Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Pamela D. Sutherland, Petitioner v. DCC Litigation Facility, Inc.
Supreme Court briefSep 25, 2024
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No. 24In the
Supreme Court of the United States
PAMELA SUTHERLAND,
Petitioner,
v.
DCC LITIGATION FACILITY, INC.,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of A ppeals for the Sixth Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
James Leonard Elsman
Counsel of Record
Elsman Law Firm
725 South Adams Road,
Suite #182
Birmingham, MI 48009
(248) 766-5184
elsmanlawfirm@aol.com
Counsel for Petitioner
332764
A
(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
Was a Jury Trial Properly Denied Petitioner, and What
Could a Jury Decide?
A. Did Dow pay $3.2 Billion, as it agreed to
pay?
B. Should Dow be discharged in Bankruptcy,
if it did not pay $3.2 Billion?
C. Did the Opt-out Plaintiff get a chance to
prove injury from Breast Implants?
D. If Dow delayed payment for 30 years,
can Plaintiff prove Dow paid nothing but
Investment-interest?
E. Are there Constitutional 14th Amendment
issues of “due process” and “equal protection,
plus 5th Amendment “taking”?
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The original Plaintiff-Appellants were 4 opt-out ladies
with separate Case #s, and jurisdiction lay also in the Dow
Bankruptcy case (# 95-20512), but the Clerk’s office for
the Sixth Circuit appeal narrowed the caption to just Ms.
Sutherland # 30276.
The counsel representing both Petitioner and now,
Respondent, are the same as in the Trial Court and in
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and now in the Hon.
U.S. SUPREME COURT.
It should be said at this time and place that Petitioner
is not a corporation or business, and has no investors to
profit from the outcome of this litigation. Petitioner is a
woman who lives in Haysi, VA.
Respondent is DCC Litigation Facility, Inc., currently
absorbed by Dow, Inc.
iii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
Pamela Sutherland v. DCC Litigation Facility, Inc.,
No 05-30276, U.S. Eastern District of Michigan, Southern
Division. Orders entered September 29, 2023.
Pamela Sutherland v. DCC Litigation Facility, Inc.,
No 23-1976, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Decision filed June 27, 2024, affirming Hon. Judge Hood.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
I.
LEGAL BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
II. FA C T UA L B A C K G R OU N D A N D
PROCEDURAL HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT . . . . . . . . . 13
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
v
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT, FILED JUNE 27, 2024 . . . . . . 1a
APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EA STERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGA N,
SOU T HERN DI V ISION, FILED
SEPTEMBER 29, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4a
vi
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Page
CASE LAW
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4, 6, 7
Frye v. U.S.,
293 F. 1013 (1929) D.C. Circuit (1923) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Ruffin v. Mercury Records,
513 Fed. 2d 222 (6th Cir. 1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
U.S. CONSTITUTION
U.S. Const. amend. VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
U.S. Const. amend. VII . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14
FEDERAL STATUTES AND RULES
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 6, 7
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Declaration of Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 13
1
OPINIONS BELOW
The Sixth Circuit’s decision (App. 1a-3a) is available at
2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 15910. The District Court Opinion
(App. 4a-11a) is available at 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176127.
JURISDICTION
THIS IS A TIMELY PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, FROM AN OPINION
OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS OF
JUNE 27, 2024, AND THE $300 FEE HAS BEEN PAID.
2 8 U . S . C . § 1 2 5 4 (1) P R OV I DE S U. S .
C ONGR E S SIONA L PER M I S SION F OR T H E
U.S. SUPREME COURT TO GRANT WRITS IN
CERTIORARI PETITION CASES.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
NO STATUTORY PROVISIONS ARE RELIED
UPON IN THIS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
EXCEPT 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) RE JURISDICTION,
referenced just above.
INTRODUCTION
This is a claim to respect what the Founders
established way back in 1791—Amendment VII to the U.S.
CONSTITUTION, i.e. the right of U.S. citizens to JURY
TRIAL in civil cases, long before the Civil War, and just
after the CONSTITUTION was enacted. Needless to say,
the CONSTITUTION is the most important document in
American Law, and most have pledged their allegiance
to it.
