Amicus Curiae Brief — Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board, et al., Petitioners v. Gentner Drummond, Attorney General of Oklahoma, ex rel. Oklahoma

Supreme Court briefApr 7, 2025

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No. 24-394; No. 24-396

In the Supreme Court of the United States

̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴

OKLAHOMA STATEWIDE CHARTER SCHOOL

BOARD, et al.,

Petitioners,

GENTNER DRUMMOND, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

OKLAHOMA, ex rel. OKLAHOMA,

Respondent.

_____________

ST. ISIDORE OF SEVILLE CATHOLIC VIRTUAL

SCHOOL

Petitioners,

GENTNER DRUMMOND, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

OKLAHOMA, ex rel. OKLAHOMA,

Respondent.

_____________

On Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

________________________

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE CONSTITUTIONAL AND

EDUCATION LAW SCHOLARS IN SUPPORT OF

RESPONDENT

________________________

STEPHAN J. SCHLEGELMILCH

Counsel of Record

VALERIE A. ZUCKERMAN

COURTNEY E. BARGER

DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP

801 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

sjschlegelmilch@debevoise.com

(202) 383-8000

BEATRICE A. WALTON

JOHN HOLLINGSWORTH

WILLIAM F. GONCHER

66 Hudson Blvd.

New York, N.Y. 10001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ..............................1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .....................................2

ARGUMENT ...............................................................4

The Provision of Public Education Is a

Core State Obligation Which States

Discharge, In Part, Through State-Created

Charter Schools. ...............................................4

States Establish and Approve Charter

Schools. .......................................................6

States Operate Charter Schools as

Public Schools. ............................................9

While Charter Schools Enjoy

Flexibility in Their Operations, States

Engage in Continuing Regulation,

Monitoring, and Control of Them. ...........15

II.

The Establishment Clause Prohibits

States from Establishing Public Charter

Schools for Religious Instruction. ..................20

The Establishment Clause Applies

with Particular Force in Public

Education..................................................20

Approving and Operating Religious

Charter Schools Is “State Action.” ...........22

Forcing State Legislatures to Create

Religious Charter Schools Would

Eviscerate the Wide-Latitude to Which

States Are Entitled in the Design of

Public Education Systems. ......................26

CONCLUSION ..........................................................29

APPENDIX: List of Amici Curiae .............................1a

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp,

374 U.S. 203 (1963) ........................................... 21

Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,

347 U.S. 483 (1954) ............................................. 4

Carson as next friend of O. C. v. Makin, 596

U.S. 767 (2022) .................... 12, 15, 18, 22, 25, 27

Edwards v. Aguillard,

482 U.S. 578 (1987) ........................................... 20

Engel v. Vitale,

370 U.S. 421 (1962) ........................................... 21

Epperson v. Arkansas,

393 U.S. 97 (1968) ............................................. 21

Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue,

591 U.S. 464 (2020) ........................................... 22

Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Tp.,

330 U.S. 1 (1947) ............................................... 23

Kennedy v. Bremerton,

597 U.S. 507 (2022) ..................................... 22, 24

Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc.,

459 U.S. 116 (1982) ........................................... 23

Lee v. Weisman,

505 U.S. 577 (1992) ........................................... 24

Locke v. Davey,

540 U.S. 712 (2004) ........................................... 26

Illinois Ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ.,

333 U.S. 203 (1948) ..................................... 21, 23

Milliken v. Bradley,

418 U.S. 717 (1974) ........................................... 26

Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. MorriseyBerru,

591 U.S. 732 (2020) ........................................... 25

Peltier v. Charter Day Sch.,

37 F.4th 104 (4th Cir. 2022) ............................. 12

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,

411 U.S. 1 (1973) ............................................... 27

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe,

530 U.S. 290 (2000) ......................... 20, 23, 24, 25

Stone v. Graham,

449 U.S. 39 (1980) ............................................. 21

Sugar Creek Charter Sch., Inc. v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 673 S.E.2d 667

(N.C. App. Ct. 2009) .......................................... 13

Thomas Jefferson Classical Acad. Charter Sch.

v. Cleveland Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,

243 N.C. App. 797 (2015) .................................. 13

Wallace v. Jaffree,

472 U.S. 38 (1985) ....................................... 20, 21

Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ.,

89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) .. 11, 15

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,

536 U.S. 639 (2002) ............................... 21, 22, 23

Zorach v. Clauson,

343 U.S. 306 (1952) ........................................... 23

CONSTITUTIONS

U.S. CONST. amend. I................................................ 4

ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 ....................................... 12

CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5 .......................................... 12

COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 ........................................ 12

DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1 ........................................... 12

MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 .................................... 10

N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV(1) ................................. 11

N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 .................................... 10, 11

OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1................................. 5, 12

STATUTES

20 U.S.C. § 7221i(2) ................................................ 10

Act of Feb. 23, 1870, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67 .................. 5

Act of Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62 .................. 5

Act of Mar. 30, 1870, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80 .................. 5

STATE STATUTES & REGULATIONS

Ala. Admin. Code (2024)

r. 290-3-2-.02(2)(a) ........................................... 17

r. 290-3-6-.02(6) .................................................. 8

Ala. Code (2025)

§ 16-6F-2(c) ......................................................... 7

§ 16-6F-4(5) ........................................................ 8

§ 16-6F-4(16) ............................................ 2, 9, 17

§ 16-6F-5(a)(1)–(3) ............................................ 11

§ 16-6F-6(a) ......................................................... 8

§ 16-6F-8 ........................................................... 18

§ 16-6F-8(c)(7) .................................................. 19

§ 16-6F-10(b)(1)(b) ............................................ 13

§ 16-46-3(a) .......................................................... 9

Alaska Admin. Code (2025)

tit. 4, § 33.110(a) .............................................. 16

tit. 4, § 33.110(a)(5) .......................................... 16

Alaska Stat. (2024)

§ 14.03.255 .......................................................... 2

§ 14.03.265(b) ................................................... 11

§ 14.03.290(2) ................................................... 10

§ 14.03.290(4) ................................................... 17

§ 14.07.020(10) .................................................... 9

§ 14.33.120 ........................................................ 24

vii

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (2025)

§ 15-101 .............................................................. 2

§ 15-756.08 ....................................................... 18

§ 15-756.08(A) .................................................. 18

§ 15-181(A) ......................................................... 9

§ 15-183 ............................................................ 18

§ 15-183(I)(3)(a)–(d) ......................................... 19

§ 15-184(A) ....................................................... 11

Ark. Code Ann. (2025)

§ 6-23-103 ........................................................... 2

§ 6-23-103(4) ........................................................ 9

§ 6-23-105(a)(1) ................................................ 19

§ 6-23-302(c)(1) ................................................... 9

§ 6-23-306(3) ..................................................... 17

§ 6-23-402(a) ..................................................... 11

§ 6-23-501(a)(1) ................................................ 13

Cal. Educ. Code (West 2024)

§ 47601(e), (g) ............................................... 2, 10

§ 47602(b) ........................................................... 7

§ 47605 ................................................................ 9

§ 47605(e)(1) ..................................................... 12

§ 47605(e)(2)(B)(iv) ........................................... 12

§ 47605.6 ............................................................. 9

§ 47605.6(e) ...................................................... 12

Colo. Rev. Stat. (2025)

§ 22-30.5-106(1) ................................................ 16

§ 22-30.5-106(2) .................................................. 7

§ 22-30.5-112 .................................................... 13

§ 22-30.5-507(1)(a) ............................................. 9

viii

Conn. Gen. Stat. (2025)

