co., 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 719, 67 Cal.App.4th 1228
(Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1998.)
“A void judgment will not support an appeal.”
See Tidwell v. State Ethics Comm'n, 599 So. 2d
12, 12 (Ala. 1992). “The appellate court has no
jurisdiction to consider the merits of an appeal
from a void judgment.” Ins. Co. of Pa. v.
Martinez. 18 S.W.3d 844, 847 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 2000, no pet.): Dallas County Appraisal
Dist. v. Funds Recovery. Inc., 887 S.W.2d 465,
468 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied).
“Lapse of time cannot cure [a] decree void on
[the] face of [the] record.” Lovd v. Director. Dept,
of Public Safety. 480 So.2d 577; “Lapse of time
29
cannot cure decree void on face of record.”
Anthony v. Anthony. 128 So. 440, 221 Ala. 221
(Ala. 1930); “A void judgment may be challenged
at any time and must be vacated upon request.”
(emphasis added); Cummings v. Bean. 853 A.2d
221, 2004 ME 93 (Me. 2004). 46 Am Jur 2d § 14.
“Because jurisdiction is fundamental, it may be
raised for the first time on appeal without the
usual requirements for preservation of error or
assignment of error.” Nichia v. Woodruff. 956
S.W.2d 612, 616 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1997, pet. denied). Ex parted Citizens Bank. 879
So.2d 535, 540 (Ala.2003) (holding that a
judgment entered without subject-matter
jurisdiction is void and that an appeal from a
void judgment must be dismissed). A void
judgment cannot be res judicata, as a matter of
common sense.”
“All courts seem to agree that a void judgment
can never be converted into a valid judgment
with the passage of time. In other words, a void
judgment can never morph into a valid
judgment.” IT!he passage of time, however
great, does not affect the validity of a judgment;
it cannot render a void judgment valid.’
“Judgment is a void judgment if court that
rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the
subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a
manner inconsistent with due process, Fed.
Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 60(b)(4), 28 U.S.C.A.
1257; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 - Klugli v. U.S.,
620 SUPP. 892 (D.S.C. 1985).”
30
THE REPORT AND ORDER FAILS AS A
MATTER OF LAW
At the conclusion of a lawyer disciplinary
proceedings,
the
Disciplinary
Hearing
Officer
announces the Disciplinary Board’s decision and is
responsible for preparing a written Report and Order
(the final judgment) setting forth specific findings of
facts and conclusions of law. This task is not
discretionary; it is imperative.
Notwithstanding
these
requirements,
the
Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s Report & Order in this
case contained no explicit facts or conclusions of law.
Why? Because no evidence of misconduct was
presented at the hearing from which such a report
could or might have been prepared. Thus, the Report
and Order failed to conform with Rule 4.2 of the Rules
of Disciplinary Procedure.
With respect, the importance of this point must
be emphasized. Rule 4.2 mandates that the Report
and Order contain both findings of facts and
conclusions of law as to each allegation of
professional
misconduct
contained
in
the
complaint, and an explanation as to why such
professional misconduct constituted a violation of a
particular ethics rule. Consequently, the Report and
31
Order, not conforming to Rule 42, was invalid as a
matter of law and thus unenforceable.
The Alabama Supreme Court delt at length with
the requirements of a Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s
Report and Order in Cooner I, Cooner II, and Cooner
III.
In those landmark cases the court plainly and
emphatically held that a Report and Order that did
not comply with procedural Rule 4.2 was due to be
vacated. Rule 4.2(b)(6), Ala. R. Disc. P. states:
"The Disciplinary Hearing Officer
shall make written findings of fact
and conclusions of law as directed
by the Disciplinary Board, which shall
be captioned 'Report and Order.' The
decision of the Disciplinary Board may
be announced immediately after the
conclusion
of the
proceedings,
(emphasis added)
"(C) The Report and Order shall contain:
"(I) A finding of fact and conclusion
of law as to each allegation of
misconduct, which, upon acceptance by
the Disciplinary Board, shall enjoy the
same presumption of correctness as the
judgment of a trier of fact in a nonjury
civil proceeding in which evidence has
32
been presented ore tenues, (emphasis
added)
"(ii) A finding as to whether the
respondent attorney is guilty or not
guilty of the misconduct charged; [and]
"(iii) A finding as to the discipline to be
imposed,
with
reference,
where
appropriate, to the Alabama Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Discipline.. .."
Equally important, Rule 4.2 mandates that the
Report and Order set forth its conclusions of law. The
Report and Order does not comply with this aspect of
the rule either. Rule 4.2 (6) states in part:
“The Disciplinary Hearing Officer shall
make written findings of fact and
conclusions of law ...
“The Report and Order shall contain: (I)
a finding of fact as to each allegation of
misconduct...”
“The complaint shall contain an
explanation as to why such conduct
constituted a violation of the particular
rule, (emphasis added)
The Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s Report
& Order in Petitioner’s case contained no
conclusions of law.