2
This current Petition is concurrent with a world
atmosphere where this Nation could well be destroyed by
Nuclear War in WW III (by Russia, China, Iran or others
in combination or alone), which our politicians take for
granted and talk openly about, especially in Presidential
Election years. (Of course, such events would preclude
this Hon. Supreme Court from even deciding on Writs of
Certiorari.)
And, further, when American politics are so raw that
even this U.S. Supreme Court is subject to revolutionary
change by various proposed means (replacing Members as
they die or resign by the Party in power; having Congress
“pack” the Court by adding more Members than the
current 9; and diluting the power of the current Court
by legislation and forcing reforms in the Ethics thereof ).
Despite such a hostile atmosphere, Petitioner relies upon
the current Court to remind America about the power of
the 7th AMENDMENT, which reads as follows and begs
to be recited in full:
“IN SUITS AT COMMON LAW, WHERE THE
VA LUE IN CONTROV ERSY SH A LL EXCEED
TWENTY DOLLARS, THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY
JURY SHALL BE PRESERVED, AND NO FACT
TRIED BY A JURY SHALL BE OTHERWISE REEXAMINED IN ANY COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, THAN ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF
THE COMMON LAW.”
HERE, does Ms. Sutherland receive her American
right or not? For some 30 years, Ms. Sutherland has
waited, while she was seriously injured by Dow silicone
breast implants, and American Justice has failed her.
3
Juries have been entrusted to decide FACTS for well
over 200 years in the jurisprudence of our young Nation,
and, surprisingly, it has not even been an issue in the
politics of our Nation. There are no street-demonstrations
with people carrying signs reading: “Abolish the Jury
system!!”. Americans get irate at Judges, but seldom at
a Jury of their peers.
It is far simpler to have Juries decide FACTS, than
for Judges to expose their multiple biases and motives,
oft still relying on the political and cultural groups that
appointed them. Judges also conflict with Judges in
different District courts or areas, causing “conflicts” in
adjudication, begetting more cost and delay. Juries do not
often “nullify” a just result, and even then, the Law has a
way of meting out Justice, as who can say “O.J.” got away
with something in the long-term?
Juries will always hear arguments and see facts from
both sides of the counsel-table, and then be instructed
on rules like FRE 702, plus the “Daubert-trilogy” (gatekeeper; relevance and reliability; scientific reliability), but
Jurors of our peers is what keeps the peace of American
politics, as what could be fairer than to have the “people”
decide.
A long history of American jurisprudence has proven
the wisdom of the Founders—juries of common citizens
have decided on billion-dollar business cases, as well as
the death penalty in criminal cases. Those who protest
Juries have a range of remedies, and jury-verdicts are
seldom without a second bite at the apple.
4
The original Defendant was Dow-Corning, but such
corporation has been dissolved by Dow & absorbed by
Dow, Inc., as a wholly-owned entity. Garan Lucow Miller
is Respondent counsel, unless other counsel is added.
Likewise, her sole counsel is a sole proprietorship and not
a corporation of any type.
There are no known other lawsuits by this counsel
for Ms. Sutherland, or via other counsel on issues of Dow
cheating re the $3.2 Billion owing and unpaid; cheating
re the investment interest-earned issue of delay; and,
last, re the issue of no Jury being allowed under the 7th
Amendment. Other counsel may have represented her
on different issues in over 30 years of litigation. Many
appellate cases were generated by silicone breast implants.
Re the 7th Amendment issue, trial judge, the Hon. DP
Hood did not mention it, as she thought the “Daubert” case
would suffice to dismiss cases; the Sixth Circuit never had
it occur to their minds in a supervisory role and again,
“Daubert” sufficed.
Petitioner emphasizes that “facts” and “common
sense” should govern, as the “law” is elusive and subject
to change (see the “abortion” and “school integration”
cases, for examples).
It is a FACT that all counsel in this case took an OATH
in Michigan that read: “I support the Constitution of the
U.S.A. and the State of Michigan.” Further, Michigan
lawyers, upon admission, say: “I will never reject, for
any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the
defenseless or oppressed, or delay any cause for lucre or
malice. . . .”
5
This counsel has never charged nor received a dollar
for representing Ms. Sutherland in almost 30 years of
service.