§ 10-66aa(1) ..................................................... 2, 9

§ 10-66bb(a)(1) .................................................... 9

§ 10-66bb(c)(1)–(2) ............................................ 11

§ 10-66bb(d) ...................................................... 16

D.C. Code (2025)

§ 38-651.01(3B) .............................................. 2, 9

§ 38-1802.12 ..................................................... 19

D.C. Mun. Regs. (2025)

tit. 5-E, § 915.1 ................................................. 11

tit. 5-E, § 922.1 ................................................. 17

tit. 5-E, § 937 .................................................... 18

Del. Admin. Code § 275(10) (2025) ........................ 18

Del. Code Ann. (2025)

tit. 14, § 154(a) ................................................. 17

tit. 14, § 503 ........................................................ 2

tit. 14, § 512(6) ................................................. 17

Fla. Admin. Code r. 6A-6.0786 (2025) ................... 18

Fla. Stat. (2024)

§ 1002.33(1) .................................................... 2, 9

§ 1002.33(3)(b) .................................................... 7

§ 1002.33(7)(a) .................................................... 8

§ 1002.33(8) ...................................................... 19

§ 1002.33(17) .................................................... 13

Ga. Code Ann. (2025)

§ 20-2-2062(1) ..................................................... 6

§ 20-2-2062(2) ................................................. 2, 7

§ 20-2-2063.3a ..................................................... 7

§ 20-2-2065.b2–b3 ............................................... 7

§ 20-2-2068.1(a) ................................................ 13

Haw. Code R. § 8-54-3 (LexisNexis 2025) ............... 9

Haw. Rev. Stat. (2024)

§ 302A-101 .......................................................... 9

§ 302A-804(b)(1) ............................................... 17

§ 302D-1 .............................................................. 2

Idaho Code (2024)

§ 33-5202A(8) ................................................. 2, 9

§ 33-5202A(2) ..................................................... 8

§ 33-5203(4)(a) .................................................... 7

§ 33-5206(1) ...................................................... 12

105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/27A-5 (2024) ..................... 2, 9

Ind. Code (2024)

§ 20-24-1-4 .......................................................... 2

§ 20-24-1-2.5(5) ................................................... 8

§ 20-24-2-1 ........................................................... 7

§ 20-24-2.1-1(a) ................................................... 8

§ 20-24-3-4(b) .................................................... 16

§ 20-24-8-5(23) .................................................. 17

§ 20-26-12-1(a) .................................................. 17

Iowa Code (2025)

§ 256E.1 ........................................................ 2, 10

§ 256E.6(1) .......................................................... 6

§ 256E.6(2) ........................................................ 19

§ 256E.7(1) ........................................................ 10

§ 256E.10 .......................................................... 18

§ 256E.10(5) ...................................................... 19

Kan. Stat. Ann. (2025)

§ 72-4206(a) .................................................. 2, 10

§ 72-4206(b) ...................................................... 17

§ 72-4209 .......................................................... 18

Kan. Admin. Regs. (2025)

§ 91-31-32(e) ........................................................ 9

La. Stat. Ann. (2024)

§ 17:3973.2a ........................................................ 2

§ 17:3983(A)(2) ................................................... 8

§ 17:3991(E)(2) ................................................... 7

§ 17:3992(A)(1) ................................................. 19

La. Admin Code. (2025)

tit. 28, pt. CXXXIX, § 103(A)(2) ......................... 9

tit. 28, pt. CXXXIX, § 515(D)(10) ..................... 17

tit. 28, pt. CXXXIX, § 1101 .............................. 18

tit. 28, pt. CXXXIX, § 1101(A) ......................... 15

Mass. Code Regs. 1.08 (2025) ................................ 18

Mass. Gen. Laws (2024)

ch. 71, § 89 .......................................................... 2

ch. 71, § 89(b) ...................................................... 7

ch. 71, § 89(c) .................................................. 7, 9

Md. Code Ann., Educ. (West 2024)

§ 7-203 .............................................................. 17

§ 9-102 ................................................................ 2

§ 9-104(a)(1) ........................................................ 8

§ 9-106 .............................................................. 17

Me. Stat. (2025)

tit. 20-A, § 2401(3) .............................................. 6

tit. 20-A, § 2401(9) .......................................... 2, 9

tit. 20-A, § 2405(1)(A)–(C) .................................. 8

tit. 20-A, § 2412(4)(C) ....................................... 12

tit. 20-A, § 2412(5)(B) ....................................... 17

tit. 20-A, § 2412(5)(J), (L) ................................ 17

Mich. Comp. Laws (2025)

§ 380.501 ............................................................. 2

§ 380.501(2)(a)(iv) .............................................. 8

Minn. Stat. (2024)

§ 124E.03 ............................................................ 2

§ 124E.12 .......................................................... 17

Miss. Code Ann. (2025)

§ 37-13-91(2)(e) ............................................. 9, 10

§ 37-28-5(e) ......................................................... 2

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 160.400(1) (2024) ..................... 2, 10

Mont. Code Ann. (2025)

§ 15-30-3102(7)(b)(ii) ........................................... 9

§ 20-4-101(1) ..................................................... 17

§ 20-6-803(9) ..................................................... 17

§ 20-6-811(1) ..................................................... 10

N.C. Gen. Stat. (2025)

§ 115C-5(7a) ..................................................... 10

§ 115C-218.1(a) .................................................. 7

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (2025)

§ 194-B:1(IV) .................................................... 10

§ 194-B:8(III) .................................................... 24

§ 194-B:16 ......................................................... 18

xii

N.J. Stat. Ann. (West 2025)

§ 18A:36A-3 ........................................................ 2

§ 18A:36A-12(b) ................................................ 13

N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:23A-1.2 (2025) .................. 10

N.M. Stat. Ann. (2025)

§ 22-8B-2(A) ........................................................ 2

§ 22-8B-4(I) ....................................................... 10

§ 22-8E-7 ........................................................... 18

N.Y. Educ. Law (McKinney 2025)

§ 2853 .................................................................. 2

§ 2856(x) ........................................................... 13

Okla. Admin. Code § 210:40-87-7(c) (2025) ........... 24

Okla. Stat. (2024)

tit. 70, § 3-140(A) .............................................. 11

tit. 70, § 3-140(E) .............................................. 11

Or. Rev. Stat. (2025)

§ 338.005(2) .................................................. 2, 10

§ 338.095(2) ...................................................... 18

24 Pa. Cons. Stat. (2025)

§ 17-1703-A(3) .................................................... 2

§ 17-1725-A(a)(2) .............................................. 13

§ 17-1729-A(i) ................................................... 19

P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 9813a (2024) .................... 10

200-20-05 R.I. Code R. § 2.5.3(A)–(C)

(LexisNexis 2025) .............................................. 19

xiii

16 R.I. Gen. Laws (2024)

§ 16-77-3.1(b) ............................................... 10, 15

§ 16-77.2-5(a) .................................................... 13

S.C. Code Ann. (2024)

§ 59-40-40 ........................................................... 2

§ 59-40-40(2)(a) ................................................ 10

§ 59-40-90 ........................................................... 9

§ 59-40-100 ......................................................... 7

§ 59-40-40(5) ............................................... 17, 18

§ 59-40-50(5) ............................................... 17, 18

§ 59-40-130(A)(1) ........................................ 17, 18

Tenn. Code Ann. (2025)

§ 49-13-104 .......................................................... 2

§ 49-13-104(14) ................................................. 10

Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0520-14-03.02 (2025)...... 16

Tex. Educ. Code Ann. (West 2025)

§ 12.001(a)(2) .................................................... 10

§ 12.105 ............................................................... 2

§ 12.106(a) ........................................................ 13

Utah Code Ann. (West 2025)