33
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATED
The hallmark of the American system of justice
is fair play. To be sure, fair play is the beating heart of
the American judicial system. And the concept of fair
play extends to the stage in any proceeding that calls
for the imposition of punishment for the violation of a
rule, the commission of an offense, or criminal
behavior. The concept of fairness is enshrined in the
Constitution by the Eighth Amendment and is a
fundamental value of most Americans.
The Eighth Amendment mandates that cruel
and unusual punishment should not be imposed on a
person for the violation of a rule, a law, or any other
offense. The prohibition applies to both federal and
state governments. When it becomes obvious that a
state government has imposed a patently unfair or
cruel punishment on one of its citizens it is incumbent
upon the federal judiciary to take corrective action.
The federal judiciary is called upon in this case to
reign in a regulatory agency of the state of Alabama
and
set
aside
the
agency’s
decision
revoking
Petitioner’s business license and his ability to earn a
living for himself and his family. No reasonable person
would come to believe that the maximum punishment
for a doubtful benign infraction of a rule of
34
professional conduct is fair. Hence, if a punishment is
manifestly unfair it must be vacated.
Petitioner asserts that the harsh punishment
imposed upon him by an element of a state regulatory
agency was unwarranted and unjustified. When a
state government, through one of its regulatory
agencies such as a Bar Association, willfully violates
the Eighth Amendment it is incumbent upon the
federal judiciary to take corrective action.
DISCIPLINARY BOARD COMPRISED OF
LAWYERS
Members of the Disciplinary Board are all but
one practicing lawyers with extensive experience in
their profession. Furthermore, some have served on
the Board for extended periods of time, so it is
reasonable to assume they would have been familiar
with the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Rules of
Disciplinary
Procedure,
and the
Standards
for
Imposing Lawyer Discipline. It is also reasonable to
assume that they would have applied those rules in
other cases that have come before them. These lawyers
would also have been expected to keep current with
appellate court caselaw dealing with disciplinary
matters, and especially landmark decisions such as
Cooner I, Cooner II, and Cooner II wherein the Board’s
decision to sanction a lawyer was reversed and the
35
sanction imposed on the lawyer vacated. After all,
appellate
court
case
law
is
intended
to
be
instructional, and the failure of the members of the
Disciplinary Board to know and apply the instructions
in Cooner, supra in future cases would be attorney
malpractice.
It should now be clear that the lawyers on the
Disciplinary Board in Petitioner’s disciplinary case
failed to comply with the instructions in the Cooner
cases, and that is inexcusable and unforgivable.
Indeed, it is malpractice at best, and corruption at
worst. Whichever the case, the sanction imposed upon
Petitioner is due to be vacated and without delay.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
A writ of certiorari is due to be granted by this
court when a state’s highest appellate court acts
corruptly by willfully failing to apply binding appellate
court case law (precedent) in a serious case involving
one of its citizens.
A writ of certiorari is due to be granted by this
court when a state regulatory agency violates a
citizen’s Sixth Amendment rights by revoking his
business license even though it failed to comply with
the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure which requires the
agency’s Disciplinary Hearing Officer to include in his
36
Report and Order findings of facts and conclusions of
law as to each allegation of professional misconduct
that the lawyer allegedly had engaged in.
A writ of certiorari is due to be granted by this
court when, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a
state regulatory agency imposes a punishment on a
lawyer for a first alleged infraction of the Rules of
Professional Conduct after a forty-six (46) year
blemish free career,
and when the punishment
imposed is patently disproportionate to or bears no
relationship to the infraction of a benign rule of
professional conduct.
A writ of certiorari is due to be granted by this
court when the facts and the applicable principles of
law are not in dispute nor in conflict, in which case its
sole and highest duty is to correctly apply the law to
the facts and render a lawful decision.
A writ of certiorari is due to be granted by this
court when the facts and the relevant applicable
principles of law are set out in a Petition for
Reconsideration, and are not challenged or disputed,
and when the state’s highest appellate court renders
an erroneous, no-opimon affirmance of the lower
court’s likewise erroneous decision.
37
A writ of certiorari is due to be granted when a
state’s highest appellate court in bad faith violates the
constitutional rights of one of its citizens, in which
case the U.S. Supreme Court has the authority and
indeed it has the heavy duty to correct the injustice.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner earnestly believes that he has shown
by irrefutable evidence and rock-solid logic that the
state regulatory agency’s Report and Order revoking
his business license is void, unenforceable, and due to
be vacated by this court. Indeed, because it is void it
would be a travesty for this court to refuse to grant
certiorari to vacate the Report and Order. This court is
respectfully reminded that whenever a void judgment
is brought to the attention of a court that that court
has a common law duty to vacate the void judgment.
That being true, Petitioner respectfully contends that
the refusal or failure of this court to vacate the void
Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s Report and Order would
be a dereliction of its judicial duty.
In conclusion, Petitioner earnestly asserts that
to this day he has absolutely no idea of the
particularized or actual misbehavior or professional
misconduct he is alleged to have engaged in that
38
resulted in the revocation of his business license, his
disgrace, and the ruination of his family name.
Dated this theJPP 7% day of September 2024.
Gatewood A. Walden, Pro se
Gatewood A. Walden
3521 Forest Brook Lane
Montgomery, Alabama 36116
334-590-2544
39
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.