Dow is a multi-billion-dollar company per-annum
(over 50 billion dollars in sales and operating in over 150
countries, with a checkered history of injuring people,
e.g. over 500,000 were killed or injured in Bhopal, India
by Dow gases and Dow has not been a great citizen in the
USA—it polluted the river in its hometown of Midland,
MI and polluted our soldiers in Viet Nam with Napalm
and Agent Orange. (See our Sixth Circuit Brief for
further details of Dow’s rogue behavior, including USA
tax evasion). Many international movies have focused on
the damage caused by chemical companies—see “Erin
Brockovich” in 2000 and an Indian film in 1999 “Bhopal
Express”.
Dow is no angel, and they have so far skirted major
responsibility in the USA courts.
Petitioner also wishes to represent the Class of 170,000
women who were original Claimants against Dow. Since
Dow paid only $1.7 Billion of the agreed $3.2 Billion,
there will be $1.5 Billion more to pay those who settled in
Bankruptcy and those who opted-out. All would benefit
from Dow’s cheating for at least $1.5 Billion, and more if
“interest-earned” is understood, and exemplary damages
awarded. At, say, 5% interest-earned for 30 years, Dow
would have over $5 Billion to pay injured women who claim,
if they are alive, or their estates and heirs, all because of
Dow silicone breast implants injuring women.
6
If Petitioner is granted Certiorari, there will not be
riots in the streets. The Republic will remain, and the
American people will note that the CONSTITUTION
is taken seriously by the Court. Indeed, the common
man and woman will know that the Courts bend over
backwards to protect the poor and sick from the power
of corporations and their money and lobbyists.
Also, a strong ruling by the Supreme Court in favor
of the Jury System will tend to consolidate a single law
standard in the whole USA regarding evidence, as some
State courts, surprisingly, are still using the old FRYE
V. U.S. decision, which was issued in 1923, 293 Fed. 1013,
over 100 years ago. American Jurors should have firstchoice at the evidence of experts. Such works for good,
and is provided for in the U.S. CONSTITUTION.
Of course, Petitioner does not contend that all scientific
expert testimony should be admitted at Trial, but Judge
Hood in the E.D. of Michigan Federal Court did not fairly
decide or explain the matter. FRE 702, as amended, was
not in effect until Dec. 1, 2023, but Petitioner is content,
for argument, to be governed by the current FRE 702 on
evidence presented to a Jury of her peers.
DAUBERT V. MERRELL DOW was granted Certiorari
in 1993. Later, KUMHO TIRE V. CARMICHAEL tried
to set guidelines for Federal Judges. But, still further,
FRE 702 was amended to change the same by imposing a
“preponderance of the evidence” standard on experts, and
“ . . . whether the bounds of what can be concluded from a
reliable application of the expert’s basis and methodology
. . . ” Those words were an attempt to clarify allowance of
expert testimony, but God help us, ambiguous language
7
does not solve the problems of the human race, but only
confuses such the more. Better to have a Civil Jury decide,
as AMENDMENT VII OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
guarantees. The Founders had great wisdom.
“Juror nullification” is not a proper subject for this
case, as this case involves the right to a civil jury, and
not a criminal case, where cases like O. J. Simpson are
oft pointed out by the public. Cases on criminal law are
concerning AMENDMENT VI, not AMENDMENT VII.
It is important in this present case to take judicial
notice that Dow promised to pay the gargantuan amount
of $3.2 Billion for its liability to get its subsidiary of
that time, out of Bankruptcy (Dow-Corning). In law
school torts class, we all learned a phrase: RES IPSA
LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself, i.e. Dow is guilty
as sin for $3,200,000,000). Expert testimony is not needed
re liability!!! The dollars speak loudly for Dow’s liability,
and Ms. Sutherland should be allowed to go to Trial on
merely her damage proofs. Why are we even talking about
FRE 702, or DAUBERT’S kin re liability?
It should be mentioned that Federal Judges have
another weapon to circumvent the rights of Americans
under the 7TH AMENDMENT, i.e. by ruling against
a Jury Verdict via a fancy Latin language phrase: NON
OBSTANTE VERDICTO, as happened to be used against
this very Counsel in RUFFIN V. MERCURY RECORDS,
where a quartet of Detroit African-American ladies sought
to emulate the success of the “Supremes” singers, and
the Jury gave them some $175,000, and the Trial Judge
thought he was smarter than the Jury. (Judge Joiner was
criticized on appeal for not specifying his reasons, but
8
those 4 ladies left Court with nothing, and went back to
their housing-project in the slums of Detroit, after such
an injustice.)