§ 53G-5-302 ........................................................ 8

§ 53G-5-401 ........................................................ 2

§ 53G-5-401(1)(a)............................................... 10

§ 53G-5-503(1) .................................................. 19

Utah Admin. Code R277-553-2 (2025) ................... 18

Va. Code Ann. (2024)

§ 22.1-212.5 ........................................................ 2

xiv

§ 22.1-212.5(B) .................................................. 10

§ 22.1-212.6(A) ................................................. 11

§ 22.1-212.6(E) ................................................. 12

§ 22.1-212.9(A) ................................................... 8

W. Va. Code (2025)

§ 18-5G-2 ............................................................ 2

§ 18-5G-3 .......................................................... 10

§ 18-5G-3(a)(7) .................................................. 12

§ 126-79-5.4.b.1.A.5 .......................................... 17

§ 18-5G-10 ........................................................ 19

Wash. Admin. Code § 108-20-070(2)(a)(ii)

(2025) ........................................................... 16, 17

Wash. Rev. Code (2024)

§ 28A.710.010 ..................................................... 2

§ 28A.710.160 ...................................................... 8

Wis. Stat. (2025)

§ 118.40 ............................................................... 2

§ 118.51(2) .......................................................... 2

§ 118.40(2m)(a) ................................................... 6

Wyo. Stat. Ann. (2024)

§ 21-3-302(vii), (viii) ........................................... 6

§ 21-3-304 ........................................................... 2

§ 21-3-306(b) ....................................................... 7

§ 21-3-308(g) ..................................................... 17

RULES

Sup. Ct. R. 37.6 ......................................................... 1

Tenn. Bd. Educ. R. 0520-01-03 (available at

https://tinyurl.com/yfhkbcnk) ........................... 16

ARTICLES

Ariel Gilreath, All-Charter No More: New

Orleans Opens Its First Traditional Public

School in Nearly 2 Decades, Chalkbeat

(Sept. 9, 2024, 6:05 AM), https://tinyurl.com/3ac4fdyk. .......................................... 14

David Osborne & Emily Langhorne, Analysis:

NAEP Scores Show D.C. Is a Leader in

Educational Improvement — With Powerful

Lessons for Other Cities, The 74 (Apr. 17,

2018), https://tinyurl.com/256bpmnp ............... 14

Derek W. Black

The Constitutional Compromise to

Guarantee Education, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 735,

778–81 (2018) ...................................................... 4

The Fundamental Right to Education, 94

Notre Dame L. Rev. 1059, 1064 (2019) .............. 5

Preferencing Educational Choice: The

Constitutional Limits, 103 Cornell L. Rev.

1359, 1361 (2018) .............................................. 14

Reforming School Discipline, 111 Nw. U. L.

Rev. 1, 10 (2016) .................................................. 4

Religion, Discrimination, and the Future of

Public Education, 13 U.C. Irvine L. Rev.

805, 811 (2023) .................................................. 23

xvi

Dylan Peers McCoy & Stephanie Wang, How

Lewis Ferebee Forged Peace with Charter

Competitors to Reshape Indianapolis

Schools, IndyStar (Feb. 7, 2019, 6:00 AM),

https://tinyurl.com/56vc9sa6 ............................ 14

Public Charter School Enrollment, National

Center for Education Statistics (May 2023),

https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator/cgb/public-charter-enrollment .................... 14

Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl,

Originalism and Brown v. Board of

Education, 2014 Mich. St. L. Rev. 429, 45061 (2015) .............................................................. 5

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Denver Charter Schools,

https://denvercharters.org/ (last visited

Apr. 1, 2025) ...................................................... 14

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1

As Amici Curiae, the Constitutional and Education Law Scholars listed in the Appendix submit this

brief in support of Respondent. Amici are immersed

in the study of constitutional and education law

through their scholarship and teaching and believe in

upholding core constitutional rights in the provision

of public education. Amici are acutely aware of the

role public education has historically played in preserving and making possible our democratic system of

government. Amici seek to assist this Court by explaining how state laws have created charter schools

as a means of discharging states’ core constitutional

obligations to provide public education and how these

legal structures relate to issues presented in this case.

1 Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 37.6, counsel for amici curiae certify

that this brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel

for any party and that no person or entity other than amici curiae

and its counsel has contributed monetarily to preparing or submitting this brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Charter schools are state-created public schools.

First brought to life by Minnesota with the adoption

of the nation’s first charter school statute in 1991, today forty-six states and the District of Columbia have

enacted similar statutes providing for the creation of

charter schools. While the exact structures of charter

schools and the regulatory requirements governing

their operations vary state-by-state, charter schools

across the country share a common structure and

function rooted in their very designation as “charters”:

the provision of public education on behalf of the

state.2

2 See

Ala. Code § 16-6F-4(16) (2025); Alaska Stat. § 14.03.255

(2024); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-101 (2025); Ark. Code Ann § 623-103 (2025); Cal. Educ. Code § 47601(e)–(g) (West 2024); Conn.

Gen. Stat. § 10-66aa(1) (2025); Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 503

(2025); D.C. Code § 38-651.01(3B) (2025); Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(1)

(2024); Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-2062(2) (2025); Haw. Rev. Stat.

§ 302D-1 (2024); Idaho Code § 33-5202A(8) (2024); 105 Ill. Comp.

Stat. 5/27A-5 (2024); Ind. Code § 20-24-1-4 (2024); Iowa Code

§ 256E.1 (2025); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-4206(a) (2025); La. Stat.

Ann. § 17:3973.2a (2024); Me. Stat. tit. 20-A, § 2401(9) (2025);

Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 9-102 (West 2024); Mass. Gen. Laws ch.

71, § 89 (2024); Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.501 (2025); Minn. Stat.

§ 124E.03 (2024); Miss. Code Ann. § 37-28-5(e) (2025); Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 160.400(1) (2024); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:36A-3 (West

2025); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-8B-2(A) (2025); N.Y. Educ. Law

§ 2853 (McKinney 2025); Or. Rev. Stat. § 338.005(2) (2025); 24

Pa. Cons. Stat. § 17-1703-A(3) (2025); S.C. Code Ann. § 59-40-40

(2024); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-13-104 (2025); Tex. Educ. Code

Ann. § 12.105 (West 2025); Utah Code Ann. § 53G-5-401 (West

2025); Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-212.5 (2024); Wash. Rev. Code

§ 28A.710.010 (2024); W. Va. Code § 18-5G-2 (2025); Wis. Stat.

§§ 118.40, 118.51(2) (2025); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-304 (2024).

Amici write to call the Court’s attention to the implications of this common structure and function of

charter schools. Based on the legal framework establishing and governing charter schools across the

states, Amici agree with the Oklahoma Supreme

Court that charter schools teaching religion as truth

are impermissible under the U.S. Constitution.

(I) First, charter schools are public schools both

under the express terms of state law and in respect to

their provision of public education services pursuant

to authority granted by the state. State and local governments create and enlist charter schools to assist

the state in discharging its core constitutional public

education responsibilities. Consistent with this state

function and responsibility, state laws require that

charter schools operate as public schools—invariably

mandating that charter schools be free and open to the

public, among other requirements of traditional public schools—and integrate charter schools into public

education funding schemes. State and local governments likewise exercise control over charter schools

throughout their operation, including through

continuing monitoring, regulation, and oversight

mechanisms that ensure they properly discharge the

state’s public education function. In short, while

states allow charter schools certain flexibility in their

operations, acting as an independent private entity is

not among those permitted aspects; charter schools instead operate as public schools, within public systems

of governance, and in line with public educational objectives. In setting out these core features of charter

schools and their administration, Oklahoma’s charter

school statute aligns with those of numerous states

across the country.

(II) Second, because charter schools are public

schools in both name and operation, states cannot

grant public school charters to entities that would use

those charters to teach religion as truth without violating the Establishment Clause. Such state action—

both the approval and operation of the religious public

charter school, as well as the state’s continuing administration of it—plainly runs afoul of the Establishment Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.

ARGUMENT

The Provision of Public Education Is a

Core State Obligation Which States Discharge, In Part, Through State-Created

Charter Schools.

The provision of public education is “perhaps the

most important function of state and local governments.” Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493

(1954). Today, the constitutions of all fifty states contain obligations requiring the provision of public education. See Derek W. Black, Reforming School Discipline, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2016). For some

states, these requirements are rooted in Reconstruction, where Congress conditioned the readmission of

secessionist states on rewriting their constitutions to

conform to a republican form of government, including

constitutional guarantees of public education. See

Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Compromise to

Guarantee Education, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 735, 778–81

(2018). Under this legislation, Congress readmitted

the last three secessionist states on the express condition that their constitutions “shall never be so

amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class

of citizens of the United States of the school rights and

privileges secured by the [state] constitution.” See Act

of Mar. 30, 1870, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81 (Texas); Act of

Feb. 23, 1870, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 68 (Mississippi); Act

of Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63 (Virginia). And

since the Civil War, no state has entered the Union

without guaranteeing public education in its constitution. See Derek W. Black, The Fundamental Right to

Education, 94 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1059, 1064 (2019).

These education clauses, moreover, were not just

a product of Reconstruction, but emerged even earlier

in other states. See Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W.

Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education,

2014 Mich. St. L. Rev. 429, 450–61 (2015). For its

part, Oklahoma’s constitution, adopted in 1907, follows in the post-Reconstruction trend of requiring the

state to “establish and maintain a system of free public schools wherein all the children of the state may be

educated.” OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.

In recent decades, states have experimented with

charter schools as a novel means of discharging their

core public education responsibilities provided for under these constitutions. As of today, some forty-six

states have enacted charter school laws. See supra

n.2. The purpose of such schools is generally to increase flexibility of curriculum, encourage innovation,

expand school choice, and, ideally, improve educational performance.

However, while charter schools were designed as

a mechanism for increasing choice and innovation in

public educational systems, they do not, as Petitioners

in this case suggest, operate outside of public education systems independent of the state. Consistent

with charter schools’ role in helping states discharge

their core public education responsibility, states not

only consider charter schools as public schools in their

authorizing statutes but indeed operate them as such,

including by requiring that they remain free and open

to all students and by funding them through publicschool formulas and appropriations. States also retain and exercise, throughout the life of each charter

school, significant mechanisms of oversight, monitoring, and control. Thus, while states invite private actors to submit applications to run charter schools,

states never cede ultimate control over the mission or

purpose of public charter schools to private actors, nor

ultimate responsibility for the education that occurs

within those schools.

States Establish and Approve

Charter Schools.

As indicated in their very name, “charter” schools

are the result of two key state acts: first, the adoption

by the state legislature of a statute authorizing charter schools to provide public educational services on

behalf of the state, and second, the approval of a proposed charter or charter application by the state or a

state-authorized entity.

Statutory Authorization. Charters are statutorily created relationships between the state and the

entity applying for a charter to provide state educational services. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-2062(1)

(2025); Iowa Code § 256E.6(1) (2025); Me. Stat. tit. 20A, § 2401(3) (2025); Wis. Stat. § 118.40(2m)(a) (2025);

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-302(vii), (viii) (2024). In Georgia, for instance, a charter, once approved, is a threeparty arrangement between the charter petitioner, a

local board of education, and the State Board of

Education. Even after its grant, the charter remains

under the jurisdiction and oversight of the state and

local school board and subject to the limits of the state

constitution. See Ga. Code Ann. §§ 20-2-2062(2), 202-2063.3a, 20-2-2065.b2–b3 (2025). Consistent with

states’ authorization of charters via state charter statutes, the objective served by each charter arrangement is ultimately that of the state, not that of any

private party. As indicated in Indiana’s charter statute, for example, the charter is to “[s]erve

the . . . needs of public school students,” “[o]ffer public

school students . . . choices,” “[a]llow public schools

freedom and flexibility,” and “[p]rovide parents, students, community members, and local entities . . . expanded opportunity for involvement in the public

school system.” Ind. Code § 20-24-2-1 (2024) (emphasis added); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 89(b)

(“The purposes of establishing charter schools [include] . . . stimulat[ing] the development of innovation

within public education[.]” (emphasis added)).

Further underscoring the public nature of charter

relationships, the vast majority of states allow public

schools to convert into charter schools. See, e.g., Mass.

Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 89(c) (2024); N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 115C-218.1(a) (2025); S.C. Code Ann. § 59-40-100

(2024); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-306(b) (2024). By contrast, several states do not permit private schools to

convert into charter schools and instead limit the

practice to existing public schools. See, e.g., Ala. Code

§ 16-6F-2(c) (2025); Cal. Educ. Code § 47602(b) (West

2024); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-30.5-106(2) (2025); Idaho

Code § 33-5203(4)(a) (2024); La. Stat. Ann.

§ 17:3991(E)(2) (2024); Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(3)(b)

(2024).

Charter Approval. States impose a variety of

conditions and requirements on charter schools seeking approval. Typically, charter applicants are required to set out such details as the terms of the

school’s mission, curriculum, and student performance standards. See, e.g., Ala. Admin. Code r. 2903-6-.02(6) (2024); Ala. Code § 16-6F-4(5) (2025); Fla.

Stat. § 1002.33(7)(a)(1)–(19) (2024); Utah Code Ann.

§ 53G-5-302 (West 2025). Government actors—including state or local boards of education, charter

school commissions, or other public entities authorized by statute—in turn review and approve charter

school applications and terms. See, e.g., Ala. Code

§ 16-6F-6(a) (2025); Ind. Code § 20-24-2.1-1(a) (2024);

La. Stat. Ann. § 17:3983(A)(2) (2024); Me. Stat. tit. 20A, § 2405(1)(A)–(C) (2025); Md. Code Ann. Educ. § 9104(a)(1) (West 2024); Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-212.9(A)

(2024); Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.710.160 (2024). Michigan, Idaho and Indiana, for example, authorize the

governing boards of state public universities or accredited nonprofit universities to approve a charter.

See Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.501(2)(a)(iv) (2025);

Idaho Code § 33-5202A(2) (2024); Ind. Code § 20-24-12.5(5) (2024). In each such circumstance, however,

the authorizers exercise authority granted to them by

state law to execute state policy in the charter approval process.

Consistent with states’ intent to ensure that charter schools are public, some state laws also give the

public an important role in the final approval of a

charter—a role unlike any seen in private contractual

relationships. Several states, for example, require a

public hearing on the charter application before granting approval, while other states create mechanisms

whereby members of the public can formally challenge

a charter. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 6-23-302(c)(1)

(2025); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 47605, 47605.6 (West

2024); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-66bb(a)(1) (2025); S.C.

Code Ann. § 59-40-90 (2024) (right to appeal a charter

grant to an administrative law judge).

These required approval processes, the conditions

imposed by states on charters, and the public’s interest and role in the chartering process all stand in

stark contrast to private schools and entities commonly characterized as “private.” See, e.g., Ala. Code

§ 16-46-3(a) (2025) (exempting private K–12 schools

from licensing requirements in Ala. Code § 16-46-5);

Alaska Stat. § 14.07.020(10) (2025) (Department of

Education may not require private schools to be licensed); Kan. Admin. Reg. § 91-31-32(e) (2025) (accreditation not mandatory for private schools); Mont.