As the founders told us, stay with the jury system,
and America will have a peaceful and happy public, with
respect for government. Do not let judges interfere, except
in unusual circumstances.
T H E J U LY 4 , 17 76 “ DEC L A R AT ION OF
INDEPENDENCE”
Because this Appeal emphasizes its basis in the “U.S.
CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT 7TH”, the Fourth of
July “DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE” should
not be neglected re the importance of the right of civil
jury trial:
It is very interesting and important that one of the
Grievances against the very King of England reads in a
way surprising, since England is now our closest and most
important international friend of America. That Grievance
reads as it was written so long ago:
“For depriving us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of
Trial by Jury . . . ”
The Signers of such Document must have thought such
important in the extreme, as they pledged their very “. . . .
Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor. . . . ” (initial
caps in the original document). Would any of us say and
do that today?
9
Note, also, that in this most important War that
Americans ever fought (for our very Independence as a
sovereign Nation), it involved the Right to Jury Trial, a
focus we seldom appreciate, until it is denied and taken
away. Yes, it was signed by many iconic Americans with
much to lose, if the War was lost—-Ben Franklin; both
John and Sam Adams; Thomas Jefferson; John Hancock;
et al, the names of our original Founders. Today, one
wonders if men and women are so brave to sign their own
death-warrant for Treason, since that would be the penalty
if they were apprehended by the British troops, in a War
of no assured outcome. Indeed, George Washington had
an untrained and rag-tag Army of volunteers for Winter
fighting, yet the rebels closed the “Declaration” with “ . . .
a firm Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence,”
(initial caps in the original).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
LEGAL BACKGROUND.
This Case arose in the Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan, where Judge Denise
Page Hood has consolidated, legally or not, all litigation
surrounding women being poisoned in their breasts
and bodies by leaking silicone (by the inner gel and
outer shell) breast implants, all for the usual purpose of
enlarging or refiguring natural breasts. Ms. Sutherland
claims damages not unlike many of the original 170,000
claimants—lupus; atypical connective tissue disease;
Reynaud’s disease; and possible cancer, et al, plus physical
and mental pain and suffering.
10
Most of the Claimants chose to accept that their
Claims would be paid out of the $3.2 Billion Bankruptcy
Settlement, but the Court’s own records show that Dow
(Dow-Corning was absorbed by big-daddy Dow, Inc.,
when Dow bought- out Corning Glass over a decade ago.)
Payment was made via a grid-system, with the more
serious injuries being paid the most money. Such system
was still operating one year ago, but was coming to an
end, with only $1.7 Billion being paid-out.
Petitioner Sutherland chose to opt-out of the
Settlement, sure that she would get a Federal Jury to
decide her Case. In fact, we know of not one case ever
tried by Jury Trial re the “opt-outs” by Judge Hood. As
the years dragged on, many women lost interest in their
Claims and could not afford lawyers. Even most lawyers
did not wish the time and cost of a lawsuit against the
wealthy Dow interests.
Judge Hood told Petitioner in open court to get
“experts” for her case. Ms. Sutherland spent big bucks on
experts, at least 3 or 4, but Judge Hood did not like their
Deposition testimony and dismissed the case ultimately.
Plaintiff Sutherland filed a Motion to re-open her
case, and Judge Hood dismissed the Motion on technical
grounds, never mentioning that Petitioner had the right to
a Jury Trial. Appeal was taken to the SIXTH CIRCUIT,
and it affirmed Judge Hood, also never mentioning that a
Jury Trial was a right of Ms. Sutherland. Ms. Sutherland
thus brings this request for a WRIT TO THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT ON THE GROUNDS SHE NEVER
HAD A CHANCE TO PUT HER CASE IN FRONT OF
A JURY, UNDER THE 7th AMENDMENT.
11
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY:
Dow-Corning (which no longer exists, as it was
absorbed by DOW, INC.) was a corporation located near
Midland, Michigan, which is the founding City and HQ
of just about all Dow entities today, except for overseas
subsidiaries. Plaintiff has always lived in the coal-mining
mountains of west Virginia. She originally brought suit
in the States on the Eastern seaboard, but somehow got
transferred to the E.D. of Michigan in front of Judge
Hood. Even the Dow interests are not located in the E.D.,
but in the Northern District of Michigan, so that also
begs explanation. In any event, diversity of citizenship
was probably behind the forum choice, but this Counsel
was not involved until Ms. Sutherland sought an attorney
near Detroit to represent her in multi-district litigation,
before Judge Hood.
Dow-Corning filed for Bankruptcy protection in Case
# 95-20512, and Judge Hood supervised that aspect, as
well, never having been a Bankruptcy Judge, even though
Ms. Sutherland was greatly inconvenienced to travel to
Detroit by car from her home in Haysi, Virginia., only
to be “pressured” by some expert college law school
professor who Judge Hood appointed to arrange as many
settlements of cases as he could of the “opt-out” cases,
which, let’s face it, were a cog in the wheels of wrapping up
the “Dow matter”. (No criticism of the Duke Law professor
is meant—he did what Judge Hood wanted him to do, i.e.
try to avoid Jury Trials by “low-balling” settlements.
This Counsel saw him bat 0 for 4, as Dow did not want
to pay even $75,000 per lady injured. The professor got
paid for his time, travel, hotel and meals, plus added to
12
his Resume. (This Counsel only settled one case of many,
and that was because Dow wanted to make the woman
happy for chump-change, i.e. she was a lawyer.)
Finally, Judge Hood dismissed the cases of all
remaining ladies represented by this Counsel, because
they would not settle, and their experts (from 3-5) were
not pleasing to Judge Hood. The sad irony is that if Dow
had paid the full $3.2 Billion, which they agreed to setaside and pay, they would have had plenty of money to pay
Bankruptcy Claimants and the “opt-outs”, as they paid
only $1.7 Billion, leaving $1.5 Billion to pay Ms. Sutherland,
and other opt-outs, and legitimate Bankruptcy claimants.
“C’EST LA VIE”; “ASI ES LA VIDA”; SUCH IS LIFE,
when large corporations are not controlled from their
animal impulses to profit and prevail over weaker citizens.
Dow, Inc. controls over 100 subsidiaries world-wide,
and is the giant of U.S. chemical companies, with yearly
sales in the $50 Billion Dollar + range per-annum, and
operations in over 180 countries, and over 6,000 different
products. Only DuPont and Monsanto can be mentioned in
the same breath. The long-lasting rogue behavior of Dow
has been recited in our 6th Circuit Brief, in detail. Dow has
killed and wounded humans in the past (roughly 1,000,000
in Bhopal, India, alone); been accused of U.S. tax fraud;
and supplied products for both Nuclear and Chemical
warfare. Those are background facts, painting a picture of
what a lone Virginia mountain lady is up against, yet she
perseveres, having faith in American justice, even unto
the highest Court in the land, THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT.
13
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. This is a paradigm case: Ms. Sutherland is a poor
woman from the coal mining area of western Virginia,
whose husband worked in the mines. Dow is a gigantic U.S.
Corporation, which generally gets its way in American
law, which tends to favor the rich and powerful, with the
best lawyers, and lobbyists in Washington, D.C. (let not
the thought of “David & Goliath” come to mind.)
II. Ms. Sutherland has lost all cases and hope so far,
and can only depend upon the U.S. Supreme Court to give
her justice, after 30 years of seeking such. She is old and
sickly, herself, and her counsel is 88 years old, and a solo
practitioner, though both he and his client were 30 years
younger when this litigation began. At base, does the U.S.
Constitution of 1789 mean anything in 2024, along with
the 7th Amendment re the right of an American to a civil
jury trial.
III. When modern times bring the world to new
inventions (AI), but closer to W.W. III and chaos, it is time
for the U.S. Supreme Court to remind all men and women
of the world that Americans still respect the dignity and
wisdom of the “old” “Declaration of Independence” and
“the U.S. Constitution, Amendment 7th”, re the right to
a civil trial by a jury of your peers.
ENOUGH SAID!!
14
CONCLUSION
We simply pray this Hon. U.S. SUPREME COURT
to consider granting a CERTIORARI WRIT, so that a
Jury Trial can be considered of her peers, in the U.S.