Code Ann. § 15-30-3102(7)(b)(ii) (2025) (accreditation

not required if written notice provided to parents or

legal guardian).

States Operate Charter Schools

as Public Schools.

State statutes expressly define charter schools as

“public schools,” not private schools. 3 Further,

3 Ala. Code § 16-6F-4(16) (2025); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15181(A) (2025); Ark. Code Ann. § 6-23-103(4) (2025); Colo. Rev.

Stat. § 22-30.5-507(1)(a) (2025); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-66aa(1)

(2025); D.C. Code § 38-651.01(3B) (2025); Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(1)

(2024); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 302A-101 (2024), Haw. Code R. § 8-543 (LexisNexis 2025); Idaho Code § 33-5202A(8) (2024); 105 Ill.

Comp. Stat. 5/27A-5 (2024); La. Admin Code. tit. 28, pt. CXXXIX,

§ 103(A)(2) (2025); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 89(c) (2024); Me.

Stat. tit. 20-A, § 2401(9) (2025); Miss. Code Ann. § 37-13-91(2)(e)

characterizing charter schools as public schools is by

no means mere labeling. Throughout the country,

states require that charter schools operate as public

schools, mandating that they be both free and open to

the public and financing them with education tax dollars reserved for public schools.

Under state funding structures, it is beyond the

power of several state legislatures, absent constitutional amendment, to operate charter schools as anything other than public schools. Indeed, state constitutions routinely mandate a system of public schools

and set out a governance structure for such schools,

reserving public school funds and resources for them.

See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (“[I]t is the duty

of the legislature to establish a general and uniform

system of public schools” (emphasis added)); N.Y.

CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“The legislature shall provide for

the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may

(2025); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 160.400(1) (2024); Mont. Code Ann. § 206-811(1) (2025); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-5(7a) (2025); N.H. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 194-B:1(IV) (2025); N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:23A-1.2

(2025); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-8B-4(I) (2025); Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 338.005(2) (2025); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 9813a (2024); 16 R.I.

Gen. Laws § 16-77-3.1(b) (2024); S.C. Code Ann. § 59-40-40(2)(a)

(2024); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-13-104(14) (2025); Utah Code

§ 53G-5-401(1)(a); Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-212.5(B) (2024); W. Va.

Code § 18-5G-3 (2025); see also Cal. Educ. Code § 47601(e), (g)

(West 2024) (providing that charter schools operate “within the

public school system”); Alaska Stat. § 14.03.290(2) (2024) (same);

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-4206(a) (2025) (same); Tex. Educ. Code Ann.

§ 12.001(a)(2) (West 2025) (same); Iowa Code § 256E.1 (“Charter

schools shall be part of the state’s program of public education.”);

Iowa Code § 256E.7(1) (2025) (endowing charter schools with

powers to fulfill their “public purpose”); 20 U.S.C. § 7221i(2)

(“The term ‘charter school’ means a public school . . . .”).

be educated.” (emphasis added)). In this way, charter

schools’ very access to state resources is contingent on

their operation as public schools, with no discretion

left to the state legislature to decide otherwise. Contra St. Isidore Br. 2; Board Br. 25. The California

Court of Appeal, for instance, has upheld charter

schools as consistent with the California state constitution precisely because charter schools are “part of

California’s public school system,” remain subject to

the legislature’s “plenary power over public schools,”

and fall “under the exclusive control of officers of the

public schools.” Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 89 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 745, 751–53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).

Admission. In abiding by these obligations,

states dictate the terms by which charter schools enroll students, requiring that these procedures align

with public schools. Cf., N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV,

cl. 1 (requiring free public education for “all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years”). Consistent with state constitutional requirements for public schools, states throughout the

country make explicit by statute that charter schools,

like public schools, must provide open enrollment to

all students. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 16-6F-5(a)(1)–(3)

(2024); Alaska Stat. § 14.03.265(b) (2024); D.C. Mun.

Regs. tit. 5-E, § 915.1 (2025); Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 3140(A) (2024); Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-212.6(A) (2024).

The only exceptions to this requirement relate to the

fact that the state may cap the number of students a

charter school is allowed to enroll. See, e.g., Ark. Code

Ann. § 6-23-402(a) (2025); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15184(A) (2025); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-66bb(c)(1)–(2)

(2025); 70 Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 3-140(E) (2024). Private schools, by contrast, typically restrict admissions

based on numerous other factors completely within

their discretion. Cf. Carson as next friend of O. C. v.

Makin, 596 U.S. 767, 783 (2022) (“[P]rivate schools

are different by definition because they do not have to

accept all students. Public schools generally do.”).

Tuition. As with traditional public schools, state

constitutions and statutes also require that charter

schools be free of cost. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. XIV,

§ 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2;

DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1;

Cal. Educ. Code §§ 47605(e)(1), 47605.6(e) (West

2024); Idaho Code § 33-5206(1) (2024); Me. Stat. tit.

20-A, § 2412(4)(C) (2025); Va. Code Ann. § 22.1212.6(E) (2024); W. Va. Code § 18-5G-3(a)(7) (2025);

cf. Carson, 596 U.S. at 783 (education provided by private schools benefiting from state tuition programs is

not “public” because the education provided “is often

not free”); Peltier v. Charter Day Sch., 37 F.4th 104,

119 (4th Cir. 2022) (observing that considering charter schools as “private” “ignores both the ‘free, universal,’ nature of this education and the statutory framework chosen by” the legislature in creating charter

schools). States take seriously the requirement of free

public education and have even instituted guardrails

to ensure that charter schools do not indirectly transgress this essential aspect of what it means to be a

public school. For instance, in California, the state

legislature has prohibited practices mandating that

parents perform service work at charter schools as a

condition of enrollment, as such practices had the effect of excluding low-income families who lacked the

free time to participate.

See Cal. Educ. Code

§ 47605(e)(2)(B)(iv) (West 2024).

Funding. States also directly fund charter

schools with public education tax dollars. Although

the precise method varies by state, charter schools receive funding through the same or similar mechanisms as traditional public schools. In several states,

this means that charter schools are entitled to the

same per pupil aid as traditional public schools, see,

e.g., Ala. Code § 16-6F-10(b)(1)(b) (2025); Ark. Code

Ann. § 6-23-501(a)(1) (2025); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2230.5-112 (2025); Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(17) (2024); Ga.

Code Ann., § 20-2-2068.1(a) (2025); N.Y. Educ. Law

§ 2856(x) (McKinney 2025); Tex. Educ. Code Ann.

§ 12.106(a) (West 2025), and that charters receive

these funds via school districts, which are responsible

for the apportioning, see, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 18A:36A-12(b) (West 2025); 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 171725-A(a)(2) (2025). In other states, local school districts must allocate a pro rata share of local education

funds to charter schools. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 18A:36A-12(b) (2025); 16 R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-77.25(a) (2024).

Critical to these public funding arrangements is

their mandatory nature. In North Carolina, for example, the state appellate court has held that charter

schools are even entitled to a portion of surplus funds

maintained by local school districts where those funds

are unrestricted and included in the fiscal year’s current expense funds. See Thomas Jefferson Classical

Acad. Charter Sch. v. Cleveland Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,

778 S.E.2d 295, 307 (N.C. App. Ct. 2015); Sugar Creek

Charter Sch., Inc. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of

Educ., 673 S.E.2d 667, 676 (N.C. App. Ct. 2009).

Enrollment. Charter schools today are thoroughly integrated in public education systems such

that they educate, as of 2021 data, nearly 4 million

students, or about 7% of public-school students

nationwide.4 But even more significant than the total

participation of students in charter schools is the role

played by charter schools within educational districts,

where they have, in some instances, all but supplanted traditional public schools. Until just last

year, all public schools in New Orleans were charter

schools. See Ariel Gilreath, All-Charter No More: New

Orleans Opens Its First Traditional Public School in

Nearly 2 Decades, Chalkbeat (Sept. 9, 2024, 6:05 AM),

https://tinyurl.com/3ac4fdyk. In Detroit and Washington, D.C., charter-school students constitute half of

public-school enrollees, see Derek W. Black, Preferencing Educational Choice: The Constitutional Limits,

103 Cornell L. Rev. 1359, 1361 (2018),5 and in Denver

one out of every four public schools is a charter

school. 6 While the situation in New Orleans is

unique, these school systems and numerous others

across the country now provide a significant percentage of students public education in charter schools.

4 See Public Charter School Enrollment, National Center for Ed-

ucation

Statistics

(May

2023),

https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator/cgb/public-charter-enrollment.

5 See also David Osborne & Emily Langhorne, Analysis: NAEP

Scores Show D.C. Is a Leader in Educational Improvement —

With Powerful Lessons for Other Cities, The 74 (Apr. 17, 2018),

https://tinyurl.com/256bpmnp.

6 See Denver Charter Schools, https://denvercharters.org/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2025); Dylan Peers McCoy & Stephanie Wang, How

Lewis Ferebee Forged Peace with Charter Competitors to Reshape

Indianapolis Schools, IndyStar (Feb. 7, 2019, 6:00 AM),

https://tinyurl.com/56vc9sa6.

While Charter Schools Enjoy

Flexibility in Their Operations,

States Engage in Continuing Regulation, Monitoring, and Control

of Them.

States also subject charter schools to numerous

conditions pertaining to their academic functions as

well as engage in continuing control and monitoring

of their performance and operations. These features

further reflect the public nature of charter schools and

state control over them. Cf. Carson 596 U.S. at 783

(observing that private schools often need not conform

with state education requirements); Wilson, 89 Cal.

Rptr. 2d at 751 (“From how charter schools come into

being, to who attends and who can teach, to how they

are governed and structured, to funding, accountability and evaluation—the Legislature has plotted all aspects of their existence.”).

While states afford charter schools flexibility beyond traditional public schools, that flexibility is carefully and narrowly circumscribed to ensure that charter schools effectively discharge the state’s public

education function. Rigorous charter application processes, waiver, and renewal systems are designed to

promote and supervise innovative implementation of

the public education function, rather than to alter the

public education mission itself. See, e.g., La. Admin.

Code tit. 28, pt. CXXXIX, § 1101(A) (2025) (charter

schools are afforded “increased educational and operational autonomy in exchange for accountability for

[academic] performance”); see also 16 R.I. Gen. Laws

§ 16-77-3.1(b) (2024) (“Charter public schools are intended to be vanguards, laboratories, and an expression of the on-going and vital state interest in the

improvement of education.”). Thus, while charter

schools enjoy certain flexibility in how they hire and

manage their staff, allocate instructional time across

the school day or year, or even experiment with methods of instruction and student engagement, they are

not free to teach anything they want, regulate student

behavior any way they want, or ignore public education objectives dictated by statute. To ensure as

much, the state continually regulates, monitors, and

controls charter schools with a particular focus on academic achievement.

Curricula and Instruction. States typically

condition the approval of charters in part on a review

of the charter school’s proposed curriculum. While

proposals can vary considerably, curricular details

may include proposed subjects, grade-level topics, content standards, required knowledge, textbooks, and

assessments. See, e.g., Alaska Admin. Code tit. 4,

§ 33.110(a) (2025); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-30.5-106(1)

(2025); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-66bb(d) (2025); Ind.

Code § 20-24-3-4(b) (2024); see also Tenn. Comp. R. &

Regs. 0520-14-03.02 (2025) (charters must apply for

waivers of “any state board rule”); Tenn. Bd. Educ. R.

0520-01-03

(available

https://tinyurl.com/yfhkbcnk) (setting out academic and instructional requirements). Many states afford charter

schools a degree of flexibility as to the precise subjects

they teach, however, the decision to approve charter

curricular proposals ultimately rests entirely with the

state.

Some states also impose baseline curricular or

other instructional requirements. See, e.g., Alaska

Admin. Code tit. 4, § 33.110(a)(5) (2025) (requiring

alignment with state curricular standards); Wash.

Admin. Code § 108-20-070(2)(a)(ii) (2025) (same); Del.

Code Ann. tit. 14, § 512(6) (2025) (same); Ind. Code

§§ 20-24-8-5(23), 20-26-12-1(a) (2024) (textbooks chosen by local officials); W. Va. Code St. R. § 126-795.4.b.1.A.5 (2025) (requiring minimum instructional

time); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-4206(b) (2025) (requiring

that charter schools adopt a “general curriculum appropriate to the grades offered”); La. Admin. Code tit.

28, pt. CXXXIX, § 515(D)(10) (2025) (curricula must

meet state grade progression and graduation requirements); Me. Stat. tit. 20-A, § 2412(5)(J), (L) (2025)

(charter schools subject to state diploma standards

and educator effectiveness requirements); Md. Code

Ann., Educ. § 9-106 (West 2024) (state core subject requirements in Md. Code Ann., Educ § 7-203 apply to

charter schools). And in many states, charter schools

remain subject to statewide assessments of core subjects as a condition of their operation. See, e.g., Ark.

Code Ann. § 6-23-306(3) (2025); Del. Code Ann. tit. 14,

§ 154(a) (2025); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5-E, § 922.1

(2025); Me. Stat. tit. 20-A, § 2412(5)(B) (2025); Wyo.

Stat. Ann. § 21-3-308(g) (2024).

Many states also require state licensing of charter

school teachers or otherwise impose basic requirements for instructors. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 16-6F4(16) (2025) (Alabama charter schools are public

schools); Ala. Admin. Code r. 290-3-2-.02(2)(a) (requiring certification for public school teachers); Alaska

Stat. § 14.03.290(4) (2024); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 302A804(b)(1) (2024) (requiring hiring of licensed teachers

except in emergencies); Minn. Stat. § 124E.12 (2024);

Mont. Code Ann. §§ 20-4-101(1) (licensing required for

public school teachers), 20-6-803(9) (2025) (charter

schools are public schools); see also S.C. Code Ann.

§§ 59-40-40(5), (6), 59-40-50(5), 59-40-130(A)(1) (2024)

(requiring certification of a percentage of charter

school teachers and setting standards by which traditional public school teachers can move between traditional public schools and charter schools). By contrast, states typically do not impose similar

requirements for instruction in private schools.

Cf. Carson, 596 U.S. at 784 (referring to the fact that

private schools typically “need not hire state-certified

teachers” as a factor distinguishing private and public

schools).

Oversight and Termination. In addition to

monitoring charter schools’ academic performance,

states also continue to monitor and regulate the financial, operational, and employment practices of charter

schools, including through on-site school visits. See,

e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-756.08 (2025); 14 Del.

Admin. Code § 275(10) (2025); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5E, § 937 (2025); La. Admin Code. tit. 28, pt. CXXXIX,

§ 1101 (2025); 603 Mass. Code Regs. 1.08 (2025); Or.

Rev. Stat. § 338.095(2) (2025); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 228E-7 (2025); Utah Admin. Code. R277-553-2 (2025).

Various state entities carry out these periodic reviews

of charter schools, including departments of education, see, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-756.08(A)

(2025), school boards, see, e.g., Iowa Code § 256E.10

(2025), and state charter authorizing entities, see, e.g.,

Ala. Code § 16-6F-8 (2025); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15183 (2025); Fla. Admin. Code r. 6A-6.0786 (2025);

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-4209 (2025); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 194-B:16 (2025).