District Court, preferably closest to the convenience of Ms.
Sutherland, so to allow adherence to the 7th Amendment
to the U.S. CONSTITUTION, which was, for some reason,
overlooked by previous Courts and Appeals. This does not
grant a win for Petitioner, nor a loss for Respondent—but,
only a Jury Trial in the future.
Respectfully submitted,
James Leonard Elsman
Counsel of Record
Elsman Law Firm
725 South Adams Road,
Suite #182
Birmingham, MI 48009
(248) 766-5184
elsmanlawfirm@aol.com
Counsel for Petitioner
APPENDIX
i
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT, FILED JUNE 27, 2024 . . . . . . 1a
APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EA STERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGA N,
SOU T HERN DI V ISION, FILED
SEPTEMBER 29, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4a
1a
APPENDIX A — Appendix
OPINIONAOF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT, FILED JUNE 27, 2024
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Case No. 23-1976
PAMELA D. SUTHERLAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DCC LITIGATION FACILITY, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
June 27, 2024, Filed
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
OPINION
Before: CLAY, McKEAGUE, and READLER, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM. In “one of the world’s largest mass
tort litigations,” scores of women sued Dow Corning
claiming that its silicone breast implants caused their
2a
Appendix A
health problems. In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d 482,
486 (6th Cir. 1996), as amended on denial of reh’g and
reh’g en banc (6th Cir. 1996).1 Hundreds of thousands
ultimately joined in a class settlement. Id. at 485-86.
Others (still thousands) opted out and pressed separate
lawsuits. Id. at 485.
Pamela Sutherland was one of those who opted out.
But in the end, her claim failed. In 2016, the district court
granted Dow summary judgment because it said Ms.
Sutherland couldn’t prove that Dow’s implants caused her
injuries. Though she offered some proposed experts on
that issue, the court excluded them under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 as unreliable. Six years later, Ms. Sutherland
asked the court to alter, amend, or provide relief from that
judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e),
60(b)(2), 60(b)(3), and 60(b)(6). She also requested a “final
accounting” of the settlement. R.128 at PageID 6387. She
thought that relief was appropriate because (1) the United
States Food and Drug Administration had recently found
cancer “in the scar tissue of silicone breast implants,” and
(2) information suggested that Dow never fully paid the
class settlement. Id. at 6388.
The district court denied Ms. Sutherland’s requests
for three reasons. One: her motions under Rules 59(e),
60(b)(2), and 60(b)(3) were all untimely. Ms. Sutherland
1. We have explained the factual background of these cases
in many other published and unpublished opinions. See, e.g., In re
Dow Corning Corp., 778 F.3d 545, 547-48 (6th Cir. 2015); Gatza
v. DCC Litig. Facility, Inc., 717 F. App’x 519, 520 (6th Cir. 2017).
We recount only basic facts here.
3a
Appendix A
had only 28 days to file her motion under Rule 59(e) and one
year under the others. Two: she had not shown exceptional
or extraordinary circumstances, as required by Rule
60(b)(6). See R.138 at PageID 6480 (citing Buck v. Davis,
580 U.S. 100, 123, 137 S. Ct. 759, 197 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2017),
and Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th
Cir. 1990)). Three: she was not entitled to an accounting
concerning the settlement because she had opted out.
Ms. Sutherland appeals that ruling. She doesn’t,
however, explain where it went wrong. She instead
repeats her theory as to why she believes Dow shorted
the settlement class’s payout and cites next to no
legal authority. Particularly given the fact that she is
represented by counsel, her failure to substantively
address the district court’s analysis is fatal to her appeal.
See United States v. Rich, 14 F.4th 489, 2021 WL 4144059,
at *40 (6th Cir. 2021); Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions,
Inc., 772 F.3d 1056, 1063 (6th Cir. 2014). But even if we put
that oversight aside, we don’t see any grounds to reverse.
The district court correctly described the applicable law
and properly applied it to the facts.
We affirm.
4a
B THE UNITED
APPENDIX B —Appendix
ORDER OF
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN,
SOUTHERN DIVISION,
FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2023
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Case No. 05-30276
PAMELA D. SUTHERLAND,
Plaintiff,
v.