Importantly, mere compliance with satisfactory

performance does not entitle charter schools to indefinite operation. Charter schools’ continued operation

instead remains entirely contingent on state approval

as set out in the state’s statutory charter scheme. In

particular, charter schools are subject to a periodic renewal process, often every few years. See, e.g., Iowa

Code §§ 256E.6(2), 256E.10(5) (2025); La. Stat. Ann.

§ 17:3992(A)(1) (2024); 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 17-1729A(i) (2025) (“When a charter is revoked, not renewed,

forfeited, surrendered or otherwise ceases to operate,

the charter school shall be dissolved.”) (West 2025);

200-20-05 R.I. Code R. § 2.5.3(A)–(C) (LexisNexis

2025). Further, because charter schools operate on behalf of the state, states may revoke charters for failure

to comply with statutory metrics, including failure to

make sufficient progress towards performance expectations and proficiency standards, or mismanagement

of funds or operations. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 16-6F8(c)(7) (2025); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-183(I)(3)(a)–

(d) (2025) (charters subject to mandatory review, and

the state may revoke charter for inadequate academic

achievement as well as failure to meet performance,

operational, or financial expectations); Ark. Code

Ann. § 6-23-105(a)(1) (2025); D.C. Code § 38-1802.12

(2025); Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(8) (2024); Utah Code Ann.

§ 53G-5-503(1) (West 2025); W. Va. Code, § 18-5G-10

(2025).

In these ways, charter schools are in fact statecreated public schools. In treating charter schools as

public schools, the Oklahoma Supreme Court and legislature’s approach thus falls entirely in line with the

practices of states throughout the country, including,

but not limited to, statutorily defining charter schools

as public schools. See supra, n.2. Like Oklahoma,

states throughout the country mandate that charter

schools provide education that is both free and open to

the public—two defining features of traditional public

schools. The mechanisms by which states continue to

retain control over charter schools to ensure appropriate provision of public education are also not to be underestimated. From performance, teacher, and curricular requirements to review processes and financing,

states remain in control of charter schools throughout

their terms of operation and decide whether to renew

or terminate approval altogether.

II.

The Establishment Clause Prohibits

States from Establishing Public Charter

Schools for Religious Instruction.

States cannot establish and operate public charter

schools teaching religion as truth without violating

core Establishment Clause principles. Were states to

approve charters with schools teaching religion as

truth, they would promote and establish religion in

the provision of public education.

The

Establishment

Clause

Applies with Particular Force in

Public Education.

This Court has long recognized that the Establishment Clause applies with particular force in public

schools. Cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–

84 (1987) (“The Court has been particularly vigilant

in monitoring compliance with the Establishment

Clause in elementary and secondary schools.”); cf. also

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 297

(2000) (public school policy of instituting prayer before

football games violated Establishment Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (daily period of

silence for mediation or voluntary prayer); Stone v.

Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Abington Sch. Dist. v.

Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (daily Bible reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (daily

classroom prayer). Where states adopt policies that

endorse a religion or “utilize [the] public school system

to aid any or all religious faiths or sects in the dissemination of their doctrines and ideals,” they plainly run

afoul of the Establishment Clause. Illinois Ex rel.

McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948);

see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106–107

(1968) (“[T]he State may not adopt programs or practices in its public schools or colleges which ‘aid or oppose’ any religion. This prohibition is absolute.” (internal citations omitted)); Sch. Dist. of Abington Tp.,

Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 220 (1963) (observing

that “neither a State nor the Federal Government . . . can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers . . . [nor] aid those religions based on a belief

in the existence of God as against those religions

founded on different beliefs[.]” (internal quotations

omitted)).

None of the Court’s recent decisions involving

publicly financed private-school tuition programs alter this basic principle. Indeed, the key consideration

in each of the Court’s recent cases exempting those tuition programs from Establishment Clause concerns

was the Court’s conclusion that government funding

arrived at private religious schools solely by virtue of

independent private decisions rather than by judgment by the state. Cf. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,

536 U.S. 639, 648–49, 653 (2002) (referring to the

Court’s “consistent distinction between governmental

programs that provide aid directly to religious

schools” and programs “in which government aid

reaches religious schools only as a result of genuine

and independent choice of private individuals”); Carson, 596 U.S. at 782–83 (distinguishing state tuition

benefits program from provision of “public education”

and upholding tuition assistance program where parents “may direct” those resources to schools “of their

choice”); Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 591

U.S. 464, 474 (2020) (Establishment Clause objection

“unavailing” because government support reaches religious schools “only as a result of” independent parent choice). Thus, the state support of religion across

these cases was indirect, and the instruction occurring

therein entirely divorced from the state.

Moreover, in reaching these and related Establishment Clause holdings, the Court has reaffirmed

the core principle that there can be no establishment

of religion in strictly public educational activities and

programs. See, e.g., Carson, 596 U.S. at 782–85; see

also Kennedy v. Bremerton, 597 U.S. 507, 540–41

(2022).

Approving

and

Religious Charter

“State Action.”

Operating

Schools Is

Critically, when a state grants a charter to a public school that provides religious instruction, the relevant state action is just that—the approval, operation,

and continuing administration of a religious institution. As this Court’s precedents have long maintained, government has no business approving or regulating religious instruction or coercing prayer or

religious practices in public schools—all of which

amount to state action in aid or establishment of

religion. Cf. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 650 (distinguishing

programs of direct aid to religious schools from incidental support for religious schools as a result of private decisions); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530

U.S. 290, 305–307 (2000) (school encouragement of religious invocations at football games violated Establishment Clause); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459

U.S. 116, 123 (1982) (“[D]elegating a governmental

power to religious institutions[] inescapably implicates the Establishment Clause.”); Zorach v. Clauson,

343 U.S. 306, 311, 315 (1952) (no First Amendment

violation where no “classrooms were used for religious

instruction” and the “force of the public school” was

not “used to promote instruction”). See also Derek W.

Black, Religion, Discrimination, and the Future of

Public Education, 13 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 805, 811

(2023) (“[S]tate action to authorize a religious charter

school is [what is] patently unconstitutional.” (emphasis added)).

But where states evaluate charter applications

and grant charters to schools teaching religion as

truth, this is exactly what the state is doing: bringing

to life a religious school through state support and

public educational tax dollars. Cf. Zelman, 536 U.S.

at 661 (distinguishing programs that “direct[ly]” provide money for religious schooling); McCollum, 333

U.S. at 209–10 (Establishment Clause violated where

the public education system “assists and is integrated

with the program of religious instruction carried on by

[] religious sects,” including through the “utilization of

the tax-established and tax-supported public school

system to aid religious groups to spread their faith”);

Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 16

(1947) (“No tax in any amount, large or small, can be

levied to support any religious activities or

institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.”). Indeed, charter school instructional programs

exist solely by virtue of the state’s approval of them.

Likewise, the resources to which charter schools become entitled, while based on student enrollment, are

ultimately the function of state and local policies and

appropriations, even if private actors initiate charter

applications in some cases. See supra Part II.B.

Further, by approving a charter, the state is installing the charter school with the state’s coercive

power to run a public school and draw on public resources. As with public schools, states generally require mandatory attendance at charter schools, see,

e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 194-B:8(III) (2025); Okla.

Admin. Code § 210:40-87-7(c) (2025), as well as permit

charter schools to exercise disciplinary authority, see,

e.g., Alaska Stat. § 14.33.120 (2024) (requiring charter

schools to adopt standards for student behavior and

safety policies for the use of reasonable and appropriate force to maintain classroom safety and discipline).

Charter schools for religious instruction would thus

promote religion in exactly the sort of coercive manner

that this Court has long recognized as antithetical to

the Establishment Clause and the separation of

church and state. Cf. Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 537, 542

(recognizing government “coercion” of religious exercise as “among the foremost hallmarks of religious establishments the framers sought to prohibit when

they adopted the First Amendment” (citing Santa Fe

Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 294 (2000))); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (observing that “prayer

exercises in public schools carry a particular risk of

indirect coercion”).

State action would furthermore be inherent in the

selection and oversight of a charter school whose instructional mission is religious in nature. See Our

Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrisey-Berru, 591 U.S.

732, 746 (2020) (“[A]ny attempt by government to dictate or even to influence [“matters ‘of faith and doctrine’”] would constitute one of the central attributes

of an establishment of religion.”); Santa Fe Indep. Sch.

Dist., 530 U.S. at 311 (“[T]he District’s decision to hold

the constitutionally problematic election [for school

prayer] is clearly ‘a choice attributable to the State[.]’”

(quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 587)). While private parties

may initiate the charter school approval process by filing a charter application, the state assesses the curriculum and methods of the applicants and ultimately

selects for authorization those it deems sufficiently

equipped to carry out the state’s educational mission.

As such, even if a state were to structure its charter school system in such a way that the state action

in support of religion were less obvious, the very nature of charter schools, including their approval and

operation, as well as their ongoing monitoring and

oversight would still hopelessly entangle the state in

matters of religion and religious instruction deeply

unsuited to both the state and religious schools. See

Carson, 596 U.S. at 787 (noting that state action

“scrutinizing whether and how a religious school pursues its educational mission” would “raise serious concerns about state entanglement with religion.” (emphasis added)).

Forcing State Legislatures to

Create Religious Charter Schools

Would Eviscerate the WideLatitude to Which States Are

Entitled in the Design of Public

Education Systems.

In deciding to operate public charter schools on a

nonsectarian basis, states act in line with this Court’s

precedents in the cases cited above as well as the discretion afforded to them in discharging their core constitutional responsibility in public education and in

the operation of public schools. This Court has long

held that state constitutional, statutory, and policy

decisions of this sort are ones to which it must defer,

lest it upset state and local control over education and

the systems of federalism our Constitution establishes. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,

741–42 (1974). No rule would cut deeper into the zone

of state autonomy protected by the Constitution than

one that deprived states of their right to create, maintain, and structure public education policy in ways

that further and protect their constitutional duties in

education.

At root of the Court’s decisions regarding public

education is thus a key factor pointing in favor of Oklahoma’s legislative interest in providing for nonsectarian charter school education here: federalism. As

explained above, education is a central state constitutional responsibility giving rise to considerable state

interest and competence. Cf. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S.

712, 720–23 (2004) (“[W]e can think of few areas in

which the State’s antiestablishment interests come

more into play [than education].”). The Court has accordingly recognized the importance of not unduly

constraining states in their policy and operational decisions as to the provision of public education. See San

Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42–

43 (1973) (recognizing public “educational policy” as

an area counseling in favor of federal judicial restraint

to avoid “imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap

the continued research and experimentation so vital

to finding even partial solutions to educational problems[.]”).

Similarly, in Carson, the Court reasoned that so

long as the state stopped short of subsidizing private

school programs, which triggered Free Exercise analysis, states retain the authority to “decid[e],” as in the

case of charter schools, “to operate schools of [their]

own.” 596 U.S. at 785 (emphasis added). Indeed,

states “may provide a strictly secular education in

[their] public schools.” Id. at 785 (emphasis added).

Moreover, states maintain considerable liberty with

respect to how they choose to set up their public school

system and deliver public education: “The State retains a number of options: it could expand the reach

of its public school system . . . provide some combination of tutoring, remote learning,” or otherwise set up

untraditional public educational programs providing

“strictly secular education.” Id. In this way, Carson

spoke to action of the very sort the Oklahoma Legislature has undertaken here in designing and operating

its public education system—the establishment by

statute of public charter schools operating on a strictly

secular and non-sectarian basis.

By contrast, compelling state legislatures and

state and local officers and agents, as Petitioners demand, to bring religious schools into life through state

action and public education dollars would not only violate the Establishment Clause but indeed negate the

core sovereignty of states in a setting where they have

historically enjoyed considerable discretion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Amici respectfully urge

this Court to affirm the decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court.

Respectfully submitted,

STEPHAN J. SCHLEGELMILCH

Counsel of Record

VALERIE A. ZUCKERMAN

COURTNEY E. BARGER

DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP

801 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 383-8000

sjschlegelmilch@debevoise.com

BEATRICE A. WALTON

JOHN HOLLINGSWORTH

WILLIAM F. GONCHER

DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP

66 Hudson Boulevard

New York, NY 10001

Counsel for Amici Curiae

April 7, 2025

APPENDIX

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF AMICI CURIAE CONSTITUTIONAL AND

EDUCATION LAW SCHOLARS ............................ 1a

LIST OF AMICI CURIAE CONSTITUTIONAL AND

EDUCATION LAW SCHOLARS

Derek W. Black

Professor of Law

University of Southern Carolina School of Law*

David C. Bloomfield

Professor of Education Leadership, Law & Policy

Brooklyn College and The CUNY Graduate Center*

Elise Boddie

Professor of Law

University of Michigan Law School*

Jack Charles Boger

Emeritus Professor of Law

University of North Carolina School of Law*

Kristine Bowman

Associate Dean and Professor

Michigan State University College of Education*

Kevin D. Brown

Professor of Law

University of South Carolina School of Law*

Erwin Chemerinsky

Dean and Professor of Law

University of California, Berkeley School of Law*

Janet Decker

Associate Professor

Indiana University, Bloomington School of Education*

Suzanne Eckes

Professor

University of Wisconsin, Madison College of Education*

Aderson B. Francois

Professor of Law

Georgetown Law Center*

Rob A. Garda, Jr.

Professor of Law

Loyola University New Orleans College of Law*

Preston Green, III

Professor of Education Leadership and Law

University of Connecticut NEAG College of Education*

Danielle R. Holley

President and Professor

Mount Holyoke College*

Daniel Kiel

Professor of Law

University of Memphis School of Law*

Christine Kiracofe

Professor and Head of Educational Studies

Purdue University College of Education*

William S. Koski

Professor of Law

Stanford University School of Law*

Maria M. Lewis

Associate Professor of Education

Pennsylvania State University College of Education*

Julie Mead

Professor Emeritus

University of Wisconsin, Madison College of Education*

Caitlin Millat

Associate Professor of Law

Arizona State University College of Law*

Raquel Muñiz

Associate Professor

Boston College School of Education and Human Development*

David Nguyen

Associate Professor

Indiana University-Purdue University, Indianapolis

School of Education*

Kimberly Jade Norwood

Professor of Law

Washington University School of Law*

Mark Paige

Associate Professor

University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth College of

Arts and Sciences*

John A. Powell

Professor of Law

University of California, Berkeley School of Law*

Matthew Patrick Shaw

Associate Professor of Law

Vanderbilt Law School*

Kimberly J. Robinson

Professor

University of Virginia School of Law*

Benjamin M. Superfine

Chair & Professor of Educational Policy Studies

University of Illinois, Chicago College of Education*

Joshua Weishart

Professor of Law

Suffolk Law School*

Kevin Welner

Professor

University of Colorado, Boulder School of Education*

Kimberly West-Faulcon

Professor of Law

Loyola Law School, Los Angeles*

Erika K. Wilson

Professor of Law

University of North Carolina School of Law*

Institutional Affiliation for Identification Purposes

Only

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.