DCC LITIGATION FACILITY, INC.,
Defendant.
Honorable Denise Page Hood
September 29, 2023, Decided;
September 29, 2023, Filed
5a
Appendix B
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REOPEN CASE
AND DENYING MOTION FOR CASE REVIEW,
REVIVAL AND FINAL ACCOUNTING
(ECF Nos. 128 and 134)
I.
BACKGROUND1
This matter is before the Court on two motions filed
by Plaintiff Pamela D. Sutherland: Renewed Motion to
Reopen Case, filed September 16, 2022 (ECF No. 128) and
Motion for Case Review, Revival and for Final Accounting,
filed October 31, 2022 (ECF No. 134). Briefs have been
filed. For the reasons set forth below, the motions are
denied.
On September 29, 2016, the Court entered an Order
and Judgment dismissing Sutherland’s case against
Defendant DCC Litigation Facility, Inc. (ECF Nos. 119,
120) Sutherland appealed the Order and Judgment, which
was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. See,
Gatza, et al. v. DCC Litig Facility, 717 F. App’x 519 (6th
Cir. 2017). The United States Supreme Court denied the
petition for writ of certiorari. See, Gatza, et al. v. DCC
Litig. Facility, Inc., 583 U.S. 1157, 138 S.Ct. 1177, 200
L. Ed. 2d 316 (2018)(mem). Almost six years later after
the entry of Judgment, as set forth above, Sutherland filed
the Motion to Reopen Case, followed by a Motion for Case
Review, Revival and for Final Accounting.
1. The following published opinions provide a detailed history
of this bankruptcy action: In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445
(E.D. Mich. 2000), 86 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 1996), 113 F.3d 565 (6th Cir.
1997), 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002), and 456 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2006).
6a
Appendix B
Sutherland opted out of the settlement process before
the Settlement Facility-Dow Corning Trust (“SF-DCT”)
as provided under the Dow Corning Amended Joint Plan
of Reorganization (“Plan”). The Effective Date for the
confirmed Plan was June 1, 2004. (April 2, 2004 Order
Establishing Effective Date, Bankruptcy Case No. 9520512) Pursuant to the Plan, claimants who choose to
litigate their claims must file claims against the DCC
Litigation Facility (“Litigation Facility”). (Plan, Art. 5.4,
6.1)
Choosing to litigate her claims, Sutherland filed the
instant action claiming various illnesses and medical
conditions, including: lupus; atypical connective disease;
Reynaud’s disease; vomiting; trouble walking; physical,
mental and emotional diseases. Sutherland claimed that
these conditions were caused by the Surgitek gel-filled
silicone breast implants implanted in 1988 and explanted
in 1992. Sutherland asserted that her illnesses and medical
conditions were caused by the silicone gel and/or elastomer
used by the manufacturer of the Surgitek implants which
Surgitek claimed were manufactured by Dow Corning.
(Complaint, ECF No. 22 and Motion/Questionnaire, ECF
No. 66, PageID.2918-2925)
On September 29, 2016, the Court granted DCC
Litigation Facility’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
finding that “summary judgment must be granted in the
Litigation Facility’s favor since Sutherland is unable to
present any expert who will testify that Dow Corning
silicone cause diseases or other symptoms.” (ECF No.
119, PageID.6289)
7a
Appendix B
II. ANALYSIS
A.
Motion to Reopen Case
Rules 59 and 60 of the Rules of Civil Procedures
govern the motions since a final Judgment has been
entered in this matter. Rule 59(e) provides that any motion
to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than
28 days after entry of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
The Local Rules of the Eastern District of Michigan
provides that any motion to alter or amend judgment
must be filed within the time allowed by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e). E.D. Mich. LR 59.1(a). The present
motions seeking to reopen the case or to further review the
case, are untimely under Rule 59(e) and LR 59.1(a) since
the motions were filed about six years after the entry of
the Judgment in 2016.
Rule 60(b) provides that, “the court may relieve a
party or its legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct
by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or
if based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or
vacated, or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable;
or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(b).
8a
Appendix B
There are time limitations governing the filing of a
Rule 60(b) motion. Rule 60(c) states that a motion under
Rule 60(b) “must be made within a reasonable time—and
for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the
entry of the judgment, order or the date of the proceeding.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). In any circumstances, motions under
subsections (1), (2) and (3), cannot be filed more than one
year after the judgment was entered. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c).
Under the catch-all provision in subsection (6), the Sixth
Circuit has held that a Rule 60(b)(6) motion must be based
upon some reason other than those stated in subsections
(1) to (5). Smith v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 776 F.2d 1330, 1333 (6th Cir. 1985). Relief
under Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in “extraordinary
circumstances.” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 123, 137
S. Ct. 759, 197 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2017)(citation omitted); Olle v.
Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1990)
(citations omitted). The party seeking relief under Rule
60(b) bears the burden of establishing grounds for such
relief by clear and convincing evidence. Info-Hold, Inc. v.
Sound Merchandising, Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 454 (6th Cir.
2008). The interests of finality of judgments and judicial
economy outweigh the value of giving a party a second
bite of the apple by allowing a Rule 60(b) motion after an
appeal period has run. Pierce v. United Mine Workers of
America Welfare, 770 F.2d 449, 451-452 (6th Cir. 1985).
“[T]he decision to grant Rule 60(b)(6) relief is a case-bycase inquiry that requires the trial court to intensively
balance numerous factors, including the competing
policies of the finality of judgments and the incessant
command of the court’s conscience that justice be done
in light of all the facts.” Jones v. Bradshaw, 46 F.4th 459,
482 (6th Cir. 2022)
9a
Appendix B
An appeal from an order denying a civil Rule 60(b)
motion does not bring up for review the underlying
judgment disposing of the case. Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of
Corrs., 434 U.S. 257, 263 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521
(1978); Hood v. Hood, 59 F.3d 40, 42 (6th Cir.1995). Rather,
the inquiry is limited to “whether one of the specified
circumstances exists in which [the plaintiff ] is entitled
to reopen the merits of his underlying claims.” Feathers
v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir.1998).
Based upon the Court’s reading of Sutherland’s motion,
the first issue raised is that based on a September 9, 2022
report by Reuter; the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) announced that cancer has been found in the
scar tissue of silicone breast implants. (ECF No. 128,
PageID.6388) It appears Sutherland is seeking to reopen
her case either based on newly-discovered evidence under
Rule 60(b)(2) or the catch-all provision under Rule 60(b)(6).
Rule 60(b)(2), along with subsections (b)(1) and (b)(3) are
unavailable since any motions under these provisions must
be filed within one year from the entry of judgment, which
in this case was September 29, 2016, about seven years
ago. Rules 60(b)(4) (the judgment is void) and ((b)(5) (the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged) also
do not apply since there is no showing that the judgment
is otherwise invalid.
As to the catch-all provision under Rule 60(b)(6), the
Court finds that noting a finding by the FDA that cancer
has been found in the scar tissue of silicone breast implants
does not support extraordinary relief to reopen the case.
There is no evidence presented linking the recent FDA
10a
Appendix B
findings to the implants which were before this Court,
other than a Reuter report. The Court’s Order dismissing
this case was based on the failure to present competent
causation testimony. The Reuter report on the FDA’s
findings does not support exceptional or extraordinary
relief to reopen the case. Sutherland has not met her
burden for the case to be reopened.
B. Motion for Case Review and Revival and for
Final Accounting
Sutherland asserts that Dow Corning promised to pay
women $3.2 Billion, but that it has paid much less. The
Dow Defendants respond that Sutherland chose to resolve
her claims via litigation and not through settlement,
therefore she is not entitled to any further case review
or final accounting.
As noted above, Sutherland opted out of the settlement
process before the SF-DCT as provided under the Plan,
instead choosing to litigate her claims against the
Litigation Facility. There is no provision under the Plan
that allows a claimant who chose to litigate claims to be
able to later obtain further review of the case before the
SF-DCT. Sutherland is bound by her choice to litigate her
claims before the Litigation Facility and is not entitled
to any review under the settlement process before the
SF-DCT.
11a
Appendix B
III. CONCLUSION/ORDER
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS ORDERED that the Renewed Motion to Reopen
Case (ECF No. 128) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for
Case Review and Revival and for Final Accounting (ECF
No. 134) is DENIED.
S/ Denise Page Hood
DENISE PAGE HOOD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: September 29, 2023
